#U.S.NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

Physical Protection of

Shipments of Irradiated

Reactor Fuel

Draft Report for Comment

NUREG-0561, Rev. 2

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
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#U.S.NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

NUREG-0561, Rev. 2

Physical Protection of

Shipments of Irradiated

Reactor Fuel

Draft Report for Comment

Manuscript Completed: October 2010

Date Published: October 2010

Prepared by

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

P.O. Box 999

Richland, WA 99352

and

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
COMMENTS ON DRAFT REPORT

Any interested party may submit comments on this report for consideration by the NRC staff.

Comments may be accompanied by additional relevant information or supporting data. Please

specify the report number NUREG-0561, Revision 2, draft, in your comments, and send them by

February 11, 2011 to the following address:

Chief, Rules, Announcements and Directives Branch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Mail Stop TWB-05-BO1

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Electronic comments may be submitted to the NRC by e-mail at RCRknrc.gov.

For any questions about the material in this report, please contact:

R. Ragland

TWFN 04 F-25M

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

Phone: 301-415-7008

E-mail: RCRF@nrc.gov
ABSTRACT

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

determined that additional security measures should be put in place during the transport of

spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and that current security regulations should be enhanced to further

protect SNF during transport. As an interim measure, on October 3, 2002, the NRC began

issuing orders to licensees shipping SNF. Subsequently, the NRC promulgated additional

requirements for the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. This guide discusses

the new regulations and provides a basis on which licensees can develop an acceptable

program for the protection of SNF shipments.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This NUREG contains and references information collection requirements that are subject to the

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were

approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval numbers 3150-0008 and

3150-0002.

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a

currently valid OMB approval number.

iii

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ iii

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Regulatory Authority ................................................................................................ 1

1.2 Organization of NUREG-0561 ................................................................................. 2

1.3 D e fin itio n s .................................................................................................................... 2

2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 5

2.1 NRC Approval of Spent Nuclear Fuel Route ........................................................... 5

2.1.1 Route Selection Criteria ...................................................................................... 6

2.1.2 Format of Approval Request ................................................................................ 7

2.1.2.1 Route Plan and Mileage ............................................................................. 8

2.1.2.2 Safe Havens ................................................................................................ 9

2.1.2.3 Mapping Requirements ................................................................................ 9

2.1.2.4 Contact Information .................................... ..10

2.1.2.5 Communications Capability and Emergency Response ............................ 10

2.1.2.6 Communications Capability along the Route ............................................ 11

2.2 Preplanning and Coordination of Shipments ..................................................... 11

2.2.1 Avoidance of Intermediate Stops ....................................................................... 12

2.2.2 Procedures at Stops ........................................................................................... 12

2.2.2.1 Stops during Road Shipments .............. ................................................... 12

2.2.2.2 Stops during Rail Shipments ................................ 13

2.2.2.3 Stops during Sea Shipments .................................................................... 13

2.3 Advance Notification of Shipments ............ 7 ...................... 14

2.3.1 Advance Notification of the State(s) ............................... 14

2.3.2 Advance Notification of the NRC ...................................................................... 15

2.3.2.1 10-Day Advance Notice ............................................................................. 15

2.3.2.2 2-Day Advance Notice, 2-Hour Notice, and Delivery Receipt Confirmation .... 16

2.3.3 Notification of Schedule Deviations ......................................................................... 16

2.4 Communications .................................................................................................... 17

2.4.1 Movement Control Centers ................................................................................ 17

2.4.2 Periodic Contacts with Movement Control Center ............................................. 17

2.5 Arrangements with Local Law Enforcement Agencies .......................................... 18

2.6 Armed Escorts ............................................................................................................ 18.

2.7 Shipment Log ........................................................................................................ 19

2.8 Procedures, Training, and Control of Information ........................................ ................ 20

2.8.1 Procedures for Coping with Safeguards Threats and Emergencies ................... 21

2.8.2 Training of Personnel Associated with Shipments ............................................. 21

2.8.3 Control of Shipment Information .................................................................... ......... 22

3 ROAD SHIPMENTS ................................................................................................. ............. 23

3.1 Protection of Road Shipments .............................................................................. 23

3.2 Communications for Road Shipments .................................................................... 23

3.3 Immobilization of Transport Vehicle ...................................................................... 24

3.3.1 Immobilization Device Performance Criteria ...................................................... 24

3.3.2 Immobilization Device Design .......................................................................... 25

3.3.3 Format of Approval Request ............................. I ............................................... 25

3.4 Training Program for Drivers .................................................................................. 25

v
4 RAIL SHIPMENTS ................................................................................................................ 27

4.1 Protection of Rail Shipments ....................................................................................... 27

4.2 Com m unications for Rail Shipments ...................................................................... 27

5 SEA SHIPMENTS ................................................................................................................. 29

5.1 Protection of Sea Shipments ................................................................................ 29

5.2 Comm unications for Sea Shipments ...................................................................... 30

6 BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS FOR UNESCORTED ACCESS TO SPENT NUCLEAR

FUEL IN TRANSIT ......................................................................................................... 31

6.1 Informed Consent ................................................................................................. 31

6.2 Protection of Information ......................................... 31

6.3 Background Investigation Elements ...................................................................... 32

6.3.1 Fingerprinting and FBI Identification and Criminal History Records Check ...... 32

6.3.2 Collection of Fingerprints ...................................... 33

6.3.3 Resubmittal of Fingerprints ................................................................................ 35

6.3.4 Verification of True Identity ................................................................................. 35

6.3.5 Em ployment History Evaluation .............................................................................. 36

6.3.6 Verification of Education ......................................................................................... 37

6.3.7 Verification of Military Service .......................................................................... 37

6.3.8 Credit History Evaluation .................................................................................... 37

6.3.9 Criminal History Review ....................................... 37

6.3.10 Character and Reputation Determination ........................................................... 38

6.3.11 Inability or Refusal to Support a Background Investigation ................................. 39

6.4 Determination of Trustworthiness and Reliability .................................................... 39

6.5 Reinvestigations .................................................................................................... 39

6.6 Prohibitions ................................................................................................................. 40

6.7 Right to Correct and Complete Information .......................................................... 40

APPENDIX A ............................................................................................................................ 42

Table 1 - Sample Route Mileage Summary ........................................................................... 43

Table 2 - Sample Detailed Route Plan ................................................. 44

vi
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Regulatory Authority

The guidance in this document pertains to the physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel

during transportation and to background investigations of individuals granted unescorted access

to irradiated reactor fuel during transportation, as required by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 73.37,

"Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit," and 10 CFR 73.38,

"Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit".

The requirements of 10 CFR 73.37 apply to "each licensee who transports, or delivers to a

carrier for transport, in a single shipment, a quantity of irradiated reactor fuel in excess of

100 grams (0.22 Ibs) in net weight of irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or other structural or

packaging material, which has a total external dose rate in excess of 1 Sv (100 rems) per hour

at a distance of .91 meters (3 feet) from any accessible surface without intervening shielding."

For the purposes of 10 CFR.73.37, 10 CFR 73.38 and this NUREG, the terms "irradiated reactor

fuel" and "spent nuclear fuel" (SNF) are considered synonymous and are used interchangeably.

These regulations apply to irradiated reactor fuel from either power or non-power reactors that is

contained in a domestic shipment or the domestic portions of import or export shipments

(i.e., while the shipment is within U.S. territory or U.S. territorial waters). The 100-gram

threshold quantity is intended to apply to the combination of uranium and plutonium compounds

and associated fission products generated during irradiation. The weight of the fuel cladding or

other structural or packaging material associated with the fuel should not be included in

determining whether the quantity of irradiated fuel in the given shipment needs to be protected

under the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37.

The objective of the physical protection system for shipments of such material is to minimize the

potential for theft, diversion, or radiological sabotage of SNF shipments and to facilitate the

location and recovery of SNF shipments that may have come under the control of unauthorized

individuals.

The licensee shall establish a physical protection system for SNF in transit, that includes armed

escorts and a movement control center, staffed and equipped to monitor and control shipments,

communicate with local law enforcement authorities (LLEAs), and respond to normal conditions

and safeguards contingencies. In accordance with the performance objectives of

10 CFR 73.37(a)(2), the physical protection system shall do the following:

Provide for early detection and assessment of attempts to gain unauthorized access to,

or control over, SNF shipments.

Delay and impede attempts at theft, diversion, or radiological sabotage of SNF

shipments until response forces arrive.

1
Provide for notification to the appropriate response forces of any attempts at theft,

diversion, or radiological sabotage of the SNF shipment.

Before granting an individual unescorted access to irradiated reactor fuel in transit, licensees

shall determine if the individual is trustworthy and reliable by completing a background

investigation of the individual in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38. The requirements of

10 CFR 73.38 apply to vehicle operators, escorts, train crews, and any other individuals

accompanying the shipment during transport, as well as movement control personnel. The

requirements of 10 CFR 73.38 do not apply to members of LLEAs while they are performing

SNF transport escort duties.

1.2 Organization of NUREG-0561

The guidance contained in this document is organized to correspond with applicable sections of

10 CFR 73.37 and 10 CFR 73.38. Chapter 1 describes the regulatory basis and definitions that

are applicable to shipments of irradiated reactor fuel. Chapter 2 corresponds to the general

requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.37(b) and 10 CFR 73.37(f). These requirements apply to

all SNF shipments regardless of the mode of transportation used for a particular shipment.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 correspond to 10 CFR 73.37(c), (d), and (e), respectively, which contain

additional requirements specific to each particular transport mode-road, rail, or sea. Chapter 6

corresponds to 10 CFR 73.38, which addresses requirements for background investigations of

individuals with unescorted access to irradiated reactor fuel in transit.

In addition to the specific physical protection requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b), (c), (d), (e) and

(f), the regulation includes performance objectives in 10 CFR 73.37(a). These performance

objectives are not intended to be implemented as specific requirements, but rather are general

statements of the Commission's intent. These objectives characterize and further define the

general level of protection expected to be provided by physical protection systems designed to

satisfy the requirements of the regulation. In this document, the discussions about each of the

specific requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b) through (f) have been developed to be consistent with

and to support the performance objectives in 10 CFR 73.37(a) to the extent that each objective

applies to a specific element of the physical protection system.

1.3 Definitions

The following definitions apply to terms used in this guidance document. These definitions shall

apply irrespective of the mode of transport, except as otherwise noted. Terms used in this

guidance not defined below shall have the same meaning as defined in 10 CFR 73.2,

"Definitions".

Escort: a person with similar duties to that of an armed escort, but who may or may not be

armed. If unarmed, the escort is not expected to actively prevent or impede acts of radiological

sabotage when met by armed adversaries.

Local law enforcement agency (or authority) (LLEA): any State, county, or municipal agency

that has law enforcement authority within the locality or jurisdiction through which the shipment

may pass. The term is usually limited to the particular law enforcement agencies that have

2
responsibility for responding to calls for assistance by escorts, such as county or municipal

police forces, port authority police, or highway patrol. In some instances involving sea

shipments, the U.S. Coast Guard or another Federal agency may also be considered as the

LLEA, depending on whether they are relied on to provide a response to a request for

assistance.

LLEA radio communications: the radio communications system normally used by the LLEA to

communicate with its mobile units.

Monitor. capability to observe and detect unauthorized access.

Radiological sabotage: As'defined in 10 CFR 73.2, this term refers to any deliberate act

directed against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed under the regulations in this

chapter is conducted, or against a component of such a plant or transport that could directly or

indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation. For purposes of SNF

fuel transportation, the definition of radiological sabotage also considers deliberate acts that

cause or are intended to cause economic damage or social disruption, regardless of the extent

to which public health and safety are endangered by exposure to radiation.

Safe haven: a readily recognizable and readily accessible site at which security is present or

from which, in the event of an emergency, the transport crew can notify and wait for LLEAs. A

safe haven is an area that can provide prudent security measures when a shipment is removed

from transit because of an elevated threat condition.

Telemetric monitoring system: a data transfer system that captures information by

instrumentation or measuring devices about the location and status of a transport vehicle or

package between the departure and destination location. The U.S. Department of Energy's

TRANSCOM system is one example of a telemetric monitoring system.

Transport vehicle or shipment vehicle: for a road shipment, an integrated-unit type of truck or

combination tractor-trailer that bears an SNF shipment; for a rail shipment, the shipment vehicle

or shipment car is the rail car containing the SNF package. In 10 CFR 73.37 it is written in

terms of a single transport vehicle or shipment car being used for a given SNF shipment.

However, it is recognized that more than one such vehicle may be employed in a single

shipment. In this case, all provisions of the regulation should be interpreted to apply to all of the

transport vehicles as a group, unless noted otherwise in the guidance.

3

2 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 NRC Approval of Spent Nuclear Fuel Route

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(vi), the NRC requires the licensee to obtain NRC approval for the

planned road and rail routes over which SNF is to be shipped and for any U.S. ports where a

vessel carrying an SNF shipment is scheduled to dock. Whenever possible, licensees should

request approval of two routes (i.e., a primary and an alternative) when transporting SNF by

road or rail.

The licensee must obtain the route approval in writing from the NRC before the. 10-day

advanced notification requirement in 10 CFR 73.72(a)(2). Licensees should submit requests for

route approvals at least 6 months before the planned date of the shipment to allow NRC staff

adequate time to review and approve the requested route. Requests to approve a route that do

not comply with this requirement will be handled on a case-by-case basis.

The request for an NRC route approval should include the following information about the

planned shipping campaign and route:

description of the cargo, including type of SNF, quantity of irradiated fuel elements, and

irradiation levels of SNF at 3 feet unshielded (e.g., reactor type, number of elements,

and confirmation that dose rates are greater than 100 rem/hour)

package identification (e.g., package design, package capacity) (Note: specific

package identification parameters (e.g., serial number) may be submitted later if

unknown at the time the route approval request is submitted to the NRC)

loaded weight of road transport vehicle or shipment rail car; for sea shipments, weight of

loaded package or cargo containers

* information about the planned shipping campaign schedule, including the following:

- number of shipments proposed in a series of shipments - approximate duration of each shipment from point of origin to destination - anticipated date(s) of shipment(s)"

if the shipment is planned for less than 60 days from date of the approval request, the

justification for priority review by NRC staff of the proposed route

information on the shipper, receiver, carriers, transfer points, modes of shipment, and a

statement of shipment security arrangements, including, if applicable, points where

armed escorts transfer responsibility for the shipment

description of the route to be used, including route plan and mileage, safe havens along

the route, summary map of the route, detailed maps of the route, contact information

along the route, communications capability along the route, and confirmation that a road

survey was performed (the description of the route selection criteria and application

format is discussed in further detail in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 below)

5
If the licensee is planning to ship to the same destination for multiple shipping

campaigns, the licensee should propose alternative routes and varying shipping

schedules such that each shipment departs at a different time of the day. Shipping

operations should not appear routine, transparent, or predictable.

The licensee should submit the application for route approvals in both- paper copy and

electronically on appropriate storage media. Note that, in most cases, route approvals contain

information that is designated as Safeguards Information (SGI). SGI must be stored,

transmitted, and handled in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21, "Protection of

Safeguards Information: Performance Requirements," and 10 CFR 73.22, "Protection of

Safeguards Information: Specific Requirements."

The information requested above should be submitted in writing along with the request for route

approval to the following:

Director, Division of Security Policy

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

Upon approval of a complete'application, the NRC will approve road routes for 5 years and rail

routes for 7 years of use. Port approvals will not carry a specific approval time; the port

approval will be consistent with the mode by which the shipment enters or leaves the port. If a

route is mixed (i.e., both rail and road), it will be approved for 5 years.'

2.1.1 Route Selection Criteria

Licensees should apply the following criteria when selecting and developing SNF shipment

planned and altemative routes for road, rail, and sea modes:

Adherence to U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) routing requirements. In

accordance with 10 CFR 71.5, "Transportation of Licensed Material," shipments of SNF

must comply with appropriate DOT regulations, which include routing of radioactive

material. For shipments by road, the DOT requirements for the security of radioactive

material shipments are found in 49 CFR Parts 172 (Subpart I - Safety and Security

Plans) and 397 (Subpart D - Routing of Class 7 (Radioactive) Materials). The licensee

should document that the highway route complies with the DOT routing requirements of

Subpart D, or that DOT approval has been obtained if it does not.

For shipments by rail, the DOT requirements for the security of radioactive material

shipments are found in 49 CFR Parts 172, 174, and 209.

Minimized transit time. Routes should be selected to minimize the time or distance that

the shipment is en route. When shipping by road, shipments, to the maximum extent

NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-01, "Expiration Date for NRC-Approved Spent Fuel

Transportation Routes," dated January 24, 2006, sets the policy for 5-year approval of highway

routes and 7-year approval of railway routes.

6
practicable, should be on primary highways with minimum use of secondary roads and

should be made without intermediate stops except for refueling, rest, or emergency

stops. Routes that are neither minimum distance nor minimum time in transit are

acceptable if the application documents that affected States and Tribes agree to the use

of the route and that it meets DOT routing requirements or that DOT approval has been

obtained.

Likelihood of swift LLEA response. Select routes that permit more timely response by

the LLEA when assistance is requested.

Availability of safe haven locations. Routes should be selected that feature locations

either on or near the approved route where, in the event of an emergency, either security

is present or from which the transport crew can notify or wait for the LLEA to respond.

Section 2.1.2.2 below discusses safe havens in greater detail.

Avoidance of tactically disadvantageous positions. Select routes that avoid passage

through areas including features of terrain that would place the shipment or shipment

escorts in significantly tactically disadvantageous positions (e.g., long tunnels, over

bridges spanning heavily populated areas).

Availability of appropriate rest and refueling stops. Shipment routes should feature

sufficient locations for rest and refueling stops to allow flexibility in adjusting schedules to

accommodate unexpected situations.

Availability of good transportation safety design features. Road and rail routes featuring

advanced safety design features (e.g., divided highways, guard rails, limited access

highways for road shipments; high-grade track for rail shipments) are preferred over

those with portions that are in disrepair or obsolete.

When selecting a route by road, licensees must survey the proposed route. Once a route is

surveyed, the licensee may use this information for future shipments over the same roads. The

licensee must judge whether new surveying is warranted because of changing road conditions

(e.g., significant road construction, demolition or construction of rest areas).

The road survey team should consist of at leasttwo personnel who travel the route to collect

data and monitor the communications capability along the route. Two-person teams are

recommended to perform these functions safely while driving. The road survey should consist

of locating safe havens, fuel and food stops for the carrier, developing LLEA contacts, and

identifying potential driving problems along the route. When appropriate, the NRC staff may

conduct its own survey of the proposed route or portions of it.

2.1.2 Format of Approval Request

The licensee shall submit a letter to the NRC requesting approval of the planned route(s). The

information requested in Section 2.1 above should be included in the licensee's request. The

route overview and specific details shall be attached to the letter and protected against

unauthorized disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22. The following

sections describe the route overview information and specific details expected in the submittal.

7
2.1.2.1 Route Plan and Mileage

The licensee should include the following information in the request to the NRC for approval of

planned and alternative routes for roadjrail, and sea shipments of SNF:

* origin and destination (i.e., specific locations and addresses)

* for road shipments, a mileage summary table that specifies the number of miles and

accumulated distances, with driving directions, for each road by State (see the sample

mileage summary table in Table 1 of Appendix A)

* for rail and sea shipments, a mileage summary table by State

• detailed route plan tables that specify the route segments by county for each State (see

the sample detailed route plan table in Table 2 of Appendix A)

0 estimated travel time for each segment (i.e., estimated time for each segment under

good conditions)

* location of planned or available stopover points for each route segment (e.g., for food,

fuel, loading, or unloading)

0 escort arrangements for each proposed route and alternative route

* firearms to be carried by armed escorts, if private guards are employed

* location and arrangements for staffing of movement control center

* plans for providing required communications capabilities

During the course of an actual shipment, circumstances may arise that preclude the use of

some portion of the approved route for an extended period of time. In this case, detours may be

taken provided that certain procedures are followed in lieu of having specific advance NRC

approval of the revised portion of the route. These procedures are as follows:

• Licensee establishes that the portion of the approved route is impassible or that

conditions along the route will likely result in unplanned stops of 1 hour or more.

• Licensee establishes that it is impractical to use an alternative route previously approved

by the NRC.

* Licensee establishes that the detour selected will most likely allow for uninterrupted

travel until the shipment is able to resume travel along the planned approved route or

along a previously approved alternative route, or that the detour selected will most likely

result in fewer stops or delays as compared to the planned approved route.

8
0 Licensee assures that contacts with the LLEA along the proposed detour route have

previously been made, or that they are made at the time a determination is made to use

the detour route.

0 The escorts notify the movement control center of the change in shipment itinerary,

delays experienced along the planned or alternative route, and estimated duration of the

detour.

* Licensee shall make arrangements to provide any additional resources for physical

protection needed to comply with the specific requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(c), (d), or

(e).

* Licensee notifies the NRC Headquarters Operations Center about the detour.

Escorts should anticipate the need for making unplanned detours so that the shipment may

keep moving without interruption. The shipment should not be stopped solely for the purpose of

making new LLEA contacts or communicating with the movement control center. In some

situations, however, stops may be unavoidable. In these cases, the shipment should proceed to

the nearest available safe haven before making the stop.

2.1.2.2 Safe Havens

For road shipments, the licensee should include the locations of identified safe havens along the

route for temporary refuge or emergency assistance. These safe havens must be coordinated

with the State(s) through which the shipment will pass. Safe havens do not apply to rail or sea

shipments.

Safe havens should be identified at routine intervals along the route. In general, safe havens

should be as close to the highway as possible, easily accessible by the transportation vehicle,

controlled, and well-lighted. The application should identify the mile marker or exit number that

corresponds to each safe haven along the entire route in each State.

Examples of possible safe havens include military stations, highway patrol stations and weigh

stations. Truck stops and rest areas may be used as a safe haven if a more preferable safe

haven is not available and the truck stop or rest area is close to the approved route. Unless

specifically approved by the State, hospitals, public libraries, and schools are not acceptable

safe havens.

2.1.2.3 Mapping Requirements

The licensee should provide a summary map that identifies the origination and destination

facilities and the complete route that will be used for the shipment. In addition, the licensee

should provide detailed maps of the planned route, the alternate routes, the locations of

identified stops, and the safe havens that have been coordinated with the State(s) through

which the shipment will pass. Maps should be part of the word processing files or images easily

integrated into the final approval document.

9
2.1.2.4 Contact Information

The route approval request should include the contact information for each LLEA jurisdiction

along the planned route and the citizens band (CB) radio channels typically monitored by each

LLEA. The licensee should provide the following:

24-hour contact information that is available throughout the United States for the LLEAs

responsible for every county in each State along the route

24-hour, 10-digit emergency telephone number that is available throughout the United

States for each State along the route

contact information for the Governor's designee for advance notification of SNF

shipments for the route segment in each State

As part of the review, the NRC staff will verify that the contact information is correct and current.

The contact information will be used by both the transport (i.e., driver and escorts) and the

movement control center (see Section 2.4.1 below). In addition to the telephone numbers listed

above, an emergency number such as 911 may be provided as a secondary number for the

transport; however, the licensee must demonstrate in its application that its method of

communication (e.g., cell phone, satellite phone) will reach the correct en-route 911 emergency

response center. The licensee must demonstrate that an en-route 911 call will not be

misdirected, thereby resulting in a delay of emergency response.

As stated earlier, routes will be approved for use over many years. However, during the

approval period, State contact information may change. Before each shipment of SNF, the

licensee is responsible for ensuring that all the contact information along the route is current.

Updating contact information is considered a change that does not reduce the effectiveness of

the route and the licensee may make such updates to contact information without prior approval

by the NRC.

The above information should be provided to drivers, escorts accompanying the shipment, and

movement control center personnel monitoring the shipment. The licensee must ensure that

such personnel are instructed in the proper use of such information. If a large number of

shipments are planned over the same route, spot checking LLEA telephone numbers and

contacts during each trip would be sufficient for updating purposes. However, if shipments

along the route are infrequent (i.e., more than 6 months apart), the licensee should perform

more systematic verification procedures. Route information verifications should be recorded on

the shipment log.

The route applications should describe armed escort arrangements (including any transfers at

State or local boundaries), contacts, and coordination with State Governors. The NRC may

conduct surveys of proposed routes, including verifying the response capabilities of LLEAs

along the routes.

2.1.2.5 Communications Capability and Emergency Response

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1), the licensee must ensure that arrangements have been

made with the appropriate State personnel and LLEAs along the routes of road and rail

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shipments, and at U.S. ports where vessels carrying SNF shipments are docked, for their

response to an emergency or a call for assistance. It should be noted that NRC requirements

under 10 CFR 73.37(e) are applicable at any U.S. port the shipment may pass through. If a

U.S. port is used during a transport, licensees shall coordinate with the U.S. Coast Guard and

local port authorities to ensure that they are appropriately informed of the material being

received at the port and to ensure that the physical protection requirements of 10 CFR 73.37

are complied with during port operations.

The licensee should provide information to the NRC on the physical protection arrangements

planned for the shipments, including the following:

* armed escort arrangements made for the proposed route and each alternative route

* firearms to be carried by any private armed escorts

* location and arrangements for staffing of movement control centers

* plans for providing required communications capabilities

Information about arrangements with local law enforcement will be verified by NRC staff.

2.1.2.6 Communications Capability along the Route

The licensee should also provide information to the NRC about the primary and secondary

communications capability along the route. The licensee should clearly identify areas along the

route and any identified alternative route within a State where pockets of poor communications

may exist. This information may be incorporated into the tables provided with the route plan.

2.2 Preplanning and Coordination of Shipments

In addition to meeting the requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(vi) to obtain advance approval of

the proposed route, the licensee should preplan and coordinate other aspects of the shipment

before each shipment.

For a shipment of spent nuclear material, the licensee should preplan and coordinate shipment

details with the Governor, or the Governor's designee, of each State through which or across

whose boundaries the shipment will pass. The purpose of this activity is to accomplish the

following:

* Ensure minimal intermediate stops and delays.

* Discuss the State's intention to provide law enforcement escorts.

* Arrange for sharing positional information about a shipment when requested by a State.

* Develop route information, including the identification of safe havens.

* Arrange with the LLEA the response to an emergency or call for assistance along the

shipment route.

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The licensee should coordinate shipment schedules and itineraries with the receiver at the final

delivery point to ensure that the receiver is present to accept the shipment. Additionally, if

applicable, any transfer of custody (in which armed escorts transfer responsibility for the

shipment) during the shipment must be preplanned and coordinated to assure that the required

written-certification of the transfer-of custody is properly documented and completed.

The licensee is also required to protect SGI in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and

10 CFR 73.22. Preplanning and coordination activities should address how this information will

be protected, especially the determination of the trustworthiness and reliability of any individual

whose assigned duties will provide access to the SNF shipment information.

The licensee should document the preplanning and coordination activities and protect this

information as SGI as specified in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

2.2.1 Avoidance of Intermediate Stops

To meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(iv)(A), the licensee should ensure that

intermediate stops and delays are kept to a minimum. Intermediate stops should be avoided to

the extent practicable because it is recognized that a shipment is generally more vulnerable to

attempts at theft, diversion, or radiological sabotage when stationary. Scheduled stops for SNF

shipments should be justified by a security or operational need for making the stop. When

possible, stops should be planned to serve multiple purposes and to avoid set patterns in the

times and places they occur.

2.2.2 Procedures at Stops

Shipments are vulnerable to attack while stationary. In accordance with

10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vii)(C), the licensee shall ensure that at least one armed escort other than

the driver maintains constant visual surveillance of the shipment and reports to the movement

control center at regular, preset intervals not to exceed 30 minutes during periods when the

shipment vehicle is stopped or the shipment vessel is docked. Maintaining surveillance of the

shipment during these periods is intended to ensure that any attack would be detected as early

as possible so that the adversary would have only a minimal amount of time to attempt theft,

diversion, or sabotage of the SNF before response forces arrive.

2.2.2.1 Stops during Road Shipments

The licensee should ensure that, when a shipment has stopped, the armed escorts maintain

visual observation of the transport vehicle itself to detect tampering with or unauthorized access

to the shipment. The visual observation by the armed escorts should include periodic walks

around the vehicle. Multiple armed escorts should be separated to prevent being

simultaneously incapacitated by a single adversary act. Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(c)(2)

requires each armed escort to be equipped with a minimum of two weapons (e.g., a handgun

and a rifle and/or shotgun).

The licensee should ensure that the driver and armed escorts assigned to the vehicle

surveillance are provided with the following:

the means to immobilize the transport vehicle

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* the means to communicate with the movement control center and LLEA

the route overview information containing specific, direct LLEA contacts, other than

dialing 911

If the LLEA is not directly involved in the escort, the LLEA should be advised of the presence of

the shipment within its jurisdiction and the purpose and projected duration of the stop, and

should be requested to be alert for possible assistance calls during the stop.

Whether occupied or not, the doors andwindows of the transport vehicle should be closed and

locked to impede unauthorized access. Before making the stop, the escorts should ensure that

communications equipment is properly operating and that LLEA contact information is readily

available.

The full complement of armed escorts should participate in the surveillance, as well as any

drivers or accompanying individuals not engaged in essential activities associated with the

purpose of the stop.

2.2.2.2 Stops during Rail Shipments

Procedures for maintaining visual surveillance of a rail shipment reflect the same concerns that

form the basis of surveillance procedures for road shipments.

During all stops, the licensee should ensure that the rail car is placed under surveillance by two

armed escorts positioned on the train within view of the shipment car. If the armed escorts

cannot or do not remain on the train, they should take up a protected position with an

unobstructed view of the shipment car and possible approaches to it. The escorts should have

immediate access to communications equipment and the route overview information containing

LLEA contacts and should be alert to external activities that may indicate a possible threat to the

safety or security of the shipment.

When practical, multiple armed escorts should be separated to prevent being simultaneously

incapacitated by a single adversary act. Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(d)(2) requires each armed

escort to be equipped with a minimum of two weapons (e.g., a handgun and a rifle and/or

shotgun).

2.2.2.3 Stops during Sea Shipments

When a shipment vessel is docked at a U.S. port, 10 CFR 73.37(e) requires the licensee to

ensure surveillance of sea shipments of SNF temporarily located on a dock and of shipments

located aboard a docked vessel by either of the following methods:

two armed escorts stationed either on board the shipment vessel or on the dock at a

location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel or the points of access to the

shipment, if it is located in an enclosed cargo compartment

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A member of an LLEA, equipped with normal radio communications, stationed either on

the vessel or on the dock

For outgoing shipments, surveillance must be provided continuously from the time the shipment

arrives at the terminal aboard a road or rail transport vehicle to the time the loaded shipment

vessel leaves the dock.

Incoming shipments must be placed under continuous surveillance from the time the shipment

vessel docks to the time the shipment is loaded onto a road or rail transport vehicle and begins

movement from the terminal, at which time the physical protection requirements governing road

or rail transport shall apply to the shipment.

These procedures also apply to intermediate stops at U.S. ports during which the shipment

remains on the shipment vessel. Visual surveillance of the shipment should be accomplished

by direct observation of the shipment or by observing points of access to the shipment if it is

located in an enclosed cargo compartment.

Armed escorts performing the surveillance should have immediate access to communications

equipment and the route overview information containing LLEA contacts and should be alert to

external activities that may indicate possible threat to the safety or security of the shipment.

Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(e)(2) requires each armed escort to be equipped with a minimum of

two weapons (e.g., a handgun and a rifle and/or shotgun).

2.3 Advance Notification of Shipments

The regulations in 10 CFR 73.37 and 10 CFR 73.72, "Requirements for Advance Notice of

Shipment of Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear Material, Special Nuclear Material

of Moderate Strategic Significance, or Irradiated Reactor Fuel," both contain specific

requirements for advance notification of shipments. Before the transport or delivery to a carrier

for transport of the licensed material outside the confines of the licensee's facility or other place

of use or storage, the licensee shall provide advance notification to the NRC and to the

Governor of the State, or the Governor's designee, of the SNF shipment moving through or

across the boundary of the State. A licensee who conducts an onsite transfer of SNF that does

not travel on or cross a public highway is exempt from the requirements for advance

notifications for that transfer.

2.3.1 Advance Notification of the State(s)

As required by 10 CFR 73.37(b)(2), any advance notification of a State delivered by mail must

be postmarked at least 7 days before transport of a shipment within or through the State. If a

notification is delivered by any other method it must reach the office of the Governor, or the

Governor's designee, at least 4 days before the scheduled transport of a shipment within or

through the State.

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(2), the NRC specifies that the following information must be submitted by

the licensee in the advance notification:

name, address, and telephone number of the shipper, carrier, and receiver of the

shipment and the license number of the shipper and receiver

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a description of the shipment as specified by DOT in 49 CFR 172.202, "Description of

Hazardous Material on Shipping Papers," and 49 CFR 172.203(d)

* a list of the routes to be used within the State

Because specific details of a shipment must be protected as SGI, the NRC requires them to be

contained in a separate enclosure to the notification. The licensee shall provide the following

information in accordance with 10 CFR 73.22(f)(1) in a separate enclosure to the written

notification:

* the estimated date and time of departure from the point of origin of the shipment

* the estimated date and time of entry into the Governor's State

for the case of a single shipment whose schedule is not related to the schedule of any

subsequent shipment, a statement that schedule information must be protected in

accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22 until at least 10 days

after the shipment has entered or originated within the State

for the case of a shipment in a series of shipments whose schedules are related, a

statement that schedule information must be protected in accordance with the provisions

of 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22 until 10 days after the last shipment in the series

has entered or originated within the State and an estimate of the date on which the last

shipment in the series will enter or originate within the State

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(2)(vi), the licensee must retain a copy of the advance

notification(s), any revision notice(s), and cancellation notice(s) as a record for 3 years.

The State contact information, including telephone number and mailing addresses of the

Governor and Governor's designee, is available on the NRC Web site at

http://nrc-stp.ornl..ov/special/designee.pdf. A list of the contact information is also available

upon request from the following:

Director, Division of Intergovernmental Liaison and Rulemaking

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555

2.3.2 Advance Notification of the NRC

A licensee who transports, ships, imports or exports SNF must make advance notifications to

the NRC at various times prior to and after the shipment commences, as specified in 10 CFR

73.72.

2.3.2.1 10-Day Advance Notice

In accordance with 10 CFR 73.72, the licensee must notify the NRC at least 10 days before

transport of the shipment commences at the shipping facility. Written notification shall be

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provided by the licensee to the NRC Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear

Security and Incident Response. Notifications that contain SGI must be made in compliance

with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

The notification should include the following information:

* the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the shipper; receiver, and carrier(s)

* the physical form of the SNF, quantity, type of reactor, and original enrichment

* a list of the modes of shipment, transfer points, and routes to be used

* the estimated time and date that shipment will commence

* for exports and imports of SNF: the estimated time and date that each country along the

route is scheduled to be entered

the estimated time and date of arrival of the shipment at the destination

2.3.2.2 2-Day Advance Notice, 2-Hour Notice, and Delivery Receipt Confirmation

In 10 CFR 73.72(a)(4), the NRC requires the licensee to make additional notifications after the

10-day advance notification. The NRC Headquarters Operations Center shall be notified about

the shipment status by telephone at the phone numbers listed in Appendix A, "U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission Offices and Classified Mailing Addresses," to 10 CFR Part 73. SGI

notifications shall be made by secure telephone.

The notifications shall take place at the following intervals:

* at least 2 days before commencement of the shipment

* 2 hours before commencement of the shipment

* once the shipment is received at its destination

2.3.3 Notification of Schedule Deviations

If the schedule changes by more than 6 hours from the notification provided to the State, the

licensee must provide a revised notice. The licensee must notify, by telephone or other means,

a responsible individual in the office of the Governor, or in the office of the Governor's designee,

about the schedule change and shall inform that individual of the number of hours of advance or

delay relative to the written schedule previously furnished. In addition, the licensee must notify

the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone at the phone numbers listed in

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73. SGI notifications must be made by secure telephone.

If a shipment is cancelled after the advance notifications have been made, the licensee must

send a cancellation notice to the Governor of each State, or to the Governor's designee,

previously notified and to the NRC's Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear

Security and Incident Response. The licensee shall state in the notice that it is a cancellation

and identify the advance notification that is being canceled.

If a shipment is lost or unaccounted for after the designated no-later-than arrival time in the

advance notification, the licensee who made the arrangements for the shipment of SNF shall

immediately conduct an investigation as required by 10 CFR 73.37(f). The receiving licensee

shall also assist in the investigation. While the investigation is ongoing, all information about the

investigation shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21

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and 10 CFR 73.22. Once the investigation is complete, the records shall be designated and

managed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

2.4 Communications

2.4.1 Movement Control Centers

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3), the NRC requires licensees to establish a movement control center.

During the active shipment, the movement control center must be continuously manned

(24 hours a day, 7 days a week) by at least one individual who has the authority to direct the

physical protection activities. This individual(s) is responsible for monitoring the progress of the

SNF shipment to assure its continued integrity and to notify the appropriate agencies in

accordance with 10 CFR 73.71, "Reporting of Safeguards Events," should a safeguards event

arise. Under 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v)(B), the licensee shall develop, maintain, revise, and

implement written procedures that document the duties of the movement control center

personnel.

The movement control center operator should maintain a record of the status reports received

for inclusion in the shipment log (see Section 2.7 of this document). The operator should also

maintain a record of any deviation from the planned shipment itinerary, any significant incidents

that occur, and reports made to the NRC and others. The operator should have a copy of the

route data for the shipment readily available and should request assistance from the LLEA in

whose jurisdiction the shipment is believed to be located if the transport does not report in on

schedule or cannot be contacted, or if a request for assistance is received from the shipment

escorts. (Escort procedures should require escorts to request LLEA assistance directly in cases

where it is operationally feasible to do so.) The movement control center must be able to

directly contact appropriate LLEA in each jurisdiction; the center cannot rely on calls to 911

systems to provide aid to shipments of SNF.

A procedure or device should be employed to ensure that the movement control center operator

becomes immediately aware when a report from the shipment escorts becomes overdue. The

operator can carry out other work while a shipment is en route, provided that the other work

does not interfere with prompt response to incoming messages from the transport or with other

safeguards-related duties.

2.4.2 Periodic Contacts with Movement Control Center

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vii)(B), the NRC requires escorts for road and rail shipments to notify the

movement control center at random intervals not to exceed 2 hours while in motion. In

10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vii)(C), the NRC requires at least one armed escort to remain alert, maintain

visual surveillance of the shipment, and periodically report to the movement control center at

regular intervals not to exceed 30 minutes during periods when the shipment vehicle is stopped

or the shipment vessel is docked. Notification calls should also be made when the shipment

undergoes a significant change in status or when delays are encountered that will result in

changes in the shipment schedule or itinerary (e.g., when making an unscheduled stop or

detour, or resuming travel).

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v), the NRC requires the licensee to develop, maintain, revise, and

implement written communications protocols for use during an SNF shipment. These protocols

17
should include a strategy for the use of authentication and duress codes, the management of

refueling or other stops and detours, and the loss of communications, temporarily or otherwise.

2.5 Arrangements with Local Law Enforcement Agencies

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(v), the NRC requires that licensees make arrangements with LLEA for

their response to an'emergency or a call for assistance along the routes of road and rail

shipments, and at U.S. ports where vessels carrying SNF shipments are docked. This

requirement is designed to provide for rapid LLEA assistance in the event of an emergency or a

call for assistance. It is also intended to ensure that the selected LLEAs along the route are

familiar with the types of situations to expect when responding to such calls. In

10 CFR 73.37(b)(4)(iv), the NRC requires the licensee to notify LLEAs of suspicious activities

and to request assistance without delay, but no later than 15 minutes after discovery of the

threat.

The licensee's application for route approval should describe armed escort arrangements,

contacts, State Governor coordination, and, if applicable, points where armed escorts transfer

responsibility for the shipment. The NRC may conduct surveys of proposed routes, including

verifying the response capabilities of LLEAs along the routes.

2.6 Armed Escorts

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v)(B), the NRC requires that the licensee develop, maintain, revise, and

implement written transportation physical protection procedures that address the duties of the

armed escorts.

Licensees must arrange for armed escorts in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37. Depending on

State requirements or availability, each State may provide the armed escorts, or the applicant

may need to contract armed escorts. This requirement does not preempt existing Federal or

State statutes or regulations regarding use of weapons and use of deadly force.

As required by 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1)(i), each licensee shall ensure that each armed escort is

instructed in the use of force sufficient to counter the force directed at that individual, including

the use of deadly force when the armed escort has a reasonable belief that it is necessary in

self-defense or in the defense of others, or any other circumstances, as authorized by

applicable Federal and State laws. This requirement does not apply to members of LLEAs

performing escort duties.

The licensee should evaluate the State requirements for armed escorts moving firearms from

state to state in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(1). All armed escorts, with the exception of

local law enforcement, must comply with and be trained in the appropriate State rules governing

the use of firearms.

In addition, as permitted by law, each armed escort, with the exception of local law enforcement,

shall be equipped with a minimum of two weapons. The NRC recommends that each weapon

provide separate and distinct response capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a rifle and/or shotgun).

Armed escorts for road, rail, or sea shipments of SNF must successfully complete a training

course in accordance with Appendix D, "Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in

18
Transit, Training Program Subject Schedule," to 10 CFR Part 73. Appendix D contains a list of

the subjects to be covered in such a course. The detailed material taught under each subject

heading should be adapted to the particular modes of transportation used for the shipment the

armed escort will be assigned to protect. The licensee may adjust the length-of the course

depending on the background and the experience of the individuals selected to be armed

escorts. The licensee should be prepared to demonstrate the efficacy of the training program to

comply with the NRC inspection and enforcement program. One way to accomplish this is to

maintain records of the licensee's evaluations (written tests, field tests, or observation of

performance) of the trainees' progress in the instruction program and any remedial training

required.

Training for the armed escorts should also address the need for the escorts to anticipate making

unplanned detours so that the shipment may keep moving without interruption. The shipment

should not be stopped solely for the purpose of making new LLEA contacts or communicating

with the movement control center. In some situations, however, stops may be unavoidable. In

these cases, the shipment should proceed to the nearest available safe haven before making

the stop.

Members of a law enforcement agency serving as escorts are considered to be adequately

trained to carry out the escort duties they are expected to perform and are not required to

undergo the training specifically required for private armed escorts. However, a member of an

LLEA should be briefed on the shipment procedures as necessary for the performance of the

escort functions.

The regulation in 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vii) requires shipment escorts to provide notifications to

the movement control center at random intervals, not to exceed 2 hours, to advise of the status

of road and rail shipments while in motion, and at regular intervals not to exceed 30 minutes

when the shipment vehicles are stopped or the shipment vessels are docked at U.S. ports.

These requirements are covered in Section 2.4 of this document.

2.7 Shipment Log

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(iv), the NRC requires the movement control center personnel and the

escorts to each maintain a written log for each SNF shipment. The log should contain

information describing the shipment and any significant events that occur during the shipment.

The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that protection requirements have been properly

carried out, to allow NRC staff to identify areas where improvement in protection is needed, and

to ensure the availability of an accurate record of the shipment to assist in resolving any

questions of public concern about the shipment that could arise after its completion.

The shipment log should include the following types of information:

names of shipping and receiving organizations, carriers, escorts, drivers (for road

shipments), chief engineers (for rail shipments), and vessels and their masters (for sea

shipments)

origin, destination, and approved route (copy of route overview)

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0 general description of cargo and shipping containers

0 dates and times of departure and arrival (planned and actual)

0 dates, times, and locations of stopovers and custody transfers

* identification of the movement control center and its staff

* dates, times, and locations of status reports made by shipment escorts to the movement

control center, and schedule of expected status reports, as well as the name of the

escort making the report and the movement control operator taking the report.

* deviations from the planned route

other abnormal occurrences with regard to route, equipment, vehicles, personnel,

weather, traffic, or threats

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(iv), the licensee shall retain the

shipment log for 3 years following completion of the shipment and make the log available to the

NRC upon request.

2.8 Procedures, Training, and Control of Information

To comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v), the licensee shall develop,. maintain,

revise, and implement written procedures for transportation physical protection to address the

following issues:

access controls to ensure that no unauthorized persons have access to the shipment

and SGI

duties of the movement control center personnel, drivers, armed escorts, and other

individuals responsible for the security of the shipment

* reporting of safeguards events in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71

• communications protocols that include a strategy for the use of authentication and

duress codes; the management of refueling or other stops, detours, and the loss of

communications, temporarily or otherwise; and communications with the NRC in

accordance with 10 CFR 73.4, "Communications"

normal-condition operating procedures

To satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(vi), each licensee should develop and

implement a method or system to ensure that records of transportation physical protection

procedures are maintained for at least 3 years after the close of period for which the licensee

possesses the special nuclear material under each license for which the plan is used. If any

portion of the procedure is superseded, the licensee should ensure the retention of the

superseded material for 3 years after each change.

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2.8.1 Procedures for Coping with Safeguards Threats and Emergencies

In 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4)(i), the NRC requires the licensee to establish, maintain, and follow written

contingency and response procedures to deal with threats, theft, and radiological sabotage

related to SNF in transit.

The contingency plan and procedures shall be retained as a record for 3 years after the close of

the period for which the licensee possesses the SNF in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4)(iii).

Additionally, each licensee shall ensure that information related to the physical protection

procedures for coping with safeguards threats and emergencies is protected in accordance with

the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

Upon detection of the abnormal presence of unauthorized individuals, vehicles, or vessels in the

vicinity of an SNF shipment or upon detection of a deliberately induced situation that has the

potential for damaging an SNF shipment, the contingency plan and procedures should direct the

armed escort to do the following:

Determine whether a threat exists.

* Assess the extent of the threat, if any.

Implement the approved contingency and response procedures developed in

accordance with these requirements.

Make the necessary tactical moves to prevent or impede theft, diversion, or radiological

sabotage of SNF.

Inform the LLEA of the threat and request assistance without delay, but not to exceed

15 minutes after discovery.

If a shipment is lost or unaccounted for after the designated no-later-than arrival time in the

advance notification, the licensee who made the arrangements for the shipment of SNF shall

immediately conduct an investigation as required by 10 CFR 73.37(f). The receiving licensee

shall also assist in the investigation. While the investigation is ongoing, all information about the

investigation shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21

and 10 CFR 73.22. Once the investigation is complete, the records shall be designated and

managed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

2.8.2 Training of Personnel Associated with Shipments

To ensure that personnel associated with SNF shipments are adequately prepared for all

possible scenarios, the licensee should develop and implement a documented training program

that covers the procedures developed under 10 CFR 73.37(b)(3)(v) and 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4), to

include transportation physical protection procedures, normal operations procedures, and

contingency and response procedures.

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2.8.3 Control of Shipment Information

The procedures for transportation physical protection shall be protected against unauthorized

disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22. The licensee should ensure that

procedures are developed and implemented to protect shipment information, procedures for

transportation physical protection, and all required records against unauthorized disclosure. As

required by 10 CFR 73.38, each licensee must also determine the trustworthiness and reliability

of any individual whose assigned duties provide access to SNF shipment information.

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3 ROAD SHIPMENTS

This chapter addresses requirements affecting the road portion of an SNF shipment by rail or

sea, as well as shipments made entirely by road. The requirements for road shipments should

be understood to apply to all shipment vehicles as a group, unless otherwise noted.

Information regarding 10 CFR 73.37(c)(3), (4), and (6) shall be protected against unauthorized

disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

3.1 Protection of Road Shipments

In addition to the general requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(b), the physical protection system for

any portion of an SNF shipment that is made by road must meet the requirements specified in

10 CFR 73.37(c).

When SNF is transported by road, the transport vehicle must be accompanied by at least two,

armed escorts. This requirement can be met in either one of two ways:

(1) The transport vehicle is occupied by at least two individuals, one of whom serves as an

armed escort, and the transport vehicle is escorted by an armed member of the LLEA in

a mobile unit of this agency.

(2) The transport vehicle may be led and trailed by escort vehicles containing at least one

armed escort each, for a minimum of three vehicles in the convoy.

Each armed escort shall carry a minimum of two weapons. The NRC recommends that each

weapon provide separate and distinct response capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a rifle and/or

shotgun).

3.2 Communications for Road Shipments

The purpose of communications requirements for SNF shipments by road is to (1) provide the

escorts with the capability to call for assistance when necessary, either directly to the LLEA or

indirectly through the movement control center, (2) permit personnel at the movement control

center to monitor the progress of the shipment, (3) provide the escorts with a means of quickly

obtaining route and LLEA contact information when unexpected detours become necessary,

and (4) provide a means of coordinating the movement of transport and escort vehicles when

more than one vehicle is used in the shipment.

In 10 CFR 73.37(c)(3), the NRC requires the transport vehicle and all escort vehicles to be

equipped with redundant communications abilities that provide for two-way communications

among the transport vehicle, escort vehicles, movement control center, LLEA, and each other at

all times. Alternate communication methods should not be subject to the same failure modes as

the primary communication method. The transport vehicle and armed escorts must use a

method capable of contacting the emergency phone numbers provided in the approved route.

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If a CB radio is being used, all escorts and drivers should be knowledgeable of the specific CB

channels normally monitored by the LLEA or Radio Emergency Associated Communications

Team (REACT) groups as they pass through different jurisdictions on the shipment route. If an

emergency arises, the occupants of each transport or escort vehicle are then capable of

independently contacting the LLEA by CB radio. This information should be indicated on the

route overview.

In addition to voice communication, 10 CFR 73.37(c)(6) requires licensees to ensure that

shipments are continuously and actively monitored by a telemetric position monitoring system or

an alternative tracking system reporting to a movement control center. The movement control

center shall provide positive confirmation of the location, status, and control over the shipment.

Additionally, the movement control center shall implement preplanned procedures in response

to deviations from the authorized route or a notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious

activities related to the theft, loss, or diversion of a shipment. These procedures will include, but

not be limited to, the identification of and contact information for the appropriate LLEA along the

shipment route.

The operator of the movement control center is required to monitor the shipment to ensure its

continued integrity while en route and maintain periodic contact with the transport vehicle, not to

exceed every 2 hours.

3.3 Immobilization of Transport Vehicle

As required by 10 CFR 73.37(c)(4), the transport vehicle must be equipped with NRC-approved

features that permit immobilization of the cab or cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle. This

requirement applies equally to all transport vehicles used in a single shipment. In this

requirement, immobilization means rendering the loaded transport vehicle incapable of

movement under its own power.

The purpose of this requirement is to deny an adversary who may succeed in gaining control of

a transport vehicle the ability to move or flee with the vehicle. The immobilization technique

should be implemented only when it is apparent that an attempt is being made to gain

unauthorized control over the shipment. Immobilization should not be initiated in a way that

would endanger the driver, escorts, or members of the public.

Immobilization procedures should be developed in accordance with 10 CFR 73.37(b)(4).

Operation of the immobilization technique and the procedures governing its use must be

covered in both the training course for escorts and the familiarization program for drivers.

3.3.1 Immobilization Device Performance Criteria

The immobilization techniques should meet each of the following criteria:

The immobilization device and procedure can be operated and performed from inside

the cab of the transport vehicle by one person.

Immobilization should be accomplished in a short period of time (several seconds) after

the immobilization procedures are initiated.

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After immobilization is accomplished, skilled technical personnel should require at least

one-half hour to return the transport vehicle to normal operating conditions. It should not

be possible, by coercion of the drivers or escorts, for an adversary to bypass the effects

of the immobilization or to significantly shorten the time needed to make the transport

operational again.

The device should pose no significant safety hazard before, during, or after the

immobilization.

3.3.2 Immobilization Device Design

Devices employed to effect immobilization may be mechanical or electrical. They should be

relatively simple and reliable to operate, so that they can be activated quickly under stressful

conditions. The following are some techniques that may form the basis for acceptable

immobilization procedures:

* severing the main wire harness under the dashboard

* disabling a critical portion of the ignition system by overloading or dismantling a key

component of the ignition system or starting system

0 disabling the gear shifting mechanism

* use of an electronic ignition control system with a procedurally irreversible time delay

feature

3.3.3 Format of Approval Request

The licensee shall submit a letter to the NRC requesting approval of the intended immobilization

device in advance. The device specification shall be attached to the letter and protected in

accordance with 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

3.4 Training Program for Drivers

Transport vehicle drivers are required under 10 CFR 73.37(c)(5) to be familiar with and capable

of implementing transport vehicle immobilization, communications, and other security

procedures.

Drivers may become involved in the physical protection of the shipment to a greater or lesser

extent depending on the arrangements made between the carrier and the shipper or receiver

(licensee). The greatest degree of driver involvement would occur when the driver is also a fully

trained armed escort and alternately assumes driving and physical protection responsibilities

with other armed escorts. However, in other circumstances the driver may have only minimal

responsibilities in protecting the shipment, in which case the licensee must ensure that the

driver is familiar with the basic security functions of transport vehicle immobilization, redundant

communications systems, and any other security procedures that would affect the driver's

operation of the transport vehicle.

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The licensee should review the roles and responsibilities of the driver and ensure that the

required training is conducted before the shipments.

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4 RAIL SHIPMENTS

This chapter addresses the requirements affecting the rail portion of an SNF shipment. The

transport vehicle in the case of a rail shipment is the shipment car carrying one or more SNF

packages. The requirements for rail shipments should be understood to apply to the shipment

cars as a group, unless noted otherwise.

Information identified in 10 CFR 73.37(d)(3) and 10 CFR 73.37(d)(4) shall be protected againstunauthorized disclosure as specified in 10 CFR 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

4.1 Protection of Rail Shipments

In addition to the general requirements of 10 CFR 73.37(b), the physical protection system for

any portion of an SNF shipment that is by rail shall provide the following:

A shipment car is accompanied by two armed escorts (who may be members of an

LLEA), at least one of whom is stationed at a location on the train that will permit

observation of the shipment car while in motion.

Each- armed escort carries a minimum of two weapons. Each weapon should provide

separate and distinct response capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a rifle and/or shotgun).

This requirement does not apply to members of the LLEA.

The armed escorts may be private guards or members of the LLEA. The armed escorts should

be trained in accordance with Appendix D to 10 CFR Part 73 and should be thoroughly familiar

with all safeguards requirements. The armed escorts should be alert to recognize any situations

that might constitute a threat to the safety or security of the shipment.

A copy of the route overview data (route identification; mileage data; LLEA identification,

jurisdiction, and response centers; LLEA telephone numbers; communication channels

monitored by LLEAs; cellular and satellite phone coverage along the route) should be readily

available to the escorts at all times.

The escorts should maintain close cooperation with the train's crew to ensure adherence as

close as practicable to the shipment schedule and to ensure that the crew remains aware of all

safeguards requirements as the shipment progresses.

4.2 Communications for Rail Shipments

The purpose of the communications requirements for SNF shipments by rail is to (1) provide

escorts with the capability to call for assistance when necessary, (2) permit personnel at the

movement control center to monitor the progress of the shipment, and (3) provide the escorts

with a means of quickly developing new LLEA contracts and obtaining new route information

when unexpected detours become necessary.

The train's operator(s) and each escort must be equipped with redundant communications

abilities that provide for two-way communications between the train operator(s), escorts,

movement control center, LLEAs, and one another at all times. Alternate communication

27
methods should not be subject to the same failure modes as the primary communication

method. The use of telephones in call boxes located along the tracks is not generally

acceptable as one of the communication methods because the telephones may not be available

if the-train is forced to make an emergency stop. However; call boxes could be relied on for

short intervals where cellular and satellite phone service is not available.

If the train's communications system is used, complementary communications capabilities

should be provided to ensure that the escorts will have immediate access to the

communications equipment when necessary, if it is located apart from where the escort is

situated.

The shipment route overview should indicate where along the route cellular, satellite, or other

equivalent communications equipment may not be effective. For such areas, alternate means

of communication should be planned.

All equipment used to satisfy the communications requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(d)(3) should

be properly maintained and checked for proper operation before the shipment starts to ensure

that it is in good operating condition before beginning the shipment.

As required by 10 CFR 73.37(d)(4), the licensee must ensure that rail shipments are monitored

by a telemetric position monitoring system or an alternative tracking system reporting to the

licensee, third-party, or railroad movement control center. The movement control center shall

provide positive confirmation of the location of the shipment and its status. The movement

control center shall implement preplanned procedures in response to deviations from the

authorized route or to a notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to the

theft or diversion of a shipment. These procedures will include, but not be limited to, the

identification of and contact information for the appropriate LLEA along the shipment route.

The operator in the movement control center is required to monitor the shipping container to

ensure its continued integrity while en route and to maintain periodic contact with the transport

vehicle, not to exceed every 2 hours.

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5 SEA SHIPMENTS

This chapter addresses additional requirements affecting the portions of SNF shipments that are

made by sea.

Information identified in 10 CFR 73.37(e)(4) shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure

as specified in 10 CFRE 73.21 and 10 CFR 73.22.

5.1 Protection of Sea Shipments

The purpose of the requirements in 10 CFR 73.37(e) is to ensure that the licensee has provided

a capability for immediate, active protection of a shipment of SNF against theft, loss, diversion,

or radiological sabotage while the shipment vessel is docked at a U.S. port. The licensee is to

achieve this objective by ensuring that there are personnel on duty on or near the shipment

vessel who have the capability to delay or prevent sabotage until LLEA response forces arrive.

In addition to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.37(b), a shipment vessel, while docked at a U.S. port,

must meet either of the following escort requirements:

two armed escorts stationed on board the shipment vessel, or stationed on the dock at a

location that will permit observation of the shipment vessel or the points of access to the

SNF shipment, if it is located in an enclosed cargo compartment

a member of an LLEA, equipped with normal LLEA radio communications, who is

stationed on board the shipment vessel, or on the dock at a location that will permit

observation of the shipment vessel or the points of access to the SNF shipment, if it is

located in an enclosed cargo compartment

As required by 10 CFR 73.37(e)(2), each armed escort shall carry a minimum of two weapons.

Each weapon should provide separate and distinct response capabilities (e.g., a handgun and a

rifle and/or shotgun).

Additionally, 10 CFR 73.37(e)(3) requires that a shipment vessel carrying SNF be accompanied

by an individual while within U.S. territorial waters. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure

that the SNF shipment is under surveillance against possible theft, loss, diversion, or

radiological sabotage, so that the LLEA may be promptly alerted to respond to any such

attempts.

For the purposes of this requirement, U.S. waters are considered to extend 3 nautical miles

from U.S. land territory other than small offshore islets. U.S. land territory includes the

48 contiguous states, Alaska, the eight largest islands of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Northern

Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa and the three major islands of the U.S. Virgin Islands.

The individual accompanying the shipment may be provided in a number of ways. The

individual may come aboard the vessel at the time of loading (or stopover) in a foreign port, may

come aboard as the ship nears U.S. territorial waters (as do ship's pilots), or may be a ship's

officer who assumes this surveillance role as the SNF shipment enters U.S. waters.

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The accompanying individual should be familiar with the vessel's itinerary. Before the vessel

enters port, the individual should verify that the SNF shipment is intact and has not been

tampered with. During unloading of any cargo in U.S. territory, the individual should ensure that

the SNF shipment is unloaded only at the port authorized by the shipper (licensee). Should any

deviation from authorized handling of the SNF shipment occur, the individual should bring the

matter to the immediate attention of the ship's most senior officer present at the time. If it

appears that the SNF shipment is likely to be unloaded at a port other than the planned

destination, the individual should also immediately notify the NRC, the U.S. Coast Guard, and

the licensee by ship-to-shore radio, radiotelephone or other available means.

5.2 Communications for Sea Shipments

In 10 CFR 73.37(e)(4), the NRC requires that each armed escort be equipped with redundant

communications capabilities that provide for two-way communication among the escorts, vessel,

movement control center, LLEA, and one another at all times. The purpose of the

communications requirements for sea shipments is similar to that of road and rail shipments,

which is primarily to ensure that a capability exists to contact the LLEA in case a threat is

detected to the safety or security of the shipment. The communications equipment provided

may be the ship's regular ship-to-shore communications device, but alternate communication

methods should not be subject to the same failure modes as the primary communication

method.

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6 BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS FOR UNESCORTED ACCESS TO

SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL IN TRANSIT

Before granting an individual unescorted access to irradiated reactor fuel in transit, licensees

shall determine if the individual is trustworthy and reliable by completing a background

investigation of the individual in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38. The requirements of

10 CFR 73.38 apply to vehicle operators, escorts, and any other individuals accompanying the

SNF shipment during transport, as well as to movement control center personnel, reviewing

officials, background screeners, and any other access authorization program personnel. The

requirements of 10 CFR 73.38 do not apply to Federal, State or local law enforcement

personnel while performing SNF transport escort duties, nor do they apply to any other persons

identified in 10 CFR 73.59, "Relief from Fingerprinting, Identification and Criminal History

Records Checks and Other Elements of Background Checks for Designated Categories of

Individuals".

The licensee is solely responsible for granting and controlling unescorted access to SNF in

transit. The licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a criminal history records

check solely for the purpose of determining an individual's suitability for unescorted access to

SNF in transit. Each licensee must inform its contractors and vendors involved in the transport

of SNF about the regulations and the need to meet the NRC requirements. The licensee shall

document the basis for its determination to grant or deny an individual unescorted access to

SNF in transit.

As required by 10 CFR 73.380), licensees, contractors, and vendors shall develop, implement,

and maintain written procedures for conducting background investigations for individuals who

are applying for unescorted access to SNF or for reinstatement of unescorted access, and for

individuals who are denied unescorted access in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(j).

6.1 Informed Consent

Before initiating an individual's background investigation for unescorted access, the licensee

must inform the individual and obtain the individual's written consent in accordance with

10 CFR 73.38(d)(1). The individual shall be informed of the types of records that may be

produced and retained, where these records are normally maintained, and the duration of

records retention. The individual shall also be informed of his or her right to review the

information and to assure its accuracy and completeness, as well as to whom and under what

circumstances the information may be released.

An individual may withdraw consent to a background investigation at any time. When an

individual withdraws consent, all processing must cease as soon as practical. Withdrawal of

consent is the same as withdrawal of the application for unescorted access.

6.2 Protection of Information

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.38(f), licensees are required to protect

information collected while performing a criminal history records check and background

investigation. The following are guidelines for the protection of information:

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* Each licensee who obtains an individual's criminal history records check, in accordance

with 10 CFR 73.38(c)(1), shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures

for protecting the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure.

* As specified in 10 CFR 73.38(f)(2), the licensee may not disclose the record or personal

information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his or

her representative, or those who have a need to access the information in performing

assigned duties in the process of determining access to SNF in transit. No individual

authorized to have access to the information may disseminate the information to any

other individual who does not have a need to know.

The personal information obtained about an individual from a criminal history records

check and background investigation may be transferred to another licensee in

accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(f)(3). This transfer may only take place when both of the

following conditions are met:

if the licensee holding the criminal history records check receives the individual's

written request to disseminate the information contained in his or her file

the acquiring licensee verifies information such as the individual's name, date of

birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics

for identification purposes

The licensee shall make criminal history records checks obtained under this section

available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine

compliance with the regulations and laws as specified in 10 CFR 73.38(f)(4).

Under 10 CFR 73.38(f)(5), the licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history

records checks received from the FBI (including data indicating no record), or a copy of

such records if the individual's file has been transferred, for 5 years after termination of

employment or 5 years after the individual no longer requires unescorted access to SNF

in transit.

* After the required 5-year period, all personal information should be destroyed by a

method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part.

6.3 Background Investigation Elements

6.3.1 Fingerprinting and FBI Identification and Criminal History Records Check

Each individual who is seeking or permitted unescorted access to SNF in transit is subject to

fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check as specified in

10 CFR 73.57, "Requirements for Criminal History Records Checks of Individuals Granted

Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or Access to Safeguards Information." The

licensee shall review and use the information received from the FBI in the determination to grant

or deny the individual unescorted access to SNF in transit.

As specified in 10 CFR 73.38(d)(1), the licensee shall notify each affected individual that the

32
fingerprints will be used to secure his or her criminal history records check and shall inform the

individual of the procedures for revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as

specified in Section 6.7 of this guidance.

Licensees need not obtain fingerprints if an individual is relieved from the fingerprinting

requirement by 10 CFR 73.59, has had a favorably decided U.S. Government criminal history

records check within the last 5 years, or possesses an active Federal security clearance.

Written confirmation from the agency or employer that granted the Federal security clearance or

reviewed the criminal history records check must be provided. The licensee must retain this

documentation for a period of 5 years from the date the individual no longer requires unescorted

access to SNF in transit.

All fingerprints obtained by the licensee under 10 CFR 73.38(d) must be submitted to the NRC

for transmission to the FBI.

6.3.2 Collection of Fingerprints

Licensees should have individual's fingerprints taken by an authorized official, such as a

representative from an LLEA. However, for the purposes of taking fingerprints, an authorized

official could be available through private entities, contractors, or an established onsite

fingerprinting program. If a licensee has fingerprints taken at a facility other than that of a

recognized Federal, State, or local law enforcement agency, then the licensee should ensure

that the prints are taken legibly and match the identity of the individual named on the fingerprint

card. In these cases, the individual taking fingerprints should, at a minimum, do the following:

Be trained to take fingerprints (training to take fingerprints is offered through the FBI, or

may be available from LLEAs and some professional associations).

Verify the identity of the individual being fingerprinted by checking a government-issued

picture identification (e.g., passport or driver's license) and comparing the name on the

fingerprint card to the name listed on the government-issued identification.

* Sign the block on the fingerprint card labeled "SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE

FINGERPRINTS."

As required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(3), licensees shall submit one completed, legible standard

fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint

records for each individual seeking unescorted access to SNF in transit, to the NRC's Division

of Facilities and Security, ATTN: Criminal History Program, Mail Stop T-06E46, Rockville, MD

20852. Overnight mail is preferred. Include with the cards the name and address of the person

to whom the individual's criminal history records check should be returned for review.

Copies of the required forms may be obtained by writing to the Office of Information Services,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, by calling 301-415-7232, or by

e-mail to forms.resourceDnrc.aov. Alternative formats for requesting the forms are set forth in

10 CFR 73.4. The licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the

fingerprint impressions results in a low rejection rate because of illegible or incomplete cards.

Licensees may also submit fingerprints to the NRC electronically. However, for many licensees

33
this option may be prohibitive because of the cost associated with the purchase of electronic

fingerprinting equipment. To establish an electronic fingerprinting program with the NRC,

contact the NRC's Facility Security Branch at 301-415-6511. Electronic submission of

fingerprints to the NRC must come directly from the licensee.

Once the NRC has reviewed submitted fingerprint cards for completeness, they will be scanned

and transmitted electronically to the FBI. The cards are retained and secured for approximately

1 month, after which time they are destroyed in accordance with Federal guidelines.

Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to

the licensee for corrections. The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one

resubmission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions

are unclassifiable (i.e., cannot be read by the FBI and used to identify the individual). The one

free resubmission must include the FBI transaction control number (TCN). Additional guidance

on resubmittal of fingerprint cards can be found in Section 6.3.4 below.

Fingerprints may be unclassifiable for several reasons:

0 incomplete impressions (fingers not completely rolled from one side of the nail to the

other)

* left and right hands reversed on the fingerprint card

* the same hand or finger printed twice on the card

0 fingerprints are not clear and distinct (smudged, uneven, too dark or light)

* fingers on card missing or partially missing without an explanation

To avoid FBI rejection of fingerprints as unclassifiable, the licensee must ensure that they are of

good quality and do not include any of these deficiencies, and that instructions on the back of

the fingerprint card have been followed completely.

The FBI has provided guidance on taking fingerprints for submission to the FBI at

httg://www.fbi.qov/hg/ciisd/takinqfps.html .

Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall submit

payment with the application for processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check,

cashier's check, or money order made payable to "U.S. NRC." (For guidance on making

electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at

301-415-7404.) Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The application fee

is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record

submitted by the NRC on behalf of a licensee and an NRC processing fee, which covers

administrative costs associated with NRC handling of licensee fingerprint submissions. The

NRC publishes the amount of the fingerprint application fee on the NRC public Web site. Once

the NRC receives the FBI identification and criminal history records check results, it will forward

them to the licensee.

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6.3.3 Resubmittal of Fingerprints

The overwhelming majority of fingerprint cards are returned as classifiable (i.e., can be read by

the FBI and used to identify the individual). However, if the initial fingerprint submission is

returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified, the licensee may

retake and resubmit them (i.e., new Form-258 or electronic submission) for a second attempt.

The licensee.will not be charged for the resubmission if the licensee provides a copy of the FBI

response indicating that the fingerprints could not be classified or provides the FBI TCN.

If the FBI is unable to classify the second submission of fingerprints, the licensee may submit

additional fingerprint impressions as follows:

(1) The third fingerprint card submission will require payment of an additional processing

fee.

(2) If the third submission is also returned as unclassifiable, the licensee may submit a

fourth set of fingerprints. An additional fee is not required because the fee for the third

submission included one resubmission. As with the second submission, the FBI's

response or TCN must be included or the submission may be treated as a new

submission and an additional fee may be imposed. The licensee may opt to take and

submit the third and fourth sets of prints together to avoid a potential delay in response.

If the third set is returned as unclassifiable, the NRC will automatically resubmit the

fourth set.

(3) If the fourth submission is returned as unclassifiable, the licensee should submit to the

NRC six additional fingerprint cards for the individual. All six cards will be forwarded to

the FBI, which will select the best quality prints from each card to make a complete set

of fingerprints. An additional processing fee is required, which covers the processing of

all six fingerprint cards but does not include an additional resubmission.

(4) If the FBI is unable to obtain classifiable fingerprints from the six cards based on

conditions other than poor quality (e.g., medical conditions or physical anomalies that

prevent the taking of readable prints), then the NRC will automatically request a

background check based on a name search for the individual and will forward the results

to the licensee.

(5) No further submissions will be required and the licensee may consider the results of the

name search-based FBI identification and criminal history records check as a

component in determining the trustworthiness and reliability of the individual in

accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(e).

6.3.4 Verification of True Identity

Licensees shall verify the true identity of an individual who is applying for unescorted access to

SNF in transit to ensure that the individual is who he or she claims to be as required by

10 CFR 73.38(d)(4). The licensee shall review official identification documents (e.g., driver's

license, passport, Immigration and Naturalization Service Form 1-9 (if applicable), government

identification, birth certificate issued by a State, province, or country of birth) and compare the

documents to personal information data provided by the individual to identify any discrepancy in

35
the information. The licensee should verify identity in the following ways:

Compare a valid (not expired) official photo identification (e.g., driver's license, passport,

government identification) with physical characteristics of the individual.

* Cross-check and compare pertinent data from the background investigation with

information supplied by the applicant (e.g., social security number, date of birth, physical

characteristics of the individual).

Licensees shall document the type, expiration, and identification number of the identification or

maintain a photocopy of identifying documents on file in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(f).

Licensees shall certify and affirm in writing that the identification was properly reviewed and

shall maintain the certification and all related documents for review during NRC inspections.

6.3.5 Employment History Evaluation

As required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(5), licensees must document the employment history of the

individual seeking unescorted access to SNF in transit for the past 10 years or since the age of

18, whichever is shorter. The evaluation shall consist of contacts with previous employers and

should include the following information:

* verification of claimed periods of employment or unemployment of 30 days or more

verification of periods of self-employment by reasonable methods (e.g., tax records,

customers, coworkers)

verification of length and nature of each period of employment, including reasons for

termination and eligibility for rehire

* disciplinary history

* any other information that would adversely reflect on the trustworthiness and reliability of

the individual as it relates to the individual being permitted unescorted access

0 verification of activities during interruptions of employment in excess of 30 days

A best effort attempt to verify a 10-year employment history record is required; however, a

minimum of a 3-year inclusive employment history immediately preceding the application for

unescorted access is mandatory. Best efforts include such activities as documented attempts to

contact previous employers and obtaining verification by telephone, letter, or other means.

Section 6.3.12 below describes what steps a licensee should take if employment history cannot

be readily verified.

If the licensee could not accomplish the employment history check for the entire 10-year period,

it must include an explanatory statement delineating the reasons. Under no circumstances may

unescorted access be granted based on an employment check of less than the 3 years

immediately preceding the application, and licensees should attempt to include the entire

10-year period.

36
For new hires without an employment history, the licensee will need to rely more on other

aspects of the background investigation. A lack of employment history need not be a negative

consideration in determining whether an individual is deemed to be trustworthy and reliable.

6.3.6 Verification of Education

Licensees must verify any claimed enrollment at an educational institution during the previous

10 years, as.required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(5). In addition, the licensee shall verify the highest

claimed post-high school attendance leading to a degree, regardless of when the degree was

conferred. Section 6.3.12 below describes what steps a licensee should take when educational

history cannot be readily verified.

6.3.7 Verification of Military Service

As required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(5), the licensee must verify any periods of active military

service that an individual claims during the previous 10 years by reviewing a copy of the

individual's DD Form 214 ("Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty"). The licensee

should also contact the last duty station, verify the dates of the individual's military service,

determine the conditions under which the individual terminated his or her duty (i.e., honorable or

dishonorable discharge), and if the individual would be eligible to serve again. The results of

this contact should be documented. Section 6.3.12 below describes what steps a licensee

should take when military service cannot be readily verified.

6.3.8 Credit History Evaluation

As specified in 10 CFR 73.38(d)(6), licensees shall ensure that the full credit history of any

individual who is applying for unescorted access to SNF in transit is evaluated. A full credit

history evaluation must include, but is not limited to, an inquiry to detect potential fraud or

misuse of social security, numbers or other financial identifiers, and a review and evaluation of

all of the information that is provided by a national credit-reporting agency about the individual's

credit history. During the course of the credit history evaluation, licensees must comply with all

Federal and applicable State and local laws and regulations that govern credit history reports

and access to such reports, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

For foreign nationals and U.S. citizens who have resided outside the United States and do not

have an established credit history that covers at least the most recent 7 years in the United

States, the licensee must document all attempts to obtain information about the individual's

credit history and financial responsibility from some relevant entity located in that other country

or countries.

6.3.9 Criminal History Review

As required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(7), the licensee's reviewing official shall evaluate the results of

the FBI criminal history records check for an individual who is applying for unescorted access to

SNF in transit to determine whether the individual has a record of criminal activity that may

adversely impact his or her trustworthiness and reliability. The scope of the licensee's review of

the criminal history records check must cover all residences of record for the 10-year period

preceding the date of application for unescorted access authorization. The licensee's reviewing

official is required to evaluate all pertinent and available information in making a determination

37
of unescorted access to SNF in transit. The reviewing official must consider the following:

If negative information is discovered that was not provided by the individual or that is

different in any material aspect from the information provided by the individual, this

information should be considered and decisions based on these findings must be

documented.

Any record containing a pattern of behaviors that indicates that the behaviors could be

expected to recur or continue, or recent behaviors that cast doubt on whether an

individual should have unescorted access to SNF in transit, should be carefully

evaluated before any authorization of unescorted access to SNF in transit.

The licensee shall review the information received from the FBI and consider it, in conjunction

with the trustworthy and reliability requirements included in Section 6.3 of this guide, in

determining whether to grant the individual unescorted access to SNF in transit.

6.3.10 Character and Reputation Determination

The licensee must examine the character and reputation of an individual, as required by

10 CFR 73.38(d)(8), by conducting reference checks with current and former coworkers,

neighbors, or friends. Reference checks may not be conducted with any person who is known

to be a close member of the individual's family, including but not limited to the individual's

spouse, parents, siblings, or children, or any individual who resides in the individual's

permanent household. References used to verify periods of employment or unemployment

cannot also be used for the character and reputation determination.

The applicant's reputation for reliability and trustworthiness should be verified through contact

with at least two references supplied by the applicant and at least two additional references

developed during the investigation. The reference's association with the applicant must be

substantive, such that the licensee can make a meaningful determination of the individual's

character and reputation. The determination should emphasize the following:

* criminal history

* illegal use or possession of a controlled substance

* abuse of alcohol, prescriptions, or over-the-counter drugs

* susceptibility to coercion or bribery

* any other conduct relating to an individual's trustworthiness and reliability to perform job

duties

The licensee must document all contact with character references. In addition, the licensee

must document the source of the developed references. Section 6.2.12 below describes what a

licensee should do if references and developed references cannot be readily verified.

38
6.3.11 Inability or Refusal to Support a Background Investigation

As required by 10 CFR 73.38(d)(5), if a previous employer, educational institution, or any other

entity with which the individual claims to have been engaged fails to provide information or

indicates an inability or unwillingness to provide information within 3 business days of the

request, the licensee shall do the following:

Document the refusal, unwillingness, or inability in the record of investigation.

Obtain a confirmation of employment, educational enrollment and attendance, or other

form of engagement claimed by the individual from at least one alternate source that has

not been previously used.

Independent information may be obtained through interviews with anybody who knows or

previously knew the individual - such as teachers, friends, coworkers, neighbors and family

members.

The NRC understands that simple verbal confirmations of past employment, education, etc. and

timeframe may be all the information an employer or other confirming entity may be willing to

provide on an individual. Although a simple confirmation of the nature and timeframe of past

employment, education, etc. would not in itself suffice to permit a licensee to find an individual

trustworthy and reliable, it would constitute independent corroboration of the accuracy of the

individual's information about that period of personal history.

6.4 Determination of Trustworthiness and Reliability

After obtaining and evaluating all of the information collected during the background

investigation conducted in accordance with 10 CFR 73.38(d), the licensee shall determine

whether the individual is trustworthy and reliable.. If the licensee concludes that there is

reasonable assurance that the individual is trustworthy and reliable and does not constitute an

unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the material, then and only then may the licensee grant

the individual unescorted access to SNF in transit. The licensee shall document its

determination and the basis for it. The licensee shall maintain records of the determination for

5 years from the date the individual no longer requires access to SNF in transit.

It is the licensee's responsibility to make a trustworthiness and reliability determination of an

employee, contractor, or other individual who would be granted unescorted access to SNF while

in transit. It is expected that licensees will use their best efforts to obtain the information

required to conduct a background investigation to determine an individual's trustworthiness and

reliability.

The background investigation consists of a series of data points. Lack of a single data point

(i.e. inability to get employment history, inability to verify military record, inability to get additional

references, etc.) should not necessarily result in a determination that the individual is not

trustworthy and reliable.

6.5 Reinvestigations

39
As required by 10 CFR 73.38(h), licensees shall conduct fingerprinting, an FBI identification and

criminal history records check, and a credit history reevaluation every 10 years for any individual

who has been granted unescorted access to SNF in transit. The reinvestigations must be

completed within 10 years of the date on which these elements were last completed and should

address the 10 years following the previous investigation.

6.6 Prohibitions

A licensee should not deny an individual unescorted access to SNF in transit solely on the basis

of information received from the FBI involving an arrest more than 1 year old for which there is

no information of the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge

or an acquittal.

The licensee should not use information received from a criminal history records check obtained

under these requirements in a manner that would infringe on the rights of any individual under

the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the licensee use the

information in any way that would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, color,

religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, veteran status, or genetic information.

6.7 Right to Correct and Complete Information

As required by 10 CFR 73.38(k), before any final adverse determination, the licensee shall

make available to the individual the contents of any criminal history records check obtained from

the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. Written confirmation by

the individual of receipt of this notification must be maintained by the licensee for a period of

1 year from the date of the notification.

If, after reviewing his or her criminal history record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or

incomplete and requests to change, correct, or explain anything in the record, the individual may

initiate procedures to challenge the determination. These procedures would include challenging

the criminal history records to the law enforcement agency that contributed the questioned

information. Or an individual may challenge the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the

criminal history record by contacting the FBI at:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division

ATTN: SCU, Mod. D-2

1000 Custer Hollow Road

Clarksburg, WV 26306

Instructions for a challenge to the FBI are set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34. The FBI will

forward the challenge to the agency that submitted the data, and will request that the agency

verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from

the agency that contributed eh original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any

necessary change to the individual's criminal history record.

The licensee cannot make a final adverse determination based only upon the criminal records

until the licensee receives the FBI's confirmation or correction of the record.

40
The licensee must provide at least 10 days for an individual to initiate action to challenge the

results of an FBI criminal history records check, although the licensee may allow more time.

The licensee may use its own judgment for other elements of the background information.

41

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE TABLES

Table I - Sample Route Mileage Summary

Il :I

43
Table 2 - Sample Detailed Route Plan1

State:

Statewide Emergency Response Number:

Governor's Designee and Phone Number:

Communications: Satellite:

Cell Coverage:

County2 IContacts 3 Safe Havens 4 Routes

_ _ _ __ 1 _ _ _ 1 __ _ j _ _ _

I +

__________ 1 _________________________________ .1. _________________ 4 ____________________

The reviewer should verify that this portion of the application is designated correctly. The

information associated with the location of safe havens is designated Safeguards Information.

2 Identify each county within the State that the shipment will pass through.

3 Identify the 24-hour emergency contact information for each county, when practicable. 24-hour

numbers are preferred, but daytime phone numbers supplemented by after-hours phone numbers

are acceptable.

Identify the safe havens and their locations.

44
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER

(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev..

NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, If any.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instructions on the reverse) NUREG-0561 Rev. 2

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

Physical Protection of Shipments of Irradiated Reactor Fuel MONTH YEAR

October 2010

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

A.G. Garrett, S.L. Garrett, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

A.S. Giantelli, R.C. Ragland, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Draft

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusive Dates)

6. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor,

provide name and mailing address.)

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, P.O. Box 999, Richland, WA 99352

Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555-0001

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type Same as above', if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

and mailing address.)

Same as above

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

Supercedes NUREG-0561t Revision 1

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) determined that additional security

measures should be put in place during the transport of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and that current security regulations should be

enhanced to further protect SNF during transport. As an interim measure, on October 3, 2002, the NRC began issuing orders to

licensees shipping SNF. Subsequently, NRC promulgated additional requirements for the physical protection of irradiated

reactor fuel in transit. This guide discusses the new regulations and provides a basis on which licensees can develop an

acceptable program for the protection of SNF shipments.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Transportation, security, security measures, licensee, protection, physical protection, shipment, unlimited

shipping, import, export, irradiated, reactor, reactor fuel, nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel, SNF, 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

uranium, plutonium, fission products, transit, transport, regulations, emergency response, safeguards, (This Page)

threat, sabotage, theft, diversion, response force, schedule, safe haven, telemetric monitoring, escort, unclassified

armed, NRC, LLEA, local law enforcement, approval, route, route plan, advance notification, (This Report)

background investigation, fingerprints, unescorted access, credit history, FBI, criminal history, unclassified

employment history, military service, reputation, trustworthiness, reliability, nuclear security, incident

response, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0561 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

FIRST-CLASS

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