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i 

80–190 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–22] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE POSTURE OF THE 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND 

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 20, 2013 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

CATHERINE SENDAK, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Counsel 

TIM MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

AARON FALK, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 20, 2013, Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act—The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern 

Command .............................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 20, 2013 ................................................................................... 39 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2013 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—THE 

POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN 

COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Army ...................... 3 

Kelly, Gen John F., USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Marine Corps ............................................................................................................. 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr. ........................................................................... 47 

Kelly, Gen John F. ............................................................................................ 73 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 43 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 45 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 122 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 120 

Ms. Shea-Porter ................................................................................................ 121 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 119 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 120 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2014 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN 

COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 20, 2013. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning. 

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the posture 

of both our Northern and our Southern Command. 

I am pleased to welcome General Charles Jacoby, Commander of 

the U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command; and General John Kelly, Commander, U.S. Southern Command. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to 

our Nation. And thank you for being here today. 

Even as we proceed in this difficult budget environment and the 

news commands our attention to Africa and the Middle East, we 

must be diligent in keeping our own hemisphere safe. Therefore, I 

was pleased by the Administration’s announcement last Friday affirming the program of the previous administration to deploy 44 

ground-based interceptors at two sites in California and Alaska. 

On the other hand, canceling the fourth phase of the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach] sends a terrible signal to America’s allies. I would have hoped after the 2009 fiasco that we would 

stop waking up our Eastern European allies to tell them at the last 

minute that we are changing our missile defense plans on them. 

General Jacoby, I look forward to learning more about how we 

are filling the gaps in our homeland missile defense. 

I also look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress 

being made by the new president of Mexico on drug-related violence and what NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] is doing to 

support Mexico and build their capacity and capabilities. This is a 

daily threat and directly impacting the U.S. homeland and we need 

to treat it as a national security imperative. 

General Kelly, in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is the 

greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. 

While we continue to see success in Colombia, destabilization and 

violence in Central America is rampant. 
2 

Tackling these issues requires close collaboration and coordination with NORTHCOM as well as our interagency partners. Unfortunately, the Navy will eliminate its ship presence in the Caribbean in April due to sequestration. 

This guarantees an increased flow of drugs and illicit networking 

across our borders. To that end, will you please elaborate on the 

other consequences of sequestration in both of your commands. 

Again, thank you, gentlemen, for being here with us today. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to join you in 

welcoming General Jacoby and General Kelly, thanking them for 

their very, very long service. I have had the pleasure of knowing 

both gentlemen for a while. General Jacoby, when he was commander out at Fort Lewis, did a fabulous job, was a real asset to 

our community. 

It is good to see you again. 

And, General Kelly, way back when I was first elected, you were 

working in the liaison’s office, had the opportunity to travel together. You did an outstanding job there and you have done an outstanding job since. 

So it is a real pleasure to have both you gentlemen here today, 

and thank you very much for your service. 

In your current commands, I concur completely with the chairman. We do have to pay attention to our own hemisphere. 

It is our, you know, first and most important line of defense. And 

I have had the opportunity to meet with both of you and I think 

you are doing an excellent job of that. As the chairman said, the 

main thing we want to know is how is sequestration affecting that? 

I know, General Kelly, it is making your primary mission of drug 

interdiction very difficult if you don’t have the assets to do that. We 

would like to have you elaborate a little bit more on the challenges 

of that, and what that means for us here at home, and how it potentially puts our safety at risk. 

Also, you have the unenviable task of monitoring the Guantanamo situation to a certain extent. There are increasingly needs 

down there, in terms of military construction, as we fight the political battle back home as to, you know, whether we ever close it or 

how long it is there. 

It is beginning to have implications long-term. I think it would 

be good for this committee to learn a little bit more about those implications and the challenges you face. If we are going to keep it 

open, there are funding obligations that are coming in order to 

make sure that our troops that are serving down there have the 

facilities and the support that they need. 

On the homeland side, I had the pleasure of visiting 

NORTHCOM not long ago. I am learning a little bit more about 

what your command is focused on. 
3 

Certainly air defenses—what you do every day to track and monitor and protect our airspace—is something I don’t think most people are aware of. We appreciate that. We would like to hear more 

about that. I concur with the chairman’s concerns about missile defense, how we need to pay attention to protecting our homeland 

from rising threats in other parts of the world. 

And lastly, of course, the situation in Mexico is an ongoing and 

evolving concern. Thus far, we have managed to, I think, protect 

this country fairly well, even as the violence in Mexico has become 

extreme. 

But going forward, I would like to hear more about our partnership with Mexico with their newly elected government, where you 

see that going—how we can build on that partnership hopefully to 

begin to make Mexico less violent but certainly to make sure that 

we protect our country from any spillover results from that violence. 

With that I yield back and I thank you very much, both of you 

again, for your service and for testifying today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will include your written statements in the record. Without 

objection, so ordered. 

General Jacoby. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. ARMY 

General JACOBY. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today. 

It is a pleasure to be here with my friend and fellow combatant 

commander, General John Kelly. On behalf of the men and women 

of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate this committee’s continuing support 

of our important missions. 

Now in the case of U.S. NORTHCOM, our missions include 

homeland defense. And it is my number one priority mission, and 

a mission in which we also work closely with Canada in our integrated NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] binational command. 

Next, we remain active in conducting our core mission of defense 

support to civil authorities, for which the highlight last year was 

our participation in the interagency response to Hurricane Sandy. 

And finally, alongside cooperative defense activities with our ally, 

Canada, we continue to conduct security cooperation efforts with 

our close partners in Mexico and the Bahamas. 

Now, our NORAD missions specifically include aerospace warning and control and maritime warning for the United States and 

Canada. Our command’s motto is, ‘‘We have the watch.’’ This reflects the vigilance with which we approach our duties and commitment to both the American and Canadian people. We execute our 

NORAD missions principally through our well-honed and uncompromising, 24/7 defense of our skies, Operation Noble Eagle. 
4 

Now our citizens have high expectations of our ability to defend 

and support them here in the homeland, and rightfully so. In the 

event of a natural or manmade disaster, U.S. NORTHCOM meets 

those expectations by leveraging the tremendous capabilities and 

capacities of the Department of Defense to support a lead Federal 

agency such as FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency]. 

Hurricane Sandy offered us a glimpse of what a complex catastrophe which spans several States and regions could look like. We 

will continue to mature the successful dual status command construct provided in the 2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization 

Act] so that we will be ready to act swiftly and with unity of effort 

when the unthinkable happens and we are called. 

Now we are facing an increasingly complex and dynamic security 

environment. Threats are adapting and evolving while technologies 

advance and proliferate, creating greater vulnerability in the homeland than ever before and complicating the accomplishment of our 

mission sets from cyber and ballistic missile defense to the disruption and defeat of transnational criminal organizations. 

As such, a critical command priority is to advocate and develop 

capabilities in our core mission areas in order to outpace these 

threats. Yet, while we are confronted with this emerging threat 

landscape, the current fiscal environment adds uncertainty to the 

availability and development of the capabilities we will need to 

manage the risks these threats will pose. 

Readiness concerns are sure to grow, as clearly described by our 

recent service chief testimonies. My most pressing of those will include unforecasted cuts to training and exercise programs which 

are fundamental to building the partnerships essential for responding to events in the homeland. Unexpected loss of service capabilities in readiness could also, in the future, erode our ability to conduct our critical homeland defense missions. 

Now as we look forward, despite these challenges, our current 

layered partnerships and history of training, education, and exercise programs for now leave U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD postured to defend the Nation against a full spectrum of threats, but 

we will have to work hard with the Services to sustain that posture 

as we deal with program and budget uncertainty. 

Now, today and in the future, we will remain committed to deter, 

prevent, and defeat aggression aimed at the United States and 

Canada as two commands oriented on a single vision. With our 

trusted partners we will defend North America, outpace and mitigate threats, maintain faith with our people, and support them in 

their times of greatest need. 

We will need this committee’s continued support to meet that vision. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I 

look forward to the questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in the 

Appendix on page 47.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Kelly. 
5 

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SOUTHERN COMMAND, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General KELLY. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to 

come here this morning and talk about something I am very proud 

of, and that is the United States Southern Command. 

We are going to talk about four missions very briefly. The first, 

and as the chairman pointed out, countering transnational organized crime. It is both a Title 10—there is a Title 10 aspect to this 

as well as security cooperation activities that we are involved in 

every day. 

Our support to law enforcement includes detention—detection, 

rather, and monitoring operations. We share information. We build 

capacity of countries we work with in the south in an attempt to 

dismantle these hugely powerful, ruthless, and very well financed 

organizations. 

The second mission is partner engagement. We focus on building 

relationships with regional militaries to enhance the defense of the 

United States and the security of Latin America. Human rights 

play a role in virtually everything we do, from my engagements 

with regional leaders to our joint training teams that are working 

alongside our partner nations in Central America, South America, 

and the Caribbean. 

Militaries in this region have made enormous strides in terms of 

professionalization and respect for civilian authorities and human 

rights, thanks in very large measure to what the U.S. military has 

done over at least two decades. 

The third thing we do down there is contingency response. This 

involves planning for a wide range of possible crises like natural 

disasters, mass migration. We have seen that in the past—evacuation of American citizens. 

And finally, a fourth is, as Congressman Smith pointed out, 

Guantanamo Bay. I manage and take care of the detainees. I support the commissions. I do not have any role in the commissions 

per se, but that is the fourth and final mission that the U.S. Southern Command is responsible for. 

And I certainly look forward to answering all of your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Kelly can be found in the 

Appendix on page 73.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

With the Administration’s pivot to the Pacific we must not lose 

sight of the security and stability within our own hemisphere. 

What do both of you consider the greatest threat to our hemisphere? 

I think when we were talking yesterday we talked about we have 

troops around the world. We travel ‘‘this way’’ [east and west], and 

we don’t travel much ‘‘this way’’ [north and south]. 

And I think that we need to make sure that we are not taking 

for granted our neighbors, [to] the south, and our own borders here. 

So, if you could tell us what you think is our greatest threat in our 

hemisphere. 

And then what do you believe, in addressing this threat—what 

part of the DOD’s [Department of Defense] core mission is part of 

supporting other agencies? And what do you think—what do you 
6 

see the problems with sequestration is going to cause in your commands? 

General JACOBY. Chairman, I will start, if I may. 

First of all, as the commander responsible for the defense of the 

homeland and how we support our citizens in the homeland with 

military capabilities, I would say, to put as fine a point on it as I 

can, the thing that is troubling most to me would be a weapon of 

mass destruction that arrives in the country through some illicit 

organization, or—whether it is terrorist or transnational criminal 

or of any nature. And that is my biggest concern. 

And that is why our principal effort in our chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear response enterprise is so important and 

has been maintained at a very high standard and we are receiving 

continued support from the Services on that. So I think that is 

really the—before I go to bed, that is what I would worry about the 

most. 

Secondly are unexpected activities or events in the homeland, 

whether natural or manmade. Unexpected catastrophe could come 

from the fault systems on the West Coast to earthquakes or volcanic activity—something of a ‘‘Sandy-times-two,’’ ‘‘Sandy-timesthree,’’ where we would have to be very focused and not being late 

to need—to support our citizens. 

And so that may sound strange to have it be that high on the 

list, but since I have been in command I have had three major hurricanes, two major wildfires. We were very active in the last major 

Northeast snowstorm. So there is an expectation that we are going 

to do better and better at supporting our civil authorities in that 

regard. 

And then we have some of the standard, longstanding, what I 

call now ‘‘hybrid’’ threats—states that can range or pose a threat 

to us, all the way from traditional means, whether it is missiles, 

aircraft, existential threats, but all the way down to unattributable 

threats such as cyber. And so those are new types of threats. They 

are difficult to deter across the entire spectrum because of degrading amounts of attribution and deterrent capability that we have. 

So those are the—really the three bins of things that concern me 

in the homeland. 

In supporting other agencies, in the homeland I get depth in the 

defense of the homeland by partnering. That is how I get depth— 

by creating relationships across Federal, State, and local agencies 

that allow us to see the whole ‘‘safety, security, defend’’ paradigm. 

And the better we are doing as partners in safety and security the 

less we may have to do in defend, or the more effective we are if 

we have to defend. 

And so, for instance, along the Southwest border, that is a terrific opportunity for us to partner with Customs and Border Protection services. 

They have got the lead. They have got the mission. But they are 

that front line of defense for illicit activity that could come into the 

country. And although they don’t work on it every day, they are 

having an effect that is very beneficial for perhaps other types of 

illicit activity that would fall more within NORTHCOM’s realm. 

So that is where I think that partnering with other agencies may 

be a little more important in the homeland than just about any-
7 

place else. And we have wonderful partners. In our headquarters 

today, 60 interagency partners from 50 agencies help bring a unity 

of effort that we haven’t seen in the past before. 

And finally, on sequestration, just a brief comment, Congressman, and I can go into more detail later, but I don’t own a lot of 

assigned forces in the homeland so I am reliant on trained and 

ready forces provided to me by the Services on very short notice. 

And so, as service readiness erodes, as risks are taken across the 

readiness front, that will have an impact on my ability to accomplish my missions from homeland defense, defense support to civil 

authorities, and theater security cooperation with our critical partners in Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas. 

The final thing on sequestration is the morale factor for the people that work for NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. And so 

the idea of, for instance, of furloughing civilians—my civilians are 

critical to what I—what we do. That is one of the great changes 

I have seen over 36 years of service is the role civilians now play. 

They help us with missile defense. They help us with—they are 

essential to our NORAD mission across all of our mission sets. And 

so telling them that they are going to take a 20 percent pay cut 

because we haven’t been able to manage our budget is a really 

tough pill to swallow for dedicated, loyal, committed members of 

my team. 

So thank you, Congressman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Kelly. 

General KELLY. Mr. Chairman, I think the committee understands that the U.S. Southern Command has traditionally, at least 

in the last 10 or 15 years, been kind of the economy of force command of all the geographical ‘‘CINC [commander in chief]-doms.’’ 

So, for a long time we have operated down in the Latin America 

or Caribbean without a lot of assets. Now, the good news story is 

there is not, from a military point of view, there is not a great 

number of military threats down there, at least towards the United 

States. 

But I am the beginning of the away game, if you will, for Chuck 

Jacoby’s home game. If he is worrying about things that are coming 

across the Mexican border or coming through a port somewhere in 

the United States I think we have probably failed him and the 

American people in keeping it away. And I do think we fail the 

American people every day because there is so much that gets 

through that we can’t take off the playing field, if you will. 

The first thing I would—what is the greatest threat down there? 

To me, it is really the network—the network that we deal with. 

Obviously, you think about drugs initially, but the network we 

deal with is incredibly efficient and it is plugged into a worldwide 

network of crime. And anything that anyone wants to put on that 

network, wherever it is in the world, if it is—if that person, if that 

individual, if that enemy of ours wants to get it into the United 

States, pretty good chance he or she can do it. 

So the network is incredibly concerning to me because, as I say, 

almost anything can get on that network. You know, we watch, obviously, the drugs that come up from Central America and from 

Mexico. A lot of it is taken off the market, so to speak, on the way 
8 

in, but an awful lot of it does get in. We watch individuals come 

into the network from as far away as the Middle East. 

Now, there are individuals that are trying to get into our country 

to make a better way of life and to jobs and things like that, but 

these are not the same kind of people. People pay big, big, big 

money to go from, say, I will give you an example, say Pakistan 

or from places like that, from Iran, pay big money to get into Latin 

America, and then they get on the network and disappear and get 

into America. 

Whatever they are up to, they are not paying—they are not coming here to drive a cab in Washington, D.C., and they are paying 

a lot of money to get here. So the network is the thing that concerns me. 

Like Chuck, what we do in the south and SOUTHCOM [U.S. 

Southern Command] is a very, very whole-of-government, interagency, not just DOD. In my headquarters we have dozens of the 

same kind of individuals that represent the entire U.S. Government—DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], Border Patrol, all of the agencies. They are 

all heroes. They all work as hard as I do to try to serve the Nation 

and keep these malign influences and objects from coming into the 

United States. 

But again, the network is incredibly efficient. It certainly rivals 

anything that Federal Express can do. It has 1,200 hubs that we 

know of in the United States, all controlled by cartels. They move 

hundreds and hundreds of tons of drugs, as an example, along that 

network. 

You know, drugs in America cost us 40,000 lives a year, not all 

from what comes in the country. A lot of it is from prescription 

drugs. But 40,000 people a year die from drugs—our countrymen. 

And you can’t even put a number on the human misery associated with that, with families that lost children and all of that. 

Drugs cost our country $200 billion a year, much of it in trying to 

rehabilitate drug addicts. 

A relatively small amount of it, $26 billion, is used in law enforcement. But if drugs get ashore in Central America they are essentially in the United States with almost—with very, very little 

success in taking them off the market. 

But the profits that the drugs generate from the drug use in the 

United States obviously goes back into the drug cartels’ pockets to 

generate more drugs that come into our country. But it also generates malign influences, or influences in other areas. And we 

know that Islamic extremist groups, as an example, benefit from 

the drug profits from our country. 

We also know that drug trafficking, sex slaves, this kind of 

thing—much of that is financed by the drug trade coming out of 

the United States once the money is laundered down through Mexico and Central America. 

What does sequestration do? Probably the most—the starkest figure I could give you is, generally speaking—and we understand 

this network, by the way, in the same way—almost to the same degree that we understood and understand the Al Qaeda network in 

Africa or in the Middle East. 
9 

But last year—numbers are up and down, but somewhere between 150 and 200 metric tons were taken off before they ever got 

ashore—of cocaine—before they ever got ashore in Honduras. And 

as I say, once it gets ashore in Central America, as hard as the 

Hondurans are in this fight with us, the Guatemalans, the 

Belizeans, the El Salvadorans—and they are shoulder-to-shoulder 

with us in this fight, with terrible, terrible death tolls in their 

countries, and of course, the real shining example of how to win the 

drug war is Colombia, and they are hugely appreciative of what we 

have done for them over the years. 

But the point is that 200 tons—and that costs the U.S. Govern- ment about $600 million to take 200 tons off the market. Because 

of sequestration, if I lose all of the ships I am expected to lose, and 

ships are critical, as is airborne ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance]. If I lose those assets, if they go to zero, and there 

are some that are predicting they will go to zero, then all of that 

cocaine, all of it, will get ashore. And more, I would predict, will 

get ashore and be on the streets of New York and Boston and Portland, Maine, and all the rest of it very, very quickly. 

So we would essentially, with the exception of what our partners 

can do for us, particularly, as I say, the heroic efforts on the Honduran part and the Guatemalans and others—but they take very 

little off the market—all of that drug will get into the United 

States. 

I also have had to cancel much of—some of my engagements in 

Latin America. These are small engagements. These are 12, 15 

members of my staff going down and advising, you know, Colombia, 

Peru, Chile, all of these great partners—Brazil—advising them on 

this, that, or the other thing, maybe sending mobile training teams 

down. But I have had to cancel these. 

And I live and breathe the engagement. I live and breathe on 

small trips down into the AO [Area of Operation] I have had to curtail my own trips in the future down into the AO. 

And, you know, that leaves a question in their minds as to how 

committed the United States is to them. They want us in their 

lives, with the notable exceptions of a few countries. They want us 

in their lives. 

They are very happy on the mil-to-mil relationship we have. 

They are very happy on the law enforcement relationship we have 

with them. But they question the commitment beyond that because 

there is so little interest already in that part of the world. 

Our State Department does tremendous things in our embassies 

throughout the region, but it is hard to argue that the United 

States should be the partner of choice in that part of the world 

when we don’t really do much in the way of partnering anymore. 

So thanks very much for an opportunity to answer that question. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize, I will have to pass and get my questions in a moment. I have got a phone call that I have to take at 10:30, so I will 

pass to Mr. Larsen if he is ready, and when I come back I will take 

my questions then. 

Thank you. 
10 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Do I have Ranking Member Smith’s unlimited time 

to ask questions, as well? 

[Laughter.] 

Didn’t hear an answer. All right, we will move on. 

General Kelly, some questions about Guantanamo, if I could. 

First, with regards to listening and recording of conversations, 

there have been reports of listening devices disguised as smoke detectors in meeting rooms where detainees meet with their defense 

counsel. And are you familiar with this, that JTF–GTMO [Joint 

Task Force Guantanamo] has placed listening devices in meeting 

rooms where detainees have met with attorneys? 

General KELLY. Am I familiar with the issue? 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY. Yes sir, I am. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY. It is nonsense, but I am familiar with the issue. 

Mr. LARSEN. It is why I am asking. It is why I am asking. 

So have these conversations between counsel and detainees been 

listened to or recorded in the detention facility at Guantanamo? 

General KELLY. No. 

Mr. LARSEN. Are there currently any video or audio recording devices in meeting spaces of the detainees and their attorneys? 

General KELLY. Visual—video. 

Mr. LARSEN. There is video. 

General KELLY. And I can elaborate if you want, I—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. 

General KELLY. Guantanamo was built to be a temporary facility—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY [continuing]. Eleven years ago. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY. If we would have had any idea we were going to 

be there even 5 years doing the operations down there that have 

changed significantly, as you know, over the years—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY [continuing]. If we knew we were going to be 

there 5 years even, we would have built a different facility. If we 

would have known we were going to be there 11 years we would 

have built a—you know, so this is kind of really a thrown-together 

operation, and it is really not 11 years long, it is 1 year 11 times. 

And as the ranking member mentioned, I mean, all of these temporary buildings, for the most part, are falling apart. And we really 

do need to get serious about taking care of our troops that are 

down there as well as improving the security—not the creature 

comforts, if you will, for the detainees. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General KELLY. They are already well taken care of in that regard. But taking care of our troops. 

But the point is that many of the—the facility was not built for 

any one thing. So years ago that particular facility was used for another purpose and that purpose required not only audio devices but 

visual devices. It was not used for attorney-client rooms. Again, the 

mission down there has morphed over time. 
11 

So the room that they were using for attorney-client discussions 

still had equipment, but that equipment was not energized, it was 

not used. And I can tell you that without question, we have not violated their rights by listening in. 

Now what I have done is—since this became an issue I said, 

well, let’s just make this simple. Let’s pull it all out. 

And in fact, this week not only have we pulled it all out, with 

exception of the video cameras, we are sending down some 

counterintel people to make sure that they have special technical 

devices to make sure that there is—they are all out. 

So no, they weren’t listened to. Yes, the video devices will remain—temporarily, at least. And the attorneys will understand 

that. 

Mr. LARSEN. And why are the video devices staying? 

General KELLY. Well, some of these men, arguably, are dangerous—arguably are dangerous. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

General KELLY. And although you would think that their defense 

attorneys would be safe, I have a responsibility to protect the defense attorneys as well, as I do the ICRC [International Committee 

of the Red Cross] that visits and the 5,700 non-DOD people that 

have visited Guantanamo since the beginning. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General KELLY. I have a responsibility to protect them, and so 

I believe it is prudent to keep the video cameras going. And we will 

see—if they contest that, which I am sure they will, then we will 

see what the—— 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand. 

General KELLY [continuing]. The judge has to say. 

Mr. LARSEN. I understand. 

With regards to the hunger strikes, what is your understanding 

of why the hunger strike is happening? 

General KELLY. Well we, in talking to the detainees and talking 

to the hunger strikers, so-called—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY [continuing]. They had great optimism that 

Guantanamo would be closed. They were devastated, apparently— 

and I don’t live down there but they work for me—they were devastated—not the detainees, of course—they were devastated when 

the President, you know, backed off, at least their perception, of 

closing the facility. He said nothing about it in his inauguration 

speech; he said nothing about it in his—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

General KELLY [continuing]. State of the Union speech; he has 

said nothing about it. He is not re-staffing the office that would 

be—that was, you know—that looks at closing the facility, so—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General KELLY [continuing]. That has caused them to become 

frustrated and they want to get this—I think turn the heat up, get 

it back in the media. 

And we know that because they talk to us. We have, actually, a 

fairly positive relationship down there with most of the detainees. 
12 

And we have definitions of what a hunger striker is, and of 

course we have an ability to take care of them if they go too far, 

and we will. I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

I see my time is up. Thank you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

And, General Jacoby and General Kelly, it is a pleasure to listen 

to you, as you are leaders of our Nation. And thank you very much. 

And, General Kelly, I think it was maybe a couple years ago I 

either read a book or we had a hearing on the Southern Command, 

and it seems like that I, in my mind, remember whomever spoke 

or the book I read, that there was an interest in the number of 

those from the Middle East coming into Honduras. 

In your comments you made mention, but just very—not casually, but you made mention that Middle Easterners coming into 

Central America. And my question is basically, is there a concern 

from either one of you gentlemen that one country or another country, you are seeing more activity of those from the Middle East 

moving into that country as to the point that maybe the population 

numbers are going to be at a point that they could have some type 

of political influence within that country? 

General KELLY. Probably the country that we see—the country 

we see with the most activity from the Middle East is Iran. They 

have been very, very active over the last few years—a close relationship with Hugo Chavez, of course, in Venezuela. That became 

their kind of best friend in the area. 

But since then they have opened embassies, they have opened 

cultural centers, they have done things like that. On the surface, 

certainly nothing wrong with that if they are just doing that to try 

to create better relations between them and other countries in the 

world, but to what end is obviously the issue. 

In an unclassified setting can’t get into some of the aspects of 

what they are using some of those centers that they are opening 

and even their embassies—what they are using them for, but in an 

open hearing we can say that they are certainly trying to befriend 

or get friends in the region because the more of that they can have 

on their side, you know, things like sanctions and all, activities in 

the U.N., condemnation, they are trying to create friends out of 

that. 

We will leave that, you know, in terms of what I can say in an 

open setting about what the Iranians are doing. 

But just very briefly—and it is not Middle East, but, you know, 

the Chinese, as an example, are doing very similar things economically. They have penetrated Latin America in a big way economically—not a bad thing, but it is something that they are very aggressive, as they are all over the world, frankly. 

Mr. JONES. General Jacoby, would you like to answer, sir? 

General JACOBY. Yes, sir. 

We are keeping our eye very closely on any Iranian activity in 

my area of responsibility. I do not believe that they wield any influence on the governments, but they are certainly aggressive. Iranians are aggressive globally, and so any Iranian involvement in 

Mexico, Canada, Bahamas will be highlighted for us. 
13 

And we have good partnerships there and I don’t see it as a 

threat other than the network itself of any Iranian activity. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be important if I 

might suggest that we hold a classified hearing on Central and 

South America, because of the problem. And you said this, Mr. 

Chairman, in your opening comments—for too long, I think, our 

country—maybe the Congress—has not been as interested in the 

southern hemisphere as we should be. 

And I do think that, from what I have heard from General 

Jacoby and General Kelly today, that a classified hearing to get 

more into the details of the Iranians and also the Chinese would 

be very beneficial, and I assure you I would be here if we have that 

kind of hearing. 

So thank you, gentlemen, very much, and I—40 seconds left, I 

will yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, and thank you for your suggestion. 

We will definitely look into that. We have lots of hearings scheduled the next few weeks, but we will see what we can do on that. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Kelly, the 2009 Guantanamo review team made recommendations for conditions at that facility that it warned might 

become inhumane over time. Since those recommendations were 

made there has been no outside evaluation to assess the current 

conditions of Guantanamo, which have changed since 2009. 

In addition, it is clear that the attorneys who represent the inmates are the best sources of information on the conditions under 

which their clients live. 

General Kelly, in 2009, at the time of the study, the office of 

chief defense council was given less than 24 hours to generate an 

ad hoc list of issues that were forwarded to the 2009 review team 

to consider as they conducted their review. No allowance was made 

for the provision of classified or otherwise protected information. 

At least two defense teams attempted to provide unclassified information under their own initiative and sought permission to provide classified or otherwise protected factual information, but each 

was blocked from providing that information. One team was told 

that the Central Intelligence Agency would not allow them to release the information to the Secretary of Defense or his staff. 

Inmate lawyers are certainly a better place to learn and transmit 

information about the impact of confinement conditions on their detainee clients. They are better equipped than any other source. A 

more reliable study would allow meaningful input by counsel. 

Why has there been no followup with regard to these conditions 

identified in the 2009 Guantanamo review? 

General KELLY. Congressman, first—and I don’t mean to challenge you—but there is no one on this earth that is better positioned to tell you what the conditions are inside Guantanamo than 

me. No one. Not their defense attorneys. Not their families. Nobody. 

I can tell you that they are humanely dealt with. They are obviously in jail. They are in a detention facility. But from the standards that are set in our own country in terms of these kinds of operations—in fact, the ICRC gives us very, very high marks down 
14 

there every time they visit for how they are treated and how they 

are dealt with—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well certainly, General, I accept the fact that you 

assert and have no reason to doubt what you are asserting, but in 

terms of independent assessment, that is what I am talking about. 

The attorneys seem to have been shut out of the process, and 

moreover, there appears to be no followup with regard to the conditions that were cited in the 2009 study that may become inhumane 

conditions. And so I think that it deserves a fresh look. It deserves 

an impartial look and a full investigatory look from different perspectives. 

So I understand your perspective. I think the defense counsel has 

a different perspective, and perhaps some of the organizations 

bring their own perspectives to that mix. 

Why hasn’t there been a followup? 

General KELLY. As I say, Congressman, I have no agenda at 

Guantanamo other than to do what my President has charged me 

to do: to take care of 166 prisoners—excuse me, detainees—and to 

take care of them humanely and provide them all of what they 

need on a day-to-day basis. And I do—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well my question is, why hasn’t there been a followup—— 

General KELLY. I do that every day. 

ICRC comes down regularly unannounced and announced. They 

know what goes on inside the detention facility. They give us high 

marks. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So pretty much we are just going to have to rely 

on your assertion to us that everything is fine down there in Guantanamo and we are not going to get an independent review of the 

conditions down there? Is that what you would testify to? 

General KELLY. We get an independent view on a regular basis. 

The International Committee of the Red Cross is down there regularly. I mean, that—they are as independent as anyone. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I don’t know if their agenda is the same as defense 

counsel or other interested parties’ might be. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

I would ask the gentleman, have you had a chance to go to Guantanamo? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to go again? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Actually, I would like to see that facility closed 

and I would like to see the inmates housed elsewhere. 

The CHAIRMAN. The reason I am asking, I would be happy to put 

together a CODEL [congressional delegation] for any members that 

would like to go down there and see for themselves the situations 

they see at—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. I will state for the record that when I was down 

there about 5 years ago I was definitely impressed with—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Five years, and the general has been down there 

much more recently than that. But if you would like to go, let me 

know and we will put together a CODEL for anyone that would 

like to—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I may take you up 

on that. 
15 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you not just for offering to do that, 

but for your leadership in having had those CODELs before, and 

you have taken a lot of members down there. I had the privilege 

of going down there with you and we got to see firsthand, and we 

are about as independent as you could get from this committee. 

And, General, I think you are doing a great job and we appreciate your efforts down there. 

General Jacoby, in the prepared testimony of the director of national intelligence last week he stated—said, ‘‘We judge Iran would 

likely choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran’s ballistic weapons are capable of delivering WMD [weapons of mass destruction]. In addition, Iran has 

demonstrated an ability to launch small satellites and we grow increasingly concerned that these technical steps, along with a regime hostile toward the United States and our allies, provide 

Tehran with the means and motivation to develop larger space 

launch vehicles and longer-range missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile.’’ 

General, do you agree with the statement, and has Iran decided 

to build an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile]? 

General JACOBY. I concur. I agree with the statement by the director. 

It is my belief from every day looking closely at the intelligence 

that Iran is on the path to developing an ICBM and that they have 

demonstrated capabilities that should inform us that they can 

achieve, in the future, an ICBM capability. 

Mr. FORBES. When is the earliest, in your best professional military judgment, that you believe Iran could flight test an ICBM, and 

could they do it this year? 

General JACOBY. Some of these estimates need to be discussed in 

a—— 

Mr. FORBES. I understand. 

General JACOBY [continuing]. In a closed hearing, and we would 

be glad to. I think that we should consider that Iran has a capability within the next few years of flight-testing ICBM-capable 

technologies. 

Mr. FORBES. Are you worried about Iranian military and Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps ballistic missile programs, and are they 

both, in your opinion, under the firm control of the Iranian leadership? And why are there two programs? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, I think that many of the issues 

associated with that very good question need to be discussed in 

closed session. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, General, I would hope that we could arrange 

that so that members of this committee and the chairman could orchestrate an opportunity for us to do that. I think this is a crucial 

thing for us to be looking at. 

And specifically, when we have that—Mr. Chairman, if we could 

have that kind of briefing—we would love to get your input on 

what additional resources, if any, you need to make sure we are 
16 

adequately dealing with this situation. I know some of that you 

will have to give us in that classified setting as well. 

General JACOBY. Thank you, Congressman. I would be very 

happy to do that. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Actually, I spoke with General Dunford on the phone getting an 

update from Afghanistan, so they are doing an outstanding job over 

there, as we all know. 

I want to talk through the Guantanamo thing just for a minute— 

couple of editorial comments and then one question. I know there 

is—we have had this debate and argument in this committee and 

I am not interested in restarting that particular argument at this 

moment, but there are some very severe long-term implications of 

what is going on down there. 

We have I think it is 166 inmates down there now. They are 

aging, as we all are, and there are certain—there is a certain lack 

of support facilities in that general area. And if we are planning 

on keeping them there forever, there is an enormous amount of expense, in terms of both caring for the inmates and then also dealing with our staff down there that has to do that. 

You know, I think medical care is one of the biggest concerns. 

There are not, you know, the first-class facilities down there. And 

as the law stands now, if we have an inmate who has a heart attack, doesn’t die, but needs more complicated care, where is he 

going to get it in Guantanamo? He is not. And that opens up all 

kinds of implications in terms of human rights violations and problems that we would have with our own laws, as well as with international laws. 

And, you know, Miami may be 2 or 3 hours away, but under the 

law right now we can’t take them there, and sort of on, and on, and 

on. We have got, you know, the—not to use the cliche ́d joke, but 

it is the Hotel California: You check in but you can’t ever check out 

on any—— 

And that is not sustainable, you know? I don’t know if it is not 

sustainable past 3 years or 4 years or 10 years, but at some point 

we will have an utterly and completely unworkable situation in 

Guantanamo if we continue to say that once you are there you 

can’t ever be let out. We need to think about that as policymakers 

and how we are going to deal with it. 

And in the short term, since we have a standoff between the Administration that would like to close Guantanamo and Congress 

that will not let them, Congress wins that fight—just the nature 

of the process—so the place stays open, but we then have expenses 

of keeping it going. 

So with that preamble, the question is: What are your short-term 

needs—things that we simply have to begin building down there? 

And, you know, we hate to invest military construction down there 

if you think the place isn’t going to stay open very long, but we 

reach the point where we have to because it is open. It is going to 
17 

be open for the foreseeable future regardless of how any one of us 

feels about that. 

So what are the short-term needs that this committee and this 

Congress has to provide to you to make sure that your troops down 

there get the support they need to do the job that they are doing? 

General KELLY. Congressman, we briefly discussed this yesterday. I am with you, by the way, on the medical care. I have gotten 

some legal opinion from the general counsel of DOD, who has advised me on what our—not necessarily our public affairs position 

is relative to, as you point out, one of them having, say, a heart 

attack and we stabilize him there on-island but can’t move him off 

to a higher level of care—— 

Mr. SMITH. We are stealing that example directly from what you 

said to me yesterday, so for full attribution, but go ahead. 

General KELLY. So, that is a concern, but I am told legally as 

long as they have access to all of the medical care that is available 

on-island—which is—it is considerable. There is a naval hospital 

there, but it is kind of a small—it would be like a small town hospital. It is—doesn’t have a higher level of care for, say, cancer 

treatment or kidney treatment or something like that. 

But in any event, I have dealt—worked with the general counsels 

on this issue and feel as though at least the advice they have given 

me is we are within the law so long as they have access—and immediate access—to any and all medical care on-island, and they, of 

course, have that. 

As far as things like MILCON [military construction], if we 

would have built that—if we had built the facility down there 

thinking that it would even be open 10 years, we would have built 

a far different facility. 

So what are the immediate needs down there? I have 1,900 mostly uniformed personnel in JTF Guantanamo Bay—Joint Task Force 

Guantanamo Bay—roughly 1,900. They are living in, to say the 

least, not squalor but in some pretty questionable—we need to take 

care of our troops. So we have several MILCON projects that I 

have submitted. 

And as you know, Congressman, everything that is built down 

there is at least twice as expensive because everything that we 

build with, to include the carpenters that have to build it, has to 

come—— 

Mr. SMITH. You have got to get people there. 

General KELLY. Yes. So it is really 55 percent, so a 10-penny nail 

costs 20 cents. So everything is more expensive. 

So we have to take care of barracks. We have to replace the dining hall, the mess hall, as marines would call it. It prepares meals 

not only for my guard personnel, most of whom, as I say, are uniformed, but the—for the detainees, as well. It is literally falling 

apart. 

And there are other projects that have to do with—none of them 

have anything to do with, you know, if you will, creature comforts 

for the detainees. They are already living humanely and comfortably, acknowledging the fact they are in jail, but they are humanely and comfortably treated. 

So none of these projects would enhance their lifestyle, if you 

will. But some of the projects will add security and better ease of 
18 

movement for them. That will benefit the guard force, not the detainees—make the guard force’s life a lot less complicated. But we 

are talking in the neighborhood of $150 billion to $170 billion—excuse me—million dollars, so it is a considerable bill. 

There are other projects that I couldn’t talk about here in the 

open, but do have to do with replacing one of the camp facilities 

where some of the detainees are—special detainees are housed. We 

could get into that off-line if you want. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

General KELLY. But that is where we are right now. These are 

things that we have to do right now. 

I am assuming Guantanamo will be closed someday, but if we 

look into the past 11 years, it was supposed to be temporary. Who 

knows where it is going? We have got to take care of our troops. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. I completely agree with that. 

That is all I have. I have had the opportunity to speak with General Jacoby before and visit with him so most of my questions have 

been answered. 

So, sir, I will yield back. 

And again, thank you, gentlemen, both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

And staff has informed me that Congresswoman Roby is leading 

a delegation to GTMO [Guantanamo] on April 22nd. We have three 

other members signed up, so anybody else that would like to go, 

please contact staff and get on that trip and we will send out some 

notice to all of the members if they have an interest to join in that 

CODEL. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank both of you for being here today. 

And, General Kelly, I am so pleased with the success of Plan Colombia. Our family works with the Partners of the Americas program, where each American State is associated with a part of Central and South America. South Carolina is associated with Southwest Colombia. We have hosted exchange students from Cali. Two 

of my sons have actually been exchange students to Cali. 

And so this is a success story about Plan Colombia that the 

American people need to know. If you could tell us what the current status is, that would be very helpful. 

General KELLY. It is a great program. I have had something to 

do with it in other places other than SOUTHCOM, but I just talked 

to SOUTHCOM. I think we have 26 partnerships with States’ National Guard all over the Caribbean, Latin America, Central America. It is a great program. It is a grassroots program. 

I think the exchange is both ways, as you point out. I mean, people in South Carolina, to use your example, have learned a lot 

about a place they would have never—probably couldn’t find on a 

map, except that there is this great relationship between Colombia 

and the South Carolina Guard. 

I think they, as I said, they get more out of the—just the example we show them and how we interact with them on a mil-to-mil 

basis. You know, we treasure in our country the relationship between the military—civilian control of the military. A lot of countries in the world don’t see that, but increasingly, through the 
19 

guard program or the partnership program, more and more countries are getting that message. 

Same thing with human rights. I mean, we can lecture people all 

day long about human rights, but by our example, by the great 

guys and gals from South Carolina National Guard or whatever 

that they interact with, they get it. And they get it more and more 

and more. 

So I can’t say enough good things about the program, sir. 

Mr. WILSON. And how would you characterize the level of violence that has been addressed in Colombia? And the American people really aren’t aware. Actually, this is a country of 40 million people. It is huge. And it—the people there are just extraordinary. And 

so the level of violence is—how is that being addressed? 

General KELLY. Fifteen, 17 years ago when I worked up here as 

a—the Marine liaison, I can remember the debates about Colombia, 

and some of you will remember those debates. Colombia was considered at the time to be a failed state. You couldn’t move outside 

of your home in Colombia without being at risk of being killed. I 

mean, the country was run by the Medellin and the Cali cartels. 

I mean, and here we go—or here we are a few years later with 

a considerable investment of U.S. funds—I mean, it is in the billions of dollars. But now we have a country that is not only shoulder-to-shoulder with us fighting our drug problem down there— 

they took 200 tons of cocaine off the market before it ever left their 

country and got into places like Venezuela or started the trip up 

to Central America—200 tons. 

The biggest IED [improvised explosive device] casualty problem 

in the world outside of Afghanistan is in Colombia because it is 

how the cartels protect the factories in the jungle that make the 

cocaine, or how the growers—the cartels, the FARC [Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia]—how they protect the grower—you 

know, the orchards, if you will. They are in this thing, but the violence—it is an amazing place. 

You can go to Medellin now and go out to dinner and there is 

no violence. In Bogota where you used to be able to—you could 

hear the bombs going off at night from the FARC, and now all of 

that is pushed very—is pushed well away from the population centers. So the violence has gone down dramatically in the last 10, 12 

years. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, congratulations—an extraordinary success 

story. 

General Jacoby, I am very concerned and—but also supportive of 

missile defense. In the 2013 budget request there was a reduction 

in the ground-based midcourse defense program of $256.8 million. 

Why was the funding reduced and how does this impact the reduction of GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse Defense] operations reliability and any modernization? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, I would have to look exactly at 

what those cuts were in. In 2013 we have made some great 

progress, particularly with testing, which is directly impacting the 

reliability of the GBI [Ground-Based Interceptor] fleet. So I think 

that what we have seen with the rollout, the introduction of new 

initiatives in ballistic missile defense that was announced Friday, 
20 

I think we are on a good path to outpace the threat—both North 

Korean and Iranian threats in the future. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask—I had 

a NORTHCOM question. I am from Texas and we are a border 

State, and I wanted to know particularly about the drug-related violence in Mexico and partnering with the Mexican police to bolster 

efforts there. 

General JACOBY. All right, thanks for the question. We have had 

a really important change over the last 4 years or so, probably a 

little bit more than that, in our military-to-military relationship 

with Mexico. We have become very good partners and a lot of that 

has been a centerpiece of, you know, going after, together, a shared 

problem, which is the drug-related violence. 

And so I can point to numerous routine border conferences that 

are held between U.S. law enforcement and U.S. military and 

Mexican military. They are very beneficial. They are very cordial, 

and they make real progress: improved communications, improved 

information sharing. And we have not seen diminishment of that 

over the change of administration—the recent change of administration in Mexico. 

So there is still a lot of work that has to be done. There is still 

more violence than either country wants. 

The violence shifts around a bit. There is less in the north now 

and more deeper into Mexico. There has been a decrease—a percentage decrease so far in 2013. But it has moved and it has increased in other parts of the country. 

So this is a tough fight against a resolute, well-funded enemy. 

But, you know, the commitment we have with our Mexican partners is very strong, and I believe that our partnership will just 

grow over time. 

Mr. VEASEY. Some of the border cities—you know, El Paso and 

some of the areas in the valley that are along the Texas-Mexico 

border—are some of the safest cities on the United States side. 

With some of the violence, you know, that continues in Mexico, do 

you think that enough is—what we are doing right now is adequate 

enough to ever stop that from spilling over? Because they have 

done it—they have been doing a great job so far. 

General JACOBY. Right. So security is going to remain a moving 

target. It is going to remain a moving target as long as we are not 

having a disruptive effect on the networks themselves. 

And so it is not geographically bound. It is going to be an issue 

of working together across many governments, not just the United 

States and Mexico, and across the agencies to attack this network—this system of networks that is able to exploit 

vulnerabilities and gaps as they expose themselves. 

And when they run into a brick wall that, you know, good law 

enforcement, good partnering has created with technology support, 

they adapt. And they are agile. 

And so, we have to go after the network. We have to go after financiers, logisticians, operators, and leadership. 
21 

And we also have to make sure our institutions—and this is essentially a law enforcement problem so we have to make sure our 

institutions and our partners’ institutions are strong and can provide the kind of security that allows for an environment where we 

can attack the network more effectively. 

Mr. VEASEY. Let me ask you one more question, and this may be 

outside of your purview. The Wall Street Journal has done a really 

good job of highlighting the drug-resistant tuberculosis problem 

that is happening in India. 

And as you know, recently there was someone that actually 

came, you know, from India and tried to come through Mexico, and 

that would have brought that drug-resistant strain here into the 

country. How do you feel about people being on the lookout for— 

and I know it is—obviously you can’t tell if somebody has tuberculosis, but fighting something like that, just someone that looks 

like, you know, a normal person coming in. What do you do about 

that? 

General JACOBY. Well, we have a limited role in Support of Civil 

Authorities, and so we actually do have a plan for how to support 

civil authorities if there was ever a pandemic crisis. So we are 

going to roll up our sleeves and get behind the relevant agencies 

that would deal with that. 

But I think you ask a really good question in terms of—it is not 

illicit activity but unwanted activity that crosses our border, and 

so it goes back to the network. So the network that would bring 

you drugs and what that does to our society, human trafficking, 

money laundering, weapons—there are all kinds of things that can 

ride on that same network. 

And so, as you know, in Texas we had a whole lot of children 

with chicken pox dropped off on the border. Those children did not 

come from Mexico. They came from all over Central America, 

brought on the same wave of these networks and deposited them 

on the border. 

And so I think you bring up a very good point and it is another 

reason why we need to look harder and work with our partners 

across the globe and interagency to get a better handle on this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General JACOBY. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Jacoby, General Kelly, thank you for being here, and 

thank you for your dedication to what is obviously most central to 

our issues of our national security, and that, of course, is the protection of our homeland. 

General Jacoby, I appreciate your characterization of the emerging threats that we see from Iran and North Korea. Probably our 

most important program that we have in trying to respond to an 

emerging threat is the issue of our missile defense. I was very concerned by last Friday’s announcement by Secretary Hagel of the 

scrapping of the portion of the Phased Adaptive Approach that 

would have provided additional protection to the homeland. 

In our policy on missile defense, one of the tenets that we have 

looked for for technical capability is the concept of ‘‘shoot-lookshoot.’’ With respect to North Korea, General Jacoby, do we have 
22 

shoot-look-shoot capability in responding to a North Korean threat 

from the West Coast looking at our assets in California and Alaska? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, shoot-look-shoot makes a lot of 

sense. It makes a lot of sense as a warfighter, not just as a technological means of conducting our tactics for missile defense. So, you 

know, shooting down—you know better than anyone, shooting 

down a ballistic missile is a sniper weapon requirement; it is not 

a machine gun requirement. 

So we want to pursue shoot-look-shoot not just for North Korea 

but as a warfighter technique. Those are emerging capabilities and 

I can discuss them in detail with you in a closed session, but we 

are very much interested and have worked closely with MDA, Missile Defense Agency, to try to improve where we are in shoot-lookshoot. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that, General, and I look forward to 

that. But in an open session, I mean, it has been acknowledged 

that part of the reason why we had the final phase of the Phased 

Adaptive Approach providing that additional forward basing of missile defense to respond to Iran was because we had a deficiency on 

the East Coast with respect to shoot-look-shoot with Iran, both 

the—President Bush’s third site that was proposed for Poland, 

President Obama’s final phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach, 

was an attempt to plug that and provide that additional capability, 

was it not? 

General JACOBY. Phase four of the European Phased Adaptive 

Approach, specifically with the SM–3 [Standard Missile 3] Block 

IIB, was designed to provide a first shot at any Iranian missile that 

could be coming towards the United States. 

Mr. TURNER. And then we would have the additional shot from 

Alaska that we would have as our additional backup. 

General JACOBY. That is correct. 

Mr. TURNER. NORTHCOM, in its 2007–2008 GBI study, had proposed an East Coast site to look to providing that shoot-look-shoot, 

that additional capability when we look to protecting the East 

Coast, both for Iran and for North Korea. 

Now that phase four of the Phased Adaptive Approach is 

scrapped, the—you know, obviously, we see even greater reason for 

that East Coast site, having been an initiative that the House put 

in the National Defense Authorization Act. 

I think you would agree, would you not—I mean, looking at your 

testimony from the Senate, that the—with—building out the Alaska field does not provide us that additional capability that an East 

Coast site would be or that the phase four of the Phased Adaptive 

Approach would have provided or the George Bush third site would 

have provided. Is that correct? 

General JACOBY. What building out the missile field at Fort 

Greely does for us is it allows us to increase our capability in a way 

that would serve both a threat from North Korea and a threat from 

Iran. 

And so as we have adopted the missile defense approach—— 

Mr. TURNER. General, I have a limited amount of time so I am 

sorry to interrupt you—— 

General JACOBY. Sure. 
23 

Mr. TURNER [continuing]. But the NORTHCOM 2007–2008 GBI 

study took into consideration the Alaska site but still made a recommendation for an East Coast side. You would agree that that 

East Coast site would provide us additional capability that we cannot have in merely building on Alaska? 

General JACOBY. I would agree that a third site, wherever the 

decision is to build a third site, would give me better weapons access, increased GBI inventory, and allow us the battle space to 

more optimize our defense against future threats from Iran and 

North Korea. 

Mr. TURNER. One additional issue that I would like to raise, the, 

you know, the old adage of ‘‘all your eggs in one basket’’ seems to 

be similar to the interpretation of the issue of Alaska. 

I mean, we do increase our vulnerability when we limit ourselves 

to a concentration of some missiles in California and a significant 

number in Alaska without that third site. I would think that would 

be an additional justification for a third site. 

General JACOBY. I wouldn’t argue with you on that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Jacoby, General Kelly, thank you so much for being 

here. I am sorry I missed the earlier testimony. 

But I wonder if I could just follow up with my colleague for a second, because, General Jacoby, it sounded to me like you didn’t, you 

know, directly answer that question, and I am just wondering 

whether there are some real downsides to that consideration that, 

perhaps, have not been clear? And we are talking about the East 

Coast site, if you could expand on that. 

General JACOBY. All right. The original missile defense construct 

was for limited defense against limited threats that most of them 

postulated into the future. And what we have done is we have 

availed ourselves of some options that were left open to us by not 

abandoning the rest of—or finishing the construction of missile 

field two in Alaska, not abandoning missile field one. And so that 

has allowed us now to keep ahead, to outpace the threat in North 

Korea. And also it addresses an Iranian threat, as well. 

We are very pleased with the NDAA that has directed us to do 

a study, and it is going to allow us to keep making steps in the 

direction to provide us options in the future so that as a threat 

evolves we can keep pace or outpace the threat. And so I think we 

are on a good path with that. 

I will tell you, all of the missile defense activity really starts with 

intelligence. It really starts with our understanding of the threat 

and building that threat picture and keeping up with it. And so we 

have made important strides in that regard, as well. 

So I take all the points that have been brought up on an East 

Coast field. The fact of the matter is there is still work to be done 

on if a third site, where is the optimum place for a third site, 

given—balancing between those two threats, one of them far more 

advanced than the other threat? 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, thank you. I appreciate that because I think 

it is obviously a point of contention, and—— 

General JACOBY. Sure. 
24 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Doesn’t sound like it is necessarily the 

strategic direction that we need to go right now. 

General JACOBY. What is not in contention is I fully feel responsibility and accountability for the defense of this Nation, not just 

from North Korea but from any threats to the Nation. And so I will 

be the strongest advocate for preparing ourselves and arming ourselves for evolving threat. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, General. If I could come back to you for 

a second, as well. I know that earlier discussing the three greatest 

threats in your area of command—and General Kelly, I am not 

sure if you weighed in in the same way on that on the three—and 

cyber obviously is one of those, and we certainly are well aware of 

that. 

I wondered if you could talk a little bit more, though, about what 

you see the impacts that such attack would have upon our homeland, and whether there are opportunities to use, perhaps, the National Guard differently in preparing for any cyber defense strategies. And are there other opportunities that you think, perhaps, because of cost constraints or just about anything else, that we are 

not doing to the extent that you would suggest? 

General JACOBY. On the cyber front, we share cyber concerns 

with Strategic Command and Cyber Command specifically. But we 

have great partners in the National Guard, strong partnership 

with the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI. And so 

that is how the spectrum of responsibilities kind of unfolds in the 

homeland, where the President’s executive order and the PDD 

[Presidential Decision Directive] really helped illuminate some 

stratification of responsibilities, and I think that is swimming into 

focus pretty well. 

Within the Department, roles and responsibilities for the different components—Active, Title 10 Reserve, and National Guard— 

we are working hard on those. It is really important that in the 

cyber domain that the standards and certification of units that participate in cyber work have got to be of the highest; and really the 

commander that sets the pace and sets the standard is Cyber Command. 

General Grass and I met with General Alexander earlier this 

week to have this very discussion because we know that there is 

an important role for the Guard to play in support of our global, 

regional and State requirements for cyber. 

Mrs. DAVIS. May I just ask you, General, quickly, I think one of 

the concerns in this area, because it is relatively new—— 

General JACOBY. It is. 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. In the scope of things in terms of the 

pipeline of skill sets and the expertise. How comfortable are you 

feeling about the way in which that training and the opportunities 

for people to really—to work in this field is developing now? 

General JACOBY. I think it deserves our constant attention. You 

know, we are under tremendous uncertainty in terms of manning 

and budget and programs, and so I will tell you, though, this is 

General Alexander’s domain. But he has got everyone’s attention 

on the requirement for, as you say, ensuring that cyber warriors 

are in the pipeline to meet the future requirements, not just the 

day-to-day. 
25 

In terms of what it might look like in the homeland, I would just 

say that we are concerned that a cyber—a large cyber attack on the 

homeland—and former Secretary Panetta characterized it as the 

potential 9/11 event—will have cascading effects. An event like that 

will have cascading effects. 

So they may hit the transportation network and shut things 

down maybe in the East Coast corridor, but it would be more than 

just stopping transportation. It would be the economic implications 

and other rippling effects into society. 

A good example of how that might unfold, really, was Hurricane 

Sandy. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, gentlelady’s time has expired. She got 

that question in just at the close of her time. 

General JACOBY. I will be glad to talk to you about it at any 

other time—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Jacoby, before I get to my questions, I hope you remembered my invitation for you to join me for this fall’s Talladega 

500. 

General Kelly, you come with him. You will have a good time. 

General Jacoby, were you involved in the new missile defense 

posture decisionmaking that was recently announced on Friday? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, yes I was. It was a very collaborative and detailed process over the last several months. 

Mr. ROGERS. Why was the decision made last week, 3 weeks before the budget is released? Why was it important, do you think, 

to go ahead and announce it last week? 

General JACOBY. I can’t speak to the exact timing of the release. 

I know that it is a report that Congress asked for quite a while 

back and it was due. 

Mr. ROGERS. I agree. 

Do you know when the President’s security adviser is going to be 

making his trip to Russia to talk about more arms control? 

General JACOBY. No I do not, Congressman. 

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Are you aware that the Russians have repeatedly stated that the SMD—SM–3 IIB missile is a ‘‘dealbreaker’’ 

for more nuclear arms control, which President Obama has indicated he wants? 

General JACOBY. I know the Russians have been unhappy with 

some of our missile defense program, but I can’t speak to the details of that. 

Mr. ROGERS. On Friday Under Secretary Miller stated, when 

asked if it had been a mistake to mothball the Missile Field One 

[Missile Field Number One at Fort Greely, Alaska], he responded, 

‘‘We saved resources at the time that we will now have to spend. 

But at the time the threat was uncertain, right? We didn’t—we 

didn’t know that we would—what we would see today—we did not 

know we would see today what we now see.’’ Were we surprised by 

the North Korean threat? 

General JACOBY. I wouldn’t characterize it as being surprised. I 

think that North Korea proceeded at a pace faster than we had an-
26 

ticipated and I think there were many factors involved in that, to 

include the change in leadership—the very dramatic change in 

leadership in North Korea over the past year. 

And so I think it is very appropriate that we proceed with continuing developments that allow us to outpace this North Korean 

threat. 

Mr. ROGERS. But as far as capability, were we surprised by the 

successful recent test that they had and their new capability? I recognize the leadership change was unexpected. 

General JACOBY. Right. There have been several attempts with 

a TD–2 [Taepo Dong–2 intermediate-range missile] to put a space 

vehicle into orbit. The intelligence community was mixed on whether they would be successful, and I think that they—we have to consider that successful and we have to consider it a demonstration of 

their ability to pursue ICBM technology, as reflected in the rollout 

of the long-range, road-mobile missile. 

And so from the NORTHCOM perspective now, what that means 

is we honor that threat. Okay, so exactly where it is, exactly how 

many is still unclear. Is it operational? Is it not? 

But from a warfighter, from a commander’s point of view, we 

honor that threat today. 

Mr. ROGERS. Don’t we have similar concerns with the Iranian potential threat? 

General JACOBY. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, I believe that the Iranians are intent on developing an ICBM. They 

have had some successful space launches where they put into orbit 

satellites. I believe they are pursuing ICBM, as the director of national intelligence has testified as well, so I think that we have to 

proceed under the assumption that without any other intervening 

factor that they will continue to seek an ICBM and we should be 

prepared to improve our capabilities as required to meet the evolution of that threat. 

Right now, as you know, we are able to defend the United States 

against Iranian—a threat from Iran today. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. 

General Jacoby, can you elaborate on sensor improvements, including added deployments of sensors that NORTHCOM believes 

are needed? For example, would added X-band sensor coverage on 

the East Coast protect against threats from Iran? 

General JACOBY. Thank you. 

I have been a strong proponent to work across the entire enterprise and not to stay focused on just one piece. And so to have the 

best GBI in the world but not to have a redundant and resilient 

sensor architecture to support that wouldn’t make sense. And so we 

very much look at the whole category of things to improve across 

the BMD enterprise. 

Now, as part of this rollout you know that TPY–2 [Transportable 

Radar Surveillance]—a second TPY–2 into Japan is central to that 

and it gives us that redundancy and resiliency in our sensor architecture. 

You know that there are improvements that are being made in 

our UEWR [Upgraded Early Warning Radar] sites. We are strong 

proponents on that for both the West and the East Coast, and we 
27 

should be fully prepared to add sensors to the program as required 

and as the threat develops. 

And it really has to do with, how sophisticated do our adversaries become over time and what does the sensor requirement become over time? 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. My time has expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

And good morning, General Jacoby and General Kelly. 

This question is for the two of you. The U.S. territories of Puerto 

Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have become increasingly affected 

by the drug trade. The most recent statistics provided by the U.S. 

Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Drug 

Enforcement Administration show very steep increases in drug seizures in and around the territories in 2012 compared to 2011 with 

no corresponding decrease in the street price of drugs in either territory. 

Violence linked to the drug trade has also spiked, and the homicide rates in the two territories are the highest in the country by 

a substantial margin. I believe that this is a national security problem, given the fact that these are U.S. jurisdictions and the fact 

that the evidence suggests that up to 80 percent of the drugs that 

enter Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are subsequently 

transported by air and maritime means to the U.S. 

So can you comment on what steps NORTHCOM and 

SOUTHCOM are already taking to address drug-related violence 

and what additional steps you intend to take going forward to address this problem? 

General JACOBY. Thank you for that question. It is a great concern for us that—the levels of violence and NORTHCOM does have 

responsibility for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and the Unified Command plan. 

One of the first things that we did was to send our defense coordinating officer and planners down to work with the Puerto Rico 

National Guard, and that is principally how we do business is we 

support civil authorities, we don’t conduct separate operations. 

So we are very much in support of any initiatives that they may 

ask us to do, or our partners. And so Customs Border Patrol, Coast 

Guard, DHS [Department of Homeland Security]—I know that they 

are working a campaign plan for looking at the problems and how 

we can help. 

And my organization that would get behind that is Joint Task 

Force North. They are my go-to organization to provide Defense 

Department support to civil authorities. That will be constrained 

by the budget, by how much—how many resources we can put 

against it, but we will make it a priority as requests come in for 

support. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And, General Kelly. 

General KELLY. As we watch the drug trafficking patterns, most 

of it of course—well 20 years ago it all came up through that part 

of the Caribbean and into Florida primarily—well, certainly the 

East Coast of the United States. Those patterns changed as our 
28 

partners and our own Government was successful. So as we stop 

that flow 20 years ago or so the flow now goes up through Panama—correction—Central America and Mexico. 

As we have been somewhat successful—I wouldn’t say highly 

successful, but fairly successful—in an operation that was started 

by my predecessor, Operation Martillo, we have been pretty successful in getting an awful lot of cocaine primarily off the flow. As 

that has been successful, I think we have started to see—and you— 

as you point out, the traffickers finding another way around. 

The good news is, unlike 20 years ago, we watch this network 

pretty closely; we know what they are doing and we can detect 

even pretty small changes in their operation patterns. 

But at the end of the day, my responsibility is for detection and 

monitoring, and working shoulder to shoulder with law enforcement, the other heroes in this fight: the DEA, local law enforcement, FBI, Treasury, Justice. And they are really in the interdiction business. 

But, if I don’t have assets, which I don’t, all I can do is watch 

the drugs go by. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you. Thank you, General. 

And I have one quick question for you, General, again. 

This is regarding the State Partnership Program. I am a very 

strong proponent of the program and I value strong state relationships such as the one between Guam and the Philippines. I believe 

the National Guard state partnership program provides combatant 

commands with a tremendous tool to partner with allied nations. 

So can you comment of the value of this program in your command? And what, if any, other opportunities are possible for the 

expansion of the SPP [State Partnership Program] in the 

SOUTHCOM AOR? 

General KELLY. I agree with the Congresswoman that it is very, 

very useful, highly successful, as I mentioned to Mr. Wilson; he 

asked a similar question. We get a lot out of it for very, very, very 

little money. So I would certainly—I think we have 26 down in the 

SOUTHCOM AOR—be certainly happy to see that increase, but I 

think it does, to a large degree these days, come down to budget. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Jacoby, General Kelly thank you so much for joining us 

today. We really appreciate your service to our Nation. 

General Kelly, I want to ask specifically about the criticality of 

the Navy’s mission there in SOUTHCOM and that AOR, the things 

that are going on there. Obviously it is a pretty expansive mission. 

Want to get a perspective about what the sequester and the potential of the C.R. [Continuing Resolution] places there on Navy operations in that area. 

And we all know that recently the cancellation of the USNS 

Comfort’s availability in that region. Just want to get your perspective on where you believe the operational capacity will be, where 

the needs may exist, and where there may be a gap potentially. 
29 

General KELLY. Well, the need is there, certainly. The wonderful 

thing about Comfort is it is a tremendous outreach to people who 

in some cases have never seen the U.S. flag before and suddenly 

they are having, you know, fairly detailed medical procedures done 

for free. I mean, thousands and thousands of medical procedures. 

So the Comfort is a big deal. By the way, the Chinese have gotten involved in that as well and have deployed their own hospital 

ship to the region. To the best of my knowledge right now, Comfort 

is gone this year, it is—we are losing that and—because of sequestration. And not just because of sequestration. I mean, when you 

take a $487 billion bite out of the budget things are going to start 

to fall, and then if you add another $500 billion on that. 

So Navy ops [operations] in my area of operations will essentially 

stop—go to zero, I believe. With a little luck, the United States 

Coast Guard, you know, the other heros in this fight—with a little 

luck I might—we might see a Coast Guard cutter down there, but 

we are going to lose airborne ISR in this—in the counterdrug fight, 

we will lose the Navy assets. 

Many of the assets we got—excuse me—many of the assets we 

got even in the recent past were just assets that were down in the 

Caribbean, as an example, training. And they have got to—you 

know, they have got to be at sea so they come down and while they 

were training in the Caribbean or in the Eastern Pacific they participate in the drug fight, if you will. So a lot of this stuff wasn’t 

even dedicated to me, it was just opportune. 

Same thing with some of the airborne ISRs. Believe it or not, B– 

52s [Stratofortress strategic bomber] and B–1s [Lancer strategic 

bomber] when they train have to train somewhere. The airplane 

doesn’t know where it is when it is doing its training so we actually 

had aircraft like that flying over the Caribbean, JSTARS [Joint 

Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], opportune opportunity 

because they were training and we just, you know, benefited from 

that training exercise. 

So much of what we have gotten is not really dedicated to us, but 

simply we take advantage of it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Very good. 

General Jacoby, I want to ask you specifically about the aerospace control alert system. As you know, it is our 24-hour system 

that allows us to respond. 

If you look at the Air Force budget it looks like that is going to 

be reduced significantly to where we will not have a 24-hour alert 

capability, and obviously in looking at the effects of the sequester 

and the C.R. my question is, going forward—and I understand that 

the Air National Guard and the Air Force provide that dual capability there—how is the sustainment of that particular effort and 

the critical nature of that going to continue obviously in the face 

of that proposed reduction, but also in looking at sequestration and 

the C.R., and how important is having that 24-hour capability to 

our ability to detect and respond to threats? 

General JACOBY. Thank you. 

This is a core mission for NORAD, and so we are going to maintain a 24/7 capability. 

Last year a very tough decision was made to reduce two sites 

from 24/7 to a lower category. There was some uncertainty with the 
30 

language coming back out, and so we believe that—we haven’t seen 

the 2014 numbers but we believe that we still may lose those two, 

so we have a plan to stand those down. But that is not getting rid 

of the unit, that is not getting rid of the capability, that is coming 

down from 24/7. 

I believe I could mitigate that reduction but I don’t want to take 

any more. And so across the country I still have 14 bases where 

I have two fighters ready to go in 7 minutes. And I really think 

that that is the most rapid, most capable military response that 

our Secretary and President has at his finger tips and we are going 

to maintain that. It is essential to what we do. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me jump right in and ask this before my time 

runs out: So you will continue the 24/7 capability at those sites? 

General JACOBY. At the 14 remaining sites in continental United 

States, two in Canada, one in Alaska, one in Hawaii. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank both generals for being here today. We really do appreciate your service to this country. 

General Kelly, I know one of the previous members had asked 

questions as it relates to GTMO and alluded to the fact that he 

thought that defense attorneys were a great source of information 

in regards to the treatment of prisoners at GTMO. That may or 

may not be true. 

I will tell you having run a detention facility of 500 prisoners, 

they weren’t necessarily objective in their criticism, you think? Particularly when we ended pizza Fridays, that was a problem. 

So I am looking forward to a trip to GTMO to see exactly the living conditions for our troops, but also how we deal with those detainees, and you correctly pointed out that ICRC comes there unannounced—announced and unannounced—and I would suggest that 

that is a pretty independent group. I don’t think they have always 

been supportive, and maybe you can answer that, and what has 

changed their mind from the past. 

General KELLY. They look at it kind of two—there are two parts 

to their—to a discussion with them, and almost certainly within 

the first few days of taking command they came by to just—we had 

a conference down in Miami down at my headquarters that they 

participated in and had to do with detainee office ops. 

They gave us high marks overall for how the detainees are cared 

for, housed, fed, medical care, but then the other part of it is—and 

I understand this and I have nothing but respect for what they do; 

I have worked with them in Iraq and other places—their idea is 

that their conditions should always improve ultimately until they 

are released. 

And so there are limits, whether it is Department of Defense or 

the commissions or other Government agencies are willing to let 

that go, but they always ask for more and we do the best we can 

to provide more—excuse me—but they are pretty independent and 

they are pretty happy with what they see down there. 

Again, their view would be, you know, housed in another place 

and maybe they question whether they should be there at all, but 
31 

at the end of the day all I am really interested in is the marks they 

give me for how they, you know—— 

Mr. NUGENT. They care for them. 

General KELLY [continuing]. How humanely we treat them, yes. 

Exactly 

Mr. NUGENT. You made a previous comment reference to Comfort 

not being deployed. What message does that send, obviously, because you are trying to build relationships with those in South 

America, and typically an underserved area from our perspective? 

How does that affect you? 

General KELLY. Well, as I think I said a little while ago, for the 

most part the people of the Caribbean, Central America, Latin 

America, they really want us in their lives; with a few notable exceptions, they want us in their lives. 

That means engagement. You know, it is funny, they don’t ask 

for very much with the exception of, ‘‘Hey, we are about to do 

something, and, you know, could you send down a few officers to 

help us plan this training exercise or naval exercise?’’ So they ask 

for very little. 

And just to go down there, my trips down there is a big deal to 

them. We will send down a small number of, say, special forces 

guys, gals to train them in something, and—or a company of marines to go down to Guatemala and teach them riverine ops, that 

kind of thing. Very, very small investments. 

And so, to answer your question, you know, as those things are— 

not as many of those things under sequestration or even under the 

initial $487 billion cut, there will be fewer—less and less of that 

kind of thing. And then I would—I can’t underscore enough, the 

Comfort is a huge deal to them down there. And to not have Comfort go down is—will catch their—— 

Mr. NUGENT. You made, I think, a very good observation that 

China is going to fill that void with their own ‘‘Comfort,’’ and flying 

the Chinese flag, particularly far away from where they live, right 

in our back door. So I am concerned about, you know, what message we are sending to our closest neighbors. 

What else do you see from China in regards to their influence in 

South America? 

General KELLY. I am watching the chairman, but they are very 

economically engaged, buying commodities in a big way and also 

investing in port facilities and the things like that. So they are 

very, very economically engaged throughout Latin America and the 

Caribbean. 

Mr. NUGENT. I appreciate your comments. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General Kelly and General Jacoby, for being 

here. 

You know, some of the issues raised today are legitimate concerns that we as Americans always have as to how we conduct our 

business. 

But as a Army medical officer who spent a year in Iraq at a detention facility in Iraq from 2005–2006 I have some firsthand 

knowledge of how we conduct our business. And I came home 

proud to say how we conducted our business. 
32 

And I also found that often there were alleged activities that absolutely had no bearing and—on things that simply did not exist 

or take place. And I am sure you can appreciate that, sitting in 

your position. 

And I can attest to the quality of care that the detainees received 

in our facility because it was the same providers and the same care 

that was offered to our troops. 

And I can also say, for the record, that as far as I know, in the 

entire year that I was there, only one politician came to see what 

we were doing and that was the governor of Florida, Jeb Bush. 

Also, what was addressed earlier was a hunger strike. And I was 

involved with the hunger strike policy that we put in place. In our 

case it was a very high-value detainee, and I can attest to the very 

humane way that we go about the business of taking care of those 

not so much as detainees, but we looked at them as a patient. 

So just for the record, I am very proud of how we conducted our 

business, and I am hopeful and feel assured that you are conducting it the same way. 

My question is, at Guantanamo, where I have not been—and I 

am assuming but asking the question—the access to medical care 

for the detainees is the same as it is for our troops. Would that be 

correct? 

General KELLY. Absolutely. 

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you. 

And I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having 

to be in and out. I have another committee that is having amendments that—with—that has recorded votes so that is why I was in 

and out. 

But both of you, thank you for your service to our country. Thank 

you for being here. 

General Jacoby, in particular, I want to greet you. It is always 

good to see you. 

And for the people including yourself and under your command 

who serve in Colorado Springs, you are such a great addition to our 

community and the public spiritedness. I just want to thank you 

for that. 

And I will ask a technical question now, because I couldn’t turn 

down this opportunity. And it has to do with missile defense. 

And Chairman Rogers was referring to this earlier, but as part 

of the overall strategic decisions—and I applaud the 10 additional 

ground-based interceptors that we are going to put on our homeland, but I am hoping—and I know he shares this same concern— 

I am hoping that that is not at the expense of what would have 

been stationed somewhere in Europe, like, let’s say Romania, because that is much closer to the threat of Iran that we all know 

is a developing threat, an emerging threat, and does protect our 

homeland from Iranian ICBMs, should that day arrive. And we 

know that their intentions are to have an ICBM capability. 

Could you comment on that, General? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, thanks. And it is great to see you 

and I will be ready to get back home with you. 
33 

So it is not really my lane for a European Phased Adaptive Approach. The rollout spoke the story of how the phases one through 

three will continue apace. 

Phase four was centered around the SM–3 Block IIB [Standard 

Missile–3 ballistic missile interceptor], and I want to make sure 

that we are thinking about this in time correctly. 

SM–3 Block IIB has been moving to the right for a long time. It 

is beyond 2020. It is—you know, we have a saying in the military, 

‘‘It is PowerPoint deep.’’ 

And so there were some aspects of SM–3 Block IIB that are 

being sustained. The advanced EKV [Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle] 

design work that is being done, that will be of tremendous benefit. 

So that continues. 

But the option that was chosen was, if you place 14 more missiles at Greely you are going to outpace the future North Korean 

threat and still be able to defend against Iran. And so you wouldn’t 

be able to do that with an ICBM shooter in Europe. You couldn’t 

go both ways. 

So, where we are, juxtaposing both threats, was a good solid decision. And where we were on the SM–3 Block IIB program, it was 

a solid decision. And I won’t speak for how the allies respond but 

I know that Admiral Stavridis is working through that right now 

and I would defer to him. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, and I know that this isn’t exactly what you 

concentrate on all the time but it is peripheral to the threats that 

you do handle and so, I appreciate your answer. And I understand 

that if we have constraints, what was decided may very well be the 

best decision. However, I am hoping—and will be working—that it 

is a both/and situation, not an either/or situation. 

General JACOBY. Right. And as the commander responsible for it, 

you know, we are not looking to compromise on the defense of the 

American people. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you. I have no doubt about that. 

I thank you again, and you, General Kelly, for the great service 

you have given our country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. CONAWAY. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

It is great to be here. I am a new guy to the United States Congress. I have been here for 21⁄2 months. But I am a naval aviator 

and I have flown counterdrug missions in Central and South America, from, you know, Colombia and El Salvador. 

And I had a question for you, General Kelly, if you could share 

for us what the correlation is between successful missions down 

south and the price of cocaine at home, and if that is a reasonable 

way to measure success? Can you share with us your thoughts on 

that? 

General KELLY. Well, I think the more cocaine you take off the 

market before it gets to, you know, Anytown, USA, will—just supply and demand will drive the price up. 

Of course, they do have a little bit of an advantage there, because they can also cut it more and drive the quality down. But 
34 

at a certain point even the average drug user has got its limits in 

terms of the quality of the product he or she is using. 

But I think, again, if you drive—if you limit the amount that 

flows north, that gets into Anytown, USA, that price will go up. 

And with a lot of prediction, I think, fewer and fewer people will 

try cocaine, young kids, as an example. It is not to say they won’t 

find another way to do harm to themselves, but I think that is a 

measure of success. 

I know the office—the White House office on drug reduction and 

all claims that the use of cocaine is down by 40 percent. I have no 

way to validate that number, but if it is down by 40 percent or 30 

percent or 2.5 percent, it just might mean one other family doesn’t 

have to bury his or her—their children. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Absolutely. I hear a lot, as a member of Congress and somebody who just got through a campaign, that the 

drug war is not worth fighting. And I would attest that when we 

see success down south we do see the effect on the price of cocaine 

at home. And ultimately, you know, we can prevent people from becoming addicted by driving down the access here in the United 

States of America. 

So I just want to thank you for the work you are doing, thank 

you for all the people in Central and South America that are working so hard on this particular mission. 

One other question I had, and this will be it: When you consider 

the assets that we have in the Caribbean or the Eastern Pacific 

and how they match up with the targets that are, you know, available, can you talk for a minute about, are those assets correctly 

matched? And what can we, as member of Congress, do to maybe 

support you in the acquisitions process to match the—you know, 

the right asset with the right targets? 

General KELLY. Well, there are kind of three aspects of what we 

do in terms of the monitoring, detection, and ultimately some of the 

interdiction. You need good intelligence, and we have really, really 

good intelligence. We understand the network and have a lot of 

human intelligence sources, have a lot of NSA [National Security 

Agency] and things like that. And that is all managed for me down 

at JIATF–South, Joint Interagency Task Force–South, in Key 

West. 

And then as that picture is built, then we can vector people like 

yourself when you flew, airborne ISR. And as I have already mentioned, we take any airplane that was available, to include B–1s 

and B–52s, at times, to search the ocean, find what we are looking 

for. 

And then rather than have, you know, the Coast Guard cutters 

or U.S. Navy ships just out patrolling like they did 10 or 12 years 

ago looking, now we almost—JIATF–South can basically tell them 

where to go, you know, get there by a certain time, look off the port 

bow, and that guy that is going 40 knots, go get him. And that guy 

going 40 knots might be doing, you know—might have 8 to 10 tons 

of very, very pure cocaine on board. 

We are getting better at it, and I don’t want to get too much into 

it in an open forum, but they have—I mean, we are being so successful in many ways, they are now building their own submarines 

with long, long, long legs—you know, a submarine, fully submers-
35 

ible that can go 6,800 miles on a tank of gas. And they are fully 

submersible—not for that whole distance; they have to come up 

and recharge. But we have driven them to that. They have to build 

these things in—primarily in the—up the estuaries in Colombia, 

and then take them to sea. 

So that is how—I mean, that is a measure of effectiveness of how 

well we are doing on the high seas and in the air. We are forcing 

them underwater and we are working to get at them down there 

as well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you so much. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And gentlemen, thank you for being here. I have had the privilege of being able to visit with both of you in a private setting and 

I just—you know, I always try to take the time if I can, when people with stars on their shoulders that have given their lives to the 

cause of freedom and given my children a better chance to be free, 

I just want to thank you with all my heart for your service, and 

I appreciate your patience sometimes with some of the incredibly 

brilliant questions you get from this panel. 

With that said, let me try not to fall into that category here. 

General Jacoby, I wanted to just again thank you for your time 

the other day. And I am curious to see how protected you feel our 

critical defense assets are from potential severe space weather or 

manmade electromagnetic pulse. It is a broad subject. 

You know, one of the challenges we have right now, we are dealing a lot with cybersecurity. And of course, you know, our generals 

are doing everything they can to protect us from that but they 

don’t have the supervisorial capability over the private I.P. [Internet Protocol] network. And the same is true of the civilian grid. 

And I just wondered if you could expand on that and maybe give 

me time to answer—ask General Kelly a question. 

General JACOBY. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. It is good to see 

you. 

Right now I start my day with a weather report, and that includes solar weather. It does have an effect on us. And so we track 

that very closely and we are very interested in the effects of any 

problems on the electric grid to critical infrastructure. 

And as you said, it is not just limited to defense critical infrastructure. Our general security is really in the hands of, you know, 

from private to Government to commercial, and so it is working as 

a team to discover what is critical, where are the nodes that need 

to be protected. And as we saw in Hurricane Sandy, there are cascading effects when the power grid goes down, so it is really important for us to be a partner in the larger effort to do that. 

Specifically for EMP [electromagnetic pulse], we are not tracking 

a—intelligence on an EMP threat today, but intelligence is really 

the key for us, but we do have vulnerabilities. So I think that as 

part of any assessment of our critical infrastructure that should be 

one of the important questions we ask about what would an EMP 

effect be. 

For my command itself, the NORAD, NORTHCOM, we are very 

well protected for EMP. We have critical national-level command 
36 

and control systems that, as part of the development of those systems, EMP hardening was taken into account and we have done 

that. 

So also, it is important to ensure that we train ourselves in operating in a denied environment and we do that as well. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. I continue to be glad you are 

on our side. 

General Kelly, I wanted to just ask you that, you know, related 

to Admiral Greenert’s testimony to this committee, he stated that 

unless our budget changes courses we will stop all aircraft deployments to South America and stopping efforts that interdicted hundreds of tons of illegal drugs in—coming into the United States in 

2012. Can you explain to this committee the direct impact it will 

have on our Nation, from your perspective—that particular issue? 

And also, I guess a little more esoteric, do you feel that greater 

use of autonomous surveillance sensors and communications assets 

could help fill any gaps in the counterterrorism and illicit drug 

trafficking capability deficiencies that were highlighted by Admiral 

Greenert? 

General KELLY. Well, in terms of ships and the like, with almost 

scientific accuracy I can tell you that if we have one average—if we 

have one ship working the drug interdiction mission or actually detection monitoring and interdiction, one ship, I can tell you on average how much that ship will be responsible for taking off the 

market in the course of a year—two ships, twice as much; three 

ships, and it goes up and up and up and up. 

By the same token, as you lose that capability on the water it 

goes down. So if I go to zero, you know, we—I believe we need 14 

ships down there in the Pacific and in the Caribbean on any given 

day and we could really, really hurt this drug flow. I get on average about 5 or 6. That includes—I am sorry—includes Coast Guard 

cutters as well, and they are very, very stressed, the Coast Guard 

is. 

So I get 5 or 6 if I am lucky. I suspect I will go to one or zero 

because of the budget issues. So all of that drugs that—all of those 

drugs will make their way up through Central America, Mexico, 

across the border, and right into Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. And as far as autonomous surveillance sensors, any 

increased need there? 

General KELLY. I mean, there are other ways to do this. Again, 

I would rather go in a classified setting. We are doing some things 

now, but things like drones and whatnot, just surveillance drones, 

could really help us out and really take the heat and wear and tear 

off of some of our manned aviation assets. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you both again for your service. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

General Kelly, it is good to see you. 

Good to see you, sir, General Jacoby, as well. 

Thank you for at least twice—I got here a little bit late—for getting into the record the $487 billion cut, as well as the $500 billion 

cut and the impacts as we are going—that those will have. And we 
37 

appreciate the struggles we are going to have—you are going to 

have trying to make do with those much-reduced resources. 

Can you give us a bit of a brief on what is post-Venezuela—or 

Venezuela will look like post-Chavez and the impact it has had— 

the influence that Chavez had throughout South America? Can you 

give what the current read is on what it is going to look like without him? 

General KELLY. As I know you know, Congressman, there were 

two parts of Chavez. You know, at least 51 percent of the population of his country thought very highly of him. He had tremendous charisma and could appeal to certain elements of his society. 

So that is one part of it. 

The other part is how, as a president, what the country—what 

the condition of the country is right now. And of course, it is in 

tough shape. It is very, very high crime, high murder rates; economy is faltering. The petrochemical industry is old and needs and 

awful lot of money to restructure. 

The expectation is that the vice president will win the election 

on the 14th of April. He may or may not be a better president. He 

doesn’t have any of the charisma and the belovedness, if you will, 

that Chavez had. 

So he will have a tough row to hoe, because I think he will—a 

lot of the things that maybe were happening or not happening in 

Venezuela, people were willing to say, ‘‘Well, yes, we still love the 

President Hugo Chavez.’’ Not going to have that advantage if you 

are not Hugo Chavez. 

So the expectation is that the vice president will be elected and 

that things will continue to be as they are in Venezuela, and who 

knows 5 years down the line. 

One of the things that I think many of the countries that benefit 

from Venezuela’s largess—Cuba and some of the other countries— 

I think they realize that they cannot continue to get the very, very, 

very reasonable rates on loans and oil and things like that at the 

cost they get it. I don’t think, probably, Venezuela can sustain that. 

So I think they are nervous that with Mr. Chavez gone, that by necessity the vice president, if he is elected—but anyone that is elected—will have to rethink the flow of money that goes out of the 

country to essentially buy friends. 

So they are nervous about it. Many of their economies are, these 

nations in particular, four or five of them, their economies are kind 

of weak. And if they actually had to pay world prices for oil or 

didn’t get the very, very low-interest loans that they enjoy under 

Chavez they would be in real trouble. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Mr. Smith, anything else? 

Mr. SMITH. No, thank you. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Gentlemen, thank you for your long service to our 

country and your continued service. 

And this meeting is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 20, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 20, 2013 

(43) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act— 

The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command 

and U.S. Southern Command 

March 20, 2013 

Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony 

on the posture of both our Northern Command and Southern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Charles Jacoby, commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace 

Defense Command, and General John Kelly, commander of U.S. 

Southern Command. Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service to our Nation and thank you for joining us 

today. 

Even as we proceed in this difficult budget environment and the 

news commands our attention to Africa and the Middle East, we 

must be diligent in keeping our hemisphere safe. Therefore, I was 

pleased by the Administration’s announcement last Friday affirming the program of the previous Administration to deploy 44 

ground-based interceptors at two sites in California and Alaska. On 

the other hand, cancelling the fourth phase of the EPAA sends a 

terrible signal to America’s allies. I would have hoped after the 

2009 fiasco, we would stop waking up our Eastern European allies 

to tell them, at the last minute, that we’re changing our missile defense plans on them. General Jacoby, I look forward to learning 

more about how we’re filling the gaps in our homeland missile 

defense. 

I also look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress 

being made by the new President of Mexico on drug-related violence and what NORTHCOM is doing to support Mexico and build 

their capacity and capabilities. This is a threat daily and directly 

impacting the U.S. homeland, and we need to treat it as a national 

security imperative. 

General Kelly, in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is the 

greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. 

While we continue to see success in Colombia, destabilization and 

violence in Central America is rampant. Tackling these issues requires close collaboration and coordination with NORTHCOM, as 

well as interagency partners. Unfortunately, the Navy will eliminate its ship presence in the Caribbean in April due to sequestration. This guarantees an increased flow of drugs and illicit net-
44 

working across our borders. To that end, please elaborate on the 

other consequences of sequestration on both of your commands. 

Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us today. 
45 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act— 

The Posture of the U.S. Northern Command 

and U.S. Southern Command 

March 20, 2013 

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General 

Kelly and General Jacoby. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts. 

Moving forward, sequestration will continue to complicate how 

the Department of Defense plans and appropriates resources. That 

will certainly have an impact on your day-to-day operations as well 

as your ability to achieve your requirements. In light of this challenge, and the other challenges you face, I look forward to hearing 

from you. 

General Kelly, after your first few months at SOUTHCOM, I am 

interested in your thoughts on the important issues in your new 

portfolio. These issues continue to be the nontraditional threats in 

the region, the rising violence and instability in Central America, 

our military-to-military cooperation in the area, and your counternarcotics duties. I would also like to hear about our continuing 

work with Colombia and finally your impressions about the detainee mission at Guantanamo Bay. While SOUTHCOM continues 

to lack traditional military threats to the United States, these 

issues are important to the United States and often require an 

interagency approach to address them. 

General Jacoby, you and the dedicated men and women of 

NORTHCOM and NORAD have been very busy lately, carrying out 

various missions to defend our homeland. Your support to civil authorities have been indispensable as our Nation responded to massive fires and devastating hurricanes over the last year. Internal 

threats such as these are increasing annually and appear to be 

growing in intensity. 

External threats such as those posed by North Korea and Iran 

are also growing as they seek to improve their capabilities to 

launch long-range missiles. I was pleased last week to see that the 

Administration continues to respond appropriately and firmly by 

bolstering our capabilities and capacity to defend ourselves. The 

Administration’s decision to deploy 14 additional ground-based 

interceptors is a wise and prudent step in implementing a sound 

strategy for missile defense. General Jacoby, I trust we will learn 

more about this decision during your testimony as well as better 

understand the Administration’s long-term efforts to make smart 

investments to improve the effectiveness and reliability of our missile defense capability. 
46 

I would also ask that you comment on the defense and security 

partnerships with our northern and southern neighbors as we pursue mutual security interests. 

Again, thank you all for your time. 
47 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR, UNITED STATES ARMY 

COMMANDER 

UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 

AND 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

MARCH 20, 2013 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 
48 

Chainnan McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to report on the posture of United States Northem Command 

(USNORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As the 

combatant commander charged with defense of our homeland, it is a distinct privilege to 

represent the more than 2,000 men and women of the Commands who stand the watch around 

the clock on behalf of our nation. Strengthened by robust partnerships with hemispheric 

neighbors and interagency communities, my commands execute three primary missions: 

homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation. 

USNORTHCOM was established October 1, 2002 to provide command and control of 

Department of Defense (DOD) homeland defense efforts and to command the federal military 

response to requests for DSCA. The imperative to protect and secure the homeland against all 

hazards is even more important today. Over the last year, Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy, record 

wildfires, severe drought, and violent tornado activity tested the nation. The continued opening 

of the Arctic precipitated significant growth in human activity, potentially posing new domestic, 

foreign consequence management, and homeland defense challenges and opportunities. In 

addition to these natural events, internal and external man-made threats continue to proliferate. 

Cognizant of these challenges, we remain positioned to support our mission partners in their 

response efforts to restore nonnalcy following any disaster, while continually honing our 

capabilities to outpace and adapt to shared security threats to the United States and Canada in 

accordance with the NORAD agreement. Leveraging the vitally important Combatant 

Commander Exercise and Engagement Program, we prepare for our missions through training, 

education, and exercises, and take every opportunity to learn from these events. With each real2 
49 

world crisis, we apply a candid, rigorous lessons learned process to replieate successes, correct 

deficiencies, and ultimately strengthen our partnerships. 

Defending the nation requires a reliance on partners in three distinct geographic 

locations: globally, in the approaches to the homeland, and within the homeland. On the outer 

layer of this defense in depth, my global partners include the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of State, and associated fnnctional and 

geographic combatant commands, to name a few. In the approaches to the homeland are our 

partners in Mexico, The Bahamas, and Canada. Within our homeland, my federal partners 

include the Military Departments and Services, National Guard Bureau (NGB), Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) (specifically, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 

United States Coast Guard (USCG), Transportation Security Administration, and Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP», Department of Justice (DOJ), and Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA). Finally and perhaps most critically. are my subordinate headquarters strategically placed 

at key intersections between the approaches and the homeland: Joint Task Force North (JTFNorth) on the Southwest border, Joint Task Force National Capital Region, Joint Task Force 

Civil Support on the eastern seaboard, and Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-Alaska) in America's 

high north. 

Partnerships are equally important in my DSCA responsibilities. I live daily with the 

knowledge that any moment can bring news of natural and man-made disasters. To meet the 

deservedly high expectations of our citizens, we work in support of primary agencies responding 

to natural disasters as part of a team of federal, state, and local entities. Disaster response is 

largely a function of preparedness. As such, our training and exercise program, collaboration, 

and communications with our partners form the foundation of our ability to execute in times of 

3 
50 

crisis. The trusted partnerships we have built with some 50 federal agencies are evident in the 

presence of more than 60 liaison officers in our headquarters with whom we work side-by-side. 

These well-established partnerships achieve two principal effects. In pre-crisis, they 

enable safety and security activities that mitigate the effects of natural disasters and deter threat 

activities. Upon transition to crisis, unity of effort and the power of interagency teamwork are a 

function of our robust, realistic, and comprehensive training and exercise programs. 

Today, our partners are pressured by budget constraints that can erode the defense and 

security of the homeland unless we judiciously build, balance, and protect homeland defense 

capabilities. We remain mindful of our nation's budgetary challenges and understand that fiscal 

responsibility is itself a matter of national security. The nation realizes meaningful security 

dividends through interagency partnering and cooperative engagement with our Canadian, 

Mexican, and Bahamian neighbors. As we confront shared challenges such as transnational 

criminal organizations, terror and weapons proliferation, and other threat networks, prudent 

investments made possible by the Congress equate to a significant down payment on our national 

security objectives. With a relatively modest geographic combatant command budget, 

USNORTHCOM and NORAD carry out our country's foremost and uniquely solemn duties to 

protect our citizens and support them in their times of greatest need. We are working smarter in 

an era of significant budget constraints, knowing threats to the homeland will likely not diminish. 

Keeping faith with our fellow Americans is our greatest moral imperative, understanding that the 

physical and moral consequences of a successful attack in the homeland far outweigh those of a 

similar attack overseas. 

4 
51 

Homeland Defense 

Homeland defense is perhaps the best example of how we defend in depth through our 

partners. Our Missile Defense, Aerospace Warning and Control, Maritime Warning, Cyber 

Security, Infrastructure Resiliency, and Antiterrorism/Force Protection mission sets require close 

cooperation and communication with partners globally, in the approaches, and in the homeland. 

Missile Defense. North Korea's Taepo Dong 2 launch in December 2012, followed by 

its announcement of a third nuclear test in February 2013, are sobering reminders that our nation 

must remain vigilant against nation-states that can threaten the homeland directly. North Korea 

continues to seek international recognition as a nuclear-armed state and has unveiled a roadmobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) with claims it can strike targets in our 

homeland. Although Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon, it is developing advanced 

missile capabilities faster than previously assessed and is apparently positioning itself to produce 

a nuclear warhead quickly should its leaders choose to do so. 

I am confident in our ability to employ the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 

system to engage the current ballistic threats against the United States. The fielded system was 

developed using a spiral acquisition approach designed to counter a limited. unsophisticated 

ballistic missile threat from a rogue nation. In light of the challenging threats that loom on the 

horizon, Admiral Locklear (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command), General Kehler (Commander, 

U.S. Strategic Command), Vice Admiral Syring (Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA)), and 

I are working as a team with the intelligence community to improve our capability to warn 

against and mitigate emerging threats. We remain committed to improving current Ballistic 

Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities to ensure we maintain our strategic advantage and guarantee 

confidence in our ability to defeat evolving, more complex threats in the future. 

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In view of the continued development of North Korean threat capabilities, we are 

partnering with the MDA to improve GMD reliability. To be sure, GMD is a system of systems. 

Only synergistic and comprehensive improvements across the entirety of the kill chainintelligence, sensors, interceptors, and command and control----{;an ensure system confidence and 

maximize performance. We are working across the entire system to enhance system reliability. 

The complexity of the GMD system dictates an intricate interplay between development of new 

capability, operator tactics, component testing, and the continuous calibration of threat profiles. 

We have worked closely with the MDA to maintain the right balance in developing and 

testing missile defense technologies, while increasing our readiness to execute this critical 

mission set. This requires that we achieve a cadence of at least one operational GMD intercept 

flight test annually. I am pleased with the successful flight test conducted in January 2013 and 

expect that future tests will serve to increase confidence in the fielded system. 

Our BMD responsibilities include all potential missile threats, regardless of range or 

source. To evaluate our capability against a regional ballistic missile threat, we have conducted 

a series of tests and exercises using Joint, Deployable Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

systems in the protection of designated critical assets (such as population centers, major events, 

and critical infrastructure) against a limited air, cruise. or ballistic missile attack. Thcse ongoing 

tests and exercises are oriented on the development of tactics, techniques. and procedures that 

integrate existing Aegis BMD, Patriot, and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 

systems into a layered defense. We will continue to pursue effective and efficient methods to 

improve our ability to protect the homeland. Our citizens expect our vigilance and rigor to 

protect them from a missile attack on our soil. We work diligently to maintain their trust. 

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Aerospace Warning and Control. A vital component of homeland defense is 

NORAD's Aerospace Warning and Control missions. Through the execution of Operation 

NOBLE EAGLE (ONE), NORAD defends North American airspace from unwanted and 

unauthorized aircraft on a 24/7 basis and accomplishes this critical mission with a combination 

of armed fighters on alert, air patrols, aerial refueling, Airborne Warning and Control System 

(AWACS) surveillance platforms, the National Capital Region Integrated Air Defense System, 

and our ground-based Air Defense Sector surveillance detection capabilities. These assets allow 

NORAD to respond to both strategic and asymmetric air threats to the Homeland. 

Since 9/11, more than 62,000 sorties have been flown in support of ONE. Our continued 

requirements for air domain awareness and intercept capabilities mean we must ensure that 

NORAD forces can protect our most critical national infrastructure, and that we maintain a 

basing architecture that defends key terrain and our most critical national infrastructure. 

This has been an extremely busy year for the men and women of USNORTHCOM and 

NORAD, as we have successfully supported the DHS and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to plan 

and execute many National Special Security Events (NSSEs). These include the G-8 Summit at 

Camp David, Maryland; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Chicago, 

Illinois; the Republican National Convention in Tampa, Florida; the Democratic National 

Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina; the Presidential Inauguration, and the State of the 

Union Address in our nation's capital. In addition to NSSEs, the day-to-day operational 

planning and support generated by the 2012 National Election involved the cooperation and 

coordination of an array of interagency organizations. NORAD participated extensively in these 

efforts with a full array of support, when required by lead federal agencies. We are proud of 

NORAD's successful planning and execution for these critical national events. 

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NORAD continues to demonstrate the ability to respond quickly to potential strategic 

threats through Northern Sovereignty Operations, which involves the monitoring and detection 

of announced and unannounced Russian Military Aviation flights entering the United States and 

Canadian Air Defense Identification Zones. This year again, Russian Long-Range Aviation 

(LRA) continues a deliberate modernization plan with increasing operational capability. The 

successful detection and intercept of such flights demonstrates NORAD's ability and intention to 

defend not only the northern reaches of our sovereign airspace, but all of NORA D's area of 

operations. Whether in the continental United States or along the northern tier of Alaska and 

Canada, NORAD continues to successfully provide Aerospace Warning and Aerospace Control 

for North America. 

Maritime Warning and Maritime Homeland Defense. NORAD's Maritime Warning 

Mission, which supplements the national intelligence analysis and warning capabilities of the 

United States and Canada, continues to mature, and we have achieved notable progress in 

building and maintaining relationships with mission partners and stakeholders in the maritime 

community of interest. My staff remains engaged with our Canadian partners through the 

Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) and the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) as 

we continue to improve awareness and develop the NORAD Maritime Warning Mission. 

Beyond maritime warning, USNORTHCOM supports the execution of the National 

Maritime Security Strategy through preparations to lead or act in a supporting role to ensure the 

security of the homeland in the face ofa maritime threat. With the recent assignment of Navy 

North (NAVNORTH), I now have a service component commander and headquarters 

responsible for maritime operations in my area of responsibility. NAVNORTH will continue to 

build on the outstanding working relationships with our interagency and Service partners, 

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particularly the USCG, to ensure future operations are coordinated and integrated to the greatest 

extent possible. 

Cyber Security. I share fonner Secretary Panetta's concern that the United States may 

be in a "pre-9I11 moment" with regard to a major cyber attack. Global dependencies on 

electronic infonnation technology offer adversaries attractive opportunities to wreak havoc in 

this domain. Cyber operations are non-kinetic, asymmetric options that have the added 

advantage of shrouded attribution. The potential effects of a targeted attack could have severe 

consequences for U.S. infrastructure and institutions, impede our homeland defense mission, 

degrade our ability to support military activities overseas, and strain our ability to provide relief 

(0 civil authorities. To address growing threats, USNORTHCOM and NORAD, in conjunction 

with U.S. Cyber Command, recently established a Joint Cyber Center (lCC) to recognize and 

assess when a cyberspace attack is being orchestrated against the homeland. Although in its 

infancy, the lCe's goal is to provide timely and accurate infonnation associated with the cyber 

domain through focused situational awareness and integrated operational cyberspace planning. 

We have also incorporated more robust cyber play in our exercises to refine our cyber-defense 

capability and enhance our effectiveness to operate within the confines of a degraded 

environment. 

Antiterrorism and Force Protection. Consistent with our Unified Command Plan 

authorities and guidance from the Secretary of Defense "to preserve the Nation's combat power," 

USNORTHCOM executes an antiterrorism and force protection mission across our area of 

responsibility. This is achieved by implementing force protection and security-related policy, 

ensuring compliance with standards, developing new technologies, and engaging with key 

mission partners. To preempt insider threats as occurred at Fort Hood, USNORTHCOM 

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maintains a close, trusted partnership with the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) to share 

threat information rapidly, and to synchronize the collective military response efforts of the 

Department. 

Protection of our installations, people, and Defense Critical Infrastructure (DCI) is 

imperative to maintain mission assurance. USNORTHCOM advocates to ensure that sufficient 

resource requirements are considered in Military Department budget deliberations to implement 

Service Component antiterrorism and force protection programs. In addition, USNORTHCOM 

continues aggressive planning and collaboration with DOD components to ensure DCI most vital 

to mission owners is always available and mission capable, consistent with DoD guidance. 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

We assist our domestic mission partners across the spectrum of activities in the 

homeland. Our civil support actions range from support to law enforcement agencies (LEAs) on 

our borders, to mitigating the effects of man-made incidents or natural disasters. Unless 

otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, our assistance in this role is 

always in support of the lead federal agency. 

USNORTHCOM, with its homeland in my area of responsibility, is uniquely 

characterized by domestic laws, policy, culture, and tradition. The nuances of the homeland, 

coupled with the evolutionary nature of the threat, highlight the criticality of US NORTH COM's 

close relationship with law enforcement partners. Our continued investment and partnership 

with LEAs in the execution of their homeland security activities prevents operational seams and 

is the cornerstone of our ability to defend the nation. Underpinning the large majority of our 

relationship with LEAs is JTF-North, co-located with the EI Paso Intelligence Center on key 

terrain of the Southwest border. 

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During 2012, we responded to multiple requests for assistance in support ofCBP, Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), USSS, 

FBI, and other agencies along the nation's Southwest border. Exchange of information and 

analysis allows DOD and LEAs to be partners in the layered defense and security of the 

homeland. Our partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies have never been stronger. 

This last year speaks to the critical nature of our strong interagency partnerships and the 

continued requirement to support our partners. To complement the tremendous capacity of 

communities and states to deal with crises, DOD has capabilities that can save and sustain lives, 

reduce suffering, protect property, mitigate the damage to critical infrastructure, and get citizens 

quickly and solidly onto the path of resuming their daily lives. Our challenge in this 

environment is not to be late to need. DOD capabilities are only useful if they are accessible and 

responsive to relief requirements. To improve the agility and effectiveness of our support, we 

conduct detailed integrated regional planning to better understand concurrent employment 

challenges of federal military forces and National Guard, and we employ Dual Status 

Commanders (DSCs), made possible by the Congress, to improve unity of effort. 

Dual Status Commanders. A fundamental change in how we execute our civil support 

mission is the use of DSCs-perhaps one of the most important initiatives taken in the area of 

DSCA in a decade. The Secretary of Defense and state governors authorize specially trained and 

certified senior military officers to command federal and state military forces employed by DOD 

and a state, respectively, in support of federal and state civil authorities, thereby promoting unity 

of effort in military assistance to the affected community. DSCs provide a link between the 

distinct and separate federal and state chains of command that is vital to facilitating unity of 

effort between the operations of federal and large state military force packages supporting civil 

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authorities. In 2012, the use ofDSCs for the Waldo Canyon fire and Hurricane Sandy provided 

opportunities, through unity of effort, to strengthen USNORTHCOM's close collaboration with 

the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), FEMA, the NGB, and States' National Guard 

organizations. Multiple states requested and received DSC designations in 2012, including: 

California and Colorado (for wildland firefighting); and Florida, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 

Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island (for hurricane response). 

Wildland Firefighting. When the Waldo Canyon fire erupted less than 12 miles from 

my headquarters last June, our DSCA role was brought into sharp focus. No one could have 

predicted the June 26, 2012 firestorm that was fueled by 65 mile per hour winds and rapidly 

consumed 346 Colorado Springs homes. some of which belonged to members of my staff. In 

reaction to this crisis. immediate response support from Fort Carson, Peterson Air Force Base 

(AFB), Schriever AFB. and Buckley AFB was directed toward the effort, and the Secretary of 

Defense and the Governor of Colorado quickly authorized a DSC. At the request ofNIFC, 

USNORTHCOM coordinated the deployment of Air National Guard C-130 aircraft. equipped 

with U.S. Forest Service (USFS) Modular Airborne Firefighting System (MAFFS) to support the 

federal wildland firefighting effort. Without hesitation, the courageous Airmen operating these 

aircraft continually put their lives at great risk to save and protect American lives and property 

during these wildfires. I would be remiss if! did not honor the names of Lieutenant Colonel 

Paul Mikeal, Major Joseph McCormick, Major Ryan David. and Senior Master Sergeant Robert 

Cannon from North Carolina Air National Guard's 145th Airlift Wing, who selflessly made the 

ultimate sacrifice fighting wildfires in South Dakota last July. 

With senior leaders from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Forest Service, 

Department ofInterior, NIFC, and the NGB, we are focused on getting ahead ofthe next fire 

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season. Through routine engagement, interagency teamwork, and a collaborative effort of 

working groups, we have expanded our collective understanding of the implications of and 

capabilities required to prepare for requests for assistance from our interagency partners' 

wildland firefighting operations. These include near-term proposals such as integrated training, 

improved processes for requesting and implementing support, and clarification of lines of 

authority, ensuring installation preparedness and necessary agreements are in place, and 

identifying technology transfers that can be accomplished before the next wildland fire season. 

Hurricane Sandy Response. Hurricane Sandy challenged the agility of the National 

Response Framework while impacting key terrain in New York City and New Jersey. Working 

with FEMA (the lead agency for the federal response), the NGB, and the individual States, we 

estimated required support and prepositioned Title 10 resources in the region in order to respond 

as soon as requested. Throughout the response to the storm, USNORTHCOM was able to 

support our federal, state, and local partners by facilitating the Department's efforts in power 

restoration, dewatering, fuel distribution, transportation, and public health and safety. In 

addition, along with the NGB, USNORTHCOM supported the Secretary's approval of 

governors' requests for DSCs. As the hurricane made landfall, DSCs received orders to facilitate 

military unity of effort for the response and recovery efforts in New Jersey and New York. The 

DSCs provided critical leadership to promoting greater unity of effort between federal and state 

military forces responding to the devastating effects of this hurricane. As a result, 

USNORTHCOM was able to support our federal, state, and local partners by facilitating power 

restoration, dewatering, fuel distribution, transportation, and public health and safety. 

As part of the Hurricane Sandy response and recovery effort, and with Military 

Department Secretary concurrence, we designated a number of Title 10 installations as Incident 

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Support Bases and Federal Team Staging Facilities (as requested by FEMA). Located 

throughout FEMA Regions I and II, these installations provided a platform for FEMA to stage 

commodities and equipment as well as response and recovery teams (such as Urban Search and 

Rescue Teams). Additionally, we designated four installations as Base Support Installations with 

the task to support logistically the Title 10 response effort. Fort Hamilton and Joint Base 

McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst simultaneously supported both FEMA and DOD response efforts. 

During the course of execution. we rapidly recognized the incredible capacity and 

capability of U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The established authorities, 

interagency agreements, funding mechanisms, and operational flexibility of these organizations 

are critical to mitigating large-scale catastrophic events in the future. 

Leveraging our relationships with USTRANSCOM and our interagency partners, 

USNORTHCOM executed the strategic air and ground movements of DOD assets and 

private/commercial power utility company trucks and personnel. Together, our teams completed 

241 sorties, hauling 4,173 short tons and 1,225 passengers. These numbers included the 

movement of262 power restoration vehicles and 429 support personnel from western States to 

New York and New Jersey. Based on our past hurricane response experience, we pre-identified 

Title 10 electrical generator and water pump availability as Hurricane Sandy approached the 

New Jersey and New York coasts. One hundred DOD water pumps and almost 300 pump 

operators were requested by FEMA and greatly contributed to the overall USACE pumping 

effort, which removed more than 475 million gallons of water from tunnels and other critical 

infrastructure. 

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USNORTHCOM's success in civil support during Sandy was characterized by 

anticipation and timely support of our partners' requests for assistance during domestic crises. 

As a result, I am overwhelmingly convinced that DSCs are the right answer to facilitating 

military unity of effort before, during, and after a natural or man-made disaster. DSCs are vital 

for a successful roadmap to readiness that links organizational learning and adaptation to a 

continuous improvement of interagency preparedness in disaster response. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response. We understand 

bad actors are committed to gaining access to chemical and biological weapons, as well as 

nuclear and radiological material, and employing these weapons against us. This truth demands 

our preparedness and resiliency if a CBRN attack should occur in the homeland. 

USNORTHCOM, in close collaboration with the NGB and our other military and civilian 

partners, has made significant progress improving our ability to respond in the aftermath of a 

CBRN incident by increasing the overall readiness of the nation's CBRN Response Enterprise. 

Following a series of external evaluations and confirn1atory exercises, the Enterprise achieved 

full operational capability (FOC) on October 1,2012. Despite the FOC designation, important 

work remains to be done to realize the full potential of the enterprise. Through our robust 

exercise program and partnerships, we are using both Title 10 exercises (e.g., VIBRANT 

RESPONSE) and regional state exercises (e.g., VIGILANT GUARD) to maximize preparedness 

for the entire range of CBRN threats and hazards. 

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Security Cooperation 

Security Cooperation with Mexico and Countering Threat Networks. When it comes 

to the security of North America and the shared pursuit of enduring stability and prosperity, we 

cannot afford to work in isolation. The ties between the United States and Mexico are deep and 

growing. The Department of Defense views Mexico as a strategic partner in mutual regional and 

hemispheric security interests. At the center of our shared security concerns is the proliferation 

and influence of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and other threat networks that 

greatly undermine citizen security in Mexico. 

TCOs are sophisticated international enterprises representing a national security threat 

based on their unique ability to move people, drugs, money, and weapons across borders. 

According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, the demand for illegal drugs in the United 

States continues, fueling the nearly $40 billion drug trade occurring in the regioni

. Per the 

Trans-Border Institute, since 2006 there have been more than 50,000 TCO-related homicides in 

Mexico,2 often the result of conflicts over lucrative territory for drug trafficking and other illicit 

activity, routes, and access points to the U.S. drug market. Although narco-related homicides 

continued to occur at disturbing levels in 2012, the number modestly declined for the first time in 

six years. 

More broadly, we are deepening our defense and military partnership with Mexico in a 

whole host of areas, including strengthening our ability to work together in humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief, cyber security, defense planning, training and education, air and 

maritime defense, counter-terrorism, and defense acquisition and maintenance. 

I Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland and Security Issues. Testimony before the U S. Senate Caucus on 

International Narcotics Conlrol. March 9, 2011. 

2 Trans-Border Institute. Drug violence in ""lexica. Data and Analysis through 20Il. March 2012. 

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In support of the President's July 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized 

Crime, and his 2012 National Drug Control Strategy, USNORTHCOM works with mission 

partners throughout our region to increase collaboration to confront TCOs. Our current priority 

of effort resides with the Mexican military where, at their request, we work with the Mexican 

Security Forces to build our shared capabilities and capacities. With full respect for Mexico's 

sovereignty and with full understanding that efforts to counter transnational organized crime 

have a civilian law enforcement lead, over the past year we have worked together in three key 

areas: increased capacity to conduct intelligence-driven operations; improved awareness and 

practice in protecting human rights; and increased capacity to work on a whole-of-government 

basis to address the challenges posed by TCOs. 

Mexico's southern border, an area of strategic importance in the counter-TCO effort, also 

represents a border between the areas of responsibility of U.S. Southern Command 

(USSOUTHCOM) and USNORTHCOM, requiring close coordination between our commands 

to ensure mission success. Illustrative of our partnership, our commands co-sponsor Mexico, 

Guatemala, and Belize Border Region Workshops. These workshops bring together national 

security forces to address communications, border security, standard operating procedures, and 

air. land, and maritime surveillance. Another example of our efforts is the coordinated 

deployment of a ground-based radar and associated information sharing protocols for Mexico. 

Guatemala, and Belize. 

Mexico and the United States are critical, strategic partners in the security sphere. My 

goal remains strengthening USNORTHCOM's relationship with the Mexican military. We look 

forward to working closely with the leadership of the Mexican Army (SEDENA) and Navy 

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(SEMAR) as they implement the strategy of President Pena Nieto and integrate their actions with 

those of Mexico's civilian agencies. 

Through our positive partnership, both nations have improved their capacity to respond to 

TCOs, to terrorist threats, and to natural disasters. I consider my relationship with the U.S. 

Ambassador to Mexico of utmost importance in the execution of Department of Defense goals 

and objectives throughout the region and hemisphere. Ambassador Wayne is the U.S. 

Government lead for engagements with Mexico and, as such, is a vital partner in all coordination 

and execution of DoD and USNORTHCOM's security cooperation mission. Confronting the 

security challenges we face in the future will continue to require an integrated, whole-ofgovernment approach at home and close cooperation with our partners abroad. Nothing is more 

important to our security and prosperity in this region than strengthening those partnerships. 

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Located at 

Fort Benning, Georgia, WHINSEC remains a key component of DOD's security cooperation 

outreach in the Western Hemisphere. WHINSEC is the only U.S. Army School that teaches in 

Spanish and informs the thinking of future Latin American leaders about democracy, human 

rights, and military topics. It is a strategic tool for international engagement supporting 

principles set forth in the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter. The training offered 

at WHINSEC impacts approximately 800-1,000 Latin American leaders annually from military, 

law enforcement, and civilian institutions and serves to increase collaboration and improve 

foreign partner capacity in pursuit of US NORTH COM's security cooperation objectives. 

Security Cooperation with The Bahamas. The United States and The Bahamas share a 

strong bilateral relationship founded upon common interests in security, trade, disaster response, 

and the promotion of meaningful cultural exchange. These shared interests, including a common 

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belief in the rule of law and democratic values, and The Bahamas' geographic proximity to the 

United States have been integral in building this long-standing partnership. The Bahamian 

government is committed to close cooperation with the United States on law enforcement and 

maritime security concerns, as well as on counternarcotics efforts. This strong security 

cooperation relationship is highlighted by Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, a trilateral 

counternarcotics effort conducted by personnel of the Royal Bahamas Police Force, Royal 

Bahamas Defence Force, and the Turks and Caicos Islands police, with counterparts from the 

DEA, ICE, CBP, and the USCG. 

One of the key focus areas in The Bahamas is the Hawk's Nest Forward Operating Base, 

a staging location for counternarcotics operations. Hawk's Nest is a centrally located facility on 

Great Exuma, used by Bahamian and interagency counternarcotics partners. We were ardent 

supporters of U.S. Embassy-Nassau in its successful effort to develop a cost-sharing agreement 

among the CBP, DEA, and FAA in an effort to maintain Hawk's Nest in a state of minimal 

operational capacity. The proximity of The Bahamas to the United States means that relatively 

small sites (like Hawk's Nest) have strategic importance for counter-illicit trafficking and 

Cooperative Defense mission areas. 

Establishment of United States Special Operations Command, North 

(SOCNORTH). On December 31, 2012, the Secretary of Defense approved the establishment 

of SOCNORTH. This subordinate unified command is the logical progression from our previous 

Special Operations Detachment (SOD). Reorganizing my existing command structures will 

improve the Department's ability to command, through a designated accountable commander, 

special operations forces throughout my area of responsibility under USNORTHCOM's existing 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities, security cooperation, and Homeland Defense 

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responsibilities. The establishment of SOCNORTH provides USNORTHCOM with a command 

and control structure that matches that of all other Geographic Combatant Commands, where a 

component commander is placed in charge of things we are already doing with a staff element. 

SOCNORTH will enhance USNORTHCOM's ability to meet our current security cooperation 

mission requirements, and improve our ability to support our interagency and regional partners. 

This organizational change is consistent with the new Defense Strategic Guidance that calls for 

low-cost, small-footprint approaches to accomplish our national security objectives. 

Partnership with Canada 

We continue to build unprecedented levels of cooperation across our two nations, and 

Canadian and U.S. cooperation in defending our homelands has been seamless. One of the most 

important enablers to USNORTHCOM and NORAD mission accomplishment remains our 

ability to conduct sophisticated, multi-echeloned exercises with our mission partners. This past 

December, the Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and I signed the 

Tri-Command Training and Exercise Statement of Intent, which provides two years of training 

and exercise planning among USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC. 

Beyond combining our exercises, the three commands have improved cooperative efforts 

in the Arctic. Rapid reductions in the extent and duration of summer ice cover in the Arctic 

region have led to increased human activity, primarily in the forms of scientific research, 

speculative shipping. and resource extraction. As counties and private businesses vie for 

regional access and influence in pursuit of economic interests, safety and security concerns will 

continue to rise. All Arctic nations have publicly stated their emphasis on cooperative 

approaches to peace and stability in the region. 

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The spike in regional activity may result in increased requests to militaries to provide 

support to other agencies, given the austere fiscal and operational environment. Other traditional 

military actors are already setting priorities for the region. Russia is actively recapitalizing its 

Arctic-focused fleet. Additionally, China, a nation without Arctic territory, is acquiring a second 

icebreaker. 

In December 2012, USNORTHCOM, NORAD, and CJOC signed the Frameworkfor 

Arctic Cooperation, which acknowledges that Canadian and U.S. forces will support other 

departments and agencies in response to threats and hazards in the region when requested or 

directed. The framework also strengthens an already mature partnership, ultimately enhancing 

joint and combined readiness in support of safety, security, and defense missions through 

information sharing, planning, and capability development. In this document, CJOC 

Commander Lieutenant-General Beare and I recognize that our near-term capability gaps in the 

Arctic are communications, maritime domain awareness, presence, and infrastructure. Along 

with the CJOC's JTF North, lTF-Alaska, which is my operational lead in the Arctic, is focused 

on how we will most effectively cooperate and partner to mitigate these capability gaps and 

effect mission success in this expansive region. Our commands will continue to seek 

opportunities to, in coordination with, and as part of wider U.S. government efforts, meet 

emerging needs associated with increased activities throughout the Arctic, and realize the full 

potential of our joint, interagency, intergovernmental. multinational, and private sector 

partnerships. 

Engagement with Russia 

We also continue to pursue our engagement with the Russian military, taking advantage 

of every opportunity to increase cooperation, interaction, and military-to-military training events. 

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I believe these efforts are particularly important to foster shared understanding, especially in 

light of expanded Russian modernization and training efforts that extend the range of patrol 

activities by their air forces. For example, NORAD and the Russian Federation Air Force 

conducted our third annual VIGILANT EAGLE counter-hijacking exercise in August 2012. By 

mutual agreement we conducted a non-flying, command post exercise (with each nation) with 

NORAD and Russian forces practicing procedures to track, intercept, and pass control for 

monitoring and escorting a simulated hijacked aircraft into the other's airspace. Like our 2011 

event, the upcoming August, 2013 exercise will be a full-profile, live-fly event, involving a 

variety of NOR AD and Russian military aircraft exercising a counter hijacking scenario. 

USNORTHCOM and NORAD are in the early stages of planning a similar cooperative counterhijacking exercise with our Mexican partners. This exercise, known as AMALGAM EAGLE, 

will provide an opportunity to practice military and civilian roles in responding to a simulated 

hijacking situation in our respective airspaces. 

In addition to fostering mutual trust and increased transparency with Russia, 

USNORTHCOM and NORAD have proposed connecting the Alaskan NORAD Region to the 

NATO/Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAl), currently operational in Europe. This 

proposal, called the Bering Strait Initiative. would provide Russian and NORAD air traffic 

controllers with information about tracks of mutual interest moving across the Bering Sea, using 

a web-enabled digital linkage to allow information exchange. Poland, Norway, and Turkey have 

already established a CAl link with Russia, and the system was declared operational in 

December 2011. We only await Russian concurrence to begin operational testing and 

implementation of the data link. This example of increased cooperation with Russia helps us to 

avoid unintended consequences associated with heightened tensions or misunderstandings. 

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Conclusion 

We now face a security environment that is more violent, uncertain, and complex than 

ever before. This environment is distinguished by myriad global actors and destabilizing events 

including terrorism, cyber attacks, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), turmoil 

in nations where WMD are stored, rogue threats, nations with nuclear weapons and those 

processing nuclear material, and transnational organized crime in the Western Hemisphere with a 

growing concern of a crime-terror nexus. Bad actors seek either to attack the homeland directly, 

or to diminish the nation's ability to build strong relationships that foster regional stability, 

security, peace, and prosperity. In the midst of this environment are near-peer competitors 

seeking geopolitical advantage over the United States while we are engaged in countering global 

threats. Since the homeland is the likely confluence of many of these threats, we face increased 

challenges as a nation and acknowledge the low level of national willingness to assume such 

risk. In the homeland, although the probability of existential and catastrophic attacks remains 

low, the consequences are unacceptable--driving us to seek preparedness and deterrence to 

reduce those probabilities as low as possible, and keep them there. 

Robust, layered partnerships and steady improvement through rigorous training, 

education, and exercise programs have readied USNORTHCOM and NORAD to defend the 

homeland against a full spectrum of threats and support of civilian partners in providing lifesaving and -sustaining assistance to the American people. We are guided by the belief that 

smart investment in relationship building with our partners in safety and security endeavors can 

prevent crises from reaching the nation by deterring and dissuading adversaries, and arresting 

threat streams. Should a transition to crisis occur, we are strengthened by the unity of effort and 

synergy of capabilities made possible by the depth of our partnerships. USNORTHCOM and 

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NORAD stand ready to deter, prevent, and defeat any aggression aimed at the United States and 

Canada as two commands oriented on a single vision: with our trusted partners, we will defend 

North America by outpacing all threats, maintaining faith with our people, and supporting them 

in their times of greatest need. 

I am grateful for the support this committee has provided my commands and am truly 

honored to serve as the Commander of US NORTH COM and NORAD. I look forward to your 

questions. 

"WE HAVE THE WATCH" 

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APPENDIX: Missions and Organization 

USNORTHCOM Mission: United States Northern Command partners to conduct homeland defense, civil support, 

and security cooperation to defend and secure the United States and its interests 

• Missile Defense: execute and direct missile defense operations to protect the homeland from hostile acts 

while assisting the Missile Defense Agency in developing improved capability 

• Antiterrorism and Force Protection: improve information sharing with our interagency partners and 

streamline reporting within the DOD to proactively detect emerging threats directed against our nation, our 

military personnel, and our critical capabilities and inlrastructure 

• Civil Support: support primary federal agencies, when requested, in responding quickly to natural and 

man-made disasters and to the effects of terrorist attacks in the homeland 

• Security Cooperation: support and enable other agencies, advocate for complementary resources, and 

work toward common objectives to improve Interagency planning and coordination that synchronize U.S. 

support for building our partners' capacities 

• Arctic Activity: prepare and plan for emerging Arctic challenges to ensure economic access and freedom 

of maneuver 

Area of Responsibility: the USNORTHCOM geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal 

operations includes North America, the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, the Caribbean region (inclusive 

of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos 

Islands), and approaches to the continent including significant portions of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic 

Oceans 

Subordinate Commands 

Joint Force Headquarters National Capital 

Region (Fort McNair, Washington D,c') 

Executes homeland defense, DSC A, and incident 

management in the National Capital Region 

Joint Task Force Civil Support (Joint Base 

Langley-Eustis, Virginia) 

Plans and integrates DOD support to the 

designated Primary Agency for domestic 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 

high-yield explosive consequence management 

operations 

,Joint Task Force North (Fort Bliss, Texas) 

Supports federal law entorcement agencies in the 

interdiction of suspected transnational threats 

within and along the approaches to the 

continental United States 

Joint Task Force Alaska (Joint Base ElmendorfRichardson, Alaska) 

(Provisional) Deters, detects, prevents, and 

defeats threats within the Alaska Joint 

Operations Area to protect U.S. telTitory, 

citizens, interests, and as directed, conduct civil 

support 

Service Components 

U.S. Army North (Fort Sam Houston, Texas) 

Executes DOD's homeland defense and civil 

support operations in the land domain. 

Develops, organizes and integrates DOD CBRN 

response capabilities and operations. Secures 

land approaches to the homeland 

U.S. Naval Forces North (Norfolk, Virginia) 

Provides maritime forces prepared to conduct 

homeland defense, civil support operations and 

security cooperation activities 

U,S, Air Forces Northern (Tyndall Air Force 

Base, Florida) 

Ensures the air sovereignty and air defense of the 

continental United States 

U.S. Marine Forces North (New Orleans, 

Louisiana) 

Executes antiterrorism program and force 

protection responsibilities. Coordinates with and 

supports USMC forces to conduct homeland 

defense operations and provide DSCA 

U.S. Special Operations Command, North (to be established) 

NORAD Mission: conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in the defense of North 

America. NORAD utilizes a network of satellites, ground-based radars, airborne radars, and fighters to detect, 

intercept, and when necessary, engage threats to Canada and the United States. NORAD assists in the detection and 

monitoring of aircraft suspected of illegal drug trafficking, ultimately passing information to civilian law 

enforcement agencies to help combat the flow of illegal drugs into North America 

25 
72 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

and UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND 

Biography 

Directorate of Public Affairs, Headquarters, NORAD/U.S. Northern Command, 

250 Vandenberg, Suite 8016, Peterson AFB, CO 80914-3808 

Phone: (719) 554-6889 DSN: 692-6889 

General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr. is the Commander of the North American 

Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command, 

headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. 

General Jacoby hails from Detroit, MI and was commissioned a second 

lieutenant upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1978. 

His military education includes the Infantry Basic and Advanced courses, the 

Command and General Staff College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, 

and the National War College. He holds a master's degree in History from the 

University of Michigan. 

His command experience includes Commander, A Company, 2d Battalion 

(Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 

and Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada; Commander, 1st Battalion, 504th 

Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina; Commander, Joint Task Force-Bravo, United States Southern 

Command, Honduras and Operation FUERTE APOYO (Strong Support), 

Hurricane Mitch; and Commanding General, United States Army Alaska and 

Deputy Commander, United States Alaskan Command; Commanding General, I Corps, including a combat tour in Iraq 

serving as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He most recently completed his tour as Director, 

Strategic Plans and Policy (J5); Senior Member, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Military Staff Committee, The Joint 

Staff. 

Additional assignments include Rifle Platoon Leader, C Company, and later Scout Platoon Leader, then S-3 (Air), 1st 

Battalion (Airborne) 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Aide-de-Camp to the 

Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina~ Instructor, later Assistant 

Professor, Department ofllistory, United States Military Academy, West Point, New York; Chief, G-3 (Operations), 25th 

Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; S-3 (Operations), I st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), 

Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Chief, G-3 (External Evaluation Branch), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, 

Hawaii; Staff Action Officer, Congressional Activities Division, Management Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, 

United States Army, Washington, D.C.; Deputy Chief of Staff, later Executive Officer to the Commander-in-Chief, United 

States Southern Command, Miami, Florida; Deputy Director for GloballMultilateral Issues/International-American Affairs, 

J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC; and Assistant Division Commander (Operations), later Assistant Division 

Commander (Support), 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to include duty as Deputy 

Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-76 and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan. 

General Jacoby's awards and decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, 

Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf 

Cluster), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (with Five Oak Leaf Clusters), Joint Service 

Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Army Commendation Medal (with Four Oak Leaf Clusters), Army 

Achievement Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Combat Infantryman Badge, Expert Infantryman Badge, Master 

Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, Ranger Tab, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge. 

(Current as of August 2011) 
73 

POSTURE STATEMENT OF 

GENERAL .JOHN F. KELLY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND 

BEFORE THE 113TH CONGRESS 

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

20 MARCH 2013 
74 

Introduction 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished Members of the 

Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As U.S. Southern 

Command enters its 50th anniversary year, we continue to work diligently to build relationships 

that enhance the defense of the United States and the security of the region, and I am proud to 

now be part of this important mission. In my first months in command, I am struck by the stark 

contrasts in our area of responsibility. It is a region of enormous promise and exciting 

opportunities, but it is also one of persistent challenges and complex threats. It is a region of 

relative peace, low likelihood of interstate conflicts, and overall economic growth, yet is also 

home to corrosive criminal violence, permissive environments for illicit activities, and episodic 

political and social protests. Given the global security realities and the fiscal constraints facing 

the U.S. government, some might argue that we should disengage from the Americas, turn our 

attention to other partners, other priorities. Mr. Chairman, Members, let me be frank: we must 

not take progress and overall stability for granted; we must not disregard our geographic 

proximity and the economic, cultural, and social interconnections of Latin America and the 

Caribbean to the United States. I thank the Congress for sharing this sentiment, for its longstanding commitment to our security partners, and for its continued support to U.S. Southern 

Command's mission. However, our ability to fully execute this mission is at extreme risk as we 

face present-day budget uncertainty and the potentially devastating long-term impacts of 

sequestration and its associated out-year budget reductions. 

Budget Uncertainty and Sequestration Concerns 

Reduced Spending Plan. Due to shortfalls associated with the allocation offunding in 

the current Continuing Resolution and the cuts we face as a result of sequestration, U.S. Southern 

2 
75 

Command is facing an immediate, combined 26% reduction to our already lean headquarters 

operating budget. Although this reduction applies only to this fiscal year, we could easily face 

another dire budget situation next year as well. We have implemented a reduced spending plan 

to ensure continued operations this year under the Continuing Resolution, and as a practical 

measure, we have incorporated potential sequestration cuts into our planning efforts. We have 

already undertaken painful cost-savings measures, including a civilian hiring freeze, eliminating 

overtime costs, not extending temporary and term hires, and reductions in travel and 

administrative costs, as well as cutting back or cancelling numerous exercises, training activities, 

and military-to-military engagements for the remainder of the fiscal year. We are also preparing 

for furloughs of our 851 dedicated and patriotic civilian employees, beginning in April and 

lasting through September. 1 I expect morale and financial effects to be severe, especially for our 

civilian professionals in the lower pay grades, who will face significant financial hardships due 

to the resulting 20% reduction in take-home pay for the last six months of the fiscal year. This 

reduction is compounded by living and working in Miami, one of the most expensive cities in the 

world? I have directed our manpower division to offer all means of advice, support, and 

guidance to our people if furloughing indeed occurs. Simply put, budget uncertainty in FY 2013 

is already having very real, deleterious effects on our readiness, effectiveness, and day-to-day 

operations in the region. Mandated sequestration cuts only amplify these effects. 

Sequestration Impact-Assigned/Allocated Forces. Although I am able to accept risk 

associated with this year's reduced spending plan, sequestration presents significant additional 

1 This number includes: all Department of Army and Defense Intelligence Agency employees at our headquarters, including term 

and temporary hires, and civilian employees at JIATF South. U.S. Special Operations Command South, JTF-GTMO and security 

cooperation offices, 

2 UBS. Pricings and Earnings Report, Edition 2012. Geneva: September, 2012; Center for Housing Policy. LOSing Ground: The 

Struggle/or /ltfiddle Income Households to Afford the Risings Costs of Housing and Transportation. October 2012. 
76 

strategic and operational risks. The severe cuts to U.S. Southern Command, and the numerous 

second and third order effects from the force-providing Service cuts, will adversely impact our 

training and ability to respond to crises. U.S. Southern Command has traditionally achieved 

valuable ends with limited means through a low-cost, small footprint approach. This approach, 

while effective, does carry inherent risk that increases exponentially under sequestration. Due to 

our minimally assigned forces and diminishing availability of surface assets, we are already 

challenged to respond to large-scale contingencies such as mass migration, natural disasters, the 

evacuation of American citizens, or ensuring the security of our embassies; maintain 

comprehensive awareness in the southern approaches to the United States; and support the 

National Drug Control Strategy's interdiction objectives. Across-the-board spending cuts will 

only exacerbate this situation, at a time in which several regional security challenges require 

active engagement by the United States. 

Sequestration Impact-Future Operations. Mr. Chainnan, Members, let me be blunt: 

sequestration in FY 2013 and its associated out-year budget cuts in future years will severely 

degrade our ability to fulfill the Department of Defense's Title 10 statutory obligations and 

provide operational support to the U.S. interagency and our partners in the region. Given the 

drastic magnitude of cuts being contemplated by the Services, the day could soon come when 

U.S. Southern Command has no assigned DoD surface assets to conduct detection and 

monitoring operations. 3 This would not only impact our ability to detect and monitor the illicit 

transit of drugs towards the United States. but we would also be unable to fully support U.S. and 

partner nation law enforcement interdiction operations to disrupt this drug flow. Under 

3 As one example. the Chief of Naval Operations indicated in a memo dated January 25. 2013 (Ser NOOO/IOOD5) that due to 

sequestration, the Department of the Navy will be compelled to reduce OMN expenditures through numerous actions, to include 

stopping all naval deployments to the Caribbean and South America. 

4 
77 

Declining Assets and Cocaine Disruptions 

sequestration, the Coast 

Guard has indicated 

that it too will curtail 

air and surface 

operations, affecting 

several missions 

including drug 

interdiction and other 

law enforcement 

operations. Taken together, these limitations would undermine the significant gains we have 

made through the highly successful and ongoing Operation MARTILLO; the 152 metric tons of 

cocaine seized to date represents over three billion dollars in revenue that will not go to fund 

powerful criminal groups, violence in Mexico, and the destabilization of our Central American 

partners. These 152 metric tons will also not reach the streets of America nor fuel costly crime 

and drug addiction. Due to sequestration, and its associated out-year budget cuts of over $50 

billion per year across the Department of Defense, we may no longer be able to support future 

interagency initiatives like the Department of State's Regional Aviation Program in Central 

America. Additionally, we could be forced to suspend our cooperation with U.S. Northern 

Command and Mexico on information operations, which had been heralded as the model for 

cross-Combatant Command collaboration. Finally, we will face challenges to resource and 

sustain our emergent cyber defense capabilities, at a time when cyber concerns are increasing in 

scope and magnitude. 
78 

Sequestration Impact-Operational Effectiveness. It is my position that scarce assets 

must be deployed where they have the greatest impact, but sequestration will cripple our proven 

operational effectiveness. As responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars, we have long employed a 

"defense forward" approach to attack the drug trafficking problem near its origin, before bulk 

shipments are broken up for transit into the United States. Although the U.S. Southwest border 

ha~ received the greater share ofpnblic attention and counternarcotics funding, Joint Interagency 

Task Force South is more effective at the removal of large quantities of cocaine than U.S. 

Southwest border operations, as bulk cocaine shipments are broken up into numerous smaller 

quantities upon reaching the transit zone of Central America. While this success is noteworthy, 

diminishing assets already place significant limitations on JIA TF South's ability to target the 

majority of documented drug trafficking events and support Coast Guard interdiction efforts. 

Sequestration cuts will only intensify this challenge, potentially allowing hundreds of tons of 

cocaine and other illicit products to flood into our cities. Likely second and third order effects 

include an increase in supply and purity and a decrease in cost of cocaine in the United States, 

undermining the significant progress that has been made in U.S. demand reduction. En route to 

our country, this largely unimpeded flow will chart a corrosive pathway through Central America 

and Mexico, contributing to instability, corruption, and violence and impacting efforts to 

improve citizen safety. 

Sequestration Impact-Security Cooperation and Partner Engagement. Building 

the capabilities ofregional militaries is a cost-effective strategy to help our partners confront 

internal challenges to security, stability, and sovereignty; increase professionalism; and 

strengthen defense and security institutions. Mr. Chairman, Members, I am deeply concerned by 

the adverse impact sequestration will have on these efforts, many of which have yielded 

6 
79 

significant and valuable security dividends. Take, for example, how U.S. Southern Command 

has provided persistent, focused training to the Naval Special Forces (FEN) in Guatemala over 

the past four years. As a result, the FEN can now effectively locate and interdict target vessels, 

seize drug shipments, and cooperate as a cohesive unit. Severe budget cuts will likely reduce 

this type of sustained relationship building and training, the repercussions of which could be 

harmful to U.S. interests. Reduced engagement by the United States could result in a partnership 

"vacuum," which nations like China, Russia, or Iran may seek to fill. In recent years, these 

countries have made in-roads, deepening diplomatic, economic, and military ties with the region. 

Declining U.S. influence will provide an opportunity to expand these relationships at the expense 

of the United States. 

From a strategic perspective, our government-to-government security relationships are 

critical to the United States' ability to meet complex global security challenges, facilitate U.S. 

military and coalition operations, and ensure regional stability. With the corresponding growth 

of globalization, economic integration, and a changing geopolitical landscape, expanding and 

deepening these bilateral relationships have become even more essential to U.S. national security 

and foreign policy. Sequestration cuts lead to the exact opposite outcome, forcing U.S. Southern 

Command to reduce support to partner nations' efforts to respond to internal and external threats 

and impeding our ability to provide defense support to U.S. foreign policy objectives, and those 

outlined in the 2012 Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement. Ultimately, sequestration 

undermines our efforts to help build and maintain an international community of nations that are 

stable and reliable partners, whose security forces fill an appropriate role in a society that is 

characterized by effective, accountable, democratic governance. 

7 
80 

Mr. Chainnan, Members, this leads me to my final thought on the impacts of 

sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts of over $50 billion per year across the 

Department of Defense. I will speak plainly: severe budget cuts will have long-tenn, detrimental 

effects on U.S. leadership in the hemisphere. Significantly reduced U.S. military engagement 

will make it difficult to counter those who would seek to exploit perceptions that the U.S. is 

abandoning our long-standing commitment to the region. Sequestration and its associated outyear budget cuts will result in damage to the United States' leadership, national security, 

readiness, and ability to deter or respond to global crises and regional security challenges. 

Regional Security Challenges 

Unfortunately, the sequester, a full-year Continuing Resolution, and associated out-year 

budget cuts due to sequestration are not accompanied by a corresponding decline in security 

challenges within our area of responsibility. These challenges are non-traditional in nature, 

networked in design, and transnational in scope, requiring constant vigilance, regional 

cooperation, and collective action. When it comes to South America, Central America, and the 

Caribbean, I cannot overstate the importance of awareness, access, and the enonnous return on 

investment from personal, on-the-ground security relationships. As the United States turns its 

attention to the home front to address domestic economic and budget issues, I finnly believe we 

must remain engaged with the nations in our shared home, the Western Hemisphere, for one very 

simple reason: proximity. Left unaddressed, security concerns in the region can quickly become 

security concerns in the homeland. 

Transnational Organized Crime. The prevalent problem in the region-particularly in 

Central America-is the growing power and destabilizing activities of criminal networks, whose 
81 

illicit operations are funded in significant part by U.S. and international drug consumption, as 

well as diverse illicit funding streams like kidnapping and extortion. As recognized by the 

President's 2011 Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, transnational organized 

crime is a global issue with global implications that directly impact the United States.4 In the 

U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility, these powerful groups exploit under-governed 

areas-where state capacity is weak and corruption and impunity are rampant-to consolidate 

control over drug, money, weapons, and human 2012 Homicide Rates per 100,000, select citiesS 

San Pedro Sula, Honduras 169 

smuggling networks that span the hemisphere. Caracas, Venezuela 118 

Tegucigalpa, Honduras 101 

(Distrito Central) This corrosive expansion is taking place in the 

New Orleans, LA 56 

Detroit,MI 54 context of deteriorating citizen security, 

Baltimore, MD 35 

Washington, DC 17 especially in Honduras, where the number of 

people killed rivals that of Iraq at the height of sectarian violence. Like many Members of 

Congress, I am troubled by this rising violence and its impact on regional stability. 

The impact on our own country is also clear. Transnational criminal organizations, 

which have expanded their presence throughout Central America, were responsible for several 

high-profile murders of American citizens across or on our border in recent years. Additionally, 

a 2007 report estimated that illicit drug usc cost the United States an estimated $193 billion 

dollars in combined health and criminal justice impacts.6 According to an analysis of arrestees 

carried out for the Officc of National Drug Control Policy, more than half of the adult males 

arrested for crimes in 10 metropolitan areas tested positive for at least one drug at the time of 

4 National Security Staff StrateKY to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National 

Security, 25 July. 20 II. 

5 Security, Peace, and Justice (Seguridad, Paz y Justicia). 50 ,Host Violent Cities in the World, 2012 Rankings. (available online 

at: http://\Vw\\,.sc£l.Uridadjusticiaypaz.org.mx) Washington, DC figures are from the Metropolitan Police Department's 2011 

Annual Report (most recent data available). 

6 National Drug Intelligence Center (2011), The Economic Impact of lIUeit Drug [hie on American Society Department of 

Justice. 

9 
82 

their arrest. 7 A recent survey estimated 6.5 million Americans 12 years and older are dependent 

According to the 2011 Nat/onal Drug Threat 

Assessment, Mexican-based transnational criminal 

organizations and their associates operate in upwards 

of 1,200 U.S. cities, working with domestic U.s. gangs to 

distribute and traffic illicit drugs throughout the 

United States. 

on or abuse an illicit drug.8 while in 

2009,39,147 people died from druginduced causes, more than double 

The FBI reports that MS-13 gang leaders in EI Salvador 

have initiated assassination plans against U.s. law 

enforcement personnel and target American citizens. 

the amount that were murdered that 

same year.9 

Mr. Chairman, Members, I'd like to sketch an image of illicit trafficking operations in 

our hemisphere to illustrate the magnitude of this problem. Picture an interconnected system of 

arteries that traverse the entire Western Hemisphere, stretching across the Atlantic and Pacific, 

through the Caribbean, and up and down North, South, and Central America. Complex, 

sophisticated networks use this vast system of illicit pathways to move tons of drugs, thousands 

of people, and countless weapons into and out of the United States, Europe, and Africa with an 

efficiency, payload, and gross profit any global transportation company would envy. In return, 

billions of dollars flood back into the hands of these criminal enterprises, enabling the purchase 

of military-grade weapons, ammunition. and state-of-the-art technology to counter law 

enforcement. This profit also allows these groups to buy the support-or silence--of local 

communities through which these arteries flourish, spreading corruption and fear and 

undermining support for legitimate governments. 

The tactics, techniques, and procedures of these criminal networks have advanced far 

beyond the typical activities of ·'traditional" organized crime. These are superbly financed, well1 Office of National Drug Control Policy. (2012). Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program: 20} J Annual Report. Executive 

Office of the President: Washington. D.C. 

s 20 II National Survey on Drug Use and Health 

9 Kenneth D. Kochanek, M.A.; Jiaquan Xu. M.D.; Sherry L. Murphy, B.S.: Arialdi M. Minino, M.P.H.; and Hsiang-Ching Kung. 

Ph.D .. "Deaths: Final Data for 2009." Division of Vital Statistics (Atlanta. GA: Centers for Disease Control), Vol. 60, Number 3. 

Dec. 29. 2011, p. 11. 

10 
83 

organized, and ruthless adversaries for our partner nations, especially our Central American 

ones. These networks conduct assassinations, executions, and massacres, and with their 

enormous revenues and advanced weaponry, they can outspend and outgun many governrnents. 

Some groups have similar-and in some cases, superior-training to regional law enforcement 

units. Through intimidation and sheer force, these criminal organizations virtually control some 

areas. In my view, the proximity of the U.S. homeland to criminally-governed spaces is a 

vulnerability with direct implications for U.S. national security. I am also troubled by the 

significant criminal capabilities that are available to anyone-for a price. Transnational criminal 

organizations have access to key facilitators who specialize in document forgery, trade-based 

money laundering, weapons procurement, and human smuggling, including the smuggling of 

special interest aliens. This criminal expertise and the ability to move people, products, and 

funds are skills that can be exploited by a variety of malign actors, including terrorists. 

Crimefferror Nexus. Mr. Chairman, Members, the presence of all these so-called "bad 

actors" raises the question of possible nexus between international terrorist organizations and 

criminal networks in the region. The answer is complex. While regionally-based Shi'a who 

support Lebanese Hezbollah are involved in drug and other illicit trafficking, we have only a 

partial understanding of possible interconnections and overlap between terrorist financing and 

illicit revenue streams, both within the hemisphere and on a global scale. The 2011 Iranian plot 

to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. demonstrates Iran is willing to leverage criminal 

groups to carry out its objectives in the U.S. homeland. This only underscores my concerns over 

the exploitation of criminal capabilities. In my judgment, any group seeking to harm the United 

States-including Iran--could view criminal middlemen, facilitators, and support networks as 

potential operational enablers, although not necessarily operational requirements. As 

11 
84 

distinguished Members of this committee have noted, an attack in or through the region would 

have major consequences for the entire Western Hemisphere. We remain vigilant against this 

possibility and its potential criminal facilitation, but need the assets to remain so. 

Iran in the Western Hemisphere. This brings me to the next issue I would like to 

discuss, which has serious implications for U.S. national security. I share the Congress' 

concerns over Iran's attempts to increase its influence in the region. The reality on the ground is 

that Iran is struggling to maintain influence in the region, and that its efforts to cooperate with a 

small set of countries with interests that are inimical to the United States are waning. In an 

attempt to evade international sanctions and cultivate anti-U.S. sentiment. the Iranian regime has 

increased its diplomatic and economic outreach across the region with nations like Venezuela, 

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Argentina. This outreach has only been marginally successful, however, 

and the region as a whole has not been receptive to Iranian efforts. 

Members and supporters ofIran's partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, have an established 

presence in several countries in the region. The Lebanese Shi'a diaspora in our area of 

responsibility may generate as much as tens of millions of dollars for Hezbollah through both 

licit and illicit means. There is also precedent for Iranian and Hezbollah collusion to conduct 

attacks in the region, as evidenced in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina. 10 In Venezuela, 

government officials have been sanctioned for providing financial support to Hezbollah, and for 

providing support to the F ARC's narcotics and arms trafficking activities in Colombia. II We 

take Iranian activities very seriously and, along with U.S. government agencies and international 

[0 This refers to the 1992 and 1994 bombings of the Asociaei6n Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) and Israeli Embassy by 

Hezbollah operatives. 

11 tJ.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. "Press Release: Treasury Designates Four Venezuelan 

Officials for Providing Arms and Security to the FARC.'· September 8. 2011; U.S. Department of the Treasury's Otlicc of 

Foreign Assets Control. "Press Release: Treasury Targds IIil.ballah in Vene/ucla." September 19,2008. 

12 
85 

partners, we remain vigilant to the 

activities of Iran and affiliated 

extremist groups and remain 

prepared to work with our partners 

to counter any direct threat to U.S. 

The U.S. Treasury Department has imposed sanctions 

against seven current or former senior Venezuelan 

government and military officials, including the former 

Minister of Defense, for providing direct support to the 

FARC's narcotics trafficking activities. 

In 2008, the u.s. Treasury Department imposed sanctions 

on two Venezuelans-Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi 

Kan'an-for providing financial and other support to 

Hezbollah. Nasr al Din served as Charge d' Affaires at the 

Venezuelan Embassy in Syria and the Director of Political 

Aspects at the Venezuelan Embassy in Lebanon. 

national security. I would be remiss, however, ifI did not share with the Congress my 

assessment that U.S. Southern Command's limited intelligence capabilities may prevent our full 

awareness of all Iranian and Hezbollah activities in the region. 

Terrorist Presence in the Region. Additionally, both Sunni and Shi'a extremists are 

present in our area ofresponsibility, and I am watchful for an evolution in operational presence, 

capacity, or radicalization, particularly among "homegrown" extremist groups. Proselytizers 

with ties to global Islamic extremism are attempting to radicalize and recruit among the Muslim 

communities throughout the region. Outreach by external extremist groups from the Middle 

East, Africa, and South Asia, such as Jama'at al Tabligh, has increased. As many Members of 

the Congress have noted, the U.S. and our partners should be extremely concerned whenever 

external extremist groups or state-sponsors of terrorism see the Western Hemisphere as 

attractive--or even worse, vulnerable. 

Terrorist groups represent a persistent challenge that has plagued the region for decades. 

The U.s. Southern Command area of responsibility has the 

highest improvised explosive devices (JED) activity in the 

world outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, with Colombia 

accounting for over 90 percent of IEDs in the region. 

The FARC is the region's oldest, 

largest, most capable, and bestequipped insurgency. The 

Government of Colombia is currently in peace negotiations with the FARC, but the fight is far 

from over and a successful peace accord is not guaranteed. Although weakened, the F ARC 

13 
86 

continues to confront the Colombian state by employing improvised explosive devices and 

attacking energy infrastructure and oil pipelines. In Peru, Sendero Luminoso (The Shining Path), 

while smaller than the F ARC, remains committed to violence and overthrowing the government. 

Both the F ARC and Sendero Luminoso rely on drug trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion to 

fund attacks on the Colombian and Peruvian governments. The hundreds of millions of dollars 

in revenue the F ARC receives from cocaine trafficking alone enable them to purchase surface-toair missiles and fund the construction of multi-million dollar "narco subs." Utilized by a variety 

of illicit trafficking groups in the region, fully submersible vessels are capable of transporting up 

to 10 metric tons of a variety of cargo and have a range capacity of 6,800 nautical miles, a range 

that could reach Africa. In other words, these subs, which are extraordinarily difficult to detect, 

can travel from the Caribbean coast of Colombia to just about any major city in Florida, Texas, 

or California in 10-12 daysI2.J3 

External Actors. Finally, I view the expanding influence of countries "external" to the 

Western Hemisphere as having uncertain 

implications. As I stated earlier, personal 

relationships are of enormous importance in this 

region, a fact other nations recognize. China is 

increasing its economic role in the region, and 

government-owned companies are funding or 

acquiring strategic infrastructure to facilitate 

2012 Regional Investments by China: 

Two Chinese banks provided $8 

billion in credit lines for 60 projects in 

12 countries in the region. 

$2 billion loan to Argentina to finance 

railway modernization throuoh soyproducing regions. 

$1.4 billion investment in copper 

mines in Ecuador. 

Joint agreement with Venezuela to 

develop Las Cristinas gold mine, one 

of the world's largest gold reserves. 

commercial logistics. Chinese companies own and operate an interest in at least five ports in the 

J2 Depending on the type and dimensions of1hc cargo, up to 10 metric tons ofa variety of products could be transported. Range 

estimates based on Office of Naval Intelligence assessments of seized fully submersible vessels. 

13 Written Testimony of Read Admiral Charles Michel, Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South. Subcommittee on Border 

and Maritime Security, House Committee on Homeland Security. June 19,2012, 

14 
87 

region, while telecommunications firms such as Huawei Technologies and ZTE have a rapidly 

expanding presence in South America. With an unprecedented three naval deployments to Latin 

America since 2008, including a hospital ship visit in 2011, China is attempting to directly 

compete with U.S. military activities in the region. I believe it is important to note that 

sequestration will likely result in the cancellation of this year's deployment of the USNS 

Comfort to the region, an absence that would stand in stark contrast to China' s recent efforts. In 

my judgment, Chinese interest in cultivating relationships with countries in the Western 

Hemisphere reaffirms the importance of strengthening our own partnerships with the region. 

Strategic Approach 

The transnational nature of many of these challenges I described cannot be addressed by 

anyone nation or agency alone. In my view, this illustrates the efficiency of working with and 

through our partners in the region and the U.S. government. U.S. Southern Command's strong, 

established relationships with regional militaries and security forces can serve as a catalyst for 

encouraging greater unity of effort on hemispheric security, from terrorism to illicit trafficking to 

the security of the Panama Canal. Many of the issues we face in the region transcend borders, 

requiring more than just a "whole of government" approach; they require a whole of community, 

a whole of society, a whole of hemisphere approach. Time and again-whether during Plan 

Colombia or Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti; whether in an interdiction operation that 

denies drug traffickers billions of dollars in revenue; or in multinational training exercises that 

improve the capability of regional armies, air forces, marines, navies, and special operations 

forces-our partnerships are the key enablers for ensuring regional security. It is my position 

that strengthening these partnerships is a cost-effective use of government resources. A layered 

defense can help the U.S. detect and deter threats before they reach the homeland, and help the 

hemisphere collectively respond to an uncertain and complex security environment. I would like 

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88 

to provide the Congress with a brief overview of what, in my view, is the invaluable return on 

investment from partnering and engaging with Central America, South America, and the 

Caribbean. I am gravely concerned, however, that sequestration and its associated out-year cuts 

to the defense budget will imperil our ability to sustain these successful partnerships and regional 

progress. 

Operation MARTILLO. We are currently witnessing the security dividends from 

regional cooperation as a result of Operation Operation MARTILLO 2012 Results 

Cocaine disrupted 152,389 kgs 

MARTILLO. In support of Department of State's Marijuana disrupted 21,488 kgs 

Bulk cash disrupted $7.2 million 

Assets seized (total) 101 

Partner nation supported 67% 

Central American Regional Security Initiative, U.S. 

Southern Command launched ajoint, interagency, disruptions 

Revenue denied to TCOs $ 3 billion 

and combined operation to counter illicit trafficking along the Central American coastlines, 

coordinating with Western Hemisphere and European partner nations to maximize all possible 

means for support. In addition to the measurable results of the operation, we have also seen 

greater unity of effort, expanded information sharing, and enhanced interoperability among 

partner nations and federal departments like the Department of Justice and the Department of 

Homeland Security. I am very proud to note that 67% of illicit trafficking disruptions in 2012 

were supportcd by partner nations, who have played an enormous role in the success of the 

operation. This unprecedented level of cooperation could serve as a model for future operations 

in Central America, although our ability to continue MARTILLO, build on the nascent progress 

of our Central American partners, or provide complementary support to the Department of 

State's Regional Aviation Program will all be in serious jeopardy due to sequestration and its 

associated out-year cuts to the defense budget. 

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Cooperation on Counterterrorism. In the region, our engagement on counterterrorism 

issues centers on promoting interoperability with key partner nations and maintaining a persistent 

and episodic presence to counter the influence of Islamic extremism, recruitment, and 

radicalization efforts. We are also conducting contingency planning for a variety of scenarios, 

but the most valuable deterrent to direct threats to the United States is through presence and 

partnerships. by maintaining active awareness and nurturing our relationships within the region. 

Continued budget uncertainty is impacting our ability to ensure this presence. however, as 

reduced resources have forced us to scale back deployments of Civil Affairs and Special 

Operations Forces teams to the region. 

Interagency and Private Sector Partnerships. Collaboration with our foreign and 

domestic partners also underscores everything we do at U.S. Southern Command headquarters. 

Thirty three interagency representatives and dctailees, along with five foreign liaison officers, are 

integrated throughout the command, allowing our military personnel to capitalize on the unique 

capabilities. authorities, and expertise of other government agencies and partner nations. 

Likewise, our military planning capability and capacity often can enhance synchronization of 

interagency efforts, even when the Department of Defense is not the lead agency. Cooperation 

with the private sector and non-governmental organizations also serves as significant force and 

resource multipliers to our activities and those of 

New Horizons 2012: Peru 

Total U.s. troops trained: 435 

Medical Readiness Training Exercises: 8 

Patients treated: over 26,000 

Animals treated: 313 

Construction and renovation projects: 6 

NGO Contribution: valued at over $200K 

our interagency partners. In 2012, our collaboration 

with the private sector leveraged gifts-in-kind and 

the participation of medical personnel, emergency 

management practitioners, business leaders, and 

academics in our humanitarian assistance activities throughout the region. While we will seek to 

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90 

expand these no-cost partnerships with the private sector, budget cuts have compelled us to 

reduce the interagency presence in our headquarters, which undermines our coordination within 

the U.S. government. 

Security Cooperation. Within the region, we build relationships with partner nation 

militaries through a range of engagements, such as training exercises, educational exchanges, 

and security cooperation activities. Every year, U.S. Southern Command conducts multinational 

training exercises with our partners, which focus primarily on maritime interdiction, the defense 

of the Panama Canal, and training for peace support and disaster response operations. These 

exercises are a unique opportunity to promote regional cooperation, enhance readiness and 

interoperability of our hemisphere's military forces, and encourage collective action to address 

shared security challenges. To help mitigate costly disaster relief operations and strengthen state 

presence in under-governed areas, we conduct low-cost humanitarian assistance programs and 

exercises that provide training to U.S. and partner nation personnel and demonstrate U.S. values 

to the region. The shadow of sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts place the 

continuation of many of these activities in doubt, however. Our security cooperation mission has 

borne the brunt of our budget reductions this year, and reduced engagements may have an 

"eroding effect" on our partnerships far into the future. 

In addition to training exercises. our Human Rights Initiative and International Military 

Education and Training are essential to developing professional armed forces throughout the 

Americas. The regional trend of deploying militaries in non-traditional roles like domestic 

security underscores the continued imporlance of our human rights training, including our 

ongoing support for Colombian military justice reform. Programs like the Inter-American Air 

Force Academy, the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, the Inter-American 

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91 

Defense College, and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship build relationships among future 

senior military leaders in the region. Additionally, the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric 

Strengthening Regional Defense Institutions 

International Military 

Education Training 

Inter-American Air Force 

Academy 

Western Hemisphere 

Institute for Security 

Cooperation 

Inter-American Defense 

Col/ege 

Funded 2,034 students from the region in 

2012 

In its 69-year history,- 44,000 graduates 

In its 12 year history, trained 15,859 

students from 34 nations, two of whom 

went on to prominent positions in their 

respective governments 

More than 2,380 students from 24 

countries have graduated from the lADe. 

34% have gone on to become partner 

nation presidents, cabinet ministers, 

ambassadors, or general officers. 

Defense Studies helps 

strengthen regional defense 

institutions by promoting 

security sector reform. 

These entities are all vital in 

assisting our partner nations 

develop the accountable, 

professional, and transparent defense institutions that are key to long-term hemispheric security. 

Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts could impact these valuable programs. Mr. 

Chairman, Members, we want to avoid losing an opportunity to build strong, enduring 

relationships with militaries in our own hemisphere. 

Through our engagement and training activities, U.S. Southern Command seeks to build 

the capabilities of regional militaries to confront internal challenges to stability, sovereignty, and 

security. In addition to the rotational forces provided by our component commands, we rely on 

the National Guard's State Partnership 

Program to engage with 22 nations in the 

area of responsibility. The State Partnership 

In 2012, U.s. National Guard units conducted 223 

events, and Colombia-South Carolina became the 

newest partnership under the program. 

Program provides long-term mentorship to our partner nations to advance democratic principles 

and values and to encourage subordination of the military to civilian authority. Due to budget 

reductions, however, we were forced to cancel more than 90 events aimed at improving partner 

nation capacity in areas such as disaster response, defense support to civil authorities, and 

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countering transnational organized crime. If triggered, sequestration and its associated out-year 

cuts to the Department of Defense budget could further limit the Services' ability to provide 

forces for future security cooperation activities. 

In Central America, we are providing training and security assistance to improve 

maritime, aerial, and land domain awareness capabilities, focusing on the Northern Tier 

countries where the threat posed by 

transnational criminal organizations is 

greatest. In the Caribbean, we are 

In 2012, U.s. Southern Command's DoD Rewards Program 

facilitated the capture of Florindo Eleuterio Flores-Hala 

(aka "Artemio"), the organizational head of the Upper 

Hua/Iaga Va/Iey (UHV) faction of Sendero Luminoso, 

landing a blow against the UHVorganization. 

supporting the development of a regional maritime interdiction strategy, as well as providing 

equipment and training to improve maritime and air domain awareness. Further south, Foreign 

Military Financing for the Joint Rotary Wing/Riverine Program has delivered critical mobility to 

Colombian counterinsurgency efforts, while an expanded Military Justice Program has resulted 

in invaluable training in the Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law. In Peru, we are 

supporting planning related to counterterrorism efforts against Sendero Luminoso. Additionally, 

we have partnered with the Joint lED Defeat Organization to help the Colombian Armed Forces 

build their counter lED capabilities, and we are in discussions on offering similar training to 

Peru. Our engagement with Brazil centers on space, cyber defense, intelligence and information 

sharing, and counterterrorism training for the upcoming World Cup and Summer Olympics. We 

are also exploring possible collaboration with U.S. Health and Human Services on consequence 

management. We fully support the proposal presented at the October 2012 Conference of the 

Defense Ministers of the Americas to advance a coordination mechanism for regional disaster 

response, and have begun discussions with the Government of Peru, the next CDMA Secretariat, 

on implementation. Although critical to ensuring the forward defense of the United States, our 

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training and engagement programs have been seriously impacted by this year's budget 

reductions. Sequestration and its associated out-year budget cuts will result in further 

debilitating effects to these valuable programs. 

Partners as Security Exporters. As I travel throughout U.S. Southern Command's area 

of responsibility, I am continuously impressed by the contributions of our partners to regional 

and international security. A global leader, Brazil heads the United Nations Stabilization 

Mission in Haiti, provides security assistance to several African nations, participates in maritime 

Thirteen countries are providing forces to 

multinational security operations and United 

Nations peacekeeping missions throughout the 

world, and EI Salvador recently deployed personnel 

in support of the NA TO mission in Afghanistan. 

exercises with South Africa and India, and 

is conducting border security operations 

with its neighbors. Chile has integrated a 

Salvadoran infantry unit into a battalion in 

support of the U.N. Mission in Haiti, and is exploring opportunities for further building partner 

capacity initiatives in Central America. Colombia is perhaps the best example of the inherent 

value of security assistance to the region. Once on the brink of falling to a powerful insurgency, 

Colombia is now a leader in counterinsurgency tactics and provides training to West African and 

Central American counterparts. U.S. Southern Command shares the commitment of these valued 

partners to ensuring a strong, secure, integrated hemisphere and global system, but sequestration 

may limit our ability to deepen our defense relationships with these partners or enhance the 

collective security of the hemisphere. 

Way Ahead 

Future Budget Reductions. While we have taken painful steps to reduce spending in 

2013, we recognize that sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defense budget will 

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94 

result in even more difficult decisions in the future. This year, we were able to decrease 

spending by applying equitable cuts across a range of programs, but future cuts may involve 

wholesale program elimination. As I have told my workforce, spending cuts will force us to "do 

less, with less." There will be some missions we will simply no longer be able to conduct, and 

our regional relationships will likely suffer as a result. 

Mitigating Asset Gaps in the Caribbean. Mr. Chairman, Members, as I alluded to 

earlier: presence matters. It is a documented deterrent. Given our likely continued asset 

reductions, we will need to rely on our partners, wherever possible, to help bridge some 

capability gaps in terms of assets, authorities, or resources. I credit the support of our European 

and Canadian allies in the Caribbean whose presence helps mitigate asset gaps, although I 

remain concerned by the sub-region's vulnerability to a shift in trafficking tactics. Although an 

estimated 92-94% percent of cocaine destined for the U.S. still flows through Central America, 

known cocaine movement towards Hispaniola-mainly the Dominican Republic-appears to 

have increased by three percent to 32 metric tons in 2012.14 We have experienced the so-called 

"balloon effect" before, and focusing limited assets on Central America creates a potential gap in 

other areas, which could be exploited by traffickers seeking to escape pressure from Operation 

MARTILLO. Last year, according to local media reports, 885 pounds of marijuana washed 

ashore on Florida's beaches, a vivid reminder of the heyday of drug smuggling in the Caribbean, 

an era I know none of us wants to see repeated. IS This will be increasingly difficult to prevent, 

however, given the impact sequestration will have on future asset availability. 

14 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM). Cocaine Movement Trends 3rd Quarter 2012. 

15 "Drugs found on South Florida beaches recalls smuggling heyday." October L 2012. Sun Sentinel. 

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95 

Detainee Operations. U.S. Southern Command continues to conduct safe, humane, and 

transparent detention operations at Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). The pending 

installation of the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station undersea fiber optic cable will save the United 

States millions of dollars in the long-term by reducing costs associated with using satellite 

communications. This cable will improve the reliability of communications with Guantanamo 

Bay facilities and also thereby enhance our ability to support military commissions, periodic 

review boards, and detention operations. 

Two of the major challenges we face at JTF-GTMO are a lack oflong-term resource 

planning, and complex issues related to future medical care of detainees. Mr. Chairman, 

Members, to paraphrase a former JTF-GTMO commander, we haven't been at Guantanamo for 

11 years; we've been there for one year, eleven times. A temporary detainee operation has now 

lasted over 11 years, and the expeditionary infrastructure at JTF -GTMO is rapidly deteriorating, 

placing assigned personnel and operations at increasing risk. Regardless of policy disputes, we 

must make pragmatic decisions to protect our troops from wlsafe and unsanitary living 

conditions and to ensure the continued safe and humane care of the detainee population. We 

have been relying on a patchwork of temporary fixes, but there is an urgent need for immediate 

refurbishment of degraded expeditionary infrastructure at JTF-GTMO. Using FY 2009 Overseas 

Contingency Funding for military construction, we have identified a series of projects aimed at 

increasing the security of the detainees, facilitating our ability to support legal processes for 

detainees, and most of all, meeting basic quality of life requirements for our troops. I look 

forward to working with the Congress as we address this issue. Additionally, the medical issues 

of the aging detainee population are increasing in scope and complexity. As is the case with any 

older person, aging detainees could require specialized treatment for issues such as heart attack, 

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96 

stroke, kidney failure, or even cancer. The future emergency and critical medical care of 

detainees may require specialists and equipment to enhance the current capabilities at Naval 

Station Guantanamo Bay. 

Quality of Life. As a non-traditional installation, U.S. Southern Command faces unique 

issues in supporting our assigned military personnel and their families, as well as retirees, and 

veterans living in South Florida who utilize the services available at our U.S. Army Garrison 

facility. In my first few months at U.S. Southern Command, I have come to realize that military 

families in South Florida are at a huge financial and benefits disadvantage. Access to a 

commissary is an integral part of the military benefits package for Active Duty personnel 

throughout their compensated period of duty or service. 16 Service members stationed at U.S. 

Southern Command do not have access to a nearby commissary, yet live in one of the most 

expensive cities in the United States. The continued lack of a commissary at our headquarters is 

not only a disservice to our personnel, but to the entire South Florida military community. In 

addition to the demonstrated economic returns and benefits, the commissary system ensures our 

service men and women and their families receive the full compensation they deserve by law. 17 

Whenever I visit one of our component commands or joint task forces, I make a 

concerted effort to address quality of life issues facing our troops, even seemingly minor ones 

like 24-hour gym access, a small request when you are working long shifts far from your loved 

ones. At our headquarters. I have spent a great deal of time talking to the service members 

assigned to U.S. Southern Command, and every single junior enlisted person I meet has told me 

of the financial hardships they face trying to make ends meet under the current Cost of Living 

16 Department of Detense Instruction 1330.17. December 2008. 

17 Resale and MWR Center for Research. Costs and Benefits a/the DoD Resale System. December 2012. 

24 
97 

Allowance. For example, a typical E-3 assigned to U.S. Southern Command receives $1,787 in 

monthly pay, $1,437 per month for housing, and a mere $18 in Cost of Living Allowance, 18 in a 

city with some of the highest insurance rates and lack of affordable rental housing in the 

country.19 I am actively engaging within the Department of Defcnse to make them aware of my 

concerns, and we are working to find a solution. 

U.S. Southern Command's most important resource is its workforce, and I am committed 

to enhancing quality of life at our headquarters. In recognition of growing concerns for the 

health and wellbeing of U.S. service members, we conducted two suicide prevention events, and 

we are developing a specialized council to address the emotional, mental, and physical health of 

all our personnel. Although an Army program, our Survivor Outreach Services office recently 

received approval to provide long-term support to family members of all our South Florida fallen 

heroes, regardless of service affiliation. As the Congress is aware, reports of sexual assault and 

harassment in the military have been at an all-time high, and U.S. Southern Command is doing 

its part to address this unacceptable issue. All incidents are handled using the exact procedures 

outlined in Department of Defense directives and policy, which promote sensitive care, 

confidential reporting for victims of sexual assault, and 100% accountability for those who 

commit these crimes. We also have a strong Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and 

Prevention (SHARP) program in place that ensures victims receive all the legal, medical, and 

psychological support they need. To support the professional development of our workforce, we 

IS Based on calculations for duty location (33176) for an £3 with two years of service and no dependents, 2013 pay infonnation 

from Defense Finance and Accounting Services; BAH calculator may be found at: W\\o\v.dcrcn,>drawLdod.mi'i-;itt:/bahCaJc . .:fm. 

The CONUS COLA calculator may be found at http:!.\nv\\.ddcnsdravcLdod.millsitc!conusC3iL"ctin 

19 According to apartment market research firm AXOIMetrics, the average effective rcnt (\vhich includes concessions) in Miami 

is $1,269 per month. compared to the U.S, as a whole at $964. According to the Joint Center tor Housing Studies at Harvard 

University, the Miami rental market has the greatest share of severely cost·burdened renters (i.e. renters \vho pay more than half 

their income to rent) in the country. 

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expanded training opportunities last year, including language and cultural awareness training to 

enhance our relations with partner nations. Possible furloughs, however, will likely disrupt 

training and professional development for our civilian employees, while sequestration will 

impact our language programs, undercutting the readiness of our assigned forces. 

Conclusion 

Finally, I would like to extend my personal gratitude to the outstanding men and women 

under my command. Day in and day out, 1,482 Soldicrs, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast 

Gnardsmen, and civilians work to enhance the defense of the United States and build enduring 

partnerships across Ccntral America, South America, and the Caribbean. Mr. Chairman, 

Members, although I have spoken extensively about the impact of drastic spending cuts to our 

missions and operations, there is also a human impact. Our dedicated Department of Defense 

civilians and Service members--our people-will disproportionally suffer the long-term 

damages sequestration and its associated out-year cuts to the defcnse budget will inflict. U.S. 

Southern Command is committed to ensuring the security and stability of the Western 

Hemisphere, and I hope the Congress will demonstrate its commitment to our great nation, its 

people, and its military by resolving budget uncertainty and preventing the devastating effects of 

sequestration. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Committee Members. I stand ready for your 

questions. 

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ANNEX: 2012 Component Accomplishments 

U.S. Army South (ARSOUTH) 

Headquarters: San Antonio, Texas 

• U.S. Army South conducted 31 security cooperation events in 13 countries in U.S. 

Southern Command's area of responsibility. These events represent 31 instances of 

engagement and building partner nation capabilities with the other militaries in the U.S. 

Southern Command area of responsibility. 

• CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ARMIES: The Conference of the American 

Armies is a 22 country delegation developed for the contribution to peacekeeping 

operations and disaster relief operations through the creation and use of mechanisms and 

procedures designed to improve the collective capacities and interoperability of its 

members. This year ARSOUTH represented the United States at the Science & 

Technology Conference in Peru, the Emerging Threats Conference in Colombia, the 

Disaster Relief Exercise in Mexico and the Extraordinary Commander's Conference in 

Mexico. 

• PANAMAX 2012: PANAMAX is ajoint and combined operational exercise focused on 

the defense of the Panama Canal by a multi-national joint task force, as well as building 

disaster and pandemic outbreak response capabilities of 17 participating partner nations. 

ARSOUTH hosted and provided mentorship to the Colombian led Combined Forces 

Land Component Command which included 122 participants from 9 countries. This was 

a major step forward in regional/coalition operations and the first time a foreign military 

played this key role in a SOUTHCOM JTF. 

>- Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013. 

• FUERZAS ALiADAS HUMANIT ARIAS: Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias is a 

regionally oriented humanitarian assistance/foreign disaster relief (HA/FDR) exercise 

that brings together partner nation and U.S. military units, civilian disaster management 

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100 

agencies, and local first responders. This year's exercise was held in Washington, D.C. 

with 70 participants from 20 nations. 

~ Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

cancelled FUERZAS ALIADAS HUMANIT ARIAS 2013. 

• PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMERICAS: This annual exercise provides 

training in international stability and peace operation in support of the United Nations 

and the Conference of the American Armies doctrine and procedures. ARSOUTH was 

the Executive Planning Agent for Peace Keeping Operations-Americas 2012 which 

included three supporting multi-echelon unit level staff training events: two in Chile and 

one in Dominican Republic, with 170 participants from 16 countries and culminated with 

a Multinational Task Force staff Command Post Exercise (CPX) held in Chile, with over 

261 participants from 22 nations. All participants received training and familiarization in 

working on a UN based peacekeeping operation. 

~ Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

cancelled PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AMERICAS 2013. 

• BEYOND THE HORIZON: Beyond the Horizon is a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff-approved, U.S. Southern Command-sponsored, Joint, Interagency, and Combined 

Field Training Exercise. The exercise provides and incorporates Humanitarian and Civic 

Assistance construction projects, Medical Readiness Exercises (MEDRETES), and other 

infrastructure projects. ARSOUTH was the Executive Planning Agent for the 2012 

Beyond the Horizon exercises conducted in Guatemala and Honduras, which involved the 

deployment of 1,800 U.S. service members into the two supported countries, resulting in 

the completion of 18 engineer projects, including schools and clinics in 12 communities, 

and 6 MEDRETEs that provided care to 33,330 patients and treated 27,800 animals for 

veterinary support. The exercises also obtained the support of 300 Guatemalan and 

Honduran military and interagency personnel working side by side with U.S. personnel. 

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• OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM CENTRAL AMERICA AND 

CARIBBEAN: In 2012, this program conducted 28 Subject Matter Expert Exchanges in 

seven countries (Panama, El Salvador, Honduras, Belize, Dominica, Guatemala, and 

Jamaica) that included over 800 host nation soldiers. 

• HUMANITARIAN MINING ACTION: Humanitarian Mine Action is a Joint Chiefs 

of Staff approved, U.S. Southern Command-sponsored demining training. Humanitarian 

Mine Action is designed to train existing host nation Demining Units using the 

International Mine Action Standards. This year ARSOUTH conducted training at the 

Ecuadorian Engineer School in Quito, Ecuador and the Colombian Army (COLAR) 

Demining Training Center in Tolemaida, Colombia. The goal of the training was to 

assist both countries in developing the capacity to remove anti-personnel mines and 

demine affected land for economic development. 

• STAFF TALKS: ARSOUTH conducted four bilateral Staff Talks in Colombia, Brazil, 

Chile, and EI Salvador and one Rotary Wing Aviation Seminar in Peru. The outcomes of 

these Staff Talks are more than 60 current Agreed to Actions (ATAs) that represent 

mutually negotiated bilateral and regional goals. A Working Group with Peru has 

yielded 12 similar Coordinated Action agreements and opportunities at a permanent staff 

talk status in the foreseeable future 

• LATIN AMERICA COOP: During FYI2, ARSOUTH Latin American Cooperation 

Funds supported 91 engagements/activities in 14 countries in the region. LA TAM Coop 

is a critical resource to execute ARSOUTH Security Cooperation objectives and U.S. 

Southern Command's Theater Security Strategy. LATAM Coop supports Army to Anny 

Staff Talks with key countries, Foreign Liaison Officers assigned to ARSOUTH, 

Conference of American Armies, professional development exchanges on multiple 

topics, army commander and distinguished visitor program, and 

Joint/Combined/Multinational Exercises and Operations. 

• CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS: ARSOUTH conducted Civil Military Relations 

Professional Development Exchanges in Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, 

improving their ability to conduct inter-organizational coordination during humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief operations. 

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12th Air Force (Air Forces Southern) 

Headquarters: Tucson, Arizona 

• Air Forces Southern conducted 21 security cooperation events in 13 countries in U.S. 

Southern Command's area of responsibility. 

• PANAMAX 2012: During PANAMAX 2012, Air Forces Southern successfully trained 

and integrated partner nation air planners into division processes and pushed 9 

ATOs/ACOs with a total of 1,193 missions (310 sorties). The Dynamic Targeting Cell 

prosecuted 12 time-sensitive targets and provided collateral damage estimate calls and 

weaponeering solutions. For the first time, a Brazilian Chief of Combat Operations was 

fully integrated into AOC operations, along with Colombian JAG officers. 

:>- Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013. 

• ISR Missions: Provided C2 for ISR missions in support of U.S. Southern Command's 

priorities; over 28,000+ images, 1,893.8 hours of signals intelligence led to the seizure of 

332,616 Ibs (3.02 billion worth) of drugs and weapons; 32 high-value narco-terrorists 

killed in action. 

• Airlift Missions: Executed 118 theater airlift missions moving 4,606 passengers and 

314.8 tons of cargo throughout U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility. 

• Medical Deployments: Planned and executed 12 Medical Deployments for training 

exercises in 2012, resulting in the treatment of 60,000 patients. Each deployment 

provided increased readiness of U.S. forces and improved the capability of regional 

partners to conduct combined operations. 

• NEW HORIZONS: Trained 435 U.S. active duty, guard, and reserve military, medical, 

and 60 host nation support forces. Provided medical humanitarian and civic assistance to 

rural areas in Peru and trained 17 engineers. Construction projects included two clinics, a 

library, auditorium, SEAHUT, and a large multi-use facility. During the exercise, the 

medical team treated over 26,000 patients. 

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• Sovereign Skies Expansion Program: Used successful lessons learned from Dominican 

Republic and Colombia programs to strengthen air force capabilities in Belize, El 

Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Training included helicopter maintenancc, night 

operations, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 

• 571 Mobility Support Advisory Squadron: Successfully completed six deployments of 

25 man teams for 6-8 weeks to Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru. 

Provided unit self training as air advisors, supported airfield infrastructure improvements, 

and built air capabilities, including logistics, communications, fuels, contracting, air 

traffic control, survival/search/rescue, supply, vehicle maintenance, security forces, 

command and control, airfield management, maintenance, information operations, and 

aerial port functions. 

• Support to Counter Illicit Trafficking efforts: Presented RC-135, C-J30 SENIOR 

SCOUT, JSTARS, AWACS, B-1, B-52, RQ-4 Global Hawk B-30, and TPS-78 groundbased radar in addition to the daily A TO support to Colombia. Provided several thousand 

hours of coverage in support of detection and monitoring operations, generally under the 

tactical control of JIATF-South. Deployed TPS-78 ground-based radar (GBR) to 

Honduras for 90 days in support of Operation MARTILLO, including surveillance 

coverage of illicit air trafficking routes resulting in law enforcement seizures of 

approximately I.4MT of cocaine, 7 aircraft seized/destroyed, and 8 pilots DOA, arrested 

or missing. Supported four month deployment of Peruvian Air Force TPS-70 GBR for 

Operation ALL INCLUSIVE and provided detailed trend analysis of current illicit air 

traffic in Peru. 

Joint Interagency Task Force South (.JIATF-S) 

Headquarters: Key West, Florida 

• Joint Interagency Task Force South contributed to the disruption of 152 metric tons of 

cocaine in FY 2012 worth more than $3 billion wholesale. This was a 30% increase in 

disruptions from the previous fiscal year. JIA TF -S employs an integrated defense 

forward capability for the ongoing efforts at the US Southwest Border and for US 

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operations in the Western Hemisphere using TACON ship days, TACON flight hours and 

the operating cost ofFSSC provided ROTHR support. 

• The vast majority of JIA TF -S successes came as a result of .HATF -S leadership and 

coordination of Operation MARTILLO, the multi-lateral effects based operation 

designed to deny the CENT AM littoral routes by illicit traffickers. Begun on 15 January 

2012, Op MARTILLO resulted in the disruption of 152 metric tons of cocaine, the 

seizure of $7.2 Million in bulk cash, and the seizure of 101 vessels including 4 selfpropelled semi submersibles (SPSS) and 8 aircraft. At its one year anniversary, Op 

MARTILLO is beginning to show its desired effects: trafficking in the Western 

Caribbean and Eastern Pacific littorals is seen to be decreasing while the activity in the 

Eastern Pacific non-littoral route is rising. 

• Operational Results and Impact. In the air domain, over the past year, JIATF-S 

assesses a 21 % decrease in illicit air tracks destined for Central America (primarily 

Honduras); and a 57 % decrease in illicit air tracks destined for Hispaniola (primarily 

Haiti). In the maritime domain, during the same period JIA TF -S assesses a decrease of 

maritime activity in the Western Caribbean littoral and non-littoral trafficking areas of 

36% and 38% for each vector respcctively. In the EPAC, the trafficking shows a steady 

decrease in the littorals (from an overall increase of71% at the end ofFY12 to a current 

43% decrease in FY13) while the activity in the EPAC non-littorals appears to be 

increasing (from an increase of 12% in FYI2 to an increase of 51% currently in FYI3). 

These changes are assessed to be a direct result of Op MAR TILLO assets working in the 

littoral areas and reflect the start of achieving the end result of the operation in driving the 

traffickers out of the littorals. 

• Role of Partner Nations. Since 15 January 2012, 67% of the disruptions were supported 

by partner nations who have played an enormous role in the success of the operation. 

This represents an increase from 57% last year. 

• Innovation to meet the counter-drug mission. JIATF-S continues to innovate in the 

face of asset reductions by their demonstrated ability to integrate any and all nontraditional counterdrug assets into their force lay down in order to achieve success. 

JIA TF-S strived to fulfill its counter-drug missions with non-traditional counterdrug 

assets. In FYI2, the USAF deployed JSTARS, B-1, and B-52 detachments to the JIATFS 

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Joint Operating Area (lOA). Under JIATF-S TACON, these detachments provided 

critical wide area surveillance and long range maritime patrol capabilities in support of 

JIATF-S' detection and monitoring mission while maximizing their pre-deployment 

training opportunities in a semi-benign but target rich JOA. 

• Information Dominance. Understanding the importance and growing emphasis on 

information warfare and cyber defense, JIATF-S reorganized their Intelligence and 

Security, C4I, and Innovation and Technology Directorates under a Senior Director for 

Information Dominance to parallel the US Navy's reorganization of their N2 311d N6. 

This reorganization resulted in efficiencies in systems development and integration. 

enhanced information fusion capabilities, and development of capacities to conduct 

counter network operations against transnational criminal organizations 

Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) 

Headquarters: Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras 

• Support to Operation ANVIL: Provided plruming and logistical support for proof of 

concept for Operation ANVIL. Operation resulted in 2,300 kgs of narcotics seized and 

16 indictments, and laid the groundwork for future Department of State-led operations in 

Central America. 

• Air Operations: Conducted 228 air movements in support of CTOC operations, 

MEDRETEs, MEDEV ACs, and official visitor movement within Honduras and to 

Nicaragua, El Salvador, Belize, and Guatemala. 

• Support to Government of Honduras: Assisted with disaster relief at the Comayagua 

prison fire in February 2012, the worst in Honduran history. Coordinated with five 

national agencies to recover and transport 352 decea~ed prisoners and partnered with 

ATF on investigation matters. JTF-Bravo assistance was praised by President Lobo on 

national television. 

• Humanitarian/Civic Assistance: 

o Conducted 14 MEDRETEs, performing 41,948 medical procedures on over 

22,000 patients throughout Central America. 

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o lTF-Bravo assisted with the reception and distribution of 143,290 pounds of 

humanitarian aid cargo on military aircraft under the Denton Program, which was 

made available to NGOs for delivery to local families. 

o Soto Cano Chapel hosted 6 chapel hikes for 521 people and distributed over 

13,000 lbs of food to needy local families. 

o lTF-B MSC's sponsored 4 orphanages with over 80 visits by JTF-B personnel, 

providing approximately $12k of aid including facility improvements, clothing, 

school supplies, and food. 

• Disaster Response Training: As part of CENT AM SMOKE, lTF-B trained 87 

firefighting personnel from Honduras and Nicaragua. 

Joint Task Force Guantanamo 

Headquarters: Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 

• Safe and Humane Care and Custody: Detainees have been moved from expeditionary 

Camps I-IV to more modem Camps V and VI. Detainees in Camp VI and parts of Camp 

V are allowed communal living arrangements, which improves social interaction and 

overall well-being for detainees, while also significantly reducing detainee-guard 

interactions, which reduces assaults on the guard force. Outdoor recreation areas of 

Camps V and VI have been significantly expanded and library holdings for loan to 

detainees have increased to 25,000 items. In order to further increase social interaction 

and mental stimulation, educational course offerings have also been broadened in scope 

and frequency. Detainees maintain family contact with mail, telephone calls and, in areas 

which support this service, videophone conferences, coordinated by the International 

Committee of the Red Cross. 

Legal and Transparent Operations: Continued assessments by the International 

Committee of the Red Cross have been expanded to six visits per year. The ICRC verifies 

compliance with international standards of custody as specified in the Geneva 

Convention and other international standards and provides confidential advice for 

suggested improvements to the lTF Commander and U.S. Southern Command. 

Detainees are granted routine visits by legal representatives, having received more than 

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898 Commissions and 362 Habeas attorney visits in 2012. JTF Guantanamo is 

committed to transparency and has hosted 970 visitors and 164 media representatives 

from 60 domestic and international news organizations over the past year. 

• Military Commissions: In March 2011, the Obama administration announced that 

military commissions would resume at Guantanamo Bay. Military commissions 

proceedings are open to observation by the media, victim family members and nongovernmental organizations. The first military commissions proceeding was the 

arraignment of the alleged mastermind of the USS COLE bombing in November, 2011. 

In 2012, JTF-Guantanamo supported 8 hearings, including: the arraignment and motions 

hearings of the five individuals accused of coordinating the September 11,2001 attacks 

on the U.S. (referred to in the press as "the 9/11 Five"), motions hearings for the alleged 

USS COLE bomber, and an arraignment and plea acceptance of Majid Khan, who plead 

guilty to conspiracy, murder, attempted murder, providing material support to terrorism, 

and spying, including in conjunction with the J.W. Marriott bombing in Indonesia. 

U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNA VSO) 

Headquarters: Mayport, Florida 

• Operation MARTILLO: Seven frigates, one replenislunent ship, and four fixed-wing 

aviation squadrons deployed to support Operation MARTILLO, conducting Countering 

Transnational Organized Crime (C-TOC) Operations under the direction of Joint Interagency 

Task Force South (JIATF-South). Navy Forces have played a key role in providing a 

persistent presence as part of a cooperative effort to shift maritime illicit trafficking away 

from the Central American littorals. MARTILLO has had a significant impact on illicit 

trafficking routes (air and maritime). Compared to calendar year 2011, disruptions were up 

more than 20%. 

• Southern Partnership Station 2012: Southern Partnership Station (SPS) is a series of 

Navy/Marine Corps Engagements focused on Theater Security Cooperation, specifically 

Building Partner Capacity through subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation 

militaries and civilian security forces. SPS Engagements include Community Relations 

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(COMREL) Projects that focus on our partnerships, shared interests, and shared values. SPS 

Deployments included: 

~ HSV SWIFT Southern Partnership Station 2012: High Speed Vessel SWIFT 

(HSV 2) conducted engagements in six Partner Nations (Dominican Republic, EI 

Salvador, Panama, Guatemala, Peru, and Haiti), which included medical, 

vcterinary, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Maritime Civil Affairs 

(MCAST), and U.S. Marine subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation 

counterparts. SWIFT Seabees completed small-scale construction/refurbishment 

projects. The SWIFT Team also delivered Project Handclasp Gifts-in-Kind 

during COMREL Projects, and made a special delivery of relief materials to Port 

Au Prince, Haiti. 

~ Navy Dive Southern Partnership Station 2012: Salvage Ship USNS 

GRAPPLE (T-ARS 53) conducted engagements in five Partner Nations 

(Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, Guatemala, and Jamaica), and featured 

Navy Divers conducting subject matter expert exchanges with partner nation 

counterparts, to include divers from Canada, Chile, and The Bahamas. These 

expert exchanges included numerous live diving operations. In a historic note, the 

GRAPPLE Team completed a refurbishment and rededication of the Oliver 

Hazard Perry Gate at a cemetery in Trinidad, on the Bicentennial of the War of 

1812. The original dedication of the Perry Gate was in 1925. 

~ Oceanographic Southern Partnership Station 2012: Survey Ship USNS 

PATHFINDER (T-AGS 60) conducted hydrographic surveys in the Eastern 

Pacific (0 support U.S. Southern Command's priority Oceanographic, 

Hydrographic and Bathymetric Requirements. As part of this deployment, a Fleet 

Survey Team traveled to Colombia to conduct joint hydrographic surveys and 

subject matter expert exchanges with Colombian Oceanographers. 

• UNIT AS 2012: UNIT AS (Latin for "Unity") enhances friendly, mutual cooperation and 

understanding between participating navies by developing interoperability in naval 

operations among the nations of the region. In 2012, the multinational maritime exercise 

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series, the longest-running in the world, celebrated its 53rd straight year with two major 

events, one in the Pacific in May and one in the Atlantic/Caribbean in September. 

» UNITAS PAC (Pacific) 2012: Peru hosted UNITAS PAC 2012, which included 

Naval Forces from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and the United 

States. Events included ashore and underway training in maritime interdiction 

operations, counter-piracy operations, air, surface, and anti-submarine warfare. 

» UNIT AS LANT (Atlantic) 2012: The United States hosted UNIT AS LANT 

2012 out of Key West, Florida, the largest number of multinational warships to 

conduct a simultaneous port call at Key West in more than 30 years. Naval 

Forces from Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States completed shore-based professional symposia 

and conducted multinational Community Relations (COMREL) Projects in Key 

West. Once at sea, participants trained in a variety of maritime scenarios to test 

command and control of forces at sea, while operating as part of a multinational 

force to provide the maximum opportunity to improve interoperability. In 2012, 

UNITAS LANT also included the U.S. Marine Corps Forces South field-training 

exercise known as Partnership of the Americas, which was conducted at Camp 

Blanding in Starke, Florida, in September. 

Southern Seas 2012: USS UNDERWOOD (FFG 36) conducted a variety of exercises and 

multinational exchanges to maintain access, enhance interoperability, and build enduring 

partnerships that foster regional security. UNDERWOOD participated in UNITAS PAC, the 

Silent Forces Exercise (SIFOREX) with Peru, UNITAS LANT, and Operation MARTILLO. 

PANAMAX 2012: Commander U.S. Forces Southern Command served as the Commander 

of Multi-National Forces South (MNFS), leading a coalition of 17 Partner Nations in the lOth 

annual exercise designed to execute stability operations under the support of United Nations 

Security Council Resolutions; provide interoperability training for participating multinational 

staffs; and build Partner Nation capacity to plan and execute complex multinational 

operations. 

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» Due to budget uncertainty aud possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013. 

• Navy Seabees: 85 Seabees deployed to Naval Base Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) to support 

construction/refurbishment projects throughout the U.S. Southern Command AOR. From 

this detachment, Seabee details deployed aboard HSV SWIFT to complete projects in 

support ofHSV SPS 2012. Seabees also deployed to complete projects in support of U.S. 

Army South's Beyond the Horizon Exercises in Guatemala and Honduras, U.S. Air Force 

Southern's New Horizons Exercise in Peru, U.S. Special Operations Command South's 

Fused Response Exercise in Guyana, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces South Operation 

MARTILLO support to Guatemala. Seabees in GTMO completed projects in support of the 

U.S. Navy Base and the Joint Task Force GTMO Commander. 

Marine Corps Forces South (MARFORSOUTH) 

Headquarters: Doral, Florida 

• Marine Corps Forces South conducted 67 Security Cooperation events in 27 countries in 

United States Southern Command's area of responsibility. 

• Marine Detachment in support of Operation MARTILLO: Responding to the new 

National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), MARFORSOUTH 

supported JIATF-South and Guatemalan Security Forces with operations to disrupt aJld deter 

trafficking along the Central American coast. The Marine Detachment conducted detection, 

monitoring activities to curtail illicit trafficking routes on the Pacific coast of the Central 

American isthmus. 

• TRADEWINDS 2012: The Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed exercise was hosted in Barbados 

with over 1,000 participants from 19 countries. Participants were trained in counter illicit 

trafficking operations and Humanitarian AssistancelDisaster Relief responses, as well as 

receiving training to improve operations center management, basic infantry skills, law 

enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures, search and rescue, maritime interdiction 

operations and procedures. 

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• UNIT AS - Partnership of the Americas (POA): This exercise enhances multinational 

operational readiness, interoperability, and security cooperation among U.S. and 9 partner 

nation naval infantries. In 2012, the exercise focus was amphibious operations, to include 

amphibious staff planning, training and equipping in support of future peace support 

operations and humanitarian assistance missions. 

~ Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

cancelled PARTNERSHIP OF THE AMERICAS 2013. 

• P ANAMAX 2012: As the Marine Service component, MARFORSOUTH sourced and 

employed a Marine Expeditionary Unit Command Element; placed liaison officers at the JTF 

and functional components; stood up and operated an Operations Center and Crisis 

Augmentation Cell; sourced a Marine General Officer, with staff, to serve as the JTF J3; and 

participated in the exercise as JTF staff. 

,. Due to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

significantly de-scoped PANAMAX 2013. 

• Counterdrug/Counternarcotics Mobile Training Team Deployments: Provided training 

to build capacity throughout the region to partner nation counterdrug and counter narcoterrorism forces to increase interdiction capacities. 

Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) 

Headquarters: Homestead, Florida 

• Building Partner Capacity. Through persistent engagement with its partners in the 

region, SOC SOUTH builds partner nation security force capacities to confront shared 

security challenges. SOCSOUTH's focus in Northern Central America is to partner with 

key security forces that are best able by mission, position, and authorities to counter 

transnational organized crime. 

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)- In 2012, SOCSOUTH maintained small elements in Guatemala, Honduras and El 

Salvador working with key units to improve ground and maritime interdiction, 

civil affairs, and intelligence capacities. 

)- In the Andean Ridge, SOCSOUTH partnered with Colombia and Peru to confront 

narco-terrorist insurgencies whose illicit trafficking operations extend throughout 

the hemisphere. SOC SOUTH elements provided assistance to the Colombian 

Special Operations Command, the new joint interagency task forces that are 

conducting operations against key F ARC concentrations. SOC SOUTH also 

provided countemarcotics, small unit tactics, and riverine training to Colombian 

National Police and military forces. In Peru, SOC SOUTH elements conducted 

countemarcotics small unit tactics and riverine training with the Peruvian Joint 

Special Operations Command. 

• Civil Affairs. In 2012, SOC SOUTH had eleven civil affairs teams helping nine partner 

nations reduce the vulnerability of key populations to influence by transnational 

organized crime or violent extremism. These civil affairs teams assisted with counterrecruitment programs and, in many cases, helped partner nations build their own civil 

affairs capacities. 

• Information Operations. SOC SOUTH maintained military information support teams 

in seven key partner nations. These teams supported the DOD Rewards Program, the 

U.S. government's Anti-Trafficking in Persons Program, partner nation counterrecruitment programs, and active tip lines in support of the wider effort against 

transnational organized criminal and violent extremist organizations. The teams also 

helped three partner nations build their own infonnation operations capacity. 

• Intelligence Analytical Support to U.S. Country Teams. SOC SOUTH provides 

intelligence and counter-threat financing support to U.S. Country Teams in the region, 

focusing on terrorism, human smuggling networks, and transnational organized crime. In 

Colombia, SOCSOUTH supported Colombian War Plan "SWORD OF HONOR" by 

helping build intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination capacity in newly 

established joint interagency task forces fighting the F ARC. 

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• Logistics Training and Advisory Team. SOCSOUTH seeks to increase the logistics 

capacity of key partner nation units with the goal of continued sustainment. In 2012, 

SOC SOUTH provided subject matter expertise to enable key Colombia partner units to 

establish a sustainable weapons-repair capability and initiate the development of an aerial 

delivery capability. SOC SOUTH also assisted Peruvian units engaged in counter narcotcrrorism operations to conduct a weapons inspection, which will serve as a starting point 

for future SOCSOUTH logistics engagement activities. 

• Building Intcllectual Capital. By partnering with academia, SOCSOUTH seeks to 

build critical thinking skills of key partner unit leadership, helping them to better confront 

complex irregular warfare challenges. In 2012, SOC SOUTH sponsored a "Counter 

FARC Ideological Activities" seminar in Colombia, and a "Counterterrorist Operations 

Planning" seminar in Peru in support of counter narco-terrorist operations. In Brazil, 

SOCSOUTH sponsored a "Joint Special Operations Task Force" seminar to assist in 

preparation for four major events, including the World Cup in 2014 and Summer 

Olympics in 2016. 

• FUERZAS COMMANDO 2012: A CJCS-approved, multinational, special operations 

interaction exercise consisting of a team-level special operations skills competition and a 

minister or cabinet-level distinguished visitors program. This year's team competition 

was held in Tolemaida, Colombia. The distinguished visitor program focused on regional 

interagency coordination and joint/combined special operations in support of overseas 

contingency operations and was held in Bogota, Colombia. Twenty-one partner nations 

from the Western Hemisphere participated in the exercise, including Mexico, Canada, 

and Barbados. 

? Duc to budget uncertainty and possible sequestration cuts, USSOUTHCOM 

cancelled FUERZAS COMANDO 2013. 

• FUSED RESPONSE 2012: A CJCS-directed exercise designed to validate 

USSOUTHCOM crisis response capabilities. This year's exercise was a level III 

exercise in Guyana, involving the participation of where intcragency partners, US and 

host nation special operations forces and staff. 

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General John F. Kelly 

Commander, US Southern Command 

General Kelly was born and raised in Boston, MA. He 

enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1970, and was discharged 

as a sergeant in 1972, after serving in an infantry company 

with the 2nd Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC. 

Following graduation from the University of 

Massachusetts in 1976, he was commissioned and 

to the 2nd Marine Division where he served as a rifle and 

weapons platoon commander, company executive officer, 

assistant operations officer, and infantry company 

commander. Sea duty in Mayport, FL, followed, at which 

time he served aboard aircraft carriers USS Forrestal and 

USS Independence. In 1980, then Captain Kelly 

transferred to the U.S. Army's Infantry Officer Advanced 

Course in Fort Benning, GA. After graduation, he was 

assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, serving there from 1981 

through 1984, as an assignment monitor. Captain Kelly returned to the 2nd Marine 

Division in 1984, to command a rifle and weapons company. Promoted to the rank of 

Major in 1987, he served as the battalion's operations officer. 

In 1987, Major Kelly transferred to the Basic School, Quantieo, V A, serving first as the 

head of the Offensive Tactics Section, Tactics Group, and later assuming the duties of the 

Director of the Infantry Officer Course. After three years of instructing young officers, he 

attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School for Advanced 

Warfare, both located at Quantico. Completing duty under instruction and seleeted for 

Lieutenant Colonel, he was assigned as Commanding Officer, 1st Light Armored 

Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, CA. Holding this 

eommand position for two years, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly returned to the East Coast in 

1994, to attend the National War College in Washington, DC. He graduated in 1995, and 

was seleeted to serve as the Commandant's Liaison Officer to the U.S. House of 

Representatives, Capitol Hill, where he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. 

In 1999, Colonel Kelly transferred to joint duty and served as the Special Assistant to the 

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in Mons, Belgium. He returned to the United States 

in 2001, and was assigned to a third tour of duty at Camp Lejeune, now as the Assistant 

Chief of Staff G-3 with the 2nd Marine Division. In 2002, selected to the rank of 

Brigadier General, Colonel Kelly again served with the I st Marine Division, this time as 

the Assistant Division Commander. Much of Brigadier General Kelly's two-year 

assignment was spent deployed in Iraq. He then returned to Headquarters Marine Corps 
115 

as the Legislative Assistant to the Commandant from 2004 to 2007. Promoted to major 

general, he returned to Camp Pendleton as the Commanding General, I Marine 

Expeditionary Force (Forward). The command deployed to Iraq in early 2008 for a yearlong mission, replacing II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) as Multinational ForceWest in Al Anbar and western Ninewa provinces. LtGen Kelly commanded Marine 

Forces Reserve and Marine Forces North from October 2009 to March 2011. General 

Kelly comes to United States Southern Command from his previous position as the 

Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from March 2011 to October 2012 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 20, 2013 

(119) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. What would the cost range be for an additional missile defense site 

(including cost of construction, GBI procurement, maintenance, personnel, etc.)? 

What were the total costs of the missile fields at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB? 

General JACOBY. This question is best answered by the MDA. USNORTHCOM 

provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new 

capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. What other installations would be required at an East Coast site and 

what would the cost for those be (including radar systems, command and control 

systems, satellite ground stations, security, fencing and alarms, roads, runways, and 

other access)? 

General JACOBY. This question is best answered by the MDA. USNORTHCOM 

provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new 

capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. The National Academy of Sciences report recommended an East Coast 

site assuming a new type of interceptor booster and EKV were developed. Is there 

a plan for a new interceptor acquisition program? What would the costs be for a 

new booster and EKV? How long would development of the new interceptor take? 

General JACOBY. These questions are best answered by the MDA. USNORTHCOM 

provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new 

capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. Why did the DOD reject Grand Forks, North Dakota, as a potential 

GMD site? 

General JACOBY. This question is best answered by OSD and MDA. 

USNORTHCOM provides warfighter requirements to the MDA, which shape the development of new capabilities. 

Mr. SMITH. What is the legal obligation of the U.S. Government in providing 

treatment for detainees for life saving/emergencies that is readily available in 

CONUS, but not at GTMO (i.e. cancer, dialysis, etc)? 

General KELLY. The legal obligation of the United States for the medical treatment of detainees is rooted in international law, Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions, and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005. These principles of law are 

reflected in Department of Defense Instruction, ‘‘Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations,’’ which provides that ‘‘to the extent practicable, treatment of detainees should be guided by professional judgments and standards similar to those 

applied to personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces.’’ 

Detainee health care is provided by the Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF– 

GTMO) Joint Medical Group (JMG), a group of more than 100 uniformed military 

health care professionals, and supported by the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Hospital. These doctors, nurses, and support personnel provide detainees the same level 

of general health care given to U.S. Armed Forces, applying identical professional 

judgments and standards in caring for the detainee population. This health care includes providing life-saving and emergency services to the extent they are available 

at Guantanamo through the JMG detainee health clinic and the Naval Hospital. 

Sustained medical care for more complex and enduring illnesses may exceed the capabilities of Guantanamo Bay, and are case dependent. 

Mr. SMITH. What is the legal obligation of the U.S. Government in the event a 

detainee refuses to eat and/or accept medical treatment, putting his own life in 

danger? 

General KELLY. The legal obligation of the United States to provide health care 

to the detainees is based in international law, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and the Department of Defense Instruction, ‘‘Medical Program Support for Detainee Operations.’’ Health care personnel have a duty to perform, encourage, and support, the humane treatment of 

detainees and to ensure that no individual in the custody of the Department of Defense shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 

We recognize a legal and moral obligation to take action in the event a detainee 

puts his own life in danger by refusing to eat, or by refusing medical treatment. Prevention of unnecessary loss of life of detainees through standard medical interven-
120 

tion includes involuntary medical intervention when necessary in cases involving detainee’s who lack the mental capacity to appreciate the impact of their decisions. 

Mr. SMITH. Would there be any occasions in which there would be a difference 

in care for a seriously ill service member at Guantanamo and a seriously ill detainee? For example, are there medical situations in which a service member would 

be sent by medevac to Miami and a detainee would not be? 

General KELLY. Yes. The difference between detainee medical care and that of 

U.S. military personnel is that the latter will be brought to the CONUS for any critical or specialized care required that is beyond the capabilities of the Guantanamo 

Bay Naval Hospital. Detainees must be treated with the medical assets available 

at Guantanamo; however, medical specialists may be brought to GTMO to provide 

specialized care for detainees. 

Since 2009, each successive National Defense Authorization Act has prohibited 

the use of funds by the Department of Defense to ‘‘transfer, release, or assist in the 

transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions’’ 

those detainees currently held at Guantanamo. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. Are you confident that the 20 CE–1 interceptor GBIs we deploy are 

an operational capability to defend the homeland against ballistic missile threats? 

General JACOBY. I am confident that the GMD system, which includes the 20 CE– 

I interceptors, can successfully defend the United States against limited ballistic 

missile threats. It is important that we continue to test and update our interceptors. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Jacoby, in your statement you discuss your work with U.S. 

Cyber Command to establish a Joint Cyber Center to recognize and assess cyber 

threats to the homeland. General, can you characterize how proactive vs. reactive 

your efforts are today against foreign cyber threats and attacks? Are you able to 

stay ahead of the perilous entities that wish to do our Nation harm in this domain? 

The reach of this threat is frightening because it touches so many parts of American’s lives. Are you working with nonmilitary cyber entities to ensure we do not 

bore scope our efforts and focus, and potentially miss large attacks that threaten 

our homeland? 

General JACOBY. We are proactive in our defensive posture for NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM command and control systems in that we strive to minimize known 

vulnerabilities. Having the capability to identify malicious cyber activity targeting 

our critical networks and the ability to mitigate that threat when it occurs is essential for mission assurance. 

The Nation’s capacity to stay ahead of entities that aim to do our Nation harm 

in the cyber domain is improving, but much more needs to be done. The cyber capability associated with NORAD and USNORTHCOM’s Joint Cyber Center is directly 

tied to DOD’s increase in cyber capacity, realized through changes in strategy and 

evolving awareness and synchronization efforts alongside a host of mission partners 

including DOJ, FBI, and DHS. It will take time to allocate and train the necessary 

workforce. 

My commands collaborate daily with non-military mission partners, gaining insight into malicious cyber activity with the potential to impact our ability to execute 

our assigned missions. We work most closely with DHS to improve our domestic 

cyber situational awareness and to appropriately plan for potential response and recovery support of civil authorities, if requested in the event of a serious domestic 

cyber attack. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Kelly, you mentioned the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iranian 

connections to your theater. Can you discuss any possible links between these 

groups and the drug trade? Furthermore, with special operations forces and ISR assets in high demand in CENTCOM and AFRICOM right now, and a limited presence in your AOR, how do we maintain an active awareness and continue to foster 

the relationships that we have built in SOUTHCOM? Do you see these 

narcoterrorist organizations connections maturing and growing unchecked? 

General KELLY. Some Latin American drug trafficking organizations with links to 

Lebanon maintain family and business connections to Lebanese Hezbollah. An unknown portion of their profits benefits Lebanese Hezbollah. Narcotics traffickers are 

generally motivated by profit and refrain from activity that will increase scrutiny 

by law enforcement. Conversely, terrorist organizations are ideologically driven and 
121 

seek public recognition for their actions. These inimical motives will continue to 

limit collusion between the two groups. 

Diminished Department of Defense ISR allocation means we rely on contract ISR, 

organic human intelligence, open source and social media. We foster interagency/ 

partner nation relationships to maintain awareness in the AOR. SOUTHCOM also 

promotes regional cooperation and intelligence sharing among partner nations by 

underscoring transnational organized crime as a hemispheric problem, which requires regional collaboration to counter successfully. Through conferences, workshops, bilateral and multilateral events, we have exposed partner nations to a new 

analytical tool that changed the way intelligence and information is shared with and 

among our partner nations. The Whole-of-Society Information Sharing for Regional 

Display (WISRD) process enables countries to share information. WISRD uses a 

Google Earth geospatial tool to organize and display complex information, which results in a three-dimensional regional common operating picture of the complicated 

transnational organized crime environment. This process provides a comprehensive 

common characterization to assist with identifying information gaps so nations can 

work together to satisfy them. Several Central/South American countries currently 

use WISRD successfully. 

The expanded awareness of illicit activities as a hemispheric problem has increased traditional partnerships to include extra-regional countries like Mexico and 

Canada, bringing an added dimension to international collaboration. We have leveraged strategic partners such as Colombia and Brazil to take on leadership roles and 

export knowledge and lessons learned throughout the region. SOUTHCOM also provides the technology employed by most partner nations to share intelligence and information with their counterparts. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. In GAO’s report to Congress in January 2012, it was noted 

that NORTHCOM was working to establish the commander’s intent and missions 

in the Arctic, as well as identify capability shortfalls. Please provide an update on 

the effort to establish this framework and what you view as NORTHCOM’s mission 

in the Arctic. What capability shortfalls currently prevent you from meeting this 

mission? 

General JACOBY. As the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities, I engage with our 

key Arctic region stakeholders to evaluate future capabilities and coordinate operations in the Arctic. Examples of these efforts include the DOD/DHS Capabilities 

Assessment Working Group White Paper I endorsed along with ADM Papp, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which assesses required capabilities in 

the Arctic in the areas of communications, Maritime Domain Awareness, infrastructure, and presence. These areas have been explored by NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM’s exercise program, working closely with Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), to look for high-payoff partnerships and burden sharing 

for Arctic investments. Additionally, as part of our Arctic campaign plan, we are 

forming a partnership between my Alaska-based operational headquarters, Joint 

Task Force Alaska, and the University of Alaska, Fairbanks to bring Arctic expertise together in a collaborative forum to shape the required capabilities way ahead. 

Lastly, in December 2012, I signed the Tri Command (NORAD, USNORTHCOM, 

CJOC) Framework for Arctic Cooperation at the Permanent Joint Board on Defense 

to promote enhanced military cooperation in the preparation and conduct of defense, 

security, and safety operations in the Arctic. My missions in the Arctic region are 

consistent with the rest of my area of responsibility: homeland defense (HD), defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), and security cooperation with our partners. My intent in the Arctic is to defend U.S. national security interests and support homeland security interests in a complementary manner with Canada to advance security, safety, and stability in the region. These missions also involve cooperative efforts with key partners such as U.S. European Command, CJOC, USCG, 

and other U.S. interagency and State of Alaska partners that contribute to 

the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner that strengthens international 

cooperation. 

Although the Arctic is an austere operating area, even in the warm summer season, today I do not currently have capability shortfalls that prevent me from accomplishing my missions of HD, DSCA, and security cooperation. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. What steps is NORTHCOM taking, as recommended by the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, to enhance maritime domain awareness, communications, and search and rescue capability in the Arctic? 
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General JACOBY. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has accomplished 

the following actions since the 2010 QDR: • Admiral Papp and I endorsed the Arctic Capabilities Assessment Working 

Group White Paper, which identified DOD and DHS shared capability gaps and 

potential solutions in the categories of communications, Maritime Domain 

Awareness, infrastructure, and presence. • In conjunction with the Canadian Joint Operations Command, NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM signed the Tri-Command Framework for Arctic Cooperation 

that outlines areas for close coordination and collaboration on Arctic issues. 

• USNORTHCOM conducted a baseline assessment for Arctic domain awareness. 

The output of the assessment provides the foundation for requirements generation, plans development, and follow-on studies. 

• USNORTHCOM supports the Northern Chiefs of Defense Forces and Armed 

Forces Security Roundtable meetings aimed at improving security, willingness, 

and cooperation on difficult issues facing the Arctic nations. 

• Proposed operations, plans and improvements in the Arctic are regularly exercised and supported. USNORTHCOM recently sponsored FY 12 exercises and 

workshops for Arctic stakeholders. The Arctic Collaborative Workshop brought 

together Federal, State, local, tribal, academia, and industry stakeholders to 

focus on SAR and oil spill response activities in the Arctic. 

• Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF–AK), my operational headquarters in Alaska/Arctic, has been engaged at the tactical level in exercising Arctic SAR and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures. JTF–AK conducted a SAR exercise 

(SAREX) in February 2013 where an Arctic Sustainment Package was tested. 

JTF–AK is scheduled to conduct a SAREX with the Joint Rescue Coordination 

Center Victoria at the end of April 2013 to test an Arctic Sustainment Package 

with a Canadian Major Air Disaster (MAJAID) kit. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. The 2010 National Security Strategy states, ‘‘The United 

States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, 

responsibly manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of 

issues.’’ In Section 5 of DOD’s Arctic Report to Congress, DOD notes that, ‘‘The U.S. 

Government has enduring national interests in the Arctic, including security, economic, and scientific interests,’’ and that ‘‘it is clear there is a current and continued 

future imperative to provide a sovereign maritime presence in the region.’’ 

Since there is an imperative for a ‘‘sovereign maritime presence’’ not only in the 

future but right now, and DOD says that, ‘‘ . . . only ice-capable ships provide assured sovereign presence throughout the region and throughout the year,’’ what 

would be the minimum and optimum numbers of icebreakers to address U.S. national security needs in the Arctic region? As noted by the GAO, DOD did not specify in Sec. 5 of the Arctic Report. 

General JACOBY. Admiral Papp, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is 

the advocate of the ice-breaking mission area. I support his ongoing assessment of 

ice-breaker requirements and the development of those platforms. NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM are working closely with the USCG as they develop their Polar Icebreaker Concept of Operations. 

ADM Papp and I also endorsed the joint DOD–DHS Arctic Capabilities Assessment White Paper which identifies the requirement for polar ice-breaking capability. 

As expressed in my 2013 posture statement, I believe the United States should 

maintain an ice-breaking capability as it is essential for successfully operating in 

this new dimension of the global commons. National security interests closely follow 

economic interests; increased activity in the Arctic requires deliberate preparation 

to guarantee economic access, ensure freedom of navigation, and deter transnational 

crime. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. Can you discuss ship presence in your AOR and how that has affected your mission in light of the new defense strategy and budget? What level of 

cooperation do you have with the Coast Guard in counternarcotics operations in 

Latin America? Can you provide any detail on the performance and needs of our 

Nation’s new National Security Cutters? 

General KELLY. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Joint Interagency Task Force–South 

(JIATF–S) efforts were supported by a 10.2 ship presence, where 1.0 ship presence 

is defined as one ship working on station each day for 365 days. A much larger 

number than 10 ships is required to sustain this presence for a full year. 
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The U.S. Navy provided 30% of the total presence, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 

provided 59%, and the remainder was provided by our European and Canadian allies. The FY 2013 ship allocation, to support the statutory detection and monitoring 

(D&M) mission under 10 USC § 124, was 8.3 ships with Department of Defense 

(DOD) and USCG providing 31% and 61% percent respectively. On 5 April 2013, the 

average ship presence fell to 2.0, provided solely by the USCG and allies, and is 

expected to remain at this level through the remainder of the Fiscal Year. No U.S. 

Navy ships will be assigned to the D&M mission for the remainder of FY 2013. 

These reductions will impact U.S. and partner nation law enforcement efforts and 

significantly degrade our ability to support partner nation counter illicit trafficking 

operations. In terms of cocaine seizures, JIATF–S expects, at a minimum, an additional 62 metric tons to escape interdiction, which in effect, is a 41% decrease in 

cocaine disruptions compared to FY 2012. 

The majority of the maritime assets and a large portion of the aviation assets 

under JIATF–S tactical control (TACON) are provided by the USCG, and this partnership remains incredibly strong. The maritime interdiction continuum consists of 

JIATF–S execution of D&M operations, and as coordinated through USCG Districts 

Seven and Eleven, executing interdiction and apprehension (I&A) activities conducted by Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET). 

The performance of the National Security Cutter (NSC) in support of JIATF–S operations has been impressive. During five deployments between June 2009 and 

March 2013, totaling approximately twelve months in the AOR, the National Security Cutters BERTHOLF and WAESCHE have disrupted and/or seized 7.5 metric 

tons of cocaine, apprehended 30 detainees and seized and/or destroyed 10 vessels. 

The unique capabilities of these new cutters—greatly increased endurance and 

speed, high readiness rate, a large helicopter flight deck, an over the horizon high 

speed small boat, coupled with significantly improved command and control/intelligence gathering capabilities—make them vastly superior to previous/current vessels. The synergistic effect of these capabilities is ideally suited to the vastness of 

the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility, creating a true force multiplier, for both 

the counternarcotics D&M and I&A missions. The state-of-the-art capabilities of the 

NSC gives it unique, dual tactical advantage against air as well as maritime surface 

narcosmuggling targets of interest (TOIs) in ways not achievable by other maritime 

assets in the U.S. Government inventory. 

Mr. PALAZZO. With the proposed end strength of our Reserve and National Guard, 

and then the restructuring of SOUTHCOM, are we as prepared to respond to future 

natural disasters and other emergency humanitarian crises in the region as we have 

been in the past? 

General KELLY. The short answer is no. As an economy of force command, 

SOUTHCOM has long depended upon deployed naval assets to provide a rapid response capability. Lack of the availability of a U.S. Navy amphibious ship during 

hurricane season seriously degrades our ability to respond quickly in the Caribbean 

basin (especially Haiti) and to remote areas of the coast of Central America. 

For small scale disasters in Central America, Joint Task Force BRAVO helicopter 

and medical assets at Soto Cano, Honduras will continue to enable SOUTHCOM to 

quickly respond to logistics and medical requirements to reduce loss of life. 

For a large scale disaster response, SOUTHCOM continues to rely on capabilities 

contained in the Global Response Force (GRF), and requests unique capabilities not 

contained in the GRF be placed on an alert status during hurricane season. Rapid 

sourcing of required Active Duty and Reserve capabilities is critical to providing 

time sensitive humanitarian and life saving disaster response operations, both in 

support of HQ SOUTHCOM and deployed Joint Task Force requirements. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Is there an optimal mix of Active and Reserve forces to execute 

SOUTHCOM’s mission? What are we doing to enhance collaborative defense and security capability in the region? 

General KELLY. Optimally, SOUTHCOM would receive more Active Component 

personnel, but due to our low priority in the Force Allocation Decision Model, 

SOUTHCOM tries to cover gaps in the Active Component force structure with Reserve Component personnel. As an economy of force command, with no assigned 

forces, we must optimize the forces made available to us to execute our mission. Our 

objective is to maintain persistent presence, to the maximum extent possible, 

throughout the theater to remain the partner of choice in the region. Reserve forces 

are critical for sustained operations at the SOUTHCOM Headquarters, Components, 

and Security Cooperation Organization. 

The USSOUTHCOM Theater Engagement Program engages Partner Nations 

(PNs) in our Area of Responsibility (AOR) on issues of mutual concern to share information, exchange ideas, and assist in building the capacity and capability of their 

security forces. Our exercises and engagements focus on building PN capacities in 
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Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), maritime security, interdiction, 

interoperability and peacekeeping operations. We use Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program, collectively known as Security Assistance, to build PN capabilities and interoperability with U.S. systems and methods that foster regional 

stability through sharing of common defense challenges. Our Civil Affairs and Humanitarian Assistance programs improve access, create visibility, and increase U.S. 

influence in the region, while building PN capacity to overcome natural disasters. 

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program produces a persistent relationship 

between U.S. States and PNs in the AOR that supports mutual interests and often 

goes beyond the military-to-military ties to promote links with all levels of society. 

Finally, we leverage International Research and Development programs to build 

capacity, promote domain awareness, counter illicit trafficking, and create 

technologies that will assist during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 

operations. 

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