alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Michael L. KEHM, Administrator of the Estate of Patricia Ann Kehm, Deceased, and as Father and Next Friend of Kathryn Kehm and Andrea Kehm, Appellee, v. The PROCTER & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING COMPANY; The Procter & Gamble Distributing Company; The Procter & Gamble Paper Products Company; and The Procter & Gamble Company, Tom Riley, Appellants.

No. 83-2030.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 13, 1983.

Decided Jan. 10, 1984.

Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellant Tom Riley.

Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio, White & Warbasse, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Lawrence R. Elleman, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellee Procter & Gamble Co.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Tom Riley represented the survivors of Patricia Kehm in a suit against Procter & Gamble alleging that Mrs. Kehm’s death resulted from her use of Rely tampons, a Procter & Gamble product. The district court awarded the plaintiff survivors $300,-000, and this court sustained the award on appeal. *Kehm v. Procter & Gamble,*724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983).

Riley now appeals from an order of the district court1 holding him in civil contempt and requiring him to pay Procter & Gamble $10,000 in attorneys’ fees arising from the contempt proceedings. The district court, on Procter & Gamble’s motion, held Riley in contempt for selling documents obtained through discovery in the *Kehm*suit to attorneys representing other plaintiffs suing Procter & Gamble in similar suits. The documents were subject to a protective order and a nondisclosure agreement barring their distribution without leave of the district court. Riley sold the documents without ever informing the court or seeking its leave.

The district court specifically held that Riley’s distribution of some of the documents violated the protective order, and resulted in the disclosure of valuable Procter & Gamble trade secrets. The district court wrote that,

> [although Riley’s sale and distribution of covered documents under the circum*631stances was not wilful, he should have realized that some of the exhibits were under the protective order, and should have sought leave of court for their release and distribution.

Having reviewed the record of the contempt proceeding, we find no error of law or fact on the part of the district court. Accordingly, we affirm. *See*8th Cir.R. 14.

1

. The Honorable Edward J. McManus, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8 (No. 333-37914 filed on July 5, 2000, and No. 333-66746 filed on
August 3, 2001) of Genius Products, Inc. and Subsidiaries of our report dated
April 5, 2002, on our audit of the financial statements of Genius Products,
Inc. and Subsidiaries as of December 31, 2001, and for each of the years in
the two-year period ended December 31, 2001.

                                         /S/ CACCIAMATTA ACCOUNTANCY CORPORATION

                                         CACCIAMATTA ACCOUNTANCY CORPORATION

Irvine, California
May 9, 2001
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEON WILSON CROCKETT

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2614 DFL CMK P

vs.

JIM POPE, Sheriff-Coroner,

Defendant. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local General Order No. 262.

On October 26, 2005, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations

herein which were served on plaintiff and which contained notice to plaintiff that any objections

to the findings and recommendations were to be filed within twenty days. Plaintiff has not filed

objections to the findings and recommendations.

///

///

///

///

Case 2:04-cv-02614-DFL-CMK Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 1 of 2
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The court has reviewed the file and finds the findings and recommendations to be

supported by the record and by the magistrate judge’s analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that: 

1. The findings and recommendations filed October 26, 2005, are adopted in full;

and

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed without prejudice. 

Dated: 6/8/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-02614-DFL-CMK Document 9 Filed 06/09/06 Page 2 of 2
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEOFFREY JONES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-2424 DFL PAN P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, Warden,

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner has requested an extension of time to file objections to the court’s

findings and recommendations filed January 6, 2006. Petitioner seeks an extension until April

15, 2006 to file objections. Good cause appearing, petitioner will be granted an extension of

time until March 15, 2006 to file and serve objections. No further extensions of time will be

granted.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s January 23, 2006 request for an extension of time is granted in

part; and

/////

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Case 2:04-cv-02424-DFL -PAN Document 11 Filed 02/21/06 Page 1 of 2
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2. Petitioner is granted until March 15, 2006 to file and serve objections to the

court’s January 6, 2006 findings and recommendations. No further extensions of time will be

granted. 

DATED: February 17, 2006.

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jone2424.111

Case 2:04-cv-02424-DFL -PAN Document 11 Filed 02/21/06 Page 2 of 2
(Reap. Dec. 8714)

Entry W-07131.

#### New York Merchandise Co., Inc. *v.*United States

(Decided December 11, 1956)

*Siegel, Mandell & Davidson*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Donlon, Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement has been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties:

> IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the respective parties hereto, subject to the approval of the Court, that the export value of all of the merchandise at the time of exportation to the United States covered by the invoices embraced in the Appeal to Reappraisement noted above, with the exception of the merchandise purchased from Tsunekawa Mokkoyo consisting of two cases of wooden spoons, No. T 6011 and 6012, at which time such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal market of the country from which exported in the usual wholesale quantity and in the ordinary course of trade for export to the United States including costs of containers and coverings of whatever nature and all other costs, charges and expenses incident to placing the merchandise ready for shipment to the United States was the appraised value less additions made to meet the advances by the Appraiser in similar cases covering the non-dutiable so-called (P. O. B.) charges for inland freight, insurance premium, storage, hauling and lighterage added by the importer on entry.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that there was no higher domestic value for merchandise such or similar to the merchandise herein at the time of exportation thereof.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the Appeal to Re-appraisement enumerated above may be submitted for decision on this stipulation.

Accepting this stipulation as a statement of fact, I find and bold that tbe export value, as defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, is the proper basis for determination of value of the merchandise here involved, except the merchandise purchased from Tsunekawa Mokkoyo, consisting of two cases of wooden spoons, Nos. T-6011 and 6012, and that such values of the respective items of merchandise are the appraised values, less additions made to meet the advances by the appraiser in similar cases covering the nondutiable so-called (f. o. b.) charges for inland freight, insurance premium, storage, hauling, and lighterage.

The appeal, insofar as it relates to the merchandise purchased from Tsunekawa Mokkoyo, consisting of two cases of wooden spoons, Nos. T-6011 and 6012, is dismissed.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD A. GLADDING , et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. CIV S-04- 2605 FCD/GGH

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

________________________________/

OLIVE GRAVES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-1661 GEB/JFM

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

et al., RELATED CASE ORDER

Defendants.

____________________________________/

Examination of the above-entitled actions reveals that they are related within the meaning

of Local Rule 83-123(a) (E.D. Cal. 1997). The actions involve many of the same defendants and

are based on the same or similar claims, the same event, similar questions of fact and the same

questions of law, and would therefore entail a substantial duplication of labor if heard by

different judges. Accordingly, the assignment of the matters to the same judge is likely to effect

a substantial savings of judicial effort and is also likely to be convenient for the parties.

Case 2:04-cv-02605-FCD-GGH Document 19 Filed 10/18/05 Page 1 of 2
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The parties should be aware that relating the cases under Local Rule 83-123 merely has

the result that these actions are assigned to the same judge; no consolidation of the actions is

effected. Under the regular practice of this court, related cases are generally assigned to the

judge and magistrate judge to whom the first filed action was assigned.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the action denominated, CIV S-05-1661 GEB/JFM

is reassigned to Judge Frank C. Damrell, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows for all

further proceedings, and any dates currently set in the reassigned case only are hereby

VACATED. Henceforth, the caption on documents filed in the reassigned case shall be shown

as, CIV S-05-1661 FCD/GGH.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court make appropriate adjustment in the

assignment of civil cases to compensate for this reassignment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:October 18, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:04-cv-02605-FCD-GGH Document 19 Filed 10/18/05 Page 2 of 2
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-30011 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff-Appellee

v. SHANNON DWAYNE NELSON, also known as Dawayne Anderson Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:05-CR-20207-1
Before KING, DAVIS and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Shannon Dwayne Nelson appeals his guilty-plea conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. He argues that the district court erred in accepting his guilty plea because the factual basi s was not sufficient to establish that he knowingly possessed the firearm. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D November 2, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-30011

2 Our review of the record is for plain error only. U nited States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993). Although Nelson denied knowledge of possession of the firearm subsequent to his arrest and prior to his mistrial, he knowingly and voluntarily admitted guilt of the elements of the crime, including knowing possession of the firearm at the rearraignment hearing. Our review of the
record, including the indictment, the factual stipulation, the rearraignment transcript, and the presentence report, demonstrates that Nelson’s guilty plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and the district court’s acceptance ofhis plea was not plainly erroneous. See United Statesv. Reasor, 418 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Dyer, 136 F.3d 417, 425 n.13 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ammirato, 670 F.2d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1982). AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 31.1

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Martin Berns, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Form 10-KSB/A1 of MEDIANET GROUP TECHNOLOGIES, INC.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible
for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined
in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and
have:

   (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;

   (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

   (c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and

5. The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed,
based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of
the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the
equivalent functions):

   (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

   (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.

Date: April 21, 2005                   By: /s/ Martin Berns
                                       Martin Berns, President, CEO, Director
                                       and Principle Executive Officer
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEYGENERAL OF TEXAS AUSTIN

Pto suoh foroes the ihoilltlesof S~tate alniorlee

and their bqulgatant

am? auof:

other ?tete prtsnlees and property RPI .may be available. Authorization Is hereby provided for eohoolauthoritleoto pennIt the 1180 of sohool

! It thereforefollow8Wmt your first question8houl.d bo anmsred In the aff%zmatlveand It I.6 so 

### tmswemd. 

### Wnlon no. a-m32 or thie dbpartmttnt 

### hohihthat thb ~orp;ni8SiOXUBl7S' eOlWt IBaJ'h&lJ @lll@.Oy tl OOUUty bomb dwmnstratlon agent and pay her a salary, awm tAou#h no provfJionwa8 sad6 for mme in the aounty budget, if the Conmiasinnex%*

Court menda the budget to take oare of **muab P**  and makes a feat deteminatlon thet t.Ve 58 a oaaic) of Hgra~e **@diic JlMtWiIity**  **to mbOt**  **UnUEUd. Md**  UMfOX'W8bR **OO~itiOM**
**I ,,**  **WhLOh oolllu**  **net ,bY**  **:~.x~aasl?~~,~atllgent QhDu&ht**  **anu attenuell** 
**.,.,** ~havb been iMdi&& bl thr'or"lginal budget." Vi. **bIMlQ#le** hwdth

a oopy of &raid opUle&

In enswbr to your 8ooom3questionyou am respeotfully advlssd that It is the opinionof tLls deparfmmt that if the C&wnlaelonerr*

Court dbtermlnedthat the nnatter tnquiredabout cae 8 oaee of '*grave publio~neoeasity

to met unusual and unformesn ooadltione whioh oould not, **by** rtmuonablyUillgent thought end attention,**httTb** been inoluded in the origkml **buLget*** the oourt would have authorityto Bmend the budceat M& eid t&9 Texas B3feruta Guard. Very truly youns

J.moRmr ss;zi!& o? Tri&:
#### In the Matter of Michael Simmons, Respondent, v Marva L. Hammons, as Commissioner of the New York City Human Resources Administration, Appellant, et al., Respondent.

[633 NYS2d 589]

—In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of mandamus, *inter alia,*to compel the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York to provide the petitioner with sufficient emergency assistance to pay his outstanding rent, the Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Barasch, J.), dated May 11, 1995, which granted the petition and ordered her agency to pay emergency rental assistance of $8,552 on behalf of the petitioner to the respondent landlord.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting therefrom the phrase "respondent Hammonds’ *[sic]*agency is ordered to pay $8552 (all rent arrears through May 1995) to the respondent Cantor on behalf of the petitioner Simmons,” and substituting therefor the phrase "respondent Marva L. Hammons, as Commissioner of Social Services of the City of New York, is ordered to pay the sum of $2,150 to the respondent landlord, J & M Cantor, on behalf of the petitioner”; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the petitioner’s ap*547plication for emergency rental assistance is not governed by Social Services Law § 350-j (2) (d), which is specifically limited to emergency assistance to families with children *(see, Matter of Boyland v Perales,*205 AD2d 759). Since the petitioner is a healthy, single adult, his request for relief falls under the home relief program, which is governed by Social Services Law §131-a and the regulations of the Department of Social Services. In particular, 18 NYCRR 352.3 (a) provides, "Each social service district must provide a monthly allowance for rent in the amount actually paid, but not in excess of the appropriate maximum [for each] district for each family size”. 18 NYCRR 352.3 further provides that the maximum shelter allowance for a family of one in New York City is $215 per month. From the time the petitioner submitted his application for emergency rental assistance in August of 1994, he was entitled to the maximum monthly shelter allowance of $215. However, the petitioner has not established his entitlement to a monthly shelter allowance that exceeds the maximum *(see,*18 NYCRR 352.7 [g] [4]). Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to emergency rental assistance totaling $2,150, which represents $215 per month for the period from August 1994 through May 1995. O’Brien, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAKELINE ESMERALDA HERNANDEZPEREZ DE RIVAS and JAKELINE 

YANETH RIVAS-HERNANDEZ, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 12-73433 

Agency Nos. A099-539-007 

A099-539-008 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 24, 2017**

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, 

Circuit Judges.

Jakeline Esmeralda Hernandez-Perez de Rivas and Jakeline Yaneth Rivas-

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 31 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 12-73433 

Hernandez, natives and citizens of El Salvador,1 petition for review of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration 

judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have 

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the 

agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility 

determinations created by the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 

1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination 

based on Hernandez-Perez de Rivas’s inconsistent testimony regarding gang 

threats to her younger son, and the number of assailants involved in the shooting 

incident outside her home. See id. at 1048 (adverse credibility finding reasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances). Thus, in the absence of credible 

testimony, in this case, Hernandez-Perez de Rivas’s asylum and withholding of 

removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of CAT protection 

because Hernandez-Perez de Rivas failed to show it is more likely than not that she 

would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government of El 

 

1 On March 24, 2017, the court received a filing by Hernandez-Perez de Rivas with 

a statement that her daughter, Rivas-Hernandez, has been approved for DACA and 

that Hernandez Perez de Rivas wishes to proceed with the petition.
3 12-73433 

Salvador. See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.