area handbook series

South Africa

a country study



South Africa

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Rita M. Byrnes

Research Completed

May 1996
On the cover: Cape Town skyline against Table Mountain

Third Edition, First Printing, 1997.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

South Africa : a country study / Federal Research Division,

Library of Congress ; edited by Rita M. Byrnes. — 3d ed.

[Rev. ed.]

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam ; 550-93)

"Supersedes the 1981 edition of South Africa : a country study, edited by Harold D. Nelson."—T.p. verso. "Research completed May 1996."

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 421-483) and

index.

ISBN 0-8444-0796-8 (alk. paper)

1. South Africa. I. Byrnes, Rita M., 1943- . II. Library

of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: DA Pam ; 550-93.

DT1719.S67 1997

968—dc21

96-48983

CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-93

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this

book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and

national security systems and institutions, and examining the

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by historical and cultural factors. Each study is written

by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors

seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society,

striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular

attention is devoted to the people who make up the society,

their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and

extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should

not be construed as an expression of an official United States

government position, policy, or decision. The authors have

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540-4840

in

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the

writers of the 1981 edition of South Africa: A Country Study,

edited by Harold D. Nelson. The authors also wish to thank

numerous individuals in various government agencies and private institutions who generously shared their expertise and

research materials in the production of this book. Thanks are due to R.T.K. Scully, Medical Assistance Programs (MAP) Inter- national; Harvey Leifert, Medical Education for South African

Blacks (MESAB), Inc.; James B. Parks, American Federation of

Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO); Smaroula Georgina Stephens, United States Information Agency;

and Witney Schneidman, Samuels International Associates.

Valuable assistance was also provided by analysts Brenda Branaman, Ed Campbell, Joe Dickie, Simon Dodge, W. Fitzpatrick,

Thomas Ofcansky, and Rachel Warner. Specialists at the Inter- national Labor Organization; Investor Responsibility Research

Center; United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of

the Census International Programs Center; and World BankInternational Monetary Fund Joint Library also helped the

authors acquire recent information on South Africa. None of

these individuals is responsible for the work of the authors,

however.

Members of the diplomatic mission of South Africa provided

valuable assistance despite the pressing demands of their country's political transition. Juan A. Henriquez, of the South Afri- can Embassy Public Affairs Office, deserves particular thanks;

he and several other embassy officials took time to explain the

often complex transition as it unfolded in their country. The

views presented in this book do not necessarily agree with

theirs, however.

Several employees of the Library of Congress made special

efforts to acquire timely materials on South Africa for this vol- ume. Afaf S. McGowan, of the African/Middle Eastern Acquisitions Section; M. Laverne Page, of the African-Middle Eastern

Division; and Joseph Rowe, of the Federal Research Division,

deserve particular mention.

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal

Research Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people include Sandra W. Med-
itz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the

sponsoring agency; Marilyn Majeska, who managed editing and

book production; Andrea Merrill, who reviewed tables and

maps; Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who performed

word processing and initial typesetting; and David P. Cabitto

and Janie L. Gilchrist, who prepared the camera-ready copy.

Thanks also to Helen C. Metz for proofreading almost-final

copy.

Contributors to the preparation of this volume also included

Mimi Cantwell, who edited chapters; Carolyn Hinton, who performed the prepublication editorial review; and Joan C. Cook,

who compiled the index. Graphics were prepared by David P. Cabitto, who, along with the firm of Maryland Mapping and

Graphics, prepared the final maps. Special thanks are owed to Sandra K. Ferrell, who designed the illustrations on the cover and the title page of the chapters.

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of individuals who allowed their photographs to be used in this study. Particular thanks go to R.T.K. Scully for photographs taken during

his extensive anthropological research and travels in South

Africa.

vi
Contents

Page

Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xv Table A. Selected Acronymns and Contractions xvii Table B. Chronology of Important Events xxiii Country Profile xxxv Introduction xlvii Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 William H. Worger

SOUTHERN AFRICAN SOCIETIES TO ca. 1 600 5

The Earliest South Africans 5 The Arrival of Bantu-Speaking Africans 7 EARLYEUROPEAN SETTLEMENT 10

Origins of Settlement 10

Establishing a Slave Economy 11 Emergence of a Settler Society 13

THE RISE OF AFRICAN STATES 18

Background to the Mfecane 19

Shaka and the Rise of the Zulu State 20

Swazi, Sotho, and Ndebele States 23

THE EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT 24

British Colonialism 24

The Great Trek 26

The Voortrekker Republics and British Policies ... 29

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND IMPERIALISM, 1870-1910. . . 33

The Mineral Revolution 33

Africans and Industrialization 34

British Imperialism and the Afrikaners 38

Formation of the Union of South Africa, 1910 .... 43

SEGREGATION, 1910-48 44

vii
Building the Legal Structure of Racial

Discrimination 44

Formation of the African National

Congress, 1912 45

World War I and Afrikaner Nationalism 46

Conflict in the 1920s 48

The Great Depression and the 1930s 50

The Impact of World War II 52

The 1948 Election 53

APARTHEID, 1948-76 54

The Legislative Implementation of Apartheid .... 54

Black Resistance in the 1950s 58

Consolidating Apartheid in the 1960s 61

The Rise of Black Consciousness 63

GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS, 1978-89 65

The Contradictions of Apartheid 65

Divisions in the White Community 68

Limited Reforms 71

DISMANTLING APARTHEID, 1990-94 74

The Quest for Peace 76

"Irreversible Progress" Toward Democracy 80

Preparing for Elections 83

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 87

Robert Thornton and Rita M. Byrnes

PHYSICAL SETTING 94

Geographic Regions 95

Lakes and Rivers 99

Climate and Rainfall 100

Environmental Trends 101

POPULATION 103

Size and Growth 103

Distribution 106

ETHNIC GROUPS AND LANGUAGE 107

Language Groups 109

Nguni Ill

Sotho 122

Tsonga and Venda 127

Afrikaans Speakers 129

English Speakers 132

Khoisan 134

viii
RELIGION 135

Historical Background 136

Religion and Apartheid 141

Zion Christian Church 144

Islam 145

EDUCATION 146

Early Development 147

Education under Apartheid 150

The School System in the 1990s 153

Higher Education 154

HEALTH AND WELFARE 156

Incidence of Disease 156

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

(AIDS) 159

Health Care Services 160

Social Welfare 162

WOMEN IN SOCIETY 164

Women and Apartheid 165

Women in the 1990s 166

Chapter 3. The Economy 171

Nancy L. Clark

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 1 74

POSTAPARTHEID RECONSTRUCTION 177

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 180

Gross Domestic Product 180

External Debt 182

Inflation 185

Economic Distortions and Apartheid 185

ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 186

Legal Restrictions 188

Parastatals 189

Budgets 190

FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT . : . ... 192

Foreign Trade 193

Investment 196

Balance of Payments 197

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR 198

Labor Force 198

Labor and Politics 199

Education and Employment 203

ix
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 205

Gold 207

Diamonds and Platinum 208

Ferrous and Nonferrous Metals 210

Energy Minerals and Petroleum 212

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, AND FISHING 214

Crops 217

Livestock 219

Forestry 220

Fishing 220

MANUFACTURING 222

Electric Power 224

Heavy Industry 225

Chemicals Industry 226

Consumer Goods 227

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 228

Railroads 229

Ports and Shipping 231

Road System and Transport 233

Civil Aviation 234

Pipelines 235

Telecommunications and Postal Service 235

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND TOURISM 238

Environmental Protection 238

Tourism 240

BANKING AND CURRENCY. 241

Banking 241

Currency 242

GROWTH TRENDS AND POTENTIAL 244

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 247

Joshua Sinai

S\5TEM OF GOVERNMENT 252

Historical Background 253

Constitutional Change . . 255

The Interim Constitution 258

Executive and Legislative Authority 259

Provincial and Local Government 265

Drafting a Final Constitution 268

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 269

The Apartheid-Era Legal System 269

x
The New Legal System 270

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 272

The 1994 Elections 272

Political Parties 275

Interest Groups 293

Political Elites 297

COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA 301

Radio and Television 302

Newspapers, Magazines, andJournals 304

FOREIGN RELATIONS 304

Relations with African States 306

Relations with Non-African States 316

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 325

Chapter 5. National Security 329

Joseph P. Smaldone

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 332

Precolonial Warfare 332

Early Development of the South African

Military 334

Rise of the Security Establishment 339

Women in the Military 348

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES 349

Arms Trade and the Defense Industry 350

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons 355

Regional Issues 357

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 362

MILITARY ORGANIZATION 363

Army 363

Air Force 370

Navy 373

Medical Service 375

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 376

Military Intelligence and Intelligence

Coordination 377

DEFENSE BUDGET 381

INTERNAL SECURITY 382

Police 382

Crime and Violence 388

Prison System 391

Penal Code 392

xi
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. . 394

Appendix. Tables 399

Bibliography 421

Glossary 485

Index 491

Contributors 529

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of South Africa, 1996 xlvi 2 400-millimeter Rainfall Line 8 3 European Expansion, 1652-1848 16

4 Major African Ethnic Groups, Eighteenth

Century 20

5 The Mfecane, 1817-28 22

6 Southern Africa, 1870 32

7 Topography and Drainage 96

8 Population by Age and Gender, Based on 1991

Census 106

9 Comparison of Provinces: Area, Population, and

Economic Output, 1994 108

10 Government-Demarcated Language Areas, 1952 110

11 Former African Homelands and Provinces, until

1994 112

12 Percentage of Population Using Each Official

Language as First Language, 1994 114

13 Origins of Gross Domestic Product, 1995 182

14 Economic Growth, 1985-95 184

15 Minerals and Mining Activity, 1996 206

16 Major Agricultural Activity, 1996 216

17 Transportation: Major Railroads and Ports, 1996 .... 230

18 Transportation: Major Highways and Airports,

1996 236

19 Structure of Government, 1996 260

20 Command Structure of the South African

National Defence Force (SANDF), 1996 364

21 Organization of the South African Army, 1996 366

22 Organization of the South African Air Force, 1996. . . 372

xii
23 Organization of the South African Navy, 1996 374

24 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1996 378

25 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1996 379

xiii
HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. . 394

Appendix. Tables 399

Bibliography 421

Glossary 485

Index 491

Contributors 529

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of South Africa, 1996 xlvi 2 400-millimeter Rainfall Line 8

3 European Expansion, 1652-1848 16

4 Major African Ethnic Groups, Eighteenth

Century 20

5 The Mfecane, 1817-28 22

6 Southern Africa, 1870 32

7 Topography and Drainage 96

8 Population by Age and Gender, Based on 1991

Census 106

9 Comparison of Provinces: Area, Population, and

Economic Output, 1994 108

10 Government-Demarcated Language Areas, 1952 110

11 Former African Homelands and Provinces, until

1994 112

12 Percentage of Population Using Each Official

Language as First Language, 1994 114

13 Origins of Gross Domestic Product, 1995 182

14 Economic Growth, 1985-95 184

15 Minerals and Mining Activity, 1996 206

16 Major Agricultural Activity, 1996 216

17 Transportation: Major Railroads and Ports, 1996 .... 230

18 Transportation: Major Highways and Airports,

1996 236

19 Structure of Government, 1996 260

20 Command Structure of the South African

National Defence Force (SANDF), 1996 364

21 Organization of the South African Army, 1996 366

22 Organization of the South African Air Force, 1996. . . 372

xii
23 Organization of the South African Navy, 1996 374

24 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1996 378

25 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1996 379

xiii

Preface

South Africa's emergence from global isolation in the 1990s

parallels its political and economic reorganization, as it works

to eliminate vestiges of the notorious system of apartheid. That

system provoked international condemnation and deprived

society of much of its human potential, and coping with its legacies has complicated the process of establishing a new system

based on nonracial norms. An interim constitution, first implemented in April 1994 to govern the political transition, is being

replaced by a new constitution, intended to protect legal equality for individuals regardless of racial identity after 1999. The

transition has just passed the halfway mark as this book goes to press, and this volume reflects the fact that many political and

social issues remain unresolved.

This book replaces South Africa: A Country Study, also produced in a time of turmoil in 1981, as the country began to rec- ognize some of the demands for broader political participation

by all racial groups. Like its predecessor, this study is an

attempt to treat in a concise and objective manner the dominant historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects of contemporary South Africa. Sources of

information included scholarly books, journal articles, and

monographs; official reports of governments and international

organizations; foreign and domestic newspapers; the authors'

previous research and observations; and numerous periodicals.

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief

comments on particularly valuable sources appear at the end of

each chapter.

Place-names follow the system adopted by the United States

Board on Geographic Names (BGN), wherever possible. Nine

new provinces have been designated to replace the four provinces and ten homelands of the apartheid era. Some other

desigations—for historical landmarks, public holidays, as well

as some public buildings and government offices—are still being changed in the mid-1990s in recognition of the country's

new political dispensation. New names have been included as available. As of early 1997, the provincial capital of KwaZuluNatal is still to be decided between Ulundi and Pietermaritzburg. The apartheid-era designation for the racial category

xv
known as "coloured" is retained in this volume for historical

accuracy.

The country has eleven official languages, which include

nine Bantu languages, selected to recognize the first language

of almost all South Africans. The two previous official languages, Afrikaans and English, remain important, but the

former no longer dominates the public media and is being

phased out in some official contexts, such as military training.

Some provincial legislatures are considering language policies to be incorporated into provincial constitutions in the late

1990s.

All measurements in this book rely on the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix).

A glossary is also included to explain terms with which the

reader may not be familiar. The use of the term billion follows

the American system; for example, one billion means

1,000,000,000.

The body of the text reflects information available as of May

1996. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been

updated: the Introduction concludes with a discussion of significant events that have occurred since the information cutoff

date; the Country Profile and Chronology include updated

information as available; and the Bibliography lists recently

published sources thought to be particularly helpful to the

reader.

xvi
Table A. Selected Acronyms and Contractions

Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term AAC

Aasac ABSA ACDP ADB ADM

AEC

AECI AHI

AIDS ALUSAF

Amcor AMCP

AME

AMP

AMWU

ANC

ANCWL

ANCYL

AOW

APIA ARM

Armscor AVF AVK AWB

Azanyu BBB BCM

BCMA

BDF BMATT

BOSS BPC BWB

CAAA

CCI CDF cm

All-African Convention

All-African Student Committee Amalgamated Banks of South Africa African Christian Democratic Party African Development Bank

African Democratic Movement

Atomic Energy Corporation

African Explosives and Chemical Industries Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut (Afrikaner Trade Institute) acquired immune deficiency syndrome

Aluminum Corporation of South Africa African Metals Corporation

African Moderates Congress Party African Methodist Episcopal Church

Africa Muslim Party African Mineworkers' Union

African National Congress

African National Congress Women's League

African National Congress Youth League

African Organisation for Women

Azanian People's Liberation Army

African Resistance Movement

Armaments Corporation of South Africa Afrikaner Volksfront Afrikanervroue-Kenkrag (Akrikaner Women's Organisation) Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement)

Azanian National Youth Unity Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging (White Protection Movement)

Black Consciousness Movement

Black Consciousness Movement of Azania Bophuthatswana Defence Force

British Military Advisory Training Team

Bureau of State Security Black People's Convention

Boere Weerstandsbeweging (Boer Resistance Movement)

Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act Crime Combatting and Investigation Office

Ciskei Defence Force

Criminal Investigation Department
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions

Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term

CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora CNETU Council of Non-European Trade Unions

Codesa Convention for a Democratic South Africa Cosag Concerned South Africans Group COSAS Congress of South African Students COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions CP Conservative Party CPSA Communist Party of South Africa CSO Central Selling Organisation CYL Congress Youth League (also ANCYL) DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa DCC Defence Command Council DP Democratic Party EAC Economic Advisory Council EC European Community

ECC End Conscription Campaign EEC European Economic Community EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone Eskom Electricity Supply Commission EU European Union FAK Federasievan Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge (Federation

of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations) FAWU Food and Allied Workers' Union

FF Freedom Front FNLA Frente Nacionale de Libertacao de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) Foskor Phosphate Development Corporation FP Federal Party FRELIMO Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (Front for the Lib- eration of Mozambique)

FSAW Federation of South African Women

FY Fiscal Year GDP gross domestic product Genmin General Mining Corporation

GNP gross national product GST general sales tax HEU highly enriched uranium HNP Herenigde Nasionale Party (Reunited National Party) HNP Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reconsdtuted Nadonal Party) IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICU Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of South

Africa IDA International Development Association IDC Industrial Development Corporation
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions

Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term IDRC

IEC

IFC

IFP IMF IOC

rp

Iscor ISL JATS

JCI JMC

JMCC

JSE MARNET

MDM

MFMK

MNR

MPLA

NACOSA

Nactu NAFCOC

NAM

NDM

NEC

NEHAWU

NGK

NIA NICC NIDR NP

NPKF

NPP NPT

NSMS

NUM

NUMSA

NUSAS NWC

OAU

OPEC

International Development Research Centre Independent Electoral Commission

International Finance Corporation

Inkatha Freedom Party

International Monetary Fund

International Olympic Committee

Independent Party South African Iron and Steel Corporation

International Socialist League

Joint Air Training Scheme

Johannesburg Consolidated Investments

Joint Management Center

Joint Military Coordinating Council Johannesburg Stock Exchange

Military Area Radio Network

Mass Democratic Movement

Mnority Front Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nadon) Mozambican National Resistance (also Renamo)

Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

National AIDS Convention of South Africa National Council of Trade Unions

National African Federated Chamber of Commerce

Nonaligned Movement

National Democradc Movement

National Executive Committee

National Education, Health, and Allied Workers' Union

Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed

Church)

National Intelligence Agency

National Intelligence Coordinating Committee

Nadonal Institute for Defence Research Nadonal Party Nadonal Peacekeeping Force

National Peoples' Party Nuclear Nonproliferadon Treaty

National Security Management System

National Union of Mineworkers

National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa Nadonal Union of South African Students

National Working Committee

Organization of African Unity Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions

Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term PAC Pan-Africanist Congress PASO Pan-Africanist Students' Organisation PFP Progressive Federal Party Popcru Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union PSA Public Service Association PTA Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa Putco Public Utility Transport Corporation

PWV Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme Renamo Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Mozambican

National Resistance) RFC Royal Flying Corps RSC regional services council SAA South Afri can Ai rways SAA South Afri can Army SAAC South African Aviation Corps SAAF South African Air Force SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation SACC South African Council of Churches SACCOLA South African Employers' Consultative Committee on

Labour Affairs SACOB South African Chamber of Business SACP South African Communist Party SACTU South African Congress of Trade Unions SACU Southern African Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community

SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Confer- ence SADF South African Defence Force (s) Safmarine South African Marine Corporation SAIC South African Indian Congress SAIRR South African Institute of Race Relations Samcor South African Motor Corporation SAMS South African Medical Service SAN South African Navy SANAC South African Native Affairs Commission SANDF South African National Defence Force SANLAM South African National Life Assurance Company

Sansco South African National Student Congress SANTAM South African National Trust Company

SAP South African Party SAP South African Police SAPA South African Press Association SAPS South African Police Service SAPU South African Police Union

XX
Table A. (Continued) Selected Acronyms and Contractions

Acronym or Contraction Organization or Term SARCC South African Rail Commuter Corporation SASO South African Students' Organisation SASOL South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation SASS South African Secret Service Satour South African Tourism Board SATS South African Transport Services SDF Seaward Defence Force SEIFSA Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South

Africa Soekor Southern Oil Exploration Corporadon

Soweto Southwestern Townships SSC State Security Council SWAPO South-West Africa People's Organisation SWATF South-West Africa Territorial Force TEC Transitional Executive Council UDF Union Defence Force(s) UDF United Democratic Front UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNITA Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola

(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) UNOMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique

UNOMSA United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa UP United Party Usco Union Steel Company

UWUSA United Workers Union of South Africa VAT value-added tax VOC Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (Dutch East India Company)

WHO World Health Organization ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front ZCC Zion Christian Church

xxi

Table B. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description EARLY HISTORY

ca. 50,000 B.C.

ca. 25,000 B.C.

ca. 14,000 B.C.

ca. 500 B.C.

ca. AD. 300 FIFTEENTH CENTURY

1488

1497 SIXTEENTH CENTURY

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

1652

1658

1659

1663 1673-77

1688 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

1713 1779-81

1793 1795

1799 NINETEENTH CENTURY

ca. 1800 1803-06

1806

1807

1809

1810

1814

1815

Date of archaeological remains of Homo sapiens in southern Africa.

Earliest rock art paintings in southern Africa.

Earliest archaeological evidence of San huntergatherers.

Earliest archaeological evidence of sheep and cattle herding. Archaeological evidence of Iron-Age settlements south of the Limpopo River.

Portuguese navigator Bartholomeu Dias rounds Cape of Good Hope. Khoisan-speaking herds- men and hunters establish trade with Europeans. Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama arrives at Cape of Good Hope en route to India. Portuguese ships land at Table Bay, Bantu-speaking

farmers and herdsmen establish trade with Europeans.

First permanent Dutch settlement at Cape of Good

Hope.

Dutch import slaves from Angola and West Africa. Khoikhoi revolt against Dutch encroachment. European settlement at Saldanha Bay. Warfare between Khoikhoi and Dutch. French Huguenots begin to settle at Cape.

Smallpox epidemic devastates Khoikhoi.

Frontier warfare; Afrikaners defeat Xhosa.

Frontier warfare: Xhosa defeat Afrikaners.

Britain seizes control of the Cape.

First of a series of Xhosa-British wars.

Drought- and famine-produced upheaval in Natal. Dutch Batavian Republic controls Cape.

Britain regains control over Cape.

Britain ends its slave trade; British missionaries

arrive in southern Africa. Pass laws enacted. Shaka defeats Buthelezi chiefdom. London Convention; Dutch formally cede Cape to

British. Afrikaner rebellion against British rule at Slachters Nek.
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1816 1817-28

1819

1824 1828

1828-34

1834-35

1834-38

1836-40

1838

1839

1843 1850

1852

1854

1856-57

1867

1868

1870

1872

1873

1877

1878

1879

1880

1881

1883

1885 1886

Shaka assumes control over Zulu. Mfecane (or crushing); Zulu expansion, decade of

upheaval.

British defeat of Xhosa; expulsion of Africans between Great Fish and Keiskama rivers. First white settlement at Port Natal. Shaka assassinated, succeeded by Dingane.

Mpondo repulse Zulu attacks; Zulu power wanes.

Consolidation of Swazi kingdom under Sobhuza I, Sotho under Moshoeshoe I, Ndebele under Mzilikazi. British and colonial forces defeat Xhosa. Emancipation of slaves in Cape Colony after Britain abolishes slavery in its possessions. Great Trek begins: 6,000 Afrikaners migrate east- ward from Cape Colony.

Battle of Blood River on December 16 avenges Afri- kaner deaths earlier that year. Voortrekker Republic of Natalia established. Britain annexes Natalia, renamed Natal. Last surviving San rock artists killed. Sand River Convention; Britain recognizes Transvaal as the independent Afrikaner South African

Republic. Bloemfontein Convention; Britain recognizes Orange Free State as independent Afrikaner

republic. Xhosa catde sacrifices lead to famine. Diamonds discovered in Orange Free State and

Kimberley

Britain annexes Sotho territory of Basutoland. Death of Sotho King Moshoeshoe I. Introduction of pass laws to control labor force in Kimberley diamond mines. Diamond diggers exceed 50,000.

Britain annexes South African Republic, renamed

Transvaal. Xhosa-Mfengu warfare.

Britain claims Walvis Bay. Zulu defeat invading British force; British and colonial forces destroy Zulu army at Isandhlwana. Griqualand East annexed to Cape Colony.

First Anglo-Boer War erupts. Cecil Rhodes establishes De Beers Consolidated Mines.

Pretoria Convention recognizes Transvaal independence.

Paul Kruger president of South African Republic. Cape-to-Kimberley railroad completed. Gold discovered at Witwatersrand; Johannesburg

established.
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1890 Rhodes pnme minister of Cape Colony. 1891 German headquarters established in South-West

AfrlCa' 1017.4 x roperty qualifications reduce coloured voters in Cape. 1894 Cape Colony annexes Mpondo territory. 1895-96 Unsuccessful Jameson Raid against Afrikaner domi- nance in Transvaal. 1897 Part of Zululand incorporated into British colony

of Natal; King Solomon ka Dinizulu exiled. 1897-98 Rinderpest epidemic decimates livestock. 1899 South African (Anglo-Boer) War. WENTTETH CENTURY

iyuu Britain claims Transvaal (South African Republic).

1 Qf»9 Mot British victory; Peace Treaty of Vereeniging ends

South African War. 1905-06 Last Zulu uprising against Bridsh. 1907 White miners strike against Chinese labor. 1909 Bridsh Parliament enacts the South Africa Act, pro- posed constitution of Union of South Africa. 1910 Self-governing Union of South Africa established within Bridsh Commonwealth.

1911 Legisladon reserves skilled jobs for whites. 1912 Land Bank established to assist white farmers. South African Native National Congress (later African National Congress—ANC) formed. 1913 Natives Land Act limits black ownership to reserves. 1913-14 Campaign of civil disobedience led by Indian human rights activist Mohandas Gandhi. 1914 Government foils coup plot by Afrikaner military

officers. South Africa invades German South- West Africa, Germans surrender. 1914-19 South Africa supports Allies in World War I. 1918 Founding of Afrikaner Broederbond. .... . _ XT . , ooutn Africa receives .League or i\ations mandate to administer former German colony, South-^^est

Africa. 1921 Communist Party of South Africa established

(later—after 1953—the South African Communist Party)

1922 Army quells miners' strike, killing 214. 1923 Natives Urban Areas Act authorizes segregadon in urban areas. South African Indian Congress

established. South African Nadve National Congress becomes African Nadonal Congress (ANC).

1925 Afrikaans recognized as South Africa's official lan- guage. 1927 Segregation compulsory in twenty-six urban areas.

XXV
Table B. ( Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1929 National Party wins national elections. 1931 Britain's Statute of Westminster affirms autonomy

of South African parliament. 1934 South African parliament enacts Status of Union

* Act claiming full sovereignty for South Africa. 1936 Black voting rights revoked in Cape; black land ownership expanded, but still restricted to 13 percent of land. 1939 Ossewabrandwag (Ox-wagon Guard) Afrikaner

paramilitary group established. 1939-45 South Africa supports Allies in World War II. 1943 ANC Youth League formed. United Party wins general elections. 1946 Army quells gold mine strikes. 1947 South Africa rejects United Nations (UN) oversight

in South-West Africa. 1948 May National Party (NP) election victory based on racial

issues. August Government ends military training for blacks. 1949 January Asian-Zulu clashes in Durban and Rand area. May South Africa rejects UN concern over treatment of

Indians. June Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. December Opening of Voortrekker Monument.

1950 April South Africa severs judicial appeals channels to British Privy Council. May Population Registration Act authorizes racial classi- fication. June Suppression of Communism Act bans anti-apart- heid activities. Communist Party of South Africa disbands (reemerges in 1953 as South African Commnunist Party). July International Court ofJustice supports League of Nations oversight in South-West Africa. Group

Areas Act authorizes residential segregadon. August South African Air Force assists UN in Korean war

effort, flies 10,000 missions in three years. NP

elecdon victory in South-West Africa. December South Africa rejects UN cridcism of apartheid, reasserts claim to South-West Africa. Black polidcal organizations unite to oppose apartheid. 1951 February Britain blocks incorporation of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland into South Africa. May Separate Representation of Voters Act separates vot- ing lists for whites, coloureds. November United States-South Africa military agreement under Mutual Defense Assistance Act. December ANC leaders petidon for direct parliamentary representation, end to apartheid. UN calls for South-West African independence. South Africa suspends participation in UN General Assembly.

xxvi
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Descriptic

1956

1952 March

June November

1953 October

1954 August

1955 February

April

June

February March May

December

September

April

April June November

February March

January March

May

June

1957 1958

1959

1960

1961

South African Supreme Court invalidates removal

of coloureds from voting lists. Passive resistance campaign by ANC and South Afri- can Indian Congress; 8,000 arrested.

Interracial violence flares. Black Defiance Campaign leaders convicted of "statutory communism." Reservation of Separate Amenities Act strengthens apartheid in public places. Bantu Education Act

limits black education. Communist Party of South Africa reactivated as South African Communist Party (SACP). South Africa proclaims South-West Africa a province. International condemnation of forcible resettle- ment of Sophiatown (most residents moved to area later named Soweto). South Africa quits United Nations Educational, Sci- entific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

after protests over apartheid. Congress of the People adopts Freedom Charter based on UN Universal Declaration of Human

Rights; signers later charged with high treason. South Africa expels Soviet diplomats. Tomlinson Commission recommends formation of Bantustans in reserved areas. Industrial Conciliation Act reserves most skilled jobs for whites. Police arrest 156 for signing Freedom Charter. Forty die in Sotho-Zulu violence. Parliamentary elections increase NP majority. Pan-Africanist Congress established. Racial violence erupts in Durban, lasts several months. Queen Elizabeth II appoints Charles Swart gover- nor general of South Africa.

British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "Winds

of Change" speech.

Sharpeville protests over pass laws; at least sixty- seven deaths, several thousand arrested. UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold visits South Africa, expresses racial concerns.

Pretoria court acquits twenty-eight activists, includ- ing ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Walter

Sisulu. Republic of South Africa established on May 31, quits Commonwealth. Month-long police raids, 8,000 arrested. ANC establishes military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation); PAC establishes armed

wing Poqo (blacks only)

.

xxvii
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

November

December

1962 November

1963 May

August

October

1964 January March

June

1966 June

September

October

1967

1968 1969

1970

1971

May

September December

September

May

October December

February

May

December

UN General Assembly refuses to recognize South

Africa. ANC leader Albert Luthuli receives Nobel Peace

Prize. Nelson Mandela announces campaign of sabotage against government buildings. UN General Assembly calls for sanctions against South Africa. Nelson Mandela sentenced to five years in prison for inciting unrest, travelling abroad without a passport.

Military wings of ANC, PAC banned. Newly established Organization of African Unity

(OAU) charter condemns apartheid. UN voluntary embargo on arms shipments to South Africa. Libyajoins Algeria and Egypt, prohibits South African overflights. Rivonia trial of ANC activists begins. Odendaal Commission recommends apartheid in South-West Africa. OAU funds liberation fighters in southern Africa. Eight ANC activists, including Nelson Mandela, sen- tenced to life in prison in Rivonia trial. Government snubs visiting United States Senator Robert Kennedy. Prime minister Verwoerd assassinated, succeeded

byJohn Vorster. Bechuanaland independence

from Britain as Botswana. Basutoland independence from Britain as Lesotho. UN General Assembly terminates South Africa's mandate to administer South-West Africa. Last British-appointed governor general and first president, Charles Swart, steps down.

Malawi first black African state to establish diplo- matic ties to South Africa. World's first heart transplant operation performed

by South African surgeon, Dr. Christian Bar- nard, at Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town.

Swaziland independence from Britain. Pan-Africanist Congress founder Robert Sobukwe

released after nine years in prison. Herstigte (Reconstituted) National Party estab- lished by white extremist wing of NP.

International Monetary Fund agrees to $35-an- ounce "floor" for South African gold. Black Homelands Citizenship Bill authorizes with- drawal of South African citizenship from blacks. International Olympic Committee (IOC) refuses recognition of South Africa (participation sus- pended since 1964). Zulu Prince Goodwill Zwelithini installed as king.
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1972

1973 November

1974

1975

1981

1982

1983

1984

May

November

1976 June

August

1977 January March

September November

1978

1979

1980 June

February

February March

September November

March

May

August

Black People's Convention founded to coordinate

black, consciousness movement role in politics. Afrikaner intellectuals protest against apartheid. Sixteen Arab countries implement OAU embargo

against oil to South Africa. NP increases parliamentary majority in April elections. Coup in Portugal signals impending inde- pendence for colonies in Africa. UN General Assembly rejects South African participation.

First television transmissions in South Africa. Reports of white South Africans killed in fighting in Angola. Worst racial violence in history in Soweto; 575

reported dead. Turnhalle Constitutional Conference sets Namibian (South-West African) independence December 1978 (subsequently postponed repeatedly

until March 1990). Government acknowledges 2,000 South African

troops in Angola. US corporations adopt Sullivan Principles to counter effects of apartheid. Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko dies in police detention; thousands attend funeral. UN mandatory embargo against arms shipments to South Africa. Pretoria adopts Total Strategy to counter internal and external threats. Ministry of Information scandal leads to Vorster res- ignation; succeeded by P. W. Botha. Government recognizes black labor unions. Largest conventional military assault since World War II on South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) bases in Angola.

Asian, coloured populations win representation on

President's Council. Labor activist Neil Aggett first white to die in police

custody. NP expels extremist wing; Andries Treurnicht forms Conservative Party of South Africa. Parliament approves multiracial representation, excluding blacks. New constitution approved by whites-only referen- dum.

Extension of UN sanctions barring military pur- chases from South Africa. Koeberg nuclear power station operational after 1982 sabotage. Nkomati Accord nonaggression

pact with Mozambique.

South Africa, Mozambique, Portugal agreement to build Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique.

Elections for tricameral parliament; escalating township unrest.

xxix
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

September

October

1985 June

July 1986 January

1987

1990

May

October

November

1988 December

1989 January

February

July September

October November

February March

April July August October

P. W. Botha named state president. Implementation

of 1983 constitution establishing tricameral par- liament. Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu awarded Nobel

Peace Prize. United States ban on computer, nuclear exports to South Africa for security forces. South African commando attacks on ANC in Botswana. First in a series of nationwide states of emergency.

Britain blocks Commonwealth sanctions. President Botha opens Parliament with reference to "outdated concept of apartheid." Parliament

repeals Pass Laws, Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. Military attacks on ANC in Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe. US Congress passes Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act (CAAA) over presidential veto. Mozambican

President Samora Machel killed in plane crash

in South Africa. Lesotho Highlands Water

Project undertaken to provide water to South

Africa. Dutch Reformed Church synod declares apartheid an error. United States bans direct US-South Africa air travel. United States bans new investments, bank loans to South Africa. National (white) elections name

Conservative Party as parliamentary opposition. Mineworkers strike by 250,000. Angola-Namibia Accords signed in New York. Botha suffers stroke, Frederik W. (F. W.) de Klerk succeeds him as NP leader in February; as state president in August. Democratic Party established as alternative to ANC. UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG)

prepares for Namibian elections. President Botha, ANC leader Nelson Mandela meet

for first talks in person. White, coloureds, Indians vote in parliamentary

elections. Walter Sisulu and other activists released after 25

years in prison. Last South African troops withdraw from Namibia. Mandela released on February 11, after twenty- seven years in prison. Violent antigovernment demonstrations in Ciskei, Bophuthatswana.

ANC exiles begin return to South Africa.

First official meeting of Mandela and de Klerk. ANC declares end of armed struggle. Parliament repeals Reservation of Separate Amenities Act.

XXX
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1991 June

July

September December

1992 January

March

April

June

July

September

1993 March

April

June

July

August

September

October November

December

Repeal of Population Registration Act, Land Acts, Group Areas Act; and release of political prisoners. Most sanctions under US CAAA lifted. "Inkathagate" revelations of government funding for IFP. Nelson Mandela elected ANC presi- dent. IOC readmits South Africa. National Peace Accord agreement. Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) begins on December 20. Most European sanctions lifted; UN General Assembly ends restrictions on cultural, academic

exchanges. Whites support political reforms in referendum. Arms manufacturing company, Denel, formed out

of portion of Armaments Corporation of South

Africa (Armscor) and subsidiaries. Kenyan president Moi visits, signals end of African

boycott. ANC withdraws from Codesa because of IFP attack on Boipatong and sub-rosa support

for IFP by police. Negotiations suspended. Mandela charges government with state terrorism before UN and OAU; fact-finding visit by UN

envoy Cyrus Vance; arrival of UN observers.

Ciskei Defence Force fires on ANC protesters; at

least 29 deaths, 200 injured. Government proclaims nuclear weapons dismantled. Constitutional negotiations resume. SACP leader Chris Hani murdered by white radical. Death of ANC president Tambo.

White radicals storm constitutional negotiations. President de Klerk, ANC leader Mandela visit US,

jointly receive Liberty Medal. IFP, conservatives withdraw from constitutional negotiations.

Political violence surges. US citizen Amy Biehl

killed in township unrest. ANC acknowledges

human rights' abuses in Angola, Tanzania. De Klerk, Mandela visit United States. Joint mission

of ANC and South African Defence Forces (SADF) to United States to discuss military reor- ganization. Most UN sanctions lifted. Two whites sentenced to death for Hani murder. US CAAA repealed. Interim constitution signed by

nineteen political parties, provides for 5-year Government of National Unity. Constitudon of the Republic of South Africa rati- fied on December 22. Transitional Executive Council (TEC) established. De Klerk, Mandela receive Nobel Peace prize.

xxxi
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1994 January

February March

April

May

June

July

August

September

October

November

December

1995 January

February

National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF) mobilized, disbanded in May. PAC suspends armed struggle, agrees to participate in national elecdons. South Africa formally relinquishes Walvis Bay to Namibia. TEC assumes control over Bophuthatswana after deaths in pre-election violence, and over Ciskei

after police mutiny. Zulu demonstration erupts

into violence at ANC headquarters (Shell House), Johannesburg; eight demonstrators

killed. State of emergency in Natal, KwaZulu.

Goldstone Commission report forces senior

police suspensions.

First democratic national elections held April 26-

29 (April 27 first day of nationwide voting)

.

Interim constitution implemented for five-year transition period on April 27. Violence subsides. Legislators elect Mandela president. Government

announces Reconstruction and Development Programme. UN Security Council lifts arms

embargo.

South Africa joins Organization of African Unity,

rejoins British Commonwealth of Nations, resumes participation in United Nations. British Military Advisory and Training Team assists mili- tary integration. Government proposes Truth and Reconciliation Commission to consider

amnesty, compensation for human rights viola- tions under apartheid. French president Francois Mitterrand first foreign head of state to visit. Resignation of Minister of Finance Derek Keys. South African Operation Mercy shipments to Rwanda. Mandela's first state visit (Mozambique). Mandela speech marking 100 days in office inter- rupted by labor unrest. New Air Force Headquarters opened in Pretoria.

British Prime Minister's first address to South

African parliament since 1960. Violent protests by coloureds against government racial bias. President Mandela on state visit to United States, addresses joint session of Congress. South Afri- can officials accept salary cuts to help fund

development. Soweto forgives US$400 million unpaid rent, utility fees. South Africa hosts first conference in Africa on implementing Convention on Chemical Weapons. ANC conference reelects Mandela as president. South African Ambassador Franklin Sonn arrives

in Washington. Death ofJoe Slovo, minister of housing, former SACP leader. Constitutional Court sworn in by President Mandela. Mandela disavows reelection plans in 1999.

xxxii
Table B. (Continued) Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

March Winnie Mandela dismissed as deputy minister for

arts, culture, science, and technology. Unification of two-tier exchange rate; financial rand

abolished. Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) province renamed Gauteng (Place of Gold). June Mandela claims responsibility for March 1994 Shell House shootings of IFP demonstrators. Constitutional Court abolishes death penalty. August South Africa agrees to lease oil storage space to Iran. November Archbishop Desmond Tutu named chair of Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Mandela

denounces Nigeria's execution of human rights

activists, including Ken Sarowiwa. 1996 January Mandela initiates urgent peace talks in KwaZuluNatal aimed at ending political violence and

resuming IFP participation in Constitutional Assembly.

April First public hearing of Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in East London, April 15. White

extremists sentenced to prison for 1994 bombings intended to derail national elections. May Parliament approves draft final constitution. Constitutional Assembly Chair Cyril Ramaphosa

resigns from parliament to join private sector. June NP cjuits Government of National Unity to become

official parliamentary opposition. Nearly 28,000

striking platinum mineworkers fired for defying

court order to return to work. September Former police colonel implicates former govern- ment and security officials in wide-ranging atrocities, illegal acts under apartheid. October Former senior military officials (including a former

minister of defense) acquitted of charges related

to murders of antiapartheid activists. November Free State provincial premier and Executive Committee resign following allegations of corruption and nepotism. December President Mandela signs legislation approving final constitution, to be implemented in stages by

1999. South Africa announces plans to sever dip- lomatic ties with Republic of China (Taiwan) and to recognize People's Republic of China

(Beijing), 1997. 1997 January Five former policemen apply for amnesty before Truth and Reconciliation Commission for 1977

killing of Steve Biko. February South Africa's first offshore oil field, south of Mossel Bay, begins production. March South African Navy celebrates seventy-fifth anniver- sary in joint naval exercises with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, in Zaire, urges rebel-government cease-fire.

xxxiii

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Republic of South Africa.

Short Form: South Africa.

Term for National(s): South African (s). Administrative Capital: Pretoria.

Legislative Capital: Cape Town.

Judicial Capital: Bloemfontein.

Independence: May 31, 1910, as Union of South Africa, selfxxxv
governing British dominion; sovereignty recognized May 1, 1934, under Britain's Statute of Westminster. Republic of South

Africa, May 31, 1961.

Public Holidays: New Year's Day (January 1), Human Rights

Day (March 21), Good Friday, Family Day (Easter Monday),

Freedom Day (April 27), Workers' Day (May 1), Ascension Day,

Youth Day (June 16), Women's Day (August 9), Heritage Day

(September 24), Day of Reconciliation (December 16),

Christmas Day (December 25), and Day of Goodwill

(December 26).

Geography

Size: South Africa occupies 1,227,200 square kilometers at the

southern tip of Africa; seventh largest African country; twice

the size of Texas. Coastline nearly 3,000 kilometers.

Extraterritorial holdings: Prince Edward Island and Marion

Island (Indian Ocean).

Topography: Interior highlands continuation of African

plateau stretching north to Sahara, 1,200 meters average

elevation. Plateau rises to Drakensberg Mountains (3,300

meters) south and east; Great Escarpment descends to coastal

lowlands. Marginal coastal lowlands vary from eighty to 240

kilometers wide. Regular coastline, few natural harbors.

Climate: Variable; warm temperate climate overall;

Mediterranean conditions far southwest; subtropical northeast;

desert northwest. Moderating influence of ocean currents: East

coast warmed by Agulhas current, west coast cooled by

Benguela current. Dry, sunny winters (April-October),

summer rains (November-March) except in southwest, where

rainfall yearround; average annual rainfall 484 millimeters.

Time: 2 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time.

Society

Population: 41.2 million, 1995 estimate (1996 census not yet

final). Annual population growth 2.2 percent. Fertility: 4.4

births per female; crude birth rate: 23.4 per 1,000; 12 percent

xxxvi
of births to teenagers. Population to double in twenty-five

years. Life expectancy: sixty-three years males, sixty-eight years

females, marked racial differences. Crude death rate: 9.4 per

1,000. Median age 19.2, declining; 37 percent under age

fifteen. Density 33.8 persons per square kilometer, uneven

distribution; concentrations in KwaZulu-Natal (21 percent of

population), Gauteng (17 percent), Eastern Cape (17

percent). Estimated urban population, 57 to 63 percent; rural,

37 to 43 percent. Major urban areas: Cape Town, 2.2 million;

Johannesburg, 1.9 million; Durban, 1.1 million; Pretoria, 1.1 million; Port Elizabeth, 854,000. Ethnic heterogeneity:

estimated 76 percent black Africans—Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa,

Swazi, Ndebele), Sotho-Tswana, Venda, Tsonga-Shangaan,

Khoisan; 13 percent whites—Afrikaners, British, other

Europeans; 11 percent Asians and others. Government

estimates at least 2 million foreign workers (1996).

Languages: Eleven official languages. Most widely used: isiZulu,

isiXhosa, Afrikaans, English, and sePedi; also seSotho,

seTswana, xiTsonga, siSwati, tshiVenda (luVenda), and

isiNdebele. English important in commerce.

Religion: No government restrictions. Population 80 percent

Christians, mostly Protestant. Of these, 8 million members of

African Independent churches; 4 million, of Dutch Reformed

churches. Traditional African beliefs remain important,

especially in rural areas. Asians almost equally Hindu and

Muslim; Islamic community growing rapidly.

Education and Literacy: Superior education system primarily

served racial minority until 1990s. Nine years compulsory

education universal after 1994; shortages of schools, teachers.

Estimated 7.17 million primary pupils, 4.59 million secondary

pupils; 20,780 primary and secondary schools, of which 20,303

government operated; 336,653 primary and secondary

teachers. Adult literacy estimated 61 percent. Nineteen major

universities, two correspondence; extensive vocational and

technical training available.

Health: Health problems reflect racial, class differences.

Physicians 1 per 1,200 people in wealthy areas (1 per 10,000 in

poor, rural areas). Acquired immune deficiency syndrome

xxxvii
(AIDS): 10,351 reported cases (1996); human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection estimated close to 1 million. Infant

mortality declining: 43.1 deaths first year per 1,000 live births

(54.3 blacks, 7.3 whites). National health insurance system

being phased in. Economy

Character and Structure: Economy based on market-oriented,

private enterprise, bolstered by state subsidies; traditionally

strong public sector undergoing initial privatization. Industry

and manufacturing crucial to growth. Government's five-year

Reconstruction and Development Programme emphasizes

public services, job creation to ameliorate most severe impacts

of apartheid. Gross domestic product (GDP) estimated

US$133.6 billion; US$3,010 per capita (1995). Major

contributions to GDP: manufacturing, 25.2 percent; trade,

15.5; finance, 15.3; general government, 14.1; mining, 8.9. Economic growth, 3.1 percent (1996), predicted 2.5 percent

(1997). Inflation, 8.7 percent (1995); 7.4 percent (1996).

Government budget: FY1997-98 proposed expenditures,

R186.7 billion; revenues R162.0 billion; projected deficit R24.7

billion. Budget allocations: military, 5.7 percent; police, 7.0

percent; interest on government debt, 20.4 percent; education,

21.3 percent; allocations to provinces, 43.2 percent. Proposed

relaxation of exchange controls, tax reductions in lower

income brackets (1997).

Mining and Minerals: Mining based on unparalleled reserves: gold, diamonds, platinum, chromium, manganese, vanadium;

also coal, iron ore, uranium, copper, silver, fluorspar, asbestos,

limestone. Mineral concentrations greatest in Gauteng,

Northern Province, Mpumalanga. One offshore oilfield,

further exploration underway.

Manufacturing: Steel, steel products, chemicals, electronics,

automobiles, textiles, paper, food processing. Strong growth in

export-oriented manufacturing, increasing capacity

utilization, mid-1990s. Substantial foreign investment. Factors

favoring investment: broad technological base, highly trained

xxxviii
managerial class, abundant labor supply, specialized financial

institutions. Factors countering investment: abundance of

unskilled, uneducated workers; crime, violence; labor

militancy. Industrial interests protected by South African

Chamber of Business (SACOB), Steel and Engineering

Industries Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA), Afrikaner

Trade Institute (Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut—AHI), National

African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC).

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Arable land roughly 11

percent of total, mostly eastern provinces, far southwest.

Principal crops: cereals and grains, especially corn; wool; sugar;

peanuts; tobacco; fruits and vegetables; affected by early 1990s

periods of drought. Flourishing wine industry. Livestock, dairy

farming. Government marketing boards being phased out. Land claims disputes arising out of apartheid era being

adjudicated, could affect 30 percent of farm land. Small timber

industry meets most domestic demand. Large commercial

fishing industry exports more than 60 percent of catch.

Energy: Extensive coal reserves expected to last through most

of twenty-first century; uranium plentiful. Limited

hydroelectric potential, plans to import electric power from

cooperative ventures in Lesotho, Mozambique. Imported

petroleum, refined domestically. World leader in coal

liquefaction to synthesize oil and gas; one nuclear power

facility, plans for additional nuclear facilities after 2000.

Labor: Work force estimated 14.5 million (1995). Employment

in manufacturing (16.6 percent), agriculture (12.2 percent),

commerce and trade (11 percent), domestic service (8.5

percent), education (7.8 percent), mining (6.9 percent).

Unemployment, 29-32 percent of formal work force. Job

creation proceeding slowly. Looming shortage of skilled labor,

oversupply of unskilled labor. Public-sector employment

increasing, especially in provincial governments. At least 194

recognized trade unions; roughly 25 percent of labor force.

Wage disparities among racial groups persist, especially in

manufacturing.

Tourism: More than 4.6 million international arrivals (1995),

including more than 3.4 million Africans; also British,

xxxix
Germans; growing Asian interest. Well-developed tourism

industry; key attractions Kruger National Park, Western Cape,

Blue Train (Pretoria-Cape Town)

.

Foreign Economic Relations: Major exports: gold, precious

metals, precious stones, base metals, textiles, chemicals, paper

products, agricultural products. Increasing coal exports. Major

imports: machinery, vehicles, petroleum products, chemicals,

scientific instruments, base metals, textiles. Early 1990s growth

in imports slowed in mid-1990s; exports rose steadily, but

declining value of rand reduced impact on trade balance.

Value of exports US$27.9 billion, value of imports US$27.1

billion (1995). Major trading partners: United States, Britain,

Germany, Japan, Italy. Trade with United States: exports

US$2.21 billion, imports US$2.75 billion (1995). Binational

Commission with United States, binational chambers of

commerce in other countries promote trade, investment.

Southern African Customs Union with Botswana, Lesotho,

Namibia, and Swaziland. Trade with other African countries:

exports US$2.5 billion, imports US$664 million (1994). Major

South African investments in Africa: tourism, telecommunications, railways, ports, breweries, mining. Pursuing

stronger trade, investment ties to China, Japan, Singapore,

India, Australia.

Currency: Rand (R) = 100 cents. As of March 1, 1997,

US$1=R4.66; conversely, R1=US21.4 cents, following uneven

decline through 1996.

Fiscal Year: April 1 through March 31.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Transportation System: Government corporation, Transnet

Ltd., embarking on privatization. Transnet divisions: Spoornet

(railroads), Portnet (ports), Autonet (roads), Petronet

(pipelines), South African Airways (SAA), PX (parcel delivery

service).

Railroads: Well-developed rail network: 21,303 kilometers,

almost all narrow-gauge (regional standard), 1.067-meter; 314

kilometers, 0.610-meter gauge. 18,241 kilometers electrified;

xl
3,009 bridges; 625 stations. Reliance on steam power or steamgenerated electricity; hauled 164 million tons of freight, 600

million intercity passengers, 1994. Urban commuter lines

managed by South African Rail Commuter Corporation

(SARCC); more than 2 million urban commuters daily.

Roads: Extensive national, provincial, and municipal road

system: 5,943 kilometers freeways; 93,000 kilometers all- weather, paved roads; 130,000 kilometers unpaved, gravel or

earth roads. More than 3.5 million passenger cars, 2.5 million

commercial vehicles. Bus, private van service vital to urban

commuters. World record accident fatality rates in urban areas. Ports: Six major ports: Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth,

Richards Bay, East London, Saldanha Bay; secondary ports:

Mossel Bay, Simonstown. First-class facilities and services. At

least 104 million tons of cargo shipped and more than 16

million tons landed per year. Civil Aviation: South African Airways (SAA) national carrier

(forty-eight aircraft), increasing competition from smaller

airlines. Nine major airports: three international

Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban; plus Bloemfontein,

East London, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, George, and

Upington. Five runways more than 3,659 meters; ten runways

2,440 meters to 3,659 meters. In addition, at least 140

permanent surface runways and 250 landing strips, private and

commercial use. Pipelines: 931 kilometers crude oil; 1,748 kilometers other

petroleum products; 322 kilometers natural gas. Telecommunications: Advanced, modern system managed by

Telkom SA Ltd., served racial minority until mid-1990s.

Carrier-equipped, open-wire lines, coaxial cables, radio relay

links, fiber optic cable, and radiocommunication stations. Key

centers: Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg,

Port Elizabeth, and Pretoria. State-owned South African

Broadcasting Corporation subject to independent review for

political neutrality; increasing competition from independent

stations. Radio service from fourteen amplitude modulation

(AM) stations, 286 frequency modulation (FM) stations; nearxli
universal access; estimated 7 million radios, not licensed.

Government funds Channel Africa, 203 hours weekly

broadcasts outside South Africa. At least 2.2 million televisions.

Three main TV channels; English, Afrikaans, five African

languages, Hindi, Tamil. M-Net (880,000 subscribers)

broadcasts in above languages plus Hebrew, Greek,

Portuguese. Three satellite earth stations. Telephones: more

than 5.3 million (1996), priority on service to rural areas;

cellular telephone service expanding rapidly.

Government and Politics

Political System: Federal state consisting of central government

and nine provincial governments. Interim constitution:

approved December 22, 1993, implemented April 27, 1994,

intended to be in force until 1999, being replaced by final

constitution in phases, 1997-99. Interim constitution provides

for Government of National Unity: bicameral parliament

includes 400-member National Assembly (popularly elected by

party, list-system proportional representation based on

universal suffrage at age eighteen), ninety-member Senate

(indirectly elected by provincial legislators). President elected

by parliament; deputy presidents named by parties winning 20

percent of popular vote (minimum two). Executive branch

under interim constitution: president, Nelson Mandela

(African National Congress—ANC), two deputy presidents

Thabo Mbeki (ANC) and Frederik Willem de Klerk (National

Party—NP). President appointed twenty-eight cabinet

ministers from parties with 5 percent of popular vote.

Executive, legislative officials normally serve five-year terms.

Final constitution drafted by Constitutional Assembly (both

houses of parliament), 1996; replaces Government of National

Unity with majoritarian rule: Party winning majority of popular

vote names executive officials; also replaces Senate with

National Council of Provinces: six permanent members

indirectly elected by each provincial legislature; each province

fills additional four seats on national council by rotation from

provincial legislature. NP abandoned Government of National

Unity, June 1996, to become parliamentary opposition. Status

of KwaZulu-Natal unresolved. Parliamentary Volkstaat Council

xlii
considering proposals for self-determination by proapartheid

whites in separate volkstaat. Major political parties: ANC, NP, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP),

Freedom Front (FF), Democratic Party (DP), Pan-Africanist

Congress (PAC), African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP);

several smaller parties. Next national elections scheduled 1999.

Administrative Divisions: Nine provinces, provisional

boundaries subject to change by referendum. Provinces (and

capitals): Eastern Cape (Bisho), Mpumalanga (Nelspruit),

Gauteng (Johannesburg), KwaZulu-Natal (Ulundi or

Pietermaritzburg), Northern Cape (Kimberley), Northern

Province (Pietersburg), North-West Province (Mmabatho)

Free State (Bloemfontein),Western Cape (Cape Town).

Provincial and local government: Nine provincial governments

formed by list-system proportional representation. Provincial

premier (executive) appoints Executive Council (cabinet)

based on party strength; provincial assemblies, 30 to 100

legislators based on party strength. November 1995 elections

for 688 metropolitan, town, and rural councils, except in

KwaZulu-Natal (violence), areas of Western Cape (boundary

disputes). Low voter turnout; ANC 66.3 percent, NP 16.2

percent, Freedom Front 5 percent. Western Cape elections,

May 29, 1996; NP won control of all contested councils; ANC

second. KwaZulu-Natal elections, June 26, 1996, IFP 44.5

percent, ANC 33.2 percent (concentration in urban areas).

Provincial authority still being defined; provincial

constitutions, once approved by Constitutional Court, could

give provincial governments most responsibility for agriculture,

education (except universities), health and welfare, housing,

police, environmental affairs, language use, media,

transportation, sports and recreation, tourism, urban and rural

development, and role of traditional leaders. Status of volkstaat

not yet determined.

Judicial System: Based on Roman-Dutch law, altered by British

rule and post-independence constitutions. Interim

constitution of 1993 empaneled eleven-judge Constitutional

Court to rule on legislative constitutionality. Supreme Court:

Appellate Division (Bloemfontein); six provincial division

xliii
headquarters: Cape Town, Grahamstown, Kimberley,

Bloemfontein, Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria; local divisions.

Lower courts: district magistrates hear cases concerning lesser

offenses. Judges or magistrates decide guilt or innocence; jury

system abolished 1969. Penalties include corporal punishment

(whipping). Death penalty abolished in 1995.

Foreign Affairs: Global diplomatic isolation ended in early

1990s. Foreign policy goals: independence from foreign

interference; desire to balance friendships with powerful

donor nations against loyalty to former antiapartheid allies; desire for close political ties to Africa, close economic ties to Asian "tigers."

International Memberships: Participation in United Nations

restored, June 1994. Membership: British Commonwealth of

Nations, International Labour Organisation, International

Telecommunications Union, Multilateral Investment

Guarantee Agency, Nonaligned Movement (NAM),

Organization of African Unity (OAU), Southern African

Customs Union (SACU), Southern African Development

Community (SADC), Universal Postal Union, World Health

Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property

Organization, World Meteorological Organization, World

Trade Organization.

National Security

Armed Forces: Armed forces renamed South African National

Defence Force (SANDF). Military reorganization in mid-1990s

to integrate national armed services with former homeland

and liberation forces. Active-duty forces (1996): 137,900. Army

118,000, of whom 4,000 women; air force 8,400, of whom 800

women; navy 5,500, of whom 350 women; medical service

6,000, of whom 2,000 women. Commandos 76,000. Reserves:

approximately 474,700, of which army 453,000, air force

20,000, navy 1,700. Downsizing to reduce SANDF to 90,000 by

1999. Civilian minister of defense; president commander in

chief. Conscription ended, 1994; voluntary service of two to six years, followed by ten-year part-time service (maximum sixty

days training per two-year period). Military budget (R10.

xliv
billion), less than 2 percent of GDP, 1997.

Police: 147,000: 110,000 active, 37,000 reserves (1997).

Reorganized in 1994 as South African Police Service under

minister for safety and security. President appoints national

police commissioner, nine provincial police commissioners.

Emphasis on ending violence, reducing crime, improving

community relations, racial tolerance, decentralization of

leadership, demilitarization of ranks and symbols. Vigilantism

increasing in response to continued violence. Senior ranks still predominantly white; some racial biases persist. Police budget

(R13.1 billion), 2.1 percent of GDP, 1997.

Prisons: 129,000 prisoners (1996), severe overcrowding,

manpower shortages in prisons. More than 200 deaths in

police custody (1995). Laws amended in 1995 to prohibit

detention of children under eighteen in prisons.

National Reconciliation: Truth and Reconciliation Commission

investigating human rights violations 1960-93. Hearings since

early 1996 considering victim compensation, amnesty for most

political crimes, to be completed in 1997 or 1998. Several

senior security officials indicted for murders committed under

apartheid; others implicated in testimony before commission.

Government-appointed Human Rights Commission to

investigate, assist aggrieved individuals seeking redress against

government officials and others.

xlv
22 Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative 30 /

BOTSWANA /

M0ZA8MBIQUE

Pietersburg Gatorom ^northern province^

Mbabane } Mma^ath^

ohannesbur^.^pumalanga NORTH-WEST "^^GAUTENG

\ PROVINCE

/ FREE STATE

Kimberley ®

/ ®

{ Bloemfontein NORTHERN CAPE \

-v SWAZILAND/""

/ Ulundi J. ® r KWAZULUWESTERN CAPE

hiCape Town

Indian Ocean

100 200 Kilometers

International boundary

Province boundary ® National capital ® Province capital NOTE—National capitals: Pretoria, administrative; Cape Town, legislative; Bloemfontein, judicial. KwaZulu-Natal

capital not decided (1996).

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of South Africa, 1996

xlvi
Introduction

DURING FOUR DAYS IN APRIL 1994, more than 19 million

South Africans, roughly 91 percent of registered voters, went to the polls, most for the first time, and elected South Africa's first democratic government. The establishment of a government

led by the African National Congress (ANC), under the presidency of Nelson Mandela, signaled emphatically the demise of

apartheid and the return of South Africa from the pariah status

it had occupied for decades to a respected place in the world

community. The change was as swift as it was dramatic. Only

five years earlier, in 1989, barely one-eighth as many voters

(roughly 69 percent of an electorate restricted by law to members of the white, mixed-race "coloured," and Asian communities) had returned to power those who were committed to maintaining apartheid. The African majority was, until then,

explicitly denied full citizenship rights on the basis of skin

color. The ANC was an illegal organization, as it had been since

April 1960. Nelson Mandela in 1989 was spending his

twenty-sixth year in prison. The fact that South Africa went on

to overturn the apartheid ideology and, in large part, apartheid practices between 1989 and 1994 was a stunning development, unforeseen by political forecasters and paralleling the

overthrow of communism in Eastern Europe.

Yet the repudiation of apartheid did not mean the end of

racial divisions. Although the electors voted in 1994 to end

apartheid, they still cast their ballots largely along racial and

ethnic lines. Most African voters supported the ANC, except in

KwaZulu-Natal where Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi's

Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) secured a majority of Zulu votes

and won control of the newly established provincial government. Most whites—Afrikaners and English speakers alike

voted for F. W. de Klerk's newly anti apartheid National Party

(NP), avoiding both the ANC and the Democratic Party (which

in a previous form, as the Progressive Federal Party, had led the

parliamentary fight to end apartheid). Coloured voters, largely

concentrated in the Western Cape province, were concerned

that their interests might be ignored by an African majority

government. Hence, they voted for the NP, thereby ensuring

that it won control of the Western Cape provincial government.

xlvii
Nor did the repudiation of apartheid mean the end of the

economic and social problems that have increasingly bedeviled

South African society since the 1980s. Racially discriminatory

policies enforced by successive governments throughout the

twentieth century have left the African majority of the population in possession of only about 13 percent of the nation's land,

and most of that of poor quality. Unable to achieve sustainable

agricultural development, Africans continue, as they have for

decades, to flock to cities. Urban migration, in turn, has cre- ated enormous squatter encampments, particularly in and

around Gauteng. Most of these squatters, as well as nearly onehalf of the adult African population nationwide, cannot find

work within the formal sector of the economy. The results are widespread poverty, appalling living conditions, and an increasing incidence of crime. South Africa's per capita crime rate,

overall, has exceeded that of almost any other country since

1992. The government has acknowledged the seriousness of

the problem but has not been able to end the wave of crimes

against persons and property that is fueled by lingering poverty.Even for many South Africans who have jobs, economic conditions are difficult, as black wages remain low compared to those of white workers. Mandela's government said in 1995 that

it could not afford to equalize pay scales across public-sector

jobs in order to compensate for past discrimination. Given

these circumstances, one of the most difficult tasks facing the

new government is to balance the high expectations of its black

supporters against economic realities. Initially, after the historic 1994 elections, President Mandela's personal charisma

and the great respect in which he is held by most South Afri- cans—both black and white—helped to ensure political stability. But Mandela has said that he would not remain in office

after 1999, and the question of succession, therefore, lingers over many 1990s political debates about the future.

South Africa's contemporary problems have deep historical

roots. Although human settlement in the subcontinent extends

back thousands of years, racial conflict dates from the Dutch

arrival at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, when the Dutch East

India Company established a resupply station at Cape Town for

its fleets traveling between Holland and its empire in South

and Southeast Asia. During the first 150 years of European control of the Cape, the company, a commercial operation, established some of the most enduring features of colonial society.

xlviii
The company was not interested in expanding European settle- ment across Africa, but only in acquiring goods (fresh water,

foodstuffs, replacement masts) to resupply its ships. When local

Khoisan peoples refused to provide these goods on terms set by

the company, the Europeans took up arms and drove most of

the local population into the interior. In place of local producers, the company relied on a combination of European farmers

(mostly former employees of the company) and imported Afri- can slave labor to work the land that had been seized from

local residents.

When the European farmers (known as Boers) attempted to escape the monopolistic trading practices and autocratic rule

of the company by moving into the interior, the company prohibited further expansion, ended the emigration of Europeans

to the Cape, and expanded the use of slave labor. By the end of

the eighteenth century, society in the Cape was marked by

antagonism between the local white community (mostly

descended from the same small group of seventeenth-century

Dutch, French, and German settlers) and a largely disinterested and exploitative metropolitan ruler. The racial divide was

reflected in the pattern of land ownership and the authoritarian structure of labor relations, based largely on slavery.

British acquisition of the Cape at the beginning of the nineteenth century accentuated divisions between local settlers and

metropolitan rulers and widened the racial divide between

whites and blacks. The British conquered the Cape largely to prevent it from falling into the hands of Napoleon, and thus to protect their only sea route to their empire in South Asia. Like

the Dutch East India Company, the British were not interested

in expanding settlement but wanted to keep down the expense

of maintaining their strategic resupply station at Cape Town.

Initially, they continued to import African slaves to meet the

labor needs of white farmers, and they did not interfere with

the farmers' harsh treatment of black workers. But the British

also tried to prevent further white expansion in South Africa

with its attendant costs of greater levels of colonial government

and the risk of wars with Africans—by closing the borders of

the Cape and importing British settlers to create a loyal buffer

in the east between expansionist Boers and densely settled Afri- can communities. Moreover, the British, influenced by strong

humanitarian groups at home, took steps to eliminate the

racially discriminatory features of colonial society, first by

reforming the judicial system and punishing white farmers who

xlix
assaulted black workers, and later by freeing all slaves throughout the British empire.

Desperate for more land and fearful of losing all of their

black labor, many Boer families in the 1830s marched into the

interior of South Africa on the Great Trek, skirting the densest

African populations. These Voortrekkers, or trekkers, hoped to establish their own communities, free of British rule. Prevented

by the British from establishing a republic on the Indian Ocean

coast, where the British colony of Natal helped protect the sea route to India, the Boers formed two republics in the interior,

the South African Republic (the region known as the Transvaal) and the Orange Free State. Both republics' economies

were based on near-subsistence farming and hunting, and both

limited political rights to white males. Thus, white settlement

expanded across the region, but almost entirely into areas with

few local inhabitants. The majority of black Africans still lived

in their own autonomous societies.

The discovery of minerals in the late nineteenth century

diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886—dramatically altered the

economic and political structure of southern Africa. The growing mineral industry created ever-greater divisions between

British and Boer, white and black, rich and poor. At the turn of

the century, for the first time, South Africa had an extremely

valuable resource that attracted foreign capital and large-scale

immigration. Discoveries of gold and diamonds in South Africa

exceeded those in any other part of the world, and more foreign capital had been invested in South Africa than in the rest of Africa combined. In the Transvaal, the site of the gold discoveries, the white population expanded eightfold, while hundreds of thousands of Africans sought work each year in the

newly developed mines and cities of industrializing areas. Yet

not all shared equally in this newfound wealth. Diamond and,

in particular, gold mining industries required vast amounts of

inexpensive labor in order to be profitable. To constrain the

ability of African workers to bargain up their wages, and to ensure that they put up with onerous employment conditions,

the British in the 1870s and 1880s conquered the

still-independent African states in southern Africa, confiscated

the bulk of the land and imposed cash taxation demands. In

this way, they ensured that men who had chosen previously to work in the mines on their own terms were now forced to do so on employers' terms. In the new industrial cities, African workers were subjected to a bewildering array of discriminatory laws

1
and practices, all enforced in order to keep workers cheap and

pliable. In the much diminished rural areas, the wives and chil- dren of these migrant laborers had to survive in large part on

the limited remittances sent back by their absent menfolk. In

short, many of the discriminatory features so typical of twentieth-century South Africa—pass laws, urban ghettos, impoverished rural homelands, African migrant labor—were first established in the course of South Africa's industrial revolution.

But the discovery of minerals also exacerbated tensions

between the British and the Boers. Gold had been discovered

in the Transvaal, and that was beyond the reach of British rule.

Yet the capital invested in the mines, and thus the ownership of

the gold industry, was primarily British controlled. Lacking

investment capital, the Boers found themselves excluded from

ownership and thus from the profits generated in their midst.

Indeed, most profits from the mines were reinvested in Europe

and the Americas and did not contribute to the growth of additional industries in South Africa. The Boers sought to gain

access to some of this wealth through taxation policies; these

policies, however, incurred the wrath of the mine magnates

and their supporters in England. The South African War,

fought by the Boers and the British between 1899 and 1902, was primarily a struggle for the control of gold. Although the

Boers lost the war, in large part they won the peace. The British

realized that in order for the diamond and gold industries to be operated profitably, they had to have a local administration

sympathetic to the financial and labor needs of mining. They

also realized—given demographic trends at the time—that

Boers would always constitute a majority of the white population. With these factors in mind, the British abandoned their

wartime anti-Boer and pro-African rhetoric and negotiated a long-term political settlement that put the local white community in charge of a self-governing united South Africa.

The Union of South Africa, established on May 31, 1910, as a self-governing state within the British Empire, legislatively

restricted political and property rights to whites at the expense

of blacks. With the exception of a very small number of voters

in the Cape Province and Natal, Africans were kept off electoral rolls throughout most of the country. By the terms of the

Mines and Works Act (1911), only whites were permitted to hold skilled jobs in the mining industry. The Natives Land Act

(1913) prohibited Africans from owning land in any part of
South Africa outside a small area (7.5 percent, expanded to 13

percent in the 1930s) set aside for their use. These laws

ensured that Africans would have to seek jobs from white

employers, that their jobs would be the lowest paid available,

and that without the right to vote they could do little to change

the laws that excluded them from the political process and rel- egated them to the bottom of the economy.

Two nationalist movements emerged in the aftermath of the

formation of the union, one racially and ethnically exclusivist,

the other much more disparate in its membership and aims.

The Afrikaner nationalist movement, built around the

National Party, appealed to Afrikaners (as they increasingly

referred to themselves after the South African War), who were

still bitter about their suffering in the war and frustrated by the

poverty in which most of them lived. The black nationalist

movement, led primarily by the African National Congress

(formed in 1912), addressed the myriad injustices against black

South Africans.

Although Afrikaner generals helped unite South Africa's

first government, most Dutch speakers did not share in the

fruits of victory. Much of their land had been confiscated by

the British during the war and was not returned after it ended.

The main source of employment, the mines, was owned by

English speakers. Rural Afrikaners moving to the cities had neither capital nor marketable skills, and thus they found themselves competing with Africans for low-paid unskilled work. As

a result, they often supported racially discriminatory legislation, such as the Mines and Works Act, that gave them privileged access to jobs solely on the basis of their color. But

because Afrikaners wanted a greater share of the economy

than they could earn as employees of English speakers, they

pooled their funds and resources to establish banks, insurance

companies, and other businesses in order to wrest a portion of

the economy out of the control of English businessmen. A few

Afrikaner leaders then led in the denunciation of the business

community in increasingly extreme, anticapitalist, and

anti-Semitic terms.

Afrikaner nationalists spoke of themselves as a chosen people, ordained by God to rule South Africa. They established

their own cultural organizations and secret societies, and they

argued that South Africa should be ruled in the interests of

Afrikaners, rather than English businessmen or African workers. Throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, the Afrikaner

In
nationalist movement grew in popularity, fueled by fears of

black competition for jobs, by antipathy toward the

English-speaking mine magnates, by the memory of past suffer- ing, and by the impact of World War II (especially massive

black urbanization). In 1948, with the support of a majority of

Afrikaners (who constituted about 60 percent of the white electorate), the NP won the election on its apartheid platform.

Henceforth, South Africa was to be governed by a party that

hoped to shape government policies to work in favor of whites,

in general, and Afrikaners, in particular. Moreover, the NP

denied that Africans, Asians, or coloureds could ever be citi- zens or full participants in the political process.

The black nationalist movement had no such success. For

most blacks, lack of access to the vote meant that they could

not organize an effective political party. Instead they had to rely on appeals, deputations, and petitions to the British government asking for equal treatment before the law. The British

responded by pointing out that South Africa was now

self-governing and that the petitioners had to make their case

to the local white rulers. Although Africans, Asians, and

coloureds shared common grievances, they were not united in

their organizations or their aims. Physically separated and

legally differentiated in practically every aspect of their lives,

they formed separate organizations to represent their interests.

Moreover, their leaders, with few exceptions, adopted accommodationist rather than confrontational tactics in dealing with

the state. Failing to gain any real concessions from increasingly

hard-line governments, none of the black political movements

succeeded in building a solid mass following. Even the ANC

had a membership of only a few thousand (out of an African

population of about 8 million) in 1948.

With the introduction of apartheid, the NP extended and

systematized many of the features of entrenched racial discrimination into a state policy of white supremacy. Every person res- ident in South Africa was legally assigned, largely on the basis

of appearance, to one racial group—white, African, coloured, or Asian. South Africa was proclaimed to be a white man's

country in which members of other racial groups would never

receive full political rights. Africans were told that eventually

they would achieve political independence in perhaps nine or ten homelands, carved out of the minuscule rural areas already

allocated to them, areas that even a government commission in

liii
the 1950s had deemed totally inadequate to support the black

population.

Coloureds and Asians, too, were to be excluded from South

African politics. By law, all races were to have separate living areas and separate amenities; there was to be no mixing. Education was to be provided according to the roles that people

were expected to play in society. In that regard, Hendrik F. Ver- woerd, the leading ideologue of apartheid and prime minister

of South Africa from 1958 until his assassination in 1966, stated

that Africans would be "making a big mistake" if they thought

that they would live "an adult life under a policy of equal

rights." According to Verwoerd, there was no place for Africans

"in the European community" (by which he meant South

Africa) above the level of certain forms of labor.

Expecting considerable opposition to policies that would

forever exclude the black majority from any role in national

politics and from any job other than that of unskilled—and

low-paid—laborer, the NP government greatly enlarged police

powers. People campaigning to repeal or to modify any law

would be presumed guilty of one of several crimes until they

could prove their innocence. The government could "list," or ban, individuals, preventing them from attending public meetings, prohibiting them from belonging to certain organizations, and subjecting them to lengthy periods of house arrest. The most draconian piece of security legislation, the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), adopted an extraordinarily broad and vague definition of communism—i.e., the aim to "bring about any political, industrial, social, or economic

change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or

disorder." Also included under the act was anyone who encour- aged "feelings of hostility between the European and the

non-European races of the Union." This legislation enabled

the police to label almost any opponent of apartheid as a supporter of the outlawed Communist Party of South Africa (reactivated in 1953 as the South African Communist Party—SACP).

Blacks rose up in protest against apartheid in the 1950s. Led

by Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo, the ANC sought to broaden its base of support and to impede the implementation

of apartheid by calling for mass noncompliance with the new

laws. Working together with white, coloured, and Indian opponents of apartheid, the ANC encouraged people to burn their

passes (identity documents, then required of all African males

and soon to be required of all African females in South Africa).

liv
The ANC also urged people to refuse to use the separate amenities (such as public toilets, park benches, and entrances to post offices) set aside for them, to use those intended for

whites instead, and to boycott discriminatory employers and

institutions. Such tactics, all of them purposely nonviolent,

although not successful in changing NP policies, did attract

large-scale support and won new members for the ANC.

In 1955 representatives of the ANC, as well as white,

coloured, and Indian organizations opposed to apartheid,

drafted a Freedom Charter as a basic statement of political

principles. According to the charter, South Africa belonged to

all who lived within its boundaries, regardless of race. The charter stated that no particular group of people should have special privileges, but that all should be treated equally before the

law It also stated that all who lived in South Africa should share

in the country's wealth, an ambiguous statement sometimes

interpreted by supporters of the ANC, and more frequently by

its opponents, to mean a call for nationalization of

private-sector enterprises.

The NP government dealt harshly with all those who

opposed its policies. Tens of thousands were arrested for participating in public demonstrations and boycotts, hundreds of

thousands were arrested each year for pass-law offenses, and

many of the delegates who drew up the Freedom Charter were

arrested and tried for treason in a trial that lasted nearly five years. Repression became harsher as opposition grew. In 1960

police at Sharpeville, a black township south ofJohannesburg,

fired into a crowd of Africans peacefully protesting against the

pass laws, and killed sixty-seven. In the aftermath of the shooting, which attracted worldwide condemnation, the government

banned the ANC, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), and

other organizations opposed to apartheid; withdrew from the

British Commonwealth of Nations; and, after a referendum

among white voters only, declared South Africa a republic.

During the 1960s, the implementation of apartheid and the

repression of internal opposition continued despite growing

world criticism of South Africa's racially discriminatory policies

and police violence. Thousands of Africans, coloureds, and

Asians (ultimately numbering about 3.5 million by the 1980s) were removed from white areas into the land set aside for other

racial groups. Some of these areas, called black homelands,

were readied for independence, even though they lacked the

physical cohesiveness—Bophuthatswana, for example, conlv
sisted of some nineteen non-contiguous pieces of land—to make political or economic independence a viable or believable concept. None of the four homelands declared independent received any form of world recognition. The ANC and the

PAC, banned from operating within South Africa, turned to violence in their struggle against apartheid—the former organization adopting a policy of bombing strategic targets such as police stations and power plants, the latter engaging in a program of terror against African chiefs and headmen, who were

seen as collaborators with the government.

Verwoerd's government crushed this internal opposition.

Leaders of the ANC and PAC within South Africa were tracked

down, arrested, and charged with treason. Nelson Mandela was sentenced in 1964 to imprisonment for life. Oliver Tambo had

already fled the country and led the ANC in exile. Despite

growing international criticism, the government's success in

capturing its enemies fueled an economic boom. Attracted by

the apparent political stability of the country, and by rates of

return on capital running as high as 15 to 20 percent annually,

foreign investment in South Africa more than doubled

between 1963 and 1972. Soaring immigration increased the

white population by as much as 50 percent during the same

period. Apartheid and economic growth seemed to work in

tandem.

Yet a number of contradictory developments during the

1970s displayed the shaky foundations of the apartheid edifice.

In 1973 wildcat strikes broke out on the Durban waterfront and

then spread around the country. Because Africans were prohibited from establishing or belonging to trade unions, they had

no organizational leaders to represent their concerns. Fearful

of police repression, strikers chose not to identify publicly any

of their leaders. Thus employers who considered negotiations

had no worker representatives with whom to negotiate and

none to hold responsible for upholding labor agreements. Several hundred thousand work hours were lost in labor actions in

1973. That same year, in a sign of growing world opposition to state-enforced racial discrimination, the United Nations (UN)

declared apartheid "a crime against humanity," a motion that

took on real meaning four years later, in 1977, when the UN

adopted a mandatory embargo on arms sales to South Africa.

In 1974 a revolutionary movement overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship in Lisbon, and the former colonial territories of Angola and Mozambique demanded independence

lvi
from Portugal. Their liberation movements-turned-Marxist

governments were committed to the eradication of colonialism

and racial discrimination throughout southern Africa. Following the 1980 independence of Zimbabwe, a nation now led by a

socialist government opposed to apartheid, South Africa found

itself surrounded by countries hostile to its policies and ready

to give refuge to the exiled forces of the ANC and the PAC.

Internal and external opposition to apartheid was fueled in

1976, when the Soweto uprising began with the protests of

high-school students against the enforced use of Afrikaans

viewed by many Africans as the oppressor's language. The protests led to weeks of demonstrations, marches, and boycotts

throughout South Africa. Violent clashes with police left more

than 500 people dead, several thousand arrested, and thousands more seeking refuge outside South Africa, many with the

exiled forces of the ANC and the PAC.

Fearful of growing instability in South Africa, many foreign

investors began to withdraw their money or to move it into

short-term rather than long-term investments; as a result, the

economy became increasingly sluggish. In order to cope with

labor unrest and to boost investor confidence, the government

decided in 1979 to allow black workers to establish unions as a necessary step toward industrial peace. This decision was a crucial step in the growing perception that apartheid would have

to end. It undercut a basic ideological premise of apartheid,

that blacks were not really full citizens of South Africa and,

therefore, were not entitled to any official representation. It also implied an acceptance by employers, many of whom had

called for the change in policy, that in order for labor relations

to operate effectively, disgruntled workers would have to be

negotiated with, rather than subjected to arbitrary dismissal

and police arrest, as in the past.

Pretending otherwise had already become increasingly diffi- cult. A national census in 1980 showed that whites were declining as a proportion of South Africa's population. From more

than 20 percent of the population at the beginning of the century, whites accounted for only about 16 percent of the population in 1980 and were likely to constitute less than 10 percent

by the end of the century. By the end of the 1980s, almost onehalf of black South Africans—according to apartheid theory, a

rural people—would be living in cities and towns, accounting

for nearly 60 percent of South Africa's urban dwellers. Demolvii
graphic facts, alone, made it increasingly difficult to argue that

South Africa was a white man's country.

In the early 1980s, NP reformers tinkered with the basic

structure of apartheid. Concerned about demographic trends,

Prime Minister P. W. Botha led his government in implementing a new constitutional arrangement, one that embraced the

concept of multiracial government but, at the same time, perpetuated the concept of racial separation. The new constitution established three racially segregated houses of parliament,

for whites, Asians, and coloureds, but excluded blacks from full citizenship. Botha and his allies hoped that such a change

would bolster NP support among coloureds and Asians, and

thereby give the party enough numerical strength to counter

growing dissent.

The constitution implemented in 1984 only inflamed further opposition to apartheid. It was denounced inside and outside South Africa as anachronistic and reactionary. Opponents

argued that by further institutionalizing the exclusion of the

majority black population, the new constitution only extended

apartheid and did not undercut it in any significant way. Within

South Africa, protests against apartheid far exceeded earlier

levels of opposition. In many black townships, police stations

and other government buildings were destroyed, along with

the homes of black policemen and town councilors, who were denounced as collaborators with the apartheid regime.

Newly legalized black trade unions took a leading role in the

opposition, particularly by organizing strikes that combined

economic and political complaints. The number of work days

lost to strikes soared to more than 5.8 million in 1987. Armed

members of the ANC and PAC infiltrated South Africa's borders from their bases in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe

and carried out a campaign of urban terror. With South Africa

on the verge of civil war, the government imposed a series of

states of emergency, used the police and the army against

opponents of apartheid, and dispatched military forces on

armed raids into neighboring countries.

Although the government's repressive actions strengthened

state control in the short term, they backfired in the long run. Police repression and brutality in South Africa, and military

adventures elsewhere in southern Africa, only heightened

South Africa's pariah status in world politics. As events in the

country grabbed world headlines and politicians across the

globe denounced apartheid, the costs for South Africa of such

lviii
widespread condemnation were difficult to bear. Foreign inves- tors withdrew; international banks called in their loans; the

value of South African currency collapsed; the price of gold fell to less than one-half of the high of the 1970s; economic output

declined; and inflation became chronic.

In the face of such developments, it was clear to most South

African businessmen, and to a majority of NP party leaders,

that apartheid itself had to undergo substantial reform if eco- nomic prosperity and political stability were to be regained. In 1989 a stroke precipitated Botha's resignation, and he was suc- ceeded by F. W. de Klerk, formerly a hard-line supporter of

apartheid but by the end of the 1980s the candidate of those

who regarded themselves as moderates within the National

Party.

De Klerk moved faster and farther to reform apartheid than

any Afrikaner politician had done before him, although in

many instances it seemed that events rather than individuals were forcing the pace and scale of change. De Klerk released

Nelson Mandela from twenty-seven years of imprisonment in

February 1990, and rescinded the banning orders on the ANC,

the PAC, the SACP, and other previously illegal organizations.

Reacting to demands from within and outside South Africa, de

Klerk in 1990 and 1991 repealed the legislative underpinnings

of apartheid: gone were the Reservation of Separate Amenities

Act, which had enforced petty apartheid; the Natives Land Act,

which had made it illegal for Africans to own land in urban

areas; the Group Areas Act, which had segregated people by

race; and the Population Registration Act, which had assigned

every resident of South Africa to a specific racial group. The

pace of change was so rapid that many within the Afrikaner

community questioned the wisdom of de Klerk's moves, and he

came under increasing attack from right-wing proponents of a return to apartheid. For most critics of apartheid, however, the

pace of change was not fast enough. They wanted to see apartheid not reformed, but overthrown entirely. Indeed, once it had been accepted that black Africans were, in fact, South Afri- cans, the real question for de Klerk and his allies was whether

they could be incorporated into the country in any fashion

short of giving them equal rights. The answer was no. With this realization, from the end of 1991 onward, government negotiators met regularly with representatives from other

political organizations to discuss ways in which some form of

democracy could be introduced and the remaining structures

lix
of apartheid dismantled. Those involved called their forum the

Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). The

negotiations were neither clear-cut nor easy, in part because

each participating group brought a different past and different

demands to the bargaining table. An official commission of

inquiry in 1990, for example, found evidence that de Klerk's

government had turned a blind eye to clandestine death

squads within the security forces that were responsible for the

deaths of many opponents of apartheid. Moreover, elements

within the government were found to have surreptitiously

funded Zulu leader Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)

and to have supplied weapons that were used to attack ANC

members in KwaZulu and in a number of mining compounds.

The ANC's armed struggle against apartheid also lingered in

popular memory during the negotiations. ANC leader Mandela raised fears among white businessmen with talk about the

need for the nationalization of industries and for the redistribution of wealth to the victims of apartheid. Yet there was more

common ground than difference in Codesa. De Klerk and

Mandela and their respective supporters were united in the

belief that continued violence would destroy all hope of eco- nomic recovery. Such a recovery was vital for the attainment of

peace and prosperity. They were also united in their belief that

there was no alternative to a negotiated settlement.

Codesa's negotiations were assisted by the decline of left- and right-wing alternatives to parliamentary democracy. The

fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the failures of socialism in Africa essentially eliminated the likelihood of a socialist state in South Africa. Although radical redistribution of property had much support among black youth, there were few

leaders in the antiapartheid forces who spoke for that point of

view. Joe Slovo, the leader of the SACP, argued for compromise

with the government rather than for the immediate introduction of a workers' state. Chris Hani, the charismatic general sec- retary of the SACP and the head of Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear

of the Nation) —the ANC's armed wing—was assassinated in

April 1993. Winnie Mandela, long a proponent of more radical

solutions to the problems of poverty and discrimination in

South Africa, saw her influence decline as her marriage to Mandela fell apart. Nor did the PAC, long an adherent of the

view that South Africa was a black man's country in which

whites were merely guests, win much support for its continued

Ix
support of armed struggle and its slogan, "One settler, one bullet"

The white right wing was weakened by a series of inept

maneuvers that discredited the movement in the eyes of its most likely supporters in the police and in the defense forces.

Two members of the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement—AWB) were quickly arrested and

convicted of the murder of Chris Hani. Television cameras captured scenes of AWB leader Eugene Terreblanche leading an

unruly band of armed followers in an attack on the building

that housed the Codesa negotiations. The scenes broadcast were of crowd violence and anarchy, bringing to mind images

of pre-World War II fascism. The final straw, and the one that

caused leaders within the security establishment to disavow any

links with white extremists, was the botched attempt by AWB

members to reinstate Lucas Mangope as leader of the

Bophuthatswana homeland in early 1993. Again television cameras were the right wing's undoing, as they broadcast worldwide

the execution of several AWB mercenaries, lying beside their

Mercedes Benz sedan, by professionally trained black soldiers.

For South Africans, the telling image was not of blacks killing

whites (although that was significant), but of the ineptness of

the right.

The members of Codesa sped up the pace of negotiations

and of plans to implement the interim constitution. South

Africa was to have a federal system of regional legislatures,

equal voting rights regardless of race, and a bicameral legislature headed by an executive president. The negotiators also

agreed that the government elected in 1994 would serve for

five years, and that a constitutional convention, sitting from

1994 onward and seeking input from all South Africans, would

be responsible for drawing up a final constitution to be implemented in 1999.

The election in April 1994 was viewed by most participants as a remarkable success. Although several parties, especially the

IFP, had threatened to boycott the election, in the end no significant groups refused to participate. The polling was

extended to four days to allow for logistical and bureaucratic

problems. In the end, it was carried out peacefully, for the most

part, and there were few complaints of interference with anyone's right to vote. No political party got everything that it wanted. The ANC won nearly 62.6 percent of the vote, but it did not get the two-third's majority needed to change unilaterlxi
ally the interim constitution, and it therefore had to work with

other parties to shape the permanent constitution. The NP, as expected, no longer led the government, but it did succeed in

winning the second largest share of votes, with 20.4 percent.

The IFP did not do well nationally, but with a much stronger

base of support in KwaZulu-Natal than most commentators

expected, it came in third, with 10.5 percent, and won for

Buthelezi control of the provincial government. The Freedom

Front, a right-of-center, almost exclusively white party led by

former members of the security establishment, got 2.2 percent

of the votes; the PAC, appealing solely for the support of

blacks, won 1.2 percent. On May 9, 1994, Nelson Mandela was unanimously elected president by the National Assembly, with

Thabo Mbeki, deputy leader of the ANC and Mandela's likely successor, and F.W. de Klerk named deputy presidents. South

Africa had made a peaceful political transition from an apartheid police state to a democratic republic.

As the new government is established in the mid-1990s,

South Africa's leaders face the daunting challenges of meeting

the expectations of black voters while fulfilling the economic

potential of the country. Half a century of apartheid and a much longer period of legally enforced racial discrimination

have left most black South Africans poor and undereducated.

The reliance on a low-wage work force, especially in the country's mines but also in other areas of the economy, left South

Africa without a significant consumer class among its black

majority. Instead, nearly one-half of the population in the mid1990s lives below internationally determined minimum-subsistence levels. Nearly fifty years of Verwoerdian "Bantu education" left the country short of skills and unable to generate the

sort of labor force that could produce an "Asian miracle" along

the lines of the skilled-labor-dependent industries of South

Korea or Taiwan.

Demands for immediate economic improvements intensified in 1995 and 1996. Labor unions pressed demands on

behalf of organized workers, many of whom feared that their

interests would be ignored, lost amid the government's concerns for alleviating severe poverty and for bolstering investor

confidence in a stable workforce. Many labor unions were also

weakened, at least temporarily, by the loss of key leaders who

were elected or appointed to government office.

After these chapters were completed in May 1996, the Constitutional Court approved the new ("final") constitution,

lxii
intended to govern after the five-year transition. President

Mandela signed the new constitution into law on December 10,

1996, and the government began phasing in provisions of the

new document in February 1997. The final constitution contains a Bill of Rights, modeled on the chapter on fundamental

rights in the interim constitution. It also ends the powersharing

requirements that were the basis for the Government of

National Unity under the interim constitution. NP deputy president de Klerk left office in June 1996, after legislators voted to forward the new constitution to the Constitutional Court, and

the NP vacated its offices in the national and provincial executive branches, which had been based on the interim constitution's powersharing provisions. The NP in 1997 is attempting

to establish a new political identity as an active participant in

the national political debate; it will challenge ANC initiatives it opposes and compete with the ANC for political support

among all racial groups.

South Africa conducted its first postapartheid census in

October 1996. The process of enumeration proved even more

difficult than expected, in part because provincial governments are still establishing their functions and authority, and

administrative boundaries are still in dispute in a few areas. The final results—likely to reveal a population of more than 45

million—are not yet available as of April 1997.

The government has made substantial progress in expanding social services, health care, and education, but the backlog

in demand for these services has been impossible to meet.

These inadequacies continue to erode confidence in the new

government, despite impressive progress in areas such as the

provision of potable water and electricity, and the expansion of

educational opportunities in previously underserved areas. The demand for housing is proving particularly difficult to meet; foreign construction firms are participating in the effort,

and the pace of new home construction is expected to increase

steadily during 1997 and 1998.

South Africa's culturally diverse society has not yet negotiated acceptable compromises for dealing with controversial

aspects of individual behavior, such as women's rights to abortion or contraceptive use and behavior related to the spread of

acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). ANC legisla- tors successfully voted to liberalize public policy in many areas, most notably concerning abortion, despite strong opposition

from some Christian and Muslim groups. The campaign

lxiii
against AIDS continues to be mired in political debate, funding

controversies, and personal acrimony, as of 1997.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has heard more

than 2,000 testimonials and received nearly 4,000 applications

for amnesty for acts committed during the apartheid era. Grisly

stories have emerged from the commission's hearings; a few

lingering questions about apartheid-era deaths and disappear- ances have been answered, but others have arisen in response

to allegations of official collusion in unrestrained violence.

Commission chair Archbishop Desmond Tutu expressed confidence in early 1997 that the commission's long-term impact

will be to further reconciliation among racial groups. Others,

including survivors of victims, however, have expressed growing anger and stepped up demands for vengeance. Outside of

the commission's purview, the courts have convicted a few

former security officers and former freedom fighters for crimes

committed before May 1994, although some of those found

guilty in the courts may also apply for amnesty before the Truth

and Reconciliation Commission.

Violence, both political and criminal, continues to plague

the country. The newly organized South African Police Service

has not yet eliminated the corruption and racial biases that

characterized some segments of the police force during the

apartheid era. Vigilante groups are emerging in response to popular demands for stricter law enforcement. The best-known

of these, a Muslim-based coalition—People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) —has attacked, and even killed,

accused drug-dealers and others deemed to be outlaws, especially in Cape Town and surrounding areas of the Western

Cape. Vigilantism is also increasing in crime-ridden areas aroundJohannesburg, and elsewhere.

The continuing violence and political uncertainty contributed to a steady decline in the value of the rand (for value of

the rand—see Glossary) in late 1996 and early 1997. Levels of

foreign investment have lagged behind that needed for eco- nomic growth, and the government is offering incentives to increase foreign participation in South Africa's business and

manufacturing sectors. The Ministry of Finance outlined new

economic strategies aimed at liberalizing foreign-exchange

controls and imposing stricter fiscal discipline, in a framework

document entitled Growth, Employment and Redistribution. The

1996 document describes investment incentives and steps

toward restructuring the tax base to help stimulate new growth

lxiv
without substantially increasing public spending. It also outlines further steps toward the lifting of import tariffs and

exchange controls to expand foreign trade.

As of April 1997, the most likely successor to President Mandela appears to be deputy president Thabo Mbeki; Mandela

signaled his approval of this choice several times in the past

year. A respected ANC diplomat and trained economist, Mbeki

is expected to press for fiscal responsibility. Private-sector development, already a high priority, is likely to receive even greater

emphasis in the early twenty-first century. At the same time, any

new government will face the challenge of narrowing the gap

between rich and poor, which will be crucial to furthering the

goals of peace and reconciliation. Any new government also

will face obstacles created by political extremists and economic

opportunists hoping to reap their own gains in the new, postapartheid South Africa.

April 2, 1997 William H. Worger and Rita M. Byrnes

lxv

Chapter t. Historical Setting
Sheer cliffs overlooking the Valley ofDesolation near Graaff-Reinet
HISTORY HAS A COMPELLING IMPORTANCE in South

Africa. Political protagonists often refer to historical events and

individuals in expounding their different points of view. The

African National Congress (ANC), for example, has as one of

its symbols the shield of Bambatha, a Zulu chief who died leading the last armed uprising of Africans against the British in

1906. Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, leader of the former

KwaZulu homeland (see Glossary) and the Inkatha Freedom

Party (IFP), often refers to Shaka Zulu, the first great monarch

to arise in South Africa, who created a vast military state in the

1820s. Afrikaners (see Glossary) have frequently called themselves a "chosen people," ordained by God to rule in South

Africa. They have argued that their ancestors settled the subcontinent before any African, but that for the past 200 years

they have had to fight against the treachery of Africans and the

oppression of British imperialists. The study of the history of

South Africa, therefore, is a highly contentious arena marked

by wide variations of interpretation and infused with politics.

South Africa did not exist as a unified self-governing state until 1910. Indeed, before the discovery of minerals—diamonds and gold—in the late nineteenth century, the emer- gence of such a country appeared unlikely because the early

history of the subcontinent was marked by economic and political fragmentation. Black African settlement of southern

Africa, which archaeologists have dated back to thousands of

years before the arrival of whites, produced a great number of

African societies that ruled much of what we now know as South Africa until the latter half of the nineteenth century.

White settlement, beginning in the seventeenth century, was

confined primarily to a small area of the southwestern coast

throughout the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.

Slaves imported from outside southern Africa were the colonists' laborers. White settlers expanded into the interior and

along the southeastern coast in the middle of the nineteenth

century, but they usually skirted areas heavily populated by

Africans. Moreover, the white settlers in the interior—Afrikaners, as they became known at the end of the nineteenth cen- tury—engaged in the same cattle-farming and hunting

activities as their African neighbors. Although African and Afri3
South Africa: A Country Study

kaner often competed—for pastureland and game—a balance

of power prevented one from conquering the other.

Mineral discoveries in the 1860s and 1880s revolutionized

the economic and political settings. Diamonds and gold fueled

economic growth in southern Africa, creating both new market

opportunities and a great demand for labor. To meet these

labor needs, the British conquered most of the African peoples

of the region in a rapid series of campaigns in the 1870s and

1880s and subjected the defeated people to controls that persisted practically to the present day: pass laws regulating the

movement of people within urban areas and between urban

and rural areas; discriminatory legal treatment of blacks compared with whites; and the establishment of "locations," for

rural Africans, that were much smaller than the original landholdings of autonomous African societies in the nineteenth

century. When the Union of South Africa was instituted in

1910, its constitutional provisions reflected a society in which

whites had achieved a monopoly on wealth and power.

The rise of an industrial economy also brought about conflict between English-speaking whites—primarily mine owners and industrialists, and Dutch-speaking whites—mostly farmers

and impoverished urban workers, who competed for control

over African land and labor and for access to the great mineral

wealth of the country. Between 1910 and 1948, Afrikaner politicians organized and developed a powerful ethnic identity, portraying Africans as savage and threatening and building

especially upon white fears of economic competition from

cheaper black workers manipulated by unscrupulous Englishspeaking businessmen. In 1948 the Afrikaner nationalists won

control of the government and implemented apartheid (apart- ness—see Glossary), a policy that reinforced existing segregationist practices securing white supremacy but that also aimed

at ensuring Afrikaner domination of political power.

After 1948, black Africans, "coloureds" (mixed-race—see

Glossary), and Asians fought against Afrikaner domination and

white supremacy, denying the apartheid dictum that South

Africa is a white man's country in which other races should find

economic and political autonomy within their own geographically separated communities. Peaceful and violent protests

alternated with periods of official repression, but during fortyfive years of apartheid, the boundaries the Afrikaners had con- structed to ensure their own survival proved intolerable for

them as well as for other racial groups. Apartheid bred a cli4
Historical Setting

mate of intolerance that was repugnant to many people of all races and a social system that turned out to be an economic

disaster. The deliberately inferior living conditions and opportunities for a majority of citizens fueled frustration with government, deprived South Africa of a significant domestic market,

and made it a pariah among civilized states. By the fourth

decade of apartheid, the pressures for reform both from within

South Africa and elsewhere, the growing realization that the

system was intolerable, and the crumbling economy emboldened political leaders on all sides to take steps to dismantle

apartheid.

Nelson (Rolihlahla) Mandela, South Africa's most popular

anti-apartheid leader, had witnessed the rise and decline of

apartheid firsthand. In the mid-1980s, after more than twenty

years in prison for opposing apartheid, he assumed a central

role in helping to end it. Government and opposition leaders

met for talks—tentative ones at first, and then with greater con- fidence and amid more publicity—and they agreed on a general approach to political reform. Four years of difficult and

uneven progress, amid escalating violence and competing

political pressures, finally paid off in 1994, when South Africa

held its first multiracial democratic elections. And while both

sides could claim some of the success in achieving this historic

goal, both sides also faced even greater challenges in trying to establish a stable multiracial society in the decades ahead.

Southern African Societies to ca. 1600

The Earliest South Africans

The oldest evidence in the world documenting the emergence of humankind has been found in South Africa; fossils of

the earliest hominids (Australopithecus africanus) date back at

least 2.5 million years, and remains linked to modern Homo

sapiens date back more than 50,000 years. Roughly 20,000

years ago, South Africa, still in the grip of the world's last Ice Age, was occupied by people now known as San. Remnants of

San communities still survive today as so-called Bushmen (now

considered a pejorative term) in the Kalahari Desert. The San,

who developed their society over thousands of years in isolation, speak a language that includes unique "click" consonants,

are smaller statured, and have lighter skin pigmentation than

the Bantu (see Glossary) speakers who later moved into south- ern Africa. However, older notions that such differences indi5
South Africa: A Country Study

cate that San are a distinct "race" of people have now been

discredited and replaced by arguments that all the black inhabitants of South Africa are closely related, sharing a common

gene pool, and that any physical differences among them can

be attributed to geographical distribution and extent of contact rather than to race. San obtained a livelihood from often difficult environments

by gathering edible plants, berries, and shellfish; by hunting

game; and by fishing. Gathering was primarily the task of

women, who provided approximately 80 percent of the foodstuffs consumed by the hunter-gatherer communities. Men

hunted, made tools and weapons from wood and stone, produced clothing from animal hides, and fashioned a remarkable

array of musical instruments. San also created vast numbers of

rock paintings—South Africa contains the bulk of the world's

prehistoric art still extant—which express an extraordinary

esthetic sensibility and document San hunting techniques and

religious beliefs. The rock paintings also demonstrate that considerable interaction took place among hunter-gatherer communities throughout southern Africa.

The primary social unit among the San was the nuclear family. Families joined together to form hunter-gatherer bands of

about twenty to fifty people. Men and women had equal status in these groups and there was no development of a hereditary

chiefship, although the male head of the main family usually

took a leading role in decision making. Such bands moved

about the countryside seeking foodstuffs, sometimes remaining for long periods in particularly productive environments,

sometimes splitting apart and joining other groups when food

was scarce. Because they made such limited demands on their

environment, San managed to provide a living for themselves

for thousands of years. Population numbers did remain small,

however, and settlement was generally sparse. Approximately 2,500 years ago, some San in the northern

parts of present-day Botswana acquired fat-tailed sheep and

long-horned cattle, perhaps through trade with people from

the north and the east, and became pastoralists. Their descendants, called "Hottentots" by early Dutch settlers, are now more

accurately termed Khoikhoi, "men of men," or Khoi, in their

own language. Although Europeans often considered San and

Khoikhoi distinct races culturally and physically, scholars now

think they are essentially the same people, distinguished only

by their occupations. Differences in size—Khoikhoi are gener6
Historical Setting

ally taller than San—are now attributed to the greater protein

intake of pastoralists. Moreover, occupational status could

often change in an individual's lifetime: San hunter-gatherers

who found a particularly well-watered and fertile area might

well acquire livestock through trade, settle down, and become

relatively sedentary Khoikhoi pastoralists; pastoralists in times

of drought or other ecological disaster might turn to hunting

and gathering to survive.

Because the southern Cape is fertile and well-watered, many

Khoikhoi settled along the coast between the Orange River and

the Great Fish River. With the greater and more regular supplies of food that they derived from their herds, Khoikhoi lived

in larger settlements than those of the San, often numbering

several hundred people in a single community. Still, as pastoralists, Khoikhoi moved with the seasons among coasts, valleys,

and mountains in search of pastureland. Such movement contributed to the fissiparous nature of Khoikhoi society, in which

groups of people, usually in patrilineally related clans, periodically broke away and formed their own communities. The

larger size of Khoikhoi communities as compared with those of

the San did, however, lead to the development of more hierarchical political structures. A Khoikhoi group was generally presided over by a khoeque (rich man). The khoeque was not an

autocrat, but rather could only exercise power in consultation

with other male elders.

The Khoikhoi engaged in extensive trade with other peoples

in southern Africa. In exchange for their sheep and cattle, they

acquired copper from the north and iron from Bantu-speaking

Africans in the east and fashioned these metals into tools,

weapons, and ornaments. They also acquired dagga (cannabis)

from the coast of what is modern-day Mozambique, cultivated

it themselves, and traded it for other goods. With San, too, they

bartered sheep and cattle products for game and hides.

By 1600 most of the Khoikhoi, numbering perhaps 50,000

people, lived along the southwest coast of the Cape. Most San,

their numbers practically impossible to determine, lived in

drier areas west of the 400-millimeter rainfall line (the limit for

cultivation), including present-day Northern Cape province,

Botswana, Namibia, and southern Angola (see fig. 2).

The Arrival of Bantu-Speaking Africans

Bantu-speaking Africans, whose descendants make up the

overwhelming majority of the present-day inhabitants of South

7
South Africa: A Country Study

Figure 2. 400-millimeter Rainfall Line

Africa, had moved south of the Limpopo River by about 1,500

years ago. Farmers who combined knowledge of cattle-keeping

and slash-and-burn (swidden) cultivation with expertise in

metal-working, the Bantu speakers came from West Central

Africa north of the Congo River near present-day Cameroon.

Historians and archaeologists now argue that this movement

took place not in any single great migration but rather in a slow

southward shift of people throughout sub-Saharan Africa that

resulted from the gradual drying up of the Sahara beginning

about 8,000 years ago. The southward movement involved not

the conquering hordes previously imagined but rather a moving frontier of farmers seeking new fields and pastures who

interacted with pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, sometimes

trading, sometimes incorporating people in client relation8
Historical Setting

ships, sometimes fighting for access to the same crucial

resources. The farmers settled throughout southern Africa east of the 400-millimeter rainfall line and as far as the southwest- ern limits of cropping along the Great Kei River.

The Bantu-speaking farmers chose to minimize risks rather

than to maximize production in their use of the environment.

They kept large herds of cattle and invested these animals with

great material and symbolic value. Cattle provided a means to acquire and to display considerable wealth, and they were used

for significant social and political transactions, such as bridewealth compensation (lobola) and tribute demands. Cattle were also valued for their milk and for their hides, but they were seldom killed for their meat except on ceremonial occasions. Hunting of game continued to provide a major source of

protein, while additional supplies came from domesticated

goats and sheep. Bantu speakers also cultivated a range of

indigenous crops, including millet, sorghum, beans, and mel- ons along with other grains and vegetables. Those close to the sea collected shellfish and fished. By utilizing such a great

range of food sources, the farmers spread their risks in a diffi- cult ecological system constantly subject to drought, disease,

and crop failure.

Still, the accumulation of large herds and the cultivation of

extensive fields produced greater concentrations of population

and considerably more stratification among Bantu speakers

than among their San and Khoikhoi neighbors. Archaeologists

have found evidence of settlements established more than

1,400 years ago comprising several thousand people each.

Toutswe, in eastern Botswana, consisted of a series of communities built on large flat-topped hills with fields cultivated below

and cattle pastured locally. The residents smelted iron and

engaged in extensive trade with people as far east as the Indian

Ocean. Similar large communities emerged at least 1,000 years

ago just south of the Limpopo River where Bambandyanalo

and then Mapungubwe arose as significant early states (both

situated at the intersection of the present-day borders of

Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa). Cultivating extensive

fields and holding large numbers of cattle, the residents of

these states also produced finely worked gold and copper orna- ments, hunted for ivory, and engaged in extensive long-distance trade. They were generally presided over by chiefs who

held considerable—although never total—power; elders always

had to be consulted about major decisions. Compared with the

9
South Africa: A Country Study

smaller-scale communities of San and Khoikhoi, the Bantuspeaking societies were marked by greater degrees of stratifica- tion: of old over young, men over women, rich over poor, and

chiefs over commoners.

There were, however, significant differences between the set- tlement patterns and the degree of political centralization

established by Bantu speakers who settled inland and by those

who lived closer to the coast. The inland Bantu speakers,

termed Sotho-Tswana on the basis of their dialects, concentrated in greater numbers around water sources and trading

towns. By the late sixteenth century, a series of powerful hereditary chiefs ruled over the society known as the Rolong, whose

capital was Taung. The capital and several other towns, centers

of cultivation and livestock raising as well as major trading communities, had populations of 15,000 to 20,000. By contrast, the

Bantu-speakers termed Nguni, who settled on the coastal plains

between the Highveld (see Glossary) and the Indian Ocean,

lived in much smaller communities and had less hierarchical

political structures. Moving their cattle often in search of fresh

pastureland, they lived in small communities scattered across the countryside. In many cases, a community identified itself on the basis of descent from some ancestral founder, as did the

Zulu and the Xhosa. Such communities could sometimes grow

to a few thousand people, as did the Xhosa, the Mpondo, the

Mthethwa, and others, but they were usually far smaller.

By 1600 all of what is now South Africa had been settled: by

Khoisan peoples in the west and the southwest, by SothoTswana in the Highveld, and by Nguni along the coastal plains.

Portuguese travelers and sailors shipwrecked along the coast in

the seventeenth century reported seeing great concentrations

of people living in apparent prosperity.

Early European Settlement

Origins of Settlement

Portuguese mariners explored the west coast of Africa

throughout the latter half of the fifteenth century. Two ships

under Bartholomeu Dias eventually rounded the Cape of Good

Hope in 1488 and traveled more than 600 kilometers along the

southwestern coast. In 1497 an expedition under Vasco da

Gama rounded the Cape, sailed up the east African coast to the

Arab port of Malindi (in present-day Kenya), and then crossed

the Indian Ocean to India, thereby opening up a way for Euro10
Monument to Portuguese

navigator Bartholemeu Bias,

who sailed around the Cape

of Good Hope in 1488

Courtesy Embassy of South

Africa, Washington

peans to gain direct access to the spices of the East without having to go through Arab middlemen. The Portuguese

dominated this trade route throughout the sixteenth century.

They built forts and supply stations along the west and east African coasts, but they did not build south of present-day

Angola and Mozambique because of the treacherous currents

along the southern coast. At the end of the sixteenth century

and in the early seventeenth century, English and Dutch merchants challenged the Portuguese monopoly in West Africa

and Asia and saw the Cape peninsula as a source of fresh water,

meat, and timber for masts, all of which they could obtain

through trade with the local Khoikhoi. The English government refused its mariners' requests that it annex land there

and establish a base, but in 1652 the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie—VOC) established

a supply station in Table Bay on the Cape peninsula, instructing its station commander, Jan van Riebeeck, and his eighty

company employees to build a fort and to obtain supplies of

foodstuffs for the Dutch fleets. Establishing a Slave Economy

The VOC's directors intended that the settlement at Table

Bay should amount to no more than a small supply station able

11
South Africa: A Country Study

largely to pay for itself. European settlement was to be limited

to VOC employees only, and their numbers were to be kept as small as possible. Company ships could stop to take on water, to get supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables grown by VOC

employees, and to trade for fresh meat and milk from the local

Khoikhoi. The Khoikhoi were also expected to supply the labor

needs of the settlement—building wharves and warehouses,

putting up offices, and laying out roads. Within its first half

decade, however, the Cape Colony was growing in ways unfore- seen at its establishment. Most Khoikhoi chose not to labor for

the Dutch because of low wages and harsh conditions; and,

although ready initially to trade with the Dutch, they became

increasingly unwilling to sell their farm products at the prices

offered by the VOC. As a result, three processes were set in

motion in the 1650s that were to produce a rapidly expanding,

racially stratified society. First, the VOC decided to import

slaves to meet local labor needs, and it maintained that policy

for more than 100 years. Second, the VOC decided to free

some of its employees from their contracts and to allow them

to establish farms of their own to supply the Dutch fleets,

thereby giving rise to a local settler population. Third, to supply the needs of the fleets as well as of the growing local population, the Dutch expanded ever farther into the lands of the

Khoikhoi, engaging in a series of wars that, together with the

effects of imported diseases, decimated the indigenous population.

Van Riebeeck had concluded within two months of the

establishment of the Cape settlement that slave labor would be

needed for the hardest and dirtiest work. Some thought was

given to enslaving Khoikhoi men, but the idea was rejected on

the grounds that such a policy would be both costly and dangerous. With a European population that did not exceed 200

during the settlement's first five years, war against neighbors

numbering more than 20,000 would have been foolhardy.

Moreover, the Dutch feared that Khoikhoi people, if enslaved,

could always escape into the local community, whereas foreigners would find it much more difficult to elude their "masters." Between 1652 and 1657, a number of unsuccessful attempts were made to obtain men from the Dutch East Indies and from

Mauritius. In 1658, however, the VOC landed two shiploads of

slaves at the Cape, one containing more than 200 people

brought from Dahomey (later Benin), the second with almost

200 people, most of them children, captured from a Portu12
Historical Setting

guese slaver off the coast of Angola. Except for a few individuals, these were to be the only slaves ever brought to the Cape

from West Africa. Thereafter, all the slaves imported into the

Cape until the British stopped the trade in 1807 were from East

Africa, Mozambique, Madagascar, and South and Southeast

Asia. Large numbers were brought from India, Ceylon, and the

Indonesian archipelago. Prisoners from other countries in the

VOC's empire were also enslaved. The slave population, which

exceeded that of the European settlers until the first quarter of

the nineteenth century, was overwhelmingly male and was thus

dependent on constant imports of new slaves to maintain and

to augment its size. Emergence of a Settler Society

In 1657 nine European men were released from the VOC's

service, given the status of "free burghers," and granted blocks

of land. They were exempted from taxation for twelve years,

but the VOC held a mortgage on their lands. They were free to trade with Khoikhoi for sheep and cattle, but they were prohibited from paying higher prices for the stock than did the VOC,

and they were told not to enslave the local pastoralists. They

were encouraged to grow crops, especially grains, for sale to the VOC, but they were not allowed to produce anything

already grown in the company's own gardens. By such measures, the VOC hoped not only to increase local production

and thereby to pay the costs of the settlement, but also to prevent any private producers from undercutting the VOC's control over prices.

Conflict between Dutch farmers and Khoikhoi broke out once it became clear to the latter that the Dutch were there to

stay and that they intended to encroach on the lands of the pastoralists. In 1659 Doman, a Khoikhoi who had worked as a

translator for the Dutch and had even traveled to Java, led an armed attempt to expel the Dutch from the Cape peninsula.

The attempt was a failure, although warfare dragged on until an inconclusive peace was established a year later. During the

following decade, pressure on the Khoikhoi grew as more of

the Dutch became free burghers, expanded their landholdings, and sought pastureland for their growing herds. War

broke out again in 1673 and continued until 1677, when

Khoikhoi resistance was destroyed by a combination of superior European weapons and Dutch manipulation of divisions

among the local people. Thereafter, Khoikhoi society in the

13
South Africa: A Country Study

western Cape disintegrated. Some people found jobs as shepherds on European farms; others rejected foreign rule and

moved away from the Cape. The final blow for most came in

1713 when a Dutch ship brought smallpox to the Cape. Hitherto unknown locally, the disease ravaged the remaining

Khoikhoi, killing 90 percent of the population.

The community at Table Bay grew larger and more diverse

throughout the late 1600s, particularly after the VOC decided

in 1679 that European settlement should be boosted in order

to expand agricultural production. German and Dutch settlers were offered free farms if they would come to the Cape. In

1688 several hundred Huguenots fleeing persecution by the

French were offered free passage to the Cape and grants of

land. These settlers, all of whom soon assimilated Dutch culture and language, grew large crops of wheat as well as other

grains for sale to the VOC, although they found such crops

barely profitable. They also planted grapevines, so that they

could make wine and brandy—products much in demand for

Dutch sailors and capable of being exported to Europe, unlike

other, perishable items. The mainstay of most settlers, however, was livestock farming, which required large areas of pastureland because the soil was generally poor. By the end of the century, pressures for land in and around the Cape peninsula had

become intense. There were approximately 1,500 Europeans in

the Cape settlement and a slightly larger number of slaves, and

the area of settlement had extended well beyond the original

base at Table Bay to include freehold farms reaching sixty kilometers inland.

The rise of an expanding settler society fueled tensions

between free burghers and the VOC. Free burghers criticized

the autocratic powers of the local VOC administration, in

which the governor had full control and the settlers had no

rights of representation. They denounced the economic policies of the VOC that fixed the prices at which settlers could sell their agricultural products. They called attention to the cor- rupt practices of VOC officers, who granted themselves prime

land and then sold their own crops at higher prices to the company. Above all, they complained about the VOC's failure—at least in their eyes—to police the frontier boundaries and to protect the settlers' crops and herds from Khoikhoi and San

raiders.

Trekboers (semi-migrant farmers of primarily Dutch, German, and French ancestry; more commonly known as Boers

14
Historical Setting

see Glossary) played a key role in the eighteenth century in the

expansion of the settlement and in the growth of frontier conflict. With much of the better land close to the Cape in the

hands of VOC officials and rich burghers, poorer whites sought

to make a living beyond the boundaries of the settlement. Traveling by wagon inland and along the southwestern coast, individual farmers, along with their immediate families (if any), a few slaves, several Khoikhoi herdsmen, and small numbers of

livestock, set out to establish farms on large tracts of land (averaging 2,500 hectares) granted on loan by the VOC (see fig. 3).

Because much of this land was already occupied by Khoikhoi

pastoralists near the coast and by San hunter-gatherers in the

interior, considerable warfare resulted. Trekboers raided the

herds of the Khoikhoi and seized control of the springs on

which pastoralists and hunter-gatherers alike depended for

water, while Khoikhoi and San counterraided the herds of the

Trekboers.

In the face of burgher agitation, growing frontier conflict,

and increasing overproduction of agricultural goods for the

local market, the VOC in 1717 attempted to limit the growth of

European settlement. It stopped all assisted immigration of

Europeans and decided that thereafter only slaves should be

used in the future development of the settlement. Moreover, it ended the granting of freehold title to land, although it did

continue to make farms available on loan.

Such measures had only a limited impact on the growth of

the settlement. Throughout the eighteenth century, the settle- ment continued to expand through internal growth of the

European population and the continued importation of slaves. The approximately 3,000 Europeans and slaves at the Cape in

1700 had increased by the end of the century to nearly 20,000

Europeans, almost 25,000 slaves, and another 15,000 Khoikhoi

and mixed-race people living within the boundaries of the set- tlement.

In the west, the economy was dominated by the bustling port

at Table Bay and the wheat farms and vineyards of Stellenbosch

and Swellendam, which depended almost totally on slave labor.

Politically, the VOC governor continued to be in firm control,

although a number of wealthy burghers exercised considerable

informal influence. Socially, the community was marked by

considerable stratification and diversity. Most wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few company officials and a minority of burghers. The majority of Europeans earned a living as

15
South Africa: A Country Study

1798

Port Elizabeth CAPE OF

GOOD HOPE

Dutch, 1652-1 795, 1803-6;

British, 1795-1803, 1806 onward.

Boundary of Cape Colony

• Trekboer migration Populated place 100 200 Kilometers 100 200 Miles

Source: Based on information from Michael Kwamena-Poh et al., African History in Maps, Essex, United Kingdom, 1982, 25-27, 42-43; and Leonard Thompson,

A History ofSouth Africa, New Haven, 1995, 89. Figure 3. European Expansion, 1652-1848

artisans, traders, and innkeepers, although almost all whites

owned at least one or two slaves. A small community of mixedrace people had also emerged, the offspring of relationships

among whites, Khoikhoi, Asians, and African slaves. In the eastern areas of the Cape, beyond the Cape Colony

itself, Trekboers predominated with their extensive pastoral

economy. Most owned some slaves, but they depended more

on Khoikhoi and San to meet their labor needs. Although

nominally under the jurisdiction of the VOC, the Trekboers

largely ruled themselves. They did not believe that Khoikhoi

and San should be treated equally with Europeans in the

courts, and they established harsh labor regimes on their

farms. To deal with frontier problems, they periodically raised

16
Historical Setting

armed bands of men to protect their herds and to carry out

punitive expeditions against Khoikhoi and San. They developed a consciousness of themselves as a distinct community set- tled permanently in South Africa and, unlike the employees of

the VOC, they did not plan to return to Europe.

By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, both western

and eastern areas of the Cape were undergoing a period of

stress. Continued overproduction for the local market in the

west and resulting economic hardship led burghers to identify

the VOC as the source of all their problems. The discontents of

the Trekboers were even greater. Their continuing expansion* was blocked by a number of barriers: by aridity 500 kilometers

north of the Cape peninsula, by hunter-gatherer raiders in the

northeast, and, most important, by large numbers of Bantuspeaking farmers (Xhosa) settled roughly 700 kilometers to the east of Cape Town and just south of the Great Fish River.

Throughout much of the eighteenth century, Xhosa and Trekboers had peacefully traded with one another, with the Dutch

exchanging glass beads, nails, and other manufactured items

for African cattle and ivory. By the late 1770s, however, tensions rose as Xhosa farmers were expanding west of the Great Fish

River at the same time that the Trekboers were moving east- ward.

Demand for the same resources—land and water—brought

Trekboers and Xhosa into conflict, and a series of frontier wars erupted in 1779 to 1781, and in 1793. In the second war, the

Xhosa avenged their defeat in the first. Their capture of thousands of head of Boer cattle and their occupation of large areas of land previously claimed by the Dutch were officially recognized and accepted by a local representative of the VOC.

Enraged by what they considered the treachery of the company, Trekboers in Graaff-Reinet rebelled in 1795, expelling

the VOC magistrate and proclaiming an independent republic.

This attempt at autonomy ended, however, with the British

takeover of the Cape settlement in 1795.

Fearing that the strategic port at Table Bay might fall into

the hands of Napoleon, the British seized the Cape to defend

their sea route to India. They sent troops to the eastern Cape

to prevent Boer insurrection and to establish order on the

frontier, but they made no attempt to extend the boundaries of

the settlement. Like the VOC before them, the British

intended that the Cape settlement should remain as small as possible. Its value lay in its strategic position, not in its produc17
South Africa: A Country Study

tion. Moreover, the British had no wish to become embroiled

in costly local struggles between European settlers and African

farmers in the interior.

In 1802 the Treaty of Amiens, which ended a decade of

upheaval in Europe, called for the return of the Cape Colony

to Dutch control. This was accomplished in 1803, but the

Dutch Batavian Republic in Europe had done little to implement this claim when the treaty began to break down in 1805.

Britain again seized control of the Cape in 1806 and defied

Dutch claims by occupying and expanding its presence in the

Cape region. Finally, in 1814 the former Batavian Republic

the Kingdom of Holland—agreed to abandon its claim to the

Cape in return for a grant of roughly 2 million British pounds.

The Rise of African States

By the eighteenth century, several groups of immigrants

from the north, known for their skill in smelting iron and in

metalworking, had occupied the mountains along the Limpopo River (see fig. 4). This heterogeneous population had

coalesced into a number of chiefdoms, known as the Venda, or VaVenda. In the southern Highveld, the powerful Tswanaspeaking kingdom known as the Rolong had split, giving rise to the Tlhaping (BaTlhaping) and the Taung. The Taung were named for a legendary military leader (Tau) among the

Rolong.

One of several Khoisan-European populations in the interior in the eighteenth century was that of the Griqua, most of

whom spoke Dutch as their first language and had adopted

Christianity. A unique Griqua culture emerged, based on hunting, herding, and trade with both Africans and Europeans

along the Orange River.

The Xhosa and related groups were the westernmost of the

Nguni-speaking societies between the southern Highveld and

the coast. Rivalries among Xhosa chiefs were common, however, and their society was weakened by repeated clashes with

Europeans, especially over land between the Sundays River and

the Great Fish River. By the late eighteenth century, the

Ndwandwe, Mthethwa, and Ngwane were emerging as powerful kingdoms south of the Highveld. The Zulu were still a small

group among the Mthethwa and had not yet begun the conquest and assimilation of neighboring groups that would characterize much of the early nineteenth century.

18
Historical Setting

Background to the Mfecane

A combination of local factors—population growth, the

depletion of natural resources, and devastating drought and

famine—led to revolutionary changes in the political, eco- nomic, and social structure of Bantu-speaking communities in

southern Africa in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Thousands of people died because of ecological catastrophe

and warfare; thousands more were displaced. Large centralized

states of tens of thousands of people with standing armies of up

to 40,000 men and autocratic leaders emerged where before

there had been only small-scale political entities and no chief

had had total power. This period of revolutionary change

known as the mfecane (or crushing—see Glossary) by the Zulu

and the difaqane (see Glossary) by the Sotho—is also often

referred to as "the time of troubles" (see fig. 5).

The causes of the mfecane were emerging by the end of the

eighteenth century, when population levels increased rapidly,

and ecological resources were sometimes scarce. Communities

that previously had often spread across the countryside or had

repeatedly divided and moved along the frontier became more

settled and more concentrated. The introduction of corn from

the Americas through the Portuguese in Mozambique was one

major reason for this trend. Corn produced more food than

indigenous grasses on the same land, and thus could sustain a

larger population. Trade in ivory with the Portuguese in Delagoa Bay was another factor that induced people to settle just

south of Mozambique. Moreover, possibilities for population

movement had become much more limited by the end of the

eighteenth century because land was in short supply. Bantuspeaking farmers had reached the margins of arable land on

the edge of the Kalahari Desert in the northwest and in the

mountains on the southern border of the Highveld, and people settling in the area found their access to water more and

more limited.

Declining rainfall in the last decades of the eighteenth century, followed by a calamitous ten-year drought that began

about 1800, caused massive disruption and suffering. The

adoption of corn as a major staple gave this drought an even

greater impact than those of the past because corn needed

much more water than local grains in order to produce. When

the rains failed, therefore, the effect was devastating. People

fought one another for meager supplies of grain and cattle,

hunted down whatever game they could find, and sought out

19
South Africa: A Country Study

100 200 Miles

Source: Based on information from Kevin Shillington, History ofSouthern Africa, London, 1987, 16; and Reader's Digest Association, Reader's Digest Illustrated History ofSouth Africa, Pleasantville, New York, 1989, 63. Figure 4. Major African Ethnic Groups, Eighteenth Century

any remaining water supplies in a desperate attempt to survive.

Warfare erupted, and two kingdoms—the Ndwandwe under

the leadership of Zwide, and the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo—battled for control of resources. Both kingdoms

became more centralized and militarized, their young men

banded together in age regiments that became the basis for

standing armies, and their kings became more autocratic as they fought for survival. The Ndwandwe appeared victorious in

1818 when Dingiswayo was killed and his forces scattered, but

they were soon overcome by Shaka, founder of the Zulu state. Shaka and the Rise of the Zulu State

Shaka Zulu was born in 1787, the illegitimate son of Senzan20
Historical Setting

gakona, chief of the Zulu clan. An outcast as a child, Shaka was brought up among a number of neighboring groups, finally

ending with the Mthethwa where he distinguished himself as a skilled warrior in Dingiswayo's army. Dingiswayo was so impressed by Shaka that in 1816 he helped him become chief

of the Zulu upon the death of Senzangakona. Among the Zulu,

Shaka consolidated a number of military innovations—some

developed by Dingiswayo, some dating back to the eighteenth

century—to produce a powerful military machine. All young

men were incorporated into age regiments and given military

training. A short stabbing spear was introduced in addition to the traditional long throwing spears, giving Shaka's army an

advantage in close combat. Military strategies, such as the

"horn" formation by which Zulu regiments encircled their enemies, were perfected. When Dingiswayo was killed, Shaka with

his military machine avenged his mentor's death, destroying

the Ndwandwe in battle (two of Zwide's generals, Shoshangane

and Zwangendaba, fled north and established kingdoms in

present-day Mozambique and southern Tanzania, respectively).

Shaka then incorporated the Mthethwa under his rule, and

established the Zulu state as the dominant power among the

northern Nguni.

By the mid-1 820s, Shaka ruled a kingdom of more than

100,000 people with a standing army of 40,000 men. He centralized power in the person of the king and his court, collected tribute from regional chiefs, and placed regiments

throughout his state to ensure compliance with his orders.

These regiments also looked after the royal herds and carried

out public works. Women, too, were incorporated into their

own age regiments, which were paired with male regiments to provide food and other services for the soldiers. Shaka forbade

members of these regiments to marry, however, until they had

completed their military service. For men this meant their late

thirties, and for women their late twenties. Only after marriage

could men and women leave their regiments and set up their

own homesteads.

Shaka fostered a new national identity by stressing the Zulu- ness of the state. All subjects of the state became Zulu and

owed the king their personal allegiance. Zulu traditions of origin became the national traditions of the state. Customary

Nguni festivals, such as planting and harvest celebrations,

became occasions on which Shaka gathered vast numbers of

his people and extolled the virtues of the state. Through such

21
South Africa: A Country Study

Boundary of Zulu heartland Boundary of Shaka's war zone

Chiefdom or clan migration • Populated place 100 200 Kilometers 100 200 Miles

Source: Based on information from Michael Kwamena-Poh et al., African History in Maps, Essex, United Kingdom, 1982, 36-37; Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa, New Haven, 1995, 82; and Reader's Digest Association, leader's

Digest Illustrated History of South Africa, Pleasantville, New York, 1989, 91.

Figure 5. The Mfecane, 1817-28

means, Shaka developed a Zulu consciousness that transcended the original identities and lineages of the various peoples who were his subjects.

During most of the 1820s, Shaka consolidated his power

through a series of wars against neighboring peoples. His

armies raided for cattle and food; they attacked any who challenged the authority of the Zulu monarch; and they extended

the limits of Shaka's realm north to the borders of present-day

Mozambique, west across the Drakensberg Mountains, and

south to the margins of the area that would later become the

Transkei homeland. He also welcomed British traders to his

kingdom and sent diplomatic emissaries to the British king.

22
Historical Setting

Shaka was assassinated at the height of his powers in 1828

and was succeeded by Dingane, his half-brother and one of the

assassins. Dingane was a much less accomplished ruler than the

founder of the Zulu state. His weak claim to the throne and his

constant fear of assassination made him a despotic ruler. Dingane maintained the centralized and militarized organization

of the Zulu state and sent his armies out on raiding missions.

Victories, however, were few because of the growing strength of

neighboring African kingdoms, and by the end of the 1830s

Dingane's hold on power was being challenged by internal dis- content and external threats.

Swazi, Sotho, and Ndebele States

Indeed, as a result of the mfecane, a series of states formed

throughout southern Africa as people banded together to secure access to foodstuffs and to protect themselves from Zulu

marauders. Sobhuza, leader of the Ngwane people to the north

of the Zulu, built a defensive state that eventually took the

name of his son and heir Mswati to form the basis of the modern Swazi nation, Swaziland. Sobhuza secured the boundaries

of his state through a combination of diplomacy and force. He

negotiated marriage alliances with Ndwandwe and later Zulu

chiefs and cemented similar arrangements with his own chiefs.

He paid tribute to the Zulu kings when he thought it necessary,

but he also built a powerful army with which the Swazi were

able to repel Dingane's incursions in the 1830s.

Moshoeshoe, another contemporary (b. 1786) of Shaka,

forged a strong Sotho kingdom on the southern Highveld in

the 1820s and 1830s. This kingdom became the foundation for

the modern state of Lesotho. Moshoeshoe, seeking in the

1820s to protect his people from the worst ravages of the

difaqane, fortified a large mesa, Thaba Bosiu, that proved

impregnable to attack for decades thereafter. With this natural

fortress as his base, he built a large kingdom, welcomed in particular refugees from famine and wars elsewhere, and provided

them with food and shelter. These refugees, once incorporated

into the state, were considered Sotho like their hosts; thus, as with the Zulu, ever larger numbers were integrated into a group with a consolidated ethnic identity, a practice that furthered the process of nation building. Moshoeshoe also sought

to strengthen his kingdom militarily, especially by acquiring

guns and horses from the Cape. A superb diplomat, he sought

to maintain cordial relations with all his neighbors, even paying

23
South Africa: A Country Study

tribute on occasion to Shaka and seeking always to avoid war. Believing that they could act as emissaries on his behalf to the

intruding European powers while also teaching his children to read and write, he welcomed French Protestant missionaries.

By the mid-1830s, Moshoeshoe's kingdom comprised about

30,000 people and was the largest state on the southern Highveld.

A fourth major African state formed in South Africa during

the 1820s and 1830s was the Ndebele state ruled by Mzilikazi.

Mzilikazi had been a subject chief of Shaka, but in 1821 he had

sought to demonstrate his independence by refusing to send

tribute cattle to the king. Fleeing from a punitive force sent by

Shaka, Mzilikazi and a few hundred followers crossed the Drakensberg Mountains and established a series of armed settle- ments on the Highveld. Raiding for cattle and grain and

forcibly incorporating Sotho-Tswana people into his forces,

Mzilikazi built a powerful kingdom in the 1830s near presentdayJohannesburg and Pretoria.

Although the mfecane in many ways promoted the political

development of southern Africa, it also caused great suffering.

Thousands died because of famine and warfare, and thousands

more were uprooted from their homes and were forced to

travel great distances, many to become refugee laborers in the

Cape who sought work at any wage. Perhaps the most significant result in terms of the future was that large areas of South

Africa were temporarily depopulated, making it seem to Europeans that there were unclaimed lands in the interior into

which they could expand.

The Expansion of European Settlement

British Colonialism

The British adopted contradictory policies in ruling their

newly acquired Cape Colony in the first three decades of the

nineteenth century. Having seized the Cape from the VOC in

1795, the British returned the colony to the Dutch government

in 1803 when peace had been concluded with the French. In

1806, however, with the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, the

British again took the Cape in order to protect the sea route to their Asian empire. Like the VOC before them, the British

tried to keep the costs low and the settlement small. Local offi- cials continued the policy of relying on imported slave labor

rather than encouraging European immigration with the lat24
Historical Setting

ter's implication of permanent and expanding settlement.

They also introduced racially discriminatory legislation to force

Khoikhoi and other so-called "free" blacks to work for as little as possible. The Hottentot Code of 1809 required that all Khoikhoi and other free blacks carry passes stating where they

lived and who their employers were. Persons without such

passes could be forced into employment by white masters. The British attempted to alleviate the land problems of

Boers in the eastern Cape by sending imperial armies against

the Xhosa of the Zuurveld (literally, "sour grassland," the

southernmost area of Bantu-speaking settlement, located

between the Sundays River and the Great Fish River). They

attacked the Xhosa from 1799 to 1803, from 1811 to 1812, and

again from 1818 to 1819, when at last, through ruthless warfare, they succeeded in expelling the Africans into the area north of the Great Fish River. Thereafter, the British sought to create a fixed frontier by settling 5,000 British-assisted immigrants on smallholder farms created out of land seized from

the Xhosa south of the Great Fish River and by clearing all lands between the Great Fish River and the Keiskama River of

all forms of African settlement.

But other policies and developments worked against these measures. In 1807 Parliament in London ordered an end to British participation in the slave trade everywhere in the world.

This decision threatened the basis of the Cape's labor supply,

for farmers in the eastern areas as well as in the west.

British missionaries, who were active in South Africa for the

first time in the 1810s and who had a sympathetic audience in

Britain, condemned the cruel labor practices often adopted by

Trekboers against their slave and Khoikhoi workers and

decried the discriminatory provisions of the Hottentot Code.

Although British officials did not rescind the legislation, they

did respond to this criticism by establishing a circuit court to monitor conditions in the western Cape. This court offended

many Boer sensibilities by giving equal weight to the evidence

of "servants" and "masters," black and white alike. The British

also raised a force of colonial police, including Khoikhoi regulars, to enforce the court's authority. In 1815 a Dutch-speaking

Afrikaner farmer who refused to answer a court summons for

mistreating a Khoikhoi employee was shot dead while resisting

arrest. Relatives and neighbors rose in what became known as the Slachter's Nek Rebellion, but their resistance was soon

crushed, and the British hanged five of the rebels.

25
South Africa: A Country Study

British policies on the eastern frontier also engendered

growing Boer hostility. The attempt to close the frontier in

1819-20 following the defeat of the Xhosa and the importation

of British immigrants only exacerbated land shortages. British

settlers found that they could not make a living from small

farms, and they competed with the Dutch pastoralists for the

limited arable land available, thereby intensifying Boer-British

tensions.

The British government, acting largely at the behest of the

missionaries and their supporters in Britain in the 1820s, abolished the Hottentot Code. Ordinance 50 of 1828 stated that no

Khoikhoi or free black had to carry a pass or could be forced to enter a labor contract. Five years later, the British Parliament

decreed that slavery would no longer be permitted in any part

of the empire. After a four-year period of "apprenticeship," all slaves would become free persons, able, because of Ordinance

50, to sell their labor for whatever the market would bear.

Moreover, slaveowners were to receive no more than one-third

of the value of their slaves in official compensation for the loss of this property. The Boers felt further threatened when, in

1834 and 1835, British forces, attempting to put a final stop to Boer-Xhosa frontier conflict, swept across the Keiskama River

into Xhosa territory and annexed all the land up to the

Keiskama River for white settlement. In 1836, however, the British government, partly in response to missionary criticism of

the invasion, returned the newly annexed lands to the Xhosa

and sought a peace treaty with their chiefs.

The Great Trek

Dutch speakers denounced these actions as striking at the

heart of their labor and land needs. Those living in the eastern

Cape, most of them among the poorer segment of the Dutchspeaking population, were particularly impassioned in their

criticisms, and many decided to abandon their farms and to seek new lands beyond the reach of British rule.

Beginning in 1836, Boer families, together with large numbers of Khoikhoi and black servants, gathered up their belongings and traveled by ox-wagon up into the Highveld interior to the north of the eastern Cape frontier. (Travel farther east was blocked by the Xhosa.) All told, some 6,000 Boer men, women,

and children, along with an equal number of blacks, participated in this movement in the late 1830s. Fewer Boer families

migrated from the western Cape, where they were more pros26
Voortrekker monument overlooking Pretoria; its friezes depict the Great

Trek and the Battle ofBlood River. Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

perous on their grain and wine farms and therefore less con- cerned about land shortages and frontier pressures. The

exodus from the Cape was not organized in a single movement

at the time, but it was later termed the Great Trek by nationalist historians, and its participants were called Voortrekkers

(pioneers).

The first groups of Voortrekkers moved into the southern

Highveld, skirted the powerful Lesotho kingdom of Moshoeshoe to the east, and pastured their herds on lands between the

Orange River and the Vaal River. A large group moved farther

north to the grasslands beyond the Vaal River into territory

where Mzilikazi had recently established a powerful Ndebele

state. Competing for the same resources—pasturelands, water,

and game—the Voortrekkers and the Ndebele soon came into

conflict. In 1836 the Voortrekkers fought off an Ndebele

27
South Africa: A Country Study

attempt to expel them from the Highveld. In the following

year, the northern Voortrekkers allied with the Rolong and the

Griqua, who were known for their fighting skills. This time the

northern Voortrekkers succeeded in defeating Mzilikazi and

forcing him and most of his followers to flee north into

present-day Zimbabwe, where he conquered the Shona and

established a new state. The majority of Voortrekkers, however, neither settled

between the Orange and the Vaal nor trekked to the north, but

moved northeastward around Lesotho and traveled down

toward the sea into Zulu-ruled areas of southeastern Africa.

The leader of this group, Piet Retief, attempted to negotiate

with Dingane for permission to settle in relatively sparsely populated areas south of the Tugela River. Dingane was at first receptive to Retief s entreaties, but then, apparently fearing

that the introduction of European settlers would undermine

his authority, he had Retief and seventy of his followers killed

while they were at his capital in February 1838. Dingane then

sent out Zulu regiments to eliminate all Voortrekkers in the

area; they killed several hundred men, women, and children

and captured more than 35,000 head of cattle and sheep.

Not all of the settlers were killed, however, and in December

the survivors, reinforced by men from the Cape Colony,

marched 500 strong to avenge the deaths of Retief and his fol- lowers. Commanded by Andries Pretorius, the Voortrekkers

pledged that they would commemorate a victory as a sign of

divine protection. They then met and defeated Dingane's army

at the Battle of Blood River. Their victory is celebrated each

year on December 16, the Day of the Vow.

The Zulu kingdom split into warring factions after this

defeat. One group under Mpande, a half-brother of Shaka and

Dingane, allied with Pretorius and the Voortrekkers, and

together they succeeded in destroying Dingane's troops and in

forcing him to flee to the lands of the Swazi, where he was

killed. The Voortrekkers recognized Mpande as king of the

Zulu north of the Tugela River, while he in turn acknowledged

their suzerainty over both his kingdom and the state that they

established south of the Tugela. The Voortrekker Republic of

Natalia (the basis of later Natal Province) was established in

1839, and by 1842 there were approximately 6,000 people

occupying vast areas of pastureland and living under a political

system in which only white males had the right to vote.

28
Historical Setting

The British, however, feeling that their security and authority were threatened, annexed the republic as Natal. They did

not want the Dutch speakers to have independent access to the sea and thereby be able to negotiate political and economic

agreements with other European powers. They also feared that

harsh treatment meted out to Africans—such as Voortrekker

attempts to clear the land by removing Africans from the

Republic of Natalia—would eventually increase population

pressures on the eastern Cape frontier. Although acquiescing

in the annexation, the great majority of the Voortrekkers effectively abandoned Natal to the British and moved back to the

Highveld in 1843. The British, having taken Natal for strategic

purposes, then had to find a way to make the colony pay for its administration. After experimenting with several crops, they

found that sugar grew well and could be exported without

deteriorating. Attempts to force Africans to endure the oner- ous labor in the sugar fields failed, however, and in 1860 the

British began importing indentured laborers from India to provide the basic work force. Between 1860 and 1866, 6,000

Indians (one-quarter of them women) were brought to the col- ony on five-year contracts. The Voortrekker Republics and British Policies

The Voortrekkers established two states in the 1840s and the

1850s: the Orange Free State between the Orange and the Vaal

rivers and the South African Republic (Zuid Afrikaansche

Republiek, a union of four Boer republics founded by the

Voortrekkers) to the north of the Vaal River in the area later

constituting the Transvaal. Like the Africans among whom they

settled, the Voortrekkers in both states made their living from a combination of extensive pastoralism and hunting. Ivory was

the most important product at first, and the search for it engendered great competition between African and European

hunters. In the 1860s, ostrich feathers also became an important export. All processed foods and manufactured goods were

acquired by trading ivory, skins, and feathers to British merchants at the Cape.

Politically, the two states were republics, with constitutions

modeled in part on that of the United States, each with a president, an elected legislature, and a franchise restricted to white

males. Africans could not vote, or own land, or carry guns

because the laws of both republics, unlike those of the British

colonies, did not recognize racial equality before the law. By

29
South Africa: A Country Study

the end of the 1860s, there were approximately 50,000 whites

settled in the two republics, practically all of them living in

rural areas, although small capitals had been established at Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State and at Pretoria in the

South African Republic.

Initially, the British attempted to strengthen their own position by extending colonial control beyond the Cape Colony's

boundaries. In 1848, after the northern frontier was threatened by fighting between Voortrekkers and Griqua on the

Orange River and by continued competition for resources among settlers and Africans, the governor of the Cape Colony,

Sir Harry Smith, annexed all the land between the Orange and

the Vaal rivers. This area, which the British called the Orange

River Sovereignty, comprised large numbers of Voortrekker

communities and practically all of the Sotho state, Lesotho.

Smith, urged on by land-hungry white settlers, also annexed

the Xhosa lands between the Keiskama and the Great Kei rivers

that the British had first taken and then returned in 1835 and

1836. Moreover, he sought to win a decisive military victory over the Xhosa and to break forever the power of their chiefs

by pursuing a ruthless war against them from 1850 to 1852.

The British had mixed success. Their attempts to tax the

Orange River Voortrekkers produced almost no revenue.

Claims to Sotho lands were met with opposition from Moshoeshoe, who in 1851 and 1852 successfully defeated British

attempts to extend their authority into his lands. As a result of

the Sotho resistance, the British decided to withdraw from the

Highveld, but in so doing they recognized the primacy of European rather than African claims to the land. The Sand River

Convention of 1852 and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854

recognized the independence of the South African Republic

and the Orange Free State, respectively, as Voortrekker republics so long as their residents agreed to acknowledge the ulti- mate sovereignty of the British government, agreed not to

allow slavery in their territories, and agreed not to sell ammunition to Africans. It was not until 1868 that the British again

attempted to extend their power onto the Highveld, and that was only when Lesotho's defeat by the Orange Free State was so complete that the total destruction of the Sotho people

seemed likely.

On the eastern Cape frontier, however, British policies

brought about enormous destruction for the Xhosa. Smith was

recalled by the British government in 1852 for instigating con30
Historical Setting

flict with the Xhosa, but the Colonial Office decided to pursue

the war to victory nonetheless in 1853. Large areas of Xhosa

land were annexed, and thousands of head of cattle were confiscated. Drought and disease further reduced the Xhosa's

remaining herds. Defeated in war, their lands greatly reduced

and food supplies in decline, the Xhosa turned for salvation to a young girl, Nongqawuse, who prophesied that if the people

purified themselves through sacrifice—by destroying their cattle and their grain, and by not planting new crops—then their

ancestors would return to aid them, the herds would reappear,

and all the whites would be driven into the sea. Although not

all Xhosa believed the prophecies, by 1857 more than 400,000

head of cattle had been killed and vast quantities of grain had

been destroyed. As a result, 40,000 Xhosa died from starvation,

and an equal number sought refuge in the Cape Colony, where

most became impoverished farm laborers.

By the end of the 1860s, white settlement in South Africa was much more extensive than it had been at the beginning of the

century. There were now two British colonies on the coast

(Cape Colony and Natal) instead of one, and two Voortrekker

republics on the southern and the northern Highveld (the

Orange Free State and the South African Republic) (see fig. 6).

The white population had also increased considerably, from

the 20,000 or so Europeans resident in the Cape Colony in

1800 to 180,000 reported in the 1865 census. There were

another 18,000 whites living in Natal and perhaps 50,000 more

whites in the Voortrekker states. Yet there were evident constraints to growth. Economically,

South Africa was little different from what it had been when

the British first arrived. The Cape produced wine, wheat, and

wool, none of them particularly profitable items on the world

market in the 1860s, especially because of competition from

American, Argentine, and Australian farmers. Natal's sugar

kept the colony going, but it was not an expanding industry. In

the interior, the Voortrekkers engaged in the same economic

activities as their African neighbors—pastoralism, limited culti- vation of grain crops, and hunting—and whereas these provided a living for the people involved, they were not the basis

on which an expanding economy could be built. Perhaps the

best indicator of the limited attractions of South Africa's econ- omy was the fact that fewer Europeans emigrated there than to the United States, Canada, Australia, or even New Zealand.

31
South Africa: A Country Study

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Orange \ Pietermaritzburg (NATAL? Durban

CAPE COLONY

Orange j> \Thembu

\ Xhosa Atlantic

Ocean

Cape Town

Port Elizabeth

Indian Ocean

Boundary of European territory Colonial capital ® Republic capital • Populated place Xhosa African territory 100 200 Kilometers 100 200 Miles

Source: Based on information from Kevin Shillington, History of Southern Africa, London, 1987, 84. Figure 6. Southern Africa, 1870

Moreover, areas of white and black settlement and political

control were largely separate. In 1865 the Cape contained

200,000 Khoikhoi and people of mixed ancestry (the basis of

today's coloured population), as well as 100,000 Bantu speakers. Several hundred thousand blacks lived in Natal and in the

Voortrekker republics. The vast majority of South Africa's black

inhabitants, however, continued to live in independent African

states ruled by their own kings and chiefs. In the 1860s,

Mpande's Zululand was a still powerful state in which most

Zulus lived. Moshoeshoe's Lesotho, although it had been

attacked by the Orange Free State and its borders contracted,

contained most of the Sotho people. To the northeast of the

South African Republic, the Pedi under their king Sekhukhune

had a well-armed state, and the Swazi kingdom continued to be

32
Historical Setting

a powerful entity. Any observer traveling in South Africa in the

late 1860s would have had little reason to assume that this bal- ance of power between blacks and whites would change dramatically during the remainder of the nineteenth century.

Industrialization and Imperialism, 1870-1910

The Mineral Revolution

Mineral discoveries in the 1860s, the 1870s, and the 1880s

had an enormous impact on southern Africa. Diamonds were

initially identified in 1867 in an area adjoining the confluence

of the Vaal and the Orange rivers, just north of the Cape Colony, although it was not until 1869 to 1870 that finds were suffi- cient to attract a "rush" of several thousand fortune hunters.

The British government, attracted by the prospect of mineral

wealth, quickly annexed the diamond fields, repudiating the

claims of the Voortrekker republics to the area. Four mines

were developed, and the town of Kimberley was established.

The town grew quickly and became the largest urban society in

the interior of southern Africa in the 1870s and the 1880s.

Although the mines were worked initially by small-scale claimsholders, the economics of diamond production and marketing soon led to consolidation. Within two decades of the first diamond find, the industry was essentially controlled by one

monopolistic company—Cecil Rhodes's De Beers Consolidated

Mines.

The diamond industry became the key to the economic for- tunes of the Cape Colony by providing the single largest source

of export earnings, as well as by fueling development throughout the colony. Whereas the Cape's exports in 1870 had been

worth little more than £2,000,000, with wool providing the bulk

of earnings, by the end of the century the value of exports had

risen to more than £15,000,000, with diamonds alone accounting for £4,000,000. There was also substantial growth in population, much of it from immigration. As a result, there were close

to 400,000 resident Europeans in the Cape Colony by 1900,

twice the number who had lived there in 1865.

Gold soon eclipsed diamonds in importance. Africans had

mined gold for centuries at Mapungubwe (in South Africa, on

the border with Zimbabwe) and later at the successor state of

Great Zimbabwe, and they had traded with Arabs and Portuguese on the east coast of Africa. In the 1860s and the 1870s,

Europeans made a number of small finds of their own, but the

33
South Africa: A Country Study

major development took place in 1886 when potentially enor- mous deposits of gold were found on the Witwatersrand (literally, "Ridge of White Waters" in Afrikaans, commonly

shortened to Rand—see Glossary) near present-day Johannesburg. English-speaking businessmen who had made their fortunes in the diamond industry quickly bought up all the

auriferous claims and established a series of large gold-mining

companies that were to dominate the industry well into the

twentieth century.

Rhodes, who had succeeded in monopolizing the diamond

industry, was much less successful on the Rand, where his companies proved to be poorer producers than those of his competitors. In the 1890s, he sought to compensate for his

lackluster performance by carving out a personal empire in

present-day Zimbabwe, original site of the fifteenth-century

gold industry of Great Zimbabwe. There he ruled the Ndebele

and the Shona people through his British South Africa Company.

Although beset by a number of technological problems in its early days, gold mining on the Rand grew rapidly, with output

increasing from £80,000 in 1887 to nearly £8,000,000, or onefifth of the world's gold production, in 1895. By the end of the

century, more than £60,000,000 of capital had been invested in

the gold industry, most of it by European investors, who

thereby continued the pattern developed at Kimberley that

southern Africa received more foreign investment than the rest of Africa combined. The gold mines employed 100,000 African

laborers, five times as many as did the diamond mines, and

drew these men from throughout southern Africa, although

most came from Portuguese-ruled areas of Mozambique.

Johannesburg, the newly established hub of this industry, had a population of 75,000 Europeans by the end of the century,

which made it the largest city in southern Africa.

Africans and Industrialization

African Enterprise

Africans participated actively in the new industrial economy.

Thousands came to Kimberley in the early 1870s, some to obtain diamond claims, the majority to seek jobs in the mines

and thereby to acquire the cash that would enable them to rebuild cattle herds depleted by drought, disease, and Boer

raids. In the early 1870s, an average of 50,000 men a year

34
Historical Setting

migrated to work in the mines, usually for two to three months,

returning home with guns purchased in Kimberley, as well as cattle and cash. Many who lived in the area of the diamond

finds chose to sell agricultural surpluses, rather than their

labor, and to invest their considerable profits in increasing production for the growing urban market. African farmers in British Basutoland (the British protectorate established in

Lesotho), the Cape, and Natal also greatly expanded their production of foodstuffs to meet rising demand throughout south- ern Africa, and out of this development emerged a relatively

prosperous peasantry supplying the new towns of the interior

as well as the coastal ports. The growth of Kimberley and other

towns also provided new economic opportunities for

coloureds, many of whom were skilled tradesmen, and for Indians, who, once they had completed their contracts on the sugar

plantations, established shops selling goods to African customers. Extending European Control

Mineowners struggling to make a profit in the early days of

the diamond industry sought, however, to undercut the bargaining strength of the Africans on whom they depended for

labor. In 1872 Kimberley's white claimsholders persuaded the

British colonial administration to introduce a pass law. This

law, the foundation of the twentieth-century South African pass

laws, required that all "servants" be in possession of passes that

stated whether the holders were legally entitled to work in the

city, whether or not they had completed their contractual obligations, and whether they could leave the city. The aim of this law, written in "color-blind" language but enforced against

blacks only, was to limit the mobility of migrant workers, who

frequently changed employers or left the diamond fields in a constant (and usually successful) attempt to bargain wages

upward.

Other restrictions followed the pass law. These included the

establishment of special courts to process pass law offenders as rapidly as possible (the basis of segregated courts in the twentieth century), the laying out of special "locations" or ghettos in

Kimberley where urban blacks had to live (the basis of municipal segregation practices), and, finally, in 1886 the formation

of "closed compounds," fenced and guarded institutions in

which all black diamond mine workers had to live for the duration of their labor contracts.

35
South Africa: A Country Study

The institutionalization of such discriminatory practices produced in Kimberley the highest rate of incarceration and the

lowest living standards for urban blacks in the Cape Colony. It also marked a major turnabout in the British administration of

law. The previous official policy that all people irrespective of

color be treated equally, while still accepted in legal theory, was now largely ignored injudicial practice. South Africa's first industrial city thus developed into a community in which discrimination became entrenched in the economic and social

order, not because of racial antipathies formed on the frontier,

but because of the desire for cheap labor.

Because blacks would not put up with such conditions if they

could maintain an autonomous existence on their own lands,

the British embarked on a large-scale program of conquest in

the 1870s and the 1880s. Mine owners argued that if they did

not get cheap labor their industries would become unprofitable. White farmers, English- and Dutch-speaking alike, interested in expanding their own production for new urban

markets, could not compete with the wages paid at the mines

and demanded that blacks be forced to work for them. They

argued that if blacks had to pay taxes in cash and that if most of

their lands were confiscated, then they would have to seek work

on the terms that white employers chose to offer. As a result of

such pressures, the British fought wars against the Zulu, the

Griqua, the Tswana, the Xhosa, the Pedi, and the Sotho, con- quering all but the last. By the middle of the 1880s, the majority of the black African population of South Africa that had still been independent in 1870 had been defeated, the bulk of their

lands had been confiscated and given to white settlers, and

taxes had been imposed on the people, who were now forced

to live on rural "locations." In order to acquire food to survive

and to earn cash to pay taxes, blacks now had to migrate to work on the farms, in the mines, and in the towns of newly

industrialized South Africa.

African Initiatives

The final quarter of the nineteenth century was marked also

by the rise of new forms of political and religious organization

as blacks struggled to attain some degree of autonomy in a world that was rapidly becoming colonized. Because the right

to vote was based on ownership of property rather than on race

in the Cape, blacks could participate in electoral politics, and

this they did in increasing numbers in the 1870s and the 1880s,

36
Historical Setting

especially in the towns. In 1879 Africans in the eastern Cape

formed the Native Educational Association (NEA), the purpose of which was to promote "the improvement and elevation

of the native races." This was followed by the establishment of

the more overtly political Imbumba Yama Nyama (literally,

"hard, solid sinew"), formed in 1882 in Port Elizabeth, which

sought to fight for "national rights" for Africans.

In 1884 John Tengo Jabavu, a mission-educated teacher and

vice president of the NEA, founded his own newspaper, Imvo

Zabantsundu (Native Opinion). Jabavu used the newspaper as a forum through which to express African grievances about the

pass laws; "location" regulations; the unequal administration of

justice; and what were considered "anti-native" laws, such as the one passed in 1887 by the Cape Parliament at Rhodes's behest

that raised the property qualification for voters and struck

20,000 Africans off the rolls. Through these organizations and

newspapers, and others like them established in the late nineteenth century, Africans protested their unequal treatment,

pointing out in particular contradictions between the theory

and practice of British colonialism. They called for the eradication of discrimination and for the incorporation of Africans

into colonial society on an equal basis with Europeans. By the

end of the nineteenth century, after property qualifications

had again been raised in 1892, there were only about 8,000

Africans on the Cape's voting roll. Africans sought to bypass what they considered the discriminatory practices of the established Christian churches (which

often preached to segregated audiences and seldom promoted

Africans within their ranks) by founding separate organizations

of their own. Starting in 1884 with Nehemiah Tile, a Thembu

(Tembu) Methodist preacher from the eastern Cape who left the Methodists and established the Tembu National Church,

Africans built their own churches throughout South Africa.

Many of these churches were termed "Ethiopian" by their

founders, on the basis of the biblical prophecy "that Ethiopia

shall soon stretch out her hands to God," and because for centuries an African-run independent Christian church had

existed in Ethiopia. A strong influence on these churches in

the 1890s and the early 1900s was the United States-based Afri- can Methodist Episcopal Church (AME), which sent missionaries to South Africa and trained many blacks from South Africa

at its own institutions in the United States. Members of these

independent churches called not so much for the elimination

37
South Africa: A Country Study

of racial discrimination and inequality as for an "Africa for the

Africans," that is, a country ruled by blacks.

British Imperialism and the Afrikaners

Minerals and the Growth ofBoer-British Antipathy

British pressures on the Dutch-speaking population of the

South African Republic became intense in the aftermath of

industrialization. In seizing the diamond fields in 1870, the

British had swept aside many Boer land claims. In 1877, fearing

a collapse of the South African Republic in the face of defeat

by a Pedi army, the British had formally annexed the Boer

state, as the Transvaal. They then set about destroying the Pedi

to obtain laborers for the Kimberley mines, and they completed the task in 1879. In 1880, however, the Transvaalers

rose, and at the Battle of Majuba Hill in 1881, they defeated a

British army. The British then withdrew, leaving the Boers vic- torious in what they would later call their First War of Independence.

The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand greatly

increased Boer-British tensions. Here was vast mineral wealth

beyond British control. Moreover, the president of the South

.African Republic, Paul Kruger, attempted to lessen his state's long-term dependence on Cape merchants by developing a rail link to Portuguese East .Africa. Such a link threatened British

commercial interests and revived old fears of the Boers' gaining

direct access to the sea and thus to other European powers. At

the same time, the mine owners were, without exception,

English speakers who exhibited no loyalty to the South African

Republic and who did not seek to reinvest their gold profits in

the local community. Indeed, they complained bitterly about

all attempts to tax the gold industry.

These economic tensions lay at the base of a political issue:

the right of English speakers to have the vote. With the rise of

the gold industry and the growth ofJohannesburg, the South

African Republic had been inundated by so many Englishspeaking immigrants (called uitlanders by the Boers), most of

them skilled mine workers, that by the 1890s they constituted a majority of the white male population. The state's constitution

limited the vote to males who had lived in the South African

Republic for at least seven years, and Kruger feared that

expanding the franchise would only enable mine owners to manipulate their workers and to thereby win political power.

38
Historical Setting

British mine owners and officials constantly decried Kruger's

refusal to extend the franchise. In December 1895, Cecil

Rhodes took matters a step further by sending 500 armed men,

employees of his British South Africa Company, into the South

African Republic under the leadership of Dr. Leander Starr

Jameson. Rhodes hoped that the uitlanders would rise and join

the invaders to help overthrow Kruger's government. The invasion, however, was a fiasco: Boer commandos disarmed Jameson and his men with little resistance, and the uitlanders took

no action. Rhodes resigned the premiership of the Cape Colony in disgrace. The British government denied having

advance knowledge of the invasion and claimed that it had no

expansionist plans of its own.

Distrusting the mine owners and the British government,

Kruger sought to build his country's strength. He engaged in

diplomatic relations with Germany, imported arms from

Europe, and continued to deny the vote to uitlanders. He also

cemented relations with the Orange Free State and sought support from Dutch speakers in the Cape. In these endeavors, fie was assisted by a growing sense of Afrikaner identity that had

developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. This

nationalistic identity had emerged clearly in the early 1880s,

after the victory of Majuba Hill, when S.J. du Toit, a Dutch

Reformed minister in the Cape, had published a newspaper,

Die Afrikaanse Patriot (The Afrikaner Patriot), and a book, Die

Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk (The History of our Land in the Language of our People), which argued that

Afrikaners were a distinct people with their own fatherland in

South Africa and that they were fulfilling a special mission

determined expressly by God. Du Toit had gone on to found a

political party in the Cape, the Afrikanerbond, to represent the

interests of Dutch speakers. The Jameson Raid and anti-Boer

sentiments expressed by gold magnates and British officials fur- ther cemented an Afrikaner sense of distinctiveness, which in

the 1890s reached across political boundaries to include Dutch

speakers in the Cape and the citizens of the Orange Free State

as well as the Transvaalers.

Rhodes, together with his fellow gold mining magnates and

the British government (in the persons ofJoseph Chamberlain,

secretary of state for the colonies, and Alfred Milner, high commissioner in South Africa) , continued to denounce Kruger and

his government. Rhodes and his peers called attention to what

they considered rampant official corruption while also com39
South Africa: A Country Study

plaining that taxes were too high and that black labor was too

expensive (because of perceived favoritism by the government

regarding the labor needs of Afrikaner farmers). Chamberlain

had concluded by the second half of the 1890s that the British

needed to take direct action to contain Afrikaner power, and

he had at first used diplomatic channels to pressure Kruger,

although with little success. Milner pointed out what he considered the appalling condition of British subjects in the South

African Republic, where, without the vote, they were, he

argued, "kept permanently in the position of helots." In 1899

Milner advised Chamberlain that he considered the case for

British intervention "overwhelming." Ignoring attempts by

Kruger to reach a compromise, Chamberlain in September

1899 issued an ultimatum requiring that Kruger enfranchise

British residents of the South African Republic. At the same

time, Chamberlain sent troop reinforcements from Britain to the Cape. Kruger, certain that the British were bent on war, took the initiative and, allied with the Orange Free State,

declared war on the British in October 1899.

The South African War

The South African War (1899-1902), fought by the British to establish their hegemony in South Africa and by the Afrikaners

to defend their autonomy, lasted three years and caused enor- mous suffering. Ninety thousand Afrikaners fought against a

British army that eventually approached 500,000 men, most

from Britain but including large numbers of volunteers also

from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. Approximately

30,000 Africans were also employed as soldiers by the British,

while thousands more labored as transport workers. Kruger's

forces, taking advantage of initial superiority in numbers

(before the British regulars arrived) and of surprise, won a number of victories at the beginning of the war. In 1900, however, British forces overwhelmed the Boers, took Bloemfontein

(capital of the Orange Free State), Johannesburg, and Pretoria

(capital of the South African Republic), and forced Kruger

into exile. Resistance continued, however, in the countryside,

where the Boers fought a ferocious guerrilla war. The British

ultimately succeeded in breaking this resistance, but only by

adopting a scorched-earth policy. In 1901 and 1902, the British

torched more than 30,000 farms in the South African Republic

and the Orange Free State and placed all the Afrikaner women

and children in concentration camps, where, because of over40
Reproduction ofpainting by R. Caton Woodville of the ill-fated Jameson Raid, 1895-96

Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

crowding and unsanitary conditions, more than 25,000 perished.

Peace was finally concluded at the town of Vereeniging on

May 21, 1902. Milner, who drew up the terms, intended that

Afrikaner power should be broken forever. He required that

the Boers hand over all their arms and agree to the incorporation of their territories into the British empire as the Orange

River Colony and the Transvaal. However, he made one significant concession to Boer sentiments by agreeing that the franchise would not be extended to Africans throughout South

Africa (they had no vote in the Boer republics) until the local

white population could decide that issue themselves. Since Mil- ner himself believed that "political equality" of blacks and

whites was "impossible" and that South Africa was really a white

man's country in which the role of blacks should essentially be

limited to that of "well-treated" labor, the concession was not a

large one for him to make.

Milner 's Peace

Milner sought to consolidate the military victory by adopting

41
South Africa: A Country Study

three policies. He planned to encourage large numbers to emigrate from Britain so that English speakers would attain a numerical majority among South Africa's white population. He

wanted to institute policies of denationalization and of anglicization so that Afrikaners would lose their sense of a separate

identity and would assimilate into British culture. To ensure

the successful implementation of both policies, he intended to rule South Africa directly without local representation.

Milner also believed that the successful development of a

loyal colonial society rested above all on ensuring the profitability of the gold industry even if that meant great strains for

the African population. To that end, he sought to address the

postwar labor needs of the gold mines by strictly enforcing pass

laws in the cities and by collecting taxes from Africans in the

countryside.

Relations between Africans and Europeans were increasingly

strained as Milner's policies were implemented. Pressures in

Natal were particularly severe. Most of Zululand had been

annexed to Natal in 1897, a decade after approximately onethird of Zululand had been incorporated into the South Afri- can Republic. These strains erupted into violence in 1905,

when a Zulu chief, Bambatha, invoking the memory of King

Shaka, led an armed uprising. British firepower was too great,

however, and in 1906 Bambatha and several thousand of his fol- lowers were killed in central Natal. His was the last armed

struggle against colonial rule.

Despite opposition from local whites, who feared the addition of yet another racial group to their community, Milner

also supported the gold magnates' plans to import large numbers of indentured Chinese laborers to work in the mines. The

first men arrived in 1904, and by 1906 there were 50,000 Chi- nese at work, comprising one-third of the gold mines' labor

force.

Milner's belief expressed before the war that blacks and

whites could never be recognized as equal in South Africa

received official sanction in 1905 with the final report of the

South African Native Affairs Commission (SANAC). The British had gone to war in 1899 stating their abhorrence of the

racially discriminatory policies adopted in the Afrikaner republics and because of such sentiments had received the active support of thousands of Africans. Between 1903 and 1905, the

SANAC commissioners looked into the question of developing

a common "native policy" for all of South Africa. Despite the

42
Historical Setting

testimony of numerous members of the educated African elite decrying discriminatory policies, the commissioners concluded

that there should be no political equality between blacks and

whites, that separate voters' rolls should be established, and

that territorial separation was advisable for the races. Yet none of Milner's policies met with real success. The gold

industry, burdened with the costs of rebuilding after the devastation of the war, produced only limited profits, and South

Africa continued to be economically depressed for much of the

first decade of the twentieth century. Few immigrants were

attracted by such poor prospects, and fewer than 1,200 British

settler families came, less than one-eighth of the number Mil- ner had hoped for. His denationalization policy was a complete

failure. Indeed, Afrikaners, already imbued with a sense of col- lective suffering by their nineteenth-century experiences at the

hands of British imperialists, were even more united after the

South African War (which they termed the Second War of

Independence). They celebrated their language, Afrikaans,

and demonstrated its beauty in an outpouring of poetry. They

set up their own schools, insisting that their children should be

taught in Afrikaans and not be limited to the English-only

instruction of government schools. In addition, they established new political parties to push for self-government: Oranje

Unie (Orange Union) formed by Abraham Fischer and General James "Barry" Munnik (J.B.M.) Hertzog in the Orange

River Colony and Het Volk (The People) founded by General

Louis Botha and Jan C. Smuts in the Transvaal. The greatest

blow to Milner's plans, however, came in 1905 with the victory

of the Liberal Party in the British general election and the formation of a government led by men who had opposed the

scorched-earth policy in the South African War as no more

than "methods of barbarism."

Formation of the Union of South Africa, 1910

Accepting the fact that English speakers would never consti- tute a majority in white South Africa, the Liberal government

sought to come to terms with the Afrikaner majority. In 1907

the British granted limited self-government to both the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, and in subsequent elections,

Het Volk and the Oranje Unie swept to victory. In the following

year, the South African Party (SAP), led by an English-speaking

critic of British imperialism and dependent on the support of

the Afrikaner Bond, came to power in the Cape Colony. Reas43
South Africa: A Country Study

sured by the readiness of Het Volk's leaders, Botha and Smuts,

to assist the gold-mining industry in obtaining larger supplies

of cheap black labor (although without the Chinese workers

who were repatriated in 1908) and in repressing militant white

miners (who protested conditions of labor andjob competition

from blacks), the British government encouraged negotiations

in South Africa among white representatives of the four self- governing colonies with the aim of establishing a single state. Negotiations held in 1908 and in 1909 produced a constitution that embodied three fundamental principles: South Africa

would adopt the Westminster style of government and would

become a unitary state in which political power would be won

by a simple majority and in which parliament would be sover- eign; the question of voting rights for blacks would be left up to each of the four self-governing colonies to decide for itself (the

Cape and Natal based their franchise on a property qualification; the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal denied all blacks the vote); and both English and Dutch would be official

languages. The constitution also provided for future incorporation of the British-governed territories of Southern Rhodesia,

Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana), Basutoland (presentday Lesotho), and Swaziland into the union.

In May 1910, Louis Botha became the first prime minister of

the newly established Union of South Africa, a dominion of the

British Empire, and Jan Smuts became his deputy. Just eight

years earlier, both men had been generals in Kruger's army;

now, through the SAP, they governed a country of 4 million

Africans, 500,000 coloureds, 150,000 Indians, and 1,275,000

whites.

Segregation, 1910-48

Building the Legal Structure of Racial Discrimination

Several pieces of legislation marked the establishment of the

Union of South Africa as a state in which racial discrimination

received official sanction. The Native Labour Regulation Act

(No. 15) of 1911 made it a criminal offense for Africans, but

not for whites, to break a labor contract. The Dutch Reformed

Church Act of 1911 prohibited Africans from becoming full members of the church. The Mines and Works Act (No. 12) of

1911 legitimized the long-term mining practice by which whites

monopolized skilled jobs by effectively restricting Africans to semi-skilled and unskilled labor in the mines. Most important,

44
Historical Setting

the Natives Land Act (No. 27) of 1913 separated South Africa

into areas in which either blacks or whites could own freehold

land: blacks, constituting two-thirds of the population, were

restricted to 7.5 percent of the land; whites, making up onefifth of the population, were given 92.5 percent. The act also

stated that Africans could live outside their own lands only if employed as laborers by whites. In particular, it made illegal

the common practice of having Africans work as sharecroppers

on farms in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Formation of the African National Congress, 1912

Milner's pro-white policies followed by the discriminatory

legislation enacted by the Union of South Africa engendered

considerable resistance from blacks and led to the formation

and growth of new political bodies. In 1902 coloureds in Cape

Town had formed the African Political Organisation to represent the interests of "educated . . . Coloured people." Abdullah

Abdurahman, a Scottish-trained doctor, became president of

the organization in 1904, and, by stressing the political discrimination to which coloureds were subjected, he had built it into a vital body with 20,000 members by 1910. Mohandas Gandhi

began a passive resistance campaign against the pass laws in

1906, leading Indians in Natal and the Transvaal (they were

legally prohibited from living in or entering the Orange Free

State) in demonstrations and organizing stop-work protests

that won the support of thousands of people. Numerous meetings were held by Africans, coloureds, and Indians to protest

the whites-only nature of the constitutional discussions that

took place in 1908 to 1909. These activities culminated in

March 1909 in a South African Native Convention, which

called for a constitution giving "full and equal rights" for all blacks, coloureds, and Indians.

But it was opposition to the Natives Land Act, preliminary

drafts of which were debated in 1911, that led to the formation

in 1912 of the most significant organization, the South African

Native National Congress (renamed the African National Congress [ANC] in 1923). Several hundred members of South

Africa's educated African elite met at Bloemfontein onJanuary

8, 1912, and established a national organization to protest

racial discrimination and to appeal for equal treatment before

the law. The founding president was John L. Dube, a minister

and schoolteacher who had studied in the United States and

who had been strongly influenced by Booker T Washington.

45
South Africa: A Country Study

Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, a lawyer with degrees from Columbia

University and Oxford University and a prime mover in organizing the meeting to establish the congress, was appointed

treasurer. Solomon T. Plaatje, a court translator, author, and

newspaper editor who had worked in Kimberley and Johannesburg, became secretary general. The meeting opened and

closed with the singing of the hymn "Nkosi sikelel'i Afrika"

("God Bless Africa"), which had been composed at the end of

the nineteenth century by a Xhosa poet.

The congress was moderate in composition, tone, and practice. Its founders were men who felt that British rule had

brought considerable benefits, especially Christianity, education, and the rule of law, but who also considered that their careers as teachers, lawyers, and court translators were hindered by the racial discrimination so endemic in South Africa.

They called not for an end to British rule but for respect for

the concept of equality for all, irrespective of color. They

respected "traditional" authorities in African societies and

made chiefs and kings office-holders as of right within the congress. They believed that they could best achieve their aims by

dialogue with the British. As John Dube said, the congress pursued a policy of "hopeful reliance on the sense of common justice and love of freedom so innate in the British character."

Such reliance, however, proved unfounded. When the congress

sent a deputation to London in 1914 to protest the Natives

Land Act, the colonial secretary informed them that there was nothing that he could do. Members of another deputation that

went to London in 1919 were received sympathetically by

Prime Minister Lloyd George, but they were also told that their

problems would have to be resolved in South Africa by the

South African government.

World War I and Afrikaner Nationalism

In August 1914, Louis Botha andJan Smuts, amid much controversy, took South Africa into World War I on the side of the

British. Botha and Smuts considered that South Africa, as a

British dominion, had no choice in the matter, and they sent

troops to conquer the German protectorate of South-West

Africa (present-day Namibia, mandated by the League of

Nations to South Africa following World War I) . More soldiers,

including a corps of coloured volunteers, were later sent to

fight in German East Africa and in France. Many Afrikaners felt no loyalty to Britain and opposed going to war with Germany,

46
Historical Setting

which had aided them during the South African War. An

attempted coup against Botha's government in September was aborted when one of the leaders, an Afrikaner hero from the

South African War, was killed by police. An armed uprising of

nearly 10,000 men in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal

later in the year, led by another war hero, was crushed by

Botha's forces.

The political opposition to Botha's entry into the war was led

by J.B.M. Hertzog and his newly formed National Party of

South Africa (NP). Hertzog was a former close ally of Botha

who had split with the SAP over three issues: he felt that the

SAP worked too closely with English mine owners (whom he

considered "fortune-hunters"); he thought that only lip-service was being given to the policy of making Dutch equal with

English as an official language; and he wanted more done to separate blacks and whites. The National Party was established

in January 1914 to take up these issues. Support for the party

grew, especially with South African entry into the war, and by

1915 there were branches in the Transvaal and the Orange

Free State led by Hertzog and by Tielman Roos, respectively,

and in the Cape, where Daniel F. (D.F.) Malan edited the

party's newspaper, Die Burger (The Citizen).

Hertzog and his allies took various steps to strengthen the

basis of Afrikaner nationalism. They stressed the richness and

importance of Afrikaans rather than Dutch, and supported

publication of books and magazines in the former language.

They also sought to alleviate the poverty that had become

endemic among Afrikaners, many of whom had been driven

off the land into the cities in the last decades of the nineteenth

century and during the South African War. Because almost all commercial enterprises and banks were run by English speakers, these people had little success in obtaining jobs or loans

from such institutions. Many found work as unskilled laborers

in the mines, where their color alone assured that they got

higher pay than blacks.

Using the concept of helpmekaar (mutual aid), initially

adopted to assist the unsuccessful rebels of 1914 and their families, relatively wealthy Afrikaner wine farmers in the western

Cape pooled their resources and in 1918 established the South

African National Trust Company (Santarn) and the South Afri- can National Life Assurance Company (Sanlam). These new

companies, a credit institution and a life insurance business,

respectively, acquired their capital from Afrikaners and

47
South Africa: A Country Study

invested their funds only with Afrikaners. Also in 1918, another

exclusively Afrikaner organization was formed, the Afrikaner

Broederbond (later the Broederbond, or Brotherhood

although this literal translation has never been used as a term

of reference). This organization, which in 1921 became a

secret society, was established by young professionals—teachers, clerks, and ministers in the Dutch Reformed Church—who

believed that they, too, needed to act to protect and to celebrate Afrikaner culture.

Conflict in the 1920s

In 1922 the interaction of economic and ethnic factors produced armed conflict among whites. Strikes had been organized by white miners in 1907, 1913, and 1914 over the

conditions of labor and the threat of black competition, with

the result that mine owners had agreed to reserve some semiskilled work for whites. In addition, white miners split politically; many of the English-speaking mine workers joined the

Labour Party (formed in 1909), while the Afrikaners supported

the National Party. Some of the more radical workers left the

Labour Party in 1915 to form the International Socialist

League of South Africa, which in turn became the Communist

Party of South Africa (CPSA) in 1921.

In the context of postwar depression, the mine owners proposed in 1922 that wages be reduced, that several thousand

white semi-skilled and unskilled workers be dismissed, and that

the statutory "colour bar" be lifted, thereby enabling the

employers to increase the ratio of black workers to white. The

white workers, supported by the Labour and National parties,

went on strike. With militant Afrikaner nationalists taking a leading role and organizing commandos, the strikers marched

through Johannesburg behind banners proclaiming "Workers

of the World Unite, and Fight for a White South Africa," occu- pied fortified positions in the mines, and announced the establishment of a White Workers' Republic. Smuts, prime minister

since Botha's death in 1919, struck back with 20,000 troops and

with artillery, tanks, and bomber aircraft. In the ensuing conflict, seventy-six strikers were killed, 4,748 were arrested, and

eighteen were sentenced to death, of whom only four were

hanged.

Smuts won only a temporary victory because in the 1924

general election he was swept out of office by an alliance of the

National and Labour parties and was replaced as prime minis48
Historical Setting

ter by J.B.M. Hertzog. The new government took immediate

steps to protect the privileged position of white labor by enact- ing the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Wage Act of

1925. The former law gave legal recognition to white trade

unions but not to black; the latter enabled the minister of labor

to force employers to give preference to the hiring of white

workers. In addition, the Mines and Works Amendment Act of

1926 reinforced the color bar in the mining industry. Together,

these laws became the cornerstone of what Hertzog termed his

"civilised labour" policy. Hertzog also introduced measures to provide whites with greater job opportunities by instituting

higher protective tariffs to encourage local manufacturing; by

opening up new overseas trade relations, especially with Germany; and by establishing the state-owned South African Iron

and Steel Corporation (Iscor). He proposed as well a number

of "native bills" to restrict the voting rights of Africans, removed

the property qualification for all white voters, and enfranchised

white women, thereby more than doubling the number of eligible white voters while reducing black voters to a negligible

number. He also introduced legislation replacing Dutch with

Afrikaans as an official language.

Black opposition to these measures took a variety of forms,

the most important of which was the growth of the Industrial

and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). The ICU had been

established in 1919 as a trade union for coloured dockworkers

in Cape Town by Clements Kadalie, a mission-educated African

from Nyasaland (present-day Malawi). Kadalie's organization

grew enormously in the 1920s, in rural as well as in urban

areas, as it tapped the great discontent that blacks already felt for the segregationist policies of Botha and Smuts and their

increased disturbance over Hertzog's "civilised labour" legislation. ICU organizers, often men with links to the independent

African churches who had little time for the overly "moderate"

policies of the ANC and who were strongly influenced by the

back-to-Africa movement of Marcus Garvey, galvanized mass

support with calls for an immediate end to discrimination and

to colonial rule. By 1928 the ICU's claimed membership, predominantly rural-based, had grown to between 150,000 and

200,000 Africans, 15,000 coloureds, and 250 whites, making it a

far larger political body than the ANC. Yet the organization soon collapsed, brought down by the contradiction between

the near-millennial expectations of its followers and the refusal

of Hertzog's government to offer any concessions, and by the

49
South Africa: A Country Study

inability of blacks to force the government to change any of its policies. By the end of the 1920s, only a few regional branches

of the ICU remained, and Kadalie was no longer at the head of

the organization.

The Great Depression and the 1930s

The onset of the Great Depression brought about considerable political change. Hertzog, whose National Party had won

the 1929 election alone, after splitting with the Labour Party,

received much of the blame for the devastating economic

impact of the depression. Fearing electoral defeat in the next

election (1934), he sought a partnership with his former opponent, Jan Smuts, and the latter's South African Party. In 1933

Hertzog and Smuts made an alliance, and in the following year

they merged their two parties to form the United South Afri- can National Party, also known as the United Party (UP). Hertzog and Smuts then won the general election; Hertzog

continued as prime minister and Smuts became his deputy.

Many Afrikaners criticized Hertzog's move, especially because

they considered Smuts to be an opponent of Afrikaner nationalism who was too closely allied with the English mine owners; under the leadership of D.F. Malan and the Broederbond, they

split away to form their own political party, the Purified

National Party.

Malan built his political appeal by stressing the particular

sufferings of the Afrikaner people. Their economic problems

had become especially evident during the depression, when

the Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites had concluded in

1931 that nearly one-third of Afrikaners lived as paupers,

whereas few English-speaking whites lived below the poverty

line. To deal with this problem, Malan and his allies in the

Broederbond encouraged the development of an Afrikaner

economic movement. The Volkskas (People's Bank) was founded in 1934; and exclusively Afrikaner trade unions, which

espoused a Christian-National ethic combining devout Calvinism with ethnic nationalism, were established at the same time.

In subsequent years, the Broederbond worked closely with Sanlam/Santam to pool whatever wealth was available and to invest

it in new economic opportunities for the volk (people). Malan

and his allies also drew attention to the past sufferings of the

Afrikaner people by organizing a commemorative reenactment

in 1938 of the Great Trek. Ox-wagon parades through the

country culminated in a festival held in Pretoria on December

50
Afrikaans Language

Monument (Afrikaans

e

Taalmonument) atPaarl, Western Cape

Courtesy Embassy of South

Africa, Washington

16, the exact day on which, 100 years earlier, the Zulu had been

defeated at the Battle of Blood River. A massive Voortrekker

Monument, replete with friezes depicting the heroism of the

Voortrekkers and the treachery of the Africans, was officially

opened while Malan made a speech in which he said that it was

the duty of Afrikaners "to make South Africa a white man's

land."

Hertzog and Smuts, while rejecting the ethnic nationalism of

Malan, hardly differed with him in their policies toward blacks. In the mid-1980s, the United Party government introduced legislation to remove Africans from the common voters' roll in the

Cape, to limit them to electing white representatives to Parliament, and to create a Natives Representative Council that had

advisory powers only (Representation of Natives Act [No. 12]

of 1936). The government increased the amount of land set aside for blacks from 7.5 percent to 13 percent of South Africa,

but confirmed the policy that the country should always be seg- regated unequally by race (the Native Trust and Land Act [No.

18] of 1936) and enforced even stricter regulation of the pass

laws (the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937). In response to growing anti-Semitic sentiments among Afrikaners—usually

directed at the mine owners, many of whom were Jewish—the

government introduced legislation to prevent the immigration

ofJews into South Africa (the Aliens Act [No. 1] of 1937). The

51
South Africa: A Country Study

same law also prohibited the entry of any immigrant who could

not quickly assimilate into the white population.

Organized black responses to these measures were muted.

The ANC, under the conservative leadership of Pixley Seme

since 1930, concentrated on advising Africans to try to better

themselves and to respect their chiefs rather than engaging in an active condemnation of Hertzog's policies. Membership in

the congress fell to a few thousand. In December 1935, some

ANC members, dissatisfied with this approach, together with

representatives of Indian and coloured political organizations,

met in Bloemfontein and formed the All-African Convention

(AAC) to protest the proposed new laws as well as segregation

in general. But even this organization, composed largely of

members of the black professional class along with church

leaders and students, avoided the confrontational approach of

the ICU. The AAC leaders stressed their loyalty to South Africa

and to Britain and called yet again for the British Parliament to intervene to ameliorate the condition of blacks.

The Impact of World War II The outbreak of World War II in 1939 proved a divisive fac- tor in the white community. Smuts favored entry into the war on the side of the British. Hertzog supported neutrality. Many

of Malan's supporters wanted to enter the war on Germany's

side. German National Socialism, with its emphasis on the

racial superiority of Germanic peoples, its anti-Semitism, and

its use of state socialism to benefit the "master race," had gar- nered many Afrikaner admirers in the 1930s. A neo-Nazi Greyshirt organization had been formed in 1933 that drew

increasing support, especially among rural Afrikaners, in the

late 1930s. In 1938 Afrikaners participating in the commemoration of the Great Trek had established the Ossewabrandwag

(Oxwagon Sentinel) as a paramilitary organization aimed at inculcating a "love for fatherland" and at instituting, by armed

force if necessary, an Afrikaner-controlled republic in South

Africa. By the end of the decade, the Ossewabrandwag claimed

a membership of 250,000 out of a total Afrikaner population of

a little more than 1 million. Oswald Pirow, Hertzog's minister

of defense until the end of 1939, formed a movement within

the National Party called the New Order, a fascist program for

remaking South African society along Nazi lines. Smuts prevailed, however, winning the support of a majority of the cabinet and becoming prime minister. Hertzog resigned and

52
Historical Setting

joined with Malan in forming the Herenigde (Reunited)

National Party (HNP). South Africa sent troops to fight on the

British side in North Africa and in Europe. In South Africa, sev- eral thousand members of the Ossewabrandwag, including a

future prime minister, John Vorster, were interned for antiwar

activities. Economically and socially, the war had a profound effect.

While gold continued to be the most important industry, providing two-thirds of South Africa's revenues and three-quarters

of its export earnings, manufacturing grew enormously to meet

wartime demands. Between 1939 and 1945, the number of people employed in manufacturing, many of them African women,

rose 60 percent. Urbanization increased rapidly: the number of

African town dwellers almost doubled. By 1946 there were more Africans in South Africa's towns and cities than there were whites. Many of these blacks lived in squatter communities established on the outskirts of major cities such as Cape

Town and Johannesburg. Such developments, although necessary for war production, contradicted the segregationist ideology that blacks should live in their rural locations and not

become permanent urban residents.

More unsettling still to the segregationists was the development of new black organizations that demanded official recognition of their existence and better treatment of their

members. In Johannesburg, for example, James Mpanza proclaimed himself king of his Orlando squatter encampment, set up his own system of local government and taxation, and established the Sofasonke ("We shall all die together") Party. Urban

black workers, demanding higher wages and better working

conditions, also formed their own trade unions and engaged in a rash of strikes throughout the early 1940s. By 1946 the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), formed in 1941,

claimed 158,000 members organized in 119 unions. The most

important of these new trade unions was the African Mineworkers Union (AMWU), which by 1944 claimed a membership of 25,000. In 1946 the AMWU struck for higher wages in

the gold mines and succeeded in getting 60,000 men to stop

work. The strike was crushed by police actions that left twelve

dead, but it demonstrated the potential strength of organized

black workers in challenging the cheap labor system.

The 1 948 Election

Smuts's governing United Party and Malan's HNP went into

53
South Africa: A Country Study

the 1948 general election campaign on opposing platforms.

The United Party based its platform on the report of the Native

Laws Commission chaired by Judge Henry Fagan. The Fagan

commission argued that because of the influx of Africans into

the cities and because of the impoverishment of the African

reserves, total segregation was impossible. Although it did not

recommend social or political integration, the commission suggested that African labor should be stabilized in the cities,

where the needs of industrial and commercial operations were

greatest. The HNP's platform, based on a report by Paul Sauer,

argued to the contrary, that only total separation of the races would prevent a move toward equality and the eventual over- whelming of white society by black.

The HNP stated that Africans should be viewed as only temporary dwellers in the cities and should be forced periodically

to return to the countryside to meet the labor needs of farmers

(primarily Afrikaners). In addition, the HNP platform declared

that Africans should develop political bodies in "their true

fatherland," the African reserves, and should have no form of

parliamentary representation in South Africa.

Malan also called for the prohibition of mixed marriages, for

the banning of black trade unions, and for stricter enforcement of job reservation. Running on this platform of apartheid, as it was termed for the first time, Malan and the HNP,

benefiting from the weight given to rural electorates, defeated

Smuts and the United Party. The HNP won a majority of the

seats contested but only a minority of the votes cast. The HNP

became the government and, renamed the National Party

(NP), ruled South Africa until 1994.

Apartheid, 1948-76

The Legislative Implementation of Apartheid

Malan and the National Party, fearing that they might lose

office in the next election, immediately set about introducing

laws to give apartheid a legislative reality that could not easily

be overturned. Such laws aimed at separating whites and

blacks, at instituting as a legal principle the theory that whites

should be treated more favorably than blacks and that separate

facilities need not be equal, and at providing the state with the

powers deemed necessary to deal with any opposition.

54
Historical Setting

Separating Blackfrom White

The Population Registration Act (No. 30) of 1950 provided

the basis for separating the population of South Africa into dif- ferent races. Under the terms of this act, all residents of South

Africa were to be classified as white, coloured, or native (later

called Bantu) people. Indians, whom the HNP in 1948 had

refused to recognize as permanent inhabitants of South Africa, were included under the category "Asian" in 1959. The act

required that people be classified primarily on the basis of

their "community acceptability"; later amendments placed

greater stress on "appearance" in order to deal with the practice of light-colored blacks "passing" as whites. The act also provided for the compilation of a population register for the

whole country and for the issuing of identity cards.

Other laws provided for geographic, social, and political separation. The Group Areas Act (No. 41) of 1950 extended the

provisions of the Natives Land Act (No. 27) of 1913, and later

laws divided South Africa into separate areas for whites and

blacks (including coloureds), and gave the government the

power to forcibly remove people from areas not designated for

their particular racial group. The Tomlinson Commission in

1954 officially concluded that the areas set aside for Africans

would support no more than two-thirds of the African population even under the best of conditions, but the government

ignored its recommendation that more land be allocated to the

reserves and began removing Africans from white areas. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No. 55) of 1949

made marriages between whites and members of other racial

groups illegal. The Immorality Act (No. 21) of 1950 extended an earlier ban on sexual relations between whites and blacks

(the Immorality Act [No. 5] of 1927) to a ban on sexual relations between whites and any non-whites. The Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68) of 1951 established Bantu tribal, regional, and

territorial authorities in the regions set out for Africans under

the Group Areas Act, and it abolished the Natives Representative Council. The Bantu authorities were to be dominated by

chiefs and headmen appointed by the government. The government also sought in 1951 to remove coloured voters in the

Cape from the common roll onto a separate roll and to require

that they elect white representatives only (Separate Representation of Voters Act [No. 46] of 1951). The Supreme Court

immediately declared the act invalid on constitutional

grounds, but after a long struggle it was successfully reenacted

55
South Africa: A Country Study

(the Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act [No.

30] of 1956).

Separate and Unequal

The concept of unequal allocation of resources was built

into legislation on general facilities, education, and jobs. The

Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (No. 49) of 1953 stated

that all races should have separate amenities—such as toilets,

parks, and beaches—and that these need not be of an equivalent quality. Under the provisions of this act, apartheid signs were erected throughout South Africa.

The Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 decreed that

blacks should be provided with separate educational facilities under the control of the Ministry of Native Affairs, rather than

the Ministry of Education. The pupils in these schools would

be taught their Bantu cultural heritage and, in the words of

Hendrik F. Verwoerd, minister of native affairs, would be

trained "in accordance with their opportunities in life," which

he considered did not reach "above the level of certain forms

of labour." The act also removed state subsidies from denominational schools with the result that most of the mission-run

African institutions (with the exception of some schools run by

the Roman Catholic Church and the Seventh Day Adventists) were sold to the government or closed. The Extension of University Education Act (No. 45) of 1959 prohibited blacks from

attending white institutions, with few exceptions, and established separate universities and colleges for Africans,

coloureds, and Indians.

The Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 28) of 1956 enabled

the minister of labour to reserve categories of work for members of specified racial groups. In effect, if the minister felt that

white workers were being pressured by "unfair competition"

from blacks, he could recategorize jobs for whites only and

increase their rates of pay. Under the terms of the Native Laws

Amendment Act (No. 54) of 1952, African women as well as men were made subject to influx control and the pass laws and,

under Section 10 of the act, neither men nor women could

remain in an urban area for longer than seventy-two hours

without a special permit stating that they were legally

employed. The Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act (No. 67) of 1952, which was designed to make the

policy of pass restrictions easier, abolished the pass, replacing it with a document known as a "reference book." The act stated

56
Historical Setting

that all Africans had to carry a reference book containing their

photograph, address, marital status, employment record, list of

taxes paid, influx control endorsements, and rural district

where officially resident; not having the reference book on

one's person was a criminal offense punishable by a prison sentence.

Security Legislation

Whereas the above laws built largely on existing legislation,

police powers underwent a much greater expansion. The Suppression of Communism Act (No. 44) of 1950 had declared the

Communist Party and its ideology illegal. Among other features, the act defined communism as any scheme that aimed

"at bringing about any political, industrial, social, or economic

change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or

disorder" or that encouraged "feelings of hostility between the

European and the non-European races of the Union the conse- quences of which are calculated to further ..." disorder. The

act allowed the minister ofjustice to list members of such organizations and to ban them, usually for five-year periods, from

public office, from attending public meetings, or from being in

any specified area of South Africa. The Public Safety Act (No.

3) of 1953 gave the British governor general power to suspend

all laws and to proclaim a state of emergency. The Criminal

Law Amendment Act (No. 8) of 1953 stated that anyone

accompanying a person found guilty of offenses committed

while "protesting], or in support of any campaign for the

repeal or modification of any law," would also be presumed

guilty and would have the burden of proving his or her innocence. The Native Administration Act (No. 42) of 1956 permitted the government to "banish" Africans, essentially exiling

them to remote rural areas far from their homes. The Customs

and Excise Act of 1955 and the Official Secrets Act (No. 16) of

1956 gave the government power to establish a Board of Censors to censor books, films, and other materials imported into or produced in South Africa. During the 1950s, enforcement of

these various laws resulted in approximately 500,000 pass-law

arrests annually, in the listing of more than 600 inhabitants as communists, in the banning of nearly 350 inhabitants, and in

the banishment of more than 150 other inhabitants.

White Politics The National Party's legislative program received increasing

57
South Africa: A Country Study

support from the white electorate. The NP won re-election in

1953 and in 1958, each time with increased majorities. Malan

retired in 1955 and was replaced as prime minister byJ.G. Strydom, leader of the Transvaal branch of the party. After Strydom's death in 1958, Hendrik F. Verwoerd, the Dutch-born

minister of native affairs as well as a former professor of

applied psychology and the preeminent proponent of apartheid, became prime minister. The United Party (UP) competed aggressively for white votes by adopting a pro-white

platform, by rejecting government expenditures on acquiring

more land for African reserves, and by supporting the removal

of coloured voters from the common roll. In 1959 the more lib- eral members of the UP broke away to form the Progressive

Federal Party (PFP) but with little impact. Practically all Afrikaners and increasing numbers of English-speaking whites

voted for the National Party. In 1960 a majority of white voters,

irritated by growing world condemnation of apartheid, especially by the newly independent Asian and African members of

the British Commonwealth of Nations, supported Verwoerd's

proposal to make South Africa a republic, whereupon it left the

Commonwealth. In the 1961 general election, the NP won 105

seats, the UP forty-five, and the PFP only one. Black Resistance in the 1950s

The Congress Youth League and the Programme ofAction

In 1943, during World War II, young members of the ANC,

critical of what they considered its passivity, formed their own

organization, the Congress Youth League (CYL). Anton Lembede, president of the CYL from 1944 until his death in 1947,

stressed that South Africa was "a black man's country," in which

the concerns of Africans should take precedence. He argued

that African society was socialistic, but, because he considered

the conflict in South Africa to be primarily a racial rather than

a class struggle, he repudiated any alliance with the Communist Party in bringing about "national liberation." After the war and Lembede's death, and faced by the implementation of

apartheid, the CYL's leaders, Peter Mda, Jordan Ngubane, Nel- son Mandela, Oliver Tambo, and Walter Sisulu, strove to take

charge of the ANC. They called on the organization to adopt

the use of strikes, boycotts, stay-at-homes, and various forms of

civil disobedience and non-cooperation to make the apartheid

system unworkable. Overcoming the opposition of ANC presi58
Historical Setting

dent Alfred Xuma, the CYL succeeded in 1949 in electing

James Moroka to the presidency, in seating three CYL members

(Sisulu, Tambo, and Mandela) on the party's national executive body, and in persuading the congress formally to adopt the

program of action.

The ANC's new leaders formed a Joint Planning Council

with leaders of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC)

(unlike Lembede, the Mandela, Sisulu, and Tambo team

believed strongly in working with other groups) and in February 1952 called on the government to repeal all unjust laws or

face a Defiance Campaign starting on April 6, the tercentenary

of Jan van Riebeeck's arrival at the Cape. Malan rejected the

ultimatum. The ANC and the SAIC, led by Yusuf Dadoo, then

organized mass rallies and stay-at-homes for April 6 and June

26. These actions drew the support of thousands of men and

women. The government reacted by banning leaders and news- papers under the Suppression of Communism Act and by

arresting participants in the demonstrations. By December

1952, approximately 8,500 people had been arrested, most of

them in the Cape, and the Defiance Campaign had largely

come to an end without bringing about any change in the laws. The ANC had grown enormously, however: its paid membership had increased from fewer than 7,000 at the beginning of

1952 to more than 100,000 by the end of the year. Its leadership had also changed: James Moroka had been dismissed in

disgrace for having pleaded guilty to charges placed under the

Suppression of Communism Act, and Albert Luthuli had been

made president.

The Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter

House arrests, bannings, and other forms of government

restriction limited the ability of ANC and SAIC leaders to organize publicly in 1953 and 1954, but in 1955, approximately

3,000 delegates met on June 25 and June 26 near Soweto in a Congress of the People. They represented black (the ANC),

white (the Congress of Democrats), Indian (the SAIC), and

coloured (the Coloured People's Congress) political organizations and the multiracial South African Congress of Trade

Unions (SACTU). The congress was held to develop a new

vision for a future South Africa, one that reached beyond protest politics. The prime document discussed was the Freedom

Charter, which had been drafted several weeks before the congress met. The charter emphasized that South Africa should be

59
South Africa: A Country Study

a nonracial society with no particular group assumed to have

special rights or privileges. The charter stated that all people

should be treated equally before the law, that land should be

"shared among those who work it," and that the people should

"share in the country's wealth," a statement that has sometimes

been interpreted to mean a call for nationalization. The congress delegates had ratified almost all the sections of the charter when the police surrounded the meeting, announced that

they suspected treason was being committed, and recorded the

names and addresses of all those in attendance.

The Pan-Africanist Congress and Sharpeville

Struggles over apartheid legislation continued through the

remainder of the 1950s. In 1956 the police arrested 156 leaders, including Luthuli, Mandela, Tambo, Sisulu, and others,

and put them on trial for treason in a court case that dragged

on for five years. Mass resistance, however, continued in a variety of forms. Thousands of people participated in bus boycotts

on the Rand, preferring to walk to work rather than to pay high

fares to travel on substandard vehicles. Thousands of African

women, organized by the newly formed Federation of South

African Women (FSAW), protested the extension of the pass

laws. In 1956, 20,000 of them marched on the Parliament

buildings in Pretoria and presented a petition with the signa- tures of tens of thousands of people opposed to the pass laws.

Yet these efforts had little effect on the Nationalist government, which was determined to implement apartheid.

The failure to achieve any real success caused a major split in

black resistance in 1959. Critics within the ANC argued that its alliance with other political groups, particularly the white Congress of Democrats, caused their organization to make too

many compromises and to fail to represent African interests.

Influenced by the writings of Lembede, the Africanists, led by

Robert Sobukwe, called on the ANC to look to African interests

first and to take more action to challenge the government.

They were, however, forced out of the ANC, and they formed

their own organization, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) . In

March 1960, the PAC began a national campaign against the

pass laws and called on Africans to assemble outside police sta- tions without their passes and to challenge the police to arrest them. One such demonstration outside the police station at Sharpeville, a "native" township in the industrial area of

Vereeniging to the south ofJohannesburg, ended in violence

60
Historical Setting

when the police fired on the demonstrators, killing at least

sixty-seven of them and wounding 186. Most of the dead and

wounded were shot in the back. Stoppages and demonstrations

continued, including a peaceful march of 30,000 Africans on

the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town. Verwoerd's government reacted by declaring a state of emergency, by arresting

approximately 18,000 demonstrators, including the leaders of

the ANC and the PAC, and by outlawing both organizations.

Consolidating Apartheid in the 1960s

The ANC and the PAC Turn to Violence

Prohibited from operating peacefully or even having a legal

existence in South Africa, both the ANC and the PAC established underground organizations in 1961 to carry out their

struggle against the government. The militant wing of the

ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK—Spear of the Nation, also

known as Umkhonto), targeted strategic places such as police

stations and power plants but carefully avoided taking any

human lives. Poqo (Blacks Only), the militant wing of the PAC,

engaged in a campaign of terror, targeting in particular Afri- can chiefs and headmen believed to be collaborators with the

government and killing them. Some young white students and

professionals established their own organization, the antiapartheid African Resistance Movement, and carried out bomb

attacks on strategic targets, including one at the Johannesburg

railway station that killed at least one person.

By 1964 the police had succeeded in crushing all of these

movements. Seventeen Umkhonto leaders, including Walter

Sisulu, had been arrested at a farmhouse at Rivonia near Johannesburg in July 1963 and, along with Nelson Mandela

who had already been imprisoned on other charges—were

tried for treason. Eight of them, including Mandela, were sent

to prison for life. Albert Luthuli had been awarded the Nobel

Peace Prize in 1960, but the government confined him to his

rural home in Zululand until his death in 1967. Tambo

escaped from South Africa and became president of the ANC

in exile. Robert Sobukwe of Poqo was jailed on Robben Island

until 1969 and then placed under a banning order and house

arrest in Kimberley until his death in 1978. The Johannesburg

railway station bomber, John Harris, was hanged. He marched

to the gallows singing "We shall overcome."

61
South Africa: A Country Study

The government campaign to crush internal resistance was

orchestrated by John Vorster, then minister ofjustice, and by

General HendrikJ. (H.J.) van den Bergh, head of the Bureau

of State Security (BOSS). Both were former members of the

Ossewabrandwag who had been interned for pro-Nazi activities during World War II. Vorster and van den Bergh used new

security legislation to put down the resistance. In particular,

the General Law Amendment Act of 1963 allowed the police to detain people for ninety days without charging them and without allowing them access to a lawyer. At the end of that period,

the police could re-arrest and re-detain them for a further

ninety days. During the period of detention, no court could

order a person's release; only the minister of justice had that

authority. Because of his success in defeating the ANC and the

PAC, John Vorster became prime minister of South Africa in

1966 when Verwoerd was assassinated by a coloured parliamentary messenger.

Consolidating Apartheid

The government took several measures in the 1960s to make

the theory of apartheid work in practice. The Nationalists

wanted particularly to establish alternative political structures

for Africans in the homelands or reserves (see Glossary), and

to eliminate the squatter camps that had grown up around the

major cities in the 1930s and the 1940s. In 1963 the Transkei

homeland, poverty-stricken and overpopulated, was made self- governing, and in 1976 it was declared "independent,"

although no country except South Africa recognized the new

state. Other homelands were even less economically viable.

Bophuthatswana consisted of nineteen separate pieces of land

spread hundreds of kilometers apart, and KwaZulu (formed

out of Zululand and other parts of Natal in 1972) was divided

into at least eleven fragments interspersed with white farms

and coastal lands allocated to whites. The South African government, nonetheless, moved ahead with preparing them for

independence.

Under the provisions of the Group Areas Act, urban and

rural areas in South Africa were divided into zones in which

members of only one racial group could live; all others had to move. In practice, it was blacks who had to move, often under

the threat or use of force. Between 1963 and 1985, approximately 3.5 million blacks were removed from areas designated

for whites and were sent to the homelands, where they added

62
Historical Setting

to the already critical problem of overpopulation. Still, even though the homeland population rose by 69 percent between

1970 and 1980, the numbers of blacks in the cities continued to

rise through natural growth and evasion of influx control, so

that by 1980, after twenty years of removals, there were twice as many blacks in South Africa's towns as there were whites.

South Africa enjoyed an economic boom in the 1960s. Foreign investors had withdrawn their funds and white immigration had come to a halt in the immediate aftermath of

Sharpeville, but Vorster's harsh measures rebuilt confidence in

the security of investments and the stability of the state, and

money and people returned. Foreign investment in South

Africa, attracted by rates of return on capital often running as high as 15 to 20 percent, more than doubled between 1963 and

1972, while high immigration levels helped the white population to increase by 50 percent during the same period. Invest- ment and immigration fueled an impressive economic boom.

The Rise of Black Consciousness

Steve Biko and the South African Students ' Organisation

With the ANC and the PAC banned and African political

activity officially limited to government-appointed bodies in

the homelands, young people sought alternative means to

express their political aspirations. In the early 1960s, African

university students looked to the multiracial National Union of

South African Students (NUSAS) to represent their concerns,

but, as this organization adopted an increasingly conservative

stance after Vorster's crackdown, they decided to form their

own movement. Led by Steve Biko, an African medical student

at the University of Natal, a group of black students established

the South African Students' Organisation (SASO) in 1969 with

Biko as president. Biko, strongly influenced by the writings of

Lembede and by the Black Power movement in the United

States, argued that Africans had to run their own organizations; they could not rely on white liberals because such people

would always ally in the last resort with other whites rather than

with blacks. He argued that blacks often oppressed themselves

by accepting the second-class status accorded them by the

apartheid system, and he stressed that they had to liberate

themselves mentally as well as physically. He rejected, however,

the use of violence adopted by the ANC and the PAC in the

63
South Africa: A Country Study

early 1960s and emphasized that only nonviolent methods

should be used in the struggle against apartheid.

Biko's message had an immediate appeal; SASO expanded

enormously, and its members established black self-help

projects, including workshops and medical clinics, in many

parts of South Africa. In 1972 the Black Peoples' Convention

(BPC) was set up to act as a political umbrella organization for

the adherents of black consciousness. Although the government had at first welcomed the development of black con- sciousness because the philosophy fit in with the racial

separation inherent in apartheid, it sought to restrict the activi- ties of Biko and his organizations when these took a more

overtly political turn. In 1972, SASO organized strikes on university campuses resulting in the arrest of more than 600 stu- dents. Rallies held by SASO and the BPC in 1974 to celebrate

the overthrow of Portuguese colonialism in Angola and

Mozambique resulted in the banning of Biko and other black

consciousness leaders and their arraignment on charges of

fomenting terrorism.

Soweto, 1976

In 1974 the newly appointed minister of Bantu education,

Michael C. Botha, and his deputy, Andries Treurnicht, decided

to enforce a previously ignored provision of the Bantu Education Act that required Afrikaans to be used on an equal basis

with English as a medium of instruction. A shortage of Afrikaans teachers and a lack of suitable textbooks had resulted in

English and African languages being used as the languages of

instruction. Because Afrikaans was identified by Africans, especially by the young and by those sympathetic to black consciousness, as the language of the oppressor, opposition to this

new policy grew throughout 1975 and into 1976. Some African

school boards refused to enforce the policy and saw their members dismissed by the government. Students began to boycott

classes. On June 16, 1976, hundreds of high-school students in

Soweto, the African township southwest of Johannesburg,

marched in protest against having to use Afrikaans. The police

responded with tear gas and then with gunfire that left at least

three dead and a dozen injured. The demonstrators, joined by

angry crowds of Soweto residents, reacted by attacking and

burning down government buildings, including administrative

offices and beer halls. The government sent in more police

64
Historical Setting

and troops and quelled the violence within a few days but at the cost of several hundred African lives. Similar outbreaks occurred elsewhere in South Africa, and

violence continued throughout the rest of 1976 and into 1977.

By February 1977, official figures counted 494 Africans, sev- enty-five coloureds, one Indian, and five whites killed. In

August of that year, Steve Biko, who had been held in indefinite detention, died from massive head injuries sustained during police interrogation. By that time, SASO and the BPC had

been banned and open black resistance had been brought to a

halt. Government in Crisis, 1978-89

The Contradictions of Apartheid

By the middle of the 1970s, apartheid was clearly under

strain. The popularity of black consciousness and the massive

levels of participation in the Soweto demonstrations illustrated

profound discontent among the black population, particularly

the young, and an increasing readiness to challenge the system

physically. Indeed, hundreds of young Africans slipped across South Africa's northern borders in the aftermath of Soweto

and volunteered to fight as guerrilla soldiers for the ANC and

the PAC. In the late 1970s, some of these people began to reenter South Africa secretly and to carry out sabotage attacks on

various targets that were seen as symbols of apartheid.

Labor discontent had also grown. The combination of discriminatory legislation and employer reliance on the use of

inexpensive labor meant that African workers were poorly paid

and were subjected to an enormous number of restrictions (see

Legal Restrictions, ch. 3). Economic recession in the early

1970s, followed by inflation and a contraction in the job market, resulted in a dramatic upsurge in labor unrest. In the first three months of 1973, some 160 strikes involving more than

60,000 workers took place in Durban; in the early 1970s, no

more than 5,000 African workers had struck annually, and in

the 1960s the average had been closer to 2,000. Labor unrest

spread to East London and the Rand and continued. In addition to the high level of participation they engendered, the

strikes were also noteworthy for other features. Fearing that the

police would arrest any person who organized a strike, the

workers chose not to form representative bodies or to elect a

leadership. Rather than entering protracted negotiations, they

65
South Africa: A Country Study

also engaged in sudden "wildcat" strikes, thereby limiting the

ability of employers and police to take preventive measures. Over time, an African union movement developed out of these

strikes, but it did so on a factory-by-factory basis rather than

through the establishment of a mass-based industrial movement as had been the case in the 1940s.

Urban-based African strikes drew attention to the fact that,

despite the segregationist ambitions of apartheid, the South

African economy depended on blacks living and working in

supposedly white areas. Nearly three-quarters of South Africa's

urban population in 1980 was black. Only half of the African

population lived in the homelands, and even then the rural

land available was so inadequate that population densities were

far greater than they were in the rest of the country. At least

four-fifths of the homeland dwellers lived in poverty

Yet the South African government persisted in arguing that

Africans were really rural dwellers and that they should exercise political rights only in the homelands. In 1976 the government proclaimed the Transkei an independent nation-state

and followed this move by granting independence to

Bophuthatswana in 1977, to Venda in 1979, and to Ciskei in

1981. Citizens of these states, including the half who lived outside their borders, were then deemed aliens in South Africa.

Another six ethnically based homelands were granted limited

self-government in preparation for eventual independence:

they were KwaZulu, Lebowa, Gazankulu, QwaQwa, KaNgwane,

and KwaNdebele (see System of Government, ch. 4). None of

these states received international recognition.

Within South Africa, there was great opposition. Blacks

viewed the homelands as a way for whites to perpetuate a form

of "divide and rule." Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, the government-appointed head of the KwaZulu homeland, while

building up an ethnically oriented power base with his Inkatha

Freedom Party, argued that independence should not be

accepted on the government's terms because that would mean

Africans would be giving up claims to the bulk of South Africa

forever. He proposed instead the development of a unified

multiracial South African state (see The Interim Constitution,

ch. 4).

South Africa's international borders also became much less secure. Until 1974 South Africa had been part of a largely

white-ruled subcontinent, with the Portuguese still governing

their empire in Angola and Mozambique, and Ian Smith and

66
Historical Setting

his white-settler regime controlling Southern Rhodesia

(present-day Zimbabwe). Botswana had achieved independence soon after Lesotho in 1966 and Swaziland in 1968; however, they were surrounded by white-ruled areas, and their

economies depended on that of South Africa.

The 1974 overthrow of the government of Premier Marcello

Caetano in Portugal dramatically changed matters. Portugal

withdrew from Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and both

countries gained independence with governments that were

avowedly Marxist and that strongly denounced apartheid.

These events directly threatened South African control of

South-West Africa (called Namibia by the United Nations

[UN], which in 1969 had terminated South Africa's trusteeship over the territory and had demanded its return to the international organization). South African forces invaded Angola in

1975 but were forced to pull back by the arrival of Cuban

troops. Seeking both to destabilize the Angolan government

and to prevent infiltration of guerrilla fighters into Namibia

where the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)

was fighting actively against South African forces, South Africa

maintained a military force in southern Angola.

In Rhodesia, Africans fighting against Ian Smith's government began to turn the tide, and by 1979 Smith was forced to the negotiating table. In 1980 Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party

won a landslide election victory and formed a government

that, like those in Angola and Mozambique, was Marxist and

antiapartheid. The South African government thereafter pursued a policy of occasional armed intervention in Zimbabwe

and other frontline states and sent in strike teams periodically

to destroy what it considered to be bases for guerrillas planning

to infiltrate South Africa. South Africa also expanded military

support for the Mozambican National Resistance movement

(Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana—MNR or Renamo), an

organization originally formed by Ian Smith's security forces to destabilize the Mozambique government (see Relations with

African States, ch. 4; Regional Issues, ch. 5).

Crackdowns on opposition groups in South Africa and the

country's readiness to invade neighboring states led to increasing international condemnation of the apartheid regime. The

administrations of United States presidents Richard Nixon and

Gerald Ford, including United States secretary of state Henry

Kissinger, had favored working with the National Party govern67
South Africa: A Country Study

ment. They saw South Africa as a key strategic ally in the Cold

War and had both encouraged the invasion of Angola and

promised United States military support. President Jimmy

Carter, however, considered South Africa a liability for the

West. His vice president, Walter Mondale, told John Vorster

that the United States wanted South Africa to adopt a policy of

one person, one vote, a principle that the ANC upheld but that

no white group in South Africa, not even those opposed to apartheid, supported. Antiapartheid sentiments also grew in

Britain and in Europe, while the UN, composed of a majority

of Third World states, had in 1973 declared apartheid "a crime

against humanity" and in 1977 had declared mandatory the

existing embargo on the sale of arms to South Africa.

Such criticism had a considerable material impact. South

Africa had to invest large sums in the development of its own

armaments industry (see Arms Trade and the Defense Industry, ch. 5). Because of an embargo by the Organization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), it also had to pay

more for oil and purchased most of its supplies from the shah

of Iran until his overthrow in 1979. Foreign investment in

South Africa, on which the country depended for much of its economic growth, also became increasingly expensive and

uncertain in the second half of the 1970s. A growing sluggish- ness in the South African economy, coupled with concerns about the country's political stability in light of the Soweto

demonstrations, caused most investors to seek out more attractive ventures for their capital in other countries. Foreign capital still flowed into South Africa, but it was primarily in the

form of short-term loans rather than investments. In 1976, for

example, two-thirds of the foreign funds entering South Africa were in short-term loans, usually of twelve months' duration

(see External Debt, ch. 3).

Divisions in the White Community

Increasing economic and political pressures caused splits in

the white political parties. In 1968 Vorster had dismissed three

conservatives from his cabinet. One of these, Albert Hertzog, a son of J.B.M. Hertzog, founded the Reconstituted National

Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party—HNP). Hertzog and the

HNP argued that no concessions should be made in pursuing

the full implementation of apartheid, whereas Vorster and his

allies argued that compromise was necessary. The split was commonly labeled a division between the verligtes (the enlight68
Historical Setting

ened) and the verkramptes (the narrow-minded), although the

differences often seemed to be primarily tactical rather than

ideological. The HNP contested elections in 1970 and in 1974

but without winning a single seat from Vorster. In 1978, however, the unfolding of a major national scandal brought about

Vorster's downfall. An official investigation determined that

Vorster, together with a small group of supporters including

the head of the Security Police, General HJ. van den Bergh,

had secretly and illegally used government funds to manipulate

the news media in South Africa and to try to purchase newspapers overseas, including the Washington Star. Vorster resigned

his position as prime minister for the largely ceremonial post

of president; his preferred successor, Connie Mulder, was purged from the National Party, and P.W. Botha, minister of

defence since 1966, became prime minister.

Botha, strongly supported by Afrikaner businessmen and by

the armed forces leaders, initiated a self-styled program of

reform. He tried to do away with aspects of "petty" apartheid

that many had come to regard as unnecessarily offensive to blacks and to world opinion, such as the allocation of separate

public facilities and the use of racially discriminatory signs to designate who could use the facilities. Hoping to develop a black middle class that would be impervious to the socialist

message of the ANC, Botha also accepted in large part the rec- ommendations of two government commissions appointed to investigate the way labor and pass laws were applied to Africans.

The Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (Wiehahn Commission), established in the aftermath of the strike wave of the early 1970s, argued that blacks should be allowed to register trade unions and to have them recognized as part of

the official conciliation process. The commission also recom- mended the elimination of statutory job reservation. Legislation incorporating these recommendations was passed in 1979

and resulted in a huge growth in African trade unionism in the

early 1980s.

The Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the

Utilisation of Manpower (Riekert Commission), accepting the

fact that poverty in the homelands would continue to push tens

of thousands of Africans into the cities, recommended in 1979

that instead of using the pass laws to punish Africans who were

illegally entering urban areas, the government should prosecute employers and landlords if they gave jobs or housing to blacks who lacked documentary proof of their right to live in

69
South Africa: A Country Study

the cities. Botha accepted this recommendation, although it was not until eight years and more than 1 million arrests later

that he introduced legislation abolishing the pass laws. At the same time, Botha pursued harsh measures against

those he deemed his enemies in order to ensure the maintenance of white power. The late 1970s and early 1980s were marked by numerous military interventions in the states bordering South Africa and by an extensive military and political

campaign to eliminate SWAPO in Namibia. Within South

Africa, vigorous police action and strict enforcement of security legislation resulted in hundreds of arrests and bannings

and an effective end to the ANC's stepped-up campaign of sabotage in the 1970s. Botha also continued to support the homeland policy, arguing as his predecessors had done that Africans

should exercise political rights only within what were deemed

to be their own communities, which in the 1980s continued to be as small and fragmented as they had been in the 1950s.

Yet one issue loomed ever larger in the eyes of apartheid's

architects, and that was the matter of demographics. Whereas

whites had accounted for 21 percent of South Africa's population in 1936, by 1980 they constituted only 16 percent. Future

projections estimated that by 2010 the white proportion would

be less than 10 percent and falling, while the African population would make up 83 percent of the total and would be

increasing. In light of these projections, Botha's government

proposed in 1983 that political power in South Africa be shared

among whites, coloureds, and Indians, with separate houses of

parliament to be established for each racial group. This proposal caused angry opposition among a number of National

Party members, sixteen of whom, including Andries Treurnicht, were expelled when they refused to sign a motion of confidence in Botha's leadership.

Treurnicht formed the Conservative Party of South Africa

(CP), bringing together old enemies of Botha such as Connie

Mulder and supporters of the verkrampte faction of the NP.

Botha proceeded with his plans, calling for a referendum in

which only white voters would be asked whether or not they

approved of the prime minister's plans for constitutional

change. Some liberal opponents of the government, such as Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leader of the Progressive Federal

Party (PFP), and Harry Oppenheimer, head of the Anglo

American Corporation, denounced Botha's plans because they

would permanently exclude Africans from having any political

70
Historical Setting

role in South Africa. Many other politicians and businessmen,

English- and Afrikaans-speaking alike, argued that any change

in apartheid would be an improvement. Most white voters

agreed, and two-thirds of those who participated in the referendum voted "yes."

Limited Reforms

The new constitution came into force in 1984. In place of

the single House of Parliament, there were three constituent

bodies: a 178-member (all-white) House of Assembly, an eightyfive-member (coloured) House of Representatives, and a fortyfive-member (Indian) House of Delegates. Whites thus

retained a majority in any joint session. Presiding over the

three houses was the state president, a new office quite unlike

the ceremonial position that it replaced. The state president was chosen by an eighty-eight-member electoral college that

preserved the 4:2:1 ratio of whites:coloureds:Indians. The president could dissolve Parliament at any time and was authorized

to allocate issues to each of the three houses (see System of

Government, ch. 4). P.W. Botha became the first state president, occupying the position from the beginning of 1984 until

late 1989.

Most blacks strongly condemned the new constitution.

Rather than viewing it as a major step toward reform, they saw

it as one more effort to bolster apartheid. It reinforced the

apartheid notion that Africans were not, and could never be

considered as, citizens of South Africa, despite the fact that

they constituted 75 percent of the country's population and

the vast bulk of its labor force. The constitution's negative

impact was compounded by the fact that Africans could not

buy land outside the homelands and that government services

for blacks, especially in education, were deliberately inferior

(see Education under Apartheid, ch. 2).

Indians and coloureds argued that the continued existence

of a white majority in Parliament and effective white monopolization of the state presidency made their incorporation into

the political process little more than window-dressing.

Although the (coloured) Labour Party of Allan Hendrickse

and the (Indian) National Peoples' Party of Amichand Rajbansi

participated in elections in 1984 for the House of Representatives and the House of Delegates, only 30 percent of registered

coloured voters and only 20 percent of registered Indian voters

cast ballots.

71
South Africa: A Country Study

Opposition to the government's plans consolidated. The

United Democratic Front (UDF), which was formed in late

1983 as 1,000 delegates representing 575 organizations—ranging from trade unions to sporting bodies—aimed to use nonviolent means to persuade the government to withdraw its constitutional proposals, to do away with apartheid, and to cre- ate a new South Africa incorporating the homelands. In early

1984, the UDF claimed a membership of more than 600 organizations and 3 million individuals; and two respected religious

leaders, Bishop Desmond Tutu and the Reverend Allan Boesak, emerged as its prime spokesmen.

Black trade unions, many formed after the Wiehahn Commission, took an increasingly prominent role in economic and

political protests in the mid-1980s. They organized strikes in

East London and on the Rand protesting economic conditions

as well as the constitutional proposals. The National Union of

Mineworkers (NUM), newly formed under the leadership of

Cyril Ramaphosa, successfully enlisted the support of almost all African miners in bringing work to a stop in a dispute over wage increases. NUM also joined with thirty other nonracial

unions in December 1985 to form the Congress of South Afri- can Trade Unions (COSATU), an umbrella organization that

represented more than 500,000 trade union members and won

new members almost every month. By the end of 1985, there

had been more than 390 strikes involving 240,000 workers, and

industrial unrest was increasing.

Conflict was even more intense in the townships, where resi- dents attacked and burned government buildings and sought

to destroy all elements of the apartheid administration.

Numerous attacks were made on the homes of black policemen

and town councillors, whose participation was necessary to the

government's operation of township administration. Violence

broke out in some of the homelands, particularly in Lebowa,

KwaNdebele, and Bophuthatswana, involving struggles

between supporters and opponents of homeland "independence." Sabotage also increased, including bombings of police

stations, power installations, and—in one particularly dramatic

instance in May 1983—the headquarters of the South African

Air Force in Pretoria. Deaths from violence increased, many of

them at the hands of the police. Whereas in 1984 there had

been 174 fatalities linked to political unrest, in 1985 the number increased to 879, and it continued to rise after that.

72
Historical Setting

International pressures on the South African government

also intensified in the mid-1980s. Antiapartheid sentiment in

the United States, fueled in large part by television coverage of

the ongoing violence in South Africa, heightened demands for

the removal of United States investments and for the imposition of official sanctions. In 1984 forty United States companies

pulled out of South Africa, with another fifty following suit in

1985. In July 1985, Chase Manhattan Bank caused a major

financial crisis in South Africa by refusing to roll over its shortterm loans, a lead that was soon followed by most other international banks, fueling inflation and eroding South African liv- ing standards (see Historical Development, ch. 3). In October

1986, the United States Congress, overriding a presidential

veto, passed legislation implementing mandatory sanctions

against South Africa; these included the banning of all new

investments and bank loans, the ending of air links between

the United States and South Africa, and the banning of many

South African imports.

President Botha activated security legislation to deal with

these crises. In mid-1985 he imposed the first in a series of

states of emergency in various troubled parts of South Africa;

this was the first time such laws had been used since the

Sharpeville violence in 1960. The state of emergency was

extended throughout the nation the following year. The emer- gency regulations gave the police powers to arrest without warrants and to detain people indefinitely without charging them

or even allowing lawyers or next of kin to be notified. It also

gave the government even greater authority than the considerable powers it already possessed to censor radio, television, and

newspaper coverage of the unrest. Botha deployed police and

more than 5,000 troops in African townships to quell the

spreading resistance. By February 1987, unofficial estimates

claimed that at least 30,000 people had been detained, many

for several months at a time.

South Africa's complex and fragmented society became

increasingly polarized around antiapartheid groups, who

expressed a growing sense of urgency in their demands for an end to the failed system of racial separation, and white conservative defenders of apartheid, who intensified their resistance

to change. Facing mounting international disapproval and eco- nomic stagnation, the government tentatively began to signal

its awareness that its plan for separate development by race would have to be substantially altered or abandoned.

73
South Africa: A Country Study

In January 1986, President Botha shocked conservatives in

the all-white House of Assembly with the statement that South

Africa had "outgrown the outdated concept of apartheid." The

government undertook tentative, incremental change, at a

carefully controlled pace, and, as it began to yield to demands

for racial equality, it severely limited the activities of antiapartheid agitators. The government tightened press restrictions,

effectively banned the UDF and other activist organizations,

and renewed a series of states of emergency throughout the

rest of the 1980s.

As the inevitability of political change became apparent,

conservative whites expressed new fears for the future. The CP

swamped the PFP in parliamentary by-elections in May 1987,

making the CP the official parliamentary opposition. Liberal

whites and other opponents of apartheid reorganized to broaden their popular appeal, first as the National Democratic

Movement (NDM) and later as a new United Party. This coalition tried unsuccessfully to win support from the progressive

wing of the NP. Within the NP, progressives were outmaneuvered by conservatives, who bolted from the party to join the

CP in an attempt to prolong apartheid. In early 1988, the government, seeking to stem the erosion of its NP support, tightened press restrictions and further restricted political activity

by antiapartheid organizations. Still excluded from national

politics, blacks sought new avenues for pressing their demands,

and their demonstrations often erupted in violence. Supporters of the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and

the banned ANC clashed in an upsurge of "black-on-black" violence that would cause as many as 10,000 deaths by 1994.

President Botha suffered a stroke in January 1989. Choosing

his successor almost split the NP, but when Botha resigned as party leader a month later, NP moderates managed to elect

Minister of Education Frederik W. (F.W.) de Klerk to succeed

him. A few weeks later, the NP elected de Klerk state president,

too, but Botha stubbornly refused to step down for several

months. Soon after he resigned under pressure on August 14,

1989, the electoral college named de Klerk to succeed him in a

five-year term as president.

Dismantling Apartheid, 1990-94

President de Klerk recognized the urgent need to bring the

black majority of South Africans into the political process, and

most NP moderates agreed with him in principle. He had held

74
Historical Setting

secret talks with the imprisoned ANC leader Mandela to begin

preparations for this major policy shift. De Klerk nonetheless

surprised some supporters and critics alike when he

announced on February 2, 1990, not only the impending

release of Mandela, but also the unbanning of the ANC, the

PAC, and the SACP, and the removal of restrictions on the UDF

and other legal political organizations. De Klerk also lifted the

four-year-old media restrictions, and he invited former liberation fighters to join the government at the negotiating table to prepare for a new multiracial constitution. De Klerk pledged

that his government would investigate alleged human rights

abuses by the security forces. He also sought improved relations with the rest of Africa by proposing joint regional development planning with neighboring states and by inviting other

African leaders to increase trade with South Africa.

Widely hailed as historic, de Klerk's speech was nonetheless

attacked by antiapartheid critics for what it lacked—it did not

mention the two most despised legislative pillars of apartheid,

the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act. It did not lift all of the security provisions that had been imposed

under states of emergency. At the same time, CP leader Treurnicht, calling for de Klerk's resignation, said de Klerk lacked

the authority to carry out such sweeping changes, and he

accused de Klerk of helping to destroy the Afrikaner volk. As Mandela was released on February 11, 1990, at age sev- enty-one after twenty-seven years in prison, South Africans

poured into the streets in celebration. His first words were to assure his supporters in the ANC that his release was not part

of a "deal" with the government, and to reassure whites that he

intended to work toward reconciliation. He also quoted his

well-known statement at the Rivonia trial in 1964, "I have

fought against white domination, and I have fought against

black domination. I have cherished the idea of a democratic

and free society in which all persons live together in harmony

and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am

prepared to die."

In the flurry of receptions and public statements that fol- lowed, Mandela enunciated other objectives that were less welcome in political and business circles. He reaffirmed ANC

policies in favor of nationalization of major sectors of the econ- omy. He refused to renounce the armed struggle immediately,

refused to call for the lifting of international sanctions against

75
South Africa: A Country Study

South Africa until further progress was achieved, and refused

to accept an interim power-sharing arrangement proposed by

the government. ANC officials elected Mandela deputy president in March 1990, giving him effective control over policy

decisions in consultation with their ailing president, Oliver

Tambo.

Despite the ANC's strong symbolic displays of unity, like

other political organizations facing new challenges, it showed

widening internal fractures. Blacks who had been unanimous

in their demands for Mandela's release from prison, nonetheless differed sharply in the extent of their willingness to reconcile peacefully over past injustices. In addition, militant black

consciousness leaders, especially in the Pan-Africanist Congress

(PAC), rejected outright Mandela's proposals for multiracial

government and demanded black control over future decisionmaking institutions. At PAC offices in Zimbabwe, PAC leader

Zephania Mothopeng rejected appeals by Mandela and by Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe for the PAC leader to join

Mandela in discussions in Pretoria.

Some of the ANC's estimated 40,000 exiles began returning

to South Africa in the early 1990s, and as organizational leaders

debated their future role, many militant former exiles and others rejected Mandela's conciliatory approach and insisted on

continuing the armed struggle. Left-wing ANC factions pressed

Mandela to demand the immediate nationalization of privatesector conglomerates. The ANC was also accused of abuse and

brutality against dissidents during its nearly three decades of

operating underground and outside South Africa—accusations

Mandela acknowledged were based in fact. Old and young lib- eration fighters appeared capable of warring even against one

another as the end of apartheid approached.

The Quest for Peace

Amid rising tensions and unrest, representatives of the government and the ANC—with strong misgivings—met in Cape

Town in May 1990 to begin planning for constitutional negotiations. Even holding "talks about talks" was risky. The government had to grant immunity from prosecution to many

formerly banned or exiled ANC members before they could

safely appear in public. In a few antiapartheid strongholds,

political moderates were attacked for being too conciliatory.

President de Klerk faced an increasingly divided constituency of his own. Conservatives intensified their demands for

76
Historical Setting

him to step down, while NP progressives pressured him to move more boldly toward multiracial government. Planning

sessions for eventual negotiations were postponed repeatedly

as Mandela and de Klerk had to reassure their constituencies of

their determination to set aside the past and to work peacefully

toward a broadly legitimate government.

De Klerk's credibility was low among his former opponents.

The talks snarled over his insistence on defending what he

termed the "rights of minorities"—a phrase the ANC viewed

simply as a ploy to preserve white control. De Klerk's standing

in the negotiations was further weakened in late 1990, when

the government-appointed Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders (Harms Commission), which he had

established earlier that year, found evidence—but not

"proof—that clandestine death squads had operated within

the security services. The commission's hearings were often

marred by violence and by claims of witness intimidation.

The international response to change in South Africa was

cautious. Several African countries, visited by Mandela within

weeks of his release from prison, held to their pledge to await

his signal of progress toward ending apartheid before they

began to lift sanctions against South Africa. Several European

countries, visited by de Klerk in May 1990, broke with European Community (EC—see Glossary) sanctions agreements

and immediately lifted their bans on investment and travel to South Africa. International athletic teams were drawn into the

controversy, as some sports organizations tried to adhere to international boycotts, while in South Africa, sports enthusiasts

and athletes demanded readmission to world competitions. In

late 1990, both de Klerk and Mandela again went abroad seeking political and financial support. De Klerk traveled to the

United States in September 1990 and to Britain and the Netherlands in October; at about the same time, Mandela traveled

to India, Japan, and other Asian countries.

Popular pressure for lifting sanctions increased in the

United States. The US Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act of

1986 had specified that five conditions would have to be met

before sanctions could be lifted. By late 1990, three of them

had been accomplished—the government had entered into

multiracial negotiations, had removed bans on multiracial

political organizations, and had lifted the state of emergency in

Natal. The remaining two conditions—freeing political prison77
South Africa: A Country Study

ers and repealing the Group Areas Act and the Population Registration Act—were not met until 1991.

The climate of uncertainty spread to the homelands during

1990 and 1991. These arid patches of land were despised by

many as symbols of the apartheid system. Several homeland

leaders, who depended heavily on Pretoria for their legitimacy—and their budgets—faced growing dissent and demands

for reincorporation into South Africa. Zulu residents of the

wealthiest and most populous homeland, KwaZulu, increasingly feared that their interests and culture would be submerged in the groundswell of support for Mandela and the

ANC, and that their past cooperation with the NP would be for- gotten.

ANC and government leaders tried to find common ground

for negotiating a new constitution, but they managed only

incremental progress while they worked to rein in the extremist fringes of their respective constituencies. In June 1990, de

Klerk and Mandela met officially for the first time to set the

agenda for further talks. The two sides moved cautiously

toward each other. In August Mandela announced the suspension of the ANC's thirty-year armed struggle. The government

continued lifting apartheid restrictions, and in October—at de

Klerk's prompting—the NP opened its ranks to all races. On

October 15, 1990, parliament repealed the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953, which had sanctioned "petty apartheid" in public places such as beaches, libraries, and places of

entertainment.

The talks were threatened by escalating violence throughout

1990, and in August Mandela accused the government of doing

little to end it. De Klerk and Mandela continued their political

tug-of-war. De Klerk sought domestic and international

approval for the changes already under way, while Mandela

pressed for change at a faster pace. A series of legislative decisions and political breakthroughs in 1990 moved South Africa

closer to multiracial democracy, but at the end of the year, it was clear that many obstacles remained.

The ANC gradually accepted the notion of a coalition

interim government, but ANC leaders insisted on determining

the rules for forming that coalition. In early 1991, debates

raged over various formulas for multiracial government, and

over the allocation of powers between regional and national

authorities, as political leaders on all sides realized that it was

easier to define an illegitimate government than to construct a

78
Historical Setting

legitimate one. They agreed that an all-party congress would

have responsibility for the most onerous organizational tasks: it would draw up broad principles on which a new constitution

would rest, would determine the makeup of the constitutionmaking body, and would establish an interim government to oversee the transition itself. In January 1991, Mandela met for the first time in nearly

thirty years with Zulu leader Buthelezi in an effort to allay Zulu

fears of ANC domination. This historic meeting did little to quell escalating ANC-IFP violence, however, and the weak

police response only fueled ANC suspicions of covert police

support for the IFP. Amid rising unrest, the government implemented a new security crackdown in the townships, dubbed

"Operation Iron Fist." Mandela faced new demands from his

militant younger generation of followers to abandon the negotiations entirely.

Finally, in February 1991, de Klerk and Mandela reached a compromise over efforts to reduce both violence and the

smuggling of arms into South Africa, and to achieve the release

of political prisoners. The ANC was anxious to repatriate its remaining exiles, many of whose skills were needed in the

negotiations, but the logistical problems of returning refugees

from countries that lacked diplomatic ties with South Africa

seemed insurmountable until the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was persuaded to intervene

on behalf of the ANC.

OnJune 5, 1991, the government repealed two more legislative pillars of apartheid, the Land Act of 1913 (and 1936) and

the Group Areas Act of 1950. The 1991 legislation gave all races equal rights to own property anywhere in the country, enabled

some 300,000 black householders to convert ninety-nine-year

leases to full ownership, enabled suburban residents of all races

to set (racially nondiscriminatory) residency standards for

their neighborhoods, authorized the establishment of new

townships and the extension of services to their residents, and

encouraged the development of farmland and rural communities. This legislation did not authorize compensation for blacks

who had been displaced from their land in the preceding thirty

years; instead, it left their complaints to be dealt with by a special court or commission to be established for that purpose.

On June 17, 1991, the government repealed the Population

Registration Act of 1950, the most infamous pillar of apartheid,

which had authorized the registration by race of newborn

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South Africa: A Country Study

babies and immigrants. Its repeal was hailed as historic

throughout the world, although critics pointed to related laws

still on the books that permitted inequitable treatment in vot- ing, in pensions, in social services, and in many other areas of

public behavior.

The National Peace Accord of September 1991 was a critical step toward formal negotiations. The thirty-three-page accord,

signed by representatives of twenty-seven political organizations and national and homeland governments, set codes of

conduct for all parties to the process, including the police. The

accord also established a network of "peace committees," to contain the violence that continued to plague the townships.

Ironically, the most important results of the National Peace

Accord turned out to be the establishment of networks of committed individuals, the opening of communications channels,

and the trust that began to be sown through discussion. The

accord itself failed to accomplish its immediate goal; the violence continued and increased sporadically throughout 1992.

"Irreversible Progress" Toward Democracy

Through dogged perseverance, amid claims and counterclaims of sabotage and brutality, key political leaders began for- mal constitutional negotiations on December 20, 1991. Calling

themselves the Convention for a Democratic South Africa

(Codesa), delegations from nineteen governmental and political organizations began planning the creation of a transitional

government and a representative parliament. They established

five working groups, each made up of thirty-eight delegates

and thirty-eight advisers, to take the lead in creating a climate

for free political activity; in determining basic constitutional

principles; in establishing transitional procedures for the nominally independent homelands of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei,

Transkei, and Venda; in setting and overseeing timetables for

the transition; and in dealing with new problems that would

arise during the transition itself. International organizations and other countries were torn

between recognizing South Africa's impressive accomplishments and encouraging further progress. Most international

sanctions were lifted soon after the Population Registration

Act, Group Areas Act, and Land Acts were repealed. In July

1991, the United States Congress lifted remaining sanctions

under its Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, although laws

restricting commercial ties with South Africa remained on the

80
Historical Setting

books in many states and cities in the United States. The EC

lifted most trade and investment bans in January 1992 and

remaining restrictions on sporting, scientific, and cultural links

three months later. On April 6, 1992, the EC lifted its oil

embargo. Other countries gradually lifted a range of boycotts,

and many African governments—under pressure from their

own business communities—reestablished diplomatic ties with

South Africa. The United Nations General Assembly would wait

until late 1993 to lift remaining UN sanctions.

Much of de Klerk's effort in 1992 was directed toward

appeasing and weakening his right-wing opponents—staunch

defenders of apartheid who had broken with the NP during the

1980s. He first tried reassuring them about the future. Then, as conservative resistance hardened, he called for a referendum

among white voters to test his mandate for change. The question posed in the March 17, 1992, referendum was carefully

worded: "Do you support continuation of the reform process

which the State President began on February 2, 1990, and

which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?"

The outcome was a resounding 68.6 percent "yes." Election

analysts reported that support among Afrikaners was even

slightly higher than among English speakers. Only one region

of the country—the northern Transvaal (later Northern Province) —voted "no." A few militant defenders of apartheid boycotted the referendum.

Buoyed by the outcome, de Klerk presented Codesa with

proposals for a two-phase transition, the first phase managed

by transitional councils appointed by Codesa, and the second

phase—the constitution-writing process—managed by an

elected transitional government headed by a multiperson presidency and a bicameral legislature. The ANC's counterproposals called for a single-stage transition, a committee elected by

proportional representation to draft the constitution, with a

two-thirds majority needed to pass constitutional provisions.

Negotiations were suspended as both sides sought to refine

their proposals and to unify their constituencies.

In mid-1992 escalating violence, allegations of police brutality, and government financial scandals threatened to derail

negotiations. After a particularly brutal attack on June 17,

1992, by IFP supporters on ANC sympathizers in Boipatong, a township near Johannesburg, the ANC suspended negotiations

and threatened to withdraw entirely unless the government

made greater efforts to end the violence and to curtail covert

81
South Africa: A Country Study

police support for the IFP. Mandela took his complaint to the

Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN, where, on

July 15, 1992, he accused the government of "a cold-blooded

strategy of state terrorism." Finally, in September 1992, de

Klerk and Mandela arrived at a Record of Understanding

affirming police responsibility for protecting residents in workers' hostels, where support for the ANC was high. ANC fears

lingered, however, especially in late 1992, when the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence

and Intimidation (Goldstone Commission) released its findings of a "dirty tricks" campaign against the ANC, apparently

sanctioned by senior figures within the South African Defence

Forces (SADF).

In protest against the Record of Understanding, Zulu leader

Buthelezi established an alternative to Codesa to include the

leaders of groups disadvantaged by the ANC's strong lead in

the Codesa forum—i.e., white conservatives and black homeland leaders, whose power bases were eroding. The resulting

Concerned South Africans Group (Cosag) pressed for a federal

constitution to preserve the rights of ethnic minorities, especially the Zulu and whites.

Negotiations resumed on March 5, 1993, but the fragile process was again threatened a month later, when Chris Hani, the

popular general secretary of the South African Communist

Party (SACP), was murdered. ANC leaders joined the government in trying to stem outbreaks of retaliatory violence, and

several white extremists were arrested within weeks after the

murder. With a new sense of urgency, political negotiators tried

to speed the process and set the date for nationwide elections

no later than April 27, 1994.

The draft constitution published onJuly 26, 1993, contained

concessions to all sides—a federal system of regional legislatures, equal voting rights regardless of race, and a bicameral

legislature. Negotiators were undeterred by the storm of protests that followed, and they went on to establish a Transitional

Executive Council (TEC), a multiracial body that would share

executive responsibilities with President de Klerk during election preparations. Cosag boycotted the TEC and formed the

Freedom Alliance to demand equal status with the government

and the ANC. Sensing new momentum, however, the government cracked down on right-wing violence and tried to reason with white extremists, without slowing the pace of election

preparations.

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Historical Setting

Preparing for Elections

In November 1993, negotiators endorsed the draft of the

interim constitution calling for a five-year transitional government, and the tricameral parliament endorsed the draft in

December (see The Interim Constitution, ch. 4). The timetable for elections remained firm after that. Mandela and the

ANC, sensing their imminent rise to power and to responsibility for the country's welfare, called for the immediate lifting of

remaining international sanctions and sought new donors and

investors for South Africa. But the ongoing violence, which was

frightening away investors, also threatened to delay the April

elections.

In December 1993, the multiracial TEC was installed as part

of the executive branch of government—over the objections of

the Freedom Alliance and the PAC. The TEC quickly established seven subcouncils with specific responsibilities during

the transition. It also approved the formation of an elevenmember Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to organize

and to verify the planned elections, and it deployed police and

army units to northern Natal to try to end the violence.

Other countries and international organizations began

mobilizing support for South Africa's historic vote. The United

Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA), which

had deployed in small numbers to quell township violence in

August 1992, expanded its mission to about 2,000 personnel to coordinate the teams of election observers that were being sent

by the OAU, the European Union (EU—see Glossary), the

British Commonwealth, and several individual countries.

The antielection Freedom Alliance began to unravel in early

1994. White conservatives stepped up their demands for a separate, whites-only homeland—dispelling any illusions of support

for their Freedom Alliance partners. The government of

Ciskei, a homeland where the ANC's popularity exceeded that

of the appointed president, broke away from its alliance part- ners and declared its intention to permit homeland residents

to vote. The government in Bophuthatswana—another Freedom Alliance partner facing strong popular opposition

sought armed support from the neo-Nazi Afrikaner Resistance

Movement (Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging—AWB), prompting the SADF to intervene and to remove Bophuthatswana

President Lucas Mangope from office. With the Freedom Alli- ance severely weakened, PAC President Clarence Makwetu

another election holdout—announced that group's suspension

83
South Africa: A Country Study

of its armed struggle, thus opening the way for election participation by its members.

Violence continued, mostly between supporters of the IFP

and the ANC, and the TEC authorized rapid training for a 10,000-member national peacekeeping force—an effort that

eventually failed. The force was disbanded as the elections

began. The Goldstone Commission found evidence of serious

police complicity in the continuing unrest, and the government suspended several officers pending investigations. The

country appeared poised to launch into violence-wracked balloting, when de Klerk imposed a state of emergency in Natal

and KwaZulu on March 31, 1994, deploying 3,000 SADF troops

to allow residents of the area to defy the IFP election boycott

and to go to the polls.

On April 12, 1994, a team of international mediators headed

by former British foreign secretary Lord Carrington and

former United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger arrived

to attempt to break the logjam that was keeping the IFP out of

the elections. After two days of fruitless discussions, their effort was declared a failure, and the mediators left. Only days later,

however, on April 19, Buthelezi—under intense pressure from

trusted local and international figures—relented and agreed to allow the IFP to be placed on the ballot. When the elections finally took place on schedule, beginning on April 26, 1994, the government and the ANC had sev- eral thousand security forces, with varying degrees of training

and authority, in place to prevent serious outbreaks of violence.

Remarkably, the violence subsided. A few "exceptional" votes were cast by voters who were disabled or were living outside

South Africa on April 26. During the next two days, more than

22 million voters stood in line for hours at some 9,000 polling

places to exercise their newly won right to vote. Balloting was extended through April 29. There was no voter registration list, so IEC officials marked voters' fingers with indelible ink to prevent fraud.

For days after the elections, tensions remained high, and

some accusations of election fraud surfaced—especially in

Natal. As the counting proceeded, the IEC prompted party

leaders to negotiate agreements over disputed results that

would allow the IEC to certify the elections as "substantially

free and fair." The official results, released on May 6, 1994,

gave the ANC 62.6 percent of the vote; the NP, 20.4 percent;

and the IFP, 10.5 percent. Seven political parties won seats in

84
Historical Setting

the National Assembly (see table 17, Appendix). Three parties

won the 5 percent of votes necessary to participate in the cabinet of the coalition government.

Mandela was unanimously elected president by the National

Assembly on May 9, 1994, in Cape Town. His two deputy presidents, former ANC chairman Thabo Mbeki and former president de Klerk, stood with Mandela when he was inaugurated

on May 10 at ceremonies in Pretoria. Representatives of 140

countries were present. Mandela's inaugural address stressed

the need for reconciliation, both within South Africa and with

other countries, and once again he quoted his own words at the Rivonia trial that had preceded his long imprisonment, and

he reaffirmed his determination to forge a peaceful, nonracial

society.

* * * Two excellent histories of South Africa have recently been

published. Leonard M. Thompson's A History of South Africa

provides a well-written and scholarly survey by the foremost his- torian of the country. Reader's Digest's An Illustrated History of

South Africa: The Real Story offers much more detailed coverage

but without any sacrifice of scholarly quality. Useful chapters

surveying the history of South Africa can also be found in the

multi-volume Cambridge History of Africa and in the two-volume

Oxford History of South Africa. Richard Elphick and Hermann

Giliomee's The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840 is essential reading on the early history of the Cape. Martin Hall's

Farmers, Kings, and Traders provides an innovative study that

shifts the focus of pre-1870 history away from the Cape and

toward developments in southern Africa at large. T. Dunbar

Moodie's The Rise ofAfrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the Afri- kaner Civil Religion is still the basic text on Afrikaner nationalism. Willem A. de Klerk's The Puritans in Africa: The Story of

Afrikanerdom is also interesting, in large part because it was written by the brother of the former president of South Africa.

Tom Lodge's Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 provides a very detailed study of resistance movements up to the early

1980s, although for a thorough analysis of black consciousness

the reader needs to consult Gail M. Gerhart's Black Power in

South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology. Three studies co-edited

by Shula Marks and others bring together the most recent writings by "radical" authors who have dominated much of the

85
South Africa: A Country Study

scholarship produced on South Africa in the 1970s and the

1980s: Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa', Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa; and The Politics ofRace,

Class, and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa. Finally,

Joseph Lelyveld's Pulitzer Prize-winning Move Your Shadow:

South Africa, Black and White is the finest journalistic study ever

written about South Africa. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

86
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Farmhouse withfamiliar windmill beneath flat-topped ridges along the south- ern edge of the Great Karoo
SOCIETY IS STILL BEING FORMED in South Africa in the

1990s. The region's earliest cultures have long since been dis- placed, and most people living in South Africa today are descendants of Africans who came to the region in the first millennium A.D. These early populations did not remain in one

place over the centuries, however. Instead, their settlement pat- terns changed as numerous small chiefdoms were thrown into

upheaval by increasing conflicts over land, the arrival of European settlers after the seventeenth century, and nineteenthcentury Zulu expansionism. During the twentieth century, sev- eral million South Africans were displaced by the government,

especially after the country's system of apartheid (see Glossary)

• invalidated many of their land claims.

South Africa's turbulent social history should not obscure

the fact that this region probably was home to some of the earliest humans on earth. Archaeological evidence suggests that

human populations evolved in the broad region of south central and eastern Africa, perhaps as early as 2 million years ago,

but at least 200,000 years ago. Fossil remains of Homo sapiens

in eastern South Africa have been tentatively dated to 50,000

years ago, and other remains show evidence of iron smelting

about 1,700 years ago in the area that became the northern

Transvaal. The evolutionary links between the earliest inhabitants and twentieth-century African populations are not well

known, but it is clear that San and Khoikhoi (also called Khoi)

peoples have been in southern Africa longer than any other liv- ing population.

San hunters and gatherers and Khoikhoi herdsmen, known

together as Khoisan because of cultural and linguistic similarities, were called "Bushmen" and "Hottentots" by early European settlers. Both of these terms are considered pejorative in

the late twentieth century and are seldom used. Most of the

nearly 3 million South Africans of mixed-race ancestry (socalled "coloureds") are descendants of Khoisan peoples and

Europeans over the past three centuries.

Bantu language speakers who arrived in southern Africa

from the north during the first millennium A.D. displaced or

killed some Khoisan peoples they encountered, but they

allowed many others to live among them peacefully. Most

Bantu societies were organized into villages and chiefdoms,

89
South Africa: A Country Study

and their economies relied primarily on livestock and crop cultivation. Their early ethnic identities were fluid and shifted

according to political and social demands. For example, the

Nguni or Nguni speakers, one of the largest Bantu language

groups, have been a diverse and expanding population for sev- eral centuries. When groups clashed with one another, or their

communities became too large, their political identity could

easily shift to emphasize their loyalty to a specific leader or descent from a specific forebear.

Historians believe that the ancestors of the Nguni-speaking

Xhosa peoples were the first Bantu speakers to reach the south- ern tip of the continent. The Zulu, a related group of small

chiefdoms, arrived soon after, and by the early nineteenth cen- tury they had evolved into a large, predatory kingdom. Zulu

armies displaced or destroyed many small chiefdoms, and in

the upheaval some of those who fled north probably retraced

the pathways their ancestors had used centuries earlier as they

moved into the region. Others were subjugated and assimilated

into Zulu society, and a few—the forebears of today's Swazi and

Sotho peoples—resisted Zulu advances and withdrew into

mountainous regions that would later become independent

nations.

European travelers and explorers visited southern Africa over the centuries and, after the mid-seventeenth century,

began settling near the Cape of Good Hope. Dutch immigrants

moved inland from the coast in search of farmland and independence, especially during the nineteenth century, when

their migration became known as the "Great Trek." British

merchants, farmers, and missionaries arrived in large numbers

during the nineteenth century. Asians, including merchants

and traders as well as laborers and slaves, arrived from India,

China, Malaya, and the Indonesian archipelago. South Africa

began to develop a multiethnic mercantile, trading, and financial class, based primarily on the country's mineral wealth after

the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1880s.

The South African War of 1899-1902, one of the Anglo-Boer

Wars, hastened the process of assimilation that made South

Africa one of the twentieth century's most diverse populations.

After the war, East Europeans arrived in growing numbers,

many of them fleeing religious or political persecution. South

Africans of African descent were increasingly marginalized as the concept of racial separation became a central theme in

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The Society and Its Environment

political debate and a key factor in government strategies for

economic development.

The mining industry fueled the development of the interior

plateau region as the nation's industrial heartland. Agriculture was made possible in this relatively arid land scattered with

rocky outcrops only by employing indigenous or imported

laborers at low wages and by the extensive use of irrigation.

These measures allowed rural whites to achieve living stan- dards that would have been impossible elsewhere and contributed to the growth of flourishing urban centers. The earliest of

these were Cape Town, where the relatively dry hinterland

proved ideal for grain farming and vineyards, and Durban,

where agricultural development centered around sugarcane,

forestry, and a variety of food crops.

The government adopted elements of legally entrenched

racial supremacy in the twentieth century that culminated in

the legal separation of the races, or apartheid, after 1948.

Some believed that apartheid would allow parallel development of all ethnic and racial groups, but it was soon clear to most South Africans and to others that apartheid was an intolerable system of racial privilege and subordination bolstered by

the frequent use of force.

Until the mid-twentieth century, white South Africans' views

on race were relatively consistent with those of other Western

nations. But after World War II, when the rest of the world

began working toward greater integration among races and

nations, South Africa veered in the opposite direction. By the

1960s, white domination had become entrenched, even as colonial rule was ending in the rest of Africa and racial segregation was condemned throughout much of the world.

As a result, South Africa became increasingly marginalized

within the international community. Apartheid became so repugnant to so many people worldwide that this wealthy

nation faced mounting economic and political pressures to end it. South Africa's growing isolation, together with the disastrous effects of apartheid, convinced most whites that racial

separation would, in the long run, not guarantee their safety or

prosperity. The government began dismantling racial barriers

in the early 1990s, but apartheid-era distinctions left lasting

marks on South African society, and the new, multiracial government in the mid-1990s faced too many pressing needs to spend much time celebrating its country's newfound character.

91
92
Cape Town set against Table Mountain, which rises more than 1, 000

meters above sea level Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

93
South Africa: A Country Study

Physical Setting

South Africa occupies the southern tip of the African continent, stretching from 22°S to 35°S latitude and from 17°E to 33°E longitude. The northeastern corner of the country lies within the tropics, astride the Tropic of Capricorn. South

Africa covers 1.2 million square kilometers of land, one-seventh

the area of the United States, or roughly twice the area of

Texas. Nearly 4,900 kilometers of international boundaries separate South Africa from Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe,

Mozambique, and Swaziland—from northwest to northeast

and South Africa completely surrounds the small nation of

Lesotho. In addition, the 2,881-kilometer coastline borders the

Atlantic Ocean on the west and the Indian Ocean on the south

and east. South Africa's extraterritorial holdings include

Robben Island, Dassen Island, and Bird Island in the Atlantic

Ocean, and Prince Edward Island and Marion Island about

1,920 kilometers southeast of Cape Town in the Indian Ocean.

Marion Island, at 46°S latitude, is the site of an important

weather research station.

South Africa forms a distinct region, or subcontinent,

divided from the rest of Africa by the rivers that mark its north- ern border. In the northwest, the Orange River cuts through

the Namib Desert and divides South Africa from Namibia. In

the east, the Limpopo River traverses large areas of arid grass- land along the common border with Zimbabwe and southeast- ern Botswana. Between these two, the Molopo River winds

through the southern basin of the Kalahari Desert, also dividing South Africa from Botswana. Populations have moved

across these rivers almost continuously over the centuries, but,

in general, the northern border region of South Africa is sparsely populated.

The geological substratum of the subcontinent was formed

at least 3.8 billion years ago, according to geologists, and most

of the country's natural features evolved into their present

form more than 200 million years ago. Especially since the

early twentieth-century writings of Alfred Wegener, geologists

have hypothesized that South Africa was once part of a large

land mass, now known as Gondwana, or Gondwanaland, that

slowly fractured along the African coastline millions of years

ago. Theories of such a supercontinent are bolstered by geological continuities and mineral similarities between South

Africa and South America, by fossil similarities between South

Africa and the Indian Ocean island of Madagascar, and by the

94
The Society and Its Environment

sharp escarpments, or geological fractures, that encircle most

of southern Africa near the coast. The ancient rock substratum is overlain by sedimentary and

volcanic rock formations. Because ground cover is sparse, only

about 11 percent of the land in South Africa is arable. More

than 20 percent of the land is too arid or the soil is too poor for

any agricultural activity without irrigation; roughly 66 percent

is suitable only for livestock grazing. Even the thin soil cover

has been severely eroded, especially in the country's most over- populated and impoverished rural areas. The relatively poor

land conceals enormous wealth in minerals, however, including gold, diamonds, copper, platinum, asbestos, and coal.

Geographic Regions

Like much of the African continent, South Africa's landscape is dominated by a high plateau in the interior, sur- rounded by a narrow strip of coastal lowlands. Unlike most of

Africa, however, the perimeter of South Africa's inland plateau

rises abruptly to form a series of mountain ranges before dropping to sea level. These mountains, known as the Great Escarpment, vary between 2,000 meters and 3,300 meters in elevation.

The coastline is fairly regular and has few natural harbors.

Each of the dominant land features—the inland plateau, the

encircling mountain ranges, and the coastal lowlands—exhibits a wide range of variation in topography and in natural

resources (see fig. 7).

The interior plateau consists of a series of rolling grasslands

("veld," in Afrikaans), arising out of the Kalahari Desert in the

north. The largest subregion in the plateau is the 1,200-meter

to 1,800-meter-high central area known as the Highveld. The

Highveld stretches from Western Cape province to the northeast, encompassing the entire Free State (formerly, Orange

Free State). In the north, it rises into a series of rock formations known as the Witwatersrand (literally, "Ridge of White

Waters" in Afrikaans, commonly shortened to Rand—see Glossary). The Rand is a ridge of gold-bearing rock, roughly 100

kilometers by thirty-seven kilometers, that serves as a watershed

for numerous rivers and streams. It is also the site of the world's

largest proven gold deposits and the country's leading industrial city, Johannesburg.

North of the Witwatersrand is a dry savanna subregion,

known as the Bushveld, characterized by open grasslands with

scattered trees and bushes. Elevation varies between 600 meters

95
South Africa: A Country Study

- not necessarily authoritative 15 —35 1 Figure 7. Topography and Drainage

96
The Society and Its Environment
South Africa: A Country Study

and about 900 meters above sea level. The Bushveld, like the

Rand, houses a virtual treasure chest of minerals, one of the

largest and best known layered igneous (volcanic) mineral

complexes in the world. Covering an area roughly 350 kilometers by 150 kilometers, the Bushveld has extensive deposits of

platinum and chromium and significant reserves of copper, flu- orspar, gold, nickel, and iron.

Along the northern edge of the Bushveld, the plains rise to a

series of high plateaus and low mountain ranges, which form

the southern edge of the Limpopo River Valley in Northern

Province. These mountains include the Waterberg and the

Strypoortberg ranges, and, in the far north, the Soutpansberg

Mountains. The Soutpansberg range reaches an elevation of

1,700 meters before dropping off into the Limpopo River Valley and the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The

Kruger National Park, which is known for its diverse terrain

and wildlife, abuts most of the north-south border with Mozambique.

West of the Bushveld is the southern basin of the Kalahari

Desert, which borders Namibia and Botswana at an elevation of

600 meters to 900 meters. Farther south, the Southern Namib

Desert stretches south from Namibia along the Atlantic coastline. Between these two deserts lies the Cape Middleveld subregion, an arid expanse of undulating plains that sometimes

reaches an elevation of 900 meters. The Cape Middleveld is also characterized by large depressions, or "pans," where rainfall collects, providing sustenance for a variety of plants and

animals.

The southern border of the Highveld rises to form the

Great Escarpment, the semicircle of mountain ranges roughly

paralleling South Africa's coastline. The Drakensberg Mountains, the country's largest mountain range, dominate the

southern and the eastern border of the Highveld from the

Eastern Cape province to the border with Swaziland. The highest peaks of the Drakensberg Mountains in KwaZulu-Natal

exceed 3,300 meters and are even higher in Lesotho, which is known as the "Mountain Kingdom."

In the west and the southwest, the Cape Ranges, the country's only "fold mountains"—formed by the folding of the continental crust—form an "L," where the north-south ranges

meet several east-west ranges. The north-south Cape Ranges,

paralleling the Atlantic coastline, include the Cedarberg

Mountains, the Witsenberg Mountains, and the Great Winter98
The Society and Its Environment

hoek Mountains, and have peaks close to 2,000 meters high.

The east-west ranges, paralleling the southern coastline,

include the Swartberg Mountains and the Langeberg Mountains, with peaks exceeding 2,200 meters.

The Cape Ranges are separated from the Highveld by a nar- row strip of semidesert, known as the Great Karoo (Karoo is a Khoisan term for "land of thirst"). Lying between 450 meters

and 750 meters above sea level, the Great Karoo is crossed by

several rivers that have carved canyons and valleys in their

southward descent from the Highveld into the ocean. Another

narrow strip of arid savanna lies south of the Great Karoo,

between the Swartberg Mountains and the Langeberg Mountains. This high plain, known as the Little Karoo, has a more

temperate climate and more diverse flora and fauna than the

Great Karoo.

The narrow coastal strip between the Great Escarpment and

the ocean, called the Lowveld, varies in width from about sixty

kilometers to more than 200 kilometers. Beyond the coastline,

the continental shelf is narrow in the west but widens along the

south coast, where exploitable deposits of oil and natural gas

have been found. The south coast is also an important spawning ground for many species of fish that eventually migrate to the Atlantic Ocean fishing zones. Lakes and Rivers

Water shortages are a chronic and severe problem in much

of South Africa. The country has no commercially navigable

rivers and no significant natural lakes. Along the coastline are

several large lagoons and estuarine lakes, such as Lake Saint

Lucia in KwaZulu-Natal. The government has created several

artificial lakes, primarily for agricultural irrigation.

South Africa's largest river, the Orange River, rises in the

Drakensberg Mountains and flows to the west and northwest,

draining the highlands of Lesotho before being joined by the

Caledon River between the Eastern Cape province and the

Free State. The Orange River forms the border with Namibia

before emptying into the Atlantic Ocean.

The major tributary of the Orange River, the Vaal ("foul"

for its murky cast) River, rises in the Drakensbergs and flows

westward, joining the Orange River from the north in North- ern Cape province. Together, the Orange and the Vaal rivers

drain almost two-thirds of the interior plateau of South Africa.

Other major rivers are the Breede River, the Komati River, the

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South Africa: A Country Study

Olifants River, the Tugela River, and the Umzimvubu River,

which run fairly short distances from the interior plateau to the

ocean, and the Limpopo and Molopo rivers along the north- ern border with Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Climate and Rainfall

Climatic conditions generally range from Mediterranean in

the southwestern corner of the country to temperate in the

interior plateau, and subtropical in the northeast. A small area

in the northwest has a desert climate. Most of the country has

warm, sunny days and cool nights. Rainfall generally occurs during summer (November through March), although in the

southwest, around the Cape of Good Hope, rainfall often occurs in winter (June through August). Temperatures are influenced by variations in elevation, terrain, and ocean cur- rents more than latitude.

Temperature and rainfall patterns vary in response to the

movement of a high-pressure belt that circles the globe

between 25° and 30° south latitude during the winter and lowpressure systems that occur during summer. There is very little difference in average temperatures from south to north, however, in part because the inland plateau rises slightly in the

northeast. For example, the average annual temperature in

Cape Town is 17°C, and in Pretoria, 17.5°C, although these cit- ies are separated by almost ten degrees of latitude. Maximum

temperatures often exceed 32°C in the summer, and reach

38°C in some areas of the far north. The country's highest

recorded temperatures, close to 48°C, have occurred in both

the Northern Cape and Mpumalanga (formerly Eastern Transvaal) . Frost occurs in high altitudes during the winter months. The

coldest temperatures have been recorded about 250 kilometers

northeast of Cape Town, where the average annual minimum

temperature is -6.1°C. Record snowfalls (almost fifty centimeters) occurred in July 1994 in mountainous areas bordering

Lesotho.

Climatic conditions vary noticeably between east and west,

largely in response to the warm Agulhas ocean current, which

sweeps southward along the Indian Ocean coastline in the east for several months of the year, and the cold Benguela current,

which sweeps northward along the Atlantic Ocean coastline in

the west. Air temperatures in Durban, on the Indian Ocean,

average nearly 6°C warmer than temperatures at the same lati100
The Society and Its Environment

tude on the Atlantic Ocean coast. The effects of these two cur- rents can be seen even at the narrow peninsula of the Cape of

Good Hope, where water temperatures average 4°C higher on

the east side than on the west. Rainfall varies considerably from west to east. In the northwest, annual rainfall often remains below 200 millimeters.

Much of the eastern Highveld, in contrast, receives 500 milli- meters to 900 millimeters of rainfall per year; occasionally, rainfall there exceeds 2,000 millimeters. A large area of the center

of the country receives about 400 millimeters of rain, on aver- age, and there are wide variations closer to the coast. The 400-

millimeter "rainfall line" has been significant because land east of the rainfall line is generally suitable for growing crops, and

land west of the rainfall line, only for livestock grazing or crop

cultivation on irrigated land (see fig. 2).

Environmental Trends

South Africa has a wealth of natural resources, but also some

severe environmental problems. The mainstay of the economy,

the mining industry, has introduced environmental concerns,

and mineowners have taken some steps in recent years to minimize the damage from this enterprise (see Environmental Protection and Tourism, ch. 3). Agriculture suffers from both land

and water shortages, and commercial farming practices have

taken a toll on the land. Energy production, too, has often contributed to environmental neglect.

Because of the generally steep grade of the Great Escarpment as it descends from the interior to the coastal lowlands,

many of South Africa's rivers have an unusually high rate of

runoff and contribute to serious soil erosion. In addition, water

consumption needs and irrigation for agriculture have

required building numerous dams. As of the mid-1990s, the

country has 519 dams with a total capacity of 50 billion cubic

meters. Water management engineers estimate that the Vaal

River, which provides most of the water for the industrial hub

around the Witwatersrand, has reached its maximum capacity

for water utilization.

The Lesotho Highlands Water Project, the largest hydroelectric project ever undertaken in Africa, is a thirty-year joint

endeavor between South Africa and Lesotho that is due for

completion in the year 2020. Through a series of dams on the

headwaters of the Orange River, it will alleviate water shortages

in South Africa and is expected to provide enough electrical

101
South Africa: A Country Study

power to enable Lesotho to become virtually self-sufficient in

energy.

Much of the land in South Africa has been seriously over- grazed and overcultivated. During the apartheid era, black

African farmers were denied many government benefits, such

as fertilizers, which were available to white farmers. Settlement

patterns, too, have contributed to land degradation, particularly in overcrowded black homelands, and the inadequate and

poorly administered homelands' budgets have allowed few

improvements in land use. The environmental impacts of the mining industry have

been devastating to some areas of the Witwatersrand, the country's most densely populated region. Some of the gold deposits

located here have been mined for more than a century.

According to South African geographer Malcolm Lupton and

South African urban planning expert Tony Wolfson, mine

shafts—the deepest is 3,793 meters—have made hillsides and

ridges less stable. Pumping water from subterranean aquifers

has caused the natural water table to subside, and the resulting

cavities within the dolomite rock formations that overlie many

gold deposits sometimes collapse, causing sinkholes. Moreover,

these impacts of the mining industry could worsen over time.

Industrial wastes and pollutants are another mining-related

environmental hazard. Solid wastes produced by the separation

of gold from ore are placed in dumps, and liquid wastes are col- lected in pits, called slimes dams. Both of these contain small

amounts of radioactive uranium. Radon gas emitted by the ura- nium poses a health threat when inhaled and can contribute to lung cancer and other ailments. Furthermore, the dust from

mine dumps can contribute to respiratory diseases, such as sili- cosis. Acids and chemicals used to reduce the ore to gold also

leave dangerous contaminants in the water table. Streams

around Johannesburg townships, such as Soweto, have been

found to contain uranium, sulfates, cyanide, and arsenic. Land

near mining operations is sometimes rendered "sterile" or too

contaminated for farming, and efforts to reclaim the land have

often proved too costly for industry or government.

Air pollution is a serious problem in some areas. Most homes

lack electricity in the mid-1990s, and coal is used for cooking

and heating. Air-quality tests have revealed high levels of particulate pollution, as a result, especially during cold weather. The

World Health Organization (WHO) reported in the early

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The Society and Its Environment

1990s that air-quality measurements in Soweto and surrounding townships outside Johannesburg exceeded recommended

levels of particulate pollution for at least three months of the

year. Other studies suggest that air pollution contributes to child health problems, especially respiratory ailments, in

densely populated areas. Electricity for industrial and commercial use and for con- sumption in urban areas is often produced in coal-burning

power stations. These electric power stations lack sulfur "scrubbers," and air-quality surveys have shown that they emit as much as 1.2 million tons of sulfur dioxide a year. A 1991 government-appointed panel of researchers reported that South

Africa had contributed about 2 percent of the so-called greenhouse gases in the global environment.

Many government officials in 1995 had been among the

strongest critics of earlier governments, and a frequent topic of

criticism was environmental neglect. Preserving the environment, therefore, was important in the mid-1990s, but financial

constraints were limiting the government's ability to enact or implement such measures. Economic development and

improved living standards among the poor appeared likely to outweigh long-range environmental concerns for at least the

remainder of the 1990s.

Population

Size and Growth

The first census of the Union of South Africa was taken in

1911, one year after its formation. Several enumerations

occurred after that, but the black African population was not

accurately counted in any of them. In 1950, when apartheid

legislation officially restricted black peoples to approximately

13 percent of the land, the government declared that a national census would be taken at the beginning of each

decade. After that, Africans were gradually assigned to live in

these homelands (see Glossary), then called Bantustans. As the

first four homelands were granted nominal independence in

the 1970s and the early 1980s, their residents and others

assigned to live there were excluded from the official census of

South Africa.

Another problem with census measurements was that many

black South Africans lived in informal settlements, or "squatter

camps," close to cities where they worked or hoped to work,

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South Africa: A Country Study

and squatters were often omitted from census counts. In addition, although all citizens were legally required to register

births, deaths, marriages, and divorces, many people—especially urban blacks—avoided doing so, in part because of the

stringency and complexity of the laws governing legal residency.

The 1980 census count was nearly 23.8 million; another 4.6

million were added to compensate for acknowledged undercounting, resulting in a nationwide population of 28.4 million.

The figures excluded those living in the three homelands that were nominally independent in 1980—an estimated 2.7 million

in Transkei, 1 million in Bophuthatswana, and about 350,000

in Venda. A fourth homeland, Ciskei, with a population of

678,000, became M independentM in 1981.

The next census, in 1991, took place amid unprecedented

political violence. For the first time, the government used

aerial photography and sample surveys to enumerate residents

in eighty-eight "unrest" areas, which were otherwise inaccessible to government officials. After being adjusted for underenumeration, the 1991 census yielded a count of 30,986,920

citizens, excluding the four "independent" homelands. Residents of the other six non-independent ("self-governing")

homelands—10,746,504 people—were included in the nationwide count.

In 1992 the United States Bureau of the Census estimated

that 48 percent of all black South Africans, and about 1 percent

of all other racial groups, lived in the ten homelands—which

made up only about one-seventh of the total land area of the

country. On this basis, the bureau estimated the total population of South Africa at 40.6 million.

In 1994 the South African government estimated the total

nationwide population at 40.4 million, after all ten homelands

had been reincorporated into South Africa (see table 2, Appendix) . In that year, the United States Bureau of the Census esti- mated the total population of South Africa at 43.9 million.

Relying on the South African government's enumeration and

legal categories, the South African Institute of Race Relations

estimated that the population was 76.4 percent black, 12.6 percent white, 8.5 percent coloured, and 2.5 percent Asian.

Population growth rates declined from about 2.9 percent

per year in the early 1980s to 2.4 percent in 1995, according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa, a South African

economic research and lending organization. Again, racial

104
The Society and Its Environment

groups varied; population growth was about 2.6 percent per

year for blacks, 2.2 percent for coloureds, 1.9 percent for

Asians, and 1.0 percent for whites. The government estimated

that the population would double by the year 2025.

Life expectancy at birth was 62. V years for males and 68.3

years for females in 1996, placing South Africa just below the

global median. These figures, too, varied considerably by race; for black males, life expectancy was about nine years less than

for white males. About 50.5 percent of the population is female

and 49.5 percent is male, according to the South African Central Statistical Service (see fig. 8). In some rural areas and the

former homelands, labor policies that draw men into urban

areas have resulted in strongly skewed gender ratios. For example, in the early 1990s, the population of QwaQwa was esti- mated to be 56 percent female; in KwaZulu, 54 percent female.

In 1995 overall fertility was 4.1 births per adult female, down

from 5.6 a decade earlier. The crude birth rate was 2V. 1 births

per 1,000 people, according to official estimates. Twelve percent of all births in the early 1990s were to women aged nineteen or younger. Infant mortality was estimated at 45.8 deaths

within the first year, per 1,000 live births. The average annual

death rate for the entire population was 7.6 per 1,000. Until

1994, these statistics had been reported by racial group, and

both birth and death rates were higher among blacks than

among whites.

The median age was 19.2 years in 1995, according to official

estimates. Roughly 37 percent of all South Africans were fifteen

years of age or younger. Nearly 13 percent were above the age

of fifty. Racial disparities in age composition were large, however; for example, 52 percent of blacks and only 31 percent of

whites were under age nineteen.

The age dependency ratio, or the ratio of the combined

population of children and the aged (those less than fifteen

years of age and those more than sixty-four years of age) compared to the number between age fifteen and sixty-four, was

70.6 percent in 1995. This measurement is often used to esti- mate the burden of "economic dependence" on the economically active population. Variations among provinces are great,

in part because of the uneven job concentration across the

country. For example, in the Northern Province, the age

dependency ratio is more than 100; while in Gauteng, the age

dependency ratio is less than 50.0, according to the Central Statistical Service.

105
South Africa: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION

Source: Based on information from South Africa Foundation, South Africa, 1995, Johannesburg, 1995, 117. Figure 8. Population by Age and Gender, Based on 1991 Census

Distribution

Population density averaged 34.4 persons per square kilometer in 1995, although distribution is uneven nationwide. The

eastern half of the country is more densely populated than the

western half, primarily because of the aridity of much of the

west and the concentration of minerals in the east. The most

densely populated areas of the country until 1994 were the

homelands—where average densities sometimes exceeded 300

people per square kilometer—and Gauteng, which includes

Pretoria, Johannesburg, and the mining region of Witwatersrand. More than 7 million people, nearly 17 percent of the

population, live in Gauteng, which constitutes less than 2 per106
The Society and Its Environment

cent of the land area of South Africa (see fig. 9). The population of Gauteng is expected to double by the year 2010.

Population distribution by racial group is also uneven. In

1995 black South Africans formed a majority in all provinces

except the Western Cape, where they made up only 20 percent

of the population. Cities were predominantly white, and the

townships and squatter areas that ringed the cities were over- whelmingly black. The racial composition of cities and of for- merly white neighborhoods began to change in the early 1990s

as apartheid-related laws were rescinded or ignored, and the

pace of change accelerated in the mid-1990s.

The Johannesburg-based Urban Foundation and other

researchers have estimated that the urban population was

approximately 57 percent of the total in 1995. Rates of urbanization varied widely by province. The most highly urbanized

provinces were Gauteng (nearly 96 percent), Western Cape (86

percent), and Northern Cape (73 percent). The population of

Northern Province, in contrast, was only about 9 percent

urban, according to the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Ethnic Groups and Language

South Africans represent a rich array of ethnic backgrounds,

but the idea of ethnicity became highly explosive during the

apartheid era, when the government used it for political and

racial purposes. Whites in South Africa often attributed the

recent centuries of warfare in the region to the varied origins

of its peoples, rather than to the increasing economic pressures

they had faced. Government officials, accordingly, imposed

fairly rigid ethnic or tribal categories on a fluid social reality,

giving each black African a tribal label, or identity, within a sin- gle racial classification.

Apartheid doctrines taught that each black population

would eventually achieve maturity as a nation, just as the Afrikaner people, in their own view, had done. Officials, therefore,

sometimes referred to the largest African ethnic groups as nations. The government established language areas for each

of these and, during the 1950s and 1960s, assigned them separate residential areas according to perceived ethnic identity

(see fig. 10). Over the next decade, portions of these language

areas became Bantustans, and then self-governing homelands;

finally, in the 1970s and the 1980s, four of the homelands

Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei—were granted

nominal "independence" (see fig. 11). Although the indepen107
South Africa: A Country Study

LAND AREA OF PROVINCES (percent of total) G k-n Gauteng (G) 1.7 KwaZulu-Natal (K-N) 7.5 Mpumalanga (MP) 6.7 Northern Province (NP) 9.6 North-West (NW) 9.7 Free State (FS) 10.5 Eastern Cape (EC) 14.0 Western Cape (WC) 10.5 Northern Cape (NC) 29.8 POPULATION OF PROVINCES (percent of total)

Source: Based on information from South Africa Foundation, South Africa, 1995, Johannesburg, 1995, 11, 19-23.

Figure 9. Comparison ofProvinces: Area, Population, and Economic

Output, 1994

108
The Society and Its Environment

dent homelands were not recognized as separate nations by

any country other than South Africa, people assigned to live there were officially "noncitizens" of South Africa.

Apartheid policies also empowered the government to remove black Africans from cities and to preserve the "ethnic

character"of neighborhoods in the African townships that were

created, legally and illegally, around the cities. Many township

neighborhoods were given specific "tribal" designations. Township residents generally ignored these labels, however, and

reacted to the divisiveness of the government's racial policies

by minimizing the importance of their ethnic heritage, or dis- avowing it entirely. A few South Africans embraced the notion

that ethnicity was an outdated concept, a creation of governments and anthropologists, invoked primarily to create divi- sions among people of a particular class or region.

The word "tribe" assumed especially pejorative connotations

during the apartheid era, in part because of the distortions that were introduced by applying this concept to society. Technically, no tribes had existed in South Africa for most of the twentieth century. The term "tribe," in anthropology, is often

defined as a group of people sharing a similar culture—i.e., patterns of belief and behavior—settled in a common territory,

and tracing their ancestry to a common—perhaps mythical

ancestor. But none of South Africa's black peoples shared a common, ancestral territory; they had been uprooted and relocated by warfare, by the search for new land, or by government

action. Few rural residents could trace their descent from an

ancestor shared with many of their neighbors.

Then in 1993 and 1994, as the country emerged from the

apartheid era, many South Africans appeared to reclaim their

ethnic heritage and to acknowledge pride in their ancestry.

The new political leaders recognized the practical advantage of

encouraging people to identify both with the nation and with a community that had a past older than the nation. So the

interim constitution of 1993 reaffirmed the importance of ethnicity by elevating nine African languages to the status of offi- cial languages of the nation, along with English and Afrikaans.

Language Groups

The most widely spoken of South Africa's eleven official languages in the mid-1990s are Zulu (isiZulu), Xhosa (isiXhosa),

Afrikaans, and English (for Bantu prefixes, see Glossary). The

others—isiNdebele, sePedi (seSotho sa Leboa), seSotho,

109
South Africa: A Country Study

110
The Society and Its Environment

seTswana, siSwati, tshiVenda (also referred to as luVenda), and

xiTsonga—are spoken in large areas of the country (see fig.

12). Each of the eleven includes a number of regional dialects

and variants.

Despite the diversity of these language groups, it is nonetheless possible to begin to understand this complex society by

viewing language groupings as essentially the same as ethnic

groupings. This is possible because, in general, most South

Africans consider one of the eleven official languages, or a

closely related tongue, to be their first language; and most people acquire their first language as part of a kinship group or an

ethnically conscious population.

Nine of South Africa's official languages (all except Afrikaans and English) are Bantu languages. Bantu languages are a

large branch of the Niger-Congo language family, which is represented throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa. Bantu languages are spoken by more than 100 million Africans in

Central Africa, East Africa, and southern Africa. Four major

subgroups of Bantu languages—Nguni, Sotho, Tsonga-Shangaan, and Venda—are represented in South Africa.

The largest group of closely related languages in South

Africa is the Nguni. Nguni peoples in the country number at

least 18 million. About 9 million Sotho (BaSotho) and 2 million Tswana (BaTswana) speak seSotho or a closely related language, seTswana. More than 2 million Tsonga and Shangaan

peoples speak xiTsonga and related languages; at least 600,000

Venda (VaVerida) speak tshiVenda (luVenda).

Each of these language groups also extends across South

Africa's boundaries into neighboring countries. For example,

Nguni-speaking Swazi people make up almost the entire population of Swaziland. At least 1.3 million seSotho speakers live in

Lesotho, and more than 1 million people in Botswana speak

seTswana. Roughly 4 million speakers of xiTsonga and related

languages live in Mozambique, and tshiVenda is spoken by sev- eral thousand people in southern Zimbabwe. Language boundaries are not rigid and fixed, however; regional dialects often assume characteristics of more than one language.

Nguni

The Nguni peoples are classified into three large subgroups,

the Northern Nguni, the Southern Nguni, and the Ndebele.

The Zulu and the Swazi are among the Northern Nguni. The

Xhosa are the largest Southern Nguni society, but the neighIll
South Africa: A Country Study

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Homelands

International boundary

Province boundary

® National capital ® Province capital • Homeland seat of government

100 200 Kilometers "TOO 200 Miles

Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication

Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1994, Pretoria, 1995, x. Figure 11. Former African Homelands and Provinces, until 1994

boring Thembu and Mpondo are also well known Southern

Nguni societies, often described as subgroups of the Xhosa.

Each of these groups is a heterogeneous grouping of smaller

(also heterogeneous) ethnic groups.

Four of South Africa's official languages are Nguni languages; isiZulu, isiXhosa, siSwati, and isiNdebele are spoken

Bophuthatswana

Ciskei J

Lebowa

Gazankulu I QwaQwa

KaNgwane

KwaNdebele

Transkei

Venda

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The Society and Its Environment

primarily by the Zulu, the Xhosa, the Swazi, and the Ndebele

peoples, respectively. Each of these languages has regional vari- ants and dialects, which are often mutually intelligible.

Before the nineteenth century, the dominant Nguni settle- ment pattern was that of dispersed households, as opposed to

villages. The typical household was centered on a patrilineage;

it also included other relatives through a variety of kinship ties,

and people who had attached themselves to the household

often as indentured laborers who were rewarded in cattle. Cattle were central to most Nguni economies, which ranged from

almost complete dependence on herding to mixed pastoralism

and crop cultivation, often supplemented by hunting.

Nguni political organization generally consisted of small

chiefdoms, sometimes only a few hundred people loyal to a person chosen by descent, achievement, or a combination of

factors. Until the eighteenth century or later, historians

believe, these chiefdoms were not united under a king or monarch. Each chiefdom typically included a group of related patrilineal clans, or descent groups united by common ancestry

only a few generations deep, and others who had chosen to attach themselves to a particular chief. A chief could demand

support and tribute (taxes) from his followers, could reward

those he favored, could form political alliances, and could

declare war against his enemies. A chiefs followers, in turn,

usually had the right to leave and to join another chiefdom, if they wished. Larger chiefdoms sometimes exercised limited

control over smaller ones, but such hegemony generally did

not last for more than a generation or two. Zulu

An estimated 8 million South Africans consider themselves

Zulu (amaZulu) or members of closely related ethnic groups in

the 1990s. By the eighteenth century, Zulu society encompassed a number of Nguni-speaking chiefdoms north of the

Tugela River (see fig. 4). The Zulu homestead (imizi) consisted

of an extended polygynous (see Glossary) family and others

attached to the household through social obligations. This

social unit was largely self-sufficient, with responsibilities

divided according to gender. Men were generally responsible

for defending the homestead, caring for cattle, manufacturing

and maintaining weapons and farm implements, and building

dwellings. Women had domestic responsibilities and raised

crops, usually grains, on land near the household.

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South Africa: A Country Study

Other (xiTsonga, seSwati,

isiNdebele, tshiVenda) 11.8%

seSotho, sePedi 16.8%

Source: Based on information from South Africa, Central Statistical Service, RSA

Statistics in Brief, 1994, Pretoria, 1994, 2.9, 2.10. Figure 12. Percentage ofPopulation UsingEach Official Language as

First Language, 1994

Zulu chiefs demanded steadily increasing tribute or taxes

from their subjects, acquired great wealth, commanded large

armies, and, in many cases, subjugated neighboring chiefdoms.

Military conquest allowed men to achieve status distinctions

that had become increasingly important. In the early nineteenth century, the large and powerful Mthethwa chiefdom,

led by Dingiswayo, dominated much of the region north of the

Tugela River (see The Rise of African States, ch. 1). Shaka, a Zulu warrior who had won recognition in 1810 by skillfully subduing the leader of the warring Buthelezi chiefdom, took

advantage of Dingiswayo's military defeat by the neighboring

Ndwandwe armies to begin building the Zulu empire in 1817.

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The Society and Its Environment

As king, Shaka Zulu (r. 1817-28) defied tradition by adopting new fighting strategies, by consolidating control over his

military regiments, and by ruthlessly eliminating potential

rivals for power. Shaka's warrior regiments (impis) eventually

subjugated the powerful Ndwandwe, and decimated or drove

from the area the armies of Shaka's rivals. Spreading warfare

exacerbated by pressures from Europeans—drove thousands of

Africans north and west, and the ensuing upheaval spawned

new conflicts throughout the region (see fig. 5).

The Zulu empire weakened after Shaka's death in 1828 and

fragmented, especially following military defeats at the hands

of the Afrikaners in 1839 and the British in 1879. Zululand, the area north of the Tugela River, was incorporated into the British colony, Natal, in 1887. The last Zulu uprising, a poll tax protest led by Chief Bambatha in 1906, was ruthlessly suppressed.

The Zulu population remained fragmented during most of the

twentieth century, although loyalty to the royal family continued to be strong in some areas. Leaders of Zulu cultural organizations and Zulu politicians were able to preserve a sense of

ethnic identity through the symbolic recognition of Zulu his- tory and through local-level politics.

Zulu men and women have made up a substantial portion of

South Africa's urban work force throughout the twentieth century, especially in the gold and copper mines of the Witwatersrand. Zulu workers organized some of the first black labor

unions in the country. For example, the Zulu Washermen's

Guild, Amawasha, was active in Natal and the Witwatersrand even before the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.

The Zululand Planters' Union organized agricultural workers

in Natal in the early twentieth century.

The KwaZulu homeland was carved out of several unconnected plots of land in Natal in the 1960s. In 1976 Mangosuthu

(Gatsha) Buthelezi, a member of the Zulu royal family, was named chief minister of KwaZulu, and the government

declared KwaZulu a self-governing territory a year later.

Buthelezi established good relations with the National Partydominated government and, in the process, severed his former

close ties to the African National Congress (ANC)

During the 1980s, Buthelezi refused repeated government

offers of homeland independence; he preferred to retain the

self-governing status that allowed the roughly 4 million resi- dents of KwaZulu to be citizens of South Africa. Zulu solidarity was enhanced by Buthelezi's intellectually powerful and domi115
South Africa: A Country Study

nant personality and by his leadership of the Zulu cultural

organization, Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National Cultural

Liberation Movement—usually called Inkatha), which became

the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) during the 1990s.

During the apartheid era, many people in areas officially

designated as Zulu were descendants of nineteenth-century

Zulu warriors or subjects of the Zulu royal family, who retained

a strong ethnic consciousness and pride in their Zulu identity.

Others in these areas, however, traced their descent to those

who resisted Shaka's domination or celebrated his death at the

hands of his own relatives in 1828. Some viewed their association with Zulu royalty as little more than an artificial political

creation. A substantial minority within the diverse Zulu society

in the 1980s and the 1990s supported the rival ANC.

Military prowess continued to be an important value in Zulu

culture, and this emphasis fueled some of the political violence

of the 1990s. Zulu people generally admire those with physical

and mental agility, and those who can speak eloquently and

hold a crowd's attention. These attributes strengthened

Buthelezi's support among many Zulu, but his political rhetoric

sometimes sparked attacks on political opponents and critics, even within Zulu society.

Buthelezi's nephew, Goodwill Zwelithini, is the Zulu monarch in the 1990s. Buthelezi and King Goodwill won the agreement of ANC negotiators just before the April 1994 elections

that, with international mediation, the government would

establish a special status for the Zulu Kingdom after the elections. Zulu leaders understood this special status to mean some

degree of regional autonomy within the province of KwaZuluNatal.

Buthelezi was appointed minister of home affairs in the first Government of National Unity in 1994. He led a walkout of

Zulu delegates from the National Assembly in early 1995 and

clashed repeatedly with newly elected President Nelson

(Rolihlahla) Mandela. Buthelezi threatened to abandon the

Government of National Unity entirely unless his Zulu constituency received greater recognition and autonomy from central

government control.

Swazi

About 1.6 million Swazi people live in the region in the

1990s—almost 900,000 in Swaziland and the remainder in

South Africa, especially in the area of the former homeland,

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The Society and Its Environment

KaNgwane. Until the late eighteenth century, Swazi society

consisted of a group of closely related Nguni chiefdoms organized around patrilineal descent groups. At that time, a powerful chief, Ngwane I, seized control over several smaller

neighboring chiefdoms of Nguni and Sotho peoples to strengthen his own army's defense against the Mthethwa forces

led by Dingiswayo. The greatest rival of the Mthethwa, the

Ndwandwe, later subjugated the Mthethwa and killed Dingiswayo. Ngwane I, under pressure from the Ndwandwe, then

withdrew into the mountainous territory that would later

become Swaziland.

Ngwane I was able to resist incorporation into the Zulu

empire during the reign of Shaka, and the Swazi maintained

generally peaceful relations with Shaka's successors. Some

Swazi clans were forced to move north, however, as regional

upheaval spread, and together with displaced Zulu clans, they

established aristocratic dynasties over herdsmen and farmers as far north as areas that would later become Malawi and Zambia.

In the twentieth century, the Swazi kingdom retained its autonomy, but not total independence, as the British protectorate of Swaziland in 1903 and as a British High Commission ter- ritory in 1907. In 1968 Swaziland became an independent

nation led by King Sobhuza II. Swaziland has pressured Pretoria for the return of Swazi-occupied areas of South Africa since

the 1960s. In 1982 Pretoria agreed, but that decision was

reversed by the South African Supreme Court.

KaNgwane was carved out of land adjacent to Swaziland during the 1960s and was declared a "self-governing" territory with

a population of about 400,000 in 1984. KaNgwane's Chief Minister Enos Mabuza tried to build an agricultural and industrial

economy in the small, segmented territory, and he became the

first homeland leader to grant full trade union rights to workers in his jurisdiction. Mabuza also led the fight against the

incorporation of KaNgwane into Swaziland. During the late

1980s, he clashed with Pretoria by expressing strong support

for the ANC, although many KaNgwane residents remained

uninvolved in South African politics.

Xhosa

The Xhosa (amaXhosa) people in South Africa in the mid1990s number roughly 6 million, according to official esti- mates, including the Pondo (Mpondo), Thembu, and several

other small ethnic groups, which have been assimilated, to

117
South Africa: A Country Study

varying degrees, into Xhosa society over several centuries. Each

of these is also a heterogeneous grouping of smaller populations.

Most Xhosa people speak English, and often several other

languages, but they also take great pride in speaking Xhosa

(isiXhosa), an Nguni language closely related to Zulu. Unlike

most other African languages, Xhosa has more than a dozen

"click" sounds, probably assimilated from Khoisan speakers

over long periods of acculturation between Xhosa and Khoisan

peoples.

Some ancestors of twentieth-century Xhosa arrived in the

eastern Cape region from the north before the fifteenth century, and others moved into the area during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries. Xhosa history tells of settlement east of

the Sundays River by the early eighteenth century. The Xhosa

eliminated or enslaved some of the Khoisan speakers they

encountered, but many Khoikhoi were peacefully assimilated

into Xhosa society. Khoikhoi workers were often entrusted with

the care of cattle for a generation or two before being accepted

as equal members of Xhosa society. The Xhosa generally incorporated newcomers who recognized the dominance of the

Xhosa chief. In fact, until the twentieth century, the term

Xhosa was often used to designate territorial affiliation rather

than common descent. The resulting Xhosa society was

extremely diverse.

Most Xhosa lived by cattle herding, crop cultivation, and

hunting. Homesteads were normally built near the tops of the

numerous ridges that overlook the rivers of the area, including

the Fish River, the Keiskama River, the Buffalo River, and the

Kei River. Cattle, serving as symbols of wealth, as well as means

of exchange, pack animals, and transportation, were central to the economy. Crops such as corn, sorghum, and tobacco

thrived in years with adequate rainfall. Woodworking and ironworking were important men's occupations.

Xhosa homesteads were organized around descent groups,

with descent traced through male forebears. These lineages,

and the large clans formed by groups of related lineages, provided the center of Xhosa social organization. These descent

groups were responsible for preserving ancestral ties and for

perpetuating the group through sacrifices to the ancestors,

mutual assistance among the living, and carefully arranged

marriages with neighboring clans or lineages. Political power

was often described as control over land and water. A powerful

118
The Society and Its Environment

chief may be praised in oral histories by the claim that he had

power over the land close to a large river, and a lesser chief, by

the claim that he had power over land near a smaller river or

tributary.

Xhosa oral histories tell of installing a royal lineage, probably by the early seventeenth century. This family, the Tshawe,

or amaTshawe (people of Tshawe), continued to dominate

other Xhosa clans for more than a century; only the Tshawe

could be recognized as chiefs over other Xhosa, according to historical accounts in The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa

People in the Day of Their Independence, by Jeffrey B. Peires. The

Xhosa also experienced a rapid increase in population, and

they divided several times over six or seven generations. The

resulting dominant chiefdoms, the Gcaleka and the Rharhabe

(Rarabe), formed distinct sections of Xhosa society throughout

the twentieth century.

Xhosa people had extensive contact with Europeans by the

early nineteenth century, and they generally welcomed European missionaries and educators into their territory. A Xhosa

grammar book—the first in a southern African language—was published in 1834. Their early and sustained contact with

Christian missionaries and educators led the Xhosa to distinguish between "school people," who had accepted Western

innovation, and "red people," who were identified with the tra- ditional red ocher used to dye clothing and to decorate the

body. By the twentieth century, the Xhosa school people

formed the core of South Africa's emerging black professional

class and included lawyers, physicians, and ministers.

The South African government recognized the split between

the Gcaleka Xhosa and the Ngqika (a subgroup of Rharhabe)

Xhosa in the twentieth century by establishing two Xhosa

homelands. Transkei, a segmented territory in eastern Cape

Province bordering Lesotho, was designated for the Gcaleka

Xhosa, and Ciskei—-just west of Transkei—was for the Ngqika

Xhosa. Transkei became an independent homeland in 1976,

and Ciskei, in 1981.

Xhosa language speakers also include the Thembu

(Tembu), the eastern neighbors of the Xhosa during much of

their history. The Thembu represent a number of clans that

managed to exert their dominance over neighboring clans.

The Thembu had long and varied contacts with the Xhosa.

These were often peaceful and friendly—for example, Xhosa

history says that the Great Wife of each chief was a Thembu

119
South Africa: A Country Study

but they sometimes erupted into war. The Thembu recognize

their own royal clan, the Hala, who led many Thembu into battle against the Xhosa during the late eighteenth century.

Also closely related to the Xhosa are the Pondo (Mpondo),

the eastern neighbors of the Thembu. The Pondo royal clan,

the Nyawuza, struggled to establish and to preserve its domi- nance over neighboring clans well into the nineteenth century,

when some of the Pondo and their neighbors were displaced

and subjugated by the Zulu.

Another population often described as a Xhosa subgroup is the Mfengu, consisting of descendants of small remnants of

clans and chiefdoms that were displaced during the early nineteenth-century upheaval of the mfecane (or crushing—see Glossary). Survivors of the mfecane attached themselves to Xhosa

society, which was relatively stable, often in Xhosa villages

located near Christian missions. After an initial period of cli- entship, or social inferiority that eroded as generations passed,

the Mfengu were generally accepted as equals in the diverse

Xhosa population.

Ndebele

The term Ndebele, or amaNdebele, in the 1990s refers primarily to about 800,000 South Africans whose forebears have

inhabited areas of the northern Transvaal (now Northern Province) for more than a century. The Ndebele language, isiNdebele, is classified among the Nguni languages, although Sotho

influences are strong enough in some areas that isiNdebele is sometimes also classified as a variant of seSotho.

Most Ndebele trace their ancestry to the area that became

Natal Province, later KwaZulu-Natal. Some began moving

northward well before the early nineteenth-century mfecane,

and many of these settled in the northern Transvaal. Others,

subjects of the Zulu leader Mzilikazi, fled north from Natal

after his defeat by Shaka in 1817. Ndebele peoples throughout

the region were forced to move several times after that, so that

by the end of the nineteenth century, the Ndebele were dispersed throughout much of Natal, the Transvaal, and adjacent

territory.

Many Ndebele became formidable warriors, often subjugating smaller chiefdoms and assimilating them into Ndebele society, and Ndebele clashed repeatedly with Voortrekker militias

around Pretoria. The late nineteenth-century Afrikaner leader

Paul Kruger jailed or executed many of their leaders, seized

120
Traditional murals decorate homesteads informer

KwaNdebele homeland.

Courtesy Lisowski Collection, Library of Congress

their land, and dispersed others to work for Afrikaner farmers

as indentured servants. Some of the land was later returned to a few Ndebele, often as a reward for loyalty or recognition of

status. Under apartheid, many Ndebele living in the northern

Transvaal were assigned to the predominantly seSotho-speaking homeland of Lebowa, which consisted of several segiments

of land scattered across the northern Transvaal. Others, mostly

southern Ndebele, who had retained more traditional elements of their culture and language, were assigned to KwaNdebele. KwaNdebele had been carved out of land that had been

given to the son of Nyabela, a well-known Ndebele fighter in

Kruger's time. The homeland was, therefore, prized by Ndebele traditionalists, who pressed for a KwaNdebele independence through the 1980s.

KwaNdebele was declared a "self-governing" territory in

1981. Very few of its 300,000 residents could find jobs in the

homeland, however, so most worked in the industrial region of

Pretoria and Johannesburg. At least 500,000 Ndebele people

lived in urban centers throughout South Africa and in homelands other than KwaNdebele through the 1980s.

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South Africa: A Country Study

During the 1980s and the early 1990s, many Ndebele recognized a royal family, the Mahlangu family, and the capital of

KwaNdebele was called KwaMahlangu. The royal family was

divided, however, over economic issues and the question of

"independence" for the homeland. These disputes were over- ridden by the dissolution of the homelands in 1994. At that

time, in addition to the estimated 800,000 Ndebele people in

South Africa, nearly 1.7 million Ndebele lived in Zimbabwe,

where they constituted about one-sixth of the population and

were known as Matabele; about 300,000 lived in Botswana.

Sotho

At least 7 million Sotho (also BaSotho) people who speak

seSotho and related languages live in South Africa. Another 3

million Sotho and closely related people live in neighboring

countries. The diverse Sotho population includes the Northern

Sotho (Pedi), the Southern Sotho, and the Tswana

(BaTswana) , each of which is itself a heterogeneous grouping.

Ancestors of today's Sotho population migrated into the

region in the fifteenth century, according to historians, probably from the area of the northern Transvaal. Like many neighboring Nguni peoples, the Sotho traditionally relied on a combination of livestock raising and crop cultivation for subsis- tence. Most Sotho were herders of cattle, goats, and sheep, and

cultivators of grains and tobacco. In addition, the Sotho were

skilled craftsmen, renowned for their metalworking, leatherworking, and wood and ivory carving.

Also like the Nguni, most Sotho lived in small chiefdoms, in

which status was determined in part by relationship to the

chief. Unlike the Nguni, Sotho homesteads were grouped

together into villages, with economic responsibilities generally

shared among village residents. Villages were divided into

wards, or residential areas, often occupied by members of more

than one patrilineal descent group.

The village chief—a hereditary position —generally

appointed ward leaders, whose residences were clustered

around the chiefs residence. Sotho villages sometimes grew

into large towns of several thousand people. Farmland was usually outside the village, not adjacent to the homestead. This vil- lage organization may have enabled the Sotho villagers to defend themselves more effectively than they could have with

dispersed households, and it probably facilitated control over ward leaders and subjects by the chief and his family.

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The Society and Its Environment

Sotho villages were also organized into age-sets, or groups of

men or women who were close in age. Each age-set had specific

responsibilities—men organized for warfare and herding,

depending on age-set, and women for crop cultivation and reli- gious responsibilities. An entire age-set generally graduated

from one task to the next, and the village often celebrated this

change with a series of rituals and, in some cases, an initiation

ceremony.

Sotho descent rules were important, even though descent

groups did not form discrete local groups. Clans were often

totemic, or bound to specific natural objects or animal species

by mystical relationships, sometimes involving taboos and prohibitions. Major Sotho clans included the Lion (Taung), Fish

(Tlhaping), Elephant (Tloung), and Crocodile (Kwean) clans.

Both Nguni and Sotho peoples reckoned descent through

patrilineal ties, but their marriage rules differed markedly.

Sotho patrilineages were usually endogamous—i.e., the preferred marriage partner would be a person related through

patrilineal descent ties. Nguni patrilineages, in contrast, were exogamous—marriage within the descent group was generally

forbidden.

By the early twentieth century, Sotho villages were losing

their claims to land, largely because of pressure from whites.

Cattle raising became more difficult, and as Western economic

pressures intensified, Sotho people living in Lesotho and in

South Africa increasingly turned to the mines for work. By the

early 1990s, an estimated 100,000 BaSotho worked in South

Africa's mines, and many others were part of South Africa's

urban work force throughout the country.

Northern Sotho

The heterogeneous Northern Sotho are often referred to as the Pedi (or BaPedi), because the Pedi make up the largest of

their constituent groups. Their language is sePedi (also called

seSotho sa Leboa or Northern Sotho) . This society arose in the

northern Transvaal, according to historians, as a confederation

of small chiefdoms some time before the seventeenth century.

A succession of strong Pedi chiefs claimed power over smaller

chiefdoms and were able to dominate important trade routes

between the interior plateau and the Indian Ocean coast for

several generations. For this reason, some historians have credited the Pedi with the first monarchy in the region, although

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South Africa: A Country Study

their reign was marked by population upheaval and occasional

military defeat.

During the nineteenth century, Pedi armies were defeated

by the Natal armies of Mzilikazi and were revived under the

command of a Pedi chief, Sekwati. Afrikaner Voortrekkers in

the Transvaal acquired some Pedi lands peacefully, but later

clashed with them over further land claims. By the 1870s, the

Voortrekker armies were sufficiently weakened from these

clashes that they agreed to a confederation with the British colonies of Natal and the Cape that would eventually lead to the

South African War in 1899.

The smaller Lobedu population makes up another subgroup

among the Northern Sotho. The Lobedu are closely related to the Shona population, the largest ethnic group in Zimbabwe,

but the Lobedu are classified among the Sotho primarily

because of linguistic similarities. The Lobedu were studied

extensively by the early twentieth-century anthropologist J. D.

Krige, who described the unique magical powers attributed to a Lobedu female authority figure, known to outsiders as the rain

queen.

The Northern Sotho homeland of Lebowa was declared a "self-governing" (not independent) territory in 1972, with a population of almost 2 million. Economic problems plagued

the poverty-stricken homeland, however, and the population

was not unified by strong ethnic solidarity. Lebowa's chief minister, Cedric Phatudi, struggled to maintain control over the

increasingly disgruntled homeland population during the early

1980s; his death in 1985 opened new factional splits and occa- sioned calls for a new homeland government. Homeland politics were complicated by the demands of several ethnic

minorities within Lebowa to have their land transferred to the

jurisdiction of another homeland. At the same time, government efforts to consolidate homeland territory forced the

transfer of several small tracts of land into Lebowa.

Southern Sotho

The Southern Sotho peoples are a diverse group that

includes almost 2 million South Africans, many of whom live in

the area surrounding Lesotho, and 1.6 million residents of

Lesotho. The Southern Sotho were unified during the reign of

King Moshoeshoe I in the 1830s. Moshoeshoe established control over several small groups of Sotho speakers and Nguni

speakers, who had been displaced by the mfecane. Some of

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Cooking hearth between family members' huts in a Northern Sotho

location near Pieters burg

Courtesy R. T. K. Scully

these communities had established ties to San peoples who

lived just west of Moshoeshoe's territory. As a result, Southern

Sotho speech, unlike that of Northern Sotho, incorporates a number of "click" sounds associated with Khoisan languages.

Southern Sotho peoples were assigned to the tiny homeland

of QwaQwa, which borders Lesotho, during the apartheid era. QwaQwa was declared "self-governing" in 1974, but Chief Minister Kenneth Mopeli rejected independence on the grounds

that the homeland did not have a viable economy. Only about

200,000 Sotho people lived in QwaQwa during the 1980s.

A community of more than 300,000 people, Botshabelo, was

incorporated into QwaQwa in 1987. Officials in the homeland

capital, Phuthaditjhaba, and many homeland residents

objected to the move, and the South African Supreme Court

returned Botshabelo to the jurisdiction of the Orange Free

State a short time later. The homeland continued to be an

overcrowded enclave of people with an inadequate economic

base until the homelands were dissolved in 1994.

Tswana

The Tswana (BaTswana), sometimes referred to as the West125
South Africa: A Country Study

ern Sotho, are a heterogeneous group, including descendants

of the once great Tlhaping and Rolong societies, as well as the

Hurutshe, Kwena, and other small groups. Their language,

seTswana, is closely related to seSotho, and the two are mutually intelligible in most areas. About 4 million Tswana people

live in southern Africa—3 million in South Africa and 1 million

in the nation of Botswana. In South Africa, many BaTswana live in the area that formed the numerous segments of the former

homeland, Bophuthatswana, as well as neighboring areas of

the North-West Province and the Northern Cape. Tswana people are also found in most urban areas throughout South

Africa.

By the nineteenth century, several Tswana groups were politically independent, loosely affiliated chiefdoms that clashed

repeatedly with Afrikaner farmers who claimed land in the

northern Transvaal. In the late nineteenth century, Afrikaner

and British officials seized almost all Tswana territory, dividing

it among the Cape Colony, Afrikaner republics, and British ter- ritories. In 1910, when the Cape and the Transvaal were incorporated into the Union of South Africa, the Tswana chiefs lost most of their remaining power, and the Tswana people were

forced to pay taxes to the British Crown. They gradually turned

to migrant labor, especially in the mines, for their livelihood.

Tswana culture is similar to that of the related Sotho peoples, although some Tswana chiefdoms were more highly strati- fied than those of other Sotho or the Nguni. Tswana culture was distinguished for its complex legal system, involving a hierarchy of courts and mediators, and harsh punishments for

those found guilty of crimes. Tswana farmers often formed

close patron-client relationships with nearby Khoisan-speaking

hunters and herdsmen; the Tswana generally received meat

and animal pelts in return for cattle and, sometimes, dogs for

herding cattle. Bophuthatswana was declared "independent" in 1977,

although no country other than South Africa recognized its independence. The homeland consisted primarily of seven dis- connected enclaves near, or adjacent to, the border between

South Africa and Botswana. Efforts to consolidate the territory

and its population continued throughout the 1980s, as successive small land areas outside Bophuthatswana were incorporated into the homeland. Its population of about 1.8 million in

the late 1980s was estimated to be 70 percent Tswana peoples;

the remainder were other Sotho peoples, as well as Xhosa,

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The Society and Its Environment

Zulu, and Shangaan. Another 1.5 million BaTswana lived else- where in South Africa.

Bophuthatswana's residents were overwhelmingly poor,

despite the area's rich mineral wealth. Wages in the homeland's

industrial sector were lower than those in South Africa, and

most workers traveled to jobs outside the homeland each day.

The poverty of homeland residents was especially evident in

comparison with the world's wealthy tourists who visited Sun

City, a gambling resort in Bophuthatswana.

The non-Tswana portion of the homeland population was

denied the right to vote in local elections in 1987, and violence

ensued. Further unrest erupted in early 1988, when members

of the Botswana Defence Force tried to oust the unpopular

homeland president, Lucas Mangope. Escalating violence after

that led to the imposition of states of emergency and government crackdowns against ANC supporters in Bophuthatswana,

who were often involved in anti-Mangope demonstrations.

Mangope was ousted just before the April 1994 elections, and

the homeland was officially dismantled after the elections.

Tsonga and Venda

Tsonga

The Tsonga are a diverse population, generally including

the Shangaan, Thonga, Tonga (unrelated to another nearby

Tonga population to the north), and several smaller ethnic

groups. Together they number about 1.5 million in South

Africa in the mid-1990s, and at least 4.5 million in southern

Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

In the eighteenth century, the ancestors of the Tsonga lived

in small, independent chiefdoms, sometimes numbering a few

thousand people. Most Tsonga relied on fishing for subsistence, although goats, chickens, and crop cultivation were also

important. Cattle were relatively rare in their economies, probably because their coastal lowland habitat was tsetse-fly

infested. The Tsonga maintained a tradition of inheritance by

brothers, in preference to sons, which is common in many Central African societies but not among other South Africans.

During the mfecane and ensuing upheaval of the nineteenth

century, most Tsonga chiefdoms moved inland. Some successfully maintained their independence from the Zulu, while others were conquered by Zulu warriors even after they had fled

(see The Rise of African States, ch. 1). One Zulu military

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South Africa: A Country Study

leader, Soshangane, established his command over a large

Tsonga population in the northern Transvaal in the mid-nineteenth century and continued his conquests farther north. The

descendants of some of the conquered populations are known

as the Shangaan, or Tsonga-Shangaan. Some Tsonga-Shangaan

trace their ancestry to the Zulu warriors who subjugated the

armies in the region, while others claim descent from the con- quered chiefdoms. The Tsonga and the Zulu languages remain

separate and are mutually unintelligible in some areas. The Tsonga-Shangaan homeland, Gazankulu, was carved

out of northern Transvaal Province during the 1960s and was

granted self-governing status in 1973. The homeland economy

depended largely on gold and on a small manufacturing sector. Only an estimated 500,000 people—less than half the TsongaShangaan population of South Africa—ever lived there, however. Many others joined the throngs of township residents

around urban centers, especially Johannesburg and Pretoria.

In the 1980s, the government of Gazankulu, led by Chief

Minister Hudson Nsanwisi, established a 68-member legislative

assembly, made up mostly of traditional chiefs. The chiefs

opposed homeland independence but favored a federal

arrangement with South Africa; they also opposed sanctions

against South Africa on the grounds that the homeland econ- omy would suffer. In areas of Gazankulu bordering the

seSotho-speaking homeland of Lebowa, residents of the two

poverty-stricken homelands clashed frequently over political

and economic issues. These clashes were cited by South African

officials as examples of the ethnic conflicts they claimed would

engulf South Africa if apartheid ended.

Venda

The Venda (also VaVenda) population of about 600,000 people coalesced into an identifiable social unit in the area of the

northern Transvaal and in Zimbabwe over several centuries.

The Venda language, tshiVenda or luVenda, emerged as a dis- tinct tongue in the sixteenth century, according to scholars. In

the twentieth century, the tshiVenda vocabulary is similar to seSotho, but the grammar shares similarities with Shona dialects, which are spoken in Zimbabwe.

Venda culture is similarly eclectic; it appears to have incorporated a variety of East African, Central African, Nguni, and

Sotho characteristics. For example, the Venda forbid the con- sumption of pork, a prohibition that is common along the East

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The Society and Its Environment

African coast. They practice male circumcision, which is com- mon among many Sotho, but not among most Nguni peoples.

Early Venda social organization consisted of small kinship

groups, often dispersed among several households. These were organized into chiefdoms, and some were ruled by chiefly

dynasties in the eighteenth century. Smaller chiefdoms often

served as vassal states to larger and stronger chiefdoms, but

they were neither entirely incorporated into them nor administered directly by a paramount chief. Venda traditional religious

beliefs, like other aspects of culture, appear to have combined

elements from several neighboring religious systems and Christianity.

The homeland of Venda became nominally independent in

1979 but was not recognized by any country except South

Africa. Unlike other homelands, Venda actually drew most of

the 700,000 people assigned to live there. Its economy

depended on agriculture and small industry, and coal mining

began in the late 1980s. Nearly 70 percent of the men worked

elsewhere in South Africa, however, and at least 40 percent of

the homeland's income was migrant labor wages. Facing eco- nomic collapse, Venda authorities applied for readmission into

South Africa in 1991. Their petition was essentially overtaken

by the political negotiations and constitutional reforms of the

early 1990s, which led to the dissolution of the homelands in

1994.

Afrikaans Speakers

Afrikaners

Roughly 3 million people, or 7 percent of the people of

South Africa, trace their roots to Dutch, German, Belgian, and

French forebears (see Early European Settlement, ch. 1). Their

language, Afrikaans, and membership in the Dutch Reformed

Church are the most widespread common features of this population. Afrikaans, a seventeenth-century African variant of

Dutch, differs from its parent language in that it has eliminated

grammatical gender and many inflected verbs. Afrikaans was

recognized as a separate language in the nineteenth century,

after a significant literature began to develop.

Many of the Afrikaners' forebears arrived in southern Africa

in search of independence from government oppression. They

settled the region by fighting a series of wars, first with

Khoikhoi and Xhosa peoples who had preceded them in the

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South Africa: A Country Study

area, and then with Zulu and British armies, who also hoped to defend their territorial claims. The Afrikaners' defeat in the

South African War was a crucial turning point in their history;

their greatly outnumbered troops suffered a military defeat,

and more than 26,000 Afrikaners—including many women and

children—died in British concentration camps. The two formerly independent Afrikaner republics, the Orange Free State

and the South African Republic (later the Transvaal), were

incorporated into the Union of South Africa within the British

empire in 1910.

The war left much of the Afrikaners' farm land devastated,

the result of the British "scorched earth" policy. Farmers had

also been hard hit by cyclical occurrences of drought and

rinderpest fever. This desperate rural poverty drove many Afrikaners into urban areas for the first time, to seek jobs in the

growing industrial sector and particularly the flourishing mining industry. But many Afrikaners lacked educational credentials and urban work experience, and they were threatened by

competition from the large black population in the cities. Afri- cans had, in some cases, become accustomed to the work and

lifestyle changes that were new to Afrikaners at the time. Afrikaner mineworkers, nonetheless, demanded superior treat- ment over their black counterparts, and they organized to demand better wages and working conditions through the

1920s.

During the 1920s and the 1930s, Afrikaner cultural organizations were important vehicles for reasserting Afrikaners' pride

in their cultural identity. The most important of these was the

Afrikaner Broederbond, also known as the Broederband

(Brotherhood), an association of educated elites. The Broederbond helped establish numerous other Afrikaner social and

cultural organizations, such as the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge —FAK), and a variety of Afrikaner social service

organizations. Most of these groups represented people of dif- ferent classes and political persuasions, but Afrikaner leaders

worked hard in the 1930s and the 1940s to forge a sense of

unity and pride among them.

By the 1940s, the National Party (NP) had gained widespread appeal among Afrikaners by emphasizing racial separation and Afrikaner nationalism. Its narrow election victory in

1948 brought apartheid into all areas of social and economic

life in South Africa. The force of the government's commit130
The Society and Its Environment

ment to apartheid, and the popularity of the Dutch Reformed

Church among Afrikaners, contributed to the impression of

Afrikaner unity during the decades of National Party rule. But

numerous rifts divided the community, and heated debates

ensued. Some believed that the basic assumptions of apartheid were flawed; others, that it was being applied poorly. A small

number of Afrikaners worked to end apartheid almost as soon

as it was imposed.

Most Afrikaners strongly supported the government's 1960s

and 1970s campaign to stem the spread of communist influ- ence in southern Africa—the Total Strategy—based in part on

their suspicion of strong centralized government and on their

religious beliefs. But many were critical of South Africa's military intervention in neighboring states during the 1980s, and

of escalating military costs in the face of the receding threat of

what had been called the communist "Total Onslaught." By the

late 1980s, enforcing apartheid at home was expensive; the

unbalanced education system was in disarray and could not

produce the skilled labor force the country needed. Most Afrikaners then welcomed the government's decision to try to end

apartheid as peacefully as possible.

" Coloureds " Roughly 3.2 million South Africans of mixed-race (Khoikhoi

and European or Asian) ancestry were known as "coloureds" in

apartheid terminology. About 83 percent of them speak Afrikaans as their first language, and most of the remainder speak

English as their first language. Almost 85 percent of coloureds

live in Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces, and a siz- able coloured community lives in KwaZulu-Natal.

The largest subgroup within the coloured population is the

Griqua, a largely Afrikaner-Khoikhoi population that developed a distinct culture as early as the seventeenth century.

Their community was centered just north of the area that later

became the Orange Free State. Growing conflicts with Afrikaner farmers and, later, diamond diggers, prompted Griqua

leaders to seek the protection of the British, and later, to relocate portions of their community to the eastern Cape Colony

and Natal. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century demands for

land and the implementation of apartheid forced Griqua communities to move repeatedly, and many eventually settled north

of Cape Town. They number at least 300,000 in the 1990s. Most

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South Africa: A Country Study

speak a variant of Afrikaans as their first language and are members of the Dutch Reformed Church.

Another large subgroup, the Cape Malays, number about

180,000, primarily in the Western Cape, in the 1990s. Most are descendants of Afrikaners, indigenous Khoikhoi, and slaves

brought to South Africa from the Dutch East Indies. The Cape

Malays have retained many cultural elements from their diverse

origins, but they are recognized as a distinct community largely

because most are Muslims.

The coloured population suffered many indignities under

apartheid, such as eviction from homes and neighborhoods

preferred by whites. But the limited political reforms of the

1980s gave them political rights that were denied blacks, such

as a separate house of parliament in the tricameral legislature

and the right to vote in national elections. Coloured politicians

took advantage of their status to improve life for their constituents, but at the same time, many were active in the antiapartheid movement.

In April 1994, the coloured community in the Western Cape

gave the NP its only provincial victory in the national elections.

Coloured voters outnumbered black voters by three-to-one,

and white voters by two-to-one, according to local estimates.

The population voted for the NP by a large margin, in part out

of fear that its interests would be sidelined by a provincial government dominated by the ANC, and in part because conservative members of the coloured community had distanced

themselves from the ANC's revolutionary rhetoric over the

years. Another important consideration for many was their

desire to preserve their first language, which is Afrikaans.

English Speakers

"Europeans " Although most of the English spoken in South Africa is spoken by nonwhites, the term "English speakers" is often used to identify non-Afrikaner whites in particular, largely because this

group shares no other common cultural feature. Some of

South Africa's roughly 2 million English-speaking whites trace

their forebears to the large influx of British immigrants of the

1820s and the 1830s. Many more Europeans arrived in the late nineteenth century, after the discovery of gold and diamonds.

Almost two-thirds of English speakers trace their ancestry to England, Scotland, Wales, or Ireland, but a few arrived from

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The Society and Its Environment

the Netherlands, Germany, or France and joined the Englishspeaking community in South Africa for a variety of social and

political reasons. During the late 1930s and the 1940s, East

Europeans arrived in substantial numbers. Unlike the Afrikaners, the English-speaking community has not worked to forge a common identity. During the apartheid era, non-Afrikaner

whites held relatively little political power, but they maintained

their superior wealth, in many cases, through their activities in

commerce and business.

Also among South African whites are about 49,000 Portuguese immigrants, and 13,000 Greeks. South Africa's Jewish

population of about 100,000 has been a relatively cohesive

community, in comparison with other non-Afrikaner whites.

Many South African Jews trace their ancestry to Eastern

Europe or to the United Kingdom, and many others fled from

Nazi Germany during the 1930s and the 1940s. In general, Jewish South Africans opposed apartheid, in part because of its emphasis on racial purity derived from National Socialist

(Nazi) thought. ManyJews have also experienced religious dis- crimination in South Africa.

Asians

Of the roughly 1 million people of Asian descent in South

Africa in the mid-1990s, all but about 20,000 are of Indian

descent. Most speak English as their first language, although

many also speak Tamil or Hindi, and some speak Afrikaans as a second or third language. Many South Africans of Indian

descent trace their ancestry to indentured agricultural laborers

brought to Natal in the nineteenth century to work on sugar

plantations. But almost all Indians in South Africa in the 1990s were born there, because the South African government curtailed immigration from India in 1913.

Asians have endured racial and ethnic pressures throughout

the past century. In the late nineteenth century, they were prohibited from living in the Orange Free State; a few settled in

the Pretoria-Johannesburg area, but in the 1990s almost 90 percent of the Asian population live in KwaZulu-Natal—especially

in Durban and other large urban centers. Only about 10 percent live in rural areas. In the nineteenth century, Indians were divided by class,

between those who had arrived as indentured laborers or

slaves, and wealthier immigrants who had paid their own passage. The latter were given citizenship rights, in most cases, and

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South Africa: A Country Study

were not bound by the labor laws applied to indentured workers. This class difference was reinforced by the origins of the

immigrants—most of the wealthier Indian immigrants had

arrived from northern and central India, and a substantial

number were Muslims, while many indentured laborers were

Hindus.

By the 1990s, these differences were narrowing; more than

60 percent of all Indians in South Africa are Hindus. About 20

percent are Muslims and 8 percent, Christians, and a few are members of other religions. Most are merchants or businessmen, but significant numbers are teachers or artisans. Caste

differences based on Indian custom continue to have some

influence over social behavior but are of decreasing importance. Khoisan

Khoisan languages, characterized by "click" sounds not

found elsewhere in Africa, have almost disappeared from

South Africa in the 1990s. All remaining Khoisan speakers are believed to be San, living in the Kalahari Desert region in the

Northern Cape and North-West Province. The government has

no accurate count of their numbers, although it is generally

believed that larger numbers of San live in Botswana and

Namibia.

The closely related Khoikhoi, who were living in coastal areas of the southwest in the seventeenth century, have been

entirely destroyed or assimilated into other cultures. No

Khoikhoi peoples remain in South Africa in the 1990s,

although many so-called coloureds and others can trace their

ancestry through Khoikhoi and other lines of descent.

The San hunters and gatherers who occupied southern

Africa for several thousand years organized their society into

small kinship-based villages, often including fewer than fifty

people. The San economy developed out of the efficient use of

the environment; their diet included a wide array of birds, animals, plants, and, among coastal populations, fish and shellfish.

The San espoused generally egalitarian values and recognized

few leadership roles, except that of religious specialist, or

diviner. The culture of the Khoikhoi was similar to that of the

San, but the Khoikhoi acquired livestock—mainly cattle and

sheep—probably from Bantu speakers who moved into the

area from the north.

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The Society and Its Environment

Some South Africans of mixed-race descent and Khoikhoi

residents of Namibia have preserved Khoikhoi oral histories

that tell of a time when their ancestors quarreled and split

apart. Ancestors of the Namaqua (Nama) moved to the Atlantic Ocean coastline and south toward the Cape of Good Hope;

other Khoikhoi moved toward the Kalahari and the Namib

deserts and farther north. Seventeenth-century European

immigrants enslaved hundreds of Khoikhoi around Cape

Town, and many died in smallpox epidemics that swept south- ern Africa in 1713 and 1755. Others were absorbed into the

dominant societies around them, both African and European,

and into the populations of laborers who were brought from

Malaya, China, and from other region of Africa.

Religion

Almost all South Africans profess some religious affiliation,

according to the official census in 1991. Attitudes toward reli- gion and religious beliefs vary widely, however. The government has actively encouraged specific Christian beliefs during

much of the twentieth century, but South Africa has never had

an official state religion nor any significant government prohibition regarding religious beliefs. About 80 percent of all South Africans are Christians, and

most are Protestants. More than 8 million South Africans are members of African Independent churches, which have at

least 4,000 congregations. The denomination generally holds a combination of traditional African and Protestant beliefs. The

other large Protestant denomination, the Dutch Reformed

Church, has about 4 million members in several branches.

Most are whites or people of mixed race. Other Protestant denominations in the mid-1990s include at least 1.8 million Methodists, 1.2 million Anglicans, 800,000

Lutherans, 460,000 Presbyterians, and smaller numbers of Baptists, Congregationalists, Seventh Day Adventists, and members

of the Assembly of God and the Apostolic Faith Mission of

Southern Africa. More than 2.4 million South Africans are Roman Catholics; about 27,000 are Greek or Russian Orthodox. More than 7,000 are Mormons. Adherents of other world

religions include at least 350,000 Hindus, perhaps 400,000

Muslims, more than 100, 000Jews, and smaller numbers of Buddhists, Confucians, and Baha'is.

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South Africa: A Country Study

Historical Background

African Religions

The earliest southern African religions, those of the Khoisan

peoples, were more complex than early missionaries often

recorded. Their beliefs and practices were substantially eroded

by contacts with Europeans. Exceptional records of Khoisan rit- uals were made by a German linguist, Wilhelm Bleek, during

the 1870s and the 1880s. Some traditional Khoisan beliefs have

been preserved through oral histories, and some religious

practices are still observed in remote areas of Botswana and

Namibia.

Many Khoisan peoples believe in a supreme being who presides over daily life and controls elements of the environment.

In some Khoisan belief systems, this god is worshiped through

rituals or small sacrifices. A second, evil deity brings illness and

misfortune to earth. This dualism between good and evil pervades other areas of Khoisan thought about the nature of the

universe. Some Khoisan belief systems maintain that a person

should never attempt to communicate with the beneficent

deity, for fear of provoking his evil counterpart, and some

believe that spiritual beings simply ignore humanity most of

the time.

Traditional Khoisan religion also included numerous mythic

tales of gods and ancestor-heroes, whose lives provided examples of ways to cope with social conflicts and personal problems. Also important was the use of dance and altered states of

consciousness to gain knowledge for healing an individual or remedying a social evil. Healing dances are still among the

most widely practiced religious rituals in South Africa, even in

the 1990s, and are used in some African Independent churches

to heal the sick or eradicate evil. For many Khoisan peoples, the sun and the moon were

gods, or aspects of a supreme deity. The cycle of religious

observance was, therefore, carefully adjusted according to the

cycles of the moon. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century

observers in the Cape Colony noted the importance of ritual

dances and prayers during the full moon each month. Khoisan

legends and myths also refer to a "trickster" god, who could

transform himself into animal or human forms, and who could

die and be reborn many times over. The praying mantis, a predatory insect with large eyes and other features characteristic of animal predators, figures in San myths and folktales in a

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The Society and Its Environment

role similar to the clever fox in European folktales. Khoisan

herdboys still use mantises to "divine" the location of lost animals, and in Afrikaans, the mantis is referred to as "the Hottentot's god."

Bantu-speaking peoples brought an array of new religious

practices and beliefs when they arrived in the first millennium

A.D. Most believed in a supreme being, or high god, who could

bestow blessings or bring misfortune to humans. More influential in their spiritual life, however, was a group of ancestral spir- its —a different pantheon of spiritual beings in each

community. These spirits could communicate with and influ- ence the lives of the living, and they could sometimes be influenced by human entreaties. The male head of a homestead was

usually the ritual leader, responsible for performing rituals, giving thanks, seeking a blessing, or healing the sick on behalf of

his homestead. Rites of passage, or rituals marking major life- cycle changes such as birth, initiation, marriage, and death, were also important religious observances, and rituals were

used for rainmaking, strengthening fertility, and enhancing

military might.

Zulu and Xhosa religions generally sought to placate male

ancestral spirits, often with libations of beer or offerings of

meat, and to seek their guidance or intercession. Ancestral

spirits were almost uniformly benevolent; evil was generally

attributed to witches or sorcerers, who might overpower or

bypass a spiritual protector or ancestor. Ancestral spirits occasionally caused minor illnesses, primarily as a warning against

religious neglect or misdeeds.

Most Bantu religious systems had no priesthood, or officially

recognized mediator between the material and the spiritual

worlds. Rather, they believed that political leadership was accompanied by religious responsibility. For example, a chiefdom or kingdom relied on the chief or monarch for physical

and spiritual survival. Particular importance was attached to the status of the diviner, or sangoma, however; the sangoma

underwent rigorous training to acquire the extensive knowledge and skills necessary for divination and healing.

Bantu religions usually avoided any claim that rituals performed by human beings could influence the actions of the

supreme deity, or high god; rituals were normally intended to honor or placate lesser spiritual beings, and sometimes to ask

for their intervention. The high god was a remote, transcendent being possessing the power to create the Earth, but

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South Africa: A Country Study

beyond human comprehension or manipulation. Ancestors, in

contrast, were once human and had kinship ties with those on

earth, and they were sometimes amenable to human entreaties.

Many Bantu societies have historical accounts or myths that

explain the presence of human society on earth. In many cases, these myths affirm that human beings first emerged from a hole in the ground, that they were plucked from a field or a bed of reeds, or that they were fashioned from elemental substances through the efforts of a supreme deity. Death originated in the failure of human beings or their messengers, such

as a chameleon who was sent to relay a divine message of

immortality, but who delayed and was overtaken by the message of death.

Such widespread myths not only provide an account of the

origins of the human condition, but they also describe appropriate behavior for coping with a complex world. For example,

a Zulu myth tells of the creation of both black and white

human beings, the assignment of the black people to the land

and the white people to the sea, and the provision of spears for

black people and guns for whites. Many of life's conflicts arise,

it is believed, when people defy the divine plan.

Scholars have reported that during the rapid acculturation

of the nineteenth century in southern Africa, new myths and

legends arose, attributing greater and greater power to traditional gods. In this way, new events and displays of power were

incorporated into existing belief systems. Others have suggested that the upheaval of the nineteenth century provided

fertile ground for Christian and Muslim missionaries, whose

teachings of a Supreme Being presiding over the entire world

provided reassurance of a divine order in a changing environment. In this view, the new world religions drew converts based on their appeal as an explanation of changing circumstances.

The Arrival of Christianity

Religion and politics were inextricably interwoven as soon as the Portuguese navigator Bartholomeu Dias (Diaz) erected a limestone pillar and Christian cross at the Cape of Good Hope

in the year A.D. 1488. Religious missionaries did not arrive in

any significant numbers for more than a century, however. In

1652 the Dutch East India Company established a resupply sta- tion at the Cape, based largely on the experience ofJan van

Riebeeck, who had survived a shipwreck off the coast of the

Cape in 1648 and who later became the governor of the Cape

138
Man consulting a Shangaan herbalist, whose manipulation of cowrie

shells, carved bones, and other ritual objects helps

communicate her diagnosis

Courtesy R. T. K. Scully

Colony. Dutch Reformed Church missionaries reported in

1658 that Khoikhoi slaves in the area attended their mission

services (and were rewarded with a glass of brandy after the ser- mon).

Religious reforms swept through the Netherlands in the

early seventeenth century, and the Calvinist Synod ruled in

1618 that any slave who was baptized should be freed. In the

Cape Colony, however, farmers who depended on their slaves

refused repeated entreaties from the church authorities in

Europe to free these slaves. Instead, the slaveowners banned

religious instruction for slaves, so none could be baptized.

The London Missionary Society sent large numbers of missionaries to the Cape Colony in 1799, and soon after that, the

Glasgow Missionary Society and the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society arrived, along with missionaries from the

United States, France, Germany, and Scandinavia. Most missions placed a high priority on literacy and Biblical instruction,

but as the Industrial Revolution swept through Europe and the

United States, the evangelical message increasingly emphasized

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South Africa: A Country Study

the spiritual benefits of productive labor. Missionaries also promoted European values and occupations as well as the possession of material goods unrelated to spiritual salvation, such as European clothing, houses, and tools. Many Western missionaries mistakenly believed that south- ern Africans had no religion because of the differences in their

faiths. Africans often denied the existence of a single, supreme

being who could be influenced by prayer on behalf of humans.

They appeared to confirm the missionaries' suspicions that

they were "godless" by performing ritual oblations to lesser

spiritual beings and ancestors. The absence of a priest or minister, or any type of church, was interpreted as further proof of

the lack of spiritual beliefs, even among those who had strong

beliefs in an array of spiritual beings and forces.

A few African leaders took advantage of the missionaries'

presence to enhance or to reinforce their own political power.

For example, the nineteenth-century Sotho King Moshoeshoe

I claimed that Christian teachings only validated rules of behavior he had long advocated for his subjects. The Xhosa chief,

Ngqika, rewarded local missionaries when their prayers

appeared to bring much-needed rain. Sotho, Tswana, and others sought the protection of Christian missionaries during the

mfecane and the related upheaval of the first part of the nineteenth century. The term Mfengu was originally applied to these displaced people who settled around Christian mission

stations, but over time, the Mfengu came to be recognized as a

relatively cohesive ethnic group.

The relationships among indigenous African leaders, missionaries, and European settlers and officials were always complex. Missionaries whose efforts were frustrated by local chiefs

sometimes sought government intervention to weaken the

chiefs' power. Government officials relied in part on the influ- ence of missionaries in order to convince indigenous Africans

of the validity of European customs. At times, however, missionaries objected to official policies that they considered harmful

to their followers, and they were criticized by government officials, as a result, for interfering in official matters. In the 1830s and the 1840s, British officials in the eastern

Cape Colony tried to eliminate the Xhosa practice of witch

hunts, which were increasing in response to the turmoil in the

region and were spreading fear through many religious communities. The British also abolished traditional economic practices, such as the Xhosa custom of paying lobola, or bridewealth

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The Society and Its Environment

given by the family of a groom to that of his bride. But abolishing an element of traditional culture almost always resulted in an array of unforeseen cultural consequences, and this was

especially true when the practices being eliminated were central to a group's social organization, as was the lobola. By 1850, the Xhosa were enraged by the British presence. A

leading Xhosa healer and diviner, Mlangeni, organized an army to confront the British and promised supernatural assis- tance in this effort, as long as the Xhosa people sacrificed all of

their yellow and dun-colored cattle to counteract the evil spell

that had engulfed them. A brutal frontier war ensued, and the

rebellion was suppressed in 1853.

The Xhosa defeat was made even more bitter when a chiefly

adviser, Mhlakaza, convinced many people of a prophecy

brought by his niece, Nongqawuse, telling of an end to British

domination and the redemption of the Xhosa if they would

first kill all their remaining cattle and destroy their food stocks. In 1856 and 1857, thousands of Xhosa responded to the prophecy; more than 400,000 cattle were sacrificed. After the prophecy failed, more than 40,000 people died of starvation, and

almost as many were forced to seek work in the colonial labor

market.

Religion and Apartheid

Dutch Reformed Churches

Christianity became a powerful influence in South Africa,

often uniting large numbers of people in a common faith. In

the twentieth century, however, several Christian churches

actively promoted racial divisions through the political philosophy of apartheid. The largest of these denominations was the

Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk

NGK), which came to be known as the "official religion" of the

National Party during the apartheid era. Its four main

branches had more than 3 million members in 1,263 congregations in the 1990s.

The Dutch Reformed Church arrived in South Africa in the

seventeenth century, after Calvinist reforms in Europe had

entrenched the idea of predestination, and the Synod of Dort

in the Netherlands had proclaimed this church as the "community of the elect" in 1619. The church gained recognition as the

state religion in 1651, and the Dutch East India Company, as an

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South Africa: A Country Study

extension of the state in southern Africa, established the first Dutch Reformed Church at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652.

Church members in South Africa generally resisted liberal

trends that arose in Europe in the nineteenth century, but rifts occurred in the church in 1853 with the formation of the

Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk (also translated, the Dutch

Reformed Church), and in 1859, with the formation of the

Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika (the Reformed Church of

South Africa). The NGK is generally referred to as the Dutch

Reformed Church, and these two newer churches are also

referred to as Dutch Reformed churches.

All of the Dutch Reformed churches share similar Calvinist

beliefs and presbyterial organization. Their doctrines assert that God is eternal, infinite, wise, and just, and the Creator of

the universe. He has planned the life and the fate of each individual on earth; the "chosen" are saved, as long as they adhere

to the church's teachings. The Bible—both the Old Testament

and the New Testament—is the final authority on religious

matters. The presbyterial organization of the Dutch Reformed

churches means that the functioning of each congregation is governed, in part, by that community, whereas decisions con- cerning policy and discipline are generally handled by regional

synods. A general synod is responsible for the denomination as a whole. In South Africa, a national synod and nine regional

synods oversee the operation of the Dutch Reformed congregations.

As black Africans and people of mixed race converted to the

religion, church members debated the question of racial separation. Pressures grew for racially separate congregations, and

the issue was complicated by the demands of some black

church members for their own churches and congregations. In

1881 the Dutch Reformed Mission Church (Sending Kerk)

established a separate coloured church. In 1910, when black

South Africans made up about 10 percent of the community,

the synods established the NGK in Afrika, as it became known,

for black Africans. (An Indian Dutch Reformed Church was formed in 1951.)

Racial separation was only widely accepted in the church in

the early twentieth century, as many Afrikaners came to believe

that their own survival as a community was threatened, and as the belief in racial separation was gaining acceptance among

white South Africans in general. Social and spiritual survival

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The Society and Its Environment

became intertwined in church philosophy, influenced in part

by the early twentieth-century persecution of the Afrikaners by

the British (see British Imperialism and the Afrikaners, ch. 1).

Church leaders refused to condemn Afrikaner rebellions

against the British, and their followers gained strength by

attributing divine origins to their struggle for survival.

As the system of apartheid was called into question throughout the country in the 1970s and the 1980s, church leaders

were, in general, more committed to apartheid than many of

their followers, and the church became an impediment to

political reform. A few Dutch Reformed clergy opposed apartheid. The best known of these, Reverend Beyers Naude, left his

whites-only church in the late 1970s and joined a black parish

within the Dutch Reformed church. The efforts of other

church leaders who worked to reduce the church's racist image

were often constrained by the fact that parish finances were

controlled by the church's highest authorities, who supported

apartheid.

Other Religious Organizations

In the 1990s, black South Africans form a majority in all large Christian churches in South Africa, except the Dutch

Reformed churches, and this was true throughout the apartheid era. In these churches, many people became involved in

efforts to reverse or to ameliorate the effects of apartheid policies, but with varying degrees of militancy. Again, there were

often significant differences between church leaders and their

followers concerning race and politics. For example, senior

officials within the Roman Catholic Church in South Africa

opposed apartheid, but a group of Catholics formed the South

African Catholic Defence League to condemn the church's

political involvement and, in particular, to denounce school

integration.

Leaders of the Church of the Province of South Africa, the

Anglican Church, spoke out in opposition to apartheid, but

church members disagreed about tactics for expressing their

views. Some white Anglicans vigorously opposed their church's

involvement in politics, while many black Anglicans became

leaders in the antiapartheid movement. The Methodist

Church, which was overwhelmingly black, adopted openly antiapartheid stands on many public issues, but its leaders' activism

cost it support among those who feared public scrutiny on this

politically sensitive issue.

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South Africa: A Country Study

Religious alliances provided a means of coordinating church

opposition to apartheid while minimizing the public exposure

of church leaders and parishioners. The South African Council

of Churches (SACC) was the most active antiapartheid

umbrella organization. The SACC not only opposed apartheid

but also offered encouragement to those who contravened race

laws. Under the leadership of Anglican Archbishop Desmond

Tutu in the 1980s, the SACC also attempted to withhold cooperation with the state, as much as possible, in protest against

apartheid. SACC leaders were outspoken in their political

views, lodging frequent complaints with government officials

and organizing numerous peaceful protests.

Countering the efforts of the antiapartheid community, the

Christian League of Southern Africa rallied in support of the

government's apartheid policies. The Christian League consisted of members of Dutch Reformed and other churches who

believed apartheid could be justified on religious grounds. The

group won little popular support, however, and was criticized

both for its principles and for its tactic of bringing religious

and political issues together in the same debate.

Zion Christian Church

The largest and fastest-growing of the African independent

churches in the 1990s is the Zion Christian Church. Its members, estimated to number between 2 million and 6 million in

more than 4,000 parishes, live primarily in urban townships

and rural communities. The church is well known by the abbreviation, ZCC, pronounced "zed-say-say." The ZCC was established in 1910 by Engenas Lekganyane, a farm worker in a

rural area that later became Zion City, in the Northern Province. Lekganyane was educated by Scottish Presbyterian missionaries, and the church reflects some elements of that

religion. The ZCC took its name from Biblical references to the

Mount of Zion in Jerusalem, based in part on the inspiration of

a similar community in Zion, Illinois. The highlight of the ZCC religious calendar is the Easter cel- ebration, which has drawn more than 1 million church members for several days of religious services at Zion City. Zionist

beliefs emphasize the healing power of religious faith, and for

this reason ZCC leaders sometimes clash with the traditional

healers, or sangomas, who are important in many belief systems.

Despite occasional conflicts, however, the ZCC respects traditional African religious beliefs, in general, especially those con144
Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu in Milwaukee,

Wisconsin, May 1995

Permission of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel;

photographer Ronald M. Overdahl

cerning the power of the ancestors to intercede on behalf of

humans.

ZCC beliefs are eclectic, but the church's practices are often

strict. The ZCC proscribes alcoholic beverages, smoking, and

eating pork. It condemns sexual promiscuity and violence. As a

result, church members have become known in the business

community for their honesty and dependability as employees.

The growth of the independent churches was spurred by the

antiapartheid movement. Nevertheless, because devout ZCC

members place their spiritual agenda ahead of earthly politics,

they generally avoided antiapartheid demonstrations and organizations. As a result, ZCC members were often shunned, and

some were even attacked, by antiapartheid militants. President

Mandela is popular among ZCC members in the 1990s, however, in part because of his political moderation and antiviolent

rhetoric.

Islam

South Africa's small Muslim community of about 400,000 is gaining new members, especially among black South Africans,

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South Africa: A Country Study

in the 1990s. The majority of Muslims are of Indian descent,

however, and a small minority are Pakistanis or people of

mixed race. Most live in or near Cape Town, Durban, or Johannesburg. The Africa Muslim Party won 47,690 votes, less than 1 percent of the total vote, in the April 1994 nationwide elections.

Most South African Muslims are members of the Sunni

branch of Islam, although a small Shia sect is becoming more

vocal in the 1990s. The Muslim Youth Movement, the Muslim

Student Association, and several other Islamic organizations

have small branches in South African universities. Diplomats

and other visitors from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have

contributed to the building of mosques and other efforts to promote Islam. The desire to proselytize in the region was an

important topic of discussion at the first southern African conference on Islam, which was held in Cape Town in April 1995.

Education

Schools in South Africa, as elsewhere, reflect society's political philosophy and goals. The earliest mission schools aimed to inculcate literacy and new social and religious values, and

schools for European immigrants aimed to preserve the values

of previous generations. In the twentieth century, the education system assumed economic importance as it prepared

young Africans for low-wage labor and protected the privileged

white minority from competition. From the 1950s to the mid1990s, no other social institution reflected the government's

racial philosophy of apartheid more clearly than the education

system. Because the schools were required both to teach and to practice apartheid, they were especially vulnerable to the weaknesses of the system.

Many young people during the 1980s were committed to destroying the school system because of its identification with

apartheid. Student strikes, vandalism, and violence seriously

undermined the schools' ability to function. By the early 1990s,

shortages of teachers, classrooms, and equipment had taken a further toll on education.

South Africa's industrial economy, with its strong reliance on

capital-intensive development, provided relatively few prospects for employment for those who had only minimal educational credentials, or none at all. Nationwide literacy was less than 60 percent throughout the 1980s, and an estimated

500,000 unskilled and uneducated young people faced unem146
The Society and Its Environment

ployment by the end of the decade, according to the respected

Education Foundation. At the same time, job openings for

highly skilled workers and managers far outpaced the number

of qualified applicants. These problems were being addressed

in the political reforms of the 1990s, but the legacies of apartheid—the insufficient education of the majority of the population and the backlog of deficiencies in the school system

promised to challenge future governments for decades, or perhaps generations.

Early Development

Many African societies placed strong emphasis on traditional

forms of education well before the arrival of Europeans. Adults

in Khoisan- and Bantu-speaking societies, for example, had

extensive responsibilities for transmitting cultural values and

skills within kinship-based groups and sometimes within larger

organizations, villages, or districts. Education involved oral his- tories of the group, tales of heroism and treachery, and practice in the skills necessary for survival in a changing

environment.

In many Nguni-speaking chiefdoms of southern Africa,

highly regimented age-groups of young men acquired knowledge and skills vital to their survival and prestige under the

instruction of respected military, religious, or political leaders.

The socialization of women, although sometimes done within

age-groups, was more often in small groups of siblings or cousins, and it emphasized domestic and agricultural skills necessary to the survival of the family. In all of these settings, the

transmission of religious values was a vital element of education.

The socialization of African youth was sometimes interrupted by warfare or political upheaval. More serious disruptions occurred in the late nineteenth century and the

twentieth century, when government policies drew large numbers of adult men away from their homes for long periods of

employment in mines or urban industries. Women were heads

of households for months or years at a time. And after apartheid became entrenched in the early 1950s, security forces

sometimes removed entire villages from their land and relocated them to less desirable areas in the interest of white eco- nomic development.

The earliest European schools in South Africa were established in the Cape Colony in the late seventeenth century by

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South Africa: A Country Study

Dutch Reformed Church elders committed to biblical instruction, which was necessary for church confirmation (see Early

European Settlement, ch. 1). In rural areas, itinerant teachers

(meesters) taught basic literacy and math skills. British mission

schools proliferated after 1799, when the first members of the

London Missionary Society arrived in the Cape Colony.

Language soon became a sensitive issue in education. At

least two dozen English-language schools operated in rural

areas of the Cape Colony by 1827, but their presence rankled

among devout Afrikaners, who considered the English language and curriculum irrelevant to rural life and Afrikaner val- ues. Throughout the nineteenth century, Afrikaners resisted

government policies aimed at the spread of the English language and British values, and many educated their children at home or in the churches.

After British colonial officials began encouraging families to emigrate from Britain to the Cape Colony in 1820, the Colonial

Office screened applicants for immigration for background

qualifications. They selected educated families, for the most

part, to establish a British presence in the Cape Colony, and

after their arrival, these parents placed a high priority on education. Throughout this time, most religious schools in the

eastern Cape accepted Xhosa children who applied for admission, and in Natal many other Nguni-speaking groups sent

their children to mission schools after the mid-nineteenth century. The government also financed teacher training classes for

Africans as part of its pacification campaign throughout the

nineteenth century.

By 1877 some 60 percent of school-age children in Natal were enrolled in school, as were 49 percent in the Cape Colony.

In the Afrikaner republics, however, enrollments remained

low—only 12 percent in the Orange Free State and 8 percent

in the Transvaal—primarily the result of Afrikaner resistance to British education. Enrollments in these republics increased

toward the end of the century, after the government agreed to the use of Afrikaans in the schools and to allow Afrikaner parents greater control over primary and secondary education.

By the late nineteenth century, three types of schools were

receiving government assistance—ward schools, or small rural

schools generally employing one teacher; district schools, providing primary-level education to several towns in an area; and

a few secondary schools in larger cities. But during the last decades of that century, all four provinces virtually abolished

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The Society and Its Environment

African enrollment in government schools. African children

attended mission schools, for the most part, and were taught by

clergy or by lay teachers, sometimes with government assis- tance. Higher education was generally reserved for those who

could travel to Europe, but in 1829 the government established

the multiracial South African College, which later became the

University of Cape Town. Religious seminaries accepted a few

African applicants as early as 1841. In 1852 British officials in

the Transvaal and the Orange Free State acknowledged the

right of Afrikaners to establish their own institutions of higher

learning, and based on this understanding, Britain's incoming

governor—Sir George Grey—allocated small sums of money to help fund Afrikaner institutions. The government established

Grey College—later the University of the Orange Free State

in Bloemfontein in 1855 and placed it under the supervision of

the Dutch Reformed Church. The Grey Institute was established in Port Elizabeth in 1856; Graaff-Reinet College was founded in 1860. The Christian College was founded at Potchefstroom in 1869 and was later incorporated into the

University of South Africa and renamed Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education.

Following the British victory in the South African War, the

new representative of the Crown, Sir Alfred Milner, brought

thousands of teachers from Britain, Canada, Australia, and

New Zealand to instill the English language and British cultural

values, especially in the two former Afrikaner republics. To

counter the British influence, a group of Afrikaner churches

proposed an education program, Christian National Education, to serve as the core of the school curriculum. The government initially refused to fund schools adopting this program,

butJan C. Smuts, the Transvaal leader who later became prime

minister, was strongly committed to reconciliation between

Afrikaners and English speakers, and he favored local control over many aspects of education. Provincial autonomy in education was strengthened in the early twentieth century, and all four provincial governments used government funds primarily

to educate whites.

The National Party (NP) was able to capitalize on the fear of

racial integration in the schools to build its support. The NP's narrow election victory in 1948 gave Afrikaans new standing in

the schools, and after that, all high-school graduates were

required to be proficient in both Afrikaans and English. The

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South Africa: A Country Study

NP government also reintroduced Christian National Education as the guiding philosophy of education.

Education under Apartheid

The Bantu Education Act

The Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 widened the gaps

in educational opportunities for different racial groups. Two of

the architects of Bantu education, Dr. W.M. Eiselen and Dr. Hendrik F. Verwoerd, had studied in Germany and had

adopted many elements of National Socialist (Nazi) philosophy. The concept of racial "purity," in particular, provided a

rationalization for keeping black education inferior. Verwoerd,

then minister of native affairs, said black Africans "should be

educated for their opportunities in life," and that there was no

place for them "above the level of certain forms of labour." The

government also tightened its control over religious high

schools by eliminating almost all financial aid, forcing many

churches to sell their schools to the government or close them

entirely.

Christian National Education supported the NP program of

apartheid by calling on educators to reinforce cultural diversity

and to rely on "mother-tongue" instruction in the first years of

primary school. This philosophy also espoused the idea that a person's social responsibilities and political opportunities are defined, in large part, by that person's ethnic identity. The government also gave strong management control to the school

boards, who were elected by the parents in each district. Official attitudes toward African education were paternalistic, based on trusteeship and segregation. Black education was

not supposed to drain government resources away from white

education. The number of schools for blacks increased during

the 1960s, but their curriculum was designed to prepare children for menial jobs. Per-capita government spending on black

education slipped to one-tenth of spending on whites in the

1970s. Black schools had inferior facilities, teachers, and text- books.

Soweto and Its Aftermath

Tensions over language in education erupted into violence

on June 16, 1976, when students took to the streets in the

Johannesburg township of Soweto. Their action was prompted

by the decision of Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, the archi150
Children at play in schoolyard, KTC Township (Cape Town)

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South Africa: A Country Study

tect of the Bantu education system, to enforce a regulation

requiring that one-half of all high-school classes must be taught

in Afrikaans. A harsh police response resulted in the deaths of

several children, some as young as eight or nine years old. In

the violence that followed, more than 575 people died, at least 134 of them under the age of eighteen.

Youthful ANC supporters abandoned school in droves; some

vowed to "make South Africa ungovernable" to protest against

apartheid education. Others left the country for military training camps run by the ANC or other liberation armies, mostly in

Angola, Tanzania, or Eastern Europe. "Liberation before education" became their battle cry. The schools suffered further damage as a result of the unrest

of 1976. Vandals and arsonists damaged or destroyed many

schools and school property. Students who tried to attend

school and their teachers were sometimes attacked, and administrators found it increasingly difficult to maintain normal

school activities. Some teachers and administrators joined in

the protests.

The National Policy for General Affairs Act (No. 76) of 1984

provided some improvements in black education but maintained the overall separation called for by the Bantu education

system. This act gave the minister of national education authority to determine general policy for syllabuses, examinations,

and certification qualifications in all institutions of formal and

informal education. But responsibility for implementing these

policies was divided among numerous government departments and offices, resulting in a bewildering array of educational authorities: For example, the Department of Education

and Training was responsible for black education outside the

homelands. Each of the three houses of parliament—for

whites, coloureds, and Indians—had an education department

for one racial group, and each of the ten homelands had its own education department. In addition, several other government departments managed specific aspects of education.

Education was compulsory for all racial groups, but at different ages, and the law was enforced differently. Whites were

required to attend school between the ages of seven and six- teen. Black children were required to attend school from age

seven until the equivalent of seventh grade or the age of six- teen, but this law was enforced only weakly, and not at all in areas where schools were unavailable. For Asians and coloured

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The Society and Its Environment

children, education was compulsory between the ages of seven and fifteen.

The discrepancies in education among racial groups were

glaring. Teacher: pupil ratios in primary schools averaged 1:18

in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, 1:27 in coloured

schools, and 1:39 in black schools. Moreover, whereas 96 percent of all teachers in white schools had teaching certificates,

only 15 percent of teachers in black schools were certified. Secondary-school pass rates for black pupils in the nationwide,

standardized high-school graduation exams were less than onehalf the pass rate for whites.

As the government implemented the 1984 legislation, new

violence flared up in response to the limited constitutional

reforms that continued to exclude blacks (see Constitutional

Change, ch. 4). Finally, the government began to signal its awareness that apartheid could not endure. By 1986 President

P.W. Botha (1984-89) had stated that the concept of apartheid was "outdated," and behind-the-scenes negotiations had begun

between government officials and imprisoned ANC leader Nel- son Mandela. The gap between government spending on education for different racial groups slowly began to narrow, and

penalties for defying apartheid rules in education began to

ease. The School System in the 1990s

Reorganizing education was one of the most daunting tasks

the government faced as apartheid laws were being lifted in the

1990s. President Frederik W. (F.W.) de Klerk, in a speech to Parliament in January 1993, stressed the need for a nonracial

school system, with enough flexibility to allow communities to preserve their religious and cultural values and their home language. De Klerk established the Education Co-ordination Ser- vice to manage education during the political transition of the

1990s, and he charged it with eliminating the bureaucratic

duplication that had resulted from apartheid education.

In August 1993, de Klerk gathered together leading experts

on education in the National Education and Training Forum

to formulate a policy framework for restructuring education.

Anticipating rising education costs, the government earmarked

23.5 percent of the national budget in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1993-94 for education. It established new education

offices and gave them specific responsibilities within the reor- ganization plan. When the new school year began in January

153
South Africa: A Country Study

1995, all government-run primary and secondary schools were

officially integrated, and the first stage of the transformation in

education had begun almost without violence.

The new policies were difficult to implement, however, and

many policy details remained to be worked out. Education was compulsory for all children between age seven and age sixteen,

for example, but there had not been enough time or resources

to provide adequate schools and teachers for the entire schoolage population. The schools received government assistance

for teachers' salaries only; they had to charge fees for equipment and supplies, but pupils who could not pay school fees

could not be expelled from school.

In 1995 South Africa had a total of 20,780 primary and sec- ondary schools. Of these, 20,303 belonged to the government,

and 477 were private. In addition, 226 specialized schools were

in operation for gifted pupils or students with special needs

(see table 3, Appendix). More than 11 million pupils were

enrolled, about 6.95 million in primary school and 4.12 million

in secondary schools. The number of teachers in the regular

primary and secondary schools was 344,083, of whom 226,900 were black. Of the white teachers, more than 60 percent were

Afrikaners. Men teachers were paid substantially more than

women; women's salaries averaged 83 percent of men's salaries

for the same job with equal qualifications.

Higher Education

University-level education suffered under apartheid. When

the NP came to power in 1948, there were ten government-subsidized institutions of higher learning—four with classes taught

in English; four with classes taught in Afrikaans; one bilingual

correspondence university; and the South African Native College at Fort Hare, in which most classes were taught in English

but other languages were permitted. The four Afrikaans universities and one of the English-language universities (Rhodes

University) admitted white students only. Students of all races attended the University of Cape Town, the University of the

Witwatersrand, and the University of Natal, although some

classes at these universities were segregated.

The Extension of University Education Act (No. 45) of 1959

prohibited established universities from accepting black stu- dents, except with the special permission of a cabinet minister.

The government opened several new universities and colleges

for black, coloured, and Indian students, and these students

154
The Society and Its Environment

were allowed to attend a "white" university only if their "own"

institutions became too overcrowded. The University of the

North, established in 1959, for example, admitted students of

Tsonga, Sotho, Venda, or Tswana descent only

The 1959 law also gave the central government control over

the South African Native College at Fort Hare (later the University of Fort Hare), and the government instituted a new policy of admitting Xhosa students only to that school. Several

technikons (advanced-level technical schools) gave preference

to students of one ethnic group. Overall, however, the 1959 legislation reduced opportunities for university education for

blacks, and by 1978 only 20 percent of all university students in

South Africa were black. During the 1980s, several university

administrations, anticipating the dismal impact of the longterm racial biases in education, began admitting students from

all racial groups.

As of the mid-1990s South Africa has twenty-one major universities, which are government-financed and open to students

of all races. In addition, secondary-school graduates can attend

one of fifteen technikons, 128 technical colleges, and seventy

teacher-training colleges (which do not require high-school

certificates for admission), or another in a wide array of

teacher training institutions (see table 4, Appendix). Students

in universities and teacher-training colleges numbered 362,000

in 1994, and the institutions themselves had 14,460 academic

staff members. At technical colleges and technikons, students

numbered 191,087, and teaching staff numbered 5,532.

Each university administration is headed by a governmentappointed chancellor, the institution's senior authority; a vice

chancellor; and a university council. The chancellor is often a

civic leader or political figure whose primary function is to represent the university to the community. The university council,

comprising members of the university and the community,

names the vice chancellor or rector, who controls the administration of the institution. The vice chancellor generally holds

office until age sixty-five.

The university senate manages academic and faculty affairs,

under the vice chancellor's authority. Each university sets its own tuition costs and receives government funding based on

studenf.faculty ratios and tuition receipts. The university aca- demic year lasts thirty-six weeks; school terms and vacation

periods are set by the university council. The government

establishes general degree requirements, but the individual

155
South Africa: A Country Study

university's council and administration set specific requirements for each campus.

A variety of adult education opportunities are available.

These include classes in basic literacy, in technical and vocational subjects, and in sports and leisure activities. Two universities, those of Cape Town and Witwatersrand, offer classes for

instructors in adult education, and Witwatersrand has a course leading to a diploma for adult educators. Some of these programs are being reoriented in the 1990s to emphasize literacy

training for the more than 8 million adults who cannot read.

Health and Welfare

South Africa's population in general enjoys good health,

compared with other African countries in the 1990s. Rural

health care compares favorably with delivery systems in Kenya

and in Nigeria, for example. The system reflects the biases of

apartheid, in that superior care is available to wealthy urban

residents, most of whom were white as of 1995, and inferior ser- vices are available to the poor, who are black. These differences

began to narrow in the early 1990s, as apartheid was being dis- mantled. Under the government's 1994 blueprint for social

and economic development, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), R14 billion (for value of the rand

see Glossary) was set aside for improvements in health care. Incidence of Disease

Tuberculosis is the most prevalent disease reported to health

officials in the 1990s. European settlers probably introduced

this disease into southern Africa in the seventeenth or the eighteenth century, and it was perhaps reintroduced by nineteenthcentury gold and diamond miners from Europe or China. Miners of all races lived in unhealthy and unsanitary conditions

during the first decades of industrial development, and these

conditions contributed to the spread of the disease in the early

twentieth century. From the beginning, whites who became ill received better treatment than others. In 1955 tuberculosis

reached epidemic proportions among black mineworkers,

which prompted the South African Chamber of Mines to

improve mineworkers' dwellings and health care services.

About 90 percent of tuberculosis cases reported after 1970 were among blacks. The rate of infection appeared to decline

between 1970 and 1985, and the government, citing this

156
Business students in a Pretoria technical college

Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

decline, ended compulsory tuberculosis vaccinations in 1987.

Although tuberculosis among blacks increased after that,

health officials believed other causes were important. Overcrowding in urban housing projects increased in the late 1980s,

and many tuberculosis patients discontinued treatment after

only a few weeks, rather than the prescribed year. The South

African National Tuberculosis Association reported that its case load increased from 88,000 cases in 1985 to more than

124,000 in 1990 and continued to increase after that. More

than 6,000 people died of tuberculosis and related effects each

year in the early 1990s. More than 47,800 new cases of the dis- ease were reported in 1994.

Malaria ranked second among reported diseases, again

affecting whites less than other racial groups. This disease

reached epidemic levels in the late nineteenth and the early

twentieth century, especially in the northern Natal and the

157
South Africa: A Country Study

lowveld areas of the northern and eastern Transvaal. During

the 1960s, there were 2.7 cases of malaria per 100,000 nonwhites, compared with only 1.1 cases per 100,000 whites. As

malaria increased during the 1970s and the 1980s, the gap

between races widened and these rates rose to 40.5 cases per

100,000 among blacks, Asians, and people of mixed race, compared with six cases per 100,000 whites in the early 1990s. In

1994 health officials reported 4,194 cases of malaria nationwide.

Several factors probably contributed to the changing patterns in malaria incidence. The use of insecticides helped

reduce the incidence of malaria temporarily in the 1950s. The

1972 worldwide ban on the insecticide, DDT, though only partially observed in South Africa, was followed by a steady

increase in the incidence of malaria. At the same time, mosquitoes and other parasites became more resistant to chemicals

and medicines. Residential patterns also changed, and several

mosquito-infested areas of the country were permanently set- tled. For example, the black homelands of Venda, Gazankulu,

and Lebowa were established in heavily malaria-infested areas of the northern Transvaal.

Most other diseases decreased between 1970 and 1990. In

keeping with world trends, smallpox was virtually eradicated in

South Africa by the 1970s. Diphtheria declined to almost negligible levels—fewer than 0.1 cases per 100,000 people—by 1990.

Leprosy showed similar trends, diminishing to 0.5 cases per

100,000 in 1990.

Typhoid continues to appear in scattered areas of the country in the 1990s, and most typhoid cases are among blacks. In

the early 1990s, between twenty-five and thirty-five cases of

typhoid were reported per 100,000 blacks, per year, compared

with fewer than eight cases per 100,000 whites, Indians, and

coloureds. A total of 581 new cases were reported in 1994. Measles outbreaks remained fairly steady in the early 1990s, with

thirty to seventy new cases per 100,000 whites, coloureds, and

Indians, and sixty to 150 cases per 100,000 blacks, each year. In

1994 a total of 1,672 cases of measles were reported. Other

common ailments, such as gastroenteritis, kill several hundred

black South Africans each year, even though these diseases are

easily treatable in South African hospitals.

Infectious and parasitic diseases cause roughly 12 percent of

all deaths among blacks but only 2 percent of deaths among

whites. Health officials attribute the high incidence of infec158
The Society and Its Environment

tious diseases in poor areas to the lack of clean water and sew- age disposal systems. As a result, these services are high

priorities in the government's development plans for the late

1990s.

Heart disease and cancer, which are common in industrialized nations, affect whites more than other racial groups in

South Africa. Heart disease accounts for about 38 percent of all deaths among whites in the 1990s, compared with only 13 percent of deaths among blacks. Cancerous tumors are responsible for 18 percent of deaths among whites, but for only 8

percent of deaths among blacks.

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)

Although the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases had

declined from 1966 through the 1980s, the overall rate of infection increased after 1990, and among these diseases, acquired

immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) raised the greatest fears. South Africa's first recorded death from AIDS occurred in

1982, although the risks of AIDS were not widely publicized at the time. In 1985 health officials began testing blood to prevent AIDS transmission through transfusion.

By early 1991, 613 cases of AIDS had been reported nationwide, and 270 people were known to have died from the dis- ease. Officials at the South African Institute of Medical

Research estimated at that time that 15,000 people were

infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The

World Health Organization (WHO) reported 1,123 cases of

AIDS in South Africa in 1992. By March 1996, the number of

reported AIDS cases had reached 10,351.

Some health researchers estimated that between 800,000

and 1 million South Africans were HIV-positive in the mid1990s. More than 500—perhaps as many as 700—people were becoming infected each day, according to these estimates, and

the rate of infection was likely to double every thirteen months

in the late 1990s. These figures suggested that between 4 million and 8 million people would be HIV-positive by the year

2000. Estimates of the number of likely deaths from AIDS in

the early twenty-first century ranged as high as 1 million.

As in most of Africa, AIDS is primarily an urban phenomenon in South Africa, but it has spread rapidly into rural areas and has affected a disproportionate number of people between

the ages of fifteen and forty. Recognizing the potential impact

on the country's economic output, the South African Chamber

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South Africa: A Country Study

of Mines, the nation's largest employer, began an aggressive

campaign to educate workers and to curtail the spread of AIDS

in the 1980s, after the chamber's health adviser warned that

AIDS could be the country's most serious health problem by

the late 1990s. The industry already had established treatment

and counseling services for workers afflicted with sexually

transmitted diseases, so it used this network to promote its cam- paign against AIDS. The Chamber of Mines found an incidence of only 0.05 percent of HIV infection among more than

30,000 mine workers in a baseline study in 1986. It then initi- ated random blood testing on 2,000 to 3,000 workers each

month and found that the rate of HIV infection had risen to 6

percent by 1992.

The government was able to build on the early efforts of the

Chamber of Mines to help stem the spread of HIV and AIDS in

the 1990s. Government officials, health specialists from the

ANC, and others established the National AIDS Convention of

South Africa to coordinate the nationwide campaign emphasizing public education. In 1993 the National AIDS Convention,

working with the Chamber of Mines, WHO, and other international experts, received financial assistance from the European

Union (EU—see Glossary) for its efforts. In 1994 and 1995,

however, the campaign became embroiled in funding disputes

and was slowed by partisan political debate.

Although health officials were concerned about the spread

of AIDS, some were still more concerned about the incidence

of tuberculosis in the mid-1990s. They argued that tuberculosis

caused as many as thirty-six deaths each day, on average, compared with less than one death per day from AIDS. Moreover,

methods for preventing the spread of tuberculosis were already

well known and could help in the fight against AIDS. Health

officials had reported that people infected with tuberculosis are more susceptible to HIV infection and more likely to develop AIDS symptoms in a shorter time after being infected,

and that these AIDS sufferers are likely to die sooner than

those free of tuberculosis.

Health Care Services

Until 1990 apartheid was practiced in most hospitals, to varying degrees. Some admitted patients of one racial group only,

and others designated operating rooms and special care facili- ties for patients of certain racial groups. This practice often led

to expensive and redundant services and organizations, and, at

160
The Society and Its Environment

times, unnecessary neglect. A few medical personnel, nonetheless, ignored apartheid-related restrictions, especially in emer- gency rooms and public clinics. By the early 1990s, deliberate

racial distinctions were beginning to disappear from hospital care in general. Health care services continued to reflect the

status of the communities in which they were found, however;

wealthier people had easier access to health care and generally

received better care. South Africa's health care facilities include hospitals, day

hospitals, community health care centers, and clinics. In 1995

about 25,600 doctors as well as 24,500 supplementary health

professionals, 160,000 nurses and nurses' auxiliaries, and more

than 5,100 dentists and dental specialists were registered with

the South African Medical and Dental Council (SAMDC) and

the South African Nursing Council. In the early 1990s, only

about 1,500 doctors, nationwide, were black. Wealthy white

areas averaged one doctor per 1,200 people; the poorest black

homelands, one doctor for 13,000 people.

Seven universities have medical schools, and six provide dental training. Nurses are trained at several universities, hospitals,

and nursing schools. More than 300 hospitals are managed

entirely or in part by provincial governments, and 255 hospitals are privately operated. There are an estimated 108,000 hospital

beds nationwide, and almost 24,800 beds in psychiatric hospitals.The South African Red Cross renders emergency, health,

and community services, and operates ambulance services,

senior citizens' homes, and air rescue services across the

nation, but primarily in urban areas. Some areas also have

twenty-four-hour-a-day poison control centers, child-assistance

phone services, rape crisis centers, and suicide prevention programs.

One of the interim government's highest priorities in the

mid-1990s is the prevention of childhood death and disease

through nationwide immunization programs. The incidence of

tetanus, measles, malaria, and other communicable diseases is high, especially in the former African homelands. For this rea- son, one of President Nelson Mandela's first actions after

assuming office in May 1994 was to implement a program of

free health care for children under the age of six. By early

1996, officials estimated that at least 75 percent of all infants

had been immunized against polio and measles.

161
South Africa: A Country Study

Malnutrition and starvation also occur in a few, especially

rural, areas. These problems are being addressed through

other elements of the government's RDP of the 1990s (see

Postapartheid Reconstruction, ch. 3). Minister of Health Nkosazana Zuma noted in December 1994 that only 20 percent of

South Africans have any form of health insurance. The government plans to institute a program of free universal primary

health care, but health officials estimated in early 1996 that it might take ten years to implement the plan fully.

Social Welfare

Disabilities and the Aged

Social welfare services in the 1990s include care for the dis- abled and the aged, alcohol and drug-rehabilitation programs,

previous offenders' programs, and child care services. At least

1,742 private welfare organizations and numerous government

agencies administer these programs.

The National Welfare Act (No. 100) of 1978 established a coordinating council, the South African Welfare Council, to help manage these diverse programs. Amendments to the act in 1987 signaled the government's growing awareness of the

need to narrow differences in social welfare among racial

groups. In the early 1990s, the government spent about Rl bil- lion per year on welfare programs, excluding old-age pensions.

About one-half of that amount was spent on whites. Government spending under the RDP in the mid-1990s was geared

toward improving social services for other racial groups.

About 3.5 million South Africans are physically disabled in

the mid-1990s. The government's approach is to encourage

independent, although sometimes assisted, living for them.

Assistance is sometimes available through outpatient rehabilitation centers, counseling services, workshops, and sheltered

employment centers. Families and church groups are still important in assisting the handicapped, especially the mentally

and psychologically impaired, although government-funded

services are available for the blind and the deaf. Substance

abuse programs, especially for alcohol abuse or marijuana

dependence, are also available in some communities.

The government administers about 1.8 million old-age (nonmilitary) pensions in the 1990s that represent a total of about

R4 billion. The government began narrowing the gap in pensions for different racial groups in 1992 and pledged to elimi162
Intensive-care unit at Morningside Medi Clinic,

Bryanston (Johannesburg)

Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

nate such disparities. But elderly black and other citizens

continued to claim that they were disadvantaged because of

their racial identity in the mid-1990s. Government welfare

agencies also provide veterans' benefits, adoption and foster care services, services for alcoholics and drug addicts, and ser- vices for abused and neglected children.

Refugees

Most refugees in South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s were from Mozambique, fleeing that country's civil war. Estimates of

their number varied widely, in part because many other

Mozambican migrant workers were in South Africa during that

time. The number of refugees was particularly difficult to esti- mate because until 1993, South African officials sometimes

163
South Africa: A Country Study

denied access to refugee camps for international observers trying to monitor the refugees' living conditions.

In early 1994, officials estimated that perhaps 1 million

Mozambicans were working in South Africa, legally or illegally,

and that perhaps as many as 500,000 were refugees. Although

only a few took advantage of a repatriation program implemented by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in April 1994, in early 1995 relief workers

estimated the number of refugees at about 200,000. This number was reduced by half during 1995, although several thousand Mozambicans were entering South Africa each month in

early 1995—some for the second or third time.

Internally displaced South Africans were believed to number

at least 500,000 in 1995, according to the United States Committee on Refugees (USCR). Most of these had been uprooted

by official apartheid-related policies in the past decade, and

perhaps 10,000 or more were displaced by political violence in

KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990s. The new government established a Land Claims Court and planned to adjudicate several

thousand of such claims by the late 1990s. By mid-1996 a few

cases had been resolved by restoring lost land, and a small

number of displaced South Africans had received compensation for their losses. Narcotics

After South Africa's international isolation ended and border trade increased in the early 1990s, problems associated

with narcotics trafficking and drug use increased dramatically,

according to the South African Police Service (SAPS). In 1994

South African authorities confiscated more than 2.4 million ounces of cocaine; nearly 25,000 grams of heroin; more than

16,000 units of LSD; 27,000 ounces of hashish, and 7 million

kilograms of cannabis (marijuana), according to police

records, and most of these figures were expected to increase in

1995 and 1996. At the same time, officials at the National

Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence reported an

increase in problems related to substance abuse and addiction,

and police officials reported that narcotics dealers often were

involved in other forms of crime, such as arms smuggling, burglaries, or car hijackings.

Women in Society

In general, all racial and ethnic groups in South Africa have

164
The Society and Its Environment

long-standing beliefs concerning gender roles, and most are based on the premise that women are less important, or less deserving of power, than men. Most African traditional social

organizations are male centered and male dominated. Even in

the 1990s, in some rural areas of South Africa, for example,

wives walk a few paces behind their husbands in keeping with

traditional practices. Afrikaner religious beliefs, too, include a strong emphasis on the theoretically biblically based notion

that women's contributions to society should normally be

approved by, or be on behalf of, men.

Twentieth-century economic and political developments

presented South African women with both new obstacles and

new opportunities to wield influence. For example, labor force

requirements in cities and mining areas have often drawn men

away from their homes for months at a time, and, as a result,

women have borne many traditionally male responsibilities in

the village and home. Women have had to guarantee the dayto-day survival of their families and to carry out financial and

legal transactions that otherwise would have been reserved for men. Women and Apartheid

Apartheid imposed new restrictions on African women

beginning in the 1950s. Many lived in squalor in the former

homelands, where malnutrition, illness, and infant mortality were much higher than in urban areas. Other women who fol- lowed their husbands into cities or mining areas lived in inadequate, and often illegal, housing near industrial compounds.

Women often left their own families to commute long distances

to low-wage jobs in the domestic work force in white neighborhoods. Substantial numbers were temporary workers in agriculture; and a growing number of women joined the burgeoning

industrial work force, as has been carefully researched in Iris Berger's Threads of Solidarity: Women in South African Industry,

1900-1980.

Women became the major source of resistance to many race- related restrictions during the apartheid era, especially the pass

laws, which required Africans to carry documents permitting

them to be in white-occupied areas. The Women's Defence of

the Constitution League, later known as the Black Sash, was formed in 1954, first to demonstrate against such laws and later to assist pass-law violators. Black Sash established pass-law

165
South Africa: A Country Study

advice centers in many cities and helped reduce sentences or

assist violators in other ways.

The African National Congress Women's League (ANCWL),

formed in 1943, was able to organize more than 20,000 women

to march on government buildings in Pretoria to protest

against the pass laws and other apartheid restrictions in 1955.

Their protests eventually failed, however. In the early 1960s,

pass-law restrictions were extended to women and new legislation restricted black women without steady employment to

stays of no more than seventy-two hours in any urban area. Also

in 1964, many senior ANC leaders were arrested, and others

fled from South Africa or went underground, and the ANCWL

became almost defunct.

Women continued to join the urban work force, and by the

late 1980s, women made up at least 90 percent of the domestic

work force and 36 percent of the industrial work force, according to labor union estimates. Women's wages were lower than

men's even for the same job, however. In addition, positions

normally held by women had long hours and few benefits, such

as sick leave; women often were dismissed without advance

notice and without any type of termination pay. Conservative Afrikaner women have organized in support of

Afrikaner cultural preservation and apartheid since the 1970s.

The Kappiekommando was established in the late 1970s to demand a return to traditional Afrikaner values. This organization was named for its distinctive Voortrekker dress, which

caused some young Afrikaners and others to ridicule its members' appearance and their militancy. The Kappiekommando's

militant opposition to political reforms eventually contributed

to its marginalization, even among staunchly conservative Afrikaners.

The Afrikanervroue-Kenkrag (AVK), another Afrikaner

women's organization, was formed in 1983 and worked primarily to oppose racial integration in schools and other public

places. AVK membership grew to about 1,000 during the mid1980s. The group published a monthly newsletter and cooperated with other Afrikaner organizations, but like the Kappiekommando, the AVK lost support when mainstream Afrikaner

political leaders began working toward racial inclusiveness in

the 1990s.

Women in the 1990s

The ANCWL was resurrected in 1990, after the ban on the

166
The Society and Its Environment

ANC was lifted, and women in more than 500 towns and cities organized to press for consideration of gender issues in the

upcoming constitutional negotiations. At the insistence of its Women's League, the ANC accepted, in principle, the proposal

that women should receive one-third of the political appointments in the new government. Other symbolic gains by the

ANCWL have included strong policy stands on women's rights

and protection against abuse and exploitation, but translating

these standards into enforceable laws proved to be a difficult

task.Women are achieving new prominence in politics as a result

of the sweeping political reforms of the 1990s. In 1994 women

won election to eighty of the 400 seats in the National Assembly, the only directly elected house of parliament, and a woman, Frene Ginwala, was elected Speaker of the National

Assembly. Women also were elected to almost one-third of the

seats in the nine provincial assemblies.

President Mandela appointed two women cabinet ministers

in May 1994, and a woman succeeded the late minister of housing, Joe Slovo, after his death in January 1995. Three women

were deputy ministers in early 1995. One of these, President

Mandela's former wife, Winnie Mandela, was appointed deputy

minister of arts, culture, science, and technology.

Mrs. Mandela had been a courageous fighter for the rights

of the downtrodden for more than two decades while her husband was in prison, and she had achieved high office within

the ANC. But her association with violent elements of the ANC

Youth League in the late 1980s and other accusations against

her in the 1990s led many within the ANC to shun her. She was

also outspoken in her criticism of the government in early 1995

for its failure to move more quickly to ease the extreme poverty

of many citizens. Her defiance led to her removal from office

in March of that year. Eliminating violence against women and improving educational opportunities for women are almost universally supported goals in South Africa in the mid-1990s, but these goals

receive only rhetorical support, in many cases. More urgent priorities are to eliminate the vestiges of apartheid legislation and

to improve economic and social conditions for the very poor,

for children, and for other groups that were especially disadvantaged in recent decades. Gender-related inequities appear

likely to be decried, but relegated to secondary importance,

well into the twenty-first century.

167
South Africa: A Country Study

* * *

Studies of South Africa's rich cultural heritage begin with

ethnographic classics by Hilda Kuper on the Swazi, Max Gluckman on the Zulu, Isaac Schapera on the Tswana, J. D. Krige on

the Lobedu, John Marshall and Elizabeth Marshall Thomas on

the San, and Monica Hunter Wilson on the Pondo. Their

works are available in numerous monographs and collections

of articles, especially in the International African Institute's

Ethnographic Survey of Africa, which includes valuable fieldwork observations and initial analyses. More recent monographs include Jeffrey B. Peires's The House ofPhalo: A History of

the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence and Gerhard

Mare's Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in

South Africa on the Zulu.

South Africa's complex society cannot be, fully understood

by analyzing specific cultures, however. Patrick J. Furlong's

Between Crown and Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era describes the

growth of authoritarian politics in South Africa. Religious

developments are presented in David Chidester's Religions of

South Africa. Iris Berger's Threads of Solidarity: Women in South

African Industry, 1900-1980 describes women's role in the

growth of the working class. Recent national developments are examined by Marina Ottaway in South Africa: The Strugglefor a New Order and by a variety of authors in South Africa: The Political

Economy of Transformation edited by Stephen John Stedman.

The complexities of the rapid changes of the 1990s are documented by Timothy Sisk in Democratization in South Africa.

Numerous articles in the Journal of Southern African Studies provide insights into political and social change under apartheid.

Available information on population, health, and education—although incomplete—has been carefully compiled each

year by the South African Institute of Race Relations in its Race

Relations Survey. The South African government's South Africa

Yearbook, originally published as the South Africa Official Yearbook, and numerous reports by the Central Statistical Service

include available data on many social issues. Urbanization and

social change are surveyed from diverse points of view in The

Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South

Africa edited by David M. Smith. Environmental concerns are outlined in Hamish Main and Stephen Wyn Williams's Environ168
The Society and Its Environment

ment and Housing in Third World Cities. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

169

Chapter 3. The Economy
outnumber people in areas of the Great Karoo.
TRADING ON JOHANNESBURG'S financial markets reached

a new all-time high on April 26, 1994, reflecting the buoyant

mood of voters of all races who were about to participate in the

country's first democratic elections. As South Africa emerged

from the economic stagnation and international isolation of

the apartheid era, the new government and its theme of eco- nomic reconstruction received international acclaim and

encouragement. At the same time, however, it faced conflicting

pressures to speed economic growth, to strengthen South

Africa's standing among international investors and donors,

and, at the same time, to improve living conditions for the

majority of citizens.

South Africa's economy had been shaped over several centuries by its abundant natural resources and by the attempts of

immigrant populations to dominate and to exploit those who

had arrived before them. For most of the twentieth century, its mineral wealth had surpassed that of almost any other country

in the world, except the Soviet Union. South Africa produced

nearly half of the world's gold and ranked among the top ten

producers of a dozen other valuable minerals, including diamonds and copper. The mining industries provided the foundation for the strongest economy on the continent, which, by

the mid-twentieth century, included a comprehensive transportation system, an extensive electric power grid, and a significant manufacturing sector. South Africa's main resource

deficiency is oil, and as a result, many industries rely on coal

rather than on imported fuels. By the mid-1980s, the economy was distorted by government

policies designed to bolster the economic and political power

of a small minority and to exclude many of South Africa's citi- zens, selected by race, from significant participation in the

nation's wealth. Basic needs were unmet, resulting in hunger,

malnutrition, and undereducation, especially in rural areas. Industrial development could not be sustained through domestic resources, and there was stagnation in some areas when for- eign capital was reduced in the face of strong international

pressures for political reform. Because the mining industry

continued to dominate the economy, wide fluctuations—especially in the price of gold—eroded currency values and

reduced the country's ability to import goods. At the same

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South Africa: A Country Study

time, keeping black wages low, which was crucial to profits in

all areas of the economy, perpetuated the discrimination that

provoked widespread protests and condemnation.

By the early 1990s, the weaknesses in the economy were

increasingly evident despite the country's dazzling mineral

wealth. Some segments of the population were poorer, and liv- ing in more difficult circumstances, than many people in far

less developed African countries. Moreover, a poorly educated,

impoverished majority of the population could not provide the

skills and the resources that the country's infrastructure and

labor market required. The government cast off the constraints

of apartheid (see Glossary) in the early 1990s, in part to confront the serious economic problems caused by that system.

The new government in the mid-1990s faces the enormous

challenges of improving living standards and managing the

country's resources profitably.

Historical Development

Before South Africa's vast mineral wealth was discovered in

the late nineteenth century, there was a general belief that

southern Africa was almost devoid of the riches that had drawn

Europeans to the rest of the continent. South Africa had no

known gold deposits such as those the Portuguese had sought

in West Africa in the fifteenth century. The region did not

attract many slave traders, in part because local populations were sparsely settled. Valuable crops such as palm oil, rubber,

and cocoa, which were found elsewhere on the continent, were

absent. Although the local economy was rich in some areas

based on mixed farming and herding—only ivory was traded to any extent. Most local products were not sought for large-scale

consumption in Europe.

Instead, Europeans first settled southern Africa to resupply

their trading expeditions bound for other parts of the world

(see Origins of Settlement, ch. 1). In 1652 the Dutch East India

Company settled a few employees at a small fort at present-day

Cape Town and ordered them to provide fresh food for the

company's ships that rounded the Cape on their way to East

Africa and Asia. This nucleus of European settlement quickly

spread outward from the fort, first to trade with the local

Khoikhoi hunting populations and later to seize their land for

European farmers. Smallpox epidemics swept the area in the

late eighteenth century, and Europeans who had come to rely

174
The Economy

on Khoikhoi labor enslaved many of the survivors of the epidemics.

By the early nineteenth century, when the Cape settlement

came under British rule, 26,000 Dutch farmers had settled the area from Stellenbosch to the Great Fish River (see fig. 7). In

1820 the British government sponsored 5,000 more settlers

who also established large cattle ranches, relying on African

labor. But the European immigrants, like earlier arrivals in the

area, engaged primarily in subsistence farming and produced

little for export.

The discovery of diamonds in 1869 and of gold in 1886 revo- lutionized the economy. European investment flowed in; by the

end of the nineteenth century, it was equivalent to all European investment in the rest of Africa. International banks and

private lenders increased cash and credit available to local

farmers, miners, and prospectors, and they, in turn, placed

growing demands for land and labor on the local African populations. The Europeans resorted to violence to defend their

economic interests, sometimes clashing with those who refused

to relinquish their freedom or their land. Eventually, as the

best land became scarce, groups of settlers clashed with one

another, and rival Dutch and British populations fought for

control over the land (see Industrialization and Imperialism,

1870-1910, ch. 1).

South Africa was drawn into the international economy

through its exports, primarily diamonds and gold, and through

its own increasing demand for a variety of agricultural imports.

The cycle of economic growth was stimulated by the continual

expansion of the mining industry, and with newfound wealth,

consumer demand fueled higher levels of trade.

In the first half of the twentieth century, government eco- nomic policies were designed to meet local consumer demand

and to reduce the nation's reliance on its mining sector by providing incentives for farming and for establishing manufacturing enterprises. But the government also saw its role as helping

to defend white farmers and businessmen from African competition. In 1913 the Natives Land Act reserved most of the land

for white ownership, forcing many black farmers to work as wage laborers on land they had previously owned. When the

act was amended in 1936, black land ownership was restricted

to 13 percent of the country, much of it heavily eroded.

White farmers received other privileges, such as loans from a government Land Bank (created in 1912), labor law protec175
South Africa: A Country Study

tion, and crop subsidies. Marketing boards, which were established to stabilize production of many crops, paid more for

produce from white farmers than for produce from black farmers. All farm activity suffered from the cyclical droughts that

swept the subcontinent, but white farmers received greater government protection against economic losses. During the 1920s, to encourage the fledgling manufacturing

industries, the government established state corporations to provide inexpensive electricity and steel for industrial use, and

it imposed import tariffs to protect local manufacturers. Again

black entrepreneurs were discouraged, and new laws limited

the rights of black workers, creating a large pool of low-cost

industrial labor. By the end of the 1930s, the growing number

of state-owned enterprises dominated the manufacturing sector, and black entrepreneurs continued to be pressured to remain outside the formal economy.

Manufacturing experienced new growth during and after

World War II. Many of the conditions necessary for economic

expansion had been present before the war—cities were growing, agriculture was being consolidated into large farms with

greater emphasis on commercial production, and mine owners and shareholders had begun to diversify their investments into

other sectors. As the war ended, local consumer demand rose

to new highs, and with strong government support—and international competitors at bay—local agriculture and manufacturing began to expand.

The government increased its role in the economy, especially in manufacturing, during the 1950s and the 1960s. It also

initiated large-scale programs to promote the commercial culti- vation of corn and wheat. Government investments through

the state-owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)

helped to establish local textile and pulp and paper industries,

as well as state corporations to produce fertilizers, chemicals,

oil, and armaments. Both manufacturing and agricultural production expanded rapidly, and by 1970 manufacturing output

exceeded that of mining.

Despite the appearance of self-sustaining economic growth

during the postwar period, the country's economy continued

to be susceptible to its historical limitations: recurrent drought,

overreliance on gold exports, and the costs and consequences

of the use of disenfranchised labor. While commercial agriculture developed into an important source of export revenue,

production plummeted during two major droughts, from 1960

176
The Economy

to 1966 and from 1981 to 1985. Gold continued to be the most

important export and revenue earner; yet, as the price of gold

fluctuated, especially during the 1980s, South Africa's

exchange rate and ability to import goods suffered.

Manufacturing, in particular, was seriously affected by downswings in the price of gold, in part because it relied on

imported machinery and capital. Some capital-intensive industries were able to expand, but only with massive foreign loans.

As a result, many industries were insulated from the rising

labor militancy, especially among black workers, which sparked

disputes and slowed productivity in the late 1980s. As black

labor increasingly voiced its frustrations, and foreign banks cut

short their loans because of mounting instability, even capitalintensive industries felt the impact of apartheid on profits.

The economy was in recession from March 1989 through

most of 1993, largely in response to worldwide economic conditions and the long-term effects of apartheid. It registered

only negligible, or negative, growth in most quarters. High

inflation had become chronic, driving up costs in all sectors. Living standards of the majority of black citizens either fell or remained dangerously low, while those of many whites also

began to decline. Economic growth continued to depend on

decent world prices for gold and on the availability of foreign

loans. Even as some sectors of the economy began to recover in

late 1993, intense violence and political uncertainty in the face

of reform slowed overall growth through 1994.

Postapartheid Reconstruction

As the African National Congress (ANC) shifted away from

its liberation agenda toward a leadership role in government in

the early 1990s, ANC economists, together with government

and private-sector consultants, developed a blueprint for development in the late 1990s. This Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) analyzed nationwide living standards

and proposed ways to improve government services and basic

living conditions for the poor. The RDP detailed the extreme

poverty of at least 17 million citizens who were living below

internationally accepted minimum standards. The report esti- mated that 4.3 million families were without adequate housing,

and some 12 million people lacked access to clean drinking

water. Most homes, and many schools and hospitals, lacked

electricity. An estimated 4.6 million adults were illiterate.

177
South Africa: A Country Study

In May 1994, the new government adopted the RDP as the

centerpiece of its economic policy, although President Nelson

(Rolihlahla) Mandela was quick to reassure potential investors

and donors that his government's social programs would be

financed largely through cuts in existing government spending. He pledged that his government would avoid both dramatic increases in taxes and large-scale deficit spending to implement the much-needed welfare improvements.

The RDP envisioned sweeping government programs to

raise living standards—to build houses and roads, to provide

services, to upgrade education, and to create jobs to narrow

the gap between rich and poor. By late 1994, the government

had begun to implement its highest RDP priorities: a US$135

million school lunch program; a US$14 million program of

free medical care for children and pregnant women; providing

water and electricity to rural communities; and phasing in free,

compulsory primary education for children of all races. Government officials and ANC economists in the National

Institute for Economic Policy estimated that RDP expenditures

in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1994-95 would amount to 2.5

billion rands (R; for value of the rand—see Glossary), or about

7 percent of government spending. They also estimated that

RDP expenditures would double in FY 1995-96 and would

increase by about R2.5 billion each year after that, to R12.5 bil- lion—probably more than 25 percent of government spending—in FY 1998-99. The Development Bank of Southern

Africa estimated costs approaching US$30 billion—US$19 bil- lion in capital expenditures and US$11 billion in recurrent

expenditures—by 1999. Government officials insisted that they

would rely on increased trade and overall economic growth, as well as on international assistance and private-sector donations,

for most of the additional revenue, and that reconstruction

would be aided by a one-time, 5 percent levy on individuals and

companies with taxable incomes of more than R50,000. They

also predicted that the government would save money by

increasing efficiency (in particular by eliminating the redundancy that had been necessary to provide services to separate

racial groups under apartheid) and by reducing military

expenditures.

To help finance the RDP, the government also undertook

negotiations to sell some national assets to private citizens,

despite the ANC's earlier opposition to privatization. Senior

government officials, including the president, accepted salary

178
Shopkeeper in a Lebowa township rewards his young assistants with oranges. Courtesy R. T. K. Scully

cuts of between 10 percent and 20 percent to contribute to

social reconstruction. President Mandela also asked for concrete proposals and contributions from the business community—such as on-the-job training and employer subsidies of

housing, transportation, and education—to meet the urgent

needs defined in the RDR

The new government launched worldwide appeals for new

trade and investment packages for South Africa, as it tried to overcome more than a decade of international isolation. South

Africa began reentering world financial markets, establishing

new trading partners, and expanding formerly clandestine

trade ties that had long existed with many countries. International donors and investors responded cautiously at first, in

part because of the continuing high levels of urban and township violence.

179
South Africa: A Country Study

After mid-1994 immigrants from other African countries

arrived in large numbers—a total of perhaps a million in that

year alone, according to some estimates—seeking jobs in postapartheid South Africa. Poorer neighboring states also intensified their requests for assistance from Pretoria, hoping South

Africa's economic revival would increase output and trade

throughout the region and that South Africa would become

the region's new "engine of development."

Structure of the Economy

Gross Domestic Product

Historically, mining and agriculture contributed the most to national output. With government assistance during and after

World War II, manufacturing grew to become the greatest contributor to overall gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), and overall economic growth in the 1960s rivaled that of

Japan—averaging 5.9 percent per year in real terms (compared

with the 4 percent annual average growth of the 1950s). During the 1970s, however, growth in both manufacturing and

agriculture stagnated, and the services sector—especially the

insurance industry, financial facilities, and transport services

became the fastest-growing economic sector (see table 5,

Appendix).

The price of gold was allowed to float (relative to the rand)

in the early 1970s, and by the end of the decade, high prices

for gold and other export commodities sparked a brief eco- nomic recovery. Mining continued to be vital to the nation's

economic future, because minerals, especially gold, dominated

exports and influenced the growth of other major economic

sectors, which relied on gold exports to bring in much-needed

foreign exchange. Thus, even as the importance of gold in the

GDP declined, it continued to affect the country's balance of

payments. When gold prices (and export revenues) declined,

local industries often were unable to obtain imports, such as machinery and other inputs necessary to maintain production;

as a result, other exports also declined.

Economic growth slowed in the late 1970s and the early

1980s, not only because of declining gold revenues, but also

because of rising prices for oil imports and increased international competition in other traditional export commodities.

The first recession of this period occurred in 1976, following

dramatic oil price hikes. Strong export growth based on higher

180
The Economy

gold prices helped the recovery from this recession, but the

country was hit by a series of droughts in the 1980s, which seri- ously affected agricultural output. Further erratic changes in

gold prices led to a series of booms and busts, reducing average

annual GDP growth for the 1980s to only 1.5 percent.

Negligible growth in the 1980s led to an overall decline in

living standards, as population growth far outpaced economic

expansion. Per capita GDP declined by more than 10 percent

during the decade, and for the average individual, real wealth

in 1990 was no higher than it had been in 1970.

National economic stagnation continued in the early 1990s.

GDP declined in 1991 and 1992, and registered only weak positive growth in 1993, according to the government's Central Statistical Service. Private consumption accounted for 57 percent

of GDP in 1993, representing a minimal (0.4 percent) increase over 1992. Private consumption was constrained by high con- sumer indebtedness, however, and by concerns over violence

and job security.

The recovery strengthened in 1994. In that year, GDP

amounted to R432.8 billion (US$121.9 billion) representing

2.6 percent real growth over 1993 (see table 6, Appendix). Per

capita GDP averaged about US$3,010, placing South Africa

among the World Bank's (see Glossary) upper-middle-income

developing countries. The recovery continued in 1995, and

officials predicted GDP growth would exceed 4 percent in 1996

(see fig. 13; fig. 14).

National accounting procedures were adjusted in 1994 to incorporate the economies of the four former "independent"

African homelands—Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and

Venda. In addition, GDP measurements were adjusted upward

by 5.6 percent to include a modest estimate of output in the

informal sector, which had been omitted from national

accounts until 1994. The informal sector constitutes a "parallel" economy, consisting primarily of unrecorded and untaxed

wages, barter trade, and other unofficial receipts. For many

rural families in South Africa, as in the rest of Africa, informal

economic activity accounts for most of the household income.

South Africa's advanced industrial sector made it the twentyfifth largest economy in the world, a giant among African countries in the 1990s. Per capita GDP, in 1994, compared with the

rest of Africa, was topped only by the Seychelles, Reunion, and

Gabon. With only about 7 percent of the population and 4 percent of the total land area of Africa, South Africa produced

181
South Africa: A Country Study

GDP* 1995 - US$133.6 billion

AGRICULTURE,

OTHER FORESTRY,

*GDP -- Gross Domestic Product (see Glossary) at current market prices.

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: South Africa, No. 2, London, 1996, 3. Figure 13. Origins of Gross Domestic Product, 1995

more than one-third of Africa's goods and services, and nearly

40 percent of its manufacturing output.

External Debt

Loan capital was readily available during the 1970s, and both

the public and the private sectors borrowed heavily, often in

the form of trade credits. Then in the early 1980s, foreign

investments declined relative to the value of foreign loans

needed to finance economic growth. As a result, equity capital

dropped as a percentage of foreign debt from 60 percent in

1970 to less than 30 percent in 1984, while South Africa's loans

grew from 40 percent to 70 percent of foreign debt. The government encouraged this trend by stepping in whenever foreign bankers hesitated to increase lending and stabilized

indebtedness through gold swaps or by borrowing from the

International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary). As a result

of these policies, South Africa's net indebtedness to the international banks increased sharply, and about two-thirds of its

182
The Economy

outstanding loans in 1984 had a maturity of one year or less. The banking sector was responsible for 44 percent of South

Africa's foreign liabilities, and a further 16 percent had been

incurred by the public sector. Only about 40 percent were private liabilities. Britain dominated foreign capital loans and

investments, accounting for about 40 percent of foreign investment in 1985.

South Africa was hit with a major foreign debt crisis in 1985,

when a group of banks, led by Chase Manhattan, withdrew substantial credit lines. The banks refused to roll over existing

loans and called in many of the short-term loans. As a result,

the value of the rand dropped precipitously, and the government temporarily closed its financial and foreign-exchange

markets. Unable to meet debt obligations so suddenly, the government declared a standstill on repayments of approximately

US$14 billion of South Africa's US$24 billion total external

debt. Liabilities not included in the standstill were trade credits, loans from the IMF and central banks, and credits guaranteed by Paris Club (see Glossary) member governments.

Publicly quoted issues of South African parastatals (state corporations) were also left out. During the standstill, government officials met with representatives of creditor banks and drew up a rescheduling plan,

which proposed extending the 1985 debt freeze until June

1987 and repaying 5 percent of the total outstanding by April

1987. An initial payment of US$420 million was made in midApril 1986, but additional rescheduling agreements in 1987

and 1989 extended many of these loans. The 1989 agreement

stipulated that the amount of debt remaining in those categories affected by the standstill, originally amounting to US$14

billion, would be reduced to roughly US$6 billion in four years. A key problem in repaying its loans was the large, but undisclosed, portion of South Africa's debt that was denominated in

hard nondollar currencies, but appreciated in dollar terms as the dollar weakened. South Africa nonetheless repaid between

US$1.7 billion and US$1.9 billion of debt by 1990, and some

foreign bankers were increasingly willing to refinance maturing South African credits. For example, US$300 million of

US$900 million bearer bonds in deutsche marks and Swiss

francs were rolled over or replaced in 1990.

There was almost no external borrowing by South Africa

from 1985 to 1990, so even its slowed schedule of debt repayment made South Africa a net capital exporter during the late

183
South Africa: A Country Study

.3 J 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

YEAR

* Gross Domestic Product (see Glossary).

Source: Based on information from Nedcor Economic Unit, South Africa's Statistical

Profile, 1 994, Johannesburg, 1994, 3; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: South Africa, No. 1, London, 1996, 3. Figure 14. Economic Growth, 1985-95

1980s. South Africa reduced its total disclosed foreign debt to

less than US$20 billion in early 1992, down from nearly US$24

billion in 1985, according to the South African Reserve Bank.

Currency fluctuations brought South Africa's international

debt back to US$25.8 billion at the end of 1993, including

rand-denominated foreign debt, and that figure continued to increase in 1994.

The government repaid about US$500 million in foreign

debt in February 1994. At that time, South Africa was considered an under-borrower by conventional financial criteria, with

a foreign debt/export ratio of about 60 percent and a foreign

debt/GDP ratio of 15.1 percent, according to South African

Reserve Bank figures. Overall, South Africa posted a net capital

inflow of more than R8 billion in the second half of 1994. Foreign borrowing increased in 1995, when gross foreign debt

rose to nearly 22 percent of GDR

184
The Economy

Inflation

Historically, South Africa's inflation rate was tied closely to that of its major trading partners. In the 1960s, annual inflation averaged about 3 percent. In line with world trends, it rose above 10 percent in 1974 and fluctuated between 11 and 14

percent through the early 1980s. During the late 1980s, however, South Africa's inflation rates did not decline along with

those of its Western trading partners. Inflation reached a high

of 18.6 percent in 1986, forcing a depreciation of the rand, and

it continued in double-digit amounts after that. The erratic

price of oil—a crucial import bought on the black market

because of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

(OPEC) sanctions—provided a consistent inflationary pressure.Inflation continued to erode economic strength in the early

1990s, but declined to 9.1 percent in 1994. Inflation increased

in early 1995 under pressure from new social spending, but

declined to 8.7 percent by the end of the year. The lower rate of inflation resulted in part from a decline in food prices, the

relative stability of the rand, and the lowering of import tariffs. Inflationary pressures persisted in the increase in credit purchases and strong labor demands.

Economic Distortions and Apartheid

National accounts in 1994 showed a sharp break with the

past, as economic and legal data were reorganized to include

citizens of all races and all jurisdictions, including former

homelands. The interim constitution implemented in 1994

ended the use of racial categories to determine social and eco- nomic opportunity, but the economic system of the mid-1990s

nonetheless continued to reflect some of the economic patterns that had developed during more than forty years of apartheid.

Creating the homelands and resettling people in them had

drastically changed the country's population distribution and

regional economic patterns in the 1970s and 1980s. Accounting for these anomalies caused confusion and obfuscation in

economic data and analyses. Many homeland residents were

barely able to support themselves, owing in part to the homelands' arid land, inferior roads and transportation, and over- crowding; some were therefore forced to travel great distances

to work in "white" South Africa. Many of these workers were

185
South Africa: A Country Study

excluded from national accounts because they were not legal

residents of South Africa.

It became increasingly clear in the 1980s that apartheid

could not be implemented as decreed by law, and eventually

many official and unofficial policies allowed some flexibility in

its application. In 1986 the government called for "orderly

urbanization," under which a limited numbers of blacks could

live in officially "white" urban areas, as long as housing was

available. Few black workers could afford to take advantage of

this policy, however, and demographic trends did not change

noticeably.

By the late 1980s, black poverty was so serious that the government began to take steps to alleviate some of the most dire

impacts of apartheid. Government statistics then indicated that

more than 16 million people were living below internationally

determined minimum-subsistence levels. Using nutritional

standards as an alternative measure, an estimated 2.3 million

people were at severe risk from hunger and malnutrition. In

1988 the minister of national health and population development characterized the crisis as "worse than the Great Depression," and in response, the government initiated food

programs and other social welfare initiatives (see Health and

Welfare, ch. 2).

Role of the Government

South African economists in the 1980s described the

national economy as a free-enterprise system in which the market, not the government, set most wages and prices. The reality was that the government played a major role in almost every

facet of the economy, including production, consumption, and

regulation. In fact, Soviet economists in the late 1980s noted

that the state-owned portion of South Africa's industrial sector was greater than that in any country outside the communist

bloc. The South African government owned and managed

almost 40 percent of all wealth-producing assets, including iron

and steel works, weapons manufacturing facilities, and energyproducing resources. Government-owned corporations and

parastatals were also vital to the services sector. Marketing

boards and tariff regulations intervened to influence consumer

prices. Finally, a wide variety of laws governed economic activities at all levels based on race. The government's main concern since the discovery of gold

in 1886 had been balancing the growth of the mining industry

186
The Economy

against the need to diversify, in order to create sustained development and self-sufficiency. Successive governments had tried to encourage and to support local industries that could reduce

imports, provide jobs, and create a multiplier effect by encour- aging further industrial growth. Paul Kruger, who had led the

Transvaal in the late nineteenth century, had granted monopoly concessions to industrialists; the 1920s governments ofJan

C. Smuts and J.B.M. Hertzog had initiated state corporations,

and the post-1948 National Party government had tried industrial decentralization (see Industrialization and Imperialism,

1870-1910; Segregation, 1910-48; and Apartheid, 1948-76, ch.

1).

Even after decades of policy shifts designed to spur development and diversification, however, South Africa's export econ- omy in the 1980s still relied primarily on the gold-mining

industry, and the government still protected import-substitution industries in order to keep them in operation. Furthermore, agriculture continued to be an uneven producer and

therefore received substantial subsidies and other forms of government assistance. In the late 1980s, the government presented a blueprint for economic policy consistent with this

history of economic struggle. Its central economic strategy

advocated a shift toward strongly market-oriented policies, but

left room for government intervention in response to social

and political demands. The strategy increased the emphasis on

local industrialization in order to cut imports and to create

jobs. The only component of the central economic strategy

that was really new was the effort to strengthen export industries, especially to increase value added through local processing of raw materials for export.

In 1994 the new Government of National Unity continued

the economic policies of its predecessors, emphasizing a market orientation overall, but allowing government intervention

when necessary, and maintaining import-substitution industries while trying to spur industrial development toward

exports. International markets increasingly opened to South

Africa, and trade flourished, especially with the new industrial

giants of Asia. Senior government officials tried to downplay

the ANC's longstanding commitment to nationalization of key

industries in order to gain much-needed foreign investment. It was nonetheless clear that the debate over privatization would

continue at least through the rest of the decade.

187
South Africa: A Country Study

Legal Restrictions

Two legislative pillars of apartheid—the Natives Land Act

(No. 27) of 1913 (and its amendment in 1936) and the Group

Areas Act (No. 41) of 1950—limited African economic and

business activities in both rural and urban areas (see The Legislative Implementation of Apartheid, ch. 1). These acts were

repealed in 1991, but few blacks could yet afford to move into

formerly white areas without financial assistance. Numerous

other laws and regulations had restricted black economic activities and employment, especially the Mines and Works Act (No.

12) of 1911, the Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15) of

1911, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and its amendments in 1937 and 1956, the Mines and Works Amendment Act

of 1926, the Factories, Machinery, and Building Works Act (No.

22) of 1941, and the Bantu Labour Act (No. 67) of 1964. Public

services and education opportunities were limited by the Bantu

Education Act (No. 47) of 1953, the Reservation of Separate

Amenities Act (No. 49) of 1953, and the National Policy for

General Affairs Act (No. 76) of 1984.

In contrast to the government's control over domestic eco- nomic activity of South Africans, few legal restrictions were imposed on the economic activities of foreign nationals in

South Africa, aside from stringent exchange controls on the

repatriation of capital funds. Foreigners were welcome, even

encouraged, to establish businesses in South Africa, and they

could qualify for numerous government concessions and subsidies. During most of the apartheid era, those who wished to sell their South African assets, however, could do so only in financial rands (a currency control device), rather than the more

commonly used commercial rands (see Currency, this ch.).

Financial rands could be sold only to a foreign buyer for capital investment inside the country, and the financial rand

traded at a discount (15 percent in late 1994) compared with

the commercial rand. Exchange restrictions did not apply to current earnings, however, and investors could transfer those

funds, subject to taxation. In March 1995, as the financial rand

strengthened, and under strong pressure from the business

community, the government abolished the financial rand.

The new government in 1994 began to implement legislation intended to compensate some of the roughly 3.5 million

black citizens who had been dispossessed of their land under

apartheid. The Restitution of Land Act (No. 22) of 1994 provided for the creation of a Land Claims Court and a Commis188
The Economy

sion on Restitution of Land Rights to arbitrate demands for

restitution. Petitioners under the law were given three years to lodge their claims. White landowners who feared the loss of

their land lobbied hard through the South African Agricultural

Union, which represented 60,000 white farmers, and suc- ceeded in weakening provisions in the new law that would have

given land rights to many sharecroppers and labor tenants.

The white landowners also won the right to appeal land-claim

decisions and to receive legal aid services under the new legislation. By mid-1996, only a small number of land claims had

been adjudicated.

Parastatals

The government's strong role in shaping the economy was

especially evident in the large number of parastatals, or state corporations, that it established beginning in the 1920s. Its primary goal was to strengthen import-substitution industries,

which had started to grow during World War I, by providing

infrastructure improvements and basic materials. Among the

first such enterprises were the Electricity Supply Commission

(Eskom) and the South African Iron and Steel Corporation

(Iscor), both founded in the 1920s, and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), established in 1940 to support other

new industries. The IDC helped to establish many other state corporations, including the Phosphate Development Corporation (Foskor); the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL); and the Southern Oil Exploration Corporation

(Soekor). In addition, many state corporations also founded

subsidiary companies in partnership with private firms, and

many held controlling shares of stock in private firms.

Private individuals were allowed to purchase shares in many

state-owned corporations. The government generally

appointed a majority of corporate directors, but senior management made most personnel decisions independent of government control. The government's primary avenue of control over state corporations was by granting or withholding loans of

state money. The electricity parastatal, Eskom, was always

allowed to raise money publicly, but most other state corporations relied on government funds for capital financing.

The anticipated private-sector participation in these parastatals did not materialize, however. Investors showed little interest in purchasing parastatals' stock. Iscor suffered the

embarrassment of an almost total public refusal of its stocks

189
South Africa: A Country Study

when they were offered for sale in 1929. In fact, most state cor- poration ventures were viewed as unprofitable and were

funded by the government because of a lack of private interest.

In 1979, however, after oil sales from Iran had been cut off, the

synthetic fuel corporation, SASOL, offered shares to the public; investors eagerly bought all that were available and fully

supported two more such issues.

In February 1988, President P. W. Botha announced plans to privatize several state-controlled industries, including Eskom,

Foskor, and Iscor, as well as state-operated transport, postal,

and telecommunications services. The reasons given for the

privatization effort were that it would reduce public criticism of

the government role in these enterprises and that these parastatals themselves were no longer profitable for the government. State corporations had been the major recipients of

large foreign loans that were called in and cut off in 1985, leav- ing them with serious capital shortages. Sale of the corporations' assets could both ease the debt burden and provide the

government with new revenue for much-needed social programs for the poor.

Iscor was the first major parastatal to be sold, in November

1989. Its sale raised R3 billion for the treasury. The government then scaled down its plans, and in the early 1990s the

future of privatization was unclear. Officials estimated that the

roughly R250 billion needed to finance the purchase of the

largest state corporations probably could not be found inside

the country. The argument for privatization was also weakened

by the worsening investment climate as political negotiations

stalled and violence increased. Government opponents, especially the ANC, vigorously opposed privatization—viewing it as a ploy to maintain white control in preparation for majority

rule.

In 1995 the Government of National Unity began to develop

its own privatization program. Late that year, Deputy President

Thabo Mbeki announced that the government would seek

equity partners in Telkom and in South African Airways and

that it would sell several smaller parastatals outright. The

announcement provoked strong protests from labor unions

over the threat ofjob losses and over labor's exclusion from the

policy decision-making process.

Budgets

The government enjoyed surplus budgets in most years dur190
The Economy

ing the 1970s and the early 1980s, until chronic high inflation

and gold price fluctuations combined to diminish the business

tax base in the mid-1980s. The severe decline in real gold

prices reduced tax revenues to less than 2 percent of total reve- nues in FY 1990-91, compared with 25 percent of total reve- nues in the boom year a decade earlier (see table 7,

Appendix).

The personal tax base had always been relatively narrow

because of the limited income of the large black population

(about 76 percent of the total population) and the relative

affluence of most whites (about 13 percent of the population).

Searching for additional revenue during the late 1980s, the

government tried to avoid higher taxes on businesses and

instead relied on deficit financing. For example, in FY 1987-88,

the deficit was 5.8 percent of GDP as part of a deliberate fiscal stimulation of the economy. This pattern of spending continued, and the budget deficit rose to 9 percent of GDP in 1993.

The erratic price of gold during the 1980s led to other budget problems, fueling the cycle of reduced industrial revenue,

currency devaluation, and high inflation. The government

attempted to encourage business development through lenient

tax policies, but average incomes continued to be low so this

strategy failed to bring in the needed government revenues. The government tried to increase its revenues by "widening the

net" of goods and services taxed in 1991, when it introduced a 10 percent value-added tax (VAT) to replace the former 13 percent general sales tax. Then, in an effort to encourage capital

spending, businesses were exempted from paying the VAT on

capital inputs. And to encourage investment, other forms of

tax, such as corporate taxes, taxes on gold mines and gold companies, and import surcharges on capital goods, were reduced.

By 1995 the VAT had been increased to 14 percent.

The FY 1994-95 budget projected revenues of R105.8 billion

and expenditures of R135.1 billion, leaving a deficit of R29.3

billion, or about 6.2 percent of projected GDP (see table 8,

Appendix). To raise revenues, the government planned to sell domestic stocks, increase foreign borrowing, and increase

excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco products—expected to bring in an estimated R525 million. The government also lev- ied a one-time, 5 percent "transition levy" on individuals and

businesses with taxable incomes of more than R50,000, expecting to enhance its revenues by about R2.25 billion through this measure.

191
South Africa: A Country Study

In March 1995, the ANC-led government's budget for FY

1995-96 estimated total revenues at roughly R123 billion and

expenditures at R153.3 billion, with a budget deficit of R29.7

billion and a gross borrowing requirement (including interest

on previous debt) of R38 billion. Government revenues were to be enhanced by higher taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline

(and a higher, 43 percent maximum rate on individual

incomes). The budget was well received overall, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange generally held steady after it was presented.

The proposed government budget for FY 1996-97 projected revenues of roughly R145 billion and expenditures of R174 bil- lion, with a projected deficit equivalent to 5.1 percent of GDR

Principal projected new revenues included taxes on monthly

retirement income, while revenues from import tariffs would

be reduced or eliminated. Proposed budget allocations

included roughly R7.5 billion for salary increases and pay

adjustments for government workers, intended to reduce the

inequities of the apartheid era. The budget also envisioned

expenditures of roughly R5.5 billion for education, RIO. 2 bil- lion for military spending, and R9.8 billion for the police.

Foreign Trade and Investment

South Africa's foreign trade and investment were affected by

sanctions and boycotts, especially during the 1980s and early

1990s. These measures included a voluntary arms embargo

instituted by the United Nations (UN) in 1963, which was

declared mandatory in 1977; the 1978 prohibition of loans

from the United States Export-Import Bank; an oil embargo

first instituted by OPEC in 1973 and strengthened in a similar

move by Iran in 1979; a 1983 prohibition on IMF loans; a 1985

cutoff of most foreign loans by private banks; the United States 1986 Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act, which limited trade

and discouraged United States investors; and the 1986 European Economic Community (EEC) ban on trade and investment. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) also

discouraged trade with South Africa, although observers esti- mated that Africa's officially unreported trade with South

Africa exceeded RIO billion per year in the late 1980s.

The most effective sanctions measure was the withdrawal of

short-term credits in 1985 by a group of international banks.

Immediate loan repayments took a heavy toll on the economy

(see External Debt, this ch.). More than 350 foreign corpora192
Durban, historic port and multicultural city

Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

tions, at least 200 of which were United States owned, sold off

their South African investments. In 1991 both the EEC and the

United States lifted many official sanctions in view of measures

taken by Pretoria to begin dismantling apartheid. Foreign

investors were slow to return to South Africa, however; most

banking institutions considered the country too unstable, and

foreign corporations faced high labor costs and unrest if they

tried to operate there.

In 1994 and 1995, many of the United States companies that

had sold off shares or operations in South Africa in the past

decade returned to do business there. By early 1996, at least

225 United States companies employed more than 45,000

South African workers.

Foreign Trade

Throughout the twentieth century, South Africa's economy

193
South Africa: A Country Study

has depended heavily on foreign trade—a trend that continued even under pressure from international sanctions and

recession. Gold dominated its exports to the point that the government occasionally intervened to promote nongold exports.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, the price of gold directly

affected the value of the rand and, therefore, the prices at which exports were sold overseas. As the gold price fluctuated,

the exchange rate of the rand rose and fell, and export reve- nues responded accordingly. Under these uncertain conditions, few manufacturers were willing to risk large investments

to increase their export capacity.

One of the 1970s programs that promoted nongold mineral

exports was the development of new harbor facilities, railway

lines, and mines, which helped to increase revenues from the

export of metal ores at the impressive rate of nearly 18 percent

per year, on average, during the 1980s. Also during the 1980s,

the Board of Trade and Industry implemented structural

adjustment programs for various industries and a General

Export Incentive Scheme, which reduced import tariffs on raw

materials to be used to manufacture goods for export, in proportion to their value and local content. One effect of these

programs was to reduce the importance of gold in South Afri- can exports from 56 percent of revenues in 1980 to 36 percent

in 1992, according to government statistics. Gold exports

increased slightly in 1993 and 1994, as a fraction of export reve- nues, but remained below 40 percent of the total. The government also took direct action to limit imports, in

part to protect local industries. The government has the power

to do so through tariffs, surcharges, and import licenses.

Import tariffs provided some protection against dumping by

foreign manufacturers. Import surcharges helped reduce

import demand and raise government revenues. In August

1988, the surcharge on some items was raised as high as 60 percent in a bid to hold down imports, but in May 1989 the sur- charge on capital goods was eased from 20 percent to 15

percent, and most import tariffs were being phased out in the

1990s.

Government pressures in the 1970s and the 1980s succeeded

in reducing South Africa's import levels but did not succeed in

changing the pattern of imports. By 1987, when total imports were down about 30 percent from their peak 1974 volume,

industrial inputs continued to dominate imports. Machinery

was the most important among these, followed by vehicles and

194
The Economy

transportation equipment, a variety of chemicals, and oil. After

the OPEC boycott of 1973 and Iran's cutoff of oil to South

Africa in 1979, however, official figures on oil trade were not

available. Observers estimated that 1987 oil import costs

reached US$1.75 billion.

The pattern of trade dominated by gold exports and industrial imports continued in the early 1990s (see table 9; table 10,

Appendix). The government continued to promote exports

and to limit imports in an effort to create the trade surplus

(and foreign exchange reserve surplus) necessary for debt

repayment. In 1993 exports were valued- at roughly R79.5 bil- lion (almost 35 percent of GDP) according to official estimates,

and imports were valued at approximately R59 billion. In 1994

exports were valued at an estimated R89.1 billion, and imports,

at R75.9 billion. In early 1995, imports began to outstrip

exports, and South Africa's trade surplus declined at an uneven

pace for the rest of the year. South African Reserve Bank esti- mates in early 1996 placed the value of exports in the previous

year at R81 billion in merchandise and R20.2 billion in gold.

Merchandise imports were about R98.5 billion, leading officials to predict that the trade balance could lapse into deficit. In

early 1996, however, exporters took advantage of the sharp

depreciation of the rand, and the trade surplus rose sharply. In

dollar values, however, the trade balance remained almost flat as the benefits of the lower rand were offset by lower commodity prices

Foreign trade delegations began arriving in South Africa as international sanctions were being lifted in the early 1990s.

Among its most dramatic turnabouts, South Africa sent a delegation to Moscow in mid-1991 to discuss strengthening trade

ties, and for the first time, South African companies participated in a trade fair there.

South Africa's main trading partners in the mid-1990s are West European countries, the United States, and Japan. Members of the European Union (EU—see Glossary) receive

roughly 40 percent of South African exports and provide onethird of South Africa's imports. In 1994 Switzerland, an important destination of South African diamonds, purchased the

largest share of South African exports. Other markets for

South African goods are the United Kingdom, the United

States, Japan, and Germany, in that order. Leading sources of

South African imports are Germany, the United States, the

United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy.

195
South Africa: A Country Study

The EU accorded South Africa duty-free entry on most of its industrial exports in early 1995, and the two were negotiating

terms for the purchase of South Africa's agricultural products.

In 1996 the EU granted South Africa a qualified membership

in the Lome Convention, to take effect in 1997. The Lome

Convention gives African, Pacific, and Caribbean countries

preferential access to European markets.

South Africa's trade with the United States increased rapidly

after 1994. In 1995 South Africa imported roughly US$2.75 bil- lion worth of United States exports, mostly manufactured

goods. This represented more than half of all United States

exports to Africa. South Africa exported roughly US$2.21 bil- lion worth of metals, alloys, and precious stones to the United

States in that year, representing the only significant source of

African products other than petroleum.

South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa, the natural market for its manufactured goods and agricultural products, was

carried on both openly and clandestinely until the early 1990s,

because of the OAU's long-standing trade ban. As commercial

ties expanded in the 1990s, African countries purchased about

10 percent of South Africa's exports; Zimbabwe, Zambia, and

Mozambique were the largest African markets. Only Zimbabwe

supplied significant exports (primarily tobacco) to South

Africa.

Official South African trade statistics include all members of

the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). SACU arose out

of a customs agreement between South Africa and the territories that became Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, dating

back even before the Union of South Africa was formed in

1910. SACU was formally established when the agreement was

renegotiated in 1969, and Namibia joined the customs union

when it became independent in 1990. Goods move freely

among SACU member states, which share a common accounting procedure and impose a common tariff structure. Each

country contributes to a shared fund and receives a fixed portion of revenues based on its approximate share of production

and consumption. In the mid-1990s, South Africa was considering either dismantling SACU or restructuring its participation

in the alliance.

Investment

During the 1960s, foreign investment in mining and manufacturing grew steadily, reaching over 60 percent of total for196
The Economy

eign investment by 1970. After that, foreign investment in

South Africa stagnated and in some cases declined, increasing

the government's reliance on loans rather than on equity capital to finance development. In 1984 loans constituted over 70

percent of South Africa's foreign liabilities, as compared with

only 27 percent from direct investments. As a result, when most

loans were cut off in 1985, available investment capital

dropped sharply, and the economy suffered. In 1989 a substantial proportion of gross investment—R39 billion out of R49 bil- lion—represented depreciation.

Although international opposition to South Africa eased in

the early 1990s and bans on investment were lifted, investment

as registered on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) con- tinued to decline and South African share prices on the JSE

and on the London Stock Exchange were low. Industrial shares

fared better than other sectors, but even the industrial index

showed only sluggish growth through 1991. The overall JSE

index improved slightly in 1992, and this trend continued after

that. In 1993 the index rose by nearly 50 percent, although the

volume of trade continued to be low by international stan- dards. By late 1995, foreign purchases on the JSE had risen to more than R4.5 billion.

Foreign purchases were primarily in portfolio investment

rather than direct investment through the mid-1990s. Most for- eign direct investment was in the form ofjoint ventures or buying into existing enterprises. There was very little foreign direct

investment in new enterprises, a trend that hit hardest in the

struggling black business sector in South Africa. United States direct investment in South Africa rose during this time, from

about US$871 million in 1992 to more than US$1.34 billion in

1995.

South Africans invested heavily in other African countries, even during the years of declining investments in South Africa.

Tourist facilities were a favorite target for South African investments during the sanctions era. South Africans invested in

tourist parks in Madagascar, for example, and in hotel development in the Comoro Islands and in Mozambique in the early

1990s. South African tourists, banned from many other tourist

locales at the time, then shared in the benefits of these developments.

Balance of Payments

Before the debt crisis of 1985, South Africa's current-account

197
South Africa: A Country Study

position traditionally mirrored its business cycle, showing alter- nate surpluses and deficits. Whenever the economy grew faster

than about 3 percent a year, local demand for imports

increased, and when the economy slowed, imports decreased.

In times of growth, when current-account deficits became too

large, the government implemented restrictive monetary and

fiscal policies in order to slow demand. After the 1985 debt crisis, however, South Africa had no choice but to run continuous

current-account surpluses to meet repayment commitments.

By the early 1990s, South Africa had become a capital-exporting nation because creditors wanted repayment on loans, and

almost no new capital inflows other than replacement or roll- over trade credits were available.

South Africa's current-account surplus, which had averaged

about 3 percent of GDP in the late 1980s, increased sharply to exceed R6 billion in 1991, before declining slightly in 1993,

according to the Central Statistical Service. In 1994 and 1995,

import growth forced the current account into a deficit for the

first time in more than a decade and officials estimated that the

current-account deficit could reach RIO billion by 1997.

South Africa's gold and foreign currency reserves were hit

hard by the need to repay the nation's loans in 1985 and 1986.

At that time, gold holdings were sufficient to cover only about

ten weeks of imports, and by the end of 1988 the reserve position had deteriorated to little more than six weeks of import

cover. Although the capital account started to improve in 1990,

and total gold and other foreign reserves rose to US$2.39 bil- lion, this amount was still equivalent to the cost of only about

six weeks of imports of goods and services. Net foreign cur- rency reserves were still very low in the mid-1990s, at about

R15.7 billion (about two months of import cover) in late 1995,

and RIO billion (only about one month's import cover) in mid1996.

Employment and Labor

Labor Force

Agricultural employment in the formal economy declined

beginning in the 1970s, reflecting the trends toward mechanization in agriculture and increasing urbanization. During that

time, the government also changed its definition of agricultural employment to exclude many farmers who owned small

plots of land and produced primarily for subsistence or for

198
The Economy

local markets. Impressive growth in the services sector—including trade, finance, insurance, restaurants, hotels, and other

business and social services—accounted for most of the jobs

created during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The services sec- tor also included the country's large domestic work force, esti- mated at more than 800,000 in the early 1990s.

The distribution of labor continued to change in the 1990s,

in response to global and regional market factors and political

change in South Africa. For example, despite the importance

of mining revenues throughout the twentieth century, the mining industry employed a dwindling share of the work force

only about 7 percent in 1995, down from nearly 10 percent a decade earlier. More than 200,000 mineworkers had been laid

off between 1987 and 1993, according to the industrial

umbrella organization, the South African Chamber of Mines

(see table 11, Appendix).

In 1994 and 1995, officials revised employment statistics to incorporate into national accounts employment in the former

black homelands—which were home to almost one-half of the

black South African population. With these revisions, the government estimated the national work force in mid-1995 at 14.3

million people. Unemployment statistics also were being

revised to incorporate workers outside the formal economy. In

1995 the government estimated unemployment at 32.6 percent. Unofficial estimates ranged to 40 percent or higher, and

officials acknowledged that the rate was as high as 47 percent

in some rural areas. Labor and Politics

Even before apartheid restrictions were imposed during the

1950s, government policies, rather than market principles,

determined many aspects of labor-management relations.

From the 1950s until the early 1990s, black workers suffered

systematic discrimination. Apartheid legislation authorized the

"reservation" of many skilled jobs and managerial positions for

whites; qualified blacks were legally excluded from most seniorlevel jobs, but black education standards were so inferior to those for whites that few blacks were qualified for well-paid

jobs. Even in equivalent job categories, blacks received lower

wages than whites. Although white workers were divided in

their racial attitudes throughout the apartheid era, they often

opposed benefits for black workers that could threaten their

own economic standing.

199
South Africa: A Country Study

Throughout South Africa's industrial history, workers of all races organized to demand better wages and working conditions, but through the early 1980s, almost all union leaders were white. This was true in part because some employers

refused to negotiate with black representatives and because of

legal restrictions on black labor organizations. The Industrial

Conciliation Act of 1924, which governed many aspects of

labor relations, redefined the term, employee, to exclude most

blacks; the definition was amended by the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (No. 48) of 1953 to exclude all blacks,

thereby depriving them of any labor law protection.

A century of South African industrial development had

relied on an abundance of low-wage labor in order to ensure

profits. But as the economic and social problems associated

with implementing apartheid emerged, and as new technologies were developed during the 1960s and the 1970s, many

industries chose to increase their capital stock—investing in

sophisticated machinery and employing a few skilled technicians—rather than adopt labor-intensive methods that would

require training and managing a large work force. This trend

toward capital-intensive operations probably resulted in lower

labor costs and increased productivity. At the same time, it contributed to the country's soaring unemployment and spreading

poverty, which fueled resentment and raised the costs to the

government of preserving apartheid.

Increasing poverty among blacks, along with entrenched

workplace discrimination and the marginalization of blacks

from national politics, caused black workers' organizations to become increasingly politicized in the 1960s and the 1970s.

They provided a legal arena in which political grievances could

be aired. By the early 1970s, there were twenty-four African

workers' organizations with a combined membership of nearly

60,000. Their increasing militance and a series of strikes that

began in Durban in 1973 finally persuaded the government to begin reassessing its restrictions on black labor.

The government-appointed Commission of Inquiry into

Labour Legislation (Wiehahn Commission) recommended the

legal recognition of these fledgling unions, in part to exercise

stronger control over black workers. As a result, Parliament

enacted the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979,

recognizing black unions and extending labor law protection

to them for the first time.

200
Adult labor often includes child- care responsibilities: street vendor's child plays beneath

urban kiosk. Courtesy Embassy of South

Africa, Washington

A weaver's child accompanies

her to work.

Courtesy Sheila Ross

Under this legislation, many black workers had the legal

right to bargain collectively with their employers in the 1980s,

and, when legally required mediation procedures failed, they

had the right to strike. They exercised these rights aggressively,

using both legal and illegal labor actions to press their workplace demands and to protest against apartheid. Black union

membership of about 500,000 in 1980 grew to more than 2.5

million in 1990. By the early 1990s, almost 70 percent of all union members in South Africa were black, and more than

one-third of all employees in mining, industry, and commerce

were union members.

The largest organizing effort among black workers resulted

in the establishment of the Congress of South African Trade

Unions (COSATU) in 1985. An umbrella organization of more

than a dozen unions, COSATU had a total of 1.3 million mem201
South Africa: A Country Study

bers by 1990. COSATU affiliated with the African National

Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party

(SACP), both of which were banned. In addition to winning

major financial concessions for its members, COSATU became

the effective mobilizing arm of the ANC and the SACP.

COSATU's two largest labor rivals were the National Council of

Trade Unions (Nactu), a blacks-only confederation that

rejected multiracial membership, and the United Workers'

Union of South Africa (UWUSA), which was affiliated with the

Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).

Union militancy contributed to labor successes. Real wages

for black manufacturing workers rose an average of 29 percent

between 1985 and 1990. Overall wage increases, outside agriculture, rose by 11 percent during 1985 alone, and this annual

rate of increase accelerated to 17 percent in 1990.

By the early 1990s, however, both labor and government

leaders were alarmed over the violence that had erupted during some labor actions. Violence had been part of labor's history of confrontation; some employers used force to suppress

labor militancy, and strikers often used violence against nonstriking workers. But the scale of labor violence increased

sharply, and the often-repressive police response also contributed to the destruction. In one of South Africa's most violent

strikes—at a gold mine near Welkom, in the Orange Free

State—more than eighty miners died in clashes between strik- ers and nonstrikers in 1991. Like many other violent strikes,

this clash initially concerned economic issues, but it escalated

because of political, ethnic, and racial grievances.

In the early 1990s, COSATU's largest and most militant

unions were the National Union of Metalworkers of South

Africa (NUMSA) and the National Union of Mineworkers

(NUM), each with more than 300,000 members. NUMSA's

actions cost automobile manufacturers and related industries

more workdays than any other union in 1993 and 1994.

NUMSA threatened even more costly labor actions in the

future if auto workers' wage increases did not accelerate.

Three other large unions led the labor movement in the

number of strikes called during the early 1990s. These were the

National Education, Health, and Allied Workers' Union; the

Transport and General Workers' Union; and the Food and

Allied Workers' Union. Even workers in small companies were becoming more militant; during the early 1990s, more than 40

percent of all strikes involved 200 or fewer employees.

202
The Economy

In 1994, with 194 legally recognized labor unions in the

country, the government extended labor law protection to domestic workers for the first time. Initially, this meant recognizing their 70,000-member domestic workers' organization as a union and granting its members rights such as sick leave and

on-the-job lunch breaks for the first time. Several COSATUaffiliated unions launched membership drives among domestic

workers in 1995 and 1996, and they promised to work for the

introduction of a legal minimum wage and access to literacy

classes and other forms of vocational training for the large

domestic work force.

Business and labor leaders agreed that confrontations with

labor contributed to rising business costs during the 1980s and

the early 1990s. The number of workdays lost to work stoppages rose from 175,000 in 1980 to 5.8 million in 1987. Lost

workdays per year declined in the late 1980s, but labor actions

still extracted high costs from business by slowing operations,

by intimidating investors, and by destroying property. Among

the most costly actions were those by transport workers, whose

services were vital to all sectors of the economy. South Africa's

ability to compete globally was also affected by labor militancy,

in part because, officials estimated, a worker's cost to employers in 1994—including wages and benefits—averaged US$5 an hour in South Africa, or double the average labor costs in

Mexico or Brazil and more than five times the average labor

cost in China.

Education and Employment

The Bantu Education Act (No. 47) of 1953 helped pave the

way for labor strife in the 1980s and the 1990s by institutionalizing a plan to restrict black workers to low-paid jobs through

deliberately inferior education (see Education, ch. 2). During

the 1960s and 1970s, per capita spending on white pupils was about ten times greater than educational spending on black

pupils. By the early 1990s, the gap had been reduced by half,

but in general, standards for teacher qualifications and facili- ties in black schools continued to be inferior to those in white

schools.

The economic costs of implementing and enforcing apartheid sky-rocketed in the 1980s. Black poverty deprived South

African businesses and manufacturers of a sizable domestic

market. Even more ominous for the future, it became clear

that South Africa lacked the necessary skilled personnel to

203
South Africa: A Country Study

maintain growth in its manufacturing enterprises, and millions

of South African workers were unqualified for anything but the

lowest-paid jobs.

South Africa's Education Foundation, a respected private

research organization, estimated in 1991 that unemployment

among unskilled and uneducated workers would increase during the 1990s, and that at least 500,000 skilled jobs and managerial positions were likely to remain unfilled, unless foreign

workers were hired to fill them. The government's National

Manpower Commission confirmed these bleak estimates in

1992, adding to the political pressure to end apartheid, especially in education.

The interlinked challenges of economic recovery and educational reorganization presented the new government with an

intractable dilemma in 1994. Educational reform would

require significant increased spending in an expanding econ- omy, but, at the same time, economic growth would require a more highly skilled work force and educational reforms. The

government approach to these challenges was deliberate and

careful, and attempted with foreign donor assistance to convince those who were uneducated and unemployed that some

of the benefits of ending apartheid would be seen during their

lifetime. Officials sought international assistance in providing

on-the-job training for workers in many industries and in

speeding the pace of reforms, but by late 1995, only a few new

programs were being implemented.

Women constituted only about 36 percent of the labor force

in the formal economy in the mid-1990s, according to official

estimates. Women of all races generally held lower-paid jobs

than men, and they were paid less in comparable jobs. During

the apartheid era, white women most often worked in service

industries and clerical positions; a few white women held

supervisory jobs or government offices. Black women dominated the large domestic work force; some worked in clerical

positions or in temporary jobs, often in agriculture. Women

managed most agricultural production in the former homelands and rural areas where men frequently left home to work

in cities or in the mines.

Foreign workers have been an important segment of the

industrial work force. In 1994 the government estimated that

between 1 million and 1.2 million workers from Botswana,

Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland were legally

employed in South Africa—most on temporary contracts in the

204
The Economy

mines or urban industries. In addition, as many as 2 million

foreign workers were believed to be self-employed or working

illegally in South Africa in 1995, according to minister of home

affairs Gatsha Buthelezi. Foreign workers were sometimes subject to immediate layoffs or discriminatory treatment at the

hands of management or fellow employees, and in 1996, they

faced the threat of new restrictions on their being hired.

Extractive Industries

South Africa's modern history has often been dated from

the first commercial mining of diamonds and gold in the 1870s

and the 1880s, when the region became a magnet for European investment. Mining in the region predated European

arrivals by several centuries, however, as the new government

recalled in its minerals policy statements in 1994 and 1995.

Iron mining and smelting sites in the northeast were used as much as 1,700 years ago; copper was mined south of the Limpopo River more than 1,000 years ago; and historians describe

early mining activities in the Witwatersrand (literally, "Ridge of

White Waters" in Afrikaans, commonly shortened to Rand)

area, which attracted miners from elsewhere in Africa as early

as the thirteenth century.

Soon after the European rush for gold and diamonds in the

late nineteenth century, mining operations expanded to include more than two dozen other minerals. By the mid-twentieth century, South Africa was the world's largest producer or second largest producer of gold, diamonds, platinum, chromium, manganese, and vanadium; and it ranked high among

producers of coal, iron ore, uranium, copper, silver, fluorspar,

asbestos, and limestone (see table 12, Appendix).

Clusters of minerals occur in five major mineral complexes—the Bushveld, Transvaal, Witwatersrand, Northern

Cape, and Western Cape complexes (see fig. 15). Whereas

most mines were originally funded and managed from European centers, by the 1970s most were managed by South

Africa's large diversified corporations, which controlled assets around the world.

Despite its importance in export revenues, the mining industry contributes only about 9.6 percent of GDP in the mid1990s, down from an average of nearly 15 percent during the

1980s. The mining sector had been gradually surpassed by

manufacturing and financial services both in terms of national

output and labor force participation. The mines still account

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South Africa: A Country Study

206
The Economy

for a greater share of export revenues than any other single

economic activity in the 1990s.

The mineowners' association, the South African Chamber of

Mines, was formed in 1889 to represent the industry in dealings with the government. In the 1990s, the Chamber of Mines

includes six major mining finance houses, with thirty-six gold

mines, twenty-two coal mines, and sixteen diamond, platinum,

antimony, asbestos, manganese, lead, and copper mines.

Together they account for 85 percent of South Africa's mineral

output. The Chamber of Mines negotiates labor concerns on

behalf of mineowners, administers training programs for mineworkers, trains mineworkers in rescue and safety procedures,

oversees pension and benefit funds, coordinates research programs, and refines and processes some minerals before sale. Gold

Gold, first mined by Europeans in 1886 near Johannesburg, soon became the most important sector in the mining industry.

South Africa has almost one-half of the world's known gold

reserves, located primarily in the Rand in what was once a prehistoric lake. Gold is also mined in the Free State. Industry analysts estimated in the early 1990s that South Africa had

produced more than 43,000 tons of gold in the past century,

and that at least that amount remained in reserves. Gold occurs in seams embedded in rock strata, sometimes

more than a mile below the surface. Deep shafts must be sunk,

large amounts of rock must be blasted and brought to the sur- face, and the rock must be crushed and chemically separated

from the gold. Some gold mines then pump processed mine

tailings underground to serve as backfill. Mining and processing are costly, especially in deposits where the gold seam is extremely thin compared with the surrounding rock. For

example, in the early 1990s industry analysts estimated that

only 5.6 grams of gold were extracted from each ton of ore

excavated. Nevertheless, the industry has consistently earned

high profits and has accounted for one-third to one-half of the

world's gold production in the 1980s and 1990s. The country's

fifty-seven operating gold mines produce between 600 and 620

tons of gold per year, representing almost 30 percent of the

world production. Gold production in 1994 and 1995 fell below 600 tons for the first time since the 1960s.

Gold mining companies traditionally kept expenses to a minimum by paying low wages. Gold mines became known for

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South Africa: A Country Study

their often exploitative labor policies, including the use of

migrant workers on limited contracts, strict worker control in

company compounds, and difficult working conditions. Labor

costs were especially important in determining profits, because

the price of gold was set at US$35 per ounce through the

1960s. After the price of gold was allowed to float in 1968, it gradually rose in response to market demand, and companies

could afford to produce less and still earn even greater profits.

They then began to expand operations into so-called lowgrade-ore mines. The volume of South African gold production fell, and gold prices skyrocketed to an all-time high of

US$613 per ounce in 1980.

During the 1980s, the dollar price of gold fluctuated widely,

but because of devaluations of the rand, the rand price of gold

generally advanced. When gold prices fell in 1989, the industry

found that many of the low-grade-ore mines were no longer

profitable. As the average value of the rand increased against

the dollar, overall industry profits declined, and nearly half of

the gold mines in operation were running at a loss. At least

40,000 gold mine workers were laid off in 1990, according to government estimates, and layoffs continued through 1993.

During 1994 all major gold mining houses except Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI) were reporting lower

profits as output fell in response to labor unrest and other factors. Randgold closed its Durban gold mine in mid-1994, owing

primarily to poor grades of available ore, and other mines were

threatening to close within the next few years unless profits

improved.

In 1994 JCI began to "unbundle" its corporate structure by

dividing into three separate companies. Anglo American, JO's

largest shareholder (with 48 percent), retained its platinum

and some diamond interests in one company, Anglo American

Platinum. JCI's gold mining and other industrial interests were

separated into two companies, JCI Limited andJohnnies Industrial Corporation. Shares for these companies are being

offered to the public, primarily as a vehicle for black investment and broadening participation in this sector of the econ- omy.

Diamonds and Platinum

South Africa's diamond mining industry dates back to 1867,

when diamonds were discovered near Kimberley, now in the

Northern Cape. The Kimberley diamond fields, and later dis208
The Economy

coveries in Gauteng, the Free State, and along the Atlantic

coast, emerged as major sources of gem-quality diamonds,

securing South Africa's position as the world's leading producer in the mid-twentieth century. (Rough diamonds were produced in larger quantities in Australia, Zaire, Botswana, and

Russia.) Through 1991 most of South Africa's diamonds were mined at only five locations, but a sixth mine, Venetia—in the

Northern Cape—opened in 1992 and was expected to become

a major diamond producer later in the decade.

The De Beers Consolidated Mines Company controlled most

diamond mining in South Africa and influenced international

trade through a diamond-producers' alliance, or cartel—the

Central Selling Organisation. The cartel enabled diamond producers to control the number of gems put on the market and

thereby to maintain high prices for gem-quality diamonds. The

cartel was able to react to marketing efforts outside its control

by temporarily flooding the market, and thereby driving down

the price paid for an outsider's product.

Diamond prices fluctuated in the early 1980s, but the industry continued to expand even in the face of international reces- sion and the discovery of the diamond-like cubic zirconia.

Dollar prices for diamonds improved in 1985 but dropped

again in 1987, requiring De Beers to support the market by

withholding diamonds from dealers. Thus, annual production

of more than 10 million carats in 1985 and in 1986 dropped to

9.1 million in the late 1980s. Gem and industrial diamond out- put in 1994 was 10.8 million carats, or roughly 11 percent of

world production.

In 1990 the Soviet Union signed and openly acknowledged a contract to sell its diamonds (estimated at a value of about R13

billion over a five-year period) exclusively through De Beers.

The action marked the first time in nearly thirty years that the

Soviet Union had openly associated itself in commodity dealings with South Africa. Later that year, De Beers announced a loan of R2.63 million to the Soviet Union, against the security

of an equivalent amount in diamonds.

Platinum group metals (platinum, palladium, ruthenium,

rhodium, iridium, and osmium), which occur together in ore seams and are mined in one operation, were discovered in

South Africa in 1924. Most of the estimated 59,000 tons of

reserves are in the Bushveld complex of minerals; some concentrations are also found in the Transvaal and the Witwatersrand complexes. Platinum is used in automobile catalytic

209
South Africa: A Country Study

converters to reduce fuel emissions, as a catalyst in industrial

processes, and in making jewelry.

South Africa is the world's leading producer of platinum. Its output of about ninety tons in 1993 accounted for almost 49

percent of world production. South Africa's platinum mines

have profited, in particular, from the sale of rhodium, which

sold for almost US$6,000 an ounce in the early 1990s, but

world market prices fell after that. Ferrous and Nonferrous Metals

South Africa has the world's largest known deposits of chromium, manganese, and vanadium, as well as significant deposits of iron ore, antimony, copper, nickel, lead, titanium,

fluorspar, zinc, and zirconium. Most of these metals are exported unprocessed, with the exception of iron ore, which is also used in the local steel industry.

South Africa's chromium deposits contain about 72 percent

of the world's reserves, most of it in the Bushveld complex of

minerals. In 1993 its mines produced 2.8 million tons of chromium, or about 32 percent of world output—down from 4 million tons in 1989; production recovered, to roughly 3.6 million

tons in 1994. Used primarily to produce stainless steel, chromium was one of South Africa's export successes in the 1980s;

prices reached US$0. 70 per pound but dropped sharply when

producers tried to undercut each other in 1990. The government used various incentives, including export subsidies and

power rebates to those who produced alloys for export, to encourage production. About one-third of chromium produced in 1993 was exported, much of it to the United States

and Japan.

South Africa contains the largest known deposits of manganese ore in the world. Its reserves of at least 12.5 billion tons,

mostly in the Northern Cape mineral complex, constitute 75

percent of the world total. Manganese is essential in the manufacture of iron and steel, and more than 90 percent of South

Africa's manganese is used for this purpose. During the late

1980s, production fluctuated slightly, but it remained between

3 and 4 million tons per year, while prices generally rose, nearly

doubling in 1989. By the end of 1991, however, South African

producers were forced to reduce prices in response to a weak

international market. In 1994 more than 2.8 million tons of

manganese ore were produced, roughly 17 percent of world

output.

210
The Economy

South Africa produced between 25,000 tons and 30,000 tons

of vanadium a year in the early 1990s, almost 45 percent of the

world's supply. Its estimated 5.4 million tons constitute onethird of world reserves. The world's largest producer is a South

African firm, Highveld Steel and Vanadium. The year 1989 set a record in terms of both production and exports for South

Africa, but when world steel production declined, demand for

vanadium dropped and prices plummeted, forcing one vana- dium producer in South Africa to close down. Prices again

surged in early 1995, and Highveld Steel and Vanadium

expected earnings to more than double in 1995, compared

with 1994. Vanadium is used in manufacturing steel, to provide

tensile and torsional strength and resistance to abrasion.

South Africa is the largest producer of iron ore on the continent, with reserves estimated at more than 9.4 billion tons. Iron is mined in the Northern Cape, the Bushveld, and the

Transvaal complexes, and in KwaZulu-Natal. More than 29.3

million tons of iron ore, roughly 3 percent of world output, were produced in 1993. Almost half of that amount was used in

the steel industry. A record 19.6 million tons were exported in

1994, much of it to Japan.

Although small by world standards, South Africa's steel manufacturing industry is the largest on the continent (see Heavy

Industry, this ch.). Steel production increased dramatically in

the 1970s following the development of port facilities at Saldanha Bay and the associated rail line connecting it to the

high-grade Sishen ore deposits in the Northern Cape. Projections for the use of steel in local construction were increasing

as the government began to implement its Reconstruction and

Development Programme in 1994. Government plans to implement stricter automobile emission standards promised another

boost to the steel manufacturers, who produce stainless steel

for use in catalytic converters. South Africa has only about 2 percent of the world's known

copper reserves, with the largest deposits in the Transvaal complex in the northeast. Copper is also mined in the Northern

Cape and the Western Cape. Mining costs are high, because of

the high concentration of other minerals in copper ore. At the

country's largest copper mine, at Phalaborwa, production

decreased in early 1993, in part because of flooding that

brought work in the mine to a standstill. Later that year, the

mine owners received government permission to institute a seven-day workweek, and the mine increased its work force to

211
South Africa: A Country Study

extend operations. Nationwide copper production, nonetheless, fell from more than 176,000 tons in 1992 to about 165,000

tons in 1994, and copper exports decreased steadily, to roughly

82,000 tons in 1994.

Energy Minerals and Petroleum

Fortunately for South Africa, it is well endowed with coal and

uranium for energy production, because the country apparently has no significant petroleum reserves and was officially

cut off from oil imports from 1979 to 1993. Oil accounted for

about 20 percent of primary energy until the early 1970s, and

the government had stockpiled an estimated 18 million tons of

imported oil by 1979. Although unreported oil shipments con- tinued during the sanctions era, many industries switched to the use of coal to power generators.

Imported crude oil is processed at four refineries—two in

Durban, one near Cape Town, and one in Sasolburg, southwest

of Johannesburg—with a combined distillation capacity of

about 401,000 barrels per day, or 21.5 million tons per year. In

1994 the government invited international investment in oil

and gas exploration for the first time since the 1960s. Minister

of Mines and Energy Roelof "Pik" Botha announced the plan,

saying that the government needed domestic energy sources

for reconstruction and development. The state-owned South- ern Oil Exploration Corporation (Soekor) also needed the

investment capital to develop nine recently discovered small

oilfields off the western Cape coast, and several other small

wells near Mossel Bay.

South Africa's coal reserves, most located in the Witwatersrand and in northern KwaZulu-Natal, were estimated to be

between 60 billion and 100 billion tons, enough to maintain

early-1 990s levels of domestic use and exports through much of

the twenty-first century, according to industry analysts. The

coal occurs in seams, often less than one hundred meters

below the surface, and hence it is relatively easy and inexpensive to mine. Most coal used locally is burned in generators at

electricity plants; it is also used for coking in the steel industry.

During the 1980s, Eskom, the government's electric power

utility, was the coal industry's major customer. Eskom purchased about two-thirds of coal output, which fluctuated

between 159 million and 176 million tons from 1984 to 1989.

In the early 1990s, the coal industry produced more than 180

million tons of coal each year, of which at least 47 million tons

212
SASOL II oil-from-coalfacility south ofJohannesburg

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth Africa, Washington

were exported. The industry employed more than 76,000 people. Eskom helped to finance coal mining operations and guaranteed coal prices to ensure the mining companies' return on

investment.

International sanctions in the 1980s affected the coal industry in two ways. United States and European importers reduced

their demand for South African coal exports, and South Afri- can homes and industries increased their use of coal in place of

oil and other imported fuels. But in 1991 and 1992, as most

sanctions were being lifted, the South African coal industry

found itself facing stiff competition from emerging low-cost

producers, such as Indonesia, Colombia, and Venezuela.

South Africa is ranked fifth in world uranium reserves in the

1990s with recoverable reserves estimated at nearly 180,000

tons. Uranium is produced as a by-product of gold in some

mines of the Witwatersrand, and as a by-product of copper in

213
South Africa: A Country Study

the Phalaborwa mines of the far northeast of the country.

Since 1968 all uranium produced in South Africa has been processed and marketed by the Nuclear Fuels Corporation of

South Africa, a private company owned by the gold mines that

produce uranium. Output declined in the late 1980s, as operating costs increased and uranium prices hit a thirteen-year low.

Uranium output averaged nearly 2,000 tons a year in the early

1990s. Exports of uranium declined from roughly 1.3 percent

of total export revenues in the 1980s to roughly 0.2 percent in

the early 1990s.

South Africa produced substantial, but undisclosed,

amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in its nuclear

weapons program, until that program was dismantled in the

early 1990s. In 1994 the government, although a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) , maintained stockpiles of HEU to produce industrial and medical isotopes, or to downgrade for use in power reactors. The government has sponsored extensive research and

development in the production of synthetic fuels, and South

Africa became a pioneer in extracting oil and gas from coal in

the 1960s and the 1970s. The South African Coal, Oil, and Gas

Corporation (SASOL) established three facilities between 1950

and 1982 and is considering building a fourth plant in the late

1990s. After 1979, when SASOL shares were offered to the public, most of the corporation was run as a private company, with

government assistance in constructing new facilities. Officials

did not release production figures to the public, but the

SASOL plants were believed to be supplying about 40 percent

of South Africa's liquid fuel needs in the early 1990s. The cor- poration received tariff protection when the price of oil

dropped below US$23 per barrel and paid into a fuel equalization fund when prices exceeded US$28.70 per barrel. In addition to liquid fuels, the company produces chemicals,

fertilizers, and explosives.

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing

South Africa has a broad and well-developed agricultural sec- tor and is a net food exporter in most years. Agricultural production, reflecting the sector's increased mechanization and

commercialization, increased throughout the twentieth century. As mining and manufacturing industries expanded at a

faster rate, however, agriculture's share of GDP declined from

about 20 percent in the 1930s to about 12 percent in the 1960s

214
The Economy

and to less than 7 percent in the 1990s. The impressive range

of crops—including almost every kind of food crop, as well as fibers, medicinal herbs, and components of cosmetic fragrances—reflects the country's diverse terrain, climate, and

ecology. The agriculture sector provides for most domestic

needs, and South Africa exports corn (maize), wool, sugar, peanuts (groundnuts), tobacco, and other farm products (see

table 13, Appendix).

About 15 million hectares, or 12 percent of the land area, is under cultivation, and about 10 percent of this is under intensive irrigation. Agricultural production has suffered from cyclical droughts since the seventeenth century, and probably even

earlier. Generally, the best rainfall is in the Western Cape and

along the coast of KwaZulu-Natal. The rest of the country is rel- atively dry, and much of the arid Northern Cape is suitable

only for grazing sheep (see fig. 16).

Under apartheid-era legislation until 1994, white farmers,

who owned only 2 percent of the farms, controlled more than

80 percent of the arable land. White-owned farms averaged

1,300 hectares in size, whereas black farms averaged 5.2 hectares. Because nearly 80 percent of the population was

restricted to less than 20 percent of the land, most black farmland was severely overused, leading to soil erosion and low productivity. As a result, many black farm families were supported

by at least one person engaged in nonagricultural employment. The need for agrarian reform—broadening land ownership and increasing overall productivity—was one of the most

serious issues facing the government in the mid-1990s as the

inequities of apartheid were being reduced.

The government regulated both the production and the

marketing phases of commercial agriculture through the early

1990s. Government-appointed marketing boards purchased

important consumer crops—such as milk, corn, and most cereals—at fixed prices and sometimes subsidized consumer prices

as well. Crops destined for further commercial processing

such as tobacco, wool, oilseeds, and dried fruit for export—also

had to be sold through a marketing board, although producers

generally received market value for these crops after the board

sold the pooled national output. The only crops freely traded were fruits and vegetables sold at local markets. The government began to reduce the role of the marketing boards in the

mid-1990s, and officials hoped to eliminate them entirely by

the end of the decade.

215
South Africa: A Country Study

Figure 16. Major Agricultural Activity, 1996

Agriculture suffered serious effects from the chronic high

inflation and debt that eroded other sectors of the economy in

the early 1990s. Input costs (fertilizers, machinery, etc.) rose by

10 to 20 percent in some years; farm debt had reached R17 bil- lion in 1992, more than four times the amount owed in 1980.

Farmers also had witnessed deterioration in the terms of trade

in farm products; for example, the amount of corn that had to be sold to buy a farm tractor increased from about 191 tons in

1984 to 347 tons in 1990. Moreover, South Africa faced

reduced harvests as a result of severe drought in the early

1990s, forcing the government to spend vital foreign exchange

on food imports.

216
The Economy

Crops

Cereals and grains are South Africa's most important crops,

occupying more than 60 percent of hectarage under cultivation in the 1990s. Corn, the country's most important crop, is a

dietary staple, a source of livestock feed, and an export crop.

Government programs, including generous loans and extension services, have been crucial to the country's self-sufficiency

in this enterprise. Corn is grown commercially on large farms,

and on more than 12,000 small farms, primarily in North-West,

Mpumalanga (formerly, Eastern Transvaal), Free State (formerly, the Orange Free State), and KwaZulu-Natal provinces.

Corn production generates at least 150,000 jobs in years with

good rainfall and uses almost one-half of the inputs of the modern agricultural sector. Corn production exceeds 10 million tons in good years;

owing to regional drought in the early 1990s, however, production fell to just over 3 million tons in 1992, and roughly 5 million tons of corn were imported, at a cost of at least US$700

million. Both domestic and imported corn was shipped to

neighboring countries to help ease the regional impacts of the

drought. The drought eased in 1993, and officials estimated

the 1994 harvest at approximately 12 million tons. Below-average rainfall in late 1994 again threatened to reduce corn out- put in 1995, and officials expected to import some 600,000

tons of corn in that year. Plentiful rain in late 1995 provided for a bumper crop in 1996.

Wheat production, which is concentrated in large, highly

mechanized farms, also increased after World War II. Wheat

cultivation spread from the western Cape where rainfall is fairly

reliable, to the Orange Free State and the eastern Transvaal,

primarily in response to rising consumer demand. But wheat

harvest volumes vary widely; for example, roughly 2.1 million

tons were produced in 1991 and only 1.3 million tons in 1992.

Production in the early 1990s failed to meet local demand for

about 2.2 million tons per year. Wheat imports in 1992, for

example, cost more than US$5 million.

Other small grains are grown in localized areas of South

Africa. For example, sorghum—which is native to southern

Africa—is grown in parts of the Free State, as well as in the

North-West and the Northern provinces, with yields often

exceeding 200,000 tons. Sorghum has been used since prehistoric times for food and brewing purposes. Barley is also grown,

217
South Africa: A Country Study

primarily in the Western Cape. Nearly 300,000 tons of barley were produced in 1995.

South Africa produces peanuts, sunflower seeds, beans, and

soybeans. Annual production of these crops varies significantly

from year to year, although South Africa is usually able to meet

domestic vegetable-oil needs and generate some exports. Plentiful rains in late 1995 meant increased harvests of these crops

in 1996, compared to 1994 and 1995.

Fruits, including grapes for wine, earn as much as 40 percent

of agricultural export earnings in some years. (Fresh fruit finds a good market in Europe because it matures during the north- ern hemisphere's winter.) Deciduous fruits, including apples,

pears, and peaches, are grown primarily in areas of the Western

Cape and the Eastern Cape, where cold winters and dry summers provide ideal conditions for these crops. Almost 1 million

tons of deciduous fruits were sold fresh locally or were

exported each year in the early 1990s.

Pineapples are grown, primarily in the Eastern Cape and

KwaZulu-Natal. Tropical fruits—especially bananas, avocados,

and mangoes—are also grown, especially in the northeast and

some coastal areas. More than half of citrus production is exported in most years. South Africa exported 40 million car- tons of citrus fruit in 1994, earning roughly R1.34 billion,

according to industry sources. More than 1.5 million tons of grapes are used domestically

in South Africa's renowned wine industry, which dates back to the seventeenth-century vineyards introduced by French

Huguenot immigrants. More than 100,000 hectares of land are planted in vineyards, centered primarily in the Western Cape.

Smaller vineyards are also found in the Northern Cape, Free

State, and Northern Province. One of the noticeable signs of

the end of international sanctions against South Africa was a dramatic increase in worldwide demand for South African

wines in 1994 and 1995.

Sugarcane is also an important export crop, and South

Africa is the world's tenth largest sugar producer. Sugarcane

was first cultivated in mid-nineteenth-century Natal. Production is still centered there, but sugar is also grown in Mpumalanga, where irrigation is used when rainfall is inadequate.

Land under sugar cultivation has steadily increased, and the

industry estimated that it produced more than 16 million tons

of sugarcane in 1994.

218
The Economy

Livestock

From the earliest times, livestock raising has been the backbone of South African agriculture. The large sheep herds of

the Khoikhoi peoples on the Cape peninsula were admired

and later appropriated by European settlers in the seventeenth

century. The early Xhosa and Zulu societies were well known

for the value they placed on cattle even before Europeans

began cattle farming in the region in the seventeenth and the

eighteenth centuries. The Europeans brought new breeds of

sheep and cattle to southern Africa, and from these various

stocks emerged a thriving commercial livestock sector. Cattle,

estimated at more than 8 million head, are found in areas throughout the country; sheep (nearly 26 million) graze primarily in pastures stretching across the Northern Cape, East- ern Cape, western Free State, and Mpumalanga.

The livestock sector produces an estimated 900,000 tons of

red meat each year. For example, the industry reported that

nearly 2 million head of cattle were slaughtered in 1994. Poultry and pig farms are also found across the country, although

most large commercial farms are near metropolitan areas. The

industry estimates that farmers own roughly 1.2 million pigs.

The poultry industry, with at least 11 million chickens, reportedly produced more than 500,000 tons of meat in 1994. In

addition, a small but growing ostrich-raising industry produces

plumes, skins, and meat.

Wool is an important agricultural export. South Africa

became the world's fourth-largest exporter of wool by the late

1940s, and is consistently among the world's top ten wool producers, with an output of about 100,000 tons in most years.

Approximately 60 percent of South African sheep are Merino,

which produce high yields of fine wool. The newer, locally

developed Afrino breed is a wool-mutton breed adapted to arid

conditions. Most wool is exported, but the domestic wool-processing industry includes wool washing, combing, spinning,

and weaving.

Dairy farming is found throughout the country, especially in

the eastern half, and is sufficient to meet domestic needs, barring periods of extreme drought. The predominant dairy

breeds are Holstein, Friesian, and Jersey cows. The milk price was deregulated in 1983, resulting in lower prices, but industry

regulations continued to enforce strict health precautions. In a system dating to 1930, all wholesale milk buyers pay a compulsory levy to the National Milk Board. This money is pooled in a

219
South Africa: A Country Study

stabilization fund and used to subsidize dairies manufacturing

butter, skim milk powder, and cheese when a surplus exists.

Fresh-milk dairies objected in the early 1990s, however, and sev- eral of them were involved in litigation to have the levy lifted. Forestry

South Africa's forests cover only about 1 percent of the country's total land area. The country never was heavily forested,

and by the early twentieth century, humans had destroyed

much of its natural wood resources. After World War I, the government began to establish forest plantations to grow trees for

commercial use. Located primarily in the northeast and in

KwaZulu-Natal, most timber plantations produce pine and

eucalyptus trees. Although most wood is used for fuel, industrial uses include construction and mine props, paper products, and a variety of agricultural applications.

The country's pulp and paper industries expanded operations for export during the 1980s. About half of all commercial

South African sawlogs came from state-owned plantations for use in the pulp and paper industries and in the mines. The two

major paper manufacturers, Mondi (owned by Anglo American) and Sappi (owned by Gencor), spent approximately R3

billion to expand their operations during the 1980s, and in

1991 Sappi expanded even further by purchasing five specialty

paper mills in Britain. Sappi was then ranked as the eleventh

largest company in South Africa.

South Africa's forests produce more than 14.5 million cubic

meters of unseasoned timber annually. Several hundred thousand people are employed on timber farms and in more than

240 wood-processing factories. Although South Africa could

supply most of its own needs for wood and wood products, the

timber industry faced problems on the export market in the

early 1990s. The industry had relied on exports of pulp and

paper, but falling world prices threatened profitability. In the

mid-1990s, the government's Reconstruction and Development

Programme calls for more than 1 million housing starts during

the decade, and the timber industry is promoting the use of

timber-frame houses to increase its domestic market share

under this program.

Fishing

South Africa has a large commercial fishing industry. More

than 4,500 commercial fishing vessels licensed by the Depart220
Tea plantation workers near Tzaneen, Northern Province

Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

ment of Environment Affairs work its nearly 3,000-kilometer

coastline from Mozambique to Namibia. The industry employs

more than 22,000 people. The principal species of shoal fish

caught by coastal trawlers are anchovy, pilchard, and herring.

Deep-sea trawlers bring in hake, barracuda, mackerel,

monkfish, sole, and squid. The most important species caught

by handline are tuna, cod, barracuda, silverfish, salmon, and

yellowtail. Cape rock lobsters are harvested along the west

coast, and several hundred other species, along the east and

the south coastline. The total catch in the early 1990s was

between 500,000 and 700,000 tons each year. South Africa exports about 80 percent of its fish in most

years. Much of the rest is consumed domestically or processed

into fish meal and fish oil. The industry hit a peak in the 1960s,

with a catch of more than 1 million tons in 1968, but declined

after that, in part because local waters had been overfished and

221
South Africa: A Country Study

marine resources were severely depleted. Recorded fish harvests also declined in the early 1990s after South Africa relinquished control over its former fishing territory off the coast of

Namibia.

The government enforces strict conservation measures,

including fishing quotas and closed seasons, to prevent over- fishing and to protect the fishing industry. Since 1977 it has

enforced an exclusive South African fisheries zone of 200 nautical miles. In 1983 the government reduced foreign fishing

quotas, and in the early 1990s it began scaling down the rights

of five foreign countries still fishing in South African waters

Japan, Israel, Spain, Portugal, and the Republic of China (Taiwan).

Much of the fishing near large ports, such as Cape Town,

Durban, Mossel Bay, and Port Elizabeth, is controlled by Portnet, the national port authority, in the mid-1990s. The provincial governments supervise some harbor facilities and provide

marine conservation inspectors at official fishing harbors,

including Saldanha Bay, Hout Bay, and at least ten others.

Manufacturing

Although agriculture and, later, mining historically have

dominated South Africa's economy, manufacturing became the

most productive sector in the early twentieth century. Until

then, manufacturing industries—wine making, tanning, and

tallow production—were entirely derived from agriculture and

were intended primarily for the domestic market. Then as the

mining sector expanded, new industries arose to meet growing

urban demands for processed foods, clothing, and footwear.

Until the 1920s, the country still depended heavily on imports,

ranging from mining equipment to textiles and clothing. The

government encouraged local manufacturing through the

establishment of state corporations to produce electricity (in

1922) and steel (in 1928) for manufacturers' use and through

tariffs designed to protect local industry.

From 1936 to 1946, manufacturing output grew by 6 percent

per year, and growth jumped even more dramatically after

1948, when the government tightened its control over imports.

Annual manufacturing output increased an average of 13.3

percent in the early 1950s. Since then, most growth in manufacturing has been in heavy industry, led by the local iron and

steel industry, but by the early 1990s, the manufacturing sector

as a whole was relatively diverse (see table 14, Appendix).

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The Economy

As manufacturing activity expanded, the sector became

increasingly capital intensive despite the availability of a large

labor pool in South Africa. The government encouraged capitalization through tax incentives and led such investment

through the state corporations. During the 1970s, manufacturing enterprises steadily increased their fixed-capital stock, leading to surplus capacity by the mid-1980s. In particular, massive

extensions at the government's power utility, Eskom, as well as the establishment of SASOL synthetic fuel plants and the Koeberg nuclear power station, represented significant capital

intensification but only a minimum labor requirement. Furthermore, most private manufacturers moved toward machinery and technology to cut labor costs, both to keep up with

foreign producers and to avoid confronting an increasingly

militant, organized labor force. Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s

the government recognized that much of the responsibility for

creating jobs for new entrants to the labor market would necessarily rest on the manufacturing industries, and for this reason,

government programs in the 1990s were beginning to encour- age more labor-intensive manufacturing enterprises.

Because of the general economic downturn of the 1980s,

chronic high inflation, and the debt crisis—which hit capitalintensive manufacturing especially hard—manufacturing out- put slumped during the decade from an overall annual

increase of 3 percent in 1981 to a decline of 2.5 percent in

1991. The biggest decreases were in textiles, footwear, industrial chemicals, and nonferrous base-metal industries. The

poor performance in these industries reflected a weakness in

local demand and the drawing down of inventories because of

higher interest rates. Furthermore, average labor productivity

in nonagricultural sectors was only about 2 percent higher in

1990 than in 1980, despite a major increase in capital per

worker during the decade. Manufacturing sales increased after

1990, largely the result of improved business and investor confidence, increased domestic and export sales, and a decline in

stocks of finished goods. In the early 1990s, manufacturing

contributed more than 22 percent of total economic output.

Manufacturing industries are heavily concentrated in urban

areas—especially in the industrial region around Johannesburg, which accounted for more than 50 percent of industrial

output in the early and mid-1990s. Other major industrial centers are Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London, and Durban.

Smaller, but nonetheless important, industrial concentrations

223
South Africa: A Country Study

are at Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Queenstown, and Mossel Bay.

Government incentives for manufacturers to move to rural

areas and the black homelands during the 1980s were generally

unsuccessful, in part because of logistical and transportation

difficulties. The government then tried regional development

projects, intended to bring manufacturingjobs to undeveloped

areas by providing performance-based incentives and improving infrastructure, although these projects were difficult and

costly to initiate. Manufacturing industries registered sharp increases in

capacity utilization in 1994 and 1995, exceeding 90 percent of

capacity in the coal and nonferrous metal industries, as well as in furniture and footwear manufacturing. Investors judged

South Africa's manufacturing competitiveness in the international arena to be fairly weak, however, largely because of the

outdated facilities and physical plant in many industries.

Electric Power

The country's first electric power plants were developed to support the turn-of-the-century mining industry. Most mines

used on-site electrical generators until 1909, when the Victoria

Falls Power Company was established. In 1923 the electricity

parastatal, Eskom, began providing electricity for the country's

railroads and nonmining industries. Eskom bought out the Victoria Falls Power Company in 1948 and has been the country's

major power producer since then. Eskom's sales increased

faster than GDP growth after World War II, and the utility

expanded steadily. From 1950 to 1982, sales grew at an average

rate of 8 percent per year. Despite Eskom's strong sales record, officials became

increasingly concerned over the government's capital investments in Eskom's expansion efforts, which were estimated at R27 billion between 1983 and 1987. Eskom was one of the

enterprises hit hardest by the cutoff in foreign loans in 1985.

After that, it scaled down plans for further expansion. Eskom

supplied more than 97 percent of the electricity used nationwide in the early 1990s, but a few mines and industries had

power generators of their own. Only about 40 percent of the

population had electricity in their homes, but the new government in 1994 placed a high priority on supplying power to rural areas. Eskom derives nearly 90 percent of its power from coal-fired

electric power stations, 8 percent from nuclear power plants,

224
The Economy

and the remainder from hydroelectric plants. Some energy

analysts predict that the country's coal reserves (estimated to be between 60 billion and 100 billion tons) will begin to run

out by the middle of the twenty-first century. Eskom officials

estimate that the last coal-fired station will be commissioned

before the year 2045. With about 14 percent of the world's ura- nium reserves in South Africa, Eskom then plans to switch to the use of nuclear power to produce electricity.

The Koeberg nuclear power station, commissioned in 1976

but subsequently damaged through sabotage, began operations using uranium as an energy source in 1984. In the mid1990s, it is the only nuclear power plant in operation, but sites have been selected for at least two additional plants to be built

early in the twenty-first century.

South Africa imported electricity from the Cahora Bassa

hydroelectric facility in Mozambique during the early 1980s,

but that source was cut off in 1983 as a result of sabotage by

Mozambican rebels. South Africa, Mozambique, and Portugal

agreed on reconstruction plans, begun in 1995, that were

expected to reestablish power to South Africa by 1997.

Heavy Industry

Iron and steel production dominates South Africa's heavy

industry, providing material for manufacturing structural

goods, transport equipment, and machinery, and for the engineering industry. Large-scale production of iron and steel was begun in 1934 by the state-owned South African Iron and Steel

Corporation (Iscor). Iscor began selling shares to the public in

1989. It operate plants at Pretoria, Vanderbijlpark (Gauteng),

and Newcastle (KwaZulu-Natal) and owns numerous coal, iron

ore, and other mines throughout the country. Most major companies in this sector, including Union Steel (Usco), African

Metals (Amcor), and Vanderbijl Engineering (Vecor), were

established with help from Iscor or are operated as subsidiaries

of Iscor. Highveld Steel and Vanadium is owned by the Anglo

American Corporation.

South Africa produced about 9 million tons of steel, on aver- age, each year in the early 1990s, only about 1 percent of world

production. This output was more than enough to meet

domestic demand and to provide some steel for export. The

industry plans to increase production in the late 1990s to meet

domestic construction needs and to increase steel exports.

225
South Africa: A Country Study

The first vehicle assembly plant was established by Ford in

Port Elizabeth, and in 1960 the government began to promote

the increased use of local parts in vehicle assembly. Phase One

through Phase Five of the local-content encouragement program were based on the weight rather than the value of local

components and tended to make South African vehicles relatively heavy and expensive. In 1989 the government introduced

Phase Six, which shifted the determination of content to value

rather than weight. The result was a reduction in the cost of

vehicles as manufacturers turned to low-cost imported parts in

order to increase the percentage of value represented by local

products. The lowered cost of assembly was evidenced in June

1991 when the South African Motor Corporation (Samcor)

announced that it had started exporting locally assembled Mazdas to Britain.

Vehicles are manufactured primarily in the industrial area aroundJohannesburg, in Mpumalanga, and in the Eastern and

Western Cape provinces, using parts manufactured locally at more than 150 plants and some imported parts. In 1994 South

African automakers assembled more than 225,000 passenger

cars and more than 97,000 commercial vehicles, employing

more than 91,000 workers. At that time, almost 6 million vehicles, including more than 3.5 million passenger cars, were

licensed to operate in South Africa.

South Africa also has a significant heavy-engineering industry that meets many of the country's industrial and construction requirements. Many of the firms connected to Iscor

produce structural steel, for use in construction, as well as machinery and mining equipment. Most advanced machinery,

such as Eskom's generators or SASOL's plant, was still being

imported in the 1990s. Nevertheless, when the production of

all categories of heavy industry is combined—including steel

and metal products, machinery, and vehicles—this subsector

accounts for about one-fourth of manufacturing output by

value.

Chemicals Industry

South Africa has a well-developed chemicals industry that

dates back to the use of explosives in the late nineteenth-century mining industry. Miners imported dynamite from France

and Germany until 1896, when the De Beers company suc- ceeded in establishing a dynamite factory at Modderfontein in

partnership with a British chemical manufacturer. In addition

226
Robots on Nissan assembly line, Rosslyn (Pretoria)

Courtesy Embassy of South

Africa, Washington

to explosives, the African Explosives and Chemical Industries

(AECI) plant produced a wide variety of industrial chemicals

including insecticides, paints, varnishes, nitrogen compounds,

sulfuric acid, and cyanide.

The government controls a significant segment of the chemical industry. Its largest investment is the SASOL operation, in

which synthetic oil and gas are extracted from coal through a

gasification process that also produces ammonia, pitch, alcohol, and paraffin. The government established the Phosphate

Development Corporation (Foskor) in 1950 to produce phosphate concentrates for use in chemical fertilizers, and Foskor

also produces zirconium and copper. Government involvement

in the industry increased in 1967, when the IDC created a holding company to merge several small chemical companies in an

effort to achieve greater economies of scale. Many other chemicals are produced in South Africa, including plastics, resins, dyes, solvents, acids, alkalis, hydrogen peroxide, iodine, nitrates, and chemical materials for atomic

reactors. Pharmaceutical products are also produced, primarily

by subsidiaries of large international firms.

Consumer Goods

The single most productive subsector in manufacturing is

227
South Africa: A Country Study

the food-processing industry, which produces canned fruits

and vegetables, dried fruit, dairy products, baked goods, sugar, and meat and fish products. Dairy products and baked goods

are sold exclusively on the local market, but dried fruit, canned

foods, sugar, meat, and fish products are exported. In the early

1990s, South Africa produced about 400,000 tons of canned

fruits and vegetables each year. Clothing manufacturing and textile weaving are important

consumer industries. The clothing industry predated local textile manufacturing; even at the end of the nineteenth century,

clothing manufacturers relied on imported textiles to produce

a variety of apparel. By the 1990s, the clothing industry not

only met the country's needs but also exported its goods, aided

in part by the government's elimination of import duties on

cloth. It maintained a 30 to 35 percent import duty on most

apparel through the early 1990s. Then, because clothing manufacturers increasingly relied on imported cloth, the domestic

textile industry suffered from the increased competition, and

as all import tariffs were being lifted in 1995 and 1996, both

clothing and textile manufacturers were laying off workers.

The bread industry was subsidized by the government for

decades in order to avoid high prices for basic foodstuffs; the

government eliminated the bread subsidy in 1991 in an effort

to encourage competition. A few large institutions then dominated the bread industry; six of them, representing about 85

percent of the local market, reached a marketing agreement,

allocating sales by producer quotas and by regional distributor.

The government in the mid-1990s decided to allow the companies to continue market-sharing but was debating whether to discourage such agreements in the future.

Transportation and Telecommunications

South Africa has a well-developed transportation system, the

product of more than a century of government investment.

The Ministry of Transport, formerly part of the Ministry of

Transport, Posts, and Telecommunications, handles national

transportation policy. The South African Railways and Harbours Administration, established in 1910, managed the operations of most of the nation's transportation network; in 1985 it became the South African Transport Services (SATS). In 1990

SATS reorganized as the public commercial company, Transnet.

228
The Economy

Transnet has six business divisions—Spoornet to operate the

railroads; Portnet to manage the country's extensive port sys- tem; Autonet, a comprehensive road transport service; South

African Airways (SAA); Petronet to manage petroleum pipelines; and a parcel delivery service, known as "PX." With assets of nearly R35 billion, Transnet is one of the country's largest

business enterprises, employing roughly 120,000 people in

1995. The government is the sole shareholder in Transnet but

is considering the privatization of some sectors of transportation management by the end of the decade.

Railroads

When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, rail- road authorities had to unify and to coordinate the operations

of the four separate provincial railroad systems. Rail transport was already a critical element in economic development

because it linked mining, agricultural, and urban areas and

moved unprocessed raw materials (primarily minerals) to the

coast for transport between South African ports and for export.

The major axis of railroad transportation at the beginning of

the twentieth century—linking Cape Town, Durban, and

present-day Maputo in Mozambique, and running inland to the mining centers of Kimberley and Johannesburg—still forms the major axis of railroad transportation almost a century later (see fig. 17).

The national rail authority, Spoornet, manages a network of

21,303 kilometers of 1.067-meter, narrow-gauge (regional stan- dard) rail lines throughout the country. An additional 314 kilometers of track are .610-meter gauge. In addition to hauling

freight (roughly 164 million tons in 1993-94), intercity passenger trains carry more than 600 million passengers per year. Rail transportation relied on steam power or steam-generated electricity as a result of the country's easy access to coal

and its lack of petroleum resources. Some of the rail lines were

electrified as early as 1926. In the 1970s, the railroads began

phasing out the use of steam locomotives in favor of electricity

in order to increase the carrying capacity and the speed of

trains, especially those used to haul heavy mineral ores and

coal for export. By the early 1990s, more than half of the rail network was electrified, and most rail traffic—both passenger

and freight—was carried by electric locomotives.

Suburban commuter trains are important to many industrial

and urban workers who live in the formerly segregated town229
South Africa: A Country Study

Figure 17. Transportation: Major Railroads and Ports, 1996

ships or rural areas, but the commuter lines are the least cost- effective rail service. The South African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC), relying on government subsidies of more than

R600 million a year, manages these trains. Many trains are in

poor condition, in part the result of the serious urban violence

of the early 1990s, which often centered on the commuter rail lines as symbols of apartheid. The SARCC began refurbishing

and modernizing rail coaches in 1994, at a cost of some

US$180,000 per vehicle. Several private railroads also operate

suburban commuter train service in several large cities. Fast freight trains operate on eighteen routes nationwide,

sometimes approaching speeds of 120 kilometers per hour,

although the more common speed of rail travel is about sixty

kilometers per hour. Railroad officials claimed a world record

in 1989 when a 71,600-ton train ran at speeds of up to eighty

230
The Economy

kilometers per hour on the 861-kilometer Sishen-Saldanha ore

line. Spoornet implemented a computerized operating information system in the early 1990s to manage high levels of rail

traffic. In 1994 this system reported on more than 3,000 trains

daily, often involving as many as 5,500 locomotives and 100,000

rail cars. South Africa's luxury line, the Blue Train, travels the 1,600-

kilometer route between Pretoria and Cape Town and is an

important tourist attraction. Other well-known trains are the

Trans-Oranj, which runs 2,088 kilometers between Durban and

Cape Town; the Trans-Natal, which runs 721 kilometers

between Johannesburg and Durban; the Diamond Express,

which runs 563 kilometers between Pretoria and Kimberley;

and the Limpopo, which runs 1,376 kilometers between Johannesburg and Harare, Zimbabwe. The Blue Train and the TransKaroo (between Johannesburg and Cape Town) have facilities for carrying passenger cars. South Africa's railroads are also vital to the economies of sev- eral neighboring countries, especially landlocked Lesotho and

Botswana, and Mozambique, where existing railroads have

been sabotaged and destroyed through warfare. In 1990 the

general managers from eight national railroads (South Africa,

Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Zaire) formed a joint operations working group to integrate rail service in the region. In 1994 they began to coor- dinate timetables for scheduled freight service in order to speed transit of export commodities and perishables between

countries. They also streamlined customs inspections and

allowed trains to leave border stations with only partial loads of

freight. As a result, during 1995, freight carried from Johannesburg to southern Zaire sometimes arrived in seven days, down

from as much as forty days for the same journey in the past.

Ports and Shipping

South Africa has no commercially navigable rivers, but ocean shipping has long been a feature of its transportation

network, capitalizing on the country's two-ocean frontage. The

earliest nineteenth-century shipping firms began as coastal car- riers for local commerce, traveling between southern African

ports. After World War II, private investors initiated an international shipping service, and in 1946 the state corporation,

South African Marine Corporation (Safmarine), assumed control over the private company. Safmarine operates container

231
South Africa: A Country Study

ships, general cargo vessels, and bulk carriers for mineral

exports, and, since the 1980s, has offered expanded service to Europe, North America, South America, and Asia (South

Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). In 1992 it purchased the newest of its five container ships, Oranje, from Croatia at a cost of

R100 million.

South Africa has six major commercial ports: Durban, Richards Bay, Cape Town, Saldanha Bay, Port Elizabeth, and East

London. Portnet manages their facilities, including cargohandling equipment, wharves, and container terminals, and

provides services such as tugs, berthing, and cargo handling.

Portnet also sets the standards for such services offered by private businesses. (In addition, Portnet manages forty-six lighthouses—eighteen operated by keepers and twenty-eight that are automatic.) Relying on containerization and automation to speed up service, Portnet handled more than 127 million tons

of cargo on more than 12,900 seagoing vessels in 1994.

Each major port has traditionally played an important, specialized role in South Africa's export sector. For example, Durban handles general cargo, especially cereal exports; Cape

Town specializes in exports of deciduous fruit, wine, and vegetables; and Saldanha Bay was built specifically to export mineral ores from the Northern Cape.

Durban's port encompasses 893 hectares of bay area. The

port entrance channel is 12.7 meters deep at low tide. Durban

has five deep-sea and two coastal container berths, and provides 15,195 meters of quayage for commercial ships. Durban

also has repair facilities, including a floating dry dock.

Through the 1980s, Durban was South Africa's busiest general

cargo port, handling as much as 25 percent of the country's

imports and exports in some years, but it was being surpassed

by Richards Bay in the 1990s.

Richards Bay, a deep-water port 193 kilometers northeast of

Durban, was commissioned in 1976 primarily to export coal

from the eastern Transvaal, but by the early 1990s it was handling almost one-half of all cargo passing through South African

ports. Port facilities can accommodate bulk carriers of up to 250,000 tons, with five berths for general and bulk cargo, and a

coal berth.

Cape Town has one of the largest dry docks in the southern

hemisphere, including five berths for container vessels and

general cargo carriers, a pier for coastal traffic, and extensive

232
The Economy

ship repair facilities. The port at Cape Town has a water area of

112.7 hectares.

Port Elizabeth's enclosed water area of about 115 hectares

has more than 3,400 meters of quayage for commercial shipping and a container terminal that has two berths. Vessels with

a draught of up to twelve meters can use the harbor, and off- shore anchorage is available for vessels of any draught. Facilities at Port Elizabeth include a mechanical ore-handling plant,

which can process up to 1,500 tons per hour, and a precooling

storage area with a capacity of 7,500 cubic meters.

Saldanha Bay, 110 kilometers northwest of Cape Town, is the

largest port on the west coast of Africa and one of the best nat- ural ports in the world. The facilities at Saldanha Bay provide

anchorage in the lee of a breakwater where the minimum

water depth is 14.6 meters. With a port area of about 5,000 hectares, Saldanha Bay is larger than the combined areas of the

ports of Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London.

The ore-loading jetty can handle carriers of 350,000 tons. South Africa's only river port, East London, is situated at the

estuary of the Buffalo River in Eastern Cape province.

Although East London is the smallest of the six major ports, it has a 75,000-ton capacity grain elevator—the largest in South

Africa. East London handles agricultural exports and is the

main outlet for copper exports from other African countries,

such as Zambia and Zaire.

Two other coastal cities—Simonstown, south of Cape Town,

and Mossel Bay, between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth—have

substantial port facilities. Mossel Bay is a commercial fishing

harbor between Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and Simonstown is a naval base and training center (see Navy, ch. 5)

Road System and Transport

South Africa has an extensive national, provincial, and

municipal road system covering the entire country (see fig.

18). As of 1996, the national routes include nearly 2,500 kilometers of limited-access freeways and 3,600 kilometers of highways with unlimited access. Roughly 60,000 kilometers of all- weather, paved roads and more than 100,000 kilometers of

unpaved roads are maintained by the national and provincial

governments.

More than 6 million vehicles are in operation nationwide,

including about 3.5 million passenger vehicles, in 1996. Buses

and private van services are also used by many workers who

233
South Africa: A Country Study

commute from townships and rural areas to urban workplaces.

Several private bus companies run commuter lines, and municipal bus services operate within several cities. South Africa has one of the highest road fatality rates in the

world—more than 10,000 people, almost one-half of them

pedestrians and bicyclists, were killed in more than 400,000

road accidents in 1992. The number of deaths was reduced

slightly, to about 9,400, in 1993. The government has taken

numerous measures to reduce accidents—for example, by

implementing seat-belt laws and lowering speed limits. Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s, the government estimates that barely

half of all automobile passengers wear seat belts, and traffic

accidents continue to take a heavy toll. Civil Aviation

The Chief Directorate of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Transport, is responsible for providing air traffic services at about

twenty airports throughout the country and for issuing licenses

to airline pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. This director- ate also certifies the airworthiness of all registered craft, and

approves maintenance schedules and flight manuals. In early

1996, more than 6,100 registered civil aviation aircraft operate

in South Africa.

The Chief Directorate of Civil Aviation operates nine major

airports. They are located at Bloemfontein, Cape Town, Durban, East London, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth,

George, and Upington. In the mid-1990s, the government

changed the names of these and several other large airports

from the Afrikaner heroes they had commemorated in the

past, to the cities in which they are located. The airports at Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban are international air- ports and receive direct overseas flights. In addition, at least

300 landing strips throughout the country are used by private

and commercial pilots.

South African Airways (SAA), the country's only national air carrier until the early 1990s, was established in 1934 by the

South African Railways and Harbours Administration. After

1990 SAA was operated by the public company, Transnet. SAA

has provided international service between Johannesburg and

London since 1945 and has used jet passenger aircraft since

1953. In the mid-1990s, SAA operates a fleet of forty-eight air- craft, primarily Boeing 747s, Boeing 737s, and Airbus 300s, pro234
The Economy

viding air service among all major cities in South Africa, with at

least 687 domestic flights a week.

SAA was denied landing rights in most European and Afri- can countries and the United States in the 1980s and the early

1990s. A few African and Middle Eastern countries, such as Sudan, Congo, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Morocco, also denied

SAA overflight rights, forcing SAA pilots to fly longer routes to avoid prohibited air space. The airline nonetheless continued

to operate flights to several European and African capitals

throughout the sanctions era; then, as sanctions eased in the

early 1990s, SAA reestablished and expanded its international

flight routes to the rest of Africa, the United States, Europe,

South America, the Middle East, and Asia.

After the government began deregulating airlines in 1990

legalizing competition with SAA on domestic and international

routes—several new private airlines were established in South

Africa, and the number of foreign air carriers flying to South

Africa increased to more than fifty. Transnet assumed control

of at least one former homeland airline and established Alli- ance Airlines as a joint venture between SAA and the national

carriers of Tanzania and Uganda. In addition, at least fifteen

independent feeder airlines operate more than 200 routes linking smaller towns to cities served by international air carriers.

Pipelines

Although South Africa has no significant petroleum

reserves, it uses a nationwide network of pipelines to transport

imported crude oil to refineries and to transport other petroleum products to industrial areas. At least 931 kilometers of

crude-oil pipelines, 322 kilometers of natural gas pipelines,

and 1,748 kilometers of pipelines for other petroleum products

make up this network in the mid-1990s.

Telecommunications and Postal Service

Until 1990 the Department of Posts and Telecommunications regulated all nationwide communications networks. In

1991, in anticipation of possible privatization, the government

formed two state-owned companies, the telecommunications

corporation, Telkom, and the South African Post Office to deliver the mail. Telkom is the largest telecommunications sys- tem in Africa. It earned at least US$2.3 billion in 1993, providing telegraph, telex, telephone, radio, television, and data and

facsimile transmissions. Telkom also holds a majority stake in

235
South Africa: A Country Study

Mkntic

Ocean

Cape Town CAPE Of GOOD HOPE

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Indian Ocean

International boundary

National capital • Populated place

National freeway

Major highway

4" Airport 100 200 Kilometers

Figure 18. Transportation: Major Highways and Airports, 1996

one of the nation's two cellular phone networks that began

operation in 1995.

The telephone system, which links all major cities and many

small towns, encompasses roughly 5 million telephones in the

mid-1990s, roughly 9.7 per 100 inhabitants. They are con- nected through more than 1,200 automatic exchanges. The

telephone system includes a network of coaxial and fiber optic

cable and radio-relay, three ground stations that communicate

with satellites over the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean,

and an undersea coaxial cable between South Africa and the

Canary Islands that joins other cables linking Europe and

South America.

Telephone service became a symbol of the racial disparities

under apartheid, especially during the 1980s, when per capita

access to telephone service in black communities was less than

236
The Economy

one-tenth that in white areas. For this reason, early-1990s plans

for a cellular telephone network in rural and township areas assumed symbolic as well as economic importance as a means

of black empowerment. In 1994 and 1995, this system

extended telephone service into many rural areas for the first time and was assisting local entrepreneurs for whom communication had often been a major obstacle. Industry officials predicted that by the late 1990s, the cellular phone industry would

create at least 4,500 jobs directly, and would contribute to the

creation of perhaps 40,000 or more jobs in related industries.

The government began allowing the private sector to provide data transmission services in 1994. The plan was to allow

companies to use Telkom facilities to provide customers with

value-added services, such as the electronic transfer of funds

and messages, management of corporate data networks, and

the remote processing of corporate information. Telkom

retained control over the independent telecommunications

services, to continue the company's statutory monopoly overall

and to regulate competition in the field. Private companies are able to lease facilities, such as data lines, from Telkom and

charge customers only for value added to these services.

The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) had a near-monopoly in television service in most of South Africa

until the independent television company, M-Net, inaugurated

service in January 1991. In 1993 the government placed SABC

broadcasts under the supervision of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, as a step toward greater media independence

from political control. Television service, which had been initi- ated in 1976, consisted of four channels broadcasting in

English, Afrikaans, and five African languages. One of the

English-Afrikaans stations was a subscription service, similar to cable television, owned by a syndicate of newspaper publishers.

Until 1994 residents of some of the former black homelands,

and those near the border with Swaziland, had received separate broadcasts from those areas. After that, television service

in the former homelands was incorporated into the nationwide

system. A reorganization of SABC was implemented in the mid1990s to allow greater diversity in its broadcasts.

The SABC operates 300 frequency modulation (FM) and

fourteen amplitude modulation (AM) radio stations. Programs

were primarily in English and Afrikaans through the early

1990s, but several low-power FM stations broadcast in at least a dozen African languages, and the use of African languages was

237
South Africa: A Country Study

increasing. One short-wave external service, Radio RSA, broadcasts worldwide.

The South African Post Office provides postal and moneytransfer services, as well as postal savings accounts. Its 1,580

post offices and other facilities handled more than 7 million

items each workday in 1994, delivering mail to some 5 million

addresses. In its first year in power (1994-95), the new Government of National Unity opened at least seventy new post offices

and upgraded many others in previously ill-served areas. It also

installed an estimated 700,000 new mail boxes at private

addresses and in post-office box locations. Postal savings

accounts are available to individuals with as little as R10 to deposit; interest payments in 1995 were reportedly as high as 5

percent on savings deposits and 1 1 percent on savings certifi- cates. South Africa was readmitted to the Universal Postal

Union in 1994, enabling it to participate in international technical assistance programs and accounting facilities within the

union.

Environmental Protection and Tourism

Environmental Protection

South Africa has signed at least twenty-four major international agreements concerning environmental preservation,

including the 1973 Convention on International Trade in

Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the

1987 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, or Montreal Protocol. During the 1980s, the government

enforced environmental legislation only weakly, however, and

the Environment Conservation Act (No. 73) of 1989 further

weakened existing practices. Based on this legislation, the government's Council on the Environment proposed a new

approach, called Integrated Environmental Management,

aimed at accommodating development concerns. As in other

countries, many business and community leaders place infrastructure development far ahead of environmental issues, and

many voters place a higher priority on alleviating poverty than

preserving the environment.

The 1989 legislation and subsequent amendments set out

the official objectives in environmental conservation—to pre- serve species and ecosystems, to maintain ecological processes,

and to protect against land degradation and environmental

deterioration resulting from human activities. The government

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The Economy

requires environmental impact assessments for major development and construction projects, and it imposes fines on industrial polluters. Demographic researchers concluded in 1993,

however, that the implications of rapid population growth are

potentially devastating to the environmentalists' concerns

they estimate that the population is likely to double by the year

2025, and one-half of the population may then be living in

"grinding poverty." As a result of these pronouncements, land

preservation and population control became interlinked social causes in the 1990s.

Environmentalists argue that the country's advanced soil

erosion and land degradation threaten future generations and

will be worsened by overpopulation and overcultivation. Little

more than one-tenth of the total land area is fit for cultivation; as much as 500 million tons of topsoil are lost each year

through erosion caused by wind and water, and the problem is worsened by deforestation through uncontrolled tree harvesting. Environmentalists also note that industrial pollutants and

raw sewage are allowed to seep into streams and lakes, and

even into wells used for drinking water in some communities.

As the April 1994 elections approached, environmental

activists persuaded ANC leaders to include a chapter on the

environment in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the blueprint for development in the 1990s.

The ANC also commissioned an environmental study by the

Canadian International Development Research Centre, and

the new government gave strong lip service to environmental

priorities when it assumed office in 1994.

Later that year, however, as some officials tried to maintain

the priority on long-term environmental concerns, they faced

strong opposition within the new, financially strapped government and from the business community. The government's

Department of Environmental Affairs (formerly Department of

Environment Affairs and Tourism) is in charge of coordinating

environmental policy, but critics have argued that it is not pursuing this task very aggressively and that nongovernmental

organizations lack the financial and political support to effect

significant change.

South Africa has sought an exception to the 1973 CITES

convention, which governs global trade in animals threatened

with extinction. The convention aims to protect the dwindling

African elephant population; it first banned trade in ivory

products among signatory states and was amended in 1989 to

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South Africa: A Country Study

outlaw commercial trade in all elephant parts. South Africa's

request was based on local game officials' reports that elephants were not threatened with extinction in South Africa,

and that animals being culled offered lucrative trade in hides

and meat. By 1995 this petition, unlike earlier petitions from

Pretoria, was being given serious consideration among CITES

signatories, partly in recognition of the new government's postapartheid needs.

Tourism

In the mid-1990s, control of the tourism industry was trans- ferred from the Department of Environmental Affairs to the

Department of Industry and Trade, partly to give a higher priority to tourist-industry development concerns. Through the

new Department of Industry, Trade, and Tourism, the government operates National Tourist Bureaus throughout the country as well as the South African Tourism Board (Satour).

Satour, established in 1983 to promote tourism from abroad,

has been recognized internationally for its high-quality services.

Among South Africa's many tourist attractions are sixteen

national parks and numerous provincial and local game parks,

nature reserves, and wilderness areas. The National Parks

Board employs more than 4,000 South Africans. Kruger

National Park in Mpumalanga and Northern provinces is one

of the most popular with visitors and is home to more than 140

species of mammals and 450 species of birds. The rare mountain zebra, which is unique to South Africa, is protected in the

Mountain Zebra National Park in the Eastern Cape. The

Augrabies Falls National Park, site of the fifty-six-meter- high

Augrabies Falls on the Orange River near Upington, preserves

plants and animals that have adapted to semi-desert conditions. The Kalahari Gemsbok National Park, in the Northern

Cape bordering Namibia and Botswana, is known for its freeroaming gemsbok and springbok. In addition to game parks,

nature reserves, and big-game hunting between May and July,

the wine region of the Western Cape is a consistent tourist

attraction.

South African tourism figures have risen since the late 1980s

and exceeded 3.8 million in 1994 (see table 15, Appendix).

More than half of the tourists in South Africa are from other

African countries; most of the remainder are from the United

Kingdom or Germany. South Africa is a member of the World

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The Economy

Tourism Organization and a participant in the Africa Travel

Association, which promotes tourist attractions in Africa to the

North American travel industry.

Banking and Currency

Banking

The heart of the banking system is the South African

Reserve Bank, which is the primary monetary authority and

custodian of the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves. The Reserve Bank is managed by a board of fourteen directors, seven representing major commercial and financial institutions, industry, and agriculture, and seven appointed by the

government. Of the latter, one serves as governor, and three

serve as deputy governors of the Reserve Bank.

The Reserve Bank's primary functions are to protect the

value of the rand and to control inflation. The Reserve Bank

regulates the money supply by influencing its cost—i.e., interest charged on loans to other institutions. It is technically independent of government control, but in practice it works closely

with the Treasury and helps to formulate and to implement

macroeconomic policy. The Reserve Bank issues banknotes

and is responsible for the sale and purchase of foreign

exchange for the government, as well as for the administration

of the treasury-bill tender system. Its major customers are government agencies, private banks, and discount houses,

although it also performs clearinghouse functions for private

banks and assists banks that experience liquidity problems.

Finally, the Reserve Bank is the authorized buyer of gold bullion, thereby acting as agent for the gold-mining industry in

effecting sales on their behalf in the private market.

The Reserve Bank uses monetary policy to control inflation,

primarily by adjusting the liquid-asset requirements of private

banking institutions and by restricting bank credit in order to control consumer demand. Until 1975 the bank enforced fixed

interest rates on long-term government securities, but thereafter it allowed transactions at market-related prices. Direct control over deposit interest rates quoted by banking institutions was abolished in 1980; nevertheless, the Reserve Bank still exercises considerable indirect control through its own bank rate. The private banking sector was controlled by commercial

banks until the 1950s when banking services began to diversify.

Until then, commercial banks had avoided services such as per241
South Africa: A Country Study

sonal loans, property leasing, and credit-card facilities. New

institutions—including discount houses, merchant banks, and

general banks—emerged to meet this demand, and in reaction

to these changes in the banking sector, commercial banks

increasingly entered into medium-term credit arrangements

with commerce and industry and acquired interests in hirepurchase firms and leasing activities. In addition, they

expanded their operations into insurance and even invested in

manufacturing and commercial enterprises.

During the late 1980s, the "big five" commercial banks

First National Bank (formerly Barclays), Standard Bank of

South Africa, Nedbank, Volkskas, and Trust Bank—were

increasingly challenged by building societies, which had listed

holding companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

(JSE) and had set up commercial and/or general banking

arms. The Deposit Taking Institutions Act of 1991 formalized

the overlapping of functions between the banks and the building societies that had existed for more than a decade. The act brought South Africa into line with internationally recognized

standards for capital requirements.

In February 1991, four of the country's leading financial

institutions—Allied Bank, United Bank, Volkskas, and Sage

Banks—merged to create the largest banking group in the

country, the Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA), with

assets of R56 billion. ABSA, which merged with a fifth bank in

1992, is jointly controlled by the Rembrandt tobacco group

and the South African National Life Assurance Company (Sanlam) , the country's second-largest insurance group. The banking industry is undergoing further reorganization in the mid1990s, in part to establish banking services in poor communities that were neglected under apartheid.

Currency

Until the late 1960s, South Africa had a fixed exchange rate for its currency; thereafter, the rand was pegged to major for- eign currencies. In 1979 the government switched to a system

that formally expressed parity against the dollar. The value of

the rand followed changes in the balance of payments and

moved roughly with sterling and other weaker currencies until

1985. The foreign-debt crisis of that year caused the rand to depreciate at an unprecedented rate, and it fell to an all-time

low of less than US$0.40. The rand recovered somewhat in

1987, reaching US$0.43, but it declined steadily, with minor

242
The South African Reserve Bank (Pretoria) regulates

money supply and monetary policy.

Embassy of South Africa, Washington

243
South Africa: A Country Study

adjustments, after that, dipping to about US$0.26 in late 1995.

Between February 1 and May 1, 1996, the rand lost roughly 16

percent of its value, falling from R3.7 to R4.33 = US$1, or a value of about US$0.23.

A parallel currency, the financial rand, was used exclusively

for the movement of nonresident capital during the 1980s and

the early 1990s. Financial rands developed out of currencyexchange controls instituted in the early 1960s, known as the

"blocked rand." The financial rand was available only to foreigners for investment in South Africa and was created by the

sale of nonresidents' assets in the country. This two-tiered cur- rency system insulated the country's foreign reserves from

politically motivated capital flight, because all divestment by

nonresidents was automatically met by new investment, and the

price of the financial rand varied independently of the commercial rand. Financial rands invariably stood at a discount to commercial rands, but the size of the discount depended on

South Africa's relative attraction as an investment destination.

The discount stood at almost 40 percent during most of 1992,

for example, but declined to about 20 percent in late 1993.

Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals, under pressure from the

banking and business communities, said that the government

would phase out the financial rand in 1994 or 1995, assuming

that South Africa's foreign currency reserves reached at least

R20 billion and that the discount between the financial and the

commercial rands narrowed to about 10 percent. Foreign cur- rency reserves were precariously low in early 1994 but, in a dramatic reversal of the capital outflow of 1993, increased steadily

throughout 1994 and early 1995. In March 1995, with foreign

reserves of only about R12 billion, the government abolished

the financial rand. The newly unified currency traded well on

international currency markets, marking a vote of confidence

in South Africa's business potential.

Growth Trends and Potential

One sign of hope for South Africa's economic future in the

mid-1990s is the black business sector, which struggled to sur- vive during the 1980s but began to thrive in the postapartheid

era. In 1994 the first major black-owned investment company

to be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, New Africa

Investment, Ltd., had 8,500 black shareholders. It holds a controlling stake in a major newspaper, a large life insurance company, and a cellular telephone company. These and other

244
The Economy

black-owned businesses plan to target rural communities and

the poor for a substantial portion of their expansion. But they,

like other enterprises in South Africa, must depend on a growing economy to finance new investment.

South Africa's businesses have been disappointed in the relatively slow increase in foreign investment since 1994, but they

still hope that outside assistance will help ease the political and

the economic transition of the 1990s. South Africa joined the

African Development Bank (ADB) in 1995, in part because

ADB membership offered the possibility of at least US$200 million in development aid by 1997, and because South African

companies could bid for contracts on ADB-sponsored projects

in other African countries. The value of these projects was esti- mated at US$3.5 billion in 1995.

South Africa's economic growth has always depended on

increasing gold profits and foreign investments. In the mid1990s, these continued to be important to the country's future,

and both were directly linked to the ongoing dismantling of

apartheid and political reconstruction. Yet profits were certain

to drop if the government agreed to raise wages for industrial

workers, as most labor leaders insisted. National earnings also

would be reduced if the mining companies were to cut back on

production. Thus, there were strong economic incentives for

the government both to limit wages and to avoid serious out- breaks of labor unrest in order to attract much-needed foreign

investment. But rising tensions in late 1994 and 1995 signaled

the difficulty it faced in balancing these two goals. Neither

manufacturing, which depended on foreign capital, nor agriculture, which produced erratically as a result of weather conditions, could provide sufficient independent growth to break

this cycle. Furthermore, both of these sectors had long

depended on low wage scales for labor and would experience

the same difficulties as the mining sector in the 1990s.

In the long term, it appears doubtful that South Africa's

economy can continue the same spectacular growth it experienced earlier in the twentieth century. But under a stable multiracial government, South Africa can gain access to many new

export markets for manufactured goods throughout Africa and

elsewhere, and, with labor's cooperation and barring serious

unrest, it can attract the investments necessary to service those

markets. The country is nonetheless likely to remain dependent on foreign capital and to suffer from erratic agricultural

production into the twenty-first century.

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South Africa: A Country Study

* * * There is a wealth of information available on South Africa's

economy and its historical development. The South African

government itself publishes the most useful information, and

citations for numerous reports and other publications may be

found in the annual South Africa Yearbook, formerly published as the South Africa Official Yearbook. Source Material on the South Afri- can Economy: 1860-1970 by D. Hobart Houghton and Jenifer

Dagut is a definitive guide to primary and secondary sources

for the historical period.

Secondary sources on historical economic development are divided both on ideological grounds and by topic. The following are some of the best known: Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall

of the South African Peasantry; D. Hobart Houghton, The South

African Economy; Frederick A. Johnstone, Class, Race, and Gold: A

Study of Class Relations and Racial Discrimination in South Africa;

Shula Marks and Anthony Atmore, eds., Economy and Society in

Pre-Industrial South Africa; Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone,

eds., Industrialisation and Social Change in South Africa; and Shula

Marks and Stanley Trapido, eds., The Politics of Race, Class, and

Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa.

Initial analyses of economic change in the 1980s and the

early 1990s are found in Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins's

State and Market in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Excellent sources of current information are the South African Reserve Bank

Quarterly Bulletin; Financial Mail; Financial Times; Africa Economic

Digest; Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial, and Technical

Series; and the various publications of the Economist Intelligence Unit, in particular the quarterly Country Report South

Africa and the annual Country Profile: South Africa. (For further

information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

246
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Steam engine wends its way past fields and homestead in hilly KwaZulu-Natal.
SOUTH AFRICA IN 1994 underwent the most radical and far- reaching political and constitutional transformation since the

racially divisive South Africa Act provided the legal basis for the

Union of South Africa in 1910. The latest sweeping transformation officially began with the April 26—29, 1994, national and

provincial elections, and with the triumph of the previously

banned African National Congress (ANC).

The country's main political antagonists, the ANC and the

former ruling National Party (NP), had agreed in November

1993 on the composition of a multiparty Transitional Executive

Council (TEC) to govern jointly until elections were held. They

also agreed that, after the elections, a transitional Government

of National Unity would be in power and that a transitional

bicameral parliament would form a constitutional assembly to draft a final constitution. In addition, they agreed on an

interim constitution that would guide the transition between

the April 1994 elections and the adoption of the final constitution.

Domestic, regional, and international developments over

the past decade had served to alter radically both Afrikaner

(see Glossary) and black politics from the politics of repression

and armed resistance to the politics of negotiation and participation. Since 1960 the banned ANC, ANC-allied South African

Communist Party (SACP), and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)

had waged an armed struggle from their bases in neighboring

countries. The armed struggle intensified during the 1980s

and expanded into a "people's war" involving mass demonstrations against the apartheid (see Glossary) state. International

pressure in the form of economic and political sanctions,

including diplomatic pressure by the United States, helped

force the Afrikaner establishment—faced with a threat to its own economic well-being—to embark on a process that would

ultimately result in sharing power, authority, and resources with

the disenfranchised black majority.

A multiparty conference, the Convention for a Democratic

South Africa (Codesa), met to formulate a new constitution on

December 20, 1991, and, after talks foundered in 1992,

resumed in March 1993 to plan the political transition. In April

1994, the nation's first nonracial provincial legislatures and the

transitional National Assembly were democratically elected by

249
South Africa: A Country Study

universal suffrage. The 1994 elections were the culmination of

a spectacular series of bilateral talks in which NP and ANC

leaders agreed on a set of compromises concerning the interim

period while formulating preliminary constitutional guidelines

for a multiracial and majoritarian democratic society, based on

the principle of "one person-one vote." Finally, the political

conflict between the ANC and several recalcitrant parties that

had boycotted the negotiations process—including the Inkatha

Freedom Party (IFP, known as Inkatha), which demanded

greater regional autonomy for its Zulu constituency, and the

Freedom Front, a group committed to Afrikaner self-determination—was resolved only days before the April 1994 elections.

In the early 1990s, the right-wing Afrikaner parties, including neo-Nazi elements, had provided the main resistance to the

transition to multiracial democracy. Their resistance took the

form of legal political parties, extra-legal movements, and paramilitary organizations. Most of these groups were fragmented,

particularly over ideology, and demoralized by their realization

that accommodationist currents were running against them.

Some of them splintered as they were being pushed to the margin of events by the pragmatism of President Frederik W.

(F.W.) de Klerk.

Establishing a national consensus over the new nonracial,

democratic political system was, therefore, the main task of the

leaders of the NP and the ANC. Only a consensus could over- come the pressures of extremists on both sides, whose violence

and racial antagonisms had been fueled by the authoritarianism, coercion, and distortions implicit in the apartheid system.

The task facing the moderate leaders was complicated by the

sharp increase in violent criminal activity throughout the country, as law and order broke down in many regions, even areas in

which crime rates had been low in the past. Although officials

estimated that at least 80 percent of all murders committed in

the early 1990s were not politically motivated, political violence

by extremist groups continuously threatened to undermine the

country's fragile political stability as the elections approached.

The revolutionary changes sweeping South Africa in 1993

and 1994 were remarkable. It was almost unprecedented for a ruling group in a society that it so completely dominated,

although it constituted an ethnic minority, to hand over power

in a peaceful manner to the country's longstanding oppressed

and banned opposition. South Africa's ruling party leaders did

250
Nelson Mandela addresses opening session of the Convention for a

Democratic South Africa (Codesa), December 1991.

Courtesy Embassy of South Africa, Washington

so with the realization that the once-banned organizations represented the political will of the majority of citizens.

Many political leaders helped to shape the new political sys- tem. The two most instrumental in bridging the gap between

the two sides were State President F.W. de Klerk, leader of the

NP, which had ruled the country without effective electoral

challenge since 1948, and Nelson (Rolihlahla) Mandela, president of the ANC, the foremost political leader among the black

majority. A third player, Chief Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi,

leader of the Zulu-based IFP, also gave expression to black aspirations, particularly in the IFP stronghold of Natal Province's

KwaZulu homeland (see Glossary). Other important players

included supporters of the new regime, such as leaders of the

coloured (mixed race—see Glossary) and the Indian communities, the largely English-speaking liberal white parties, and

newly emerging leaders in the black homelands. In contrast were the virulent opponents of the postapartheid system, such

as the Afrikaner extremists, who had split from the NP into sev- eral groups seeking to brake the slide toward political and

social transformation in order to preserve a state based on the

principles of apartheid.

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South Africa: A Country Study

As the country prepared to embark on full-scale democracy

in the early 1990s, new challenges confronted the ANC. First, as a newly legalized party, the ANC had to demonstrate that it was no longer merely an extraparliamentary liberation movement, but a serious contender for the task of governing the

country. It also had to balance the need to provide expression

to a younger generation of black South Africans who had been

radicalized by years of boycotts, jailings, suppression, and ethnic violence, against the need to attract new supporters not

only from its black constituency, but from the white, the

coloured, and the Indian communities as well. Mandela, in order to succeed in the new political arena, had

to gain the support of the more conservative, yet antiapartheid,

ethnic leaders in the countryside and in the black homelands,

while retaining the support of younger leaders and activists and

while mobilizing the violence-prone majority in the townships.

He also had to distance the party from the political and eco- nomic program of its longstanding ally, the SACP, even though

a number of SACP leaders remained on the ANC's executive

and working committees. To present a cohesive front, the ANC

also had to join forces in one form or another with Inkatha

Chief Buthelezi, although the tensions between the two black

movements often erupted into violence over political turf, particularly in Natal and KwaZulu. Finally, the ANC had to fill the

vacuum left by the loss of political and military support of previous state sponsors such as the former Soviet Union, which no

longer provided material support to Third World liberation

movements.

Similarly, NP leader de Klerk had to retain the party's traditional bases of support among Afrikaners while working to gain or to retain the support of coloured, Indian, and liberal white

votes. Finally, de Klerk had to reach out to previously hostile

black communities, a move that would invariably provoke white

right-wing extremists, who had resorted to violence in the past

and who were threatening antigovernment insurgency.

System of Government

The new political system was established by the interim constitution voted into law in late 1993 and officially implemented

on April 27, 1994. The interim constitution provides for a Government of National Unity and for a five-year transition, during

which the final constitution would be drafted by the Constitutional Assembly, consisting of the combined Senate and

252
Government and Politics

National Assembly. To understand fully the revolutionary

nature of the new government and the direction that the political transition is likely to take in the long term, it is necessary to examine the evolution of the political system that was based on

the principles and practices of apartheid.

Historical Background

The Union of South Africa became a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth on May 31, 1910, when

four British dependencies were merged under the South Africa

Act passed by the British Parliament in 1909. Unification was

interpreted differently by British and by Afrikaner leaders,

however. To the British, uniting the four dependencies was

central to their imperialist philosophy of consolidating the

empire; to many Afrikaners, unity represented a step toward

weakening British imperial influence. Ironically, however, this

act failed to unite South Africa in a real sense because by

excluding the black majority from political participation, it fueled the discontent and the conflict that characterized the

country's politics throughout the twentieth century.

The South Africa Act served as the Union of South Africa's

constitution until 1961. Although the country was formally

ruled by a governor general representing the Crown, its government was granted almost total independence in internal

affairs. Britain's 1931 Statute of Westminster removed many

constitutional limitations on all British dominions, and South

Africa's corresponding legislation, the Status of Union Act of

1934, declared that no act of the British parliament could apply

to South Africa unless accepted by the Union parliament.

South Africa officially became the Republic of South Africa

on May 31, 1961, following a national referendum among the

country's white voters on October 5, 1960. The constitution of

1961 was based largely on the South Africa Act, but it severed

ties with the British Commonwealth of Nations, replacing the

words "king," "queen," and "crown" with "state." The state president replaced the British monarch and governor general.

The 1961 constitution provided for a president, a prime

minister, and an executive council (cabinet) with offices at Pre- toria (where most of the administrative bureaucracy was

located). A bicameral legislature was situated at Cape Town.

The independent judiciary was headquartered at Bloemfontein.

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South Africa: A Country Study

The 1961 constitution maintained white political domination through an electoral system that denied blacks, coloureds,

and Asians the right to vote for national office holders.

Coloureds and Asians, but not blacks, won limited participation in ethnic affairs through, respectively, a Coloured Persons'

Representative Council established in 1964 and a South Afri- can Indian Council established in 1968. Since 1951 the Bantu

Authorities Act had restricted black political participation to homelands (also referred to as Bantustans) set aside for Afri- cans. During the 1970s and the 1980s, four of the ten homelands were declared "independent" black states, while the

remaining six were known as "self-governing" territories.

Following intense debate and a series of legislative revisions

in the early 1980s, the new Constitution of the Republic of

South Africa Act (No. 110) of 1983 went into effect on September 22, 1984. It outlined a government led by a president, who

served as head of state and chief executive, and a parliamentary system with increased coloured and Indian representation.

The new, tricameral Parliament encompassed a (white) House

of Assembly, a (coloured) House of Representatives, and an

(Indian) House of Delegates. The president was selected by an

eighty-eight-member electoral college consisting of fifty whites,

twenty-five coloureds, and thirteen Indians, chosen by a majority vote in their respective houses of parliament. The president

served for the duration of the parliament that selected him,

normally a five-year term. The president could dissolve the parliament, or could extend it by up to six months beyond its five- year term.

The president shared executive authority with a cabinet,

which he appointed from the tricameral parliament, and with a Ministers Council chosen by him from the majority in each

house of parliament. In addition, the president relied on a sixty-member President's Council for advice on urgent matters

and for resolution of differences among houses of parliament.

The President's Council comprised twenty members from the

House of Assembly, ten from the House of Representatives, five

from the House of Delegates, fifteen nominated by the president, and ten nominated by opposition party leaders. The NP

dominated the President's Council throughout the ten-year

duration of the 1983 constitution.

The three-chambered parliament was based on a fundamental premise of the 1983 constitution, the distinction between a

racial community's "own" affairs (encompassing education,

254
Government and Politics

health, housing, social welfare, local government, and some

aspects of agriculture), and "general" affairs (encompassing

defense, finance, foreign policy, justice, law and order, trans- port, commerce and industry, manpower, internal affairs, and

overall agricultural policy) . Thus, legislation "affecting the

interests" of one community was deliberated upon by the

appropriate house, but legislation on "general affairs" of

importance to all races was handled by all three houses of parliament. Disagreements among houses of parliament on specific legislation could be resolved by the President's Council,

giving the NP-dominated House of Assembly substantial weight

in determining the outcome of all legislative debates. The president signed all legislation, and he also exercised administrative responsibility for black affairs. The country was divided into four provinces—Cape of Good

Hope Province (later, the Cape Province), Natal Province, the

Transvaal, and the Orange Free State. The president appointed

a provincial administrator for each province. Until the mid1980s, the provincial administrator acted in consultation with a provincial council, which was elected by whites only. In July

1987, the provincial councils were replaced by eight multiracial

regional services councils (RSCs)—four in the Transvaal, three

in the Cape Province, and one in the Orange Free State. The

RSCs were empowered to administer government regulations

and to coordinate the provision of services to local communities. Constitutional Change

The constitutional reforms of the early 1980s led to four

phases of political change that, ultimately, irrevocably trans- formed the South African political system. First, the 1983 constitution's new political representation for coloureds and

Indians made the glaring lack of participation by the country's

black majority even more obvious. Even early discussions of the

new constitution triggered widespread violent protests by antiapartheid activists. The escalating violence prompted the government to impose a series of states of emergency and forced

both the government and many citizens to realize that promising future political reform regarding black political participation would no longer suffice; sweeping political reforms would

be necessary, and the need for such reforms was becoming

increasingly urgent.

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South Africa: A Country Study

The second phase of change was a series of secret meetings

between NP officials and imprisoned ANC leaders. These

began in July 1984, after Minister ofJustice Hendrik "Kobie"

Coetsee (representing President P.W. Botha) paid several

unpublicized visits to ANC leader Nelson Mandela, who was

then serving the twenty-first year of a life prison sentence. The

government formalized these visits in May 1988 by establishing a committee to handle government contacts with Mandela and

with other imprisoned or exiled ANC leaders. OnJuly 5, 1989,

in response to Mandela's request for high-level discussions of a

possible negotiated settlement to the ANC's armed struggle,

Botha and Mandela held their first face-to-face talks. Botha resigned from office, owing to ill health, in August

1989, and in December, Mandela suggested a "road map" for

future negotiations to the new president, F.W. de Klerk. Mandela's proposal outlined a power-sharing plan for the NP and

its political rivals and embraced the spirit of compromise that

would be needed to weather the political turbulence that lay

ahead.

These talks led to the third, and most transforming, phase in

recent politics, beginning with de Klerk's historic speech of

February 2, 1990, in which he legalized more than thirty antiapartheid organizations; ordered the release of eight long-term

political prisoners, including Mandela and ANC deputy president Walter Sisulu; removed many emergency regulations con- cerning the media and political detainees; and announced his

intention to negotiate a new democratic constitution with his

political opponents. In October of that year, the parliament

took a symbolic step toward reform by repealing the Separate

Amenities Act, an important legislative pillar of apartheid.

The fourth phase in the political transformation occurred as the NP government and the ANC leadership began to recognize their mutual dependence and the need for cooperation

and compromise in embarking on constitutional negotiations.

In this phase, their previously adversarial relationship was

transformed through their discussions and their agreement on

three accords—the Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990), the

Pretoria Minute (August 1990), and the D.F. Malan Accord

(February 1991). In these accords, ANC leaders pledged to sus- pend the armed struggle, the government agreed to release all political prisoners, and both sides agreed to pursue political

reform through negotiation. On September 14, 1991, representatives of twenty-seven political parties, interest groups, and

256
Government and Politics

the national and homeland governments signed the National

Peace Accord, agreeing to form a multiracial council, later

called the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), to serve as temporary executive authority until democratic elections could

be held.

Nearly three months after the signing of the historic peace

accord, preliminary negotiations to agree on procedural rules

began at the World Trade Center outside Johannesburg, as the

Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa). In September 1992, Mandela and de Klerk reached a Record of

Understanding, formally committing both sides to accept a democratically elected, five-year interim Government of

National Unity led by a political coalition. They also agreed

that the center of government would remain in Pretoria and

that the new state president would be chosen from the party

winning the largest plurality of votes in nationwide nonracial

elections. Any party that won at least 5 percent of the seats in

parliament would be entitled to a place in the cabinet. The

transitional, bicameral parliament was to be charged with drafting and adopting a new constitution. The ANC accepted the

idea of sharing power with the NP during the transition.

Assuming the ANC would win the elections, it would, as the

majority party, exercise its prerogative on most matters, and the

NP would serve as a junior partner in running the country.

These agreements on the transitional government represented important compromises by both the government and

the ANC, and they helped to set new precedents for future

negotiations. The NP won agreement on its refusal to give the

new state president broad and extensive powers during the

transition period. (Under the previous system, the president

could override the views of minority parties.) At the same time,

de Klerk compromised on his demand for a permanent consensus-style arrangement to be enshrined in any new constitution by agreeing to a five-year transitional government. The

arrangement satisfied the NP demand for legally binding

checks and balances to protect the country's white minority.

The ANC, for its part, compromised on its earlier insistence on

full and immediate majority rule, by agreeing to participate in a powersharing arrangement for at least five years. At the same

time, many ANC leaders hoped that their party, as the dominant party in the transitional government, would win a suffi- ciently large majority to enable it to enact most of its policies, even without the consent of other parties.

257
South Africa: A Country Study

Supporters on both sides viewed the Government of

National Unity as the country's best hope for achieving longterm political and economic stability, for attracting muchneeded foreign investment, and for limiting violence by both

white and black extremists. One of the main criticisms of the

proposed coalition government was that with the two major

political rivals entering into a governing alliance, their smallparty opponents would have little political maneuverability and

would be forced into extraparliamentary protest.

By early 1994, a number of problems remained unresolved.

The most crucial was the need to establish a broad consensus among the political parties over the basic principles to be

embodied in a new constitution. The negotiators had yet to reach agreement on the powers and the functions of the three

commissions responsible for overseeing the transition—the

TEC, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), and the

Independent Media Commission that would be charged with

ensuring media fairness. Other problems concerned the operations of the interim government—such as joint ANC-NP control over the country's security forces and the integration of the

ANC's and PAC's paramilitary wings into the new national

army.

The ANC and Inkatha still had to resolve their civil war in

Natal and KwaZulu, where more than 10,000 people had been

killed in a decade of ethnic and political violence. The large

Zulu population (of about 8 million) was split between supporters of the ANC and Inkatha, and Inkatha itself was split

between the conflicting interests of IFP leader Buthelezi and

the traditional Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini.

The Interim Constitution

The interim constitution—The Constitution of the Republic

of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200) —was ratified on December

22, 1993, and implemented on April 27, 1994. It provides a framework for governing for five years, while a new constitution, to be implemented by 1999, was drafted by the Constitutional Assembly. The final constitution had to comply with the

principles embodied in the interim constitution, including a commitment to a multiparty democracy based on universal

adult franchise, individual rights without discrimination, and

separation of the powers of government.

The interim constitution consists of a preamble, fifteen

chapters containing 251 sections, and seven attachments. It

258
Government and Politics

contains a chapter on fundamental rights, and it requires a

constitutional court to invalidate any new law or government

action that might unreasonably restrict these basic human freedoms. The guaranteed freedoms include the right to life and

human dignity, freedom of religion, freedom of expression,

the right of free association, language and cultural rights, and

other internationally accepted human rights. Key provisions

are proportional party representation in the legislature with

representatives to be selected from lists of party delegates; a bicameral parliament comprising a 400-seat National Assembly

and a Senate consisting of ten members chosen by each of the

nine provinces; and a Constitutional Assembly made up of both

houses of parliament. The interim constitution requires that

the draft of the final constitution be prepared within two years

and that the draft be approved by two-thirds of the legislators

and by the Constitutional Court.

The interim constitution also defines the government's

authority; reaffirms its sovereignty, the supremacy of the constitution, and existing national symbols; and defines the national

executive (a president, at least two deputy presidents, and the

cabinet), the judicial system (the Constitutional Court, the

Supreme Court, and lower-level courts), the Office of the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission, the Commission

on Gender Equality, the Commission on Restitution of Land

Rights, and the Public Service Commission. Further provisions

relate to the police and security establishment; the continuation or repeal of existing laws and international agreements;

and arrangements for legislative, executive, public service,

legal, financial, and other administrative bodies. Schedules

attached to the interim constitution describe the nation's nine

new provinces, including areas still under contention; the electoral system; oaths and affirmations of office; the procedure for

electing the president; and the authority of provincial legisla- tures. Executive and Legislative Authority

The President

Under the interim constitution, executive authority is vested

in the president, deputy presidents, and a cabinet chosen by

the president in consultation with party leaders (see fig. 19).

The executive offices are based in the administrative capital,

Pretoria. The directly elected National Assembly elects the

259
South Africa: A Country Study

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260
Government and Politics

president from among its members and can remove the president from office by a vote of no-confidence or by impeachment. The president's primary responsibilities are to uphold,

to defend, and to respect the constitution; to appoint cabinet

members; to convene cabinet meetings; to refer bills back to the legislators or forward them to the Constitutional Court

when constitutionality is in question; to summon the National

Assembly for urgent matters; to appoint commissions of

inquiry; to appoint ambassadors; and to accredit foreign diplomats.

According to the interim constitution, any party winning

more than 20 percent of the popular vote is entitled to name a deputy president. If only one party or no party wins that percentage of votes, each of the two parties with the largest numbers of votes selects a deputy president. The deputy presidents'

primary responsibilities are to assist the president in the duties

of the executive and to succeed the president in the event of

absence, incapacitation, or vacancy in that office. In 1994 the

NP named outgoing president F. W. de Klerk and the ANC

named Thabo Mbeki to serve as deputy presidents.

The Cabinet

The cabinet shares executive authority with the president

and his deputies, and its members are appointed by the president in consultation with party leaders. Under the interim constitution, cabinet appointments reflect the relative strength of

political parties; each party winning more than 5 percent of the

popular vote is entitled to a proportional number of cabinet

portfolios. In May 1994, the ANC was allocated seventeen cabinet portfolios, and a minister without portfolio was from the

ANC. The NP was allocated six cabinet portfolios, and the IFP,

three. After NP Minister of Finance Derek Keys resigned in July

1994, that post was designated "nonpartisan," and a new portfolio, General Services, was allocated to the NP in December

1994.

The president, in consultation with national party leaders,

appoints a minister and deputy minister to manage each cabinet portfolio. In most ministries, a department staffed by government employees assists the ministry in the implementation

of national policy. For example, the Department of Education,

within the Ministry of Education, assists in implementing

national educational policy. Each department is headed by a

261
South Africa: A Country Study

director general, who is generally a career government

employee.

The cabinet customarily travels between the administrative

capital, Pretoria, and the legislative capital, Cape Town, while

the parliament is in session. The transitional cabinet's first ses- sion on May 23, 1994, took place in Cape Town. The president

is required to consult with the cabinet and to gain the approval

of two-thirds of the cabinet on issues of fundamental importance, but most cabinet decisions are reached by consensus. The diversity represented in the new cabinet in 1994 was a major departure from earlier administrations (see table 16,

Appendix). The ANC held key portfolios, such as foreign

affairs, defense, safety and security, justice, and land affairs,

and had strong deputy ministers in finance, home affairs, provincial affairs, and agriculture. The ANC appointees included

older contemporaries of President Mandela, middle-aged

former exiles, and younger antiapartheid activists of the 1980s.

There were three women in the senior executive ranks—two

women cabinet ministers and one woman deputy minister.

Other sharp breaks with the past were the reorganization

and the renaming of several ministries. For example, in 1994

the Ministry of Law and Order became the Ministry of Safety

and Security, and the Ministry of Information was subsumed

under the Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications, and Broadcasting. In addition, the apartheid-based distinction between a

racial community's "own" affairs and "general" affairs was abolished.

One of the new government's most controversial cabinet

appointments was the minister of foreign affairs, Alfred Nzo, a veteran of the antiapartheid struggle who had little foreign

affairs background. Nzo's deputy, Aziz Pahad, had been considered effective in managing the ANC foreign affairs department

during the preelection period, and new Deputy President

Mbeki planned to maintain close oversight of the foreign

affairs portfolio. Another controversial ANC appointment was

that of Winnie Mandela, President Mandela's estranged wife, as deputy minister of arts, culture, science, and technology. In

March 1995, the president removed Mrs. Mandela from her

post as deputy minister, citing insubordination as the cause for

her dismissal. (After a legal challenge of his action, Mrs. Mandela resigned from the post.)

Cabinet ministers from the NP included some of the previ- ous government's most experienced members. Important port262
Government and Politics

folios were assigned to Keys, who retained the finance portfolio

until his resignation, and to constitutional negotiators Roelf

Meyer (Ministry of Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development) and Dawie de Villiers (Ministry of Environmental

Affairs and Tourism). Veteran minister Roelof "Pik" Botha was appointed Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs.

To appease and to accommodate Mandela's rival, the IFP

leader, Zulu Chief Buthelezi, he was appointed minister of

home affairs. His duties include managing elections and internal issues, several of which affect his IFP stronghold in KwaZulu-Natal. Buthelezi also shares responsibility for resolving

the country's growing problem of illegal immigration from

neighboring states. Parliament

Under the interim constitution of 1993, legislative authority

is vested in a bicameral parliament consisting of the National

Assembly (lower house) and the Senate (upper house), based

in the country's legislative capital, Cape Town. Members of the

National Assembly are chosen by proportional representation:

constitutionally, 200 of the 400 assembly delegates are chosen

from party lists of national candidates, and 200 are chosen

from lists of candidates representing specific provinces. The

200 selected from provincial party lists are allocated in the fol- lowing proportions: Eastern Cape 28, Free State 14, Gauteng

44, KwaZulu-Natal 42, Mpumalanga 11, Northern Cape 4,

Northern Province 25, North-West Province 12, and Western

Cape 20. In 1994 individual delegates could choose to run as national or provincial party delegates. Provincial party leaders submitted lists of delegates after elections or party caucuses in each

province. A candidate nominated on a provincial list had to be

a resident of that province, although exceptions were made for

parties that listed only one nonresident candidate, or for cases in which fewer than 10 percent of the party's nominees lived

outside the province. The assembly delegates elected a speaker

and deputy speaker to preside over their deliberations. The

speaker and the deputy speaker retained their parliamentary

seats but could not vote, except in the case of a tie. The Senate consists of ten members from each of the nine

provinces, selected by the provincial legislature on the basis of

proportional representation, to reflect party strength in each

province. The president and the two deputy presidents preside

263
South Africa: A Country Study

over the Senate and are also members of the Senate. Although

not granted a deliberative vote, they can vote in case of a tie. The bicameral parliament is empowered not only to pass

laws, but, in its additional role as the Constitutional Assembly,

to draft and to adopt the final constitution, which had to be

completed in 1996. Although intended to serve as the interim

legislature for five years, parliament may be dissolved at any

time by presidential decree, followed by new parliamentary

elections.

The interim constitution requires ordinary bills introduced

in either house of parliament to be voted on by both houses. If one house passes a bill and the other rejects it, the bill is referred to a joint committee from both houses. Both houses

approve bills affecting the powers and the boundaries of provinces; the appropriate provincial legislature also must approve

any bill affecting the powers and the boundaries of that province. Both houses deal with bills appropriating revenue or imposing taxes, and in case of a conflict between houses on any

bill, the decision of the National Assembly prevails.

In accordance with the interim constitution, parliament generally convenes from January to June each year in Cape Town,

although a briefer session may be called later in the year if needed. All members of the government plus many of the

departmental secretaries and heads of other executive agencies

reside in Cape Town when parliament is in session.

Reflecting the far-reaching changes in the new political sys- tem, the new parliament in 1994, unlike its predecessor,

adopted an informal dress code—many new members dispensed with the conventional Western suit and instead wore

kaftans or safari suits. For the first time as well, some speeches

in parliament were delivered in African languages, with a bevy

of translators assembled to render them in English or Afrikaans.

Volkstaat Council

In November 1994, the Volkstaat Council Act (No. 30) of

1994 established a Volkstaat Council within the legislative

branch of the government to investigate the possibility of establishing an Afrikaner state within South Africa. The twenty

members of the council were elected by a joint session of the

National Assembly and the Senate. The functions of the council are to gather information concerning possible powers,

boundaries, and structures of such a state; to study the feasibil264
Government and Politics

ity of these; and to submit recommendations to the joint

National Assembly and Senate. The Volkstaat Council began

deliberations in early 1995. Its formal proposals had not been

presented as of mid-1996.

Provincial and Local Government

Until 1994 South Africa was divided administratively into

four provinces, the Cape Province, Natal Province, the Transvaal, and the Orange Free State; six "self-governing" homelands, Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa,

and QwaQwa; and four "independent" homelands or "sover- eign independent states," Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda,

and Ciskei (see fig. 11). The government estimated in the early

1990s that 44 percent of the country's total population resided

in the ten homelands, which formed less than 14 percent of

the total land area. A 1992 study by the Urban Foundation, a South African research organization, concluded that this high

population density—several hundred persons per square kilometer in some areas—greatly exacerbated socioeconomic and

political problems in the homelands.

To resolve these problems, government and ANC negotiators redrew the country's internal boundaries, dissolving the

homeland boundaries and forming nine new provinces (see

fig. 1). The demarcation process began in May 1993, when the

Multiparty Negotiating Council appointed a 150-member Commission on the Demarcation of States/Provinces/Regions, with

instructions to hold a public hearing and to submit recommendations to the council. After receiving 304 written reports and

hearing eighty oral witnesses, the commission recommended

the formation of nine provinces, with a few disputed borders to be reconsidered at a later date. These recommendations were

incorporated into the interim constitution, and the homelands

were officially dissolved on April 27, 1994.

The interim constitution assigns authority in each of the

nine provinces to a provincial executive, or premier, and a legislative assembly. The premier, elected by the legislators, selects a council, or cabinet, based on proportional representation of

political parties (see table 17, Appendix). Provincial legisla- tures have between thirty and 100 members, although within

those limits, the size of the legislature is proportional to the

number of votes cast in the province—i.e., the total is divided

by 50,000, and that number is added to the base of thirty delegates (see table 18, Appendix). Thus, at both the provincial

265
South Africa: A Country Study

and the national levels, voters select a political party they wish

to have represent them rather than a specific individual to serve as legislator. The legislators are chosen on the basis of

proportional representation from lists of party representatives.

The capitals of the new provinces are Cape Town (Western

Cape), Kimberley (Northern Cape), Bisho (Eastern Cape),

Bloemfontein (Free State), Nelspruit (Mpumalanga), Pietersburg (Northern Province), Johannesburg (Gauteng), and

Mmabatho (North-West Province). The capital of KwaZuluNatal was not yet decided, between Ulundi and Pietermaritzburg, as of 1996.

As the 1994 elections approached, the government

amended the interim constitution to strengthen the power of

the provincial governments, largely in an attempt to appease

Zulu and Afrikaner separatists. These new measures uphold

the general principle of "self-determination," to the extent that

people of a common culture are allowed to establish a "territorial homeland" where their language and traditions can be

maintained. They also stipulate that the resulting homeland

must have broad popular support within its boundaries and its policies may not be racially or ethnically discriminatory. The

amendments also assign to the provincial authorities the power

to levy taxes and to formulate a provincial constitution, as long

as they do not violate constitutional provisions concerning fundamental rights. Furthermore, to satisfy Zulu aspirations, the

negotiators adopted the name KwaZulu-Natal for the former

Natal Province and agreed to allow the Zulu king to retain his

honorary crown and to continue to receive his salary from the

central government.

Although the new provincial administrations assumed power

immediately after the April 1994 elections, many of them were

unable to deliver government services to their constituents in

the months following the elections. Provincial authority had

not yet been fully defined, and many provincial and local-level

offices and procedures continued to be under the control of

apartheid-era civil servants. Throughout 1995, several provincial administrators demanded more autonomy and more financial support from the central government, and this issue

delayed agreement on a draft of the final constitution in 1996.

One of the last steps in the creation of the new political sys- tem was the establishment of new local government institutions

below the provincial level. The government planned for elections in 1995 to replace the existing all-white city councils with

266
Town meeting at chiefs kraal in Makushane location, Northern Province

Courtesy R. T. K Scully

nonracial, democratically chosen municipal governments and

to establish multiracial local councils in rural districts. The

Local Government Transition Act (No. 209) of 1993 required

40 percent of local government members to be elected by a sys- tem of proportional representation using a party list system,

and 60 percent to represent individual localities. The interim

constitution specified that the existing local governments in

1994 would continue in place until the new elections were

held.

On November 1, 1995, local government elections were held

in all areas of the country except KwaZulu-Natal and some

parts of the Western Cape. The elections put in place municipal and rural councils, replacing the bureaucratic infrastructure that had existed since the apartheid era. The elections were successfully held in 686 constituencies, although only

about 52 percent of the registered electorate turned out to

267
South Africa: A Country Study

vote. The ANC won seats on all 686 councils, and it won a majority of the seats on 387 councils. The NP won a majority of

seats on forty-five councils. The Freedom Front won control

over one local council. Independent or nonpartisan candidates

won a majority of seats on at least forty-two councils. A few elections were finally decided in byelections held in early 1996. In

KwaZulu-Natal and areas of the Western Cape, the local government elections were postponed until mid-1996.

Drafting a Final Constitution

On May 8, 1996, the Constitutional Assembly completed two

years of work on a draft of a final constitution, intended to replace the interim constitution of 1993 by the year 1999. The

draft embodied many of the provisions contained in the

interim constitution, but some of the differences between

them were controversial. In the final constitution, the Government of National Unity is replaced by a majoritarian government—an arrangement referred to by its critics as "winnertake-all" in national elections. Instead of requiring political parties to share executive power, the final constitution would

enable the majority party to appoint cabinet members and

other officials without necessarily consulting the minority parties that would be represented in the National Assembly.

The draft final constitution in 1996 also proposes changes in

the country's legislative structure. The National Assembly

would continue to be the country's only directly elected house

of parliament, but the Senate would be replaced by a National

Council of Provinces. Like its predecessor, the new council

would consist of legislators chosen to represent each of the

country's nine provinces. The new council would include some

temporary delegates from each province, however, so some legislators would rotate between the National Council of Provinces and the provincial legislatures from which they were

chosen.

Negotiators in the early 1990s had agreed that the 1996 draft

constitution would be submitted to the Constitutional Court to ensure that it conformed to agreed-upon constitutional principles, such as the commitment to a multiparty democracy, based

on universal franchise without discrimination. In May 1996,

however, the Constitutional Court did not immediately

approve the draft as received; instead, it referred the document

back to the Constitutional Assembly for revision and clarification of specific provisions. Chief among its concerns were the

268
Government and Politics

need to clarify references to the powers that would devolve to the provincial legislatures and the rights of organized labor

and management in an industrial dispute. The Constitutional

Assembly was revising the draft constitution as of mid-1996.

Even before it was approved or implemented, the draft constitution had an immediate impact on the structure of government in 1996. Just one day after the draft had been completed

by the Constitutional Assembly the National Party declared its intention to resign from the Government of National Unity,

effective June 30, 1996. In the weeks leading up to the NP's for- mal departure from the executive branch, NP leaders repeatedly tried to assure voters that the party would play a

constructive role in politics as a loyal critic of the ANC-led government. President Mandela, too, accepted the NP departure

as a sign of a "maturing democracy." NP legislators continued

to serve in the National Assembly and in the Senate.

The Legal System

South Africa's legal system, like the rest of the political sys- tem, was radically transformed as the apartheid-based constitutional system was restructured during the early 1990s.

Nevertheless, many laws unrelated to apartheid continued to be rooted in the old legal system. Thus, the justice system after

1994 reflected elements of both the apartheid-era system and

nondiscriminatory reforms.

The Apartheid- Era Legal System

The principles embodied in the legal system were adapted

from Roman-Dutch law with an admixture of English law introduced after 1806. The influence of English law is most pronounced in criminal legal procedures, in constitutional or

statutory law, and in corporate and mercantile law. RomanDutch law predominates in private law—for example, the law

of persons, of property, of succession, and the law of sale and

lease. Despite the influence of these universally accepted laws,

however, a prominent feature of the former legal system was

the pervasive role of discriminatory apartheid-based laws, regulations, and codes (see The Legislative Implementation of

Apartheid, ch. 1), and the extensive judicial apparatus

required to enforce them.

Judicial authority is vested in the state, and the minister of

justice is responsible for administering the justice system. The

269
South Africa: A Country Study

president appoints the attorneys general, who order public

prosecutions on behalf of the state, and whose authority in the

lower courts is delegated to public prosecutors. Similarly, the

president also appoints judges from among members of the

bar. Until the 1990s, all judges were white. The legal profession

is divided broadly, as in Britain, into advocates (barristers) and

attorneys (solicitors); only the former can plead a case in a higher court. The judicial system is headed by the Supreme Court, the

decisions and interpretations of which are considered an

important source of the law. The Supreme Court comprises an

Appellate Division and six provincial divisions. Each provincial

division encompasses a judge president, three local divisions

presided over byjudges, and magisterial divisions presided over by magistrates. Separate traditional courts administer African

traditional law and custom; they are presided over by traditional leaders, often chiefs or respected elders.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the highest

court in the country and is seated in Bloemfontein, the country's judicial capital. The Appellate Division is composed of the

chiefjustice and the judges of appeal, whose number varies, as determined by the president. Supreme Court members can be

removed only on grounds of misbehavior or incapacity. The

Appellate Division's decisions are binding on all lower courts,

as are the decisions—within their areas ofjurisdiction—of the

provincial and the local divisions. Lower courts, which are presided over by civil service magistrates, have limited jurisdiction

in civil and criminal cases. In 1995, there were 309 district magistrates' offices, presided over by 1,014 magistrates, 1,196 prosecutors, and 3,717 officers.

The Legal Aid Society, an independent statutory body, provides advice and assistance to indigent persons. Other programs offer aid or rehabilitation to prisoners. Until the mid1990s, a few private voluntary organizations, such as Black

Sash, offered legal assistance to people who faced legal problems arising out of the pass laws or other apartheid-era legislation.

The New Legal System

The postapartheid legal system introduced by the interim

constitution of 1993 embodies the supreme law of the land and

is binding on all judicial organs of the state. It establishes an independent judiciary, including a Constitutional Court with

270
Supreme Court in Bloemfontein

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth Africa, Washington

the power to review and to abolish legislation inconsistent with

the constitution. It includes provisions not found in apartheid- era laws, such as a prohibition on all forms of discrimination

and an emphasis on individual rights. These rights include

"equality before the law and equal protection of the law"; freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, petition, and

association; the right to "choose a place of residence anywhere

in the national territory"; the right not to be deprived of citi- zenship without justification; full political rights; full access to the courts; and fair and lawful administrative justice mechanisms, including rights concerning detention, arrest, and accusation. Other provisions provide for specific rights in areas such as economic activity, labor relations, property, environment, children, language and culture, education, and conditions under which a state of emergency can be declared.

271
South Africa: A Country Study

In 1994 the government established the new Constitutional

Court, a Human Rights Commission, and a Judicial Services

Commission that forwarded to the president its ten nominees

to the Constitutional Court. Legislation in 1994 also set forth

operating procedures for these bodies and established the

Office of the Public Protector (public defender).

The new legal system also deals with the consequences of

apartheid-related abuses and crimes, although it aims primarily

to promote a spirit of national reconciliation and a new "culture of human rights," rather than to resolve long-standing

grievances. In June 1994, the government announced that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission would investigate accusations of human rights abuses and political crimes by both

supporters and opponents of apartheid, and that it would consider related issues such as amnesty and reparation to survivors

and their dependents. The government established guidelines

for the commission's operations in 1994 and 1995, and the

Truth and Reconciliation Commission began hearing testi- mony by both victims and perpetrators of apartheid-era violence in early 1996 (see Human Rights and National

Reconciliation, ch. 5).

Political Participation

The abolition of apartheid radically transformed political

participation in South Africa in the 1990s. This change, in

turn, had a major impact on the nature of the country's electoral system, political parties, and political elites. The 1 994 Elections

Until the nonracial elections in April 1994, the laws of apartheid governed elections. An elections administrator, or chief

electoral officer, prepared a list based on the population registry of people who were qualified to register as voters. They had

to be more than eighteen years of age and, under the 1983 constitution, to belong to one of the constituencies of the three

racially based houses of parliament—white, coloured, and

Indian (see Limited Reforms, ch. 1). In the 1989 parliamentary

election, for example, only 2,176,481 votes were cast, out of

3,170,667 registered voters and a total population of almost 28

million.

In the April 1994 national and provincial elections, nineteen

political parties, representing the country's diverse constituen272
Voters in Cape Town (above) and Durban (below)

in historic elections ofApril 1994

Courtesy James B, Parks

273
South Africa: A Country Study

ties, participated in the electoral process. Each voter received

two ballots and cast two votes (enabling each voter to choose

different parties at the national and the provincial levels). Voters selected a political party, not an individual candidate, to represent them in the National Assembly and in the provincial

legislature. Each party had prepared ranked lists of delegates

for the national and the provincial legislatures. Political parties

gained seats in each body proportionally, according to the

number of votes each party received, and party delegates

became legislators based on their ranking on the appropriate

list.The number of eligible voters in 1994 was estimated at 21.7

million—about 16 million of whom had never voted before. In a radical departure from previous electoral practice, no formal

voter register was prepared; instead, voters were asked to

present identity books as proof of citizenship, and even this

requirement was enforced with flexibility. Officials had determined before the elections that about 2.5 million people

mostly blacks—lacked identity books, and most of these were

given temporary identity papers. For most residents of the

homelands, valid travel documents were accepted as legal identification.

The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) created a

state electoral fund with an estimated 22 million rands (for

value of the rand—see Glossary) to finance the April 1994 elections. Half of that amount was distributed among participating

political parties before the election, and the balance afterward.

The first payment was made in late March 1994 to nine parties

that had submitted documentation of popular support.

During the campaign, political parties were hampered by

several factors. One of the major challenges was the need to educate the electorate, particularly those who had never voted

before, in basic elements of democracy and electoral procedures. For example, there was a great deal of skepticism about

democratic practices—such as the secret ballot—particularly in

rural areas where literacy rates are low, and where traditional

leaders and white employers had often manipulated political

participation in the past. In addition, the political violence

leading up to the elections threatened to keep many potential

first-time voters away from the polls. ANC voters felt especially

vulnerable in KwaZulu, Bophuthatswana, and Giskei, where the

apartheid-era homeland leaders and security forces had

harassed and intimidated ANC supporters. Similarly, in ANC274
Government and Politics

controlled areas, some of that party's activists intimidated IFP,

NP, and even liberal Democratic Party (DP) organizers and dis- rupted their campaign rallies, despite ANC leaders' pleas for

tolerance. Finally, the election posed a logistical nightmare for

the IEC, which had to accommodate the IFP's last-minute decision to participate in the elections and add the party's name to the ballots. The IEC helped monitor the more-than-9,000 polling stations and was responsible for verifying the vote count

before it was announced.

The IEC reported that it had counted 19,726,579 ballots and

rejected 193,081 as invalid. The voting was declared generally

free and fair. Observer missions from the United Nations

(UN), British Commonwealth, European Union (EU—see

Glossary), and Organization of African Unity (OAU) issued

this statement: "South Africans' confidence in the secrecy of

the ballot was manifest and they were able to participate freely

in the elections. The outcome of the elections reflects the will

of the people of South Africa."

Seven political parties won seats in the National Assembly,

the ANC, 252 seats (representing 62.6 percent of the popular

vote); the NP, 82 seats (20.4 percent); the IFP, 43 seats (10.5

percent); the Freedom Front (FF), 9 seats (2.2 percent); the

DP, 7 seats (1.7 percent); the PAC, 5 seats (1.2 percent); and

the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), 2 seats (0.5

percent). Twelve other parties received too few votes to be represented in the National Assembly. Each of the seven major

parties also won representation in at least one of the nine provincial legislatures. The ANC won a majority in seven provincial

legislatures. The NP won a majority in the Western Cape; and

the IFP did so in KwaZulu-Natal (see table 18, Appendix).

Political Parties

South Africa's political party system underwent radical trans- formation in the early 1990s when previously illegal parties were unbanned and participated in the April 1994 elections. In

what international observers called a "developing multiparty

system," parties were challenged to become all-inclusive and

not to limit their appeal to their traditional constituent groups.

They also had to reorient themselves to participate in the

bicameral multiracial legislature rather than the previous tri- cameral apartheid-based parliament. The most successful of

the parties in the April 1994 elections (and the South African

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South Africa: A Country Study

Communist Party) are described below, in order of decreasing

parliamentary strength.

African National Congress

The African National Congress (ANC) was founded in 1912

as the South African Native National Congress, under the leadership of Dr. Pixley Ka Isaka Seme, a Durban attorney. It was renamed the African National Congress in 1923. Although the

ANC cooperated to some degree with the Communist Party of

South Africa (CPSA—later, in 1953, the South African Communist Party, or SACP) in the early 1920s, cooperation ceased in

1927 when some traditional African leaders opposed white-led

communist involvement in the black nationalist movement. In

the 1930s, the ANC's influence declined, primarily because it was unsuccessful in representing black grievances and was weakened by factionalism and leadership disarray. The ANC's

revival in the 1940s was largely the result of a dynamic group of

young leaders—including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu,

Oliver Tambo, and Anton Lembede—who were influenced by

a pan-African version of black nationalism. In 1943 they established the ANC Youth League to mobilize mass protest against

racial discrimination. Following the rise to power of the NP in

1948 and its implementation of strict apartheid laws, the ANC,

with many of the Youth League founders then in leadership

positions, responded by launching a series of countrywide defiance campaigns. This activism invigorated the ANC and

resulted in the movement's growth from 7,000 to some 100,000

dues-paying members in 1952.

In the mid-1950s, the ANC formed the Congress Alliance

with other antiapartheid organizations to oppose the white

state. On June 26, 1955, alliance members adopted the Freedom Charter, which advocated the creation of a nonsocialist

multiracial society, but the debate over the charter widened an

ideological rift in the ANC between Charterists and Africanists,

concerning the question of multiracialism. A few activists

opposed the ANC's inclusive policies and established the PanAfricanist Congress (PAC) in 1959 to press for black political

control.

The government declared the ANC an illegal organization

on April 8, 1960, as part of a government crackdown and state of emergency following violent antiapartheid incidents at Sharpeville and Langa. The ANC went underground, many of

its cadres left South Africa for exile in neighboring states, and

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Government and Politics

its leaders adopted armed struggle as a means of achieving

their goals. In 1961 ANC and SACP leaders created a joint military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe ("Spear of the Nation," also

known as Umkhonto, MK). The principle of armed struggle

through guerrilla warfare to overthrow the South African

regime superseded the goal of gaining political rights for all cit- izens. ANC sabotage and attacks between 1960 and 1962 led to the arrest of many party leaders. At the 1963 trial that became

renowned as "the Rivonia trial," Mandela, Sisulu, Govan Mbeki,

and others were convicted of treason and were sentenced to

life terms in prison. Most ANC leaders fled the country, established ANC headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia, and continued

their struggle against the Pretoria regime.

Over the years, the ANC built up a strong support network

in many Western and Eastern-bloc states, in cooperation with overseas antiapartheid groups. Although certain Western

states, particularly Scandinavian countries, provided financial

support, the ANC's logistical support, including the supply of

weapons, came from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The ANC also attained

observer status at the UN and during the 1980s broadened its diplomatic ties with Western states. The ANC's leadership structure consists of the president,

deputy president, secretary general, deputy secretary general,

and treasurer general. A ninety-member National Executive

Committee (NEC) consults with senior officers and influences

decisions on important issues. A twenty-six-member National

Working Committee (NWC), chosen from the NEC, oversees

day-to-day decision making and administration and manages

the party's functional departments. The seven appointed members of the President's Committee serve as presidential advisers

and assistants.

The ANC's annual national conference brings together

more than 1,300 representatives, whose functions are to elect

the NEC and to nominate delegates to the party's National

Assembly, which meets every five years. At a working level, the

party has nine national departments—Information and

Research, Manpower and Development, Foreign Affairs, Youth,

Political Education, Information and Publicity, Finance, Religious Affairs, and Women—as well as branches in each of the

provinces.

In the early 1990s, the ANC took a number of steps to

broaden its political base. It reactivated the ANC Youth League

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South Africa: A Country Study

in order to bridge the generational gap between its older lead- ers and young members. In addition, propelled by the many

politically active women in the organization, the ANC reactivated its Women's League in order to promote women's rights

nationwide. The ANC Youth League and the ANC Women's

League work in cooperation with the corresponding departments within the ANC.

Although the ANC primarily represents the interests of the

majority black population, its membership is open to whites,

coloureds, and Asians, as well. It had appealed to all races to join in 1969, and a substantial number of white liberals did join

during the 1970s and the 1980s. In April 1991, five white members of parliament representing the Democratic Party left that

party to join the ANC, giving the ANC official parliamentary

representation for the first time in the all-white House of

Assembly.

Until the ANC and the NP-led government entered into

negotiations over the country's political future in 1991, the

ANC's ideological platform for opposing apartheid ranged

from Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi's strategy of passive resis- tance (in the early 1900s), to pan-Africanism (in the 1940s), to the Freedom Charter in 1955. In 1969 the ANC adopted an

official policy advocating armed struggle to gain political control of the state, and in 1988 it promulgated the Constitutional

Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, derived from the

Freedom Charter of the 1950s. These guidelines called for a nonracial democratic state based on universal franchise. In

August 1989, the ANC adopted the Harare Declaration, advocating multiparty negotiations to arrive at a new form of government, giving strong emphasis to the concept of individual

rights.

The ANC's major political partner throughout most of the

apartheid era was the SACP. SACP leaders helped the ANC to secure the support of communist and socialist governments

during its period of exile, played important roles in ANC policy

formulation, and helped to consolidate support for the ANC in

the labor movement. The SACP at times played a moderating

role in the ANC, too; for example, in early 1993 SACP chairJoe

Slovo drafted the ANC's proposals, couched in a "sunset

clause," to compromise and to share power with the NP. Slovo's

position was that compromise was necessary because the party was "not dealing with a defeated enemy," but with the NP as a minority party.

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Government and Politics

Although the ANC became the country's dominant political

party in 1994, it still faced a number of long-term problems.

The issue of political succession had yet to be resolved. President Mandela and other senior party leaders were members of

the older generation, whose active leadership years were drawing to a close. Mandela had pledged he would not seek reelection in 1999. His most likely successors—Thabo Mbeki, the

former ANC secretary for international affairs, and Cyril Ramaphosa, ANC secretary general since 1991 —had not demonstrated the decades of practiced leadership of their seniors.

As the dominant party in the national unity government, the

ANC had to balance the need to co-manage (along with the

NP) the country's finances to facilitate economic growth

against its long-standing affiliation with the Congress of South

African Trade Unions (COSATU), the labor confederation

known for vigorously defending workers' interests against those

of the previous government. The ANC also had to overcome its image as a violator of human rights after its leaders acknowledged there had been instances of torture, execution, and

abuse of dissidents in its exile camps and in some black townships during the antiapartheid struggle. In 1993 the party apologized for past abuses, but it refused to punish its human rights

violators or to pay compensation to the victims or their families.In 1994 the ANC proposed a number of controversial cabinet appointments, adding to the difficulties inherent in trans- forming itself from a former liberation movement into a broadbased political party. A notable case was that of Winnie Mandela, who had earlier been regarded as South Africa's "first lady

of liberation." She had staged a political comeback after being

stripped of her official posts in the ANC and after being

shunned by many black leaders because of her 1991 conviction

for her part in a kidnapping that had resulted in a death. Her

five-year jail sentence was set aside for a fine, but she was subsequently removed from the ANC's NEC and as head of its Welfare Department.

Mrs. Mandela went on to organize an independent power

base in the restive and impoverished squatter camps, where she was respected for her activism on behalf of the poor. In some

communities, Mrs. Mandela was able to capitalize on the widespread distrust of government that extended even to black

leaders like Nelson Mandela. During the preelection negotiations, she had criticized power-sharing proposals as a deal

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South Africa: A Country Study

between "the elite of the oppressed and the oppressors" and

had charged ANC leaders with "the distortion of a noble goal

in favor of a short-cut route to parliament by a handful of individuals." But while she chided ANC leaders for their new-found

"embourgeoisement," Mrs. Mandela continued to live in relative luxury in the Johannesburg township of Soweto. Even after

she fell out of favor with the government led by her husband in

1994, she remained popular, especially among the poor and

unemployed. Her defiance of the government led to her

removal from office in March 1995.

South African Communist Party

In 1994 the South African Communist Party (SACP) was not an independent political entity, but a strong faction within the

ANC, where its members held important leadership positions.

Former party leaders, Joe Slovo and Chris Hani, for example,

had both served as chief of staff of the ANC's military wing and

on its most important committees. The SACP won strong representation in the National Assembly in 1994, not by participating openly in the April 1994 elections, but by having SACP

members well represented among delegates from the ANC.

The SACP was originally founded as the Communist Party of

South Africa (CPSA) in July 1921 in Cape Town. The CPSA was formed out of the merger of several leftist organizations,

including the International Socialist League (ISL), the Social

Democratic Federation, the Durban Marxist Club, the Cape

Communist Party, and the Jewish Socialist Society. The CPSA

affiliated with the Communist International (Comintern),

headquartered in Moscow, which provided it with political

direction, although some party factions opposed Moscow's

intervention in South African affairs. Although whites dominated the party in the 1920s, some

CPSA leaders attempted to strengthen its reputation as an

indigenous communist organization by increasing its African

membership and orientation. David Ivon Jones and Sidney Percival Bunting, formerly of the ISL, translated the concept of

social revolution into a struggle for a "black republic" and a "democratic native republic, with equal rights for all races." The major stumbling block they encountered was the belief,

inherent in Marxist dogma, that all workers fundamentally

share the same interests. In South Africa, white workers generally felt they had little in common with their black counterparts

280
Government and Politics

and feared that any improvements for black workers would

reduce their own status and income.

Despite efforts at Africanization, the CPSA failed to establish

strong ties with black political organizations, many of which

were dominated by traditional tribal leaders. In 1928, for example, the ANC denounced the "fraternization" between the ANC

and the CPSA. ANC President James T. Gumede was removed

from office in 1930, after trying to educate ANC members

about Marxism. Even as the CPSA gradually succeeded in

recruiting more black members, its leadership continued to be

white. For this reason, two ANC Youth League leaders in the

1940s—Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu—opposed any alli- ance between the ANC and the CPSA at that time.

CPSA members were divided over the increasing Comintern

intervention in local affairs. Moscow urged the CPSA and all communist parties to continue to be small, revolutionary elite organizations, and to rid the party of alleged "rightist" elements. In 1931 a new Stalinist faction, led by Douglas Wolton,

Molly Wolton, and Lazar Bach, assumed leadership roles in the

CPSA and proceeded to purge the party of many white leaders. In the internal upheaval that followed, the party lost black support, too, and weakened its ties to labor. As its leadership ranks were "Stalinized" and leading party activists fled the country,

CPSA membership dropped from an estimated 1,750 members

in 1928 to about 150 in 1933. Racial divisions continued to exist between the predominantly white leadership and the

largely black membership ranks.

At the outset of World War II, the CPSA opposed efforts to counter the Nazi threat, primarily because of the 1939 NaziSoviet Nonaggression Pact, which led to Soviet neutrality. Party

members campaigned against military recruitment of blacks

(and Indians) in South Africa, arguing that the "natives"

should not be sacrificed to perpetuate their own exploitation.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the CPSA

echoed Moscow's shift to support the anti-Nazi campaign, and

the South African government responded by releasing some

CPSA activists from detention and permitting political activities in support of the war effort. By the mid-1940s, CPSA membership was increasing, and the

party had gained influence after a few CPSA members (all

white) won political office. After the 1948 NP election victory,

however, the government quickly restricted black political

activity and in 1950 banned the CPSA. The party went under281
South Africa: A Country Study

ground temporarily but also strengthened its ties to local

nationalist organizations, such as the ANC. During the years it was banned, while the ANC continued to operate legally, the

CPSA viewed the ANC as the primary expression of black aspirations for a multiracial socialist state under eventual communist leadership. The Comintern's Sixth Congress declared that

"the CPSA could now play an active role in the ANC." The party

re-emerged in 1953 under the leadership ofJoe Slovo and his

wife, Ruth First, and changed its name to the SACP.

The SACP and the ANC in the 1950s held similar views

about policy and tactics as embodied in the ANC's Freedom

Charter; in addition, they both advocated the use of guerrilla

warfare against the apartheid regime in order to bring about

the dual-phase revolution of political liberation followed by

economic transformation. Party members reportedly persuaded the ANC to abandon African nationalism in favor of

nonracialism, however, although the SACP, unlike the ANC,

viewed the primary objective of the revolution as the creation

of a socialist state. After many leaders of both organizations were arrested in 1963, both the SACP and the ANC shifted

their political and military bases of operations to neighboring

African states. The close ties between the SACP and the ANC, particularly

the predominance of SACP members in the ANC, have always

been controversial, and in 1959 prompted a split by black

nationalists from the ANC to form the militant Africanist, anticommunist PAC. The SACP-ANC relationship evolved into a

symbiosis, derived in part from their dual memberships and

overlapping leadership ranks. Throughout the 1980s, for

example, the SACP was well represented on the ANC's NEC

and in other key ANC positions, and in ANC-affiliated labor

organizations, such as COSATU.

When the SACP was unbanned in February 1990, its strength was difficult to estimate because many party members

had been underground for years. In July 1990, a party spokesman publicized the names of twenty-two SACP members who

were prominent in national politics but said that the names of

others would remain secret. In 1991 SACP leaders estimated

that the party had 10,000 dues-paying members, but refused to publish the party's membership rolls. SACP chairman Joe Slovo was the most prominent party

member in government in 1994. Slovo was a trained lawyer and

advocate, a member of the Johannesburg Bar, and one of the

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original members of MK, the ANC military wing. He served on

the ANC's revolutionary council from 1969 until it was disbanded in 1983, became the first white member of the ANC's

NEC in 1985, and served as MK chief of staff until April 1987.

He was appointed SACP general secretary in 1986, following

the death of Moses Madhiba, and continued in that post until

1991, when he became party chairman. Slovo was appointed

minister of housing in the Government of National Unity in

May 1994 and served in that post until his death in January

1995.

Slovo had been a hard-line communist, a Stalinist, when he

joined the party in the 1940s, but along with others in the

SACP had followed Moscow's 1980s reforms. By 1987 Slovo and

his associates espoused the creation of a multiparty state with a mixed economy, and sought to broaden the party's membership base. This liberal philosophy might have explained the

SACP's large representation among ANC leaders in the 1990s.

The collapse of the Soviet system in the late 1980s had weakened the SACP's outside support and appeared to have weakened the appeal of the socialist ideals the party espoused for

South Africa. Party activists believed, nonetheless, that the

remaining economic disparities among racial groups provided

fertile ground for SACP recruitment in the 1990s.

SACP leaders, considerably weakened by the murder of

Chris Hani in 1993, debated the possibility that the party no

longer represented a political asset to the ANC, as they prepared for the April 1994 elections. They realized that the SACP

could do little to help the ANC broaden its popular support

beyond its liberation allies, and public opinion polls gave the

SACP, alone, strong support among only about 5 percent of

voters. By including a large number of SACP members among

the electoral delegates representing the ANC in the April 1994

elections, however, the SACP was able to gain significantly

more representation in the national and provincial legislatures

and more key posts in the government than it would have, had

it run independently.

National Party

In the early 1990s, the National Party (NP), led by President

de Klerk, led the white community in radically transforming

the apartheid system and ushering in nonracial democracy.

This process also served to transform the NP into a modern

democratic party, while at the same time depriving it of the

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South Africa: A Country Study

uninterrupted political dominance it had enjoyed for some

forty-five years. The present-day NP emerged out of Afrikaner organizations

of the early 1900s. Founded by General J.B.M. Hertzog in January 1914 as an expression of Afrikaner ideology and ethnic

nationalism, the NP sought to strengthen racial separation and

to oppose British rule in South Africa. The NP, in alliance with

the Labour Party—a white organization led by Colonel F.H.P. Creswell—defeated General Jan C. Smuts's ruling South Afri- can Party (SAP) in parliamentary elections in 1924. In 1933 the

NP formed an alliance with the SAP, and the alliance was for- malized in 1934 as the United South Africa National Party, or

the United Party (UP). The merger prompted staunch segregationists from Cape Town to establish the Purified National

Party under the leadership of Daniel F. (D.F.) Malan, to counteract the UP's relatively moderate positions on race. The UP

ruled until it was unexpectedly defeated by Malan's party (then

known as the Reunited National Party, owing to a reconciliation with a conservative faction of the UP) in parliamentary

elections in May 1948. After the 1948 elections, the victorious

alliance—again under the banner of the NP—ruled without

interruption until April 1994.

The NP's dominance over political and security organizations gave it a vast patronage pool for its mostly Afrikaner constituency. Numerous cultural, social, economic, and religious

organizations also furthered Afrikaner interests, including the

Afrikaner Broederbond (later Broederbond, or Brotherhood),

Nasionale Pers (National Press), South African National Life

Assurance Company (Sanlam), the Voortrekkers (a scouting

organization), the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge—FAK),

Helpmekaar (an Afrikaner social service organization, roughly

translated "mutual aid"), and Volkskas (People's Bank).

Although the party did not publish membership figures,

much was known about its organization—a federal structure

divided into four provincial parties, linked through a Federal

Council. At the lowest level were the party's local branches,

consisting of 500 or fewer members. Local branches in rural

areas reported to a District Council, which comprised a leader, a deputy leader, a secretary, and elected representatives from

each local branch in the district. In addition, local branches

elected Constituency Divisional Councils. Above each divisional council were a Head Council, a Provincial Congress that

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Government and Politics

met annually, and a provincial leader. At the apex of the NP

was the thirty-seven-member Federal Council that met at least once a year. The national leader of the NP, who until 1994 was

also the state president, was elected by the party's parliamentary delegates in caucus. Under P.W. Botha's leadership in the 1980s, the NP began to change directions, first to reform, and then to dismantle, apartheid. Although these reform initiatives led to a number of

splits within the NP, the reformist wing (referred to in party

parlance as verligte, or "enlightened") was sufficiently strong, its parliamentary delegation sufficiently disciplined, and its national leadership sufficiently cohesive to enable the party to remain in power as its members vigorously debated the question of reform. The NP quickly recovered after its conservative

faction, led by Transvaal NP leader Andries Treurnicht, abandoned the party in February 1982 in protest against the proposed "power-sharing" constitution that established the

tricameral parliament. Treurnicht launched the Conservative

Party (CP), which gained immediate parliamentary representation through the conversion of seventeen NP members of parliament. The NP nonetheless retained its majority in the next

elections in 1987.

The most dramatic changes in the NP began in 1989, when

President Botha relinquished his party leadership following a

stroke and was replaced by then Minister of Education FW. de

Klerk. De Klerk committed himself to establishing a new postapartheid South Africa, over the objections of Botha, who had

retained his position as president. The NP's Federal Council in

June 1989 went on to pass a five-year plan to reform apartheid.

As de Klerk and Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha prepared to discuss their planned political reforms with Zambian

president Kenneth Kaunda later that year, President Botha

objected to the pace of the proposed reforms, and he opposed

any plan to hold discussions with Kaunda. In August 1989, his

intransigence finally prompted the cabinet to ask him to

resign. He did so in a televised broadcast, and de Klerk suc- ceeded him as president. In national elections in September

1989, the NP under de Klerk's leadership remained in power

both in the national House of Assembly and in the provincial

legislatures, and de Klerk was confirmed as president for

another five-year term.

The NP then spearheaded the reform process that paved the

way for the postapartheid political system (see Constitutional

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South Africa: A Country Study

Change, this ch.). The NP also sought to project a new party

image. In 1990 it launched a nationwide recruitment drive for

new members of all races, appointed a new management council and new regional secretaries to oversee its reforms, and

established new training programs for party leaders, to emphasize racial tolerance. These changes broadened the party's parliamentary support. In May 1991, five MPs deserted the Labour

Party, which since 1965 had represented the interests of the

coloured community, to join the NP delegation. Their view that

the new NP best represented the interests of their community

was rejected by most of the Labour Party, but the NP continued

to seek the support of the roughly 1.6 million voters in the

coloured community.

As the April 1994 elections approached, the party tried new

approaches to win support among the country's black majority.

One of its campaign tactics was to emphasize its active role in

dismantling apartheid and to portray itself as the liberator of

the country's black population. The NP also portrayed the

ANC as intolerant of political dissent.

The NP failed to gain many black votes in the April 1994

elections but nonetheless won the second-largest vote—20.4

percent of the total, gaining eighty-two seats in the National

Assembly. The NP won a majority in the Western Cape, garnered the second-largest vote in seven provinces, and ranked

third in KwaZulu-Natal. Despite its second-place performance

in the elections, the NP—by virtue of its long-term political

dominance—still exerts strong influence in the state bureaucracy and the country's security forces.

Inkatha Freedom Party

The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP, also Inkatha) is a Zulubased political party, based in its ethnic stronghold, KwaZuluNatal. It is the ANC's main rival in the black community.

Between 1970 and 1990, Inkatha portrayed itself as a moderate

and democratic organization, contrasting its views with extremist positions within the ANC. But in the early 1990s, the IFP

became increasingly intransigent in its efforts to preserve its traditional power base in KwaZulu, while the rest of the country was moving closer to nonracial democracy under the now

moderate NP and ANC leadership.

Inkatha was originally established in 1922 as a cultural move- ment to promote the Zulu heritage. It was rejuvenated in 1928

by the Zulu king, Solomon ka Dinuzulu, as Inkatha ya kwa Zulu

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Government and Politics

(Organization of the Zulu). During this phase, controversy

arose over the party's activities. For example, critics claimed

that funds collected from Natal's impoverished black population were misused to pay for King Solomon's lavish life-style.

Others suggested that the organization's 1928 constitution,

written by a white lawyer from Durban at the urging of white

businessmen in Natal, was intended to ensure that the party

would express the interests of the traditional tribal elites, the

conservative black petite bourgeoisie, and a few white power

brokers. After a period of relative inactivity, and following an

unsuccessful attempt to revive it in 1959, Inkatha ya kwa Zulu

was reestablished as a political organization in March 1975 by

KwaZulu's chief minister, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi.

Buthelezi renamed the organization Inkatha Yenkululeko

Yesizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement). In August

1990, following the unbanning of antiapartheid organizations,

Inkatha proclaimed itself a political party, the IFP, with membership open to all races. From its primarily Zulu political base, Inkatha has played an important role in national politics. In 1977 it was the largest

legal black movement in the country, having an estimated

120,000 members; by the late 1980s, its leaders estimated their

membership at 1.5 million (considered highly inflated by the

inclusion of the party's 600,000-member Youth Brigade and

500,000-member Women's Brigade). It has never managed to recruit many members outside the Zulu community, however.

The IFP in the 1990s is a tightly knit and authoritarian organization, dominated by Buthelezi. Its political structure consists

of local branches organized into regions and provinces. The

IFP's four provincial councils are led by the IFP National Council. Provincial delegates elect representatives to the annual general conference, where delegates to the National Council are elected each year. The IFP's power base is rooted in three

sources—the former KwaZulu homeland bureaucracy, which

the party controlled by virtue of its dominance over the local

legislature and provincial government; the Zulu traditional

leaders—i.e., chiefs and headmen; and the Zulu population,

including the inhabitants of large squatter settlements near sev- eral cities, especiallyJohannesburg and Durban.

Although Inkatha and the ANC had close ties in the early

1970s, their relationship deteriorated after that. Inkatha

became especially threatened by ANC organizing efforts

among educated and urban Zulus. The ANC criticized

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South Africa: A Country Study

Buthelezi for becoming the leader of the KwaZulu homeland,

and thereby accepting the government's demographic manipulation for apartheid purposes. The ANC pressed for a more

militant antiapartheid campaign and waged a propaganda war

against Buthelezi, demonizing him as a "stooge" of apartheid.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, this rivalry degenerated into

violent conflict, spilling over into townships and rural areas, and claiming the lives of thousands of black South Africans.

Some Western observers and South African political leaders

hoped that the IFP, rooted in Zulu tradition and Western in its outlook in support of a federalist democracy and free enterprise, would attract moderate South African blacks to its ranks.

That prospect dimmed in the climate of escalating violence

leading up to the 1994 elections. Buthelezi protested against

his being sidelined by what he considered "ANC-NP collusion"

in the negotiating process, and in early 1994 he announced

that the IFP would boycott the country's first free elections.

The IFP ultimately participated in the elections, after the

ANC and the NP agreed to consider international mediation

on the issue of provincial autonomy and agreed to reinforce

the status of Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini and the Zulu homeland. The party's late entry cost it popular support at the polls,

however. The IFP managed to win barely one-half of the vote in

Natal and only 10.5 percent of the nationwide vote, with most

of its support in KwaZulu and the area aroundJohannesburg.

The IFP's commitment to Zulu autonomy remained strong

after the elections. In May 1994, at a caucus of the KwaZulu legislative assembly, Inkatha formed a new society called Iso

Lesizwe, or Eye of the Nation, with Chief Buthelezi as its president. The new organization dedicated itself to pursuing Zulu

autonomy "within the parameters of democratic and pluralistic

forms of government and along with all the other peoples liv- ing in the ancestral territory of the Zulu nation." Debate over

this issue intensified in 1995 and 1996.

Freedom Front

The Freedom Front (FF) is a right-wing Afrikaner political

party established in March 1994, following a split among

extremist organizations, to ensure a proapartheid presence in

the April elections. It is a successor to the Afrikaner Volksfront

(AVF), which was founded by General Constand Viljoen, who

had also served as chief of the South African Defence Force

(SADF) until November 1985. Viljoen emerged from retire288
Government and Politics

ment in 1991 to lead a group of right-wing former generals in

forming an alliance of Afrikaner parties. As the AVF, the alli- ance included the White Protection Movement (Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging—BBB) , the Boerestaat Party (Boer State Party,

the military wing of which was known as the the Boer Resistance Movement, or the Boere Weerstandsbeweging—BWB),

the Conservative Party of South Africa (CP), the Reconstituted

National Party (Herstigte Nasionale Party—HNP), the Oranjewerkers (Orange Workers), and the Republic Unity Movement. The AVF's objective was to unify the extreme right and to advocate the formation of a volkstaat, an autonomous Afrikaner

nation-state, in a postapartheid South Africa. However, even some AVF leaders were troubled by the violent racism and

political extremism of some members of the front. Their

refusal to participate in the nation's first nonracial elections

weakened the movement, and in March 1994 General Viljoen

and his allies broke away to form the FF. Much of the support for the FF comes from farmers' organizations in the former Transvaal and the Free State. Among the

FF's leaders are several former Conservative Party members of

parliament, former high-ranking military officers, and a former chairman of the Broederbond.

In the 1994 elections, the FF received only 2.2 percent of the

vote, gaining nine National Assembly seats. The party performed best in Gauteng, where some 40 percent of its votes were cast. Its participation in the elections helped to legitimize

the electoral process and thus to neutralize the violent threat

that the extremist right-wing extraparliamentary forces could

have posed to the new political system. In doing so, it bolstered

the standing of Viljoen and others who sought to preserve Afrikaner cultural autonomy through nonviolent means.

Other Political Parties

The Democratic Party (DP) was established in April 1989 as a liberal, centrist party. It was formed as an amalgamation of

four liberal political groupings, the most important of which

was the recently disbanded Progressive Federal Party (PFP), led

by Zach de Beer. The coalition also included the Independent

Party (IP), led by Dennis Worrall; the National Democratic

Movement (NDM), led by Wynand Malan; and a group of

reform-minded Afrikaners dubbed the "fourth force." The DP

then became the primary left-of-center parliamentary opposi289
South Africa: A Country Study

tion to the NP. It won 20 percent of white support in the 1989

general election, giving it thirty-three parliamentary seats. The DP advocated the abolition of apartheid and the cre- ation of a nonracial social democratic state through the protection of human rights, a government based on proportional

party representation and universal suffrage, an independent

judiciary, collective bargaining in industrial relations, and eco- nomic growth through individual entrepreneurship. Ironically,

the NP adopted some of the DP's notions about reforming the

apartheid state in 1989 and 1990, thus depriving the DP of

some of its political base. A few DP leaders advocated an alli- ance with the ANC; others favored joining the NP; and the

embattled center—led by the party's leader de Beer—sought to develop a distinctive, liberal, centrist image that would serve to mediate between the ANC and the NP. At the same time, the

DP sought, without much success, to expand its support among

all racial groups.

In preparation for the April 1994 elections, the DP's eco- nomic program gave top priority to creatingjobs in a "free market economy with a social conscience," while rejecting the

"nationalization of privately owned businesses and the expropriation of property for political purposes." The DP also

opposed "economic populism," socialism, and the "politicization of education, housing, and social services." Its political

program criticized the interim constitution for failing to eliminate laws that allowed detention without trial, and for failing to ensure the political independence of the media. The DP also

opposed the antidefection clauses in the interim constitution,

which made it difficult for members of parliament to break

ranks and vote against the dictates of their party leaders. The

DP called, instead, for a constitution based on individual

rights, property rights, press freedom, women's rights, proportional representation within constituencies, federalism, devolution of federal powers to the provinces, and the direct election

of senators by the provincial electorates.

In the 1994 elections, the DP's performance was considered

disastrous, as it won only 1.7 percent of the vote and gained

only seven seats in the National Assembly. The voting results

revealed that it had failed to broaden its urban, middle-class,

and English-speaking white base. It had won only about 3 percent of the coloured vote in the Western Cape, a comparable

percentage of the Indian vote in KwaZulu-Natal, and no significant black support.

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Government and Politics

The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was established in April

1959 by ANC dissidents who opposed that group's multiracial

orientation and advocated black liberation within an exclusively black nationalist context. The party was founded in the

black townships of Orlando and Soweto, outside Johannesburg, where it has received most of its support. The government declared the PAC an "unlawful" organization in 1960,

because it advocated violent rebellion against the government.

Like the ANC, the PAC was recognized by the United Nations

(UN) and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as an

official South African liberation movement. It was unbanned

on February 2, 1990.

As advocates of the black liberation struggle, the PAC's

founders criticized the ANC for diluting black nationalism by

accepting white members (and Asians and coloureds). The

PAC also opposed the ANC's alliance with the SACP because

most PAC leaders rejected Marxist economic dogma (although

the PAC had advocated some Maoist tenets in the late 1960s).

Instead, the PAC advocated an indigenous form of African

"communalism." It rejected the ANC's Freedom Charter

because the charter sought to guarantee minority rights in a future postapartheid state, and issued instead the Azanian

Manifesto in 1959. The manifesto promoted armed struggle by

black South Africans as the only means of seizing power, over- throwing capitalism, and restoring their birthright of African

landownership. Finally, unlike the ANC, which engaged in

extensive political organizing through formal party structures,

the PAC believed in the inevitability of national liberation

through the spontaneous revolt of the masses. From 1960 to 1990, the PAC's activities ranged from mass

action campaigns, such as a campaign in 1960 to overcome

what it termed "black psychological subservience to whites," to protests against the hated pass laws that required black South

Africans to carry identity documents. One such demonstration

in March 1960 led to at least sixty-seven deaths at police hands

and more than 11,000 arrests in subsequent disturbances. The

PAC's military wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army

(APLA)—then known by the name "Poqo" (loosely translated

"blacks only") —also engaged in an underground armed struggle against white-dominated political and cultural institutions

(see Consolidating Apartheid in the 1960s, ch. 1).

After the PAC was banned in 1960, the organization went

underground, with headquarters located in Maseru, Lesotho.

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South Africa: A Country Study

It was led by an executive committee, the members of which

had either evaded arrest or been released from prison. The

PAC's senior leaders included its charismatic founder, Robert

Sobukwe; acting president Potlako Leballo, who resigned

under pressure in 1979; Vusumazi Make, who succeeded Leballo; John Pokela, who became leader in 1981; Johnson

Mlambo, who succeeded Pokela as chairman in 1985; and Clar- ence Makwetu, who became president in 1990.

Following the PAC's unbanning in 1990, it reorganized as a

legal political party, although its military wing continued to operate underground until 1994. Its internal organization consisted of a thirty-five-member National Executive Committee

led by President Makwetu, first deputy president Johnson

Mlambo, second deputy president Dikgang Moseneki, and general secretary Benny Alexander.

The PAC has eight working committees and a five-member

National Coordinating Committee. Its members are organized

into 105 local branches nationwide. Affiliated organizations

include the Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu), a youth

wing; the All African Student Committee (Aasac) ; the National

Council of Trade Unions (Nactu); the African Organisation for

Women (AOW); the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM);

the Sobukwe Forum, a London-based faction; and the Pan-Africanist Students' Organisation (PASO), which has branches at several South African universities.

Although the PAC played little role in the multiparty negotiations during 1993 and early 1994, it formally suspended its armed struggle in early 1994 and agreed to participate in the

April elections. It gained only 1.2 percent of the national vote,

receiving five seats in the National Assembly, and it won one

seat in each of three provincial legislatures—in Gauteng (then

Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging—PWV) , KwaZulu-Natal,

and the Eastern Cape.

Several other political parties participated in the 1994 elections, although, with the exception of the African Christian

Democratic Party (which gained two seats in the National

Assembly and seats in three of the nine provincial legislatures),

none received more than 1 percent of the vote. These parties

included the Sports Organisation for Collective Contributions

and Equal Rights (SOCCER), the Keep It Straight and Simple

Party (KISS), the Women's Rights Peace Party (WRPP), the

Worker's List Party (WLP), the Ximoko Progressive Party

(XPP), the Africa Muslim Party (AMP), the African Democratic

292
Government and Politics Movement (ADM), the African Moderates Congress Party

(AMCP), the Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa (DPSA), the

Federal Party (FP), the Luso-South Africa Party (LUSAP), and

the Minority Front (MF).

Interest Groups

Interest groups have played a significant role in South Afri- can politics, although until apartheid was abolished the primary criterion for interest articulation was race, more often

than economic issues. Interest groups work to achieve the goals

of a particular ethnic community (Afrikaner, Xhosa, Zulu),

racial group (white, black, coloured, or Indian) , or other cate- gory of persons sharing a common goal. Leonard Thompson

and Andrew Prior, in their book South African Politics, describe

apartheid-era attempts by groups such as the Afrikaner Broederbond to win political influence in the parliament and the

executive branch in order to maintain the status quo, while

others, such as trade unions, sought to change labor relations

and economic policy. Still other interest groups, such as the

South African Media Council, had specific goals, in this case

the establishment of a free and independent press. Finally, sev- eral organizations that were effectively banned from the political arena, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the

Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), continued to function as

political interest groups during the apartheid era. Within this system, the Afrikaner interest groups were the

most influential, as they constituted an element in the country's ruling elite. After apartheid was abolished, however, interest-group politics began to change. Many organizations

abandoned their ethnically based, secretive, extraparliamentary, or underground characteristics to meet the challenges of

the new nonracial, open, and democratic political order.

Afrikaner Broederbond

The Afrikaner Broederbond (later Broederbond, or Brotherhood) was the most important apartheid-era interest group

in South Africa. Functioning for almost sixty years as an elite,

exclusively Afrikaner, secret society, the Broederbond gradually

shifted its perspective on the future and supported the political

reform process beginning in the early 1980s.

Founded in 1918, the Broederbond became a secret organization in 1921 and dedicated itself to advancing Afrikaner

political, cultural, and economic interests. Membership was

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South Africa: A Country Study

restricted to white Afrikaner males who passed a rigorous selection process. One of the group's primary goals was to place

Afrikaner nationalists in key political positions and to establish

other organizations to further Afrikaner interests. With members of the Broederbond in key leadership positions, the NP

government often promoted the interests of the group.

The Broederbond's organizational structure and political

strategy were first publicly disclosed in the late 1970s by Hennie

Serfontein, an Afrikaner journalist who devoted much of his career to investigating the organization. According to internal

Broederbond documents, in 1993 the society reportedly had

20,074 members—one of the highest figures in its history

organized into twelve regions and 1,392 branches, or cells. Branches varied in size from five to twenty members, and central committees in towns and cities coordinated branch activities. Branch cells selected representatives to regional councils,

the next higher level of organization. Top policy-making

authority was vested in the National Congress (Bondsraad),

which met every two years and elected the organization's senior

executive authorities, the Broederbond chairman and the

Executive Council. The Executive Council served for two years;

in 1993 it had eighteen members.

The Broederbond played an important role in transforming

apartheid. Major governmental policy shifts in areas such as education and sports were first tested in Broederbond discussions before being aired in parliamentary debate. Then in

November 1993, in preparation for the postapartheid political

system, the Broederbond adopted a new constitution that radically transformed the previously clandestine organization. The

Broederbond changed its name to the Afrikanerbond,

removed its cloak of secrecy, and abolished its Afrikaner male

exclusivity by permitting women and all racial groups to join.

Some membership restrictions remained—new entrants had to speak Afrikaans, had to subscribe to the organization's constitution, and had to be approved by the other members. These

restrictions helped to ensure the continued importance of Afrikaner interests and identity.

United Democratic Front

The United Democratic Front (UDF) was an extraparliamentary organization established in 1983, primarily in opposition to the government's constitutional proposals of that year.

It served as an umbrella organization of antiapartheid groups.

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Government and Politics

Membership was open to any organization that endorsed the

principles of the ANG's Freedom Charter. Affiliates of the UDF

included the Congress of South African Trade Unions

(COSATU), the South African National Student Congress

(Sansco), the National Union of South African Students

(NUSAS), and the Congress of South African Students

(COSAS).

Following clashes with the government, the UDF was effectively banned—i.e., its political activities were proscribed

under the terms of the emergency regulations of February 24,

1988, and many of its affiliates were reorganized under the

guise of a new political coalition. The UDF disbanded on

August 20, 1991, declaring that its major objectives had been

fulfilled. Mass Democratic Movement

The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) was the name of an informal coalition of antiapartheid groups during the 1970s

and early 1980s. As a formal organization, the MDM was established as an antiapartheid successor to the UDF after the 1988

emergency restrictions effectively banned the UDF and several

other opposition groups. Even after 1988, the MDM was a temporary loose coalition of antiapartheid activists with no permanent constitution, no official membership rolls, no national or regional governing body, and no officeholders. Like the UDF,

the MDM drew much of its support from the black community;

a condition for affiliation with the MDM was adherence to the

provisions of the ANC's Freedom Charter.

The MDM gained prominence in 1989, when it organized a campaign of civil disobedience in anticipation of national elections scheduled to take place in September of that year. Defying the state-of-emergency regulations in effect at the time,

several hundred black protesters entered "whites-only" hospitals and beaches. During that month, people of all races marched peacefully in several cities to protest against police

brutality and repressive legislation. When the UDF was

unbanned in February 1990, most MDM leaders and many

members rejoined their former organizations.

Trade Unions

Labor activism dates back to the 1840s, when the first unions were formed. Most major industrial unions were organized

after World War I either to support or to oppose racial privi295
South Africa: A Country Study

leges claimed by whites. Black and communist organizations

formed antiapartheid unions to abolish racist policies in the

workplace; most proapartheid unions were formed by government forces to support discriminatory labor practices. During

the apartheid era, membership in most trade unions was based

on race, and until 1979, the government did not recognize

black unions or grant them labor law protection. In 1977, for

example, out of 172 registered trade unions that were eligible

to bargain collectively, eighty-three were white, forty-eight were

coloured, and forty-one were open to whites, coloureds, and

Asians. Among the proapartheid and all-white unions were the

White Workers' Protection Association (Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond), the Mineworkers1 Union, and larger coordinating

bodies such as the South African Confederation of Labour.

The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU),

formed in the early 1950s, became the leader of the antiapartheid struggle in the labor movement. The government often

arrested and harassed its leaders for political agitation. During

the 1970s, however, the government recognized the need to exert greater control over labor activities and to improve government-union relations. In 1977 it established the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, headed by Professor

Nicolas Wiehahn. The Wiehahn Commission recommended

the legalization of black unions, in part to bring labor militants

under government control. The government recognized black

unions in 1979 and granted them limited collective bargaining

rights. In the same year, the government established a National

Manpower Commission, with representatives from labor, business, and government, to advise policy makers on labor issues.

During the 1980s, business owners and management organizations, such as the Afrikaner Trade Institute (Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut—AHI), which had represented Afrikaner

commercial interests since the 1940s, were forced to negotiate

with black labor leaders for the first time. To adapt to the new

labor environment, they established the South African Employers' Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs (SACCOLA) to represent the owners in lobbying and collective bargaining ses- sions.

Black union membership soared during the 1980s. New

labor confederations included the nonracial COSATU, which

was affiliated with the ANC and the SACP; the PAC-affiliated

National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu); and the IFP-affili- ated United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). By

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Government and Politics

1990 COSATU, the largest of these, had more than thirty

union affiliates with more than 1 million members.

Efforts to begin dismantling apartheid during the early

1990s meant that union leaders were pressed to represent

workers' interests more vigorously in the changing economic

environment. Although the largest unions had been strong

ANC supporters in the past—and were vital to ANC efforts to mobilize popular demonstrations against apartheid—they

began to clash with ANC party officials and with government

leaders in 1994 and 1995. Some union members feared that

workers' interests would be overlooked in the effort to implement economic development plans in the postapartheid era.

Political Elites Although change was evident at all levels of society as South

Africa began to dismantle apartheid during the 1990s, particularly dramatic changes were occurring in the country's political

and social leadership. Not only were new leaders emerging on

the national level, but shifts were also occurring within political

organizations, as new political expectations and aspirations arose and as new demands were placed on political leaders at

all levels. Since 1948 the country's governing class, the political elite,

had been dominated by Afrikaners. Afrikaners held most high

positions in government, including the legislature, the judiciary, the cabinet, and the senior ranks of the military and

security services. Afrikaners also came to dominate the larger

community of leaders, the power elite, by assuming important

roles in the civil service bureaucracy, and to a lesser extent in

business, the universities, and the media. Afrikaner dominance

was reinforced by the rules of apartheid, in large part because

the government's security and intelligence services helped to enforce the rules of apartheid through other institutions.

In general, during the apartheid era, English-speaking

whites were less important in the political and power elites. They played only secondary roles in most areas of government.

English speakers were, nevertheless, prominent in commerce

and industry, where the Afrikaners' success had lagged behind

their political achievements, as is explained by Thompson and

Prior. By the 1980s, English-speaking whites also held important positions in universities and the media, and in a few areas of government.

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South Africa: A Country Study

In the early 1990s, these political and power elites were

evolving, as is demonstrated in the authoritative survey of

elites, Who's Who in South African Politics, by the South African

writer Shelagh Gastrow. Gastrow divided South Africa's dominant political leaders into four major categories: political leaders within the Afrikaner community, most associated with the

NP; an older generation of black opposition leaders, most

within the ANC; a younger generation of leaders emerging

from the Black Consciousness Movement; and a new group of

labor leaders who had risen to prominence as the trade union

movement strengthened during the 1970s and 1980s. A fifth

category might be added—according to South African political

scientist Roger Southall, who reviewed Gastrow's book—the

small number of white political leaders who attempted to

reshape white politics along nonracial, democratic lines. A subsequent revised edition of Gastrow's book identified

118 individuals—110 men and only eight women—as constituting South Africa's evolving political elite in 1992. Among the

obvious changes occurring at that time was the emergence of

formerly imprisoned, exiled, or banned opposition leaders,

who had been released from prison or had been legally recognized since early 1990. They could then be legally quoted in

the country's media, and their ideas were being widely disseminated. In addition, new challengers arose to replace formerly

entrenched leaders, especially conservative blacks, coloureds,

and Indians who had gained office through various forms of

state patronage in the black homelands or in other institutions

of government.

Changes were also occurring within the senior ranks of the

organizations from which the country's new leaders had

emerged. As the ANC, for example, was forced to cooperate

with former opponents, especially the NP, in pursuing national

goals, new alliances and friendships were formed, shaped in

part by a pragmatic appraisal of the political realities of the

time. In addition, former opposition groups—especially the

ANC—began to revise their rhetoric from that of guerrilla

opponents of government, or "states in exile," to adapt to their

new positions of responsibility. The ANC's best educated,

skilled technocrats, capable of managing governmental and

other bureaucracies, were gaining particular prominence.

At the same time, a greater distance was developing between

these educated elites and the less educated rank-and-file within

their own organizations. In particular, there was a growing dis298
Apartheid-era civil servant leaving bcation in Lebowa

Courtesy R. T. K Scully

tance between the ANC and its radical youth wing in late 1994

and 1995. There was also a growing distance between the ANC

leadership and their former ally, the South African Communist

Party (SACP). Ties between these two organizations had not

only been close in the past; their membership and leadership

rolls had overlapped.

In some cases, the new elites appeared to have more in com- mon with members of rival political organizations than with

their organization's own members. Several new government

leaders, for example, were drawn from traditional African

elites—royal families, chiefs, and influential clans. President

Mandela, while a university-trained lawyer, is also a descendant

of a leading family among the Thembu (Tembu), a Xhosa subgroup. Like Mandela, the prominent Zulu leader and minister

of home affairs, Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi, is universityeducated and the product of aristocratic origins. Buthelezi, a

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South Africa: A Country Study

member of the Zulu royal family, is also a chief within the

Buthelezi sub-group (also, "tribe") of the Zulu.

Other members of South Africa's new government also represent ethnic elites. For example, the minister of public enter- prises in 1995, Stella Sigcau, is the daughter of a well-known

Pondo paramount chief, Botha Sigcau. Stella Sigcau also had

served as chief minister in the Transkei government during the

early 1980s.

Many former ANC officials who were in government office

in the mid-1990s had worked to overcome factional differences

based on ethnicity during the apartheid era. Although the

ANC is often stereotyped as "Xhosa-dominated," and a number

of its officers are Xhosa, several ethnic groups have been represented in the ANC's senior ranks. Thomas Nkobi, treasurer

general from 1973 through the early 1990s, represents a subgroup within the Zimbabwe-based Shona people. Former Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa and National Working

Committee member Sydney Mufamadi are Venda (VaVenda

see Ethnic Groups and Language, ch. 2). Ramaphosa's former

deputy, Jacob Zuma, is one of several Zulu leaders who rose to prominence within the ANC. The ANC's former security and

intelligence specialist, Patrick "Terror" Lekota, and former MK

leader Joe Modise are Sotho (BaSotho). Several popular

regional leaders are Tswana (BaTswana). In general, these

leaders have rejected arguments that favored the use of ethnicity to define political factions.

Age differences appeared more divisive than ethnicity within

the ANC during the early and the mid-1990s. There were

heated debates over questions of political succession, as the

ANC's aging leaders—many over the age of seventy—faced

challenges from the generations below them. Nelson Mandela

was seventy-five years old when he was elected president in

1994, and several other ANC leaders were more than seventy

years of age. Their most likely successors—especially Mbeki,

Ramaphosa, Zuma, and the ANC's former director of intelli- gence, "Mac" Maharaj—were roughly two decades younger.

Some of the ANC's younger militants threatened revolt against

senior party figures in the early months of the new government, as their demands for jobs, homes, and improved living

standards continued to be unmet. Criticism of the "older generation" was fueled in late 1994 and early 1995, when the president's former wife, Winnie Mandela, clashed with the

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Government and Politics

government and was ousted as a deputy minister, as she championed the grievances of the ANC's militant youth.

As the apartheid system was being dismantled, some members of the Afrikaner elite in government, the civil service, and

the security services reacted with impressive flexibility. By

adapting quickly to the new environment, many of them not

only retained their valued positions in the bureaucracy but

also won new respect from former adversaries. As the ANC

assumed responsibility for the security establishment, the

police, and the intelligence services, ANC leaders were often

able to work. closely and cooperatively with Afrikaners who had

once been so effective in excluding blacks from the political

process.

The shift in power and influence among the country's political elites had begun well before the April 1994 elections. An

important arena in which this power shift occurred was that of

the political negotiations concerning the interim constitution

of 1993. During those negotiations, as difficult and unpromising as they sometimes appeared, then-governing whites began,

some for the first time, to view their black counterparts as legitimate partners in the decision-making process. At the same

time, many black leaders adjusted smoothly to the new climate

of political tolerance.

Communications Media

South Africa's communications media were radically trans- formed by the political reforms sweeping the country in the

1990s. The most fundamental changes were the gradual easing

of government censorship and its abolition in the interim constitution. In spite of frequent government censorship under

apartheid, however, South Africans had received news reports

through numerous publications and broadcasts.

Under apartheid, a vast array of legislation and regulations

had imposed limits on the media. The South African Press

Council, for example, had the power to fine newspaper editors

for defying emergency regulations, which often barred cover- age of political events. Under emergency regulations in the

1980s, journalists were forbidden to report on banned organizations and people; the media were prohibited from reporting

events relating to "state security," such as protests and demonstrations. The public then had to rely on the government's

Bureau of Information for official reports of political events. And for violating emergency regulations, some journalists were

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South Africa: A Country Study

detained—even without being charged—and newspapers were

temporarily suspended. Some editors and reporters were prosecuted, and foreign journalists were expelled or refused entry

visas. Similarly, the Publications Control Board, under the Publications Act (No. 42) of 1974, censored certain books and

movies, especially those dealing with race relations.

In the early 1990s as part of the government's pledge to

reform apartheid, many of the emergency regulations relating

to the media were removed. Thus, the Protection of Information Act of 1982, which imposed penalties on publications that

violated national security, was repealed in February 1990 and

less stringent guidelines for protecting sensitive information were established. Thereafter, the press, including numerous

mainstream and alternative publications, was generally independent, criticizing both the government in power and the var- ious opposition parties involved in the political transformation.

Radio and Television

South Africa has an estimated 12.1 million radio receivers

and more than 3.5 million television sets in the mid-1990s.

Radio and television broadcasting (with the exception of MNet, a privately owned, subscriber-based cable television ser- vice) is controlled by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), a statutory body that obtains its revenue from

licenses and advertising. It operates twenty-two domestic radio

broadcasting services in eleven languages through SABCRadio, one external radio broadcasting service in seven languages through Channel Africa Radio, and two television channels that broadcast in seven languages through SABCTelevision. Although M-Net was the only privately owned televi- sion network (with more than 880,000 subscribers), there were

at least six privately owned commercial radio stations by 1996.

The most fundamental change in the role of the media in

the mid-1990s took place in the SABC, which had been controlled by NP-led governments and had generally expressed

government views. In April 1993, a new twenty-five-member

SABC board began to prepare the SABC for the postapartheid

era as an independent, autonomous, and impartial broadcasting authority. President de Klerk relinquished the right to

appoint its board members, and the members of the board

were selected publicly for the first time, after an independent

judicial panel had screened the nominees to ensure political

neutrality. Ironically, however, as a reflection of the new bal302
Union Buildings house government offices and

National Archives (Pretoria).

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth Africa, Washington

ance of forces in the country, an estimated nineteen of the

twenty-five new board members were ANC members or were

generally believed to be ANC supporters, and new complaints

of political bias in the media began to emerge.

Another major change in the broadcasting system was the

establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority in

January 1994, as authorized by the Independent Broadcasting

Authority Act (No. 153) of 1993. The authority consists of a seven-member panel, appointed by the minister of home

affairs after a period of public discussion and nominations.

The authority in 1994 required all broadcasters to reapply for

operating licenses. It issued temporary licenses to most, and it obtained court orders to close down a few broadcast stations

that had not applied for licenses. Permanent licenses were

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South Africa: A Country Study

issued in 1995, after five months of public hearings and debate

over the rules of broadcasting in South Africa.

Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals

More than 5,000 newspapers, magazines, and journals were

registered with the South African Department of Home Affairs

byJanuary 1994; sixty-six new ones registered in that year, and

registration was no longer required after 1994. As in other

nations, newspaper and magazine publishers are organized

into corporate groupings. Major corporations include the

Argus Printing and Publishing Company, Perskor, and Times

Media. Newspapers are printed in English, Afrikaans, and sev- eral African languages. The country's two national newspapers,

which are printed on Sundays, are the Sunday Times and Rapport Both are printed in several cities, simultaneously. The Sunday Times had a circulation of about 524,164 in 1995, and

Rapport, about 396,974. Other major newspapers (and 1995 cir- culation figures) are City Press (262,203), The Sowetan

(204,219), and The Star (199,753) (see table 19, Appendix).

South Africa has more than 300 consumer magazines and

500 trade, technical, and professional publications. Huisgenoot, a weekly Afrikaans publication, sold more than 520,000 issues

in 1995, while You, its English counterpart, sold nearly 300,000

issues. The leading business and political magazine is the

weekly Financial Mail, with approximately 32,000 subscribers.

The South African Press Association (SAPA) is the country's

national news agency. It is a forty-member nonprofit cooperative, engaged in foreign and domestic news-gathering and dis- tribution. Foreign news agencies operating in South Africa

include Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Reuters, and

United Press International.

Foreign Relations

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for South Afri- can foreign policy decisions. The Department of Foreign

Affairs (DFA) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts

liaison with foreign governments and international organizations on all matters affecting official relations. These relations are conducted through foreign government officials, through

diplomats accredited to South Africa, and through South

Africa's accredited embassies, consulates, and other missions

abroad. Until the early 1990s, the DFA and the diplomatic

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Government and Politics

corps competed against numerous counterestablishment "diplomatic services" run by antiapartheid organizations in exile,

especially the ANC. The aim of these parallel communication

channels was to isolate the South African government within

the international community as a means of pressuring Pretoria

to abolish apartheid.

After the abolition of apartheid and the inauguration of the

democratically elected Government of National Unity, South

Africa's foreign relations were dramatically transformed. The

country's diplomatic isolation ended, and existing relations

with other countries and with international organizations

improved. South Africa reestablished diplomatic and trade

relations with many countries, particularly in Africa, and established new relations with some former sanctions "hardliners,"

such as India, Pakistan, Bahrain, Malaysia, Jordan, Libya, and

Cuba. Several regional and international organizations invited

South Africa to join, or to reactivate its membership, including

the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Southern Afri- can Development Community (SADC), and the United

Nations (UN). In addition, South Africa participated in international and bilateral sport, academic, and scientific activities,

often for the first time in decades. Relations with the countries

of the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Central

Europe improved. South Africa had full diplomatic ties with

thirty-nine countries in 1990; that number increased to sixtynine in 1993, and to at least 147 in 1995.

After the April 1994 elections, President Mandela appointed

two ANC members, Alfred Nzo and Aziz Pahad, as minister and

deputy minister of foreign affairs. He refused to make immediate sweeping changes in the diplomatic corps. The pillars of

South Africa's future foreign policy had been enunciated by

Mandela in late 1993, in an article published in Foreign Affairs. These principles are the promotion of human rights and

democracy; respect for justice and international law in interstate relations; the achievement of peace through "internationally agreed and nonviolent mechanisms, including effective

arms-control regimes"; incorporation of African concerns and

interests into foreign policy choices; and economic development based on "cooperation in an interdependent world." In

southern Africa, Mandela denounced South Africa's earlier

economic domination of the region and its deliberate destabilization of neighboring states. Instead, Mandela called for "cooperation in regional construction, infrastructure and resource

305
South Africa: A Country Study

development projects ... in virtually every sector and area."

Finally, Mandela advocated the full reintegration of South

Africa into global trade networks.

These foreign policy principles were being implemented

even before Mandela's inauguration. For example, in early

1994 de Klerk and Mandela, along with the presidents of

Botswana and Zimbabwe, helped mediate an end to a military

revolt in neighboring Lesotho. In mid-1994, South Africa provided its first assistance to a UN peacekeeping operation when

it supplied hospital equipment for Rwanda. Also in 1994, President Mandela agreed to help resolve the intractable civil war in

Angola, although he cautioned against unrealistically high

expectations in this and other deep-rooted political and ethnic

conflicts.

Relations with African States

Official delegations from almost every other African state vis- ited Pretoria in 1992 or 1993 to discuss ways to strengthen bilat- eral ties. South Africa's estimated 100 assistance projects in

twenty-two African countries in 1991 more than doubled by

1994 and provided technical aid and training in agriculture,

wildlife conservation, education, and health care. The effects

of the early-1 990s drought in southern Africa would have been

even more devastating to the region's agriculture and wildlife if South Africa had not provided transportation and food assis- tance to its neighbors.

The change in South Africa's regional standing was dramatically marked by its admission to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 1994. The twelve-member

organization (also including Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,

Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) aims to promote regional cooperation in economic development and security affairs. The SADC

annual meeting of heads of state and government was held in

Johannesburg on August 28, 1995. The assembled leaders

agreed to create a regional common market with the elimination of all internal trade barriers by the year 2000. They also

signed an agreement to share water resources among SADC

member nations.

Almost all African countries had depended on South African

trade even during the sanctions era, despite their strong rhetorical condemnation of the apartheid regime. In 1991 South

Africa's trade with the rest of the continent was at least US$3.5

306
Government and Politics

billion, and this figure increased steadily as apartheid was

being dismantled.

For the five landlocked countries of southern Africa

(Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Malawi), South

Africa's well-developed system of roads, railroads, and port

facilities provides a vital trade link. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), headquartered in South Africa, provides

a common customs area, including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Namibia (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3).

Botswana

Relations with Botswana were normalized in the early 1990s,

after a period of strained ties in the 1980s. The most contentious issue between the two countries had been Botswana's will- ingness to provide safe haven for the ANC military wing, MK,

and, to a lesser extent, for other opposition groups such as the

Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA—the exter- nal wing of the Black Consciousness Movement). Although

Botswana officially prohibited ANC use of its territory as a base

for attacks against South Africa, the ANC violated this policy

during the 1980s, provoking several small-scale raids by the

South African Defence Forces (SADF) against ANC bases in

Botswana. At the same time, although Botswana joined in the

international condemnation of apartheid, its geographic and

economic vulnerability deterred it from imposing economic

sanctions against South Africa, with whom it maintained extensive but unpublicized trade relations.

Relations improved in the early 1990s, as apartheid was gradually dismantled. ANC camps in Botswana were closed in 1991

and 1992, as several hundred political exiles returned to South

Africa under a program administered by the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Lesotho

Until the 1960s, several South African governments pressed

for the incorporation of Lesotho, then a British protectorate,

into the Union of South Africa. As a landlocked country completely surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho depended heavily

on South Africa for its economic well-being. After Lesotho

became independent in October 1966, South Africa played a major role in the country's internal affairs—for example, by

supporting the new government led by Chief LeabuaJonathan.

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South Africa: A Country Study

Tensions between the two countries rose in the 1970s

because of Lesotho's criticism of South Africa at the UN and at the OAU, its support for the ANC, its provision of safe haven to antiapartheid fighters such as MK, and its close ties to a number of socialist countries. Relations became severely strained in

April 1983, when the Jonathan government announced that

Lesotho was at war with South Africa, and again in 1984, when

Lesotho refused to sign a nonaggression pact with South

Africa. In response, South Africa impounded shipments of

arms to Lesotho, threatened economic sanctions, and sus- pended talks concerning the Lesotho Highlands Water Project

(a thirty-year cooperative engineering venture that would supply water to South Africa and provide electric power and financial compensation to Lesotho). Tensions eased in 1984, as some ANC forces withdrew from Lesotho, but in 1985 new ten- sions prompted Pretoria to step up security measures along the

border between the two countrries.

In early 1986, South Africa backed a military coup in

Maseru, bringing into power a government more sympathetic

to Pretoria's security interests. Lesotho expelled several ANC

members and technicians from the Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (North Korea), whom Pretoria considered a menace, and relations between the two nations improved.

Work on the Highlands Water Project resumed, and in 1987

they established a joint trade mission. Relations continued to improve after that, and the countries established full diplomatic ties in May 1992. Pretoria recognized the outcome of

Lesotho's March 1993 elections, the first in twenty-two years. In January 1994, Lesotho's democratically elected civilian

government sought South African assistance in quelling an army mutiny over pay and conditions of service in the Lesotho

Defence Forces. Pretoria refused to intervene directly, but

threatened to seal off Lesotho's borders, which would have

blocked vital commercial transportation to and from Maseru.

De Klerk and Mandela, together with the presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana, urged both sides to negotiate an end to the

crisis, a move that represented the likely pattern of postapartheid diplomacy in southern Africa.

Swaziland

South Africa's relations with the Kingdom of Swaziland, one

of Africa's smallest nations—which South Africa surrounds on

the north, west, and south—were shaped by the kingdom's

308
Government and Politics

complete dependence on its powerful neighbor for its eco- nomic and political well-being. During the 1970s and early

1980s, although Swaziland claimed to be neutral in the East- West conflict, it was actually pro-Western and maintained

strong relations with South Africa, including clandestine cooperation in economic and security matters. South Africa

invested heavily in Swaziland's economy, and Swaziland joined

the Pretoria-dominated SACU. During the 1980s, some South

African businesses also used Swazi territory as a transshipment

point in order to circumvent international sanctions on South

Africa. Relying on a secret security agreement with South

Africa in 1982, Swazi officials harassed ANC representatives in

the capital, Mbabane, and eventually expelled them from Swaziland. South African security forces, operating undercover,

also carried out operations against the ANC on Swazi territory.

Throughout this time, part of the Swazi royal family quietly

sought the reintegration of Swazi-occupied territory in South

Africa into their kingdom.

In June 1993, South Africa and Swaziland signed a judicial

agreement providing for South African judges, magistrates,

and prosecutors to serve in Swaziland's courts. South Africa

also agreed to provide training for Swazi court personnel. In

August 1995, the two countries signed an agreement to cooperate in anti-crime and anti-smuggling efforts along their com- mon border.

Zimbabwe

Bilateral relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe

improved substantially as apartheid legally ended. In December 1993, the foreign ministers of both countries met for the

first time to discuss ways to improve bilateral ties. Tensions

between the two countries had been high since 1965, when

South Africa demonstrated tacit support for the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by white-dominated Rhodesia

(Southern Rhodesia), a former British colony. South Africa

also had assisted the new regime led by Prime Minister Ian

Smith for almost fourteen years, until it was brought down by a combination of guerrilla war and international pressure.

After Rhodesia's independence as Zimbabwe, the government in Harare supported mandatory sanctions against South

Africa and provided political, diplomatic, and military support

to the ANC in its armed struggle. Zimbabwe also provided military assistance, including troops, for Maputo's struggle against

309
South Africa: A Country Study

South African-supported insurgents in the Mozambican

National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana

MNR or RENAMO). SADF troops retaliated against Harare,

with two raids on alleged ANC bases in the capital in 1986 and

1987, and bomb explosions in Harare in October 1987 and in

Bulawayo in January 1988.

Relations between the two countries began to stabilize in

1990, after Mandela was released from prison and South Africa

moved toward constitutional reform. Even before international

sanctions against South Africa were lifted, a number of unpublicized ministerial contacts took place to discuss matters of

trade and transport. President de Klerk and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe met publicly for the first time on January

27, 1994, when de Klerk, Mandela, Mugabe, and Botswana's

President Quett Masire joined together in urging a peaceful

resolution to a military mutiny in Lesotho.

President Mandela visited Harare in early 1995. The two

countries debated trade issues throughout the year, primarily

centered around efforts to dismantle apartheid-era tariffs. In

November 1995, a ceremony attended by presidents Mandela

and Mugabe marked the opening of a new bridge linking the

two countries, across the Limpopo River.

Namibia

South Africa's relations with Namibia (formerly South-West

Africa) were normalized following the 1988 agreement that

paved the way for the solution to the interlinked conflicts in

Namibia and Angola. Prior to this agreement, Namibia had

been under South Africa's control since 1919, when Pretoria

received the League of Nations mandate over the territory

then known as South-West Africa. In 1946 the UN refused

South Africa's request to annex the territory. In 1964 South

Africa introduced apartheid in South-West Africa (Pretoria had

granted Europeans living there limited self-governing privileges since 1925).

The United Nations General Assembly in 1966 voted to revoke South Africa's mandate and to place the territory under

direct UN administration. South Africa refused to recognize

this UN resolution until 1985, when President Botha ceded

administrative control to the territory's interim government.

South Africa allowed a UN peacekeeping force and an administrator to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), establishing the United Nations Transitional

310
Government and Politics

Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. Finally, on December

22, 1988, South Africa signed an agreement linking its withdrawal from the disputed territory to an end to Soviet and

Cuban involvement in the long civil war in neighboring

Angola. Namibia's new government, led by the South-West

Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), was elected in a landslide victory in November 1989.

After Namibia's independence in March 1990, South Africa

and Namibia established diplomatic ties, but relations between

the two countries were uneasy, in part because many of

Namibia's senior government officials had been leaders in the

guerrilla war to oust South Africa from their country. Namibia

nonetheless joined the Southern African Customs Union

(SACU) and continued to be almost totally dependent on

South Africa in trade and investment. In 1992, for example, 90

percent of Namibia's imports came from South Africa, and

South Africa purchased 30 percent of Namibia's exports. Relations improved as apartheid was dismantled.

The two countries established aJoint Administrative Authority to manage the port facilities at Walvis Bay, Namibia's only

deep-water port, which had remained under South African

control after Namibian independence. Under pressure from

the ANC, South Africa then agreed to transfer control over the

port enclave to Windhoek before the 1994 elections. Namibia

finally assumed control over Walvis Bay on March 1, 1994.

The prospects for multiracial democracy in South Africa

prompted Namibia to sign a series of bilateral agreements with

Pretoria in anticipation of the close ties they hoped to maintain

through the rest of the 1990s. One of these, signed in 1992,

pledged cooperation in supplying water to arid regions of both

countries along their common border. In December 1994,

President Mandela announced his government's decision to write off Namibia's debt, an estimated US$190 million owed to South Africa. He also transferred most South African state property in Namibia to Namibian government ownership.

Mozambique

After Mozambique's independence from Portugal in 1975,

relations between South Africa and Mozambique were shaped

by the rise to power of the revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique

FRELIMO) government, and in particular, by FRELIMO's com- mitment to support regional liberation movements. South

311
South Africa: A Country Study

Africa provided covert military assistance to the anti-FRELIMO

insurgency, RENAMO. In an attempt to curtail South Africa's

intervention, Maputo entered into negotiations with Pretoria

in late 1983, resulting in a non-aggression pact, the Nkomati

Accord, in 1984. This accord committed both countries to end

their assistance to each other's opposition movements, and to establish a joint security commission to monitor implementation of the pact. South Africa continued to assist RENAMO,

however, and relations between the two countries worsened.

After unsubstantiated allegations of South African involvement in the death (in a plane crash) of Mozambican president

Samora Machel in October 1986, demonstrators attacked the

South African trade mission in Maputo. Pretoria threatened to

retaliate by banning Mozambican migrant laborers from South

Africa's mines, but this plan was not implemented. Even after

South African security forces raided ANC bases around Maputo

in 1987, presidents Botha and Joaquim Chissano met to try to revive the Nkomati Accord. They agreed to establish a joint

commission on cooperation and development, whereby South

Africa would protect Mozambique's Cahora Bassa power lines,

which had been targets of RENAMO sabotage, and would assist in improving Maputo's harbor as well as road and rail links with

South Africa.

Relations continued to improve in 1989 following a South

African initiative to help resolve Mozambique's civil war. Although both Chissano and RENAMO leader Afonso

Dhlakama rejected Pretoria's proposal of United States mediation in Mozambique, Pretoria nonetheless played an important

role in persuading the two men to pursue a negotiated peace.

South African president de Klerk, Zimbabwe's president

Mugabe, and other regional leaders urged Mozambique's war- ring parties to sign a peace agreement and, after they did so in

October 1992, to prepare for democratic elections. In December 1992, the UN began deploying 7,500 troops for the UN

Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), and the date for

Mozambique's first multiparty elections was finally set for October 1994.

In 1993 South Africa and Mozambique agreed to formalize

their trade missions in each other's capitals and to upgrade diplomatic ties. Late that year, the two countries agreed to cooperate in repatriating more than 350,000 Mozambicans who had

sought refuge in South Africa—some of the more than 800,000

Mozambican refugees scattered throughout the region. The

312
Government and Politics UNHCR reported that refugees continued returning to

Mozambique throughout 1994 as the elections approached.

After South Africa's April 1994 elections, Deputy President

Mbeki opened communication channels with RENAMO leaders, including Dhlakama, in an effort to help preserve the fragile peace in Mozambique. President Mandela made his first official state visit to the country on July 20, 1994, and he

emphasized the challenges both countries faced in strengthening democratic institutions. The two governments signed

agreements establishing a joint cooperation commission to pursue shared development goals in agriculture, security, trans- portation, and medicine.

In 1996 the two countries began to implement a South Afri- can proposal for a small group of South African farmers to set- tle and farm land in Mozambique. The proposal had

originated in the desire of a few Afrikaner farmers to leave

South Africa, and both governments viewed it as a possible

means of improving the agricultural infrastructure in Mozambique and of providing jobs for farm laborers there. For Pretoria, the proposal held some promise of reducing the influx of

farm workers into South Africa.

Zambia

South African-Zambian relations until 1990 were shaped by

Zambia's support for antiapartheid movements inside South

Africa, by its agreement to allow anti-South African SWAPO

guerrillas to operate from Zambia's territory, and by its antiRENAMO assistance to government forces in Mozambique. As

one of the leaders of the frontline states against South Africa,

Zambia provided safe haven for the ANC, which had its headquarters in Lusaka, prompting military reprisals by South

Africa in the late 1980s. Relations between the two countries

improved as apartheid was being dismantled in the early 1990s,

leading to several visits by the two countries' leaders. Thenpresident Kaunda visited South Africa for the first time in February 1992, and the two countries established diplomatic ties and began to normalize trade relations later that year. (Zambia

was already South Africa's second largest African trading partner.) President de Klerk visited Lusaka in mid-1993, the first

visit by a South African head of state. In 1994 South Africa con- tinued to be the most important source of Zambian imports

mostly machinery and manufactured goods—and the two

313
South Africa: A Country Study

countries were exploring new avenues for trade during the rest of the 1990s.

Angola

South Africa has long-standing geographic, commercial, and

political ties with Angola, which became independent from

Portugal in November 1975. Until the early 1990s, relations

between the two countries were strained, however, owing primarily to South Africa's extensive military support for the

insurgent movement in Angola. The National Union for the

Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi,

had waged a sixteen-year war against the Marxist-led government in Luanda. Pretoria became Savimbi's patron principally

because it feared the threat of Soviet and Cuban expansionism,

but by the late 1980s, a new geostrategic environment was emerging in the region. The Cold War ended, accompanied by

the collapse of Angola's superpower patron, the former Soviet

Union; Cuban forces withdrew from Angola as part of the 1988

Angola-Namibia Accord, and the Angolan civil war ended tentatively, with a peace agreement in May 1991.

Angola's first democratic elections in September 1992 failed,

after Savimbi refused to accept his electoral defeat and the war

resumed. Pretoria then supported a negotiated outcome to the

festering civil war, although a few South Africans (said to be

operating outside Pretoria's control) continued their support

to Savimbi.

Relations between South Africa and Angola deteriorated

after Pretoria withdrew its diplomatic representation from

Luanda in late 1992. Early in 1993, however, both governments

again began working to normalize diplomatic ties, and Pretoria

promised to crack down on private channels of assistance from

South Africa to Savimbi. Although de Klerk announced that

South Africa would grant recognition only after a fully representative government had been installed in Luanda, Pretoria

reopened its offices in Luanda and upgraded diplomatic ties in

mid-1993. The two countries established full diplomatic relations on May 27, 1994, and Luanda appointed an ambassador

to South Africa later that year. In June 1994, President Mandela agreed to requests by UN

Special Envoy to Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye, to attend talks with Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Savimbi

in an effort to end the fighting in Angola. Pretoria initially pro314
Government and Politics

vided the venue for talks between dos Santos and President

Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, as dos Santos sought an end to Zairian assistance to UNITA. Finally, in November 1994, Mandela witnessed an agreement between dos Santos and Savimbi

to end the fighting in Angola and to begin rebuilding the

country, and the slow process of disarming rebel fighters began

in 1995.

Kenya

South Africa had long maintained relatively cordial relations

with Kenya, one of Africa's leading pro-Western governments,

although until 1990 these ties were mostly unpublicized and

centered around trade. The nature of their relations changed

in November 1990 when South Africa's minister of foreign

affairs, Pik Botha, visited Kenya in the first publicized ministerial-level contact between the two countries since 1960. Relations were further consolidated when President de Klerk visited

Kenya in June 1991, and Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi vis- ited Cape Town in June 1992—the first visit to South Africa by an African head of state. In addition to strong trade ties in the mid-1990s, South

Africa and Kenya share the desire to promote cooperation

among countries of the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR). In March

1995, delegations from both countries, along with representatives of Australia, India, Oman, and Singapore, met in Mauritius to discuss ways to strengthen trade, investment, and

economic cooperation among IOR member states. Nigeria

Nigeria maintained a hostile attitude toward South Africa for

more than thirty years until the early 1990s. Then the new

political environment led to President de Klerk's visit to Nigeria in April 1992 to discuss bilateral issues, primarily trade.

South Africa and Nigeria established diplomatic relations in

mid-1994.

President Mandela was among the small number of world

leaders who in late 1995 appealed to Nigeria's military head of

state, General Sani Abacha, to spare the lives of the writer and

environmental activist Ken Sarowiwa and eight others convicted of inciting violence that resulted in several deaths in

Nigeria. After Sarowiwa and the others were executed on

November 10, 1995, Mandela called for international sanctions

against the Abacha government. South African officials later

315
South Africa: A Country Study

dropped this demand, deferring to the OAU, which was reluc- tant to impose sanctions against a member state. Relations with Non-African States

Relations with non-African states focused mainly on the

United States, Britain, and Western Europe through the 1980s.

Commercial ties, often clandestine and subject to sanctions

restrictions, were vital to the survival of many South African

industries. As sanctions were lifted, commercial and diplomatic

ties were immediately strengthened with the West, and at the

same time, new alliances were being formed in the 1990s, especially in Asia and the Middle East. United States Although the United States joined the international community in 1986 in imposing economic sanctions against South

Africa, earlier United States interests had been driven largely

by the aim of reducing Soviet influence in southern Africa.

United States officials had viewed South Africa as an important

Western geostrategic bulwark in an unstable region. All United

States administrations during the 1970s and the 1980s con- demned apartheid, but they were generally opposed to broad

economic sanctions, often arguing that the most severe impacts

of such sanctions would be felt by the same segment of the population that was most disadvantaged by apartheid. The Carter

administration (1977-81), however, adopted a tougher line

toward Pretoria, viewing African nationalism as a driving force

in the region that was compatible with United States interests.

The United States had imposed an arms embargo on Pretoria in 1964 and had joined the international consensus in refusing to recognize the "independence" of four of South Africa's

black homelands between 1976 and 1984. The 1983 Gramm

Amendment opposed the extension of International Monetary

Fund (IMF—see Glossary) credits to "any country practicing

apartheid." The 1985 Export Administration Amendment Act

barred United States exports to South Africa's military and

police, except for humanitarian supplies and medical equipment.

The United States maintained formal diplomatic relations

with Pretoria throughout the apartheid era. The United States was still South Africa's second largest trading partner, with

exports and imports valued at more than US$1.6 billion per

year, during most of the sanctions years.

316
President Frederik W de Klerk and President George Bush in

Washington, September 1990

Courtesy The White House

United States administrations tried to influence South Afri- can governments by working with them discreetly in a strategy

called "constructive engagement" during the late 1970s and

early 1980s. Guided primarily by Assistant Secretary of State for

African Affairs Chester Crocker, the United States emphasized

its common strategic interests with South Africa and insisted on

unilateral rather than multilateral negotiations over South

Africa's future (i.e., negotiations between the government and

its opposition, as opposed to negotiations participated in by

outside interests). One of the arguments against sweeping

sanctions at the time was that United States officials hoped to maintain the small degree of influence they may have had in

pressing for political reforms.

The United States also sought to bring about regional

change through peaceful and democratic means and vigor317
South Africa: A Country Study

ously supported the negotiations for Namibian independence

from South Africa. This policy approach ultimately paved the

way for the 1988 agreement that linked the withdrawal of

South African troops from Namibia with the withdrawal of

Cuban troops from Angola, in a process that culminated in

Namibia's first democratic elections in 1989 and independence

in March 1990.

With the passage of the United States Comprehensive Antiapartheid Act (CAAA) over a presidential veto in 1986, the

United States Congress established an elaborate sanctions

structure prohibiting future investments, bank loans, and some

forms of trade with South Africa. More than 200 of the 280

United States companies in South Africa sold all, or part of,

their operations there, and many of those remaining adhered

to business principles intended to ameliorate the effects of

apartheid. The CAAA called on the United States president to report to Congress each year on the state of apartheid in South

Africa, in order to assess the need for further legislation. In

1987 the Intelligence Authorization Act prohibited intelligence sharing between the two countries. By 1990, twenty- seven state governments, ninety cities, and twenty-four counties

had also imposed sanctions against South Africa or divestment measures on their own citizens' South African holdings.

In July 1991, United States President George Bush declared

South Africa's progress toward democracy "irreversible," and

the United States began to lift sanctions imposed under the

1986 CAAA. Most IMF and military-related bans remained in

force until after the 1994 elections. A few city and county-level

restrictions on dealings with South Africa remained on the

books even after 1994.

In early 1994, Washington contributed US$10 million to

assist the electoral process in South Africa, including election

observers and technical assistance to parties participating in

the elections. After the elections, the administration of President William J. Clinton announced a US$600 million, threeyear aid, trade, and investment package for South Africa. The

United States also promised to support the participation of

international lending institutions, such as the IMF, in reconstructing the South African economy.

Minor strains emerged in South Africa's relations with the

United States after the elections, however. President Mandela

was critical of the United States on several fronts, including the

level of economic assistance offered to help recover from apart318
President Nelson Mandela and

President WilliamJ. Clinton in

Washington, October 1994

Courtesy The White House

heid. Another source of tension arose out of a 1991 indictment

by a United States court against South Africa's state-owned

Armscor (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) . The case concerned apparent violations of United States arms export

controls during the 1980s. South African officials in 1994

requested that the indictment be dropped, noting that the tar- get of sanctions—the apartheid regime—had been removed

from power. United States officials refused to intervene in the

judicial process, however, and the case was finally settled without public clamor in 1996.

Washington placed South Africa on a "trade watch" list in

1996, referring to apparent trademark violations that were

being adjudicated in South African courts. These and other rel- atively minor disagreements might have been resolved fairly

amicably, had they not taken place against the backdrop of

anti-American rhetoric by South African officials on several

occasions. For example, in his determination to maintain his

government's sovereignty and freedom from outside interfer- ence, President Mandela repeatedly emphasized his loyalty and

gratitude to countries that had staunchly opposed apartheid

during the 1970s and 1980s. Among these countries were

Cuba, Libya, and Iran, which the United States considered

international outcasts or state sponsors of terrorism.

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South Africa: A Country Study

Pretoria has championed the cause of ending the thirty-yearold trade embargo against Cuba, in defiance of the United

States, and South Africa hosted a conference to promote African-Cuban solidarity in October 1995. Pretoria also forged sev- eral new cooperation agreements with Iran in 1995 and 1996,

and increased its oil purchases from Iran, over United States

objections. President Mandela proclaimed South Africa's soli- darity with Libya and welcomed that country's leader on a visit to South Africa in late 1995.

Despite these strains, South Africa and the United States are pursuing closer ties in many areas. More than 500 United

States companies have more than US$5 billion in direct investments in South Africa in the mid-1990s, and trade between the

two countries is increasing steadily In March 1995, Washington

and Pretoria established a United States-South Africa Binational Commission to improve communication and cooperation. (The United States has similar commissions with Egypt,

Russia, and Mexico.) The commission is co-chaired by United

States vice president Albert Gore and South African deputy

president Thabo Mbeki. It has six committees to investigate avenues for cooperation in agriculture, business, environment

and water resources, human resources and education, science

and technology, and sustainable energy resources. European Union

The twelve-member European Union (EU) was South

Africa's leading trading partner in the early 1990s, purchasing

almost 40 percent of its exports in most years. European

(including British) direct investment in South Africa had

reached US$17 billion, or 52 percent of all foreign investment

in South Africa, by 1992. By the mid-1990s, the EU could promise South Africa one of the world's largest markets for South

African exports. The EU also proposed a variety of loans and

grants on preferential terms for South Africa in the 1990s, as well as a US$122 million aid program for priority needs such as education, health, job creation, and human rights.

South Africa's closest European ties have been with Britain,

particularly with its Conservative Party-led governments. More

than 800,000 white South Africans retained the right to live in

Britain, although official ties weakened after South Africa left the British Commonwealth in 1961 (see Apartheid, 1948-76,

ch. 1). Britain supported the 1977 Commonwealth decision to discourage sporting links with South Africa to register interna320
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki and Vice President Albert Gore

in Washington, March 1995

Courtesy The White House

tional disapproval of apartheid, but Britain's refusal to impose

broader sanctions came under attack at subsequent Commonwealth heads of government meetings, especially in 1985, 1987,

and 1989. In September 1994, British Prime Minister John

Major, on a visit to Pretoria, promised a new investment protection treaty that would further strengthen commercial ties. France played little role in South Africa before the 1990s.

Trade between the two countries was increasing during the

decade, however. South Africa imports roughly US$1 billion in

French products a year, and at least 125 French companies

operate in South Africa. French president Francois Mitterrand

paid his first visit to South Africa on July 5, 1994, when the two

nations signed an agreement aimed at strengthening commercial ties through long-term loans, subsidies, and technical assis- tance programs. Sectoral goals for these programs include

321
South Africa: A Country Study

strengthening cooperation between the private and public sectors, urban and rural development, financial reconstruction,

and environmental protection.

Russian Federation

Pretoria severed diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in

1956, largely because of Moscow's support for the SACP. In

1964 the Soviet Union began to deliver arms to ANC military

training camps in Tanzania, and this support continued

through the early 1980s. Then in 1986, Soviet president

Mikhail Gorbachev denounced the idea of a revolutionary

takeover in South Africa and advocated a negotiated settlement

between Pretoria and its opponents. Officials from the two

countries then sought improved commercial and diplomatic

relations.

In July 1990, the South African mining conglomerate, De

Beers Consolidated Mines, advanced a US$l-billion loan to the

Soviet Union as part of an agreement for that company to serve

as the exclusive exporter of Soviet rough diamonds. In August

of that year, South Africa's minister of trade and industry, Kent

Durr, visited Moscow to discuss possible South African assis- tance in the cleanup of the former Soviet nuclear site at Chernobyl. In early 1991, the two countries agreed to open interest

sections in the Austrian embassies in each other's capitals, and

Pretoria appointed its first trade representative to Russia a year

later. Diplomatic ties were established in February 1992, and

the first ambassador to South Africa of the new Russian Federation arrived in Pretoria in December 1992. At the time, the two

countries hoped to develop trade ties, especially in military

hardware, although they were competitors in some areas of

international arms trade.

Iran

In early 1994, after a fifteen-year break, the Iranian Ministry

of Foreign Affairs began preparing to reestablish formal ties by

ending the oil embargo against South Africa. Iran had been

South Africa's primary oil supplier until the fall of the shah in

1979, when open economic and political ties were suspended.

Limited economic relations continued between the two countries, although at a discreet level. For example, the National

Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) continued to maintain its 17.5

percent share in the Sasolburg refinery of the National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa, even after other ties between

322
Government and Politics

the two countries were suspended. In 1995 and 1996, South

Africa pressed for closer ties to Iran, both to acquire oil

imports on favorable terms and to demonstrate Pretoria's will- ingness and ability to defy United States pressures to shun Iran.

Israel

One of the most hidden but critical of South Africa's strate- gic relationships during the apartheid era was that with Israel,

including both the Labor and the Likud governments. Israel

officially opposed the apartheid system, but it also opposed

broad international sanctions against Pretoria. For strategic

reasons, much of the debate in Israeli government circles

stressed coordinating ties to Pretoria within the framework of

the tripartite relationship amongjerusalem, the United States

(Israel's primary benefactor), and South Africa. Israel was also

opposed to international embargoes in general, largely as a consequence of its own vulnerability to UN and other international sanctions.

South Africa and Israel had collaborated on military training, weapons development, and weapons production for years

before broad sanctions were imposed in the late 1980s. Military

cooperation continued despite the arms embargo and other

trade restrictions imposed by the United States and much of

Western Europe. Israel and several other countries discreetly

traded with, and purchased enriched uranium from, South

Africa throughout the 1980s. Romania's former president Nicolae Ceausescu, for example, used Israel as the "middleman" for

exports to South Africa. In a few cases, joint ventures between

Israel and South Africa helped to reduce the impact of sanctions on South African businesses.

The Israeli interest in South Africa sprang in part from the

presence in South Africa of about 110,000 Jews, including at least 15,000 Israeli citizens. Israeli leaders sometimes justified

trade with South Africa as support for the South African Jewish

community, and South Africa provided a market for some of

Israel's military exports. Israel's arms trade with South Africa was estimated at between US$400 million and US$800 million

annually (see Arms Trade and the Defense Industry, ch. 5) . In

1986 Israel also imported approximately US$181 million in

goods, mainly coal, from South Africa, and exported to South

Africa nonmilitary products worth about US$58.8 million.

In 1987 Israel took steps to reduce its military ties to South

Africa to bring its policies in line with those of the United

323
South Africa: A Country Study

States and Western Europe. Then Minister of Foreign Affairs

Shimon Peres announced the Israeli plan to ban new military

sales contracts with South Africa, to reduce cultural and tour- ism ties, to appoint a committee to study sanctions proposals,

and to condemn apartheid—which Peres characterized as "a policy totally rejected by all human beings." Israel also established educational programs in Israel for black South Africans.

Nevertheless, through the early 1990s, several secret treaties

remained in force, continuing the military relationship

between the two countries and their joint research in missile

development and nuclear technology.

Relations with Other Countries

In the early 1990s, South Africa began establishing or rees- tablishing ties with many other countries. Algeria, Bulgaria,

Italy, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands,

Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, and Tunisia announced the end

of trade sanctions against South Africa in 1991 and 1992, paving the way for full diplomatic relations. Representatives of 169

countries attended President Mandela's inauguration in May

1994; by 1995 South Africa had ties to at least 147 countries.

Among the many countries that were eager for closer ties to South Africa in the mid-1990s were the Republic of China

(ROC) on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

South Africa and the ROC had maintained ties during the

apartheid era, partly because both were virtual outcasts from

the international community. The PRC had been strongly criti- cal of apartheid but had been cool toward the ANC (generally

supporting the PAC). In the 1990s, President Mandela

expressed South Africa's desire to maintain longstanding ties to the ROC and to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. In

response to PRC objections to proposals of dual recognition,

Mandela suggested that the question of sovereignty should be

decided between Taipei and Beijing, rather than being left to other countries to choose between them.

With one of the strongest economies in the world, the ROC

has been an important source of investment, trade, and tour- ism for South Africa. Taiwanese investments in South Africa,

for example, exceeded R1.4 billion in 1994, according to South

African reports, and the ROC was then one of South Africa's six

largest trading partners. In addition, Taipei made significant

contributions to South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Programme and to other areas of development.

324
Government and Politics

The PRC—with lower levels of investment, trade, and development assistance to South Africa—nonetheless represents a population of more than 1.2 billion people in the 1990s. In

addition, Beijing holds a permanent seat on the United

Nations Security Council and is recognized by most other

countries as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. With the expected transfer of control over Hong Kong to Beijing in 1997, some South African officials argued forcefully

for strengthening ties between South Africa and the PRC, even

at the expense of ties to the ROC. Opponents argued, in

response, that Taiwan's record of commitment to South Africa

and Beijing's record of disregard for international norms con- cerning human rights favored recognition of the ROC over the

PRC, at least in the mid-1990s.

International Organizations

The year 1994 marked a watershed in South Africa's international relations, as it was welcomed into regional and international organizations, such as the UN, the Organization of

African Unity (OAU), the Nonaligned Movement, and many

others. The UN already had played an important role in South

Africa's transition to democracy beginning in August 1992,

when United Nations Security Council Resolution 772 authorized the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa

(UNOMSA) to help quell political violence. UNOMSA

deployed thirty members in November of that year, and

increased the number to 1,800 to oversee the April 1994 elections.

On May 25, 1994, the United Nations Security Council lifted

the last of its punitive measures, the arms embargo of November 1977, known as Security Council Resolution 418 (strengthened in December 1984 as Security Council Resolution 558).

Pretoria then refused to pay roughly US$100 million in dues

and annual payments for the years its UN participation had

been suspended. In 1995 the UN waived most of this amount,

stating the Pretoria was not obliged to make back-payments on

behalf of the apartheid regime.

President Mandela addressed the OAU summit in Tunis in

June 1994, when South Africa assumed its seat in that organization for the first time. He emphasized his support for other

African leaders and South Africa's solidarity with African interests. Also in June 1994, South Africa rejoined the British Commonwealth of Nations, which included fifty-one former British

325
South Africa: A Country Study

colonies. This action followed a thirty-three-year absence that

had begun when South Africa declared itself a republic in

1961.

South Africa became the eleventh member of the Southern

African Development Community (SADC) on August 29, 1994,

when Deputy President Thabo Mbeki attended a SADC meeting at the organization's headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana.

SADC's predecessor, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), had been established in 1979

to attempt to reduce regional economic dependence on South

Africa. In 1992 SADCC's ten member states agreed to reorganize as SADC in order to strengthen regional ties and to work

toward the formation of a regional common market.

On September 21, 1994, South Africa became the twentyfourth member of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation

Zone and attended that organization's meeting in Brasilia.

South Africa also signed a declaration affirming the South

Atlantic as a nuclear-weapons-free zone as well as agreements

on trade and environmental protection in the region.

South African leaders in early 1996 were working to capitalize on the universal goodwill that had greeted their country's

establishment of multiracial democracy in 1994 and its emer- gence from international pariah status. It was evident, at the

same time, that some of the ANC's former staunch defenders

in Africa were expecting concessions and assistance from the

new government in Pretoria, in recognition of the decades of

support South Africa's new leaders had received during their

struggle to end apartheid.

* * * Many excellent books, monographs, and articles are available concerning the South African political system. Valuable

works include those of Robert M. Price, The Apartheid State in

Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990;

Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? Constitutional

Engineering in a Divided Society; Allister Sparks, The Mind of South

Africa: The Story of the Rise and Fall ofApartheid; Marina Ottaway,

South Africa: The Struggle for a New Order, Kenneth W. Grundy,

South Africa: Domestic Crisis and Global Challenge; Stephen John

Stedman, ed. South Africa: The Political Economy of Transformation; John D. Brewer, Restructuring South Africa; John Kane-Ber326
Government and Politics

man, Political Violence in South Africa; and Timothy D. Sisk,

Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract. Informative biographies of political leaders include two

works by President Mandela: The Struggle is My Life, and Long

Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography ofNelson Mandela; Willem de

Klerk's biography of his brother, F.W. de Klerk; Gerhard Mare

and Georgina Hamilton's An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's

Inkatha and South Africa; and David Ottaway's Chained Together:

Mandela, de Klerk, and the Struggle to Remake South Africa. Analysis

of political organizations is found in works by Edward Roux,

Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man's Struggle for

Freedom in South Africa; Baruch Hirson, Yours for the Union: Class

and Community Struggles in South Africa, 1930-1947; Anthony

Marx, Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-

1990; Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr., eds., Mandela,

Tambo, and the African National Congress: The Struggle Against

Apartheid, 1948-1990; Patrick J. Furlong, Between Crown and

Swastika: The Impact of the Radical Right on the Afrikaner Nationalist Movement in the Fascist Era; and Vernon February, The Afrikaners of South Africa.

Outstanding analyses of the country's foreign relations

include those of Pauline H. Baker, The United States and South

Africa: The Reagan Years; Stephen Chan, Exporting Apartheid: Foreign Policies in Southern Africa, 1978-1988; George W. Shepherd,

Jr., ed., Effective Sanctions on South Africa: The Cutting Edge ofEco- nomic Intervention; Gavin Maasdorp and Alan Whiteside, eds.,

Towards a Post-Apartheid Future: Political and Economic Relations in

Southern Africa; and Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern

Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

327

Chapter 5. National Security
Cape Point, outcroppings and coves typical of the southern coastline
SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ORIENTATION,

policies, and institutions were changing rapidly in the 1990s.

South Africa had settled its protracted conflict with Angola and

had negotiated independence for Namibia (formerly SouthWest Africa) after waging a twenty-two-year war to retain control over that country. South Africa signed nonaggression pacts

with neighboring states and began working toward peaceful

and constructive regional ties, while its first democratic constitution was being negotiated and implemented at home.

Domestic security concerns shifted from the uncompromising

suppression of dissent and the denial of political rights for a

majority of citizens, first, to accommodation and negotiation

with former adversaries, and, finally, in 1994 to a multiracial

Government of National Unity.

South Africa had been the dominant military and economic

power on the subcontinent for more than a century. Its military forces were not only capable of prevailing in any conceivable conventional conflict but also the only regional force

capable of sustained military operations and of projecting

national power beyond international borders. South Africa's

real vulnerability until the 1990s was internal. Its governing

philosophy and domination by a racial minority could not withstand the internal dissent generated during more than forty

years of apartheid (see Glossary).

By the late 1980s, it was evident to many political leaders and

others in South Africa that their impressive security establishment was functioning primarily to defend a failing system of

apartheid against enemies within South Africa and elsewhere.

Whites, with their monopoly over the national electoral process, were becoming increasingly polarized over tactics for dealing with the growing threat of antiapartheid dissidents. This

polarization became evident in September 1989, when the

largely Afrikaner (see Glossary) National Party (NP) suffered

its worst electoral setback since it came to power in 1948. In the

1989 elections, the NP retained its majority in the all-white

chamber of Parliament but lost ground to both the right-wing

Conservative Party (CP) and the liberal Democratic Party

(DP).

Whites who favored a stronger defense of apartheid became

even more anxious about their own future after President Fred331
South Africa: A Country Study

erik W. (F.W.) de Klerk's historic February 2, 1990, speech

announcing the legalization of black opposition groups and

the release of political prisoners including African National

Congress (ANC) leader Nelson (Rolihlahla) Mandela, and call- ing for multiracial constitutional negotiations. To those who

supported political reform, the speech heralded new hope for

domestic peace and improved relations with neighboring

states, but, at the same time, it signaled the intensification of

power struggles and an increase in violence in South Africa.

These unprecedented conditions emerged just as South

Africa's external security environment became more benign.

President de Klerk began to reduce the size and the power of

the military in relation to other branches of government; concurrently, military commanders and their former adversaries,

black liberation fighters, began to plan for the amalgamation

of their organizations into a unified military. As the political

negotiations over a new constitution proceeded haltingly during the early 1990s, a surprising degree of consensus emerged

among senior military officers on all sides of the political

debate. Even before the elections in April 1994, national and

homeland military officers and former commanders of antiapartheid fighters began the military reorganization that they

hoped would ensure the country's future peace.

Historical Background

Precolonial Warfare

Bantu-speaking populations began moving into southern

Africa from the center of the continent around A.D. 500 (see

Southern African Societies to ca. 1600, ch. 1). In the process,

they encountered the generally peaceful San and Khoikhoi

populations who had preceded them in southern Africa by at least several centuries. Warfare and the desire for better land

had been among the causes for the gradual southern migration, and some of these early chiefdoms routinely seized cattle

from their neighbors. But warfare was not central to their culture or traditions. Most of southern Africa was sparsely settled, so fights over land were relatively rare. Ambitious men sought

to control people, more than land. For example, during the

seventeenth-century expansion of the Nguni-speaking Xhosa

chiefdoms along the southern African coast, many Khoikhoi

were peacefully incorporated into Xhosa society, and at least one Khoikhoi elder became a Xhosa chief.

332
National Security

The cultural emphasis on the value of cattle, which was

strong among Nguni-speaking societies, prompted increasingly

frequent cattle raids by the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In dry areas, such as the southern fringe of the Kalahari

Desert, and in dry years, sporadic battles over land and water

occurred. These clashes were generally limited in scope and

were conducted under strict rules of engagement. Weapons

were often spears (about two meters long) thrown at a distance, or knobkerries (wooden clubs) used in close combat.

Bystanders sometimes cheered on the participants, and a battle

often ended when one side admitted defeat but was not annihilated.

During the eighteenth century, Nguni-speaking Zulu warriors earned a reputation as the most fearsome fighters in the

region. They sometimes defied tradition and fought in close

combat with broken spears, or assegais; in this way, they

inflicted unusually large numbers of casualties. The Zulu men's

age-groups, close-knit fraternities organized primarily for social

and religious purposes, provided armies when called on by

their chiefs. By the late eighteenth century, these groups

increasingly served as trained armed regiments to conduct

raids and to fend off challenges from neighboring groups.

Under the leadership of Shaka Zulu (r. 1817-28), Zulu

armies redefined military tradition, using new strategies, tactics, and formations. As Shaka's warriors became more skilled

and ruthless, they overran their weaker neighbors and drew

conquered clans into a confederacy under the Zulu monarchy.

In the upheaval that followed, known as the mfecane (or crushing—see Glossary), thousands of Africans moved north and

west, out of the expanding boundaries of the Zulu kingdom

that was located in the area that would later become KwaZulu

(see fig. 5).

Throughout the nineteenth century, European population

growth and thirst for land added to the regional upheaval, in

part because European immigrants sometimes forced African

populations off land they had only recently settled and because

Europeans sometimes used their superior weapons to annihilate or to subjugate indigenous populations. By the late nineteenth century, Zulu expansion had been halted. British forces

eliminated the few remaining African leaders who defied them

and finally subdued the Zulu army just before the outbreak of

the most devastating in a series of Anglo-Boer (see Glossary)

wars, the South African War of 1899-1902 (see Industrializa333
South Africa: A Country Study

tion and Imperialism, 1870-1910, ch. 1). Military traditions

and values continued to be central to the Zulu culture throughout the twentieth century and were reflected in Zulu political

rhetoric of the 1990s.

Early Development of the South African Military

Ground Forces The South African military evolved within the tradition of

frontier warfare fought by popular militias and small commando forces, reinforced by the Afrikaners' historical distrust

of large standing armies. Twentieth-century military developments were punctuated by mass mobilization for war and major

crises. After the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910,

General Jan C. Smuts, the union's first minister of defense,

placed a high priority on creating a unified military out of the

separate armies of the union's four provinces. The Defence Act

(No. 13) of 1912 established a Union Defence Force (UDF)

that included a Permanent Force—or standing army—of

career soldiers, an active Citizen Force of temporary conscripts

and volunteers, and a Cadet organization. The 1912 law also

obligated all white males between seventeen and sixty years of

age to serve in the military, but the law was not strictly enforced

as long as there were enough volunteers to fill the military

ranks. In 1913 and 1914, the new 23,400-member Citizen Force was called on to suppress several industrial strikes on the Witwatersrand (literally, "Ridge of White Waters" in Afrikaans,

commonly shortened to Rand—see Glossary)

In September 1914, the union's troops supported Britain's

declaration of war against Germany, despite strong objections

from Afrikaner nationalists still resentful of Britain's treatment

of them during the South African War. More than 146,000

whites, 83,000 Africans, and 2,500 people of mixed race

("coloureds") and Asians volunteered or were conscripted for

service in World War I. At Britain's request, UDF forces com- manded by General Louis Botha invaded the neighboring German colony of South-West Africa by land and sea, forcing

German troops stationed there to surrender in July 1915. In

1920 South Africa received the League of Nations mandate to govern the former German colony and to prepare it for independence within a few years. In East Africa, more than 20,000 South African troops

fought under General Smuts's command when he directed the

334
National Security

British campaign against the Germans in 1915. South Africans

also saw action with the Cape Corps in Palestine and with the

First Brigade in Europe. By the end of World War I, 12,452

South Africans had died—more than 4,600 in the European

theater alone.

Wartime casualties and postwar demobilization weakened

the UDF. New legislation in 1922 reestablished conscription for

white males over the age of twenty-one, for four years of military training and service. UDF troops assumed internal security

tasks in South Africa and quelled numerous revolts against for- eign domination in South-West Africa. South Africans suffered

high casualties, especially in 1922, when an independent group

of Khoikhoi—known as the Bondelswart-Herero for the black

bands they wore into battle—led one of numerous revolts; in

1925, when a mixed-race population—the Basters—demanded

cultural autonomy and political independence; and in 1932,

when the Ovambo (Vambo) population along the border with

Angola demanded an end to South African domination.

The UDF increased its active-duty forces to 56,000 by the late 1930s, and 100,000 men belonged to the National Riflemen's

Reserve, which provided weapons training and practice. South

Africa again joined the allies against Germany in World War II, despite growing protests by Afrikaners who objected to any alli- ance with Britain. South Africa, nonetheless, raised three divi- sions—334,000 volunteers, including some 211,000 whites,

77,000 blacks, and 46,000 coloureds and Asians. Nearly 9,000

South Africans were killed in action in campaigns in Ethiopia,

North Africa, Italy, and Madagascar during World War II. Wartime expansion was again followed by rapid demobilization after World War II. By then, a century of Anglo-Boer

clashes followed by decades of growing British influence in

South Africa had fueled Afrikaner resentment. Resurgent Afrikaner nationalism was an important factor in the growth of the

NP as the 1948 elections approached. The system of apartheid was intended both to bolster Afrikaner pride and to compensate the Afrikaners for the suffering they had endured.

After the narrow election victory by the NP in 1948, the government began the steady Afrikanerization of the military; it expanded military service obligations and enforced conscription laws more strictly. Most UDF conscripts underwent three

months of Citizen Force training in their first year of service,

and an additional three weeks of training each year for four

years after that. The Defence Act (No. 44) of 1957 renamed the

335
South Africa: A Country Study

UDF the South African Defence Force (SADF) and established

within it some quick-reaction units, or Commandos, to respond

to localized threats. The SADF, numbering about 20,000 in

1958, would grow to almost 80,000 in the next two decades.

The 1960s ushered in a new era in military history. South

Africa's growing international isolation and the intensified

black resistance to apartheid prompted the government to

increase military service obligations repeatedly and to extend

periods of active duty. The Defence Act (No. 12) of 1961 authorized the minister of defense to deploy Citizen Force troops

and Commandos for riot control, often to quell antiapartheid

demonstrations. The Defence Act (No. 85) of 1967 also

expanded military obligations, requiring white male citizens to perform national service, including an initial period of training, a period of active duty, and several years in reserve status,

subject to immediate call-up.

As the military expanded during the 1970s, the SADF staff was organized into six divisions—to manage finance, intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, and planning; and the

South African Medical Service (SAMS) was made co-equal with

the South African Army, the South African Navy, and the South

African Air Force. Also during the 1970s, the SADF began

accepting nonwhites and women into the military as career sol- diers, not only as temporary volunteers or reservists, but it did

not assign women to combat roles. By the end of the 1970s, the

army had become the principal defender of the apartheid

regime against the rising tide of African nationalism in South

Africa and the region.

During the 1980s, the legal requirements for national ser- vice were to register for service at age sixteen and to report for

duty when called up, which occurred at some time after a man's eighteenth birthday. National service obligations could

be fulfilled by volunteering for active-duty military service for

two years and by serving in the reserves, generally for ten or

twelve years. Reservists generally underwent fifty days per year

of active duty or training, after their initial period of service.

The requirements for national service changed several times

during the 1980s and the early 1990s in response to national

security needs, and they were suspended in 1993.

Air and Naval Forces The origin of the South African Air Force (SAAF) dates to the Defence Act (No. 13) of 1912, which established the South

336
Army troops on parade

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth

Africa, Washington

African Aviation Corps (SAAC) as part of the army's Citizen

Force. The SAAC's first aircraft were deployed against German

forces in South-West Africa in January 1915. Before that, a few

SAAC pilots had volunteered for service in Britain, where they

joined the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). South African pilots in

the RFC saw action over France in late 1914 and in East Africa

in 1915. By the end of World War I, nearly 3,000 South African

pilots had served in RFC squadrons.

The SAAF became a separate branch of the armed services

in 1920 and was soon put to the test in suppressing one of a

series of miners' strikes in the Rand, nearJohannesburg, as well

as rebellions in South-West Africa. World War II saw the SAAF

grow from a small force of ten officers, thirty-five officer cadets,

1,600 men of other ranks, and 100 aircraft in 1939 to a force of

31,204 servicemen, including nearly 1,000 pilots and at least

1,700 aircraft, in 1941. By 1945, the SAAF had more than

45,000 personnel in thirty-five operational squadrons. More

than 10,000 women served in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force

during the war. The air force established aJoint Air Training Scheme (JATS)

in 1940. The JATS brought British and other Allied air and

ground crews to South Africa for training and achieved impressive training records. By 1945 thirty-eight JATS training pro337
South Africa: A Country Study

grams had turned out more than 33,300 air crew and 7,800

pilots, including 12,200 SAAF personnel.

In addition to protecting Allied shipping along South

Africa's coastlines, SAAF combat and support units served in

West Africa, East Africa, North Africa, Madagascar, the Middle

East, Italy, the Balkans, and elsewhere in the European and the

Mediterranean theaters. In North Africa alone, the SAAF's

eleven squadrons flew nearly 34,000 missions and destroyed

342 enemy aircraft between April 1941 and May 1943. The

SAAF's 17,000-man contingent in the Italian campaign played

the dominant role in Allied air operations there. In all of

World War II, the SAAF flew more than 82,000 missions and

lost at least 2,227 SAAF members.

The SAAF's contributions to Western causes also included

missions during the Berlin airlift of the late 1940s; SAAF crews

flew 1,240 missions carrying 4,133 tons of supplies to West Berlin in 1948 and 1949. During the Korean War (1950-53), the

SAAF's Second Squadron (the Flying Cheetahs) flew more

than 12,000 missions, establishing a strong record of success. During that time, the SAAF reportedly lost only thirty-four

pilots and seventy-eight aircraft. By the end of the 1950s, South Africa faced increasing international isolation and the eruptions of internal and regional

conflicts, which it confronted largely without the assistance of

allies. SAAF pilots acquired the ability to fly at least twenty-six

types of aircraft on a wide range of missions. In the escalating

conflict in South-West Africa, the SAAF carried out long-range

casualty evacuations, visual and photo reconnaissance missions,

close air support, and air strikes, most often flying helicopters or light attack aircraft. The SAAF also developed both impressive early-warning equipment and maneuvering tactics to out- smart superior technology. SAAF mechanics were skilled

repairmen; some aging SAAF aircraft were used through the

1980s and were not retired until the Namibian (South-West

African) conflict wound down at the end of the decade.

The South African Navy (SAN) traces its origins back more

than a century to the UDF's seagoing vessels, and to a naval volunteer unit formed in Durban in 1885. The British Royal Naval

Volunteer Reserve established a division in South Africa in

1912. The navy's modern antecedent was the Seaward Defence

Force (SDF), established in 1940 with fifteen small ships and

several shore bases. The SDF soon grew into a force of several

escort groups and minesweeping flotillas, some of which served

338
- .....

-

. ; >;

French-manufactured Puma helicopter used by South African AirForce

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth Africa, Washington

in the Mediterranean in World War II. Many SDF personnel

saw active service in British Royal Navy vessels. The SDF was renamed the South African Naval Force in

1947 and the South African Navy in 1951. Its main assignments were to guard naval installations and harbors at Richards Bay,

Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. The

navy's small, elite Marine Corps branch had major responsibilities in this area until it was disbanded in 1957. The Marine

Corps was reestablished in 1979, with a force of about 900

marines, who trained at several installations in western Cape

Province.

Naval acquisitions were seriously impaired by international

embargoes of the late 1970s and 1980s. Navy personnel were

reduced from almost 9,000 to half that number by 1990, and

the navy bore the brunt of the military retrenchment, or downsizing, of the early 1990s. The SAN closed some facilities at Richards Bay, East London, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, and

reduced armaments depots and stores at its base at Simonstown, south of Cape Town.

Rise of the Security Establishment

Senior government officials became convinced in the 1970s

that their country faced a serious threat of insurgency orches339
South Africa: A Country Study

trated by communist world powers and carried out by their sur- rogates in southern Africa. To emphasize the comprehensive

nature of this threat, they referred to it as a "Total Onslaught,"

and to counter it, they developed a "Total Strategy," which

called for mobilizing military, political, educational, economic,

and psychological resources. The SADF emerged as the key

participant in the Total Strategy, as the centerpiece of an elaborate national security apparatus encompassing the defense

establishment, the paramilitary South African Police (SAP),

numerous intelligence agencies, defense-oriented parastatal

and private organizations, and—by the late 1970s—a growing

number of government agencies with security concerns. The

SADF's expanded role increased its influence in policy decision

making and in resource allocation. By the end of the 1970s, the

military was at the center of the country's domestic and foreign

policy, implementing its Total Strategy to outmaneuver exter- nal and internal enemies of the state. National Security Management System

Security concerns were foremost in the policies of P. W.

Botha, who became prime minister in 1978, following twelve

years as minister of defense. Botha and the new minister of

defense, General Magnus Malan, overhauled, consolidated,

and streamlined much of the government, subordinating its other functions to their security concerns. To manage this cum- bersome bureaucratic arrangement, Botha, Malan, and a few

key advisers created the National Security Management System

(NSMS) and consolidated the preeminence of the Directorate

of Military Intelligence within the government's informationgathering community.

The NSMS subsumed and co-opted existing structures, both

public and private, in a comprehensive security apparatus.

Some critics of government viewed the NSMS as a shadow or

parallel government, or even a covert infrastructure for de

facto military rule. Its mission was based upon a classical counterinsurgency strategy—to identify and to neutralize antigovernment activists and to strengthen public support ("Winning

the hearts and minds"—WHAM) for security-related activities. At the apex of the NSMS was the State Security Council

(SSC). The SSC had been established in 1972 as one of twenty

cabinet committees with advisory responsibilities to the executive branch of government. In 1979 it became the most important and most powerful of the four remaining cabinet

340
National Security

committees. Botha chaired the enlarged SSC, which also

included the minister of defense, the minister of foreign

affairs, the minister of justice, and the minister of law and

order; the chief of the SADF; the chiefs of the military and the

intelligence services; the commissioner of police; the chief of

the security police; and other senior government officials by

invitation.

The SSC functioned as a national command center, evaluating current intelligence, formulating policy, and directing a nationwide organizational network dedicated to implementing

the Total Strategy. The scope of its responsibilities, size, organizational complexity, and budget far exceeded that of any other

cabinet committee, past or present. The SSC was supported by

a Work Committee and by the State Security Secretariat staff. The Work Committee met weekly to review and to coordinate

the activities of more than a dozen interdepartmental committees and to refine issues to be put before the entire council.

The secretariat staff of about ninety consisted primarily of military and intelligence personnel.

Internally, the SSC was organized into four branches. These

had responsibility for security strategy—developing strategic

options and monitoring overall government policy; for

national intelligence—reviewing, evaluating, and interpreting

information produced by other agencies; for strategic communication—considering problems associated with the government's psychological and public-relations campaigns; and for

administration.

Below this national command center was a hierarchy ofJoint

Management Centers (JMCs), generally corresponding to SADF area commands. Twelve JMCs were operating in 1986;

these were later reduced to nine to coincide with the government's newly designated economic development areas. Headquartered in major cities, the JMCs were chaired by military or

police brigadiers (between colonel and major general), each

directing fifty to fifty-five officials and security officers. JMC

officials also directed the activities of sub-JMCs, or subcenters

composed of officials from city government, police, and military in the area. At the bottom of the security apparatus pyramid were approximately 448 minicenters, directed by

municipal officials, postmasters, fire chiefs, local defense offi- cials, and other community leaders. JMC authorities at each

level were assisted by three advisory committees specializing in

341
South Africa: A Country Study

communications; in intelligence; and in constitutional, eco- nomic, and social affairs. In the mid-1980s, the government established the Military

Area Radio Network (MARNET), a twenty-four-hour very-highfrequency system designed to link farmers in rural locations

with police and military forces in the area. The radio network

was intended to help protect civilians in emergencies, such as an armed uprising or terrorist attack, especially in the far

northern Transvaal. Other civilian defense measures included

weapons training, fire-fighting, and first-aid classes provided by

the military.

As internal dissent escalated in the mid-1980s, the government again raised minimum national service requirements,

and new legislation extended military service obligations to foreign residents of South Africa. By 1989 the SADF had grown

to an estimated 103,000 active-duty and 455,000 reserve-duty

troops. Growing civilian opposition, in the meantime,

prompted an activist End Conscription Campaign to urge civil- ians to resist military service. The number of men who avoided

conscription each year rose steadily, and the government

debated instituting a system of conscientious objection (and

alternative service) to allow a small number of conscripts to avoid military service legally, based on their religious beliefs.

But by the time such a system became law in 1992, several thousand men each year had refused to be conscripted for military

service, and a small number were prosecuted and were jailed or fined for this offense.

Regional tensions began to ease in the late 1980s. The government was reevaluating its commitment to apartheid, and

expectations of political change were becoming evident in

South Africa and throughout the region. Moreover, as the

fighting in Angola began to subside, South African troops withdrew from Namibia, and the government began to seek contacts among former opponents to negotiate a way out of the

political and economic impasse created by apartheid. National

Service obligations were scaled back; for example, in 1991 the

initial mandatory period of military service was reduced to one

year.

Specialized Farces The SADF increasingly assumed internal security functions

during the 1970s and 1980s and was deployed to urban areas of

South Africa, often referred to as the second front, to combat

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National Security

sabotage. In these nontraditional military functions, senior

officers relied on specialized military and paramilitary units,

some with unpublicized areas of responsibility.

The Special Forces were assigned sensitive missions and

operations inside and outside South Africa, which were often

closed to public scrutiny. The Special Forces consisted of five or six reconnaissance (recce) regiments during most of the

apartheid era. Other specialized units were sometimes involved

in clandestine operations, but were not technically included

among the Special Forces. The reconnaissance regiments' com- manders had the authority to initiate operations subject only to the approval of the military chief of staff for operations. The

commanding general of all Special Forces reported directly to the SADF chief.

The oldest of the Special Forces, the First Reconnaissance

Regiment, known as "One Recce," was formed in 1972 and was headquartered in Durban. It was responsible for the initial

training of all Special Forces members from the mid-1970s on. The other reconnaissance units were formed in the late 1970s

or early 1980s.

The Second Reconnaissance Regiment was headquartered

in Pretoria and was deployed largely in that area. Little public

information exists about the Third Reconnaissance Regiment,

which reportedly was disbanded during the 1980s. The Fourth

Reconnaissance Regiment, based at Langebaan, near Saldanha

Bay, specialized in seaborne operations and saw extensive ser- vice in Angola during the early and mid-1980s.

The Fifth Reconnaissance Regiment, based at Phalaborwa,

in the northeast, operated primarily in Mozambique in support

of the Mozambican National Resistance (Resistencia Nactional

Mocambicana—MNR or Renamo), but saw additional action in

South Africa and Angola. The Sixth Reconnaissance Regiment

also saw action in Mozambique. Members of the reconnaissance regiments were recruited in Zimbabwe (until 1980, Rhodesia), Angola, and Mozambique, and among South Africans

who opposed the antiapartheid struggle or the ANC, in particular, for a variety of political and personal reasons. Several other specialized military units provided clandestine

and open support for the government and its apartheid policies. For example, the South-West Africa Territorial Force

(SWATF), the Forty-Fourth Parachute Brigade, the Thirty-Second Battalion, and the Koevoet ("crowbar," in Afrikaans) counterinsurgency force had specific responsibilities for preserving

343
South Africa: A Country Study

the status quo or for defending the government. Some of these

units—which often included members of all races but were

usually commanded by whites—earned reputations for particular brutality in carrying out their missions.

Before Namibian independence in 1990, whites in that disputed territory had the same compulsory military service as in

South Africa, and they sometimes served in SADF units in

Namibia. In August 1980, the SADF established SWATF to counter the growing South-West Africa People's Organisation

(SWAPO) insurgency, which had been fighting for independence since the 1960s. SWATF included some SADF units and

local recruits; its commander, an SADF general, was both

South-West Africa secretary of defense and general officer

commanding South African army forces in the territory.

By 1987 SWATF was a 22,000-member militia, with a reaction

force element and an area force. The reaction force had a motorized brigade composed of three infantry battalions and

an armored car regiment, and a standing force of six light

infantry battalions with supporting units recruited and trained

for service in specific regions, or among specific ethnic groups.

The area force comprised twenty-six multiracial counterinsurgency forces. Additional specialized units of SWATF included

engineers, signals personnel, mounted troops, a parachute battalion, and a commando squadron. Several other multiracial

units performed territory-wide functions in South-West Africa.

The Forty-Fourth Parachute Brigade, headquartered at Murray Hill near Pretoria, was the SADF's best-qualified rapid

deployment force. The First Paratroop Battalion, its only standing battalion, was based at Tempe, outside Bloemfontein.

These forces were used extensively in South-West Africa and in

Angola during the late 1970s, and after 1980 were joined by

paratroopers from the former Rhodesian army.

The Thirty-Second Battalion, a black multinational light

infantry force, was formed in 1976 from remnants of Angolan

rebel units that had been defeated in that country's civil war. It was primarily involved in anti-SWAPO operations in Namibia.

The Thirty-Second Battalion worked closely with several recon- naissance units of the SADF. In April 1989, it moved to Pomfret, in the northern Cape Province, from which it was

deployed to quell violence in black townships in several urban

areas. During the 1980s, the 3,000-strong Koevoet counterinsurgency force, composed mostly of Ovambo fighters commanded

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National Security

by white SADF officers, conducted anti-SWAPO operations in

Namibia and earned a reputation for ruthlessness and brutality. Koevoet was largely disbanded after the territory achieved

independence in 1990, and some of its members were trans- ferred to the Namibian police force. Former Koevoet members

are widely despised by citizens and, in particular, by former

SWAPO members who have also joined the country's new

police force.

Several other specialized military units were not part of the

Special Forces, but their particular missions were defined in

part by legally established racial boundaries. The South African

Cape Corps (SACC), for example, traced its origins to a small

force of coloured soldiers who had fought together during

World War II. In 1965 Cape Corps personnel were permanently

assigned to the navy, and later some were transferred to air

force maintenance units. An Indian Corps was set up in 1974 to train Asian volunteers, primarily for the navy. During the 1980s,

these volunteers were trained at the Indian Training Centre at Durban for service in the navy or the Marine Corps.

Until the early 1990s, the military's Catering Corps was

responsible for enforcing aspects of apartheid related to food

and dining. As a general rule, caterers in any of the military

services could serve food only to members of their own racial

group. They prepared different rations for soldiers of different

racial identities and for those whose religions enforced food

prohibitions. The caterers also served special rations to the

crews of maritime aircraft, ships, and submarines, and to pris- oners of war. The State President's Guard, established as an elite, specially

trained unit in May 1967, was disbanded in October 1990. It performed both protective and ceremonial functions. As a home guard, it protected and staffed the president's homes in

Cape Town, Pretoria, Durban, and Bloemfontein while the

president was in residence. It also served as a ceremonial

honor guard at important events such as presidential inaugurations and funerals, state visits, and VIP visits. Over the course of

its twenty-three-year history, it was successively attached to the

Army Gymnasium in Pretoria, the South African Medical Ser- vice Training Centre at Heidelberg (southeast ofJohannesburg), the Fourth Provost Company in Wonderboom

(northeast of Bloemfontein), the Second Signal Regiment in

Pretoria, and the South African Army College (near Pretoria).

During the 1980s, a few presidential guard units were deployed

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South Africa: A Country Study

to border areas for ten to twelve months, in part because their

superior training enabled them to serve longer than the nor- mal three-month rotation to those regions.

Homeland Militaries

Each of the four nominally independent homelands (see

Glossary) —Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda

maintained small defense forces that were effectively under

SADF control, despite each government's claim to national sov- ereignty. (No country except South Africa recognized these

homelands as independent countries.) The homelands were

dissolved when the April 1994 elections took place, and their

military forces were integrated into the new national military

establishment in 1995 and 1996.

Bophuthatswana, with a population of 2.4 million, was

declared "independent" in 1977. The homeland consisted of

several scattered enclaves near the border with Botswana.

Bophuthatswana's military, the 3,100-member Bophuthatswana

Defence Force (BDF), was organized into six military regions.

Its ground forces included two infantry battalions, possessing

two armored personnel carriers. The BDF air wing of 150 personnel possessed three combat aircraft and two armed helicopters.The BDF was deployed several times in the late 1980s and

early 1990s to quell popular demonstrations by residents of

what had been South African territory bordering the homeland, when their residential areas were incorporated into

Bophuthatswana for administrative purposes. South African

security forces intervened to suppress these demonstrations

and at least one coup attempt against the unpopular regime of

President Lucas Mangope, who had been appointed by Pretoria.Mangope was removed from office in April 1994, after BDF

troops had killed at least forty people and had injured 150

more who were insisting on the right to vote in South Africa's

upcoming elections, a demand that Mangope refused. Members of South African right-wing white extremist organizations

arrived to support Mangope and clashed with some members

of the BDF who had sided with the civilian demonstrators. The

clash led to the highly publicized executions of two whites by

the homeland military. The unrest ended when SADF troops

arrived and placed Bophuthatswana under the control of

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National Security

South Africa's interim executive authority until the elections

took place.

Ciskei and Transkei were largely Xhosa-speaking homelands

in the southern coastal region that became the Eastern Cape

province in 1994. Ciskei, with a population of only 1 million,

became "independent" in 1981. The Ciskei Defence Force

(CDF), consisting of about 1,000 troops, was organized into

two infantry battalions, possessing one armored personnel carrier, and an air wing company with five light aircraft and four

helicopters.

Ciskei's president in the early 1980s, Lennox Sebe, established an elaborate security apparatus to protect his government, but members of his family and his army, nonetheless,

tried on several occasions to overthrow him. Sebe was ousted in a military coup in March 1990 and was replaced by a military

council led by Brigadier Joshua Gqozo. Tensions rose as the

new Ciskei government debated the reincorporation of the

homeland into South Africa, and the Gqozo government was

ousted in early 1994, only weeks before the historic South Afri- can national elections and the dissolution of the homelands.

Transkei, the second Xhosa-speaking homeland, was

declared "independent" in 1976. It had a population of about

4.4 million. The Transkei Defence Force (TDF) numbered

about 2,000, including one infantry battalion and an air wing

with two light transports and two helicopters. The Transkei

government of the 1980s had a strained relationship with

South Africa, largely because of the existence of armed strongholds of the ANC and other antiapartheid organizations in the

homeland (which included within its territory the birthplace of

ANC leader Nelson Mandela).

In 1987 Major General Bantu Holomisa—a staunch ANC

activist—led a bloodless coup against the Transkei government; he then suspended the civilian constitution and refused

South Africa's repeated demands for a return to civilian rule,

insisting that a civilian government would be a puppet controlled by Pretoria. When the homeland was dissolved in 1994,

Holomisa was named deputy minister of housing in President

Mandela's cabinet.

Venda, a tiny homeland in the northern Transvaal, had a population of about 665,000 and was declared "independent"

in 1979. Venda's 900-member military force consisted of two

infantry battalions with one armored personnel carrier, one

engineering unit, and an air wing with three helicopters. These

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South Africa: A Country Study

forces and their equipment were incorporated into the

national military in 1995.

Women in the Military

South African women have a long history of service in the

military. Women served in auxiliary roles in the SADF in World

War I and World War II, and were assigned to active, non-combat duties after 1970. The army established a volunteer nursing

service in 1914 and sent 328 nurses to serve with South African

troops in Europe and East Africa in World War I. The Women's

Auxiliary Army Service began accepting women recruits in

1916. Officials estimated that women volunteers relieved

12,000 men for combat in World War I by assuming clerical and

other duties. During World War II, South Africa had five ser- vice organizations for women—the South African Military

Nursing Service, and women's auxiliaries attached to the army,

the navy, the air force, and the military police.

In 1970 the SADF began to accept women volunteers into

the Permanent Force, and to assign them to duties that would

release men for combat and operational duties. One year later,

the South African Army Women's College initiated women's

military training programs for jobs in military finance, personnel, intelligence, and medical units. No women were trained

for combat. Women were not assigned to duties that presented

a high risk of capture by foreign enemies.

During the late 1970s and 1980s, women were active in civil defense organizations and were being trained as part of the

country's general mobilization against possible terrorist

attacks. In 1989, for example, the Johannesburg Civil Defence

Program provided training for 800 civil defense volunteers,

about one-half of whom were women. These classes included

such subjects as weapons training for self-defense, antiriot procedures, traffic and crowd control, first aid, and fire-fighting.

An unreported number of women also received instruction in

counterinsurgency techniques and commando operations.

Women also served in military elements of liberation militias in

the 1970s and the 1980s, and women were accepted into the

ANC's military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation,

also known as Umkhonto—MK), throughout the antiapartheid

struggle.

In 1995 women of all races were being incorporated into the

South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and a woman

officer, Brigadier Jackie Sedibe, was appointed to oversee the

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implementation of new SANDF policies concerning the treat- ment of women. Women had been promoted as high as war- rant officers and brigadiers in the Permanent Force by the

early 1990s, but only ten women were SADF colonels in 1994.

In 1996 Brigadier Sedibe became the first woman in the military to be promoted to the rank of major general. Widespread

cultural attitudes in the 1990s still oppose the idea of women in

combat, but officials are debating ways to assign women an

equitable share of the leadership positions in the military.

Global and Regional Issues

Since the arrival of seafaring European powers in the fif- teenth century, South Africa has never been isolated in a strate- gic sense. The Cape of Good Hope initially served as a

reprovisioning depot for Portuguese, English, and Dutch traders on their way to and from the Orient (see Southern African

Societies to ca. 1600, ch. 1). After the mid-seventeenth century,

southern Africa attracted Dutch and French Huguenot traders

and settlers, whose troops engaged in a series of wars with

indigenous Africans. In the late eighteenth century, the region was caught up in the Napoleonic wars and passed to British

imperial control. An influx of Indian laborers and traders in

the nineteenth century added an Asian dimension to South

Africa's increasingly complex multicultural society. During the

twentieth century, South Africa fought on the side of the victorious allies in the two world wars and in the Korean War; after

that, it was caught up in the global strategic contest between

the United States and the Soviet Union.

Despite the strong international presence over several centuries, South Africa's strategic position has been peripheral

rather than central. World powers have sought access to, or

control of, its remote subcontinental location and its mineral

resources as a means of furthering their own global or imperial

designs. Their arrivals and departures in southern Africa paralleled their countries' rise and fall in the international political

and economic hierarchy.

After World War II, international interest in South Africa

centered on its mineral wealth and its location along southern

trade routes and lines of communication between the Eastern

and the Western hemispheres. South Africa's potential international importance was nonetheless limited because domestic

conditions, specifically its apartheid policies, made it the object

of international scorn. Its diplomatic isolation was com349
South Africa: A Country Study

pounded by international embargoes and by a wide range of

Western economic sanctions during the 1980s. Paradoxically,

this nation with a long history of trade, with a strategic location, with overwhelming military and economic power in the

region, with strong cultural roots on three continents, and with

hard-earned international stature, became a pariah. Then as East-West and United States-Soviet tensions eased, southern

African regional conflicts ended and domestic political

reforms reduced Pretoria's isolation. In the early 1990s, South

Africans negotiated a peaceful end to apartheid and began to build new ties to the region and to the rest of the international

community.

Arms Trade and the Defense Industry

Growth of the Defense Industry

South Africa's domestic arms industry originated in 1940

with the appointment of an Advisory Committee on Defence

Force Requirements to study and to assess the country's military-industrial potential. Relying on its recommendations, the

government, with British assistance, established six factories to produce or to assemble ammunition, bombs, howitzers, mortars, armored vehicles, and electronic equipment. A number of

private companies also produced weapons during World War

II. Most weapons factories were dismantled in the late 1940s.

Seeking long-term military research and development capabilities, the government in 1945 established the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to study the country's

overall industrial potential. The Board of Defence Resources,

established in 1949, and the Munitions Production Office,

established in 1951, oversaw policy planning concerning armaments. In 1953 the first rifle factory was established, and the

Lyttleton Engineering Works, formerly the Defence Ordnance

Workshop, collected technical data and information on manufacturing methods. In 1954 the government established the

National Institute for Defence Research (NIDR) to assess and

to improve the fledgling defense industry.

In 1960 the increasingly security-conscious National Party

(NP) government stepped up programs to improve the arsenal

of the armed forces. Pretoria raised arms production levels,

sought new foreign sources of weapons, and began to acquire

new defense technology systems. These efforts intensified after

the 1963 United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution

350
South African-built armored vehicles Courtesy Embassy ofSouth Africa, Washington

restricting the sale of arms, ammunition, or military vehicles to South Africa. The Armaments Act (No. 87) of 1964 established an Armaments Production Board to manage the Lyttleton

Engineering Works and a state-owned ammunition plant. The

board assumed responsibility for coordinating arms purchases

among government, military, and private agencies.

The Armaments Development and Production Act (No. 57)

of 1968 established a special production unit, the Armaments

Development and Production Corporation (Armscor), to consolidate and to manage public and private arms manufacturing. Through Armscor's efforts, South Africa soon achieved

self-sufficiency in the production of small arms, military vehicles, optical devices, and ammunition. During the mid-1970s,

Armscor reorganized as the Armaments Corporation of South

Africa (still Armscor), expanded existing arms industries, and

assumed control over most research and development done by

NIDR. Before the voluntary UN arms embargo was declared

mandatory in 1977, South Africa received military technology

through licensing agreements, primarily with West Germany,

Italy, Israel, France, Belgium, and Canada. Licensing and

coproduction agreements in the 1970s and 1980s made it diffi- cult to distinguish between fully indigenous military manufac351
South Africa: A Country Study

tures and those that relied on foreign manufacturing

capabilities.

During the 1980s, Armscor was a central feature of South

Africa's military-industrial complex, a state corporation that

depended on private industry for specific processes and components. Armscor's financial autonomy was evident in its access

to the capital market for loans, but at the same time, many of

its functions were closely tied to the government. Armscor

executives reported directly to the minister of defense. Armscor's ten-member corporate board had overlapping membership with the ministry's Defence Planning Committee and

included leading businessmen, financiers, and scientists, as well as the government's director general of finance and the

chief of the SADF. In addition, Armscor was represented on the

government's high-level military planning and policy bodies.

Armscor's marketing and sales department, Nimrod, undertook an aggressive arms export promotion campaign in the

1980s. It participated in international arms exhibitions, in

Greece in 1982, in Chile each year from 1984 through the end

of the decade, and in Turkey in 1989 (displaying its G-5 howitzer and Rooikat armored vehicle). Armscor also displayed its manufactures at numerous demonstrations and trade fairs in

South Africa. Despite the UN ban on arms sales to Pretoria and

a 1984 UN ban on the purchase of arms from South Africa,

Armscor's business flourished. The corporation did not disclose export figures or customers during the 1980s, but the

United States government estimated South Africa's arms sales

at US$273 million (in constant 1989 dollars) over the five-year

period from 1984 to 1988. The best year was 1985, when it earned roughly US$102 million.

Armscor did experience the effect of the cutback in weapons

sales in the late 1980s. Its work force had increased from 10,000

to 33,000 between 1974 and 1984, but had declined to about

20,000 by 1989. At that time, Armscor purchased most of its manufacturing components from twelve subsidiary companies

and an estimated 3,000 private contractors and subcontractors,

representing a total work force of more than 80,000 employees.

The government began to privatize parts of the arms industry

in the early 1990s. Under a major restructuring that began in

April 1992, a segment of Armscor and several of its manufacturing subsidiaries were reorganized as an independent weapons manufacturing company, Denel. Denel and several other

manufacturers produced equipment on contract with Armscor,

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which retained overall responsibility for military acquisitions.

Armscor also acted as the agent of the state, regulating military

imports and exports, issuing marketing certificates, and ensur- ing adherence to international agreements.

Defying International Embargoes

Despite the numerous international embargoes against arms

trade with South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, it nonetheless

developed the most advanced military-industrial base on the

continent. In the late 1970s, it ranked behind Brazil and Israel,

among developing-country arms suppliers. The reasons for this

apparent irony are evident in South Africa's defense production infrastructure, which had developed even before the first UN embargo in 1963; in the incremental, haphazard, and

inconsistent ways in which the arms embargoes were imposed

and enforced; in the deliberate refusal by several countries to comply with the embargoes; in Pretoria's use of clever and

covert circumvention techniques; and in its ability to develop

and to exploit advanced commercial and "dual-use" technologies for military applications. By the late 1960s, South Africa

had acquired at least 127 foreign production licenses for arms,

ammunition, and military vehicles. South Africa had purchased fighter aircraft, tanks, naval vessels, naval armaments,

and maritime patrol aircraft, primarily from Britain. After that,

military equipment was carefully maintained, upgraded, and

often reverse-engineered or copied, after the embargo made it difficult to obtain replacements or replacement parts.

During the 1970s, South Africa expanded and refined its ability to acquire foreign assistance for domestic military production. Its broad-based industrial growth enabled it to shift

imports from finished products to technology and components

that could be incorporated into locally designed or copied military systems. Through this maneuver, multinational firms and

banks became major sources of technology and capital for

South Africa's defense industry, even during the embargo era. Dual-use equipment and technology—such as electronics, computers, communications, machine tools, and industrial equipment—and manufacturing techniques were not subject to

embargo and were easy to exploit for military applications.

South African engineers also were able to modify, to redesign,

to retrofit, and to upgrade a wide range of weapons using foreign technology and systems.

353
South Africa: A Country Study

South Africa also invested in strategic foreign industries;

recruited foreign technicians to design, to develop, and to manufacture weapons; rented and leased technical services,

including computers; and resorted to cover companies, deceptive practices, third-country shipments, and outright smuggling

and piracy to meet its defense needs. By the 1980s, the defense

industry, as extensive as it was, was nonetheless incapable of

designing and producing some advanced military systems, such

as high-performance combat aircraft, tanks, and aerospace

electronics.

Even as Pretoria's diplomatic isolation increased in the

1980s, as many as fifty countries—including several in Africa

purchased Armscor's relatively simple, dependable, battletested arms for their own defense needs. The Johannesburg

Weekly Mail, citing government documents, disclosed arms

shipments in the mid-1980s to Iraq, Gabon, Malawi, Chile,

France, Belgium, and Spain. Morocco and Zaire obtained Ratel

armored vehicles from Pretoria, and South Africa's mobile

razor-wire barrier, used for area protection and crowd control, was exported to at least fifteen countries, including several in

Africa, and to United States forces in West Germany.

Reports of the Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980s and of the Persian GulfWar of early 1991 highlighted Pretoria's previous sales to several countries in the Middle East. Armscor had sold G-5

towed howitzers to both Iran and Iraq, and G-6 self-propelled

howitzers to the United Arab Emirates. South Africa also provided vaccines to Israel, for that country's use as a precaution

against the possible Iraqi use of biological weapons. Numerous

other reports of South African arms sales to the Middle East, to Peru, to several leaders of breakaway Yugoslav republics, and to other countries indicated the international awareness of the

strength of South Africa's arms industry. The London-based

humanitarian organization, Oxfam, criticized South Africa in

1992 for having sold automatic rifles, machine guns, grenade

launchers, and ammunition to war-torn Rwanda. Military sales to Rwanda continued in the mid-1990s, even after that country's genocidal outbreak of violence in 1994.

The new Government of National Unity in 1994 faced the

dilemma of whether to dismantle the defense industry many of

its leaders had reviled for two decades or to preserve a lucrative

export industry that still employed tens of thousands of South

Africans. After some debate, President Mandela and Minister

of Defence Joe Modise decided to maintain a high level of

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defense manufacturing and to increase military exports in the

late 1990s. The industry, they argued, would benefit civil society in areas such as mass transportation, medical care, mobile

services, information management, and other areas of infrastructure development. Increasing defense exports, they maintained, would bolster foreign currency reserves and would help

reduce unemployment. Moreover, they pledged that military

exports to other countries would require cabinet approval and

verification by Armscor; and, they promised, arms would not

be sold to countries that threatened war with their neighbors.

Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons

The international fear of nuclear proliferation made South

Africa the focus of intense concern during the 1980s. Although

Pretoria initially would not confirm it was developing, or possessed, nuclear weapons, it had large natural deposits of ura- nium, as well as uranium enrichment facilities and the

necessary technological infrastructure. In addition, until the

late 1980s South Africa had the deeply entrenched fear of its adversaries and the insecurity about its borders that were

important incentives in other nations' nuclear programs. After

1981 South Africa was able to produce annually about fifty kilograms of highly enriched uranium, enough to make two or

three twenty-kiloton nuclear bombs each year. With the cooperation of Israel—another technologically advanced, militarily

powerful, nuclear-capable nation surrounded by hostile neighbors—South Africa developed at least six nuclear warheads,

which it later acknowledged, along with a variety of missiles

and other conventional weapons.

In 1987 President Botha announced that South Africa was

considering signing the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

(NPT) and would begin discussions with other countries

toward that end. In September 1990, Pretoria agreed to sign

the NPT, but only "in the context of an equal commitment by

other states in the Southern African region." After intensive

diplomatic efforts, especially by the United States and the

Soviet Union, Tanzania and Zambia agreed to sign the treaty.

South Africa signed the NPT in July 1991, and an International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement in September of that year. In addition, the government banned any

further development, manufacture, marketing, import, or export of nuclear weapons or explosives, as required by the

NPT. The IAEA declared it had completed its inspection in late

355
South Africa: A Country Study

1994 and that South Africa's nuclear weapons facilities had

been dismantled.

South Africa's nuclear parastatal, the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), which changed its emphasis from nuclear deterrents to industrial and economic needs, assists in the marketing

of more than 150 products and services in the mid-1990s.

These products have applications in mining and aerospace

development, food production, transportation, and environmental preservation. Some examples are air filters for motor

vehicles, a measuring device for minerals industry flotation

processes, radio-isotopes for medical and industrial use, and a biogas unit to recover methane from refuse for use as vehicle

fuel. These sales generated more than US$28 million between

March 1993 and March 1994, according to official reports.

Although these developments represented a dramatic breakthrough in the international campaign to curb the spread of

nuclear weapons, and a marked change in South Africa's own

position, they did not permanently foreclose Pretoria's nuclear

options. Pretoria could withdraw from its treaty obligations

NPT signatories may do so on ninety days' notice simply by cit- ing "supreme interests." Moreover, South Africa could resume

the production of weapons-grade uranium, although this product would be under IAEA safeguards and could not be used for

nuclear explosives as long as South Africa chose to abide by the

NPT.

South Africa's Council for Nuclear Safety, a statutory body

set up to safeguard citizens and property against nuclear hazards, announced on September 27, 1994, an agreement

between South Africa and the United States to exchange information about nuclear safety. This agreement, the first of its kind for South Africa—the twenty-ninth for the United

States—enables signatory governments to remain abreast of

the latest research information in the field of nuclear safety.

South Africa developed the ability to produce and to deploy

chemical and biological weapons during the mid-1980s,

although Pretoria then acknowledged only that it was developing defensive countermeasures against such weapons. Military

officials then believed that chemical or biological weapons

were being used by Angolan government forces in that country's festering civil war. In 1993, after South Africa's involvement in that war had ended, President de Klerk ordered the

destruction of any remaining chemical and biological substances. His government also joined more than forty other Afri356
National Security

can nations in signing the international Convention on

Chemical Weapons. In October 1994, South Africa hosted the

first conference in Africa on the implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons.

Regional Issues South Africa was increasingly isolated, diplomatically and

politically, after the early 1960s. Its system of apartheid, constructed to exclude blacks and to subordinate their concerns to white interests, made it a pariah on the continent. It was the

only African country to be excluded from the Organization of

African Unity (OAU); it became the target of a campaign

intended to punish, to isolate, and to overthrow the government in Pretoria. A few OAU members tried unsuccessfully to mobilize a pan-African military force, which, they had hoped,

would oust the NP government and would install the ANC in

power in South Africa.

The climate of regional hostility intensified against a changing background of African politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Several dozen former European colonies and protectorates

became independent African countries. After 1972 South Afri- can police units tried to bolster the illegal Rhodesian regime of

Ian Smith against Zimbabwean national liberation armies, but

by 1980 the new nation of Zimbabwe had achieved a new government with international legitimacy. Pretoria also assisted

the Portuguese in their unsuccessful struggles against liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique; these two countries won independence from Portugal in 1975. In South-West

Africa, the only other white-minority stronghold in the region,

the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) continued its independence struggle, which had begun in 1966.

By the early 1980s, Pretoria's former regional "buffer zone"

against an enemy onslaught had become a hostile region of

"front-line states" opposing Pretoria. South Africa's neighbors

welcomed its dissidents, giving them political sanctuary and

asylum, organizational headquarters, and military training

facilities. South Africa found itself the lone white-ruled state in an unstable region. Civil wars in Angola and Mozambique,

exacerbated by large-scale foreign intervention, drew Pretoria

into protracted regional conflicts. It confronted an influx of

Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and Cuban armed forces and weaponry

into the region, and saw mounting dissent within its own borders.

357
South Africa: A Country Study

Despite the regional animosities, no African army posed a

serious or immediate challenge to South Africa's military might

during this time, and its domestic enemies were not well

enough organized or equipped to confront the power of the

state. But the government in Pretoria often failed to distinguish between external and internal enemies. It saw itself as besieged, caught in a pernicious cycle of low-intensity, unconventional warfare from within and without—a Total Onslaught

against which only a Total Strategy could ensure survival. This

strategy required military and economic self-sufficiency; small,

mobile, offensive-oriented armed forces; air superiority and at least a modest naval capability, backed by a large reserve force; a military doctrine of deterrence, including the use of preemptive and retaliatory force, as well as large-scale interventions in

neighboring states; and an extensive intelligence and security

network, both inside and outside South Africa.

South Africa's four-pronged strategy of alliance, accommodation, deterrence through defense, and counterthreat has

been outlined by David Albright, a specialist in international

security affairs. Pretoria's de facto alliances with Angola and

Mozambique ended with their independence in 1975, and its informal cooperation pact with Southern Rhodesia (later, Rhodesia) ended soon after that. Then, lacking the option of forging open security alliances with neighboring states, Pretoria

still tried to lessen regional tensions through nonaggression

pacts, such as its agreements with Swaziland in 1982 and with

Mozambique and Angola in 1984. It sought accommodation

with regional states that were small, weak, or geographically

remote, such as Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, and—to a lesser degree—Zambia.

Two elements of South Africa's regional strategy, deterrence

and counterthreat, which were increasingly important after the

regional "buffer zone" had been eliminated, were only possible

because South Africa had engaged in a massive security

buildup over two decades. Beginning in the 1960s, Pretoria

had extended military obligations for white males, had

enlarged its permanent and reserve military forces, had

increased its defense spending, had invested heavily in military

industrialization, and had expanded and diversified its military

arsenals.

Pretoria's most aggressive and open intervention in a neighboring state, in Angola in the mid-1970s, was believed to be

necessary to avoid a communist onslaught in South-West Africa

358
National Security

and, eventually, perhaps in South Africa. South African officials also estimated that competing Angolan nationalist armies

would continue their power struggle after Portugal granted

Angola independence in November 1975. Therefore, as Portuguese forces withdrew from the region, SADF troops intervened directly and continued to be engaged there until a United States-brokered peace accord was signed in December

1988 (see Relations with African States, ch. 4). During this

time, Pretoria launched periodic cross-border military operations in Angola against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular

Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular

de Libertacao de Angola—MPLA) regime in Luanda. In addition, it launched frequent air and ground attacks on operational centers and training camps of liberation movements that

supported the MPLA, including the ANC and SWAPO.

To counter the ANC threat, South Africa abducted and assas- sinated ANC exiles in neighboring states, in some instances. It also launched attacks into Mozambique in 1980, 1981, 1983,

and 1987; into Lesotho in 1982 and 1985; into Botswana in

1985, 1986, and 1988; into Zambia in 1986 and 1987; and into

Zimbabwe in 1982 and 1986. On one day, May 19, 1986, South

African forces attacked alleged ANC bases in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—all members of the British Commonwealth of Nations—souring relations with Commonwealth

leaders who had tried to block international sanctions efforts

against Pretoria.

Lesotho became the target of numerous South African counterinsurgency operations. Completely surrounded by South

Africa, Lesotho was a natural haven for antiapartheid militants.

South Africa applied economic and military pressure to quell

criticism of Pretoria by Lesotho's prime minister, Chief Leabua

Jonathan. A series of armed raids against alleged ANC strongholds around Maseru in the early 1980s prompted Chief

Jonathan to declare a virtual state of war with South Africa in

1983. Finally, in January 1986, Pretoria provided covert support

for a military coup that ousted ChiefJonathan and installed a

military government led by Major General Justin Lekhanya;

then, Lekhanya's government was pressured to prevent any

ANC activity within its territory.

South Africa also furnished covert aid to opposition parties

and to rebel organizations as part of an effort to destabilize

hostile neighboring governments. For example, it supplied

extensive aid to the Angolan rebel movement, the National

359
South Africa: A Country Study

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional

para a Independencia Total de Angola—UNITA) . South Africa

also supplied military assistance in the form of sanctuary, supplies, logistical support, training, and arms to the Mozambican

National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana

MNR or Renamo) during the early 1980s. Assistance to both

UNITA and Renamo declined in the late 1980s (see Relations

with African States, ch. 4).

Also during the 1980s, South Africa enforced border controls against illegal refugees and guerrilla infiltration by install- ing electrified fences, especially along its northeastern border.

In 1985, for example, it installed 2,800-volt fences along portions of its borders with Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Lesotho,

and with the homelands of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, and

Venda. During 1988, the first year of available records, at least

seventy people were electrocuted on these fences.

Regional tensions began to ease by the end of the 1980s, and

in southern Africa, as elsewhere on the globe, the year 1989

marked a turning point in political and security relationships.

The agreement signed in December 1988 linked Namibia's

independence from South Africa with the cessation of foreign

military involvement in Angola, and set in motion a series of

other changes that contributed to dramatically improved prospects for peace. The Soviet Union slowed, and eventually

halted, arms shipments to Angolan and Mozambican forces

and played an active role in seeking political settlements to those conflicts. South Africa recognized the reduced regional

threat by cautiously beginning domestic political reforms, by

reducing the military's domestic security role, by drawing down

military personnel, and by reducing military spending in areas related to external operations.

Namibia held national elections in 1989 and achieved formal independence in March 1990; Pretoria's former nemesis,

SWAPO, won control over the new government in Windhoek.

SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma took a conciliatory line toward

Pretoria, however, and both countries recognized Namibia's

continued economic dependence on South Africa. In March

1991, South African and Namibian officials began negotiations

aimed at transferring to Windhoek control over Namibia's only

deep-water port, Walvis Bay, as well as the Penguin Islands.

South Africa's last military battalion was removed from Walvis

Bay later that year, and that enclave and the islands formally

became part of Namibia on March 1, 1994.

360
National Security

A number of events in the early 1990s helped to solidify

South Africa's view of its future leadership role in southern

Africa. During a serious drought and famine that swept most of

the region, South Africa was credited with saving thousands of

lives by shipping domestic and imported corn to neighboring

states and by providing other forms of drought assistance. The

government also eased border restrictions, in part to facilitate

the use of South Africa's developed transportation infrastruc- ture by neighboring countries.

The rest of Africa began to open up formerly covert trade

relations with South Africa and to welcome it into diplomatic

circles. President de Klerk paid his first visit to Nigeria in April

1992, and his warm welcome by President Ibrahim Babangida

sent a strong signal of acceptance to other African leaders.

Within weeks, Zambia, Kenya, and Lesotho began preparations

for establishing formal diplomatic relations.

While ties with the rest of Africa were being strengthened,

South Africa's relationship with Angola continued to be uncertain. Hopes for peace in Angola rose and fell; the signing of the

Bicesse Accord in May 1991 paved the way for national elections in September 1992. After a brief lull, the country

returned to civil war. In 1994 the MPLA government employed

military trainers from South Africa—former SADF fighters,

including some who had fought against the MPLA during the

1980s—to help it recapture UNITA-held towns. Another peace

agreement, signed in Zambia in late 1994, gave some hope of a UN-monitored peace and of elections in 1995 or 1996. As of

mid-1996, however, rebel troops were still being disarmed, and

a date for Angolan elections had not been set. The 1980s power struggle in Lesotho had never really

ended; when violence flared in 1994, Pretoria's response provided an indication of the regional role that the new Government of National Unity envisioned for itself for the next few

years. The Lesotho military had forced the country's reigning

monarch, King Moshoeshoe II, into exile in 1990, and in 1993

Lesotho had held its first nationwide elections in twenty-seven

years. The former monarch was allowed to return, but the new

prime minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, had allowed his own strained

relationship with the army to deteriorate to the point that

South African troops were posted to guard the border between

the two countries in 1993 and in 1994. In 1994 South African

officials helped to mediate a compromise between Lesotho's

government and military, but President Mandela encouraged

361
South Africa: A Country Study

Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe to take a leading role in

regional peacemaking, while South Africa worked to reorganize and train its new National Defence Force.

Constitutional and Legal Framework

South Africa's 1984 constitution, the Republic of South

Africa Constitution Act (No. 110) of 1983, which remained in

effect through 1993, affirmed the provisions of the Defence

Act (No. 44) of 1957 establishing the missions of the armed

forces. These missions were, and continue to be, to defend the

country; to fulfill South Africa's international treaty obligations; to prevent terrorism and domestic disorder; to protect

life, health, and property; and to help maintain essential services. The president had the power to declare war, martial law,

and states of emergency, and to establish peace. The minister

of defence, under the overall direction of the president and

with the consent of the State Security Council (SSC), bore

responsibility for formulating and for executing defense policy.

During the late 1980s, the military was frequently assigned

domestic duties as part of the constitutional requirement to help the police and local authorities to maintain essential ser- vices and domestic order in times of emergency.

The 1994 interim constitution, the Constitution of the

Republic of South Africa (No. 200) of 1993, reiterates the provisions of the 1957 Defence Act that make the president com- mander in chief of the armed forces. The constitution reserves

specific powers related to national security for the president,

who may, with parliamentary approval, declare a "state of

national defence." This is, in effect, a state of national emergency, but the framers of the constitution emphasize their

reluctance to undertake any offensive military action against

neighboring states. The constitution also authorizes the president to establish a national defense force to fulfill the responsibilities formerly assigned to the SADF. It empowers the

president to employ the military in accordance with constitutional principles to defend the sovereignty and the territorial

integrity of the republic; to fulfill South Africa's international

obligations; to preserve life, health, and property; to provide or

to maintain essential services; to uphold law and order in cooperation with the police; and to support the general social and

economic improvement of the population.

The interim constitution states that the new military organization, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF),

362
National Security

will include former members of the SADF, the ANC's

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), and the militias of the former

homelands of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei.

Former members of other militias, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party's Self-Protection Units, were admitted to the SANDF

after the 1994 constitution was implemented.

In May 1996, the National Assembly and the Senate, in joint

session as the Constitutional Assembly, completed a draft of the

final constitution, to be implemented by the end of the formal

political transition. Like the interim document that preceded

it, the 1996 draft constitution calls for civilian control over the

military. The draft makes no mention of the State Security

Council or similar overarching security apparatus reminiscent

of the 1980s. It reaffirms the missions of the armed forces as outlined in the Defence Act of 1957 and the role of the president to serve as commander in chief of the SANDF. As of mid1996, the draft was being reviewed by the Constitutional Court,

and after some revisions, was expected to be implemented in

phases, beginning in 1997.

Military Organization

Four armed services—the South African Army, the South

African Air Force, the South African Navy, and the South Afri- can Medical Service—make up the SANDF, also referred to as the National Defence Force. SANDF headquarters are in Pretoria. The SANDF is commanded by the chief of the armed

forces, who is appointed by the president from one of the four

branches of the military (see fig. 20). The SANDF chief is accountable to the minister of defence, who is a civilian. The SANDF chief consults with members of several councils

and committees and chairs the Defence Command Council

(DCC), which oversees the defense budget. On the DCC are

the four service chiefs, the chief of the National Defence Force

staff, the military inspector general, the chiefs of defence headquarters staff divisions, and other key defense officials. Headquarters responsibilities are allocated among six staff

divisions—the Finance Division, the Intelligence Division, the

Logistics Division, the Operations Division, the Personnel Division, and the Planning Division.

Army

The army in the 1990s continues to rely on a small Perma363
South Africa: A Country Study

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National Security

nent Force of professional soldiers and a large Citizen Force.

The Citizen Force consists of volunteers serving an initial

period of training and active duty, followed by several years of

reserve status. Reservists rotate into active duty when called

upon. Volunteers can apply to transfer from the Citizen Force

to the Permanent Force if they wish to become professional, career soldiers.

The sweeping changes of the mid-1990s allowed varying

assessments of the strength of the army. The government's

South Africa Yearbook, 1995 indicated that roughly 95,000 activeduty members of the SADF and of the former homeland militaries, as well as about 27,000 former liberation fighters, made

up the army in 1995. Many of the active-duty troops were in var- ious stages of training or retraining for at least one year after

that. After the integration of these forces into the SANDF was

completed, officials planned to reduce army ranks, to a force

of about 91,000 by the year 1998. Officials were also considering further reductions, perhaps to a force of about 75,000

active-duty troops, by the year 2000. The number of military

reservists, in a wide variety of reserve duty statuses, was esti- mated at more than 360,000 in late 1995. The government's

South Africa Yearbook, 1995 indicated that more than 500,000

troops were on part-time or reserve status (see table 20, Appendix).

The chief of the army, who holds the rank of lieutenant general, commands all army forces. He is assisted by his general

staff at the army headquarters in Pretoria. He also is responsible for the Army Battle School at Lohatla in the Northern

Cape, the Defence College (formerly the South African Military College) at Pretoria, and various corps schools, such as the

Artillery School at Potchefstroom (North-West Province), the

Infantry School at Oudtshoorn (Western Cape), and the Intel- ligence School at Kimberley.

The army is organized into territorial forces and conventional forces, both commanded by the chief of the army

through different command structures (see fig. 21). This divi- sion reflects the army's dual mission—to ensure internal security and to defend the country against external threats. The

territorial forces are organized by region and are primarily

responsible for internal security tasks, such as helping the

police ensure law and order, combating terrorism, patrolling

national borders, protecting strategic sites, providing emer- gency and disaster relief, and administering military reserve

365
South Africa: A Country Study

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National Security

forces within their region. In 1996 most members of the

former homeland military forces were being incorporated into

the territorial forces.

The ten regional military commands are headquartered at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, Kimberley, Durban,

Bloemfontein, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Nelspruit, and Pietersburg. In 1996 the boundaries of the military regions were

being changed to conform more closely to the country's new

administrative regions.

Like the territorial forces, the army's conventional forces are stationed throughout the country, but their training and organization are separate from the territorial forces. The conventional forces fall under the operational control of the army

headquarters in Pretoria, not under the regional commanders.

The conventional forces are trained to confront traditional

security threats, such as a foreign enemy.

The conventional forces are organized into contingency

forces and a mobilization force. As of the early and mid-1990s,

the contingency forces consisted of one mechanized/motorized brigade and two parachute brigades—the Forty-fourth

Parachute Brigade and the Forty-fifth Parachute Brigade. The

mobilization force was organized into three mechanized divi- sions—the Seventh Division, the Eighth Division, and the

Ninth Division.

Functionally, the army also distinguishes between combat

corps and support service corps. The combat corps include

infantry, artillery, antiaircraft, and armored corps. The infantry

is the largest of the combat corps and has both mechanized

and airborne units. The artillery corps uses indirect fire guns,

howitzers, field guns, and multiple rocket launchers, generally

coordinating operations with the antiaircraft corps to protect

ground forces. The armored corps relies largely on tanks with

105-millimeter guns and on a variety of other armored vehicles.

The support service corps include engineers, signals specialists, and others trained in ordnance, technical services, intelli- gence, personnel, and finance, as well as musicians, caterers,

and the military police. Service units maintain, repair, and

recondition all equipment, except communications equipment. The military police serve as the army's internal police

force and control traffic to and from operational areas. The Commandos are formally under the authority of the

regional commands of the army but are organized and

deployed in a tradition similar to that of the National Guard in

367
South Africa: A Country Study

the United States. Originally volunteers trained for quickresponse to local emergencies, they were used to quell unrest

during the apartheid era; in the 1990s, Commando units are assigned to guard important installations, such as industrial

plants, oil refineries, communication centers, and transportation facilities. Commandos generally serve a total of 1,000 active-duty days over a ten- or twelve-year period. In emergencies, the period of

active duty is increased in increments of fifty days. Urban Commando units are generally organized into a single urban battalion. Rural Commando units are sometimes organized into a regional battalion.

The army's ground forces in the mid-1990s can field an imposing array of equipment, most of it produced in South

Africa. Their arsenal includes tanks, armored reconnaissance

vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel car- riers (see table 21, Appendix). The army also has a wide array

of artillery pieces, including towed and self-propelled heavy

artillery, multiple-rocket-launcher systems, as well as mortars

and antitank and air defense weapons.

Integrating Armies in the 1990s

The military's massive reorganization began a year before

the historic April 1994 elections and was scheduled to be completed by late 1996. The process began with the creation of a multiservice Joint Military Coordinating Council (JMCC) by

the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) —the country's

interim executive authority. The TEC also established a Subcouncil on Defence to supervise the planning phase of the

reorganization. TheJMCC and the subcouncil worked together

to set program goals, and in late 1993 the JMCC formed five

working groups to address specific problems associated with

finance, intelligence, logistics, operations, and personnel.

These working groups presented their recommendations to the JMCC and the subcouncil in early 1994.

At that time, the major security challenge for South Africa was the need to end the township violence that threatened to derail the April 1994 elections. Officials hastily formed a multiracial National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF), including about

3,500 members of existing military organizations—primarily

the SADF and MK. In February 1994, the NPKF was deployed

to several townships around Johannesburg, but its troops, with

widely varying military backgrounds and training, could not

368
National Security

adequately coordinate their operations and standards of behavior. NPKF units encountered morale and disciplinary problems, and, in at least one instance, civilians were killed in

gunfire between military and paramilitary personnel. The

NPKF was disbanded soon after the April 1994 elections.

The failure of the NPKF did not delay the military reorganization, however, and other efforts already underway in early

1994 were more successful. SADF officials and a British Military

Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) assembled members of

the former homeland armies and former MK and Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA—the military wing of the PanAfricanist Congress) liberation fighters at locations nearJohannesburg, Cape Town, and Bloemfontein to evaluate applicants

for the new army. The SANDF accepted into its ranks most

senior officers from both homeland and liberation armies without extensive testing. In addition, members of the homeland

armies who had been trained by SADF instructors were generally accepted immediately into the new organization.

Finally, MK and APLA members were considered for admission on an individual basis, but these cases proved more diffi- cult. Some of the liberation fighters could not meet minimal

formal education requirements. Many had received uneven or inadequate training that left them ill-prepared for either combat or organizational responsibilities. Some had been trained

in languages other than English or Afrikaans. A few were dis- qualified because of bureaucratic problems, such as lost files, or because they were overage. The SADF and BMATT personnel provided three to six months of basic training for many

former liberation fighters, in order to rectify gaps in background qualifications or experience. For some of the new

SANDF soldiers, training continued through 1996.

The New Face of the Army

As the military reorganization proceeded, a multiracial offi- cer corps emerged. By early 1996, more than 1,300 former

members of homeland or liberation armies held officer ranks

of lieutenant or above. At least eleven black South Africans had

been promoted to the rank of major general or above.

As of 1996, military officials had no plans to reinstate conscription as long as there were enough qualified volunteers to meet national security needs. They planned, instead, to trans- fer some soldiers into the police and others into service brigades. The latter would act as civic-action teams to work on

369
South Africa: A Country Study

road construction and other infrastructure development

projects. Military officials chose this tactic over large-scale dis- missals in order to avoid flooding the civilian work force and to provide some work-related training and job skills for former

guerrilla fighters. Funds were allocated for this training in late 1994, and the first three- and six-month training courses began

in early 1995.

Military officials were working to maintain continuity in

SANDF military training, and, at the same time, to inculcate a sense of the changing responsibilities of the army in the 1990s.

Military trainers were preparing for new border control problems, as the threat of political infiltration by antiapartheid dissi- dents gave way to a tide of political and economic refugees

hoping to prosper in the new South Africa. Officials also were concerned about increased smuggling and other forms of border fraud. One of their greatest challenges was the dramatic

increase in cross-border narcotics trafficking that threatened to bring South Africa into the global spotlight as an important

transshipment point in the late 1990s. Finally, the military con- tinued to prepare for the possibility of cross-border hostilities

with a neighboring state, although this possibility appeared

remote as of 1996.

Air Force

The South African Air Force (SAAF) includes about 7,000

career active-duty troops and 3,000 active-duty volunteers who

are fulfilling their national service obligations, as of 1996.

About 400 air force personnel are women. In addition, about

20,000 reservists are available to be rotated into active duty as ground support personnel; reservists are also assigned to tacti- cal air units and to units charged with safeguarding SAAF facilities (see fig. 22).

The air force is under the overall command of the chief of

the air force, a lieutenant general, who is assisted by the chief

of the air force staff and the air force inspector general. The air

force's headquarters organization reflects the same six-division

administrative structure as the entire military establishment,

with divisions handling finance, intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, and planning.

All regional commands and functional commands are answerable to air force headquarters in Pretoria for all air operations. Until 1993, there were two regional commands, the

Western Command and the Southern Command. The Western

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Command was dismantled in preparation for South Africa's

relinquishing control over Walvis Bay in early 1994. The South- ern Command, located at Simonstown, has responsibility for

several territorial command posts and bases in the southern

coastal area. Air force bases not under the direct control of the

Southern Command fall under air force headquarters at Pretoria.The air force has two functional commands, the Training

Command and the Air Logistics Command. The Training

Command, headquartered in Pretoria, oversees programs in

basic training, flying, navigation, logistics training, and other

instruction, and controls most major training facilities. The Air

Logistics Command controls several air force units, including

airfield maintenance units, repair depots, and supply depots. It also provides complete materiel procurement and engineering

services, including aircraft management and ground systems

support.

Two other functional commands, the Air Space Control

Command and the Tactical Support Command, were dismantled in the early 1990s as part of the overall military downsizing. The Air Space Control Command had been responsible

for air defenses and control of airspace, in conjunction with

civil authorities. The Tactical Support Command had con- ducted formal operational command and control training, as well as instruction in other air force operations. These responsibilities were assumed by other commands and by headquarters personnel.

In addition to regional and functional commands, the air

force has several command posts, which are subordinate to commands. One of these, the Main Threat Area Command

Post, is co-located with the air force headquarters at Pretoria.

The Main Threat Area Command Post oversees the operations

of several air bases, air defense radar sites, and other installations throughout the region. The Southern Command Post,

headquartered at Cape Town, oversees operations of bases near Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, and is responsible for air

force maritime and other operations in these coastal areas. The air force operates an estimated 400 aircraft. The fleet

includes Cheetah, Mirage, and Impala fighter aircraft, Cessna

light reconnaissance aircraft, and Oryx and Alouette III helicopters (see table 22, Appendix). The air force in early 1996 was awaiting the delivery of fifty to sixty Pilatus PC-7 basic

training aircraft from Switzerland and planned to purchase sev371
South Africa: A Country Study

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372
National Security

eral locally manufactured Rooivalk combat helicopters. The air

force is also upgrading its Cheetah fighter aircraft and is developing plans to produce short- and medium-range air-to-air missiles for this purpose.

Navy

In the mid-1990s, the South African Navy (SAN) is a 4,500-

person uniformed force, including 300 women. The navy is commanded by a vice admiral, the chief of the navy. The chief

of the navy is assisted by a chief of naval operations and a chief

of naval support; the latter two positions are filled by rear admirals. Naval headquarters are at Pretoria, although most important elements of the navy are at the navy's two bases at Simonstown and on Salisbury Island, near Durban. In addition

to the headquarters organization and bases, the command

structure includes seven naval units, flotillas, and independent

ships (see fig. 23). Naval units are stationed in Johannesburg

and Pretoria and at several of South Africa's major ports.

Naval officer training is provided at the South African Naval

College in Gordon's Bay, near Simonstown. Basic training is provided at the nearby South African Naval Staff College and

on the SAS Saldanha. Technical naval training is provided on

the SAS Wingfield, and advanced combat and other nontechnical specialist training is provided on the SAS Simonsberg. After

completing an initial period of service with the navy, voluntary

service personnel separating from active duty are assigned to one of the seven reserve naval units.

The navy is organized into a submarine flotilla, which possesses three Daphne-class submarines, a surface-strike flotilla with nine Minister-class 450-ton missile craft, and a mine coun- termeasure flotilla with four River-class mine hunters and four

Ton-class minesweepers. The navy's plans for upgrading and

expansion include the purchase of four corvette hulls, to be fit- ted with a locally manufactured combat system. These are expected to be commissioned by the year 1999. The navy also

plans to acquire six 800- to 1200-ton strike craft by the year

2003 and four new submarines by the year 2005, and is considering the decommissioning of its nine well-worn Minister-class

missile craft (see table 23, Appendix).

The navy helped to celebrate South Africa's return to the

international community in the mid-1990s, when a growing

number of foreign ships docked at South African ports. The

January 1994 visit to Simonstown by the HMS Norfolk was the

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South Africa: A Country Study

374
National Security

first British Royal Navy visit in twenty-seven years. A month

later, the French frigate FNS Germinal made the first official

visit by a French vessel in nineteen years. In November 1994,

two United States vessels, the USS Gettysburg and the USS Halyburton, received a twenty-one-gun salute in Simonstown in the

first call by United States Navy ships in twenty-seven years. South African ships also participated in joint naval exercises

in 1994, the first in twenty years. In June 1994, a 6,000-ton fleet

replenishment ship, the SAS Drakensberg, took part in exercises

with the British Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The South

African Navy also carried out joint exercises with the Argentine, Brazilian, and Uruguayan navies in May 1995. In addition,

maritime training involved ships and aircraft from the United

States, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain.

The navy has performed coast guard duties and search-and- rescue missions throughout its history, and is preparing for

increased responsibilities during the late 1990s, primarily to protect the country's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic

zone (EEZ) and to combat smuggling and maritime narcotics

trafficking. South Africa's navy is also in demand by other Afri- can governments; in the early 1990s, for example, South Afri- can personnel performed naval facility repairs for Zaire,

marine surveys for Mozambique, and relief-supply transport to Kenya for shipment to Somalia and Rwanda.

Medical Service

The South African Medical Service (SAMS) was established

as a full service branch of the SADF in 1979 to consolidate the

medical services of the army, the navy, and the air force. The

SAMS includes full-time army medical personnel, civilian

employees of the Ministry of Defence, and (until the mid1990s) qualified national service personnel on active duty.

Reservists from the Citizen Force and from the Commandos

are sometimes assigned to short-term active duty in the SAMS,

as well. The military employs roughly 400 medical doctors, and

private medical specialists are sometimes appointed to supplement the staff of the SAMS.

The surgeon general heads the SAMS and has the rank of

lieutenant general. The SAMS operational units include three

hospitals—the First Military Hospital near Pretoria, the Second

Military Hospital at Cape Town, and the Third Military Hospital at Bloemfontein. There are also three specialized insti375
South Africa: A Country Study

tutes—the Institute for Aviation Medicine, the Institute for

Maritime Medicine, and the Military Psychological Institute.

They provide comprehensive medical care for military personnel and their dependents, as well as the police and employees

of other security-related government departments, and occasionally to neighboring countries. The SAMS also provides

occasional veterinary services for animals (mainly horses and

dogs) used by the security services. The Institute for Aviation

Medicine and the Institute for Maritime Medicine screen pilot

candidates for the air force and for civilian aviation certification, as well as divers and submariners for the navy. The military's medical services also include general medical and dental

care, and specialized rehabilitation services.

The SAMS is organized into regional medical commands,

corresponding to the army's regional commands, as well as a Medical Logistics Command and a Medical Training Command. The regional commands support military units, military

base hospitals, and military unit sickbays in their region. The

Medical Logistics Command is responsible for medical logistics

only, as each service provides for its own logistics support. In

addition, the Medical Training Command supervises the South

African Medical Service College, the South African Medical

Service Nursing College, and the South African Medical Service Training Centre, as well as the military hospitals' training

programs. The nursing college, in Pretoria, grants a four-year

nursing diploma in association with the University of South

Africa. Specialized, in-service training courses for nurses and

for nursing assistants are also available.

The SAMS implemented several retrenchment measures in

the early 1990s. It consolidated all quartermaster stores in the

Cape Town and the Bloemfontein areas, relocated the SAMS

training center from Potchefstroom to Pretoria, closed several

medical supply depots, consolidated computer centers and sys- tems, rationalized procedures for procuring medicine and

medical equipment, discontinued survival training, and

reduced or closed sickbays and military medical clinics that

served other armed services affected by retrenchments.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

The SADF has been recognized internationally for its emphasis on appearance and strict observance of dress-code

regulations, and SANDF officers in the mid-1990s indicated

their determination to maintain these high standards. SANDF

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uniforms are generally functional in design. The army's service

uniform consists of a brown jacket and tie, and light brown

shirt and trousers. In warm weather, an open-collared, shortsleeved khaki shirt or light jacket replaces the jacket and tie. Senior officers' service uniforms are distinguished by poppyred lapel tabs. The army's field uniforms—required for work

details, for training, and for field exercises—include a brown

shirt, fatigue trousers, a webbed utility belt, and boots. Camouflage battle dress is authorized for selected units. A peaked cap

or beret is worn on selected occasions with service uniforms

and field uniforms. Some combat units are distinguished by

the color of their berets. Bush hats are also worn in the field,

but not in public.

Air force uniforms are steel blue. Like the army and the

navy, the air force permits open-collared shirts in warm

weather and shorts and knee socks on occasion.

The navy wears dark blue uniforms in winter and white, in

summer. Enlisted ranks in the navy wear jacket-and-tie uniforms in cool weather and white jackets with a high collar in summer.

Military rank is indicated by shoulder or sleeve insignia (see

fig. 24 and fig. 25). Officer insignia are worn on the shoulder,

with the exception of naval officers' cool-weather uniforms,

which display the insignia on the sleeve. Enlisted rank insignia are worn on the sleeve. Some military insignia were changed in

the mid-1990s. For example, the Castle of Good Hope, in sev- eral army and air force insignia, was replaced by a nine-pointed

star, symbolic of the nine provinces of the new South Africa.

Military awards recognize several categories of service and

accomplishments. As of the mid-1990s, South Africa's highest

decoration is the Castle of Good Hope, which is reserved for

exceptional heroism on the battlefield. The Honoris Crux,

conferred in four classes, is awarded for valor. The Order of

the Star of South Africa, conferred in two classes, is restricted

to general officers who perform meritorious service in promoting the efficiency and the preparedness of the armed forces.

Other ranks are eligible for the Southern Cross and the Pro

Merito decoration, and various medals are given in recognition

of outstanding service and devotion to duty.

Military Intelligence and Intelligence Coordination

The military has a long history of intelligence gathering and

evaluation, but military intelligence agencies were virtually

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South Africa: A Country Study
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South Africa: A Country Study

independent of each other and of other government agencies

for much of this history. In 1962 the Directorate of Military

Intelligence was established to coordinate the collection and

the management of defense-related information among the

military services. In 1969 the government established the

Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to coordinate military, domestic, and economic intelligence. During the 1970s, BOSS

became embroiled in several unethical projects and government scandals that seriously undermined its credibility. In 1978

President P. W. Botha established the Department of National

Security to strengthen his control over the intelligence community and to incorporate it into his Total Strategy against opposition to the state. Botha himself held the cabinet portfolio on

national intelligence and continually stressed the need for

community-wide coordination.

In 1981 the Department of National Security, renamed the

Directorate of National Intelligence, increased the emphasis

on military intelligence and military access to all other forms

of intelligence. The directorate worked closely with the military, coordinating efforts among intelligence agencies, and

using directorate analyses and recommendations to formulate

security policy.

In the uneasy atmosphere of the mid-1980s, the definition of

"enemies of the state" expanded rapidly, extending the role of

the intelligence community. Various intelligence services

engaged in operations involving harassment, assault, disappearance, and sometimes the murder of antiapartheid activists. In the early 1990s, the government began reorganizing the

country's intelligence-gathering network. The Intelligence Ser- vices Act (No. 38) of 1994, the National Strategic Intelligence

Act (No. 39) of 1994, and the Parliamentary Committee on

Intelligence Act (No. 40) of 1994 established a National Intelli- gence Coordinating Committee (NICC) to present coordinated intelligence analyses to the president and the cabinet.

The NICC oversees the operations of the four arms of the

intelligence community. These are the National Intelligence

Agency (NIA), which is responsible for domestic intelligence

gathering; the South African Secret Service (SASS), which

manages foreign intelligence; the military intelligence agencies, and the police intelligence unit. The NICC is chaired by

the deputy minister of intelligence services, who is appointed

by the president and who reports directly to the president.

(There is no minister in charge of intelligence activities.)

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National Security

The 1994 legislation also authorizes military intelligence

units to collect foreign intelligence and, under specific, limited

circumstances, to collect domestic intelligence. It does not

authorize any military intelligence agency to conduct domestic

intelligence gathering on a routine basis.

One overriding concern among senior government officials

in the postapartheid era is guaranteeing the protection of the

individual against interference by the agencies under their

control. To help protect citizens against such abuse, the president appoints an inspector general for the NIA and for the

SASS. The two inspectors general report to the Joint Committee on Defence, which includes members of both houses of

Parliament, appointed jointly by the president and the speaker

of the National Assembly. This committee must report to both

houses of Parliament at least once each year concerning the

state of intelligence gathering nationwide.

Defense Budget

South Africa's defense budget grew almost tenfold in nominal terms between 1975 and 1989, from Rl billion to R9.4 bil- lion (for value of the rand—see Glossary). In constant dollar

value, however, the increase was modest—from US$3 billion

per year in the early 1980s to US$3.43 billion per year in the

last half of that decade, based on 1988 prices. Defense spending averaged 16.4 percent of government budgets in the 1980s;

it ranged from a high of 22.7 percent in 1982 to 13.7 percent in

1987, but rose to 15.7 percent of government spending in

1989.

Although South Africa's defense spending was high in comparison with economic output in the 1980s, the "trend toward

militarization" in that decade, which was noted by many observers in analyzing South Africa's apartheid-era spending, was not

evident in global comparisons. Out of 144 countries surveyed

by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in

1989, South Africa ranked thirtieth in total military expenditures, forty-fourth in military spending as a percentage of gross

national product (GNP—see Glossary), and sixty-third in military spending as a percentage of total government spending.

South Africa also ranked forty-ninth in the size of its armed

forces and 103d in the size of the armed forces in relation to population.

By the mid-1990s, defense spending had been reduced to

less than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glos381
South Africa: A Country Study

sary), and less than 10 percent of total government spending

(see table 8; table 24, Appendix). Military salaries consumed

more than half of defense spending, in part the result of the

military reorganization. Spending on armaments and equipment had declined, as a portion of defense spending, from 44

percent in the 1980s to 28 percent in 1994, according to newly

appointed SANDF chief General George Meiring. Meiring and

other defense officials in 1995 expressed concern about military preparedness, noting the reduced production and acquisition of armored vehicles, the decline in antiaircraft capability,

the reduction of civil service positions from 144,000 to about

100,000, the closure of military bases, and the reduction in military training courses. Deputy Minister of Defence Ronnie Kasrils said in 1995 that the government's planned cuts in defense

spending could also result in the loss of as many as 90,000 jobs

in defense-related industries.

The budget for military intelligence in 1994 was R163 million, and of this, R37 million was allocated for clandestine military intelligence gathering, according to a senior military

intelligence officer reporting to the Joint Committee on

Defence in October 1994. Spending on clandestine military

intelligence was about 1 percent of the total military budget,

according to the 1994 report.

Internal Security

Police

Early Development

The South African Police Service (SAPS) traces its origin to the Dutch Watch, a paramilitary organization formed by set- tlers in the Cape in 1655, initially to protect (white) civilians

against attack and later to maintain law and order. In 1795 British officials assumed control over the Dutch Watch, and in

1825 they organized the Cape Constabulary, which became the

Cape Town Police Force in 1840. The Durban Police Force,

established in 1846, became the Natal Mounted Police in 1861,

and gradually assumed increasing paramilitary functions as South Africa endured the last in a series of frontier wars that

had continued for more than a century.

In 1913 a number of police forces consolidated into the

Mounted Riflemen's Association, and some members of this

association established a separate organization, which they

382
Officer of the South African

Police Service

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth

Africa, Washington

called the South African Police (SAP). Four years later, the

Mounted Riflemen's Association relinquished its civilian

responsibilities to the SAP as most of the riflemen left to serve

in World War I. The SAP and the military maintained their

close relationship even after the SAP assumed permanent

responsibility for domestic law and order in 1926. Police offi- cials often called on the army for support in emergencies. In

World War II, one SAP brigade served with the Second Infantry

Division of the South African Army in North Africa.

When the National Party (NP) edged out its more liberal

opponents in nationwide elections in 1948, the new government enacted legislation strengthening the relationship

between the police and the military. The police were heavily

armed after that, especially when facing unruly or hostile

crowds. The Police Act (No. 7) of 1958 broadened the mission

of the SAP beyond conventional police functions, such as maintaining law and order and investigating and preventing crime,

and gave the police extraordinary powers to quell unrest and

to conduct counterinsurgency activities. The Police Amendment Act (No. 70) of 1965 empowered the police to search

without warrant any person, receptacle, vehicle, aircraft, or premise within two kilometers of any national border, and to

seize anything found during such a search. This search-and383
South Africa: A Country Study

seize zone was extended to within ten kilometers of any border

in 1979, and to the entire country in 1983.

The Police Reserve, established in 1973, enabled the government to recall former police personnel for active duty for thirty to ninety days each year, and for additional service in times of

emergency. Another reserve (volunteer) force was established

in 1981, consisting of unpaid civilians willing to perform limited police duties. A youth wing of this reserve force reported

that it had inducted almost 3,000 students and young people to

assist the police during the late 1980s.

The police increased the use of part-time, specialized personnel, such as the special constables (kitskonstabels) , to help

quell the growing violence in the 1980s. In 1987, for example,

the police recruited almost 9,000 kitskonstabels and gave them

an intensive six-week training course. These "instant" police

assistants were then armed and assigned to areas of unrest,

which were often the most turbulent townships. Even with

training courses extended to three months, the kitskonstabels'

often brutal and inept performance contributed to the growing hostility between the police and the public by the late

1980s.

Although the mission of the SAP grew well beyond conventional policing responsibilities during the 1970s, the size of the

police force declined relative to population. In 1981 the police

force of roughly 48,991 represented a ratio of less than 1.5

police per 1,000 people, down from 1.67 per 1,000 people in

the 1960s. Alarmed by the increased political violence and

crime in the mid-1980s and by the lack of adequate police support, officials then increased the size of the police force to 93,600—a ratio of 2.7 per 1,000 people—by 1991.

The police are authorized to act on behalf of other government officials when called upon. For example, in rural areas and small towns, where there may be no public prosecutor

available, police personnel can institute criminal proceedings.

The police can legally serve as wardens, court clerks, and messengers, as well as immigration, health, and revenue officials. In some circumstances, the police are also authorized to serve

as vehicle inspectors, postal agents, and local court personnel.

The Police in the 1990s

After President de Klerk lifted the ban on black political

organizations and released leading dissidents from prison in

1990, he met with the police and ordered them help end apart384
National Security

heid, to demonstrate greater political tolerance, and to

improve their standing in black communities. The police

accepted these orders, but did so much more slowly and reluctantly than the military. White police personnel were, in general, ambivalent about the changes taking place and divided

over strategies for implementing them. For decades the police

force had been organized around the authoritarian ideal of

maintaining apartheid. With wide-ranging powers, the police

had operated without strong institutional checks and balances

and without serious external scrutiny. For many, the government's new policies represented an abrupt reversal in the orientation of the police.

Through the early 1990s, police units were sometimes integrated, but most police recruits had been trained in single-race

classes, sometimes in institutions designated for one racial

group. For example, most black police personnel had trained

at Hammanskraal, near Pretoria; most whites, in Pretoria; most

coloureds, at Lavis Bay, near Cape Town; and Asians at Wentworth, near Durban. As the apartheid era ended, these programs were restructured to emphasize racial tolerance and

respect for basic human rights. The police also increased

recruitment among black youth and hired international police

training experts to advise them on ways to improve race relations in the service.

The basic police training regimen includes courses in criminal investigation procedures, self-defense, weapons handling,

drills, inspections, public relations, and law Specialized courses include crowd and riot control, detective skills, horsemanship

and veterinary training, and advanced-level management skills. Since 1990, South Africa also has provided training for police

from Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Zaire.

Police officers on duty generally carry a pistol or revolver

and a truncheon. To quell disturbances, police use a variety of

arms, including 37-millimeter stopper guns, which can shoot

tear gas, rubber bullets, or signal colors; twelve-gauge Browning semiautomatic and Beretta pump shotguns; and R-l semiautomatic rifles. Through the early 1990s, the police were also

equipped with smoke and tear-gas dispensing vehicles, tank

trucks with water cannons, vehicles that dispensed barbed wire

or razor wire to cordon off areas rapidly, and a small number of

helicopters capable of dropping "water bombs" on crowds of

demonstrators. Riot-control forces deployed in specially

designed buses or Casspir armored personal carriers.

385
South Africa: A Country Study

The climate of escalating violence in the early 1990s often

posed even greater challenges to the police than they had

faced in the 1980s, as violence shifted from antigovernment

activity to a mosaic of political rivalries and factional clashes. At

the same time, many South Africans feared that the police were

causing some of the criminal and political violence, and they

demanded immediate changes in the police force to mark the

end of apartheid-era injustices.

To meet the new challenges, the 91,000 active police personnel in 1991, including administrative and support personnel, were increased to more than 110,000 by 1993 and 140,000 by

1995. Throughout this time, police reserves numbered at least

37,000. In 1996 the combined active and reserve police represented a police-to-population ratio of almost 4.0 per 1,000.

As part of the overall reorganization of the police, the government merged the formerly dreaded Criminal Investigation

Department (CID) and the police security branch to form a Crime Combatting and Investigation (CCI) Division. The new

CCI, with responsibility for reversing the rising crime rate,

combined the intelligence and operational resources of the

security police with the anticrime capabilities of the CID.

Minister of Law and Order Hernus Kriel in 1991 also

appointed an ombudsman to investigate allegations of police

misconduct. He increased the recruitment of black police personnel, formed a civilian riot-control unit that was separate

from the SAP but worked with it, developed a code of police

conduct agreed upon by a number of political parties and communities, and substantially increased police training facilities. In 1992 Kriel began restructuring the SAP into a three-tiered

force consisting of a national police, primarily responsible for

internal security and for serious crime; autonomous regional

forces, responsible for crime prevention and for matters of

general law and order; and municipal police, responsible for

local law enforcement and for minor criminal matters. He also

established police/community forums in almost every police

station.

By the time the April 1994 elections were held, the SAP had

undergone a significant transformation, in keeping with the

nation's sweeping political reforms. It was a more representative force, with greater dedication to protecting citizens' rights.

The SAP was renamed the South African Police Service

(SAPS) , and the Ministry of Law and Order was renamed the

Ministry of Safety and Security, in keeping with these symbolic

386
National Security

reforms. The new minister of safety and security, Sydney Mufamadi, obtained police training assistance from Zimbabwe, Britain, and Canada, and proclaimed that racial tolerance and

human rights would be central to police training programs in

the future. By the end of 1995, the SAPS had incorporated the

ten police agencies from the former homelands and had reor- ganized at both the national level and at the level of South

Africa's nine new provinces.

The SAPS headquarters in Pretoria is organized into six divi- sions. These are the Crime Combatting and Investigation Division, the Visible Policing Division, the Internal Stability

Division, the Community Relations Division, the Supporting

Services Division, and the Human Resource Management Division.

The Crime Combatting and Investigation Division holds

overall responsibility for coordinating information about crime

and investigative procedures. It administers the SAPS Criminal

Record Center, the SAPS Commercial Crime Unit, the SAPS

Diamond and Gold Branch, the South African Narcotics

Bureau, the Stock Theft Unit, the Inspectorate for Explosives,

murder and robbery units located in each major city, and vehicle theft units throughout the country. In addition, the division

manages the National Bureau of Missing Persons, which was

established in late 1994.

The Visible Policing Division manages highly public police

operations, such as guarding senior government officials and

dignitaries. Most government residences are guarded by members of the division's Special Guard Unit. The division's all-vol- unteer Special Task Force handles hostage situations and other

high-risk activities. The Internal Stability Division is responsible

for preventing and quelling internal unrest, and for assisting

other divisions in combatting crime. The Community Relations

Division consults with all police divisions concerning accountability and respect for human rights. The Supporting Services

Division manages financial, legal, and administrative aspects of

the SAPS. The Human Resource Management Division helps

to hire, to train, and to maintain a competent work force for

the SAPS.

Three police unions are active in bargaining on behalf of

police personnel and in protecting the interests of the work

force, as of 1996. These are the Police and Prisons Civil Rights

Union (Popcru), which has about 15,000 members; the South

African Police Union (SAPU), which has about 35,000 mera387
South Africa: A Country Study

bers; and the Public Service Association (PSA), which has

about 4,000 members.

Crime and Violence

Patterns of crime and violence in South Africa have often

reflected political developments, especially since the 1950s.

Crime surged to alarming proportions after a new constitution was implemented in 1984, granting limited parliamentary representation to coloureds and to Asians, but not to blacks. The

number of reported murders in South Africa rose to 10,000 in

1989 and to 11,000 in 1990. The incidence of assault, rape, and

armed robbery showed similar increases. Police estimated that

22,000 people died in crime-related violence in the fifteen

months ending in February 1991. By 1992 South Africa had

one of the world's highest crime rates, on a per capita basis. Waves of serious violence swept through many townships

around Johannesburg and in Natal Province, where the rivalry

between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African

National Congress (ANC) resulted in several hundred—some

estimated more than 1,000—deaths each year in the late 1980s

and the early 1990s. Officials estimated that 12,000 citizens

(and 2,000 SADF troops) were involved in ANC-IFP clashes in

the early 1990s.

White right-wing terrorists added to the crime rate as they

were increasingly marginalized from the political process.

Groups such as the White Liberation Army, the White Republi- can Army, the Boer Republican Army, the White Wolves, and

the Order of the Boer Nation claimed responsibility for more

than thirty-five bombings. Some of these groups formed an alli- ance known as the White People's Front in 1992 and threatened further violence as the political transition continued.

Community Response

Dealing with rising levels of crime and violence became a major public preoccupation in the 1990s and resulted in a variety of ad hoc security arrangements and alliances. For example, many organizations and a few individuals hired private

security guards for protection. Civilians volunteered to monitor

street crime in several turbulent townships. The ANC, after initially opposing these groups as "vigilantes," formed its own Self- Defense Units to help protect ANC supporters in the townships. Their political rivals in IFP strongholds responded by

388
National Security

forming Zulu Self-Protection Units, especially in and around

workers' hostels.

During the apartheid era, black South Africans had been

legally barred from owning guns, but many whites considered

gun ownership a normal defensive measure and a cherished

right. Gun owners were legally required to register their weapons with the police, and a record 123,000 firearms were registered in 1990. By 1992 more than 2.5 million firearms had

been registered nationwide. Police officials estimated that onehalf of all white families owned at least one firearm, and at least 100,000 white households owned more than five registered

weapons. Many more people were arming themselves illegally,

according to police estimates.

Weapons thefts were extremely common. More than 7,700

firearms were reported stolen during 1990 alone. More than

5,000 guns were turned in to the police during a six-week

amnesty in late 1990, and another 1,900, during a second

amnesty in 1992. Although firearms and explosives were the cause of more than one-half of the deaths in the early 1990s,

spears, knives, and axes—so-called Zulu traditional weapons,

which were legal—were responsible for about 20 percent of violent deaths.

Government Response

Under strong pressure to end the township violence of the

early 1990s, the police undertook numerous security sweeps

through townships and squatter camps. During one of the larg- est of these, Operation Iron Fist, in late 1990, some 1,500 SAP

and several hundred SADF troops swept through workers' hostels around Johannesburg and recovered several thousand ille- gal weapons. More than 30,000 SAP and SADF personnel

conducted routine crime sweeps after that, and they made 337

arrests in one operation alone in 1991. By 1993 more than

10,000 people had been arrested, and large quantities of illegal

drugs and weapons had been confiscated.

President de Klerk's credibility was severely damaged in July

1991, when official documents leaked to the public confirmed

long-standing rumors of police support for the Zulu-dominated IFP in its rivalry with the ANC. A burst of publicity,

dubbed "Inkathagate" by the press, threatened to derail constitutional negotiations after evidence linked senior government

and police officials with funds secretly channeled to the IFP's labor activities and membership drives, which many believed

389
South Africa: A Country Study

had fueled the violence. Public anger rose, both because of the

politicization of the police and because the government then

appeared incapable of halting the violence as the scandal

intensified.

The September 1991 National Peace Accord marked a desperate effort by both the government and the ANC to end the

killing and to ease anxiety about official involvement in it. The

accord, signed by more than two dozen leaders of government

and political organizations, established committees and channels of communication at national, regional, and community

levels to try to avert bloodshed arising out of political disagreements. Under this accord, the government established the

Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public

Violence and Intimidation, chaired by a respected jurist, Richard Goldstone, to investigate the causes of the violence. The

Goldstone Commission's interim report in early 1992 attributed most of the killing to the political battle between supporters of the ANC and the IFP, but it also confirmed suspicions

that elements of the security forces, especially the police, had

contributed to the unrest. Then ANC leader Mandela, who was vocal in his criticism of

the government for its failure to quell the unrest of the early

1990s, insisted that international attention be given to the issue

of state-sponsored violence. In June 1992, Mandela, Foreign

Minister Roelof "Pik" Botha, and IFP leader Mangosuthu (Gatsha) Buthelezi addressed the United Nations concerning this

issue. After that, other countries increased their involvement in

South Africa's political reform. In August of that year, former

United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance went to South

Africa as United Nations special envoy. Acting on his suggestion, the United Nations sent political monitors to South Africa

to demonstrate international support for the institutions that

had arisen out of the National Peace Accord. At the same time,

South Africa's political leaders implemented another of

Vance's recommendations—to speed up the pace of progress

toward nationwide elections.

Then, in late 1992, the Goldstone Commission concluded

that secret cells within the police force had, with the cooperation of military intelligence officials, "waged a war" on the

ANC, primarily because of its commitment to armed struggle

to end apartheid and its association with the South African

Communist Party (SACP). The commission's report also

implied that elements in the security forces were continuing to

390
National Security

provoke or commit violent acts. In response to rising pressures,

President de Klerk persuaded twenty-three senior military offi- cers to retire, including the heads of the SADF and military

intelligence.

Despite significant progress, there were at least 4,300 politically motivated deaths in 1993, according to the South African

Institute of Race Relations, and each new round of violence

brought a new sense of urgency to the task of preparing for

elections. More than 2,000 murders were in Zulu-inhabited

areas of KwaZulu and Natal Province. The Goldstone Commission later concluded that some of the weapons used in the violence against ANC supporters had been supplied by the police.

The police arrested a few whites who advocated violence to block the elections, including Afrikaner Resistance Movement

(Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging—AWB) leader Eugene Terreblanche. In most cases, the accused were fined for their activities or were granted immunity in return for information about

their organizations and activities. White extremists were

arrested for the April 1993 murder of a popular SACP leader,

Chris Hani, and two were sentenced to death for that crime.

(The death penalty was abolished before their sentences were

carried out.)

Prison System

In the mid-1990s, South Africa's Department of Correctional

Services operates 234 prisons. Of these, 226 are primarily or

solely for male prisoners, and 119 of these have separate

women's sections. The department also operates twenty prison

farms.

There were roughly 114,000 prisoners nationwide—nearly

92,000 serving prison sentences and about 22,000 not yet sen- tenced—as of 1995. Some 70 percent of prisoners were black,

25 percent were coloured, 4 percent were white, and less than 1 percent were Asian. This prison population constituted

roughly 130 percent of prison capacity. More than 400,000 people were jailed at some time during 1995, most for periods

ranging from a few days to several months. Nearly 26,000 people per day were on parole.

The Department of Correctional Services has roughly

22,500 employees, at least 4,500 fewer than its workload

requires, according to official estimates. Severe staff shortages

are sometimes ameliorated by employing some of the 1,500

391
South Africa: A Country Study

members of the Prisons Service Reserve Force (mostly retired

prison staff) and as many as 1,000 military reservists.

Four categories of prisoners are held: unsentenced prisoners, most of whom are detained pending a hearing or sentencing; short-term prisoners, who are serving terms of less than

two years; long-term prisoners; and juvenile prisoners, who are under twenty-one years of age. Through 1994 women made up

about 4 percent of the prison population, but late that year, the

new government granted an amnesty to all female prisoners

with children under the age of twelve, if they had been convicted of nonviolent crimes. In late 1994, 250 prisoners over

the age of sixty also had their sentences remitted and were

released from prison.

In 1995 the prison population included 1,278 children

under the age of eighteen, half of them awaiting trial, according to the Department of Correctional Services. The number

represented less than half the number ofjuveniles in prison in

1992. A small, but unknown, number of children under age

fourteen were among the juveniles in prison, according to international human rights observers.

Literacy training and vocational courses are offered in some

prisons. Parole supervision is generally strict, and parole viola- tors are returned to prison, where they must serve out their

original terms and sometimes additional periods of incarceration. Some jurisdictions instituted a system of correctional

supervision as an alternative to prison sentences in the early

1990s, partly in response to prison overcrowding. Correctional

supervision entails community service, victim compensation,

house arrest, treatment sessions, a prohibition of alcohol con- sumption, or a combination of these programs. The department also established correctional boards in 1992 to provide a communication link between its officials and residents of local

communities. In addition, the department established a National Advisory Board on Correctional Services to advise

prison authorities on legal and policy concerns. The National

Advisory Board is chaired by a Supreme Court judge, and its members include specialists from the court system and the

police, as well as social welfare authorities, and business and

community representatives.

Penal Code

South Africa's courts are empowered to impose punishments

of death (through early 1995), imprisonment, periodic impris392
The Castle of Good Hope,

pentagonalfortress built in

1666, later served as a prison.

Courtesy Embassy ofSouth

Africa, Washington

onment for a total of between 100 and 2,000 hours over a period of weeks or months, being declared a "habitual criminal," commitment to an institution other than prison, fines,

and whipping. Those convicted of lesser crimes are often given

a choice of punishment—for example, a fine or imprisonment.

During the apartheid era, the courts imposed prison terms of

several days to several weeks for pass law violations, and ten to twenty years for membership in the ANC or the SACP, which

were banned organizations until 1990. Other typical prison

sentences are terms of two to ten years for robbery; up to twenty years for assault or rape; ten to fifteen years for possessing an illegal firearm; ten to twenty years for attempted murder; and twenty years to life in prison for murder.

Murder and treason were capital crimes through the 1980s,

although whites often received light sentences for crimes

against black people, and they were almost never sentenced to death for murdering blacks. All executions were suspended in

early 1990, and although more than 240 people were sen- tenced to death between 1990 and early 1995, no one was exe- cuted during that time. Parliament abolished the death penalty

in early 1995.

Whipping is frequently used to punish juveniles for public

misbehavior, but may only be imposed on male offenders

under the age of thirty. The punishment may not exceed seven

393
South Africa: A Country Study

strokes of a cane. Whipping is done in private, although the

parents of a juvenile can be present. This punishment was imposed on more than 30,000 juveniles and young men each

year in the early 1990s.

Human Rights and National Reconciliation

South Africa's record on human rights came under frequent

attack during the apartheid era, and improving it became a high priority for achieving national reconciliation and international legitimacy in the 1990s. South Africa had more than

2,500 political prisoners in 1990, according to the UN Human

Rights Commission. Responding to criticism on this sensitive

subject during the early 1990s negotiations, then President de

Klerk agreed to review all cases of crimes against state security,

and as a result, the government released 933 political prisoners

by April 1991. It rejected 364 appeals for release because of the

nature of the crimes involved. In September 1992, based on

special requests by ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and through

the intervention of UN special representative, former United

States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the government released an additional 400 political prisoners as a further step toward

successful negotiations. Officials went ahead with election

preparations even though the issue of political prisoners was not fully resolved, and the new government in mid-1994

released from prison several hundred people who had been

convicted of nonviolent crimes. Among them were an unre- ported number whose offenses were considered political.

The ANC faced its own internal accusations of human rights

violations during the early 1990s. Former detainees from ANC

prison camps alleged that they had been held in harsh conditions in Angola, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, or Zambia. Human

rights monitors confirmed that prisoners in these camps had

sometimes been tortured and, in a few cases, had been executed. Moreover, they alleged that some of the camps continued to be in operation, even after the ANC had announced the

suspension of its armed struggle against apartheid. Mandela

promised to investigate and to end these practices, but would

not agree to air the allegations in public.

The interim constitution's chapter on fundamental rights

guarantees freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association,

and religion, as well as the freedom to travel and to live where

one chooses, and the protection of minority rights. The

interim constitution repealed Section 29 of the Internal Secu394
National Security

rity Act, which had allowed the government to detain individuals for indefinite periods without charging them with a crime.

Subsequent legislation established an independent Human

Rights Commission and Office of the Public Protector, both to be appointed by the parliament. The public protector is charged with investigating allegations of abuse or incompetence against members of the government, including the

police.

Despite obvious improvements in human rights policies and

practices in the mid-1990s, several forms of human rights abuse

continued at unacceptable levels and appeared to involve highlevel police officials. Thirty-one unexplained deaths occurred

in police custody in 1994, according to the private South Afri- can Human Rights Committee. This number was eight fewer

than in 1993, and fifty-six fewer than in 1990. Pathologists'

reports confirmed instances of police abuse in some of the

1994 deaths, and a team of international human rights monitors and independent experts uncovered a pattern of torture

of detainees by some police personnel in the Johannesburg

area. The Goldstone Commission's investigations had unearthed

prima facie evidence implicating senior police officials in supplying weapons to the Zulu-based IFP in 1993 and 1994, and

had noted that some of these weapons had surfaced at the scene of IFP attacks on political opponents. These conclusions

had resulted in the retirement of several senior police officers; one police training unit commander was charged with murder

and later sentenced to life in prison.

Soon after the new government was in office in 1994, it began investigating allegations of "hit squads" within the KwaZulu police (predominantly IFP supporters) and launched an

investigation into ANC-instigated violence in KwaZulu-Natal.

Despite some initial reluctance, the provincial government

cooperated with the international human rights monitors and

allowed them access to prisons and detainees.

Violence against women continued to occur with regularity

through the mid-1990s. The Department ofJustice issued chill- ing statistics in 1994: more than one-half of all women who

were murdered had died at the hands of their male partners.

About 43 percent of women questioned in one study said they

had been the victim of marital rape or assault. The police

received reports of more than 25,200 rapes between January 1 and October 31, 1994—a 17 percent increase over the same

395
South Africa: A Country Study

period in 1993—but estimated that most such incidents were

not reported and only about 25 percent of reported rapes

resulted in convictions. Numerous laws were passed, both

before and after the April 1994 elections, aimed at protecting

women against abuse, but these laws were often ignored or

bypassed. The new government pledged stricter legislation and

stronger efforts to establish fair treatment for women.

The new government's promises of an improved human

rights record and of security forces that are accountable to the

population helped to set the tone for democratic reforms in

1994 and 1995. But the security forces faced even greater challenges than the political leaders in trying to implement these

reforms. Members of the police, in particular, had to abandon

their apartheid-related agendas—enforcing or opposing the

old order—while, at the same time, upholding the changing

laws that apply to the entire population. They had to establish

"instant legitimacy," as several South African scholars observed,

in the midst of change.

Legislation in 1995 established a Truth and Reconciliation

Commission to deal with grievances arising out of human

rights violations of the apartheid era. The commission's goals

are to establish the truth about such crimes, to identify victims

and determine their fate, to recommend reparation for victims

and survivors, and to recommend to the president amnesty or indemnity under limited circumstances. Any grant of amnesty

initially applied only to politically motivated acts committed

before October 8, 1990, and subsequent legislation extended

the cut-off date to May 10, 1994.

President Mandela appointed Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu to chair the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

and a respected jurist, Alex Boraine, as his deputy. The commission began hearing testimony in March 1996, and it scheduled hearings in each province to enable South Africans from

all regions to testify or to apply for amnesty. By mid-1996 sev- eral hundred testimonies had been heard, most of them con- cerning brutality or other mistreatment by the former security

forces.

With less than one-half of its hearings completed in mid1996, the commission was generally viewed as a positive step

toward national reconciliation. A few outspoken critics disagreed, however, and charged the commission with impeding

justice. Among these were relatives of ANC activists who had

been killed by the security forces; some survivors criticized the

396
National Security

commission for even considering amnesty applications from

those who might otherwise have been brought to justice in the

courts. Some former members of the security forces, for their

part, criticized the commission for its apparent willingness to accept allegations against them. A few others who had testified

before the commission complained that they had received little or no compensation for their losses, although most requests for

compensation had not yet been acted upon by mid-1996.

Despite these complaints, it appeared likely that the hearings

would contribute to a broader public understanding of the violence that had bolstered the implementation of apartheid.

* * *

South Africa has an extensive military history literature.

Official accounts are available in numerous publications by

Neil D. Orpen, such as The History of the Transvaal Horse Artillery,

1904-1974; The Cape Town Rifles: The 'Duke, ' 1856-1984; War in

the Desert; East African and Abyssinian Campaigns; and Prince

Alfred's Guard, 1856-1966. Helmoed-Romer Heitman's The

South African War Machine, South African Arms and Armour, and

War in Angola: The Final South African Phase also cover important

areas of military history. Different historical viewpoints are found in A. N. Porter's The Origins of the South African War:Joseph

Chamberlain and the Diplomacy ofImperialism, 1895-1899 and Carman Miller's Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African

War, 1899-1902. An interesting comparative perspective is found in James O. Gump's The Dust Rose like Smoke: The Subjugation of the Zulu and the Sioux. Jacklyn Cock's Women and War in

South Africa presents a gender-related view of the subject.

The climate of domestic violence of the 1980s is analyzed in

publications of the South African Institute of Race Relations,

such as the annual Race Relations Survey, and in John Kane-Berman's Political Violence in South Africa. Political Violence and the Struggle in South Africa, edited by N. Chabani Manganyi and

Andre du Toit; Policing the Conflict in South Africa, edited by

Mary L. Mathews, Philip B. Heymann, and Anthony S. Mathews; and Policing South Africa: The South African Police and

the Transition from Apartheid, by Gavin Cawthra, are also valuable.

South Africa's regional security policies since the early 1980s

are discussed in numerous periodicals and monographs. High

Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood by

397
South Africa: A Country Study

Chester A. Crocker, and Toward Peace and Security in Southern

Africa, edited by Harvey Glickman, discuss Western points of

view on that era. The New Is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in

Southern Africa by Thomas Ohlson and Stephen John Stedman

with Robert Davies reviews regional clashes and peacemaking

efforts in recent decades.

The changing security situation in the mid-1990s is outlined

in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Year- book, 1995; "Prospects for Security and Stability in the New

South Africa" by Carole Birch in Brassey's Defence Yearbook; and

"Current Trends in South Africa's Security Establishment" by

Annette Seegers in Armed Forces and Society. Jane's Information

Group's special report ofJuly 1994, Whither South Africa's Warriors?, is a valuable contribution. The South African National

Defence Force periodical, Salut, conveys brief insights into military concerns in the mid-1990s. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

398
Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population by Province, 1994

3 Number of Pupils and Teachers by Province, 1995

4 Major Institutions of Higher Learning and Research, 1995

5 Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years,

1948-93

6 Key Economic Indicators, 1991-95

7 Sources of Government Revenue, 1994, 1995, and 1996

8 Government Expenditures, 1995 and 1996

9 Major Imports, 1992, 1993, and 1994

10 Major Exports, 1992, 1993, and 1994

11 Distribution of Employment in the Formal Economy, 1994

12 Selected Mining Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994

13 Selected Agricultural Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994

14 Selected Industrial Production, 1992-95

15 Foreign Tourist Arrivals, 1991-95

16 Political Party Representation in National Government,

1995

17 Political Party Representation in Provincial Government:

Executive Officials, 1995

18 Political Party Representation in Provincial Government:

Legislative Assemblies, 1995

19 Major Newspapers, 1995

20 Composition of South African National Defence Force, 1996

21 Major Army Equipment, 1996

22 Major Air Force Equipment, 1996

23 Major Naval Equipment, 1996

24 Defense Budget, 1995 and 1996

399

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 04 inches Centimeters 39 inched Meters 3.3 feet 62 miles Hectares 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) . . 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit and add 32

Table 2. Population by Province, 1994

Province Population1 Density2

Eastern Cape 6,665,400 38.2 Free State 2,804,600 21.5 6,847,000 374.7 KwaZulu-Natal 8,549,000 94.5 2,838,500 38.4 Northern Cape 763,900 2.1 Northern Province 5,120,600 43.8 North-West Province 3,506,800 28.8 Western Cape 3,620,200 28.8

Estimated. Persons per square kilometer. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 5-21.

401
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 3. Number ofPupils and Teachers by Province, 1995

Province Pupils Teachers Primary Secondary

(six years) (six years)

Eastern Cape 1,583,261 741,962 58,254 Free State 414,826 283,573 23,521 Gauteng 787,599 621,036 46,335 KwaZulu-Natal 1,628,679 948,588 63,283 Mpumalanga 545,312 368,363 23,521 Northern Cape 110,223 62,333 7,222 Northern Province 1,050,594 866,428 52,061 North-West Province 545,841 369,588 30,740 Western Cape 504,967 331,602 31,716 TOTAL 7,171,302 4,593,473 336,653 Source: Based on information from Jacob P. Strauss, Hendrik van der Linde, et al., Education and Manpower Development, 1995, Bloemfontein, 1996, 6-10.

402
Appendix

Table 4. Major Institutions of Higher Learning and Research,

1995

Institution Enrollment Location Date Founded

Universities Medical University of South

Africa Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education Rand Afrikaans University Rhodes University

University of Cape Town

University of Durban-Westville

University of Fort Hare

University of Natal

University of North-West

University of Port Elizabeth

University of Pretoria

University of South Africa (correspondence)

University of Stellenbosch

University of the North

University of the Orange Free

State University of the Western Cape

University of the Witwatersrand

University of Transkei

University of Venda

University of Zululand

Vista University (correspondence) Technikons2 Border Technikon Cape Technikon Mangosuthu Technikon

M.L. Sultan Technikon

Peninsula Technikon

Technikon Natal Technikon Northern Transvaal Technikon Orange Free State Technikon Port Elizabeth Technikon Pretoria

o,^y S 4Q7/ Pretoria n.a.

10,408 Potchefstroom 1869

20,145 Auckland Park 1966

4,594 Grahamstown 1904

14,672 Cape Town 1829

10,626 Durban 1961

5,200 Alice 1916

14,093 Durban/Pieter- 1910

maritzburg

4,918 Mmabatho 1979

5,600 Port Elizabeth 1964

24,435 Pretoria 1908

130,350 Pretoria 1873

14,608 Stellenbosch 1918

19,012 Turfloop 1959

Witzieshoek

Giyani Phuthaditjhaba

9,446 Bloemfontein 1855

14,650 beliville 1960

17,428 Johannesburg 1922

7,325 Eastern Cape 1976

7,166 Sibasa n.a. 7,997 KwaDlangezwa 1960

34,014 Pretoria 1982

1,366 East London n.a. 9,360 Cape Town 1979

4,648 Umlazi 1978

6,359 Durban 1946

6,773 Beliville 1967

7,551 Durban 1907

6,764 Pretoria 1979

5,895 Bloemfontein 1981

7,864 Port Elizabeth 1925

16,509 Pretoria 1906

403
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 4. ( Continued) Major Institutions of Higher Learning and

Research, 1995

Institution Enrollment Location Date Founded

Technikon SA

Technikon Setlogalo Technikon Witwatersrand

Transkei Technikon

Vaal Triangle Technikon

Research organizadons

Agricultural Research Council Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa Council for Geoscience

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research Hartebeesthoek Radio Astronomy

Observatory Human Sciences Research

Council

Insdtute for the Study of Man

in Africa MINTER4 Municipal Botanic Gardens

National Zoological Gardens of South Africa South African Institute for Medical Research Learned societies Africa Institute of South Africa

Classical Association of South

Africa Economic Society of South Africa Foundation for Educadon, Science and Technology

Genealogical Society of South Africa . . . Heraldry Society of Southern Africa . . . Royal Society of South Africa South Africa Foundadon

South Africa Institute of International

Affairs South African Academy of Science and Arts South African Archaeological

Society South African Association of the Arts South African Geographical Society. . . . South African Insdtute for Librarianship and Information Science

83,741 1^1 1 lUioriHlUda 1980

1,958 Rosslyn n.a. 10,976 Doornfontein 1925

2,181 Butterworth n.a. 7,856 Vanderbijlpark 1966

3 Pretoria 1992 — Pretoria 1982

Pretoria 1912

Pretoria 1945 _ Krugersdorp 1961

Pre toria 1969

Johannesburg 1960 Randburg 1934 Durban 1849 — Pretoria 1899

Johannesburg 1912

Pretoria 1960

Bloemfontein 1956

Pretoria 1925

1 1C Ll/1 Id 1950

Kelvin 1963 — Cape Town 1953 Cape Town 1877 Johannesburg 1959

Johannesburg 1934

Pretoria 1909

Vlaeberg 1945

Pretoria 1945

Witwatersrand 1917

Pretoria 1930

404
Appendix

Table 4. (Continued) Major Institutions of Higher Learning and

Research, 1995

Institution Enrollment Location Date Founded

South African Institute of Race

Relations — Johannesburg 1929 South African Museums

Association — Sunnyside 1936 Van Riebeeck Society — Cape Town 1918

1 n.a.—not available.

2 Postsecondary technical training.

5 —not applicable.

4 Mineral science and mining technology. Source: Based on information from The World ofLearning, 1995, London, 1995, 1348-

75; and South Africa, Department of Education, Annual Report, June 1994-

December 1995, Pretoria, 1996, Appendix.

Table 5. Real Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Years, 1948-

93

(in millions of rands) 1

Year Primary Sector2 Secondary Sector3 Tertiary Sector4 Total5

1948 14,463 10,738 26,151 51,352 1953 17,197 15,007 30,966 63,169 1958 22,536 19,534 37,844 79,914 1963 30,094 26,042 45,412 101,548 1968 34,588 40,094 60,974 135,656 1973 33,410 58,125 78,418 169,953 1978 35,155 66,887 91,812 193,853 1983 33,205 77,164 110,029 220,399 1988 36,745 82,033 124,447 243,225 1993 36,451 76,895 128,655 242,001

For value of the rand—see Glossary. Figures at factor cost and in constant 1990 prices.

2 Includes agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and quarrying.

3 Includes construction, electricity, gas, manufacturing, and water.

4 Includes accommodations, business services, catering, communications, community services, finance, insurance,

real estate, social and personal services, storage, transport, and wholesale and retail trade.

5 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from South African Institute of Race Relations, Race

Relations Survey, 1 994-95, Johannesburg, 1995, 379-80.

405
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 6. Key Economic Indicators, 1991-95

(in billions of United States dollars unless otherwise indicated)

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Gross domestic product

(GDP) 1 310.1 341.0 383.1 432.8 485.9 Real GDP growth2 -1.0 -2.2 1.3 2.7 3.3 Consumer price inflation2 15.3 13.9 9.7 9.1 8.7 Gross domestic fixed invest3 ment 50.1 47.5 45.9 50.1 55.2 Exports, f.o.b. 4 23.3 23.6 24.1 25.1 27.9 Imports, c.i.f. 5 18.9 19.8 20.0 23.4 29.4 Current account balance 2.2 1.4 1.8 -0.6 -3.1 Gross reserves

6 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.1 4.4 External debt 25.6 27.2 25.5 27.9 30.8 Exchange rate

7 2.76 2.85 3.26 3.55 3.64 Population8 38.0 38.6 39.5 40.4 41.2

In billions of rands at current market prices; for value of the rand—see Glossary.

2 In percentages.

3 In billions of rands at constant 1990 prices.

4 f.o.b.—free on board.

5

c.Lf.—cost, insurance, and freight.

6 Includes gold.

7 In rands per United States dollar; annual average.

8 In millions. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: South

Africa [London] , No. 1, 1996, 3, 5.

Table 7. Sources of Government Revenue, 1994, 1995, and 1996

(in millions of rands) 2

1994 1995 19963

Income taxes: individuals 37,786 44,763 49,755 Income taxes: companies 11,917 15,502 17,368 Value-added tax 25,425 28,975 32,750 Customs and excise duties 18,074 19,124 20,446

(Less payment to Southern African Customs

Union) -3,089 -3,250 -3,890 Other taxes and revenues 6,741 6,436 6,562 TOTAL 96,854 111,550 122,991

For years ending March 31

.

2 For value of the rand—see Glossary.

3 Estimated. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 239.

406
Appendix

Table 8. Government Expenditures, 1995 and 1996

1995 1996

Value2 Percentage Value2 Percentage

Economic services Agriculture, forestry, and

fishing 3,645 2.5 2,764 1.8 Fuel and energy 433 0.3 138 0.1 Manufacturing o\JZ ().o U.4 99% ft 9 208 1

ftl Ol 1/ft (\ yo / ftu.ofi

L l CLLIJLJKJL LcLllKJ 11 a.H\JL munication 6,701 4.5 6,357 4.1 Water projects 1,208 0.8 1,309 0.8 Export promotion and

tourism 3,947 2.6 3,321 2.2 Total economic services 17,776 12.0 15,655 10.2 General government services Foreign affairs 1,320 0.9 1,321 0.9 General research 506 0.3 510 0.3 Administration and'Other 11,321 7.6 8,816 5.7 Total general government

13,147 8.9 10,647 6.9 Security services Defense 12,908 8.7 11,025 7.2 Judiciary 1,601 1.1 1,705 1.1 Police 10,168 6.9 11,614 7.5 Prisons 2,584 1.7 2,862 1.9 Total security services 27,261 18.4 27,206 17.6 Social services 31,428 21.2 32,616 21.2 Health 15,565 10.5 16,885 11.0 Housing 1,648 1.1 4,226 2.7 Community development3 2,192 1.5 785 0.5 Recreation and culture 668 0.5 833 0.5 Social security and welfare 13,672 9.2 16,713 10.8 Total social services 65,173 44.0 72,058 46.7 24,863 16.8 28,604 18.6 Government enterprises 9 0.0 7 0.0 TOTAL 148,229 100.0 154,177 100.0

For years ending March 31 . Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

2 In millions of rands; for value of the rand—see Glossary.

3 Includes sewage and sanitation services. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 238.

407
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 9. MajorImports, 1992, 1993, and 1994

(in millions of rands) 1

Commodity 1992 1993 19942

Machinery and appliances 15,010 17,131 24,805

Vehicles and transportation equipment 6,619 8,916 11,284

5,789 6,599 8,292 Base metals and articles 2,502 2,606 3,399

Professional and scientific equipment 2,243 2,716 3,299 Texdies 2,437 2,654 3,295

Plastics and rubber articles 2,250 2,639 3,256 Paper products 1,463 1,740 2,183 Precious and semiprecious stones and

precious metals 351 1,467 1,847 Vegetable products 2,570 1,928 1,365

For value of the rand—see Glossary. Preliminary figures. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 224; and Africa South of the Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 908.

Table 10. MajorExports, 1992, 1993, and 1994

(in millions of rands) 1

Commodity 1992 1993 19942

9,484 9,905 11,853 Precious stones and precious metals 7,160 10,138 10,213 7,083 8,444 7,712 Chemicals and plastics 3,221 3,378 4,757 Vegetable products 2,291 2,437 4,197 Prepared foodstuffs and tobacco 1,857 1,813 2,826 Machinery and appliances 2,151 2,811 2,567

Vehicles and transportation equipment 2,329 2,701 2,265 Paper and paper products 1,896 1,937 2,042

Textiles 1,809 1,812 1,923

For value of the rand—see Glossary. Preliminary figures. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 223; and Africa South of the Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 908.

408
Appendix

Table 11. Distribution ofEmployment in the Formal Economy, 1994

(in percentages)

Economic Activity Regular Employment1 Casual Employment

Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 12.2 8.3 Armed forces 2.3 0.2 Construction 5.6 12.6 Domestic services 8.5 26.6

7.8 2.8

Electricity and water services 1.9 1.6 4.2 1.6 Legal services 2.0 0.3 Manufacturing 16.6 9.8 5.6 1.6 Mining 7.3 0.7 Hotels and restaurants 2.6 6.4 Transportation and communications .... 6.7 4.2 Wholesale and retail trade 10.9 16.7 Other 5.8 6.6 TOTAL 100.0 100.0

Total labor force estimated at 123 million, excluding agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Source: Based on information from South African Institute of Race Relations, Race

Relations Survey, 1994-95, Johannesburg, 1995, 473.

409
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 12. Selected Mining Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994

(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated)

Mineral 1992 1993 1994

Iron ore 28,226 28,912 32,321 Diamonds1 10,177 10,324 10,812 Manganese ore 2,462 2,504 2,851 Chrome ore 3,000 2,563 3,590 Gold2 611 616 580 Copper 167 157 165.2 Asbestos 124 97 92.1 Platinum2 69 90 164.8 Lead 75.4 100.2 95.8

Silver2 172 195 n.a.

3 Uranium oxide2 2,222 2,008 1,913 Coal 174,072 182,262 190,672

In thousands of carats.

2 In tons.

3 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1994, Pretoria, 1995, 59; and South Africa, South

African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 122,125.

Table 13. Selected Agricultural Production, 1992, 1993, and 1994

(in thousands of tons)

Commodity 1992 1993 1994]

Barley 265 230 275 Corn 3,125 9,668 12,143 Grapes 1,450 1,249 1,284 Potatoes 1,215 1,127 1,306 Sorghum 98 478 520

Sugarcane 12,955 11,244 15,683 Wheat 1,269 1,984 1,782 Wool 124 111 106

Initial estimates. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 108; and Africa South of the Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 905.

410
Appendix

Table 14. Selected Industrial Production, 1992-95

Product 1992 1993 1994 1995

Automobiles, assembled .... 206,600 227,700 227,000 228,400 Cement1 5,850 6,135 7,065 7,437

Cigarettes2 35,563 34,499 n.a.

3

n.a. Electrical energy

4 154,083 159,505 165,985 171,301 Petroleum products5 Gasoline 7,234 8,113 8,720 8,947 Kerosene 703 916 980 935

Distillates 5,893 5,915 5,736 6,551 Rubber tires

6 7,333 7,676 8,111 8,947

Steel, crude7 9,061 8,610 8,300 8,000

Sugar, refined7 1,316 1,098 1,246 n.a. Wheat flour7 1,833 1,867 1,872 n.a. Wine8 3,779 3,647 2,150 n.a.

In millions of tons.

2 In millions of cigarettes.

3 n.a.—not available.

4 In millions of kilowatt-hours.

5 In millions of liters. 6 In thousands.

7 In thousands of tons.

8 In thousands of hectoliters. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 124; and Africa South of the Sahara, 1997, London, 1996, 906.

Table 15. Foreign Tourist Arrivals, 1991-95

Region of Origin 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Africa 1,193,700 2,328,000 2,698,100 3,125,958 3,452,164 Europe 367,600 395,300 429,900 463,477 721,878 North America and

South America . . 67,100 75,000 91,700 115,621 160,473

Asia 59,300 67,500 87,500 113,724 158,463 Oceania 20,000 24,800 30,100 36,658 61,085 Other 2,300 2,200 32,500 41,109 130,001 TOTAL 1,710,000 2,892,800 3,369,800 3,896,547 4,684,064 Source: Based on information from Africa South of the Sahara, 1996, London, 1995, 882.

411
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 16. Political Party Representation in National Government,

1995

Political Party Executive Legislature

X 1 CjIUCU l Deputy

Presidents Nadonal

Assembly

Senate

African National Congress .

.

1 1 18 252 60

National Party 1 6 82 17 Inkatha Freedom Party 3 43 5 Freedom Front 9 5 Democratic Party 7 3

Pan-Africanist Congress .... 5 African Christian Democratic

Party 2

Plus one nonpartisan portfolio.

Table 1 7. Political Party Representation in Provincial Government:

Executive Officials, 1995

Province Premier Executive Council ANC1 NP2 IFP3 FF'

Eastern Cape ANC 9 1 — —

Free State ANC 9 1 — —

Gauteng ANC 7 3 — —

KwaZulu-Natal IFP 3 1 6 —

Mpumalanga ANC 9 1 — —

Northern Cape ANC 5 4 — 1 Northern Province ANC 9 — — 1 North-West Province ANC 9 1 — —

Western Cape NP 4 6 — —

African National Congress.

2 National Party.

3 Inkatha Freedom Party.

4 Freedom Front.

412
Appendix

II HI I I I

I I I I I I

H

I HH I I I I

I I I ~ I

ffvf <N rH r-H

5 I I I I I

2 U 3 3

O £

5 -5 -S

ft.S H

. c &

2 .2 2 <

z JS ti: q £

413
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 19. Major Newspapers, 1995

Newspaper

Place of

Publication Frequency Language Grculation

The Argus Cape Town Daily English 82,774

Beeld (Image) Johannesburg Daily Afrikaans 111,958 Die Burger (The Citizen) Cape Town Daily Afrikaans 94,193

Business Day Johannesburg Daily English 37,085 The Cape Times Cape Town Daily English 48,685 The Citizen Johannesburg Daily English 136,848

City Press Johnannesburg Weekly English 261,057

Daily Dispatch East London Daily English 37,485 TheDailyNews Durban Daily English 75,960 DiamondFields Advertiser Kimberley Daily English 8,000 EP Herald Port Elizabeth Daily English 30,484 Evening Post Port Elizabeth Daily English 16,827

Ilanga (The Sun) Durban Biweekly Zulu 1 125,761 Imvo Zabantsundu (Voice King William's Weekly Xhosa1 14,401 of the Black People) Town

The Natal Mercury Durban Daily English 42,690 The Natal Witness Pietermaritz- Daily English 27,500 burg

Post (Natal) Durban Weekly English 47,667 The Pretoria News Pretoria Daily English 23,006

Rapport (Dispatch) Johannesburg Weekly Afrikaans 375,723

Sowetan Johannesburg Daily English 207,849 The Star. Johannesburg Daily English 165,171 Sunday Nation Johannesburg Weekly English 49,300 Sunday Times Johannesburg Weekly English 467,745 Sunday Tribune Durban Weekly English 115,418

Umafrika Marianhill Weekly Zulu 40,500 Die Volksblad (The People's Paper) Bloemfontein Daily Afrikaans 21,453

Weekly Mail Johannesburg Weekly English 28,220

1 Some articles are in English. Source: Based on information from South Africa, South African Communication Service, South Africa Yearbook, 1995, Pretoria, 1996, 296; and Financial Mail [Johan- nesburg] , February 23, 1996, 85.

414
Appendix

Table 20. Composition of South African National Defence Force, 19961

Service Active Duty Reserve Army 118,000 377,000s Air Force 8,400 20,000 Navy 5,500 1,700 Medical Service 6,000 n.a.

3 TOTAL 137,900 398,700

Reorganization incomplete.

2 Excluding Commandos (estimated 76,000).

3 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 264-65.

415
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 21. Major Army Equipment, 1996

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory

Main battle tanks

Olifant 1A and IB1 South Africa Approximately 250 Tank technology demonstrator South Africa Being developed Armored reconnaissance vehicles Eland-60 and -90 South Africa 1,100 Rooikat-76 South Africa 160 Armored infantry fighting vehicles Ratel-20, -60, and -90 South Africa 1,500 Armored personnel carriers Buffel, Casspir South Africa 1,500 Mamba South Africa 160+ Towed artillery G-l (88mm) South Africa 30 G-2 (140mm) South Africa 75 G-4 (155mm) South Africa n.a.

2 G—5 (155mm howitzer) South Africa 75

Self-propelled artillery G-6 (155mm howitzer) South Africa 20

Multiple rocket launchers

Bataleur (127mm, 40-tube) South Africa 120

Valkiri-22 (self-propelled, 24-tube) South Africa 60

Valkiri-5 (towed) South Africa n.a. Mortars M3 (81mm) South Africa 4,000 Brandt (120mm) South Africa 120+

Antitank guided weapons ZT-3 Swift. South Africa n.a. Milan South Africa n.a. Rocket launchers FT-5 (92mm) n.a. n.a. Recoilless launchers M^OAl (106mm) n.a. n.a. Air defense guns 20mm, self-propelled n.a. 600 23mm, self-propelled n.a. 36 35mm South Africa 150

Surface-to-air missiles SA-7 and SA-14 Soviet Union3 n.a.

1 Olifant 1A and IB manufactured in South Africa; derived from Centurion (Britain).

2 n.a.—not available.

3 Some captured in regional conflicts. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996,

264; andJane's Defence Weekly [London], 23, No. 17, April 29, 1995, 23-41.

416
Appendix

Table 22. Major AirForce Equipment, 1996

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inven tory

Fighters, ground attack Mirage F-1AZ

Impala II Cheetah C

Cheetah E

Fighters Mirage F-1CZ

Tanker/early warning

Boeing 707-320

Transport aircraft C-130B

HS-125 and -400B

Super King Air 200

Citation C-47

Liaison/fighter aircraft Cessna 185

Helicopters SA-316/-319 (some armed) SA-330 C/H/L Puma

BK-117 CSH-2 Rooivalk Training aircraft C-47TP

Cheetah D

T-6G Harvard HA/HI

Impala I PilatusPC-7 SA-316/-330 helicopters. . . Unmanned aerial vehicles Seeker Scout

Missiles Air-to-surface AS-11/-20/-30

Air-to-air R-530

R-550 Magic V-3C Darter V-3A/B Kukri AJM-9 Sidewinder Python 3

France South Africa South Africa South Africa

France

Israel

United States Britain United States United States United States

United States

France

France_2

South Africa

United States South Africa United States South Africa Switzerland France

n.a.

3 n.a.

20

75

381 11

11

7

32

1 19

24

63

63

19

121

12

14 130 11460

37

n.a. n.a.

n.a. n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a. n.a.

n.a. n.a. n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

417
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 22. (Continued) Major AirForce Equipment, 1996

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory Ground equipment Armored personnel carriers (Rhino) South Africa n.a. Radar

Fixed n.a. 3 Mobile n.a. Several

Surface-to-air missiles Cactus (Crotale) n.a. 20 SA-8/-9/-13 n.a. n.a.

1 Some on order.

2 Some acquired from former "independent" homelands.

9 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 241 , 265; and A.D. Baker, comp., CombatFleets of the World, 1995: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament, Annapolis, Maryland, 1995, 676-79.

418
Appendix

Table 23. Major Naval Equipment, 1996

Type and Description Country of Origin In Inventory

Submarines Daphne class France 3 (550mm torpedo tube) 1 Missile craft Minister class Israel 9 Inshore patrol craft Hydrofoils n.a.

2 3 (Coastguard T2212 class) Harbor craft n.a. 28 (Namicurra class) Mine warfare ships Coastal minesweepers Britain 1 4 (Ton class) Minehunters n.a. 4

(River class) Support and miscellaneous Combat/logistic support vessels (Drakensberg) South Africa 1 (Outeniqua) Ukraine 1 Hydrographic survey vessel n.a. 1 Diving support vessel n.a. 1 Antarctic transport with two

helicopters n.a. 1 Tugs n.a. 3

Frigates (1,500-ton to 1,800-ton) South Africa 4

3

1 Modified.

2 n.a. —not available.

3 Construction to begin late 1990s. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1996-1997, London, 1996, 264-65.

419
South Africa: A Country Study

Table 24. DefenseBudget, 1995 and 1996

(in millions of rands) 2

Budget Allocation 1995 1996

3,687 3,095

Air defense 1,633 1,777 Maritime defense 649 686

Medical services 857 720 Command and control 397 420 General support 320 323

Special defense account 3,093 3,514 TOTAL 10,636 10,535 Percentage of GDP3 3.4 2.2

Years ending March 31. For value of the rand—see Glossary. GDP—gross domestic product. Source: Based on information from Helmoed-Romer Heitman, "R2.9b Defence Budget

Marks End to Decline, "Jane 's Defence Weekly [London], 23, No. 12, March 25, 1995,5.

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South Africa. Prime Minister's Department. Union War Histories Section. Crisis in the Desert, May-July 1942. Cape Town:

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South Africa. South African Communication Service. South

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481
South Africa: A Country Study

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"

482
Bibliography

(Various issues of the following periodicals, annual publications, and newspapers were also used in the preparation of this

chapter: Africa Analysis [London]; Africa Confidential [London];

Africa Contemporary Record; Africa Events [London] ; Africa Report;

Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social, and Cultural Series)

[Oxford]; Africa South of the Sahara [London]; African Affairs

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[Cape Town]; Christian Science Monitor, Commando [Pretoria];

Daily Telegraph [London] ; Facts and Reports [Amsterdam] ; Focus on Africa [London]; Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa; Guardian [Manchester] ; Indian

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Vbotnuus Navy News [Simonstown] ; and Washington Post.)

483

Glossary

Afrikaner—South African of Dutch ancestry, often with German, French, or other European forebears; member of

white community tracing its roots to the seventeenth-century Dutch settlers at the Cape of Good Hope.

apartheid—"Separateness," (Afrikaans, Dutch); policy implemented by National Party government (1948-94) to maintain separate development of government-demarcated

racial groups; also referred to as "separate development,"

and later "multinational development"; abolished by Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1993.

Bantu—Literally, "human beings," in more than 300 Bantu languages of equatorial and southern Africa. Bantu languages

are classified within the central branch of the Niger-Congo

language family; characterized by a system of noun classes

marked by prefixes, so that each dependent word in a sen- tence carries a prefix of the same class. Outsiders often

simplify by omitting prefix; for example, the amaZulu

(people) are known as the Zulu; their language, isiZulu, is also referred to as Zulu. Speakers of seSotho, the BaSotho,

are often referred to simply as Sotho peoples. Four major

subgroups of Bantu languages—Nguni, Sotho, TsongaShangaan, and Venda—are widely represented in South

Africa. They include nine of South Africa's official languages—isiXhosa, isiZulu, isiNdebele, sePedi, seSotho,

seTswana, siSwati, tshiVenda (also luVenda), and xiTsonga.

During the apartheid era, the term Bantu was often used

in government regulations, official statements, and sometimes in conversation to designate people of black African

descent. Because this group was particularly disadvantaged

by apartheid, the term Bantu assumed pejorative connotations in many apartheid-era contexts. Bantustan—An area reserved for an officially designated

Bantu-speaking ethnic group during the apartheid era; a term generally supplanted by "homeland," national state, or self-governing state during the 1970s and 1980s.

Boer—Farmer (Afrikaans); generally used in eighteenth and

nineteenth century to refer to white South African settlers of Dutch, German, and French Huguenot origin; generally supplanted by the term Afrikaner (q.v.) in the twentieth

485
South Africa: A Country Study

century. See also Trekboer.

coloureds—Those "of mixed race," in apartheid terminology;

usually referred to people with African and Dutch ancestry. European Community (EC)—^European Union (EU).

European Union (EU)—Formerly, the European Community

(EC), established as the EU by the Treaty on European

Union, November 1, 1993. The EU comprises three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community

(ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and

the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).

Each community is legally distinct, but since 1967 the

three bodies have shared common governing institutions.

The EU forms more than a framework for free trade and

economic cooperation: EU signatories have agreed in

principle to integrate their economies and ultimately to form a political union. EU members in early 1996 were

Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.

fiscal year (FY) —In South Africa, April 1-March 31. For example, FY 1997-98 includes the period from April 1, 1997, to March 31, 1998.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A measure of the total value of

goods and services produced by a domestic national econ- omy during a given period, usually one year. Obtained by

adding the value contributed by each sector of the econ- omy in the form of profits, compensation to employees,

and depreciation (consumption of capital). Only domestic

production is included, not income arising from investments and possessions owned abroad, hence the use of the

word domestic to distinguish GDP from the gross national

product (GNP

q.v.). Real GDP is the value of GDP when

inflation has been taken into account.

gross national product (GNP) —The total market value of all final goods and services produced by an economy during a

year. Obtained by adding gross domestic product (GDP

q.v.) and the income received from abroad by residents

and then subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. Real GNP is the value of GNP when inflation has

been taken into account.

Highveld—High-altitude grassland, generally between 1,200

meters and 1,800 meters above sea level.

486
Glossary

homeland or reserve—A primarily residential area set aside for a single officially designated black ethnic group during the

apartheid era. Some of the ten homelands in the 1980s

consisted of more than a dozen discrete segments of land.

Homeland boundaries shifted as the government assigned

additional groups of people to the often crowded homelands or as neighboring jurisdictions successfully pressed

claims to territory within a homeland's boundary.

import substitution—An economic development strategy that

emphasizes the growth of domestic industries, often by

import protection using tariff and nontariff measures. Proponents favor the export of industrial goods over primary

products.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with

the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized

agency, affiliated with the United Nations, that is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of

loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions

that require substantial internal economic adjustments by

the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

lineage—A group, the members of which are descended

through males from a common male ancestor (patrilineage) or through females from a common female ancestor

(matrilineage). Such descent can in principle be traced.

mfecane—"Crushing" or "hammering" (isiZulu); refers to early

nineteenth-century upheaval in southeastern Africa

caused by expansion of Zulu society under the military

leadership of Shaka and combined economic and population pressures throughout the region; difeqane, in seSotho.

parastatal—A semi-autonomous, quasi-governmental, state- owned enterprise.

Paris Club—Informal name for a consortium of Western creditor countries (Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany,

Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and

the United States) that have made loans, or have guaranteed export credits, to developing nations and that meet in

Paris to discuss borrowers' ability to repay debts. Paris Club

deliberations often result in the tendering of emergency

loans to countries in economic difficulty or in the rescheduling of debts. Formed in October 1962, the organization

487
South Africa: A Country Study

has no formal or institutional existence. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury. It has a close relationship with

the International Monetary Fund (q.v.), to which all of its members except Switzerland belong, as well as with the

World Bank (q.v.), and the United Nations Conference on

Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The Paris Club is also known as the Group of Ten (G-10).

polygynous—having more than one wife at the same time;

polygynous marriages are allowed by tradition in many

African societies.

rand (R) —Unit of currency. A decimal currency of 100 cents,

the rand replaced the South African pound in 1961. The

official exchange rate of the rand against the United States dollar was R1=US$1.40 until December 1971, and from

September 1975 to January 1979, R1=US$1.15. From 1972

to 1975, and after 1979, the government allowed market

forces to determine the value of the rand. The exchange

rate averaged R3.55=US$1 in 1994 and R3.64=US$1 in

1995. On April 30, 1996, R4.34=US$1; conversely, Rl=

US$.23. Financial rands were issued only to foreign buyers

for capital investment inside South Africa. They were avail- able periodically until 1983 and again in September 1985,

but were abolished in March 1995.

Rand—Local contraction of Witwatersrand (q.v.).

Trekboer—Migrant farmer, in Afrikaans; signifies participation

in nineteenth-century population migrations eastward

from the Cape of Good Hope. See alsoRoer.

Witwatersrand—Literally, "Ridge of White Waters" (Afrikaans),

often shortened to Rand; mining region south ofJohannesburg known primarily for rich deposits of gold and

other minerals.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions that provide advice and

assistance on long-term finance and policy issues to developing countries: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), the International

Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established

in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans

at market-related rates of interest to developing countries

at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a

legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the

488
Glossary

IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest

developing countries on much easier terms than those of

conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and

assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of

productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the

IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The MIGA,

which began operating in June 1988, insures private foreign investment in developing countries against such non- commercial risks as expropriation, civil strife, and

nonconvertibility of currency. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe

their capital. To participate in the World Bank, member

states must first belong to the International Monetary

Fund (q.v.).

489

Index

AAC. See All-African Convention

Aasac. See All African Student Committee Abacha, Sani, 315 Abdurahman, Abdullah, 45

Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act (No. 67) (1952), 56

abortion, lxiii ABSA. See Amalgamated Banks of South

Africa acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), lxiii-lxiv, 159-60; deaths

from, 159; education campaign, lxiiilxiv, 159-60; number of cases of, 159 Advisory Committee on Defence Force

Requirements, 350

Africa Muslim Party, 146, 292

African Christian Democratic Party: in elections, 275, 292; in National Assembly, 275

African Democratic Movement, 292-93

African Development Bank, 245

African Explosives and Chemical Industries, 227

African Independent churches, 135; healing dances of, 136; theology of, 135, 136-37 African languages: as languages of

instruction, 64; newspapers in, 304; as

official languages, 109-111, 114; radio broadcasts in, 237-38; television

broadcasts in, 237

African Metals (Amcor) , 225 African Methodist Episcopal Church

(AME), 37

African Mineworkers Union (AMWU),

53; membership of, 53; strikes by, 53

African Moderates Congress Party, 293

African National Congress (ANC) (see also South African Native National

Congress), lii, 202, 276-80; armed

forces campaign against, 82, 359; armed struggle of, lvi, lviii, 61-62, 65,

76, 78, 81, 84, 175, 249, 277; banned,

xlvii, lv, 61, 276; cabinet appointments, 261, 262, 279; conflict of, with Inkatha, Ix, 257, 274, 275, 287-88,

388-89; in Congress of the People, 59; cooperation of, with Communist

Party, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 299; cooperation of, with National

Party, 298; crackdown on, lvi, 70; defi- ance campaigns of, liv-lv, 59, 276; economists of, 177; in elections, xlvii, lxi-lxii, 84, 249, 275; ethnic distribu- tion in, 300; foreign relations by, 305; formation of, 45-46, 276; generation gap in, 298-99, 300-301; in House of Assembly, 278; human rights violations by, 279, 394; in government, 177,

268, 279; and labor unions, 297; leaders of, 59, 276; materiel for, 277; members of, liii, 276; military wing, 277; in National Assembly, 275; national con- ference of, 277; organization of, 277; platform of, 52, 75-76, 252, 278; polit- ical succession in, Ixv, 279; recruit- ment for, 277-78; schism in, 76; secret meetings of, with National Party, 256; supporters of, 116, 274, 277; symbols

of, 3; transition proposals by, 81, 256, 257; transition talks, lix-lx, 250; unbanned, lix, 75, 332; in United

Nations, 277; violence by, 395 African National Congress Women's

League, 166-67; reactivated, 278 African National Congress Youth

League, 281, 298-99; founded, 276;

reactivated, 277-78 African Organisation for Women

(AOW), 292

African Political Organisation, 45

African Resistance Movement, 61

Africans. See blacks

Africa Travel Association, 241 Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut. See Afri- kaner Trade Institute Afrikaanse Patriot, Die (The Afrikaner

Patriot), 39

Afrikaans language, 129; as language of

491
South Africa: A Country Study

instruction, lvii, 43, 64, 149, 152; news- papers in, 304; as official language, 49, 109; promotion of, 47; radio broadcasts in, 237-38; speakers of (see also Afrikaners, coloureds), 129-32, 131,

132; television broadcasts in, 237

Afrikanerbond, 39, 294

Afrikaner Broederbond {see also Afrikan- erbond), 48, 50, 130, 284, 293-94; founded, 293; membership, 293-94;

organization of, 294; and transformation of apartheid, 294

Afrikaner cultural organizations, lii, 130, 284, 293; women's, 166 Afrikaner nationalism, lii-liii, 46-48,

130, 335; attempts to strengthen, 47-

48; development of, lii, liii, 4, 39 Afrikaner Resistance Movement (Afri- kaner Weerstandsbeweging—AWB)

,

lxi, 83, 391 Afrikaners (see also Boers, whites), 129-

31; ancestors of, 129-30; cattle farming by, 3-4; as "chosen people," lii, 3; conflict of, with British settlers, 4, 130; conflict of, with nonwhites, 4, 126, 129-30; conflicts among, 131; and

education, 149; expansion by, 126; hunting by, 3-4; in Mozambique, 313; National Socialism embraced by, 52, 250; opposition of, to reform, 250;

political affiliations of, 250; in political

elite, 297, 298, 301; population of, 129; poverty among, lii, 47, 50; voting

by, xlvii; women, 166

Afrikaner state, proposed, 264-65, 289 Afrikaner Trade Institute (Afrikaanse

Handelsinstituut—AHI) , 296

Afrikaner Volksfront, 288-89

Afrikanervroue-Kenkrag, 166

Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. See Afri- kaner Resistance Movement

Agence France Presse, 304

agricultural extension services, 217

agricultural production, 31, 214, 245

agricultural products (see also under indi- vidual crops), 215, 217-18; barley, 217-

18; cereals, 217-18; corn, 19, 118, 176, 214, 215, 217; export of, 215, 217; food crops, 91, 214, 215; fruits, 218;

grain, 14, 15, 31, 91, 217; import of, 175; legumes, 218; peanuts, 215, 218; sorghum, 118, 217; subsidies for, 176;

sugar, 29, 91, 215, 218; tobacco, 118,

215; wheat, 31, 176, 217; wine grapes,

14, 15, 31, 91, 218; wool, 31, 215, 219

agricultural reform, 215

agriculture, 222; by Africans, 31, 118,

122, 127, 129; ancient, 9; assistance in, 306; consolidation of, 176; employment in, 198-99, 217; export crops,

215; input costs of, 216; in interior pla- teau, 91; irrigation for, 91, 95, 215,

218; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 180, 214-15; problems in, 101, 216; subsidies for, 187; swidden

(slash-and-burn) , 8-9; by Voortrekkers, 31 AHI. See Afrikaner Trade Institute AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

air force, 336-37, 370-73; aircraft of, 337, 371-73; chief of, 370; command

posts, 371; commands of, 370-71; cre- ation of, 336-37; insignia, 377; materiel, 371; number of personnel, 337,

370; organization of, 370; ranks, 377;

reserves, 370; training, 337-38; uni- forms, 376-77; violence against, 72; women in, 337, 348, 370

airlines, 234-35; deregulation of, 235

airports, 234

Albright, David, 358

Alexander, Benny, 292

Algeria: relations with, 324

Aliens Act (No. 1) (1937), 51-52; opposition to, 52

All-African Convention (AAC), 52

All African Student Committee (Aasac), 292

Alliance Airlines, 235

Allied Bank, 242 Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA), 242 amaNdebele. SeeNdebele people amaTshawe. S^Tshawe dynasty

Amawasha. See Zulu Washermen's Guild amaXhosa. See Xhosa people amaZulu. See Zulu people

Amcor. See African Metals AME. See African Methodist Episcopal

Church

AMWU. Sa? African Mineworkers Union

ANC. Se* African National Congress

Anglican Church: and apartheid, 143;

492
Index

members of, 135

anglicization, 42; failure of, 43 Anglo American Corporation, 70, 208,

220, 225 Anglo American Platinum, 208 Anglo-Boer Wars. See South African War; War of Independence

Angola, 66-67; civil war in, 306, 343, 356, 357, 360; Cuban troops in, 67, 318,

357; elections in, 314; independence

for, lvi-lvii, 67, 357; intervention in, 306, 357, 358-59, 360; invasion of, 67, 343; relations with, 314-15, 331, 361;

in Southern African Development

Community, 306 Angola-Namibia Accord (1988), 314

antiapartheid resistance {see also political violence), 4-5, 58, 61, 255, 332; crack- downs on, lv, 62, 67, 70, 380; groups

promoting, 294-95, 305

antimony, 210 AOW. See African Organisation for Women

apartheid, 54—65, 297; arrests under, lv, 57, 60, 61, 62, 70, 73; bannings under,

57, 61, 64, 65, 70; consolidation of, 62-63; costs of, 131, 173-74, 176-77,

185-86, 203-4; dismantling of, 5, 74-

85, 285; economic problems under, 5, 185-86; education under, 56, 131, 146, 150-53; elections under, 272; employ- ment under, 199; geographic distribu- tion under, 63, 66, 107, 109; health

care under, 156, 160-61; human rights violations under, 394; implementation of, liii, 4, 54-58, 91, 130-31, 335;

international reaction to, 5, 67-68, 80, 91; and labor unions, 296; legal system under, 269-70; opposition to, liv-lv,

lvi, lvii, lviii, 4-5, 58, 61, 131, 133, 146,

165, 166, 255, 276, 296; origins of, 90-

91; principles of, 150; and religion, 133, 135, 141-44, 145; signs for segre- gation, 56; in South-West Africa, 310; support for, 128, 131, 141, 144, 150,

166, 296, 331, 336, 345, 368; telecom- munications under, 236-37; tribes imposed under, 107; universities

under, 154; and women, 56, 165-66

apartheid reform (see also Reconstruction and Development Programme),

lviii, 69-71, 73-74, 153, 174, 177, 285;

Afrikaner participation in, 294; inter- national reaction to, 173; National

Party in, 285-86; opposition to, 84, 250, 251, 285, 385, 396; police under,

385, 396; problems in, 257; support

for, 251, 257, 285; talks for, lix-lx, 250, 251 APLA. SeeAzanian People's Liberation Army

Apostolic Faith Mission of Southern

Africa Church: members of, 1 35

Arabs: trade with, 33 Arap Moi, Daniel, 315

archaeological research, 5, 9, 89; art in, 6,9

Argentina: joint military exercises with, 375 Argus Printing and Publishing Company,

304 Armaments Act (No. 87) (1964), 351 Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armscor), 319, 351; board of, 352; employees, 352; marking department,

352; privatization of, 352; product

exhibitions, 352; restructuring of, 352 Armaments Development and Production Act (No. 57) (1968), 351 Armaments Development and Production Corporation (Armscor), 351, Armaments Production Board, 351 armed forces (see also paramilitary organizations; Union Defence Force): Afri- kanerization of, 335; apartheid

defended by, lviii, 331, 336, 345, 368; buildup of, 358; Cadet organization, 334; campaign of, against African

National Congress, lviii, 82, 359; Catering Corps, 345; Citizen Force,

334, 335, 337, 365; civic-action role of, 362, 369-70; clandestine death squads

of, 77; commander in chief, 363; Commandos, 336; conscription in, 335,

369; under constitutions, 362-63; dec- orations of, 377; demobilization of, 335; ethnic distribution in, 334, 336, 344, 345; headquarters of, 343, 363;

history of, 334-39; homeland, 346^8;

integration of, 257, 332, 334, 362-63,

365, 367, 368-69; internal security by, 335, 337, 340, 342-43; invasion of Angola by, 67, 331; invasion of Mozambique by, 359; invasion of

493
South Africa: A Country Study

Namibia by, 67; invasion of Zimbabwe

by, 67; medical service, 336; missions

of, 343, 362, 363; number of personnel in, 334, 335, 336, 342; organization of, 336, 343; Permanent Force,

334, 363-65; President's Guard, 345-

46; reserves, 336, 365; restructuring

of, 332; retrenchment, 339; service obligations of, 336, 342; specialized

forces, 342-46; support for police by,

lviii, 383; training, 335, 343, 370; uni- forms, ranks, and insignia of, 376-77; women in, 336, 337, 348-49; in World War I, 334-35

Armscor. See Armaments Corporation of South Africa Armscor. See Armaments Development

and Production Corporation arms embargo. See materiel army, 363-70; chief of, 365; Citizen

Force, 365; combat corps, 367; Commandos, 367-68; conscription in, 369; conventional forces, 367; deployment

of, 237; headquarters of, 367; histori- cal origins of, 334-36; insignia, 377;

integration in, 365, 367, 368-69; inter- nal security by, 337, 368; materiel of, 368; military commands of, 367; mission of, 365-67; number of personnel

in, 365; organization of, 365; Perma- nent Force, 363-65; qualifications, 369; ranks, 377; reduction of, 365;

reserves, 365; service brigades, 369-

70; support service corps, 367; territorial forces, 365-67; training of, 365, 369, 370; uniforms, 376-77; women

in, 348 Army Battle School, 365

art: prehistoric, 6

Artillery School, 365

asbestos, 95; production of, 205

Asia: Mandela's visit to, 77

Asians, 133-34; in armed forces, 345;

classification of, liii, 55, 133-34; conflict of, with Afrikaners, liii, 4; and dis- ease, 158; geographic distribution of, 133; immigration of, 90; languages of, 133; occupations of, 35, 134; in police

force, 385; political affiliations of, 59;

political representation for, lviii, 71, 254; population of, 44, 105, 133; reli- gions of, 133-34, 146; schools for, liv,

56; as students, 154-55; voting by,

xlvii, 254 Assembly of God Church: members of, 135

Associated Press, 304 Atomic Energy Corporation, 356 Augrabies Falls, 240

Augrabies Falls National Park, 240

Australia: teachers from, 149

Australopithecus africanus, 5 Autonet (transport authority), 229 AWB. See Afrikaner Resistance Move- ment

Azanian National Youth Unity (Azanyu)

,

292 Azanian People's Liberation Army

(APLA, formerly Poqo), 291; integra- tion of, into armed forces, 365, 367, 369 Azanyu. See Azanian National Youth

Unity

Babangida, Ibrahim, 361 Bach, Lazar, 281

Baha'is, 135

Bahrain: relations with, 305

balance of payments, 197-98, 242; cycle, 198 Bambatha, 42, 115 banishment, 57

banking, 183, 241-42; diversification of, 241-42; reorganization of, 242

banks, 241-42; Afrikaner, lii, 47, 50; and

building societies, 242; commercial,

241; discount, 242; foreign, 183; general, 242; investment by, 242; merchant, 242 Bantu Authorities Act (No. 68) (1951),

55, 254 Bantu Education Act (No. 47) (1953),

56,150, 188,203 Bantu Labour Act (No. 67) (1964) {see also Native Labour Regulation Act)

,

188 Bantu languages, 5, 111; number of

speakers of, 111 Bantu people {see also blacks, native people): classification of, liii, 55; religion

of, 137-38 Bantu society: education in, 147; organization of, 89-90

494
Index

Bantu speakers: history of, 7-1 0, 89, 332; number of, 111; population of, 32;

social organization of, 9-10

Bantustans. See homelands

Baptist Church: members of, 135

barley, 217-18

BaSotho. SeeSotho people

Basters, 335 BaTswana. S£<?Tswana people

Batavian Republic, 18 BaTlhaping. S#?Tlhaping people

Battle of Blood River (1838), 28

Battle of Majuba Hill (1881), 38, 39 BBB. See White Protection Movement

Belgium: arms shipments to, 354; immigration from, 129; materiel licensing

agreements with, 351

Berger, Iris, 165

Berlin airlift, 338

Beye, Alioune Blondin, 314-15

Bicesse Accord (1991), 361

Biko, Steve, 63-64; banned, 64; killed, 65

Bird Island, 94

birth: rate, 105; registration of, 104; rites, 137

birth control, Ixiii Bisho, 266

black consciousness, lii, liii, 63-65

Black Consciousness Movement of Azania, 292, 298, 307

black market: oil bought on, 185 Black People's Convention (BPC), 64; banned, 65

blacks {see also discrimination): in armed

forces, 344; banishment of, 57; birth

rate of, 105; under Botha, 71; under

British colonial government, 4; cattle farming by, 3-4, 31; conflict of, with

Afrikaners, 4; death rate of, 105; and

disease, 156-57, 158-59; education of, lxii, 67, 71, 147, 148-49, 150, 203;

elite, 299; employment of, 199, 203; as entrepreneurs, 244-45; farming by, 35, 175, 176, 215; geographic distribu- tion of, 32, 66, 104; gold mining by, 1, 33; and homelands, 62-63, 66, 103,

104; hunting by, 3-4, 31; investment

by, 208, 244-45; in labor unions, lvii,

lviii, 69, 72, 115, 200, 201, 296; land of, 55, 175; life expectancy of, 105; living standards of, 177; migration by, for work, 1, li, 34; migration of, to South

Africa, 3; and missionaries, 140; pasto- ralism by, 31; as percentage of population, 70; in police force, 385; political activities of, 36-38; political affilia- tions of, 59, 280; in political elite, 298; population of, 32, 44, 103; population

growth of, 105; poverty among, lii, lxii, 186, 203; as professionals, 119; reli- gions of, 142, 145; resistance by, lii, 58-61, 177; restrictions on, 65; schools

for, 56; segregation of, 55-56, 63; self- help projects, 64; socialization of, 147;

strikes by, 72, 200; as students, 154-55;

trade by, 33; tribal labels for, 107; in urban areas, lvii, 63, 66, 109, 123, 166; violence among, 74; voting by, xlvii, 51, 254; wages of, xlviii, 65, 174, 199,

202; as workers, 65, 115, 123, 147, 176, 199 Black Sash, 165-66; legal assistance by, 270

Blacks Only. SeePoqo

Blanke Bevrydingsbeweging. See White

Protection Movement

Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond. See White Workers' Protection Association

Bleek, Wilhelm, 136 Bloemfontein, 266; airport at, 234; manufacturing in, 224; military headquarters in, 367

Bloemfontein Convention (1854), 30

Blue Train, 231 Board of Censors, 57 Board of Defence Resources, 350 Board of Trade and Industry, 194

Boerestaat Party (Boer State Party) , 289 Boere Weerstandsbeweging. See Boer

Resistance Movement

Boer State Party. See Boerestaat Party Boer Republican Army, 388 Boer Resistance Movement (Boere Weer- standsbeweging—BWB) , 289 Boers (farmers) (see also Afrikaners,

Trekboers), xlix, 14, 175; in Great

Trek, 1, 26; in Mozambique, 313; tensions of, with British, li, lii, 26, 38, 130,

175, 333; violence by, 175

Boesak, Allan, 72

Bondelswart-Herero, 335 Bophuthatswana homeland (see also Sun

City), 62, 126, 265; armed forces of, 346, 363; border with, 360; coup

495
South Africa: A Country Study

attempt in, 346; economy of, 181; eth- nic groups in, 126-27; geographic dis- tribution of, lv-lvi; independence for, 62, 66, 107-9, 126, 254, 346; political harassment in, 274; population of, 104, 126, 346; poverty in, 127; transi- tion of, from apartheid, 80, 83; vio- lence in, 72; voting in, 274

Boraine, Alex, 396 borders, 94; control of, 370; with

Lesotho, 361; natural, 99, 100 border security, 361; deterioration of, 66-67; against illegal immigration,

360 BOSS. See Bureau of State Security

Botha, Louis, 43 Botha, Louis, government: attempted

coup against, 47

Botha, Michael C, 64 - * Botha, P.W.: objections of, to apartheid

reform, 285; as prime minister, 69; res- ignation of, lix, 74, 285; speech

announcing apartheid reform, lviii, 153; as state president, 71 Botha, P.W., government (1978-89):

privatization under, 190; reform

under, lviii, 69-71; security under, 340, 380

Botha, Roelof "Pik", 212, 263, 285, 390;

visit of, to Kenya, 315

Botshabelo, 125 Botswana: ethnic groups in, 122, 126,

134; independence of, 67; invasion of, 359; language in, 111; rail service, 231; relations with, 307, 358; religion in, 136; repatriation of exiles from, 307;

in Southern African Customs Union,

196, 307; in Southern African Devel- opment Community, 306; trade with, 307; transportation links with, 307; workers from, 204-5 Botswana Defence Force, 127 BPC. See Black People's Convention

Brazil: joint military exercises with, 375 Breede River, 99

bridewealth compensation (lobola), 9, 140

Britain: de Klerk's visit to, 77; immigrants from, xlix-1, 132, 148; invest- ments from, 183; loans from, 183;

materiel from, 353; military assistance from, 350; opposition of, to apartheid,

68; police training assistance from,

387; relations with, 320-21; South

Africa conquered by, xlix, 4, 17-18;

teachers from, 149; trade with, 195

British colonial government, 1, 24-26,

117, 175; Africans' lands seized by, 126; Boer lands annexed by, lii, 29, 30, 38, 130; concentration camps of, 40-

41, 130; diamond fields annexed by, 33; education under, 148; judicial sys- tem under, xlix-1; police under, 25;

racial discrimination under, xlix-li, 4, 25, 43; religion under, 140-41; restric- tions on natives, 4; taxes imposed by, 1, 30, 126; tensions of, with Boers, li, 26, 38, 130, 175, 333; wars of, with Afri- cans, 1, 25, 26, 30, 36, 115

British Commonwealth of Nations: elec- tion observers from, 83, 275; reinstate- ment in, 325; withdrawal from, lv, 58

British High Commission, 117

British merchants: trade by, 1

1

British Military Advisory and Training

Team, 369

British Royal Air Force, 375

British Royal Navy, 338; joint exercises

with, 375; visit to South Africa, 375

British settlers, 90; conflict of, with Afri- kaners, 4, 130, 175; violence by, 175

British South Africa Company, 34; pri- vate army of, 39 Broederbond. See Afrikaner Broeder- bond

Buddhists, 135 budget deficit, 191 , 192; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 192

Buffalo River: port on, 233

building societies, 242

Bulgaria: relations with, 324

Bunting, Sidney Percival, 280 Bureau of Information, 301 Bureau of State Security (BOSS), 62,

380; established, 380; scandals in, 380

Burger, Die (The Citizen) , 47

burghers, 13, 14; discontents of, 17 Bush, George, 318 Bushmen. See San people

Bushveld, 95-98; elevation of, 95; minerals in, 98, 205, 209, 210, 211

business sector: black, 244-45

Buthelezi, Mangosuthu (Gatsha), 3, 287; background of, 299-300; chief

496
Index

minister of KwaZulu, 115-16, 257;

clashes of, with Mandela, 116, 288; meeting of, with Mandela, 79; as minister of home affairs, 116, 263; policies

of, 66; in transition process, 251, 252, 390 BWB. See Boer Resistance Movement

cabinet: appointments, 261, 279; under

interim constitution, 259, 261-63;

portfolios, 261, 262; sessions of, 262; women in, 262

Gaetano, Marcello: coup against, 67 Caledon River, 99

Calvinist Synod, 139 Canada: materiel licensing agreements

with, 351; police training assistance from, 387; teachers from, 149 Cape Colony, 24; population of, 31; schools in, 147-48 Cape Communist Party, 280 Cape Constabulary, 382 Cape Malays, 132 Cape Middleveld, 98; elevation of, 98 Cape of Good Hope: ceded to British, 17 Cape of Good Hope Province, 255 Cape Province, 255, 265 Cape Ranges, 98-99 Cape Town, 91, 174, 266; airport at, 234; climate in, 100; crime in, Ixiv; fishing

near, '222; manufacturing in, 223; mili- tary headquarters in, 367; Muslims in, 146; naval installation, 339; port of, 232-33; squatter communities near, 53 Cape Town Police force, 382

capital: export of, 198; inflow, 184; outflow, 244 Carnegie Commission on Poor Whites, 50

Carrington, Lord, 84

Carter, Jimmy, 68, 316 Catholic Church, Roman: and apartheid, 143; members of, 135; schools run by, 56

cattle: diseases, 130; herding, 118; holdings, 6, 113, 134, 219, 333; sacrifice of, 31, 141; value of, 9, 118 CCI. See Crime Combatting and Investi- gation Divison Ceausescu, Nicolae, 323 Cederberg Mountains, 98

censorship, 57; abolished, 301 census: of 1911, 103; of 1980, 104; of

1991, 104; of 1996, lxiii; problems

with, 103-4

Central Selling Organisation, 209

Central Statistical Service, 181 Chamberlain, Joseph, 39-40 Channel Africa Radio, 302 Chase Manhattan Bank, 73, 183

children: health care for, 161; immunization for, 161; as prisoners, 392

Chile: arms shipments to, 354

China: immigrants from, 90

China, People's Republic of: relations

with, 324, 325 China, Republic of (Taiwan): fishing

rights of, 222; investments by, 324;

relations with, 324

Chissano, Joaquim, 312

Christian College (see also Potchefstroom

University), 149

Christianity (see also under individual

denominations): distribution of, 18; encouragement of, 135; introduction

of, 138-41

Christian League of Southern Africa: and apartheid, 144

Christian missionaries. See missionaries

Christian National Education, 149, 150; support of, for apartheid, 150

Christians: African, 37-38, 129; Asian,

134; percentage of, in population, 135 chromium, 98; deposits, 210; export of, 210; production of, 205; reserves, 210

churches, African, 37-38 Church of the Province of South Africa, 143 CID. See Criminal Investigation Depart- ment

Ciskei homeland, 119, 265; armed forces

of, 346, 347, 363; coup attempt in, 347; economy of, 181; independence

for, 66, 107-9, 254, 347; political

harassment in, 274; population of, 104, 347; transition of, from apartheid, 80; voting in, 274

CITES. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

City Press, 304

civil aviation, 234-35

civil disobedience: against apartheid,

497
South Africa: A Country Study

58, 59, 60, 276, 295

climate, 100-101; Marion Island weather

station, 94; rainfall, 100-101, 215;

rainfall line, 101; snowfall, 100; temperature, 100

Clinton, William J., 318 CNETU. See Council of Non-European

Trade Unions

coal, 95, 212-13; effect of sanctions on,

213; exports of, 213; production of, 205, 212; reliance on, 173; reserves,

212, 225

coastline, 95

Codesa. ^Convention for a Democratic South Africa Coetsee, Hendrik "Kobie," 256 Coloured People's Congress: in Congress of the People, 59 Coloured Persons' Representative Council, 254

coloureds, 131-32; ancestors of, 89, 134;

classification of, liii, 55; conflict of, with Afrikaners, liii, 4; discrimination

against, liii, 45; and disease, 158; geo- graphic distribution of, 131; histories

of, 135; languages of, 131, 132; occupations of, 35; in police force, 385; ori- gins of, 16; political affiliations of, 59;

political representation for, lviii, 70,

71, 254; population of, 32, 44; population growth of, 105; religions of, 132,

135, 142, 146; revolt by, 335; rights of, 132; schools for, liv, 56; students, 154-

55; voting by, xlvii, 55, 132, 254 Comintern. See Communist International Commission of Inquiry into Certain

Alleged Murders (Harms Commission), 77 Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation (Wiehahn Commission), 69, 200, 296 Commission of Inquiry into Legislation

Affecting the Utilisation of Manpower

(Riekert Commission), 69 Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and

Intimidation (Goldstone Commission), 82, 84, 390-91; report of, 390-

91, 395 Commission on Gender Equality, 259 Commission on Restitution of Land

Rights, 189, 259 Commission on the Demarcation of

States/Provinces/Regions, 265 communications. See telecommunications communism: apartheid definition of, liv, 57; campaign against, 131, 340; and

labor unions, 296 Communist International (Comintern), 280 Communist Party of South Africa

(CPSA) {see also International Socialist League of South Africa; South African Communist Party), 48; banned, liv, 281-82; cooperation of, with African

National Congress, 276, 277, 281, 282; founded, 280; members of, 281; mili- tary wing, 277; name changed, 282; outlawed, 57; purged, 281; Stalinist

faction, 281 Comoro Islands: investment in, 197

concentration camps, British: Boers in, 40-41 , 1 30; deaths in , 41 , 1 30 Concerned South Africans Group

(Cosag), 82

Confucians, 135

Congregationalist Church: members of, 135 Congress Alliance, 276 Congress of Democrats: in Congress of

the People, 59 Congress of South African Students

(COSAS), 295 Congress of South African Trade Unions

(COSATU), 72, 201-2, 279, 295; established, 201; members of, 201-2, 296

Congress of the People, 59-60; constitu- ency of, 59 Congress Youth League, 58-59; formed,

58; leaders of, 58; platform of, 58

Conservative Party of South Africa (CP),

70, 285, 289; in elections, 74, 331

Constitutional Assembly, 252-53; under

constitution of 1993, 259

Constitutional Court: under constitution of 1993, 259, 270-71; established, 272; proposed constitution submitted to,

lxii-lxiii, 268, 363

Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, 278

constitution of 1909. See South Africa Act

constitution of 1961, 253-54; executive

498
Index

under, 253; judiciary under, 253; legis- lature under, 253

constitution of 1983, lviii, 71; armed

forces under, 362; community affairs under, 254-55, 262; executive under,

254; general affairs under, 255, 262; legislature under, 254; president

under, 362

Constitution of the Republic of South

Africa (No. 200) (1993) (interim constitution), 249, 258-59; armed forces under, 362-63; cabinet under, 259,

261-63; criticisms of, 290; deputy pres- idents under, 259, 261; draft, 82, 83;

electoral system under, 259; executive under, 259-61; freedoms under, 259,

271; human rights under, 394; implemented, 252, 257; judiciary under,

259, 270; languages in, 109; negotiations for, 76-77, 78, 301; parliament

under, 259, 263-64; police under, 259; president under, 259, 362; provinces

under, 259; ratified, 257; rights under, 394

constitution, final (draft), 249, 252-53; armed forces under, 363; bill of rights,

lxiii; labor under, 269; legislature in, 268; majoritarian government in, 268; preparation of, 268-69; president

under, 363; revisions to, lxii-lxiii, 268-

69 consumer goods, 227-28; demand for, 176, 181 Convention on Chemical Weapons, 357 Convention for a Democratic South

Africa (Codesa), lx, lxi, 80, 249, 257 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 238; exceptions

to, 239-40

copper, 95, 98; deposits, 210; economic

importance of, 173; mining, 205; pro- duction of, 205, 211-12; reserves, 211

corn, 118; cultivation of, 176; export of, 215, 217, 361; import of, 217; intro- duction of, 19; production, 217

Cosag. See Concerned South Africans Group

COSAS. See Congress of South African

Students COSATU. See Congress of South African Trade Unions

Council for Nuclear Safety, 356 Council for Scientific and Industrial

Research, 350

Council of Non-European Trade Unions

(CNETU),53

Council on the Environment, 238 coups d'etat: in Lesotho, 308, 359; in Transkei, 347 coups d'etat, attempted: in Bophuthatswana, 346; in Ciskei, 347; of 1914, 47

courts: constitutional, 259; land claims, 164; lower, 270; segregation of, 35; supreme, 259, 270

CP. See Conservative Party of South

Africa CPSA. See Communist Party of South

Africa

Creswell, F.H.P., 284

crime, 388-91; community response to, 388-89; deaths from, 388; government

response to, 389-91; political, 272;

rate, xlviii, 388; during transition, 250, 388-91; weapons used in, 389 Crime Combatting and Investigation

(CCI) Division, 386, 387 Criminal Investigation Department

(CID), 386

criminal justice system (see also judicial

system; see also under courts): detention

in, 62, 73; punishment in, 392-94

Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 8) (1953), 57

Crocker, Chester, 317 Cuba: relations with, 305, 320; troops

from, in Angola, 67, 318, 357

currency, 242-44; blocked rands, 244; commercial rands, 188, 244; depreciation of, lix, 185, 242-44; devaluation

of, 191, 208; exchange rate, 177, 242; financial rands, 188, 244; reserves,

198, 244; value of, lxiv, 183, 194

current account, 198; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 198 Customs and Excise Act (1955), 57

Dadoo, Yusuf, 59 da Gama, Vasco, 10 dams, 101 Dassen Island, 94 Day of the Vow, 28

death: in British concentration camps,

499
South Africa: A Country Study

41; from disease, 157, 158-59; of

Khoikhoi, 12, 14; rate, 105; registra- tion of, 104; religious beliefs about,

138; rites, 137; by starvation, 31, 141 de Beer, Zach, 289, 290 De Beers Consolidated Mines Company,

33, 209; cartel of, 209; relations of, with Soviet Union, 209, 322 Defence Act (No. 13) (1912), 334, 336-

37 Defence Act (No. 44) (1957), 335-36,

362 Defence Act (No. 12) (1961), 336 Defence Act (No. 85) (1967), 336 Defence Command Council, 363; staff, 363 Defence Ordnance Workshop, 350

defense budget, 381-82; growth of, 381; for military intelligence, 382; as per- centage of government budget, 381, 382

defense industry, domestic, 68, 176, 319, 350-53, 355; circumvention of

embargo by, 353-54; employment in, 382; expansion of, 350; under Mandela, 354-55; origins of, 350 defense spending, 192; cuts in, 382;

increase in, 358; on military salaries, 382; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 381; as percentage of gross

national product, 381 Defiance Campaign, 59, 276 de Klerk, Frederik W.: credibility of, 77;

as deputy president, lxii, Ixiii, 85, 261;

in foreign relations, 310, 312; international tour of, 77; reform speech, 256,

332; resignation of, lxiii; as state presi- dent, lix, 74, 285; talks of, with Mandela, lix-lx, 75, 82, 153, 251; in

transition process, 252, 257, 283; visit of, to Kenya, 315; visit of, to Nigeria, 361 de Klerk government (1989-94): armed

forces under, 332; financial scandals

in, 81; reforms of, lix, 74-76, 153; state of emergency under, 84; transition proposals by, 81 Democratic Party (see also Progressive Federal Party), 289-90; in elections,

xlvii, 275, 290, 331; in National Assembly, 275; platform of, 290; support for, 290

demonstrations. See political demonstrations Denel, 352-53 Department of Correctional Services, 391-92; employees of, 391-92 Department of Education and Training, 152 Department of Environmental Affairs, 239, 240 Department of Industry and Trade, 240 Department of Industry, Trade, and

Tourism, 240 Department of National Security, 380 Department of Posts and Telecommunications, 235 Deposit Taking Institutions Act (1991), 242

deputy president, 85, 261 Development Bank of Southern Africa, 104, 107, 178 de Villiers, Dawie, 263

D.F. Malan Accord (February 1991), 256 Dhlakama, Alfonso, 312 Diamond Express Train, 231 diamond fields: annexed by British, 33; geographic distribution of, 209; at Kimberly, 208; at Venetia, 209 diamonds, 95, 208-9; cartel for selling, 209; discovery of, 1, 4, 33, 90, 175, 205, 208; economic importance of, 173; exports of, 33, 175, 195; prices of, 209; production of, 205, 209

Dias (Diaz), Bartholomeu, 10, 138

diet, 9; and malnutrition, 162, 186; of San people, 134; of Venda people,

128-29

difaqane ("time of troubles") , 19 Dikwankwetla Party of South Africa, 293 Dingane, 23; killed, 28; massacre of

Voortrekkers by, 28 Dingiswayo, 20, 114; death of, 21; rela- tionship of, with Shaka, 21 diplomatic corps, 304-5

Directorate of Military Intelligence (see also intelligence services; military

intelligence) , 340, 380

Directorate of National Intelligence, 380

discrimination: against blacks, 174, 199; antimiscegenation laws, 54, 55; by British, 1-li, 4, 25, 43; calls for eradication

of, 37, 43; against coloureds, 45; in employment, 200; against Jews, 51,

500
Index

133; in Kimberly, 35-36; in land distri- bution, 45, 51; legal structure of, 44-

45; in mining industry, 48, 49; opposition to, 52; pass laws, 4, 35, 42, 56, 57, 60; prohibition of, 271; against women, 56; against workers, 65 disease: AIDS, 159-60; cancer, 159;

deaths from, 157, 158-59; diphtheria, 158; effect of, on Africans, 12, 14; heart disease, 159; HIV infection, 159; incidence of, 156-59, 160; leprosy, 158; malaria, 157-58; measles, 158;

sexually transmitted, 159, 160; small- pox, 14, 135, 158, 174; tuberculosis, 156-57, 160; typhoid, 158

divorce: registration of, 104 Doman, 13 dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 314-15 Drakensberg Mountains, 98 drought, 176, 215; of 1800-10, 19; of

1910s, 130; of 1960s, 176-77; of 1980s,

177, 181; of 1990s, 216, 217, 306, 361

drugs, 389; addiction to, 164; trafficking

in, 164, 370, 375 Dubejohn L.,45

Durban, 91; airport at, 234; climate in, 100; ethnic groups in, 133; fishing

near, 222; manufacturing in, 223; mili- tary headquarters in, 367; Muslims in, 146; naval installation, 339, 373; port

of, 232 Durban Marxist Club, 280 Durban Police Force, 382

Durr, Kent, 322 Dutch East India Company (Verenigde

Oostindische Compagnie—VOC),

xlviii-xlix, 11-12; conflicts of, with settlers, 14; slaves imported by, 12; supply

station for, xlviii, 11-12, 138, 174 Dutch merchants: trade by, 1

Dutch Reformed Church Act (1911), 44 Dutch Reformed churches, 129; and

apartheid, 141-43; branches of, 141; Indian, 142; introduction of, 141-42; members of, 132, 135, 141; missionaries from, 139; organization of, 142;

schools of, 148; theology of, 141, 142 Dutch Reformed Mission Church (Sending Kerk), 142 Dutch settlers, xlix, 12, 90, 129; expansion by, 12, 15, 17; free burghers, 13,

14, 17; immigration of, 14; violence by,

175; wars of, with Khoikhoi, xlix, 12,

13, 15, 349 Dutch speakers: conflicts of, with British, 26; Griqua as, 18 Dutch Watch, 382

duToit, S.J., 39

East Africa: in World War I, 334-35; in World War II, 338

Eastern Cape Province: agriculture in, 218; capital of, 266; livestock in, 219; manufacturing in, 226; representation

of, in parliament, 263

East Germany. See German Democratic

Republic

East London: airport at, 234; manufacturing in, 223; naval installation, 339; port of, 232, 233

EC. See European Community

economic activity: of foreign nationals,

188; restrictions on, 188-89 economic growth: mining support for, 4, 175; in 1960s, 180; in 1970s, 180 economic policy, 1 75; of interim govern- ment, 187 economic problems: under apartheid,

5, 177, 185-86 economic recession: of 1970s, 180; of

1990s, 177 economic sanctions, 192, 249, 316, 321, 350 economy, 181-82; historical development of, 174-77; and homelands,

185-86; influences on, 173; informal,

181, 199; role of government in, 186-

92; slave, 11-13; structure of, 180-86 education (see also schools) , 146-56;

adult, 156; in African societies, 147; under apartheid, 56, 131, 146, 150-53;

for Asians, liv, 152-53; assistance in, 306; for blacks, lxii, 56, 71, 150, 152, 188, 203; budgets for, 153; for

coloureds, liv, 152-53; compulsory,

152, 154; curriculum, 149, 150; dis- crepancies in, 153; early development

of, 147-50; and employment, 203-5; expansion of, lxiii; goals of, 146; gov- ernment responsibility for, 152; gov- ernment spending on, 148; languages

of, 43, 64, 148, 149, 150; postsecondary, 149, 154-56; reform, 153-54, 178,

501
South Africa: A Country Study

204; and religion, 147; segregation of, 56, 131; spending on, 150, 192, 203;

subsidies, 179; teachenpupil ratios in, 153; for whites, 152,203

Education Co-ordination Service, 153 Education Foundation, 147, 204 EEC. See European Economic Community Eiselen, W.M., 150

elections: under apartheid, 272; of 1924, 284; of 1948, liii, 53-54, 130-31, 284,

335; of 1953, 58; of 1958, 58; of 1961,

58; of 1970, 69; of 1974, 69; of 1983

(reform referendum), 70-71; of 1984,

71; of 1987, 74, 127; of 1989, 272, 285, 331; of 1992 (reform referendum),

81; voter turnout in, 71 elections of 1994, xlvii, lxi, 5, 84-85, 249, 250, 272-75; accusations of fraud in, 84; African Christian Democratic

Party in, 275, 292; African National Congress in, lxi-lxii, 249, 275; campaign for, 274, 286; coloureds in, 132; Democratic Party in, 275, 290; ethnic

distribution in, xlvii; Freedom Front

in, lxii, 275, 289; Inkatha Freedom

Party in, lxii, 275, 288; Muslims in, 146; National Party in, lxii, 132, 249, 275, 286; observers for, 83, 275; PanAfricanist Congress in, lxii, 275, 292; participation in, 84; political parties

in, 292; preparations for, 83-84, 274-

75; procedures for, 272-74, 275;

united States assistance for, 318; voter turnout in, xlvii Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom),

189, 223, 224-25; capital investment

in, 224; coal used by, 212; imports by, 226; privatization of, 190

electric power, 173, 224-25; coal for, 212, 224; distribution of, lxiii, 177, 178;

generation, 103; in homes, 224; hydro,

101-2, 225; imported, 225; nuclear,

223, 224; parastatals for, 176, 222, 223;

in rural areas, 224 employment, 198-205; in agriculture,

91, 198-99, 217; under apartheid, 199; of blacks, li-lii, 199, 203; of domestic

workers, 199; and education, 203-5; in

fishing, 221; in homelands, 199; and

job creation, 178, 223; in manufacturing, 53; in mining, 199; in prisons,

391-92; restrictions on, li-lii, 65, 69; in services sector, 199; in telecommunications, 237; in tourism, 240; by

United States companies, 193; of

whites, li-lii, 199 End Conscription Campaign, 342 energy production (see also under individ- ual energy sources), 212-14; environ- mental problems caused by, 101;

minerals for, 212-14

English language: as language of instruction, 43, 64, 148, 149; newspapers in, 304; as official language, 109; radio broadcasts in, 237-38; speakers of, 118, 131, 132-34; television broadcasts

in, 237

English speakers (see also Asians, Europeans), xlvii, 297 environment, 101-3, 238-40; air pollution, 102-3; effect of population on,

239; impact assessments, 239; opposition to protection of, 239; problems

in, 101, 102; protection of, 238-39;

studies of, 239; and uranium, 356; water pollution, 102, 239 Environment Conservation Act (No. 73) (1989), 238 Eskom. See Electricity Supply Commission ethnic identity: and language, 111

ethnicity: reaction to, 109; of Xhosa people, 117-18 EU. See European Union

Europe: opposition of, to apartheid, 68; in World War I, 335 Europe, Central: relations with, 305 Europe, Eastern: relations with, 305; set- tlers from, 90, 133 European Community (EC): sanctions

of, 81,350

European Economic Community (EEC):

sanctions of, 192, 193, 350 Europeans, 132-33; ancestors of, 132-

33; exploration by, 90; investment by, 175; and missionaries, 140; population

of, 14, 15, 132; settlement by, xlix, 10-

18, 24-33, 90, 135, 174, 333; trade

with, 19, 33; violence by, 175 European Union (EU): election observers from, 83, 275; financial assistance from, 160; investment by, 320; rela- tions with, 320-22; trade with, 195,

502
Index

196, 320 exchange, lxiv; rate, 177, 242; restrictions, 188

executive branch (see also president):

under constitution of 1961, 253; under constitution of 1983, 254

exiles, 40, 61; return of, 76, 79, 307

expansion, 12, 15; barriers to, 17

explosives, 226-27

Export Administration Amendment Act

(1985), 316

exports (see also under individual products)

,

33, 187, 223; of crops, 215, 217; of dia- monds, 33, 175, 195; of food, 214, 215, 217; of gold, 53, 175, 180, 187, 194; income from, 53; industrial, 196; of

materiel, 354-55; of minerals, 194,

207, 210, 211, 214; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 195; ratio of, to foreign debt, 184; revenues from,

180, 207; value of, 195; of wool, 33, 215, 219

Extension of University Education Act

(No. 45) (1959), 56, 154-55

external debt, 182-84; growth of, 182-83

Eye of the Nation. Seelso Lesizwe

Factories, Machinery, and Building

Works Act (No. 22) (1941), 188

Fagan, Henry, 54 FAK. See Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organisations

families: nuclear, 6; of San people, 6; of Xhosa people, 118; of Zulu people, 113

famine: 1800-1810, 19; of mfecane, 24; of

1990s, 361 farmers: black, 175, 176, 215; debts of, 216; in Mozambique, 313; white, 175- 76,215

farming: by Africans, 35, 215; dairy, 219-

20; by Europeans, 175, 215

farms: size of, 215

Federal Party, 293

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- many, Federal Republic of Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge. See Federation of Afrikaner

Cultural Organisations Federation ofAfrikaner Cultural Organisations (Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge—FAK), 130, 284 Federation of South African Women

(FSAW),60

fertility rate, 105

Financial Mail, 304

financial sector: contribution of, to econ- omy, 180; employment in, 199

First, Ruth, 282

First National Bank (Barclays), 242

Fischer, Abraham, 43

fishing, 127, 220-22; catches, 221-22; employment in, 221; exports, 221;

official harbors for, 222; quotas, 222;

rights, 222

fluorspar, 98; deposits, 210; production

of, 205

food: in armed forces, 345; export of, 214, 215, 228; import of, 216; processing, 228, 356; subsidies, 228 Food and Allied Workers' Union, 202

Ford, Gerald, 67-68 Ford Motor Company, 226

foreign assistance: to African countries,

180, 306; from European Union, 160; from Republic of China, 324; from the United States, 318

foreign debt, 68; and agriculture, 216;

crisis, 183, 223, 242; in 1980s, 184; in 1990s, 184; as percentage of gross domestic product, 184; ratio of, to exports, 184; repayment of, 183, 184; rescheduling of, 183 foreign loans, 197; from Britain, 183;

called in, lix, 183, 190, 192; embargo

on, 192; refusal to roll over, 73, 177

foreign investment, lvi, lxiv, 63, 192-93,

245; from Britain, 183; decline in, 68; dependence on, 245; embargo on,

192, 350; by European Union, 320; in manufacturing, 196-97; in mining, 1, 175, 196-97; by Republic of China,

324; solicitation of, 83, 179; by United

States, 197, 318, 320; withdrawal of,

lvii.lix, 73, 192-93

foreign policy: principles of, 305-6

foreign relations, 304-25

forestry, 91 , 220

forests: depletion of, 239; plantations of, 220; reserves, 220

Foskor. See Phosphate Development Cor- poration

fourth force, 289

503
South Africa: A Country Study

France: arms shipments to, 354; immigrants from, xlix, 129, 133, 349; materiel licensing agreements with, 351; missionaries from, 24, 139; relations

with, 321-22; trade with, 321 Freedom Alliance, 82; decline of, 83; opposition by, 83 Freedom Charter (1955), lv, 59-60, 276, 291 Freedom Front, 250, 288-89; in elections, lxii, 275, 289; formed, 289; in government, 268, 275; support for, 289

Free State: agriculture in, 217, 218; capital of, 266; diamonds in, 209; gold in, 207; livestock in, 219; representation

of, in parliament, 263; topography of, 95 FRELIMO. See Front for the Liberation

of Mozambique

Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique.

See Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

Front for the Liberation of Mozambique

(Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique—FRELIMO), 311-12

fruit, 218 FSAW. See Federation of South African Women

Gabon: arms shipments to, 354 Gandhi, Mohandas: passive resistance campaigns, 45

Garvey, Marcus, 49

gas, natural: deposits, 99; exploration,

212; synthetic, 214, 227

Gastrow, Shelagh, 298 Gauteng: age dependency ratio in, 105;

capital of, 266; diamonds in, 209; population of, 106-7; population density

of, 106-7; representation of, in parlia- ment, 263; urbanization rate in, 107 Gazankulu homeland, 128, 265; econ- omy of, 128; government of, 128; malaria in, 158; population of, 128; self-government for, 66, 254; violence

in, 128 Gcaleka Xhosa: chiefdom of, 119; homeland of, 119 GDP. See gross domestic product

Gencor, 220

General Export Incentive Scheme, 194

General Law Amendment Act (1963), 62 geographic regions, 95-99; rainfall line, 101

geology, 94-95

George: airport at, 234

George, Lloyd, 46

geostrategic situation, 349 Gereformeerde Kerk van Suid-Afrika (Reformed Church of South Africa), 142 German Democratic Republic (East Ger- many): materiel from, 277 Germany: immigration from, xlix, 14, 129, 133; missionaries from, 139; rela- tions of, with Republic of South

Africa, 39; relations of, with Union of South Africa, 49; trade with, 195 Germany, Federal Republic of (West

Germany): materiel licensing agree- ments with, 351; trade with, 354

Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van

ons Volk (du Toit) , 39

ghettos, li; in Kimberly, 35

Ginwala, Frene, 167 Glasgow Missionary Society, 1 39 GNP. See gross national product

gold, 95, 98, 207-8; deposits, 95, 207; dis- covery of, 1, 4, 34, 90, 175, 205; distri- bution of, 33, 34; export of, 53, 175,

176, 180, 187, 194; importance of, 33, 42, 173, 176, 245; mining of, 33, 34, 102, 128, 207; price of, lix, 173, 177, 180, 181, 191, 194, 208; profits, 207, 208; production, 34, 205, 207;

reserves, 198, 207; revenues from, 53, 194 gold industry, 42; importance of, 187;

protections for, 42; and Reserve Bank,

241; taxes on, 191; wages in, 245

Goldstone, Richard, 390

Goldstone Commission. See Commission

of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention

of Public Violence and Intimidation Goodwill Zwelithini, King, 116, 257, 266, 288

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 322

Gore, Albert, 320 government: controls on industry, 227; ethnic distribution in, 297; loans by, 189; role of, in economy, 186-92 government, interim. See Government of

504
Index

National Unity

government, local, 266-68; elections, 266-68 government, provincial, 265-68; powers

of, 266; representation in, 265-66 government budget, 190-92; defense

budget as percentage of, 381, 382; deficit, 191, 192; for 1995-96, 192; for 1996-97, 192; surplus, 190-91 Government of National Unity, 78-79,

83, 249, 252-69; African National

Congress in, 279; Communist Party in, 283; economic policies of, 187; for- eign policy of, 305-6; foreign relations

of, 305; formation of, 80, 83; National Party resignation from, lxiii, 269;

privatization under, 190; proposals for, 81; rules for forming, 78-79; support

for, 257-58 government services: improvements in, 177 government spending: on defense, 192; on education, 150, 153, 192; on

police, 192; on reconstruction and

development, 156 Gqozo, Joshua, 347

Graaff-Reinet College, 149 Gramm Amendment (1983), 316

Great Depression, 50-52; National Party

in, 50 Great Escarpment, 95, 98; elevation of, 95 Great Karoo, 99; elevation of, 99

Great Trek (see also Voortrekkers) ,1,26-

29, 90; commemorative reenactment

of, 50-51

Great Winterhoek Mountains, 98-99

Great Zimbabwe: gold mining at, 33

Greece: immigrants from, 133 Greek Orthodox Church: members of, 135

Grey, George, 149 Grey College (see also University of the Orange Free State) , 149 Grey Institute, 149

Greyshirts, 52; support for, 52 Griqua people, 18, 131; alliance of, with Voortrekkers, 28; conflicts of, with

Dutch, 30; culture of, 18; language of, 18, 131; migrations of, 131; population of, 131; religion of, 18; wars of, 36 Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990), 256

gross domestic product (GDP), 180-82;

in 1980s, 181; in 1990s, 181; per capita, 181

gross domestic product fractions: agri- culture, 180, 214-15; budget deficit, 191, 192; current account, 198;

defense spending, 381; exports, 195; foreign debt, 184; mining, 180, 205;

services sector, 1 80

gross national product (GNP): defense spending as a percentage of, 381 Group Areas Act (No. 41) (1950), 55,

188; racial zones under, 62; repealed,

lix, 79

Growth, Employment and Redistribution,

lxiv-lxv Gumede, James T., 281

Hala dynasty, 120

Hani, Chris, 280; murdered, lx, 82, 283, 391 Harare Declaration (1989), 278 Harms Commission. See Commission of

Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders

Harris, John, 61 health (see also disease), 156-62

health care: under apartheid, 156, 160-

61; assistance in, 306; for children,

161; emergency, 161; improvements

in, 178; in rural areas, 156

health care professionals, 161; in armed

forces, 336, 348, 375; black, 161; geo- graphic distribution of, 161; training

for, 161,376

health facilities, 160-61; apartheid in, 160-61; military, 375

health insurance, 162

helpmekaar (mutual aid) , 47-48 Helpmekaar (social service organization), 284

Hendrickse, Allan, 71 Herenigde (Reunited) National Party (HNP) (see also National Party), 53, 284; in elections, 53-54; formed, 53; platform of, 54

Herstigte Nasionale Party. See Reconstituted National Party Hertzog, Albert, 68 Hertzog, James "Barry" Munnik (J.B.M.), 43, 53, 284; opposition by, to World War I, 47; as prime minister, 48-49, 50;

505
South Africa: A Country Study

resignation of, 52 Hertzog (J.B.M.) government: "civilised labour" policy of, 49; discrimination under, 49, 51-52; parastatals under,

187 Het Volk (The People) party, 43; formed, 43

Highveld, 95; climate in, 101; elevation

of, 95 Highveld Steel and Vanadium, 211, 225

Hindi, 133 Hindus, 134; number of, 135

history: anthropological, 5; importance

of, 3 History of our Land in the Language of our

People (duToit) , 39 HNP. See Herenigde (Reunited)

National Party; Reconstituted

National Party Holland, Kingdom of, 18 Holomisa, Bantu, 347 homelands: armed forces of, 346-48,

365, 369; blacks removed to, 62-63,

103, 121, 185; citizenship in, 109; and

economy, 186-86; employment in, 199; establishment of, li, liii-liv, 62; ethnic distribution in, 107; geographic

distribution of, Iv-lvi; independence

for, 62, 66, 107-9, 126, 254; land deg- radation in, 102; manufacturing in, 224; opposition to, 66; population of, 63, 66; population density of, 66, 104,

106, 265; poverty in, 66, 185; self-gov- ernment for, 66, 121, 254; support for, 70; television in, 237; transition of, from apartheid, 80, 265; violence in, 72, 78 Homo sapiens: fossils of, 89 Hottentot Code (1809), 25; abolished, 26

Hottentots. See Khoikhoi House of Assembly (white), 71, 254; Afri- can National Congress representatives in, 278 House of Delegates (Asian), 71, 254

House ofPhalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Day of Their Independence

(Peires), 119 House of Representatives (coloured),

71, 254

housing: construction, 178, 220; demand

for, lxiii; subsidies, 179

Hout Bay: fishing in, 222 Huguenots: immigration of, 14, 218

Huisgenoot, 304 human rights, 272; abuses, 279, 394, 395, 396; under apartheid, 394, 395; and

national reconciliation, 394-97; by

police, 395; reparations, 396 Human Rights Commission, 259, 395;

established, 272

hunter-gatherers, 6 hunting: by Africans, 31, 118; by Nguni,

113; by Voortrekkers, 29, 31 Hurutshe people, 126

hydroelectric projects, 101-2

ICU. See Industrial and Commercial

Workers Union

IEC. See Independent Electoral Commission

IFP. See Inkatha Freedom Party Imbumba Yama Nyama, 37 IMR See International Monetary Fund

immigration, 1, 33, 43, 90; from African

countries, 180; encouragement of, lvi, 148, 175; illegal, 263, 360; restrictions on, 15, 133; by whites, 1, 63, 175

Immorality Act (No. 5) (1927), 55 Immorality Act (No. 21) (1950), 55

imperialism, 33-44

imports: of agricultural products, 175; dependence on, 222; of food, 216,

217; industrial, 194-95, 226; of oil, 180, 185, 195; pattern of, 194-95;

restrictions on, 194; tariffs on, 176,

191, 192, 194; value of, 195 Imvo Zabantsundu (Native Opinion), 37

income: from gold, 53 indentured laborers: from China, 42; from India, 29; number of, 42 Independent Broadcasting Authority,

237, 303-i Independent Broadcasting Authority Act

(No. 153) (1993), 303^

Independent Electoral Commission

(IEC), 83, 257, 274; administration of 1994 elections by, 274-75; electoral fund, 274; voter education by, 274 Independent Media Commission, 257 Independent Party, 289

India: immigrants from, 90, 349; indentured laborers from, 29, 90, 349; Man506
Index

dela's visit to, 77; relations with, 305

Indians. See Asians

Indonesia: immigrants from, 90

Industrial and Commercial Workers

Union (ICU), 49-50; membership of, 49; platform of, 49

Industrial Conciliation Act (1924), 49,

188, 200

Industrial Conciliation Act (1937), 188 Industrial Conciliation Act (No. 28)

(1956), 56, 188

Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act

(1979), 200

industrial development: stagnation in, 173

Industrial Development Corporation,

176, 189

industrialization, 34-88; local, 187

industry: chemicals, 226-27; clothing,

228; decentralization of, 187; effect of

apartheid on, 176-77; ethnic distribu- tion in, 297; exports by, 196; heavy, 225-26; heavy-engineering, 226; in homelands, 128, 129; imports for, 194-95; import-substitution, 187, 189; modernization of, 200; monopolies in, 187; nationalization of, lx; pollution

by, 102, 239; revenue of, 191; state- owned, 186

infant mortality, 1 05

Infantry School, 365

inflation, lix, 73, 177, 185, 191, 223; and

agriculture, 216

initiation rites, 137 Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 66, 74, 202, 286-88; cabinet appointments,

261; conflict of, with African National Congress, lx, 257, 274, 275, 287-88, 388-89; in elections, xlvii, lxii, 84, 275, 288; formed, 286; members of, 287; military wing, 363; organization of, 287; in National Assembly, 275; plat- form of, 286; police support for, 82, 389-91, 395; resistance of, to reform,

84, 250, 252, 286; violence by, 81, 84 Inkatha ya kwa Zulu (Organization of

the Zulu), 286-87

Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe (National

Cultural Liberation Movement), 116, 287

Inkatha Youth Brigade, 287

Inkatha Women's Brigade, 287

Institute for Aviation Medicine, 376;

Institute for Maritime Medicine, 376

insurance services: Afrikaner, lii, 47, 50, 242, 284; from banks, 242; contribution of, to economy, 1 80; employment

in, 199 Integrated Environmental Management, 238

Intelligence school, 365

intelligence services, 340, 380 Intelligence Services Act (No. 38)

(1994), 380

interest groups, 293-97

internal security, 382-94; intelligence

services, 340; as mission of armed

forces, 335, 337, 340, 342-43

Internal Security Act, 394-95; repealed, 394

interior plateau, 95

International Atomic Energy Agency:

inspection by, 355

international community: and apartheid, 5, 305; isolation from, 305, 338, 349-50, 357

International Development Research

Centre (Canadian), 239

International Monetary Fund (IMF);

loans from, 182, 183, 192

international organizations, 325-26

international sanctions, 249, 350; and air travel, 235; and coal industry, 213;

opposition to, 321, 323

International Socialist League of South

Africa (see also Communist Party of South Africa), 48, 280

investment: by banks, 242; by blacks, 208, 244-45; in manufacturing, 224; in Namibia, 311 investment, foreign. See foreign invest- ment

Iran: arms shipments to, 354; oil from,

68, 190, 192, 320, 322; relations with, 320, 322-23

Iraq: arms shipments to, 354

iron, 98; deposits, 210; mining, 205; pro- duction of, 205, 211, 225; reserves,

211

irrigation, 91, 95, 99, 215, 218

Iscor. See South African Iron and Steel Corporation

isiNdebele. SeeNdebele language

isiXhosa. SeeXhosa language

507
South Africa: A Country Study

isiZulu. See Zulu language

Islam, 145-46

Iso Lesizwe (Eye of the Nation), 288

Israel: arms shipments to, 354; fishing

rights of, 222; military cooperation

with, 323, 351; relations with, 323-24;

trade with, 323

Italy: materiel licensing agreements with, 351; relations with, 324; trade with,

195; in World War II, 335, 338

ivory: of Voortrekkers, 29; trade in, 19, 174

Jabavu, John Tengo, 37 Jameson, Leander Starr, 39 Jameson Raid (1895) , 39 Japan: fishing rights of, 222; Mandela's

visit to, 77; trade with, 195, 210

JCI Limited, 208

Jewish Socialist Society, 280

Jews: discrimination against, lii, 51, 52, 133; population of, 133, 135, 323 Johannesburg, 266; airport at, 234; crime in, Ixiv; ethnic groups in, 133; gold mining in, 34, 95; manufacturing

in, 223, 226; military headquarters in, 367; Muslims in, 146; population of, 34; squatter communities near, 53 Johannesburg Civil Defence program,

348 Johannesburg Consolidated Invest- ments, 208 Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 192, 242; foreign purchases on, 197; trading on,

173, 197, 244 Johannesburg Weekly Mail, 354

Johnnies Industrial Corporation, 208

Joint Air Training Scheme, 337-38

Joint Committee on Defence, 381 Joint Management Centers, 341-42;

advisory committees, 341-42; hierar- chy of, 341

Joint Military Coordinating Council, 368 Joint Planning Council, 59; Defiance

Campaign of, 59; formed, 59 Jonathan, Leabua, 307, 359; ousted, 359

Jones, David Ivon, 280

Jordan: relations with, 305

journalists: detention of, 301-2

judges: appointment of, 270; sent to Swaziland, 309

Judicial Services Commission: established, 272

judiciary: under constitution of 1961, 253

Kadalie, Clements, 49, 50

Kalahari Desert, 98; elevation of, 98; resi- dents of, 5, 134

Kalahari Gemsbok National Park, 240 KaNgwane homeland, 265; self-govern- ment for, 66, 254; and Swaziland, 117; Swazi population of, 116-17 Kappiekommando, 166 Kaunda, Kenneth, 285, 313 Keep It Straight and Simple Party

(KISS), 292 Kenya: military cooperation with, 375;

relations with, 315, 361

Keys, Derek, 261, 263 Khoi people. SeeKhoikhoi people

Khoikhoi people, 6-7; extermination of, 12, 134, 135; geographic distribution

of, 7, 118; in Great Trek, 26; histories

of, 135; labor by, 16, 25; migrations of, 13-14; occupations of, 6; origins of, 89; population of, 7, 32; religion of, 139; settlements of, 7; as slaves, 135,

139, 174; social structure of, 7; trade

by, 7, 11, 12, 174; wars of, xlix, 1, 12, 13,15,129-30,335,349

Khoisan languages, 134-35 Khoisan people, 89; descendants of, 89; education of, 147; geographic distri- bution of, 1 0; religion of, 1 36

Kimberly, 266; airport at, 234; diamonds

in, 208; established, 33; locations

(ghettos) in, 35; manufacturing in, 224; migration to, for work, 34; mili- tary headquarters in, 367; racial dis- crimination in, 35-36

KISS. See Keep It Straight and Simple

Party

Kissinger, Henry, 67-68, 84 Koeberg nuclear power station, 223, 225 Koevoet counterinsurgency force, 344-

45 Komati River, 99 Korean War, 338, 349

Kriel, Hernus, 386

KrigeJ.D., 124

Kruger, Paul, 38, 39; assaults by, on Afri508
Index

cans, 120-21; exiled, 40; monopolies

under, 187 Kruger National Park, 98, 240 KwaNdebele homeland, 121, 265; population of, 121; self-government for, 66, 121, 254; violence in, 72 KwaZulu homeland, 62, 115-16, 265; under apartheid reform, lx, 78; gen- der ratio in, 105; independence for, 62, 254; political conflict in, 257, 274,

391; self-government for, 66, 254; state of emergency in, 84; violence in, lx; voting in, 274

KwaZulu-Natal province: agriculture in, 217; capital of, 266; elections in, 268; ethnic distribution in, 131, 133; mining in, 211, 212; representation of, in parliament, 263; timber plantations

in, 220; violence in, 395 Kwena people, 126

labor (see also workers; work force): costs, 223; demand for, 4; distribution of, 199; laws, 175-76; policies, 208; and

politics, 199-203; productivity of, 223; under proposed constitution, 269;

unrest, 65, 202

labor unions, lxii, 295-97; Afrikaner,

130; antiapartheid, 296; black, lvii,

lviii, 69, 72, 115, 200, 200, 201, 296; communist, 295; membership in, 201, 296; organization of, 200, 295; police, 387-88; political activities of, 293, 297, 298; proapartheid, 296; recognition

of, 200-201; restrictions on, 54, 200;

rights of, 117; white, 200 Labour Party: in elections, 71 , 284; members of, 48, 71

lakes, 99; artificial, 99 Lake Saint Lucia, 99

land: arable, 95; area, 94; for blacks,

xlviii, 55, 175; cultivated, 215; degradation, 101, 102, 239; distribution,

xlviii, 45, 55, 175; irrigated, 215; pollu- tion of, 102; restrictions on distribu- tion of, 15; segregation, 45, 51;

seizures, lii, 120, 126, 174, 333; shortages, 101; of whites, 175, 189 Land Bank: loans from, 175 Land Claims Court, 164, 188

land reform, 215

Langa protest, 276 Langeberg Mountains, 99 languages (see also under individual languages), 109-11; click, 5, 118, 125; and

ethnic groups, 111; families of, 111; of

instruction, 43, 64, 148, 149, 150; official, 109-11; in parliament, 264

lead, 210

Leballo, Potlako, 292 Lebowa homeland, 121, 124, 265; econ- omy of, 124; malaria in, 158; politics

of, 124; population of, 124; self-gov- ernment for, 66, 254; violence in, 72, 128

Legal Aid Society, 270

legal system, 269-72; under apartheid, 269-70; attorneys general in, 270; judges in, 270; lawyers in, 270; origins

of, 269; of Tswana, 126

legislative branch: under constitution of

1961, 253; under constitution of 1983,

254; under proposed constitution, 268 Lekganyane, Engenas, 144

Lekhanya, Justin, 359

Lekota, Patrick "Terror,", 300 Lembede, Anton, 58, 276

Lesotho, 32, 111; annexed by British, 30; border with, 360, 361; coup in, 308; defeated by Orange Free State, 30; elections in, 361; independence of, 67, 307; intervention in, 306, 308, 359, 361-62; military revolt in, 306; origins

of, 23; police training in, 385; rela- tions with, 307-8, 358, 361; in South- ern African Customs Union, 196, 307;

in Southern African Development

Community, 306; trade with, 307, 308; transportation links with, 307; workers

from, 204-5

Lesotho Highlands Water Project, 101-2, 308

Libya: relations with, 305, 320, 324

limestone: production of, 205 Limpopo River, 94, 1 00 Limpopo River Valley, 98 Limpopo Train, 231

literacy: classes, 156, 392; rate, 146, 177

Little Karoo, 99

livestock, 122, 219-20; cattle, 6, 9, 127,

134, 219, 333; farming, 14; goats, 9, 127; holdings, 6; of Khoikhoi, 6; pigs, 219; poultry, 127, 219; sheep, 6, 9, 31,

509
South Africa: A Country Study

134, 215,219

living standards: attempts to improve,

177; of blacks, 177; decline in, 181; of

whites, 91, 177 Lobedu people, 124

lobola. See bridewealth compensation

Local Government Transition Act (No.

209) (1993), 267

locations {see also ghettos; homelands;

townships): under British, 4; in Kimberly, 35 Lome Convention: qualified membership in, 196 London Missionary Society, 139 London Stock Exchange, 197

Lowveld, 99

Lupton, Malcolm, 102 Luso-South Africa Party, 293

Luthuli, Albert, 59; arrested, 60; imprisoned, 61; Nobel Prize of, 61 luVenda. S«?Venda language

Lyttleton Engineering Works, 350

Mabuza, Enos, 117

Machel, Samora, 312 Madagascar: investment in, 197; rela- tions with, 358; in World War II, 335, 338 Madhiba, Moses, 283

Maharaj, "Mac," 300 Mahlangu dynasty, 122

Major, John, 321 Make, Vusumazi, 292 Makwetu, Clarence, 83-84, 292 Malan, Daniel F. (D.E), 47, 50, 53, 284; retirement of, 58

Malan, Magnus, 340

Malan, Wynand, 289 Malan Accord (February 1991), 256

malaria, 157-58; geographic distribution

of, 157-58; rate of infection, 158

Malawi: arms shipments to, 354; police

training in, 385; relations with, 358; in Southern African Development Community, 306; trade with, 307; transportation links with, 307; workers from, 204-5

Malaya: immigrants from, 90

Malaysia: relations with, 305

malnutrition, 162, 186 Mandela, Nelson (Rolihlahla), liv, 5, 58,

59, 276, 281, 394; arrested, 60, 61;

clashes of, with Buthelezi, 116; ethnic background of, 299; in foreign relations, 310, 314-15; imprisoned, xlvii,

lvi, 61, 277; inauguration of, 324;

international tour of, 77; meeting of, with Buthelezi, 79; as president, lxii, 85, 354; released from prison, lix, 75-

76, 256, 332; state visits of, 313; succes- sors to, xlviii, Ixv, 279; talks of, with

Botha, 256; talks of, with de Klerk, lixlx, 75, 153, 251; in transition process,

77, 79, 82, 252, 256, 257, 390; transi- tion proposals by, 81, 256 Mandela, Winnie, lx, 167, 262, 279-80;

controversy surrounding, 279, 300-

301; support for, 279 Mandela government. See Government

of National Unity

manganese: deposits, 210; prices, 210; production of, 205, 210; reserves, 210 Mangope, Lucas, lxi; ousted, 83, 127, 346

manufacturing, 128, 173, 222-28; capacity, 223, 224; capitalization of, 223; employment in, 53; foreign invest- ment in, 196-97; geographic distribu- tion of, 223-24; growth in, 176, 245; investment in, 224; output, 222, 223;

sales, 223 Mapungubwe: gold mining at, 33 Marine Corps, 339 Marion Island, 94; weather research sta- tion, 94 marketing boards, 176, 215; for milk, 219-20 MARNET. See Military Area Radio Net- work

marriage: arranged, 118; bridewealth compensation, 9, 140-41; mixed, 54,

55; of Nguni people, 123; registration

of, 104; rites, 137; of Sotho people,

123; of Xhosa people, 140-41

Masire, Quett, 310 Mass Democratic Movement (MDM),

293, 295 Matabele people. SeeNdebele people

materiel: for African National Congress,

277; air force, 371; army, 368; from

Belgium, 351; biological, 355-57; from Britain, 353; from Canada, 351; chemical, 355-57; dual-use technology, 353; from East Germany, 277;

510
Index

embargo on, lvi, 68, 192, 316, 325,

350, 353, 354; from France, 351; from

Germany, 351; from Israel, 323, 351; from Italy, 351; licensing agreements,

351, 353; nuclear, 214, 355-57; police, 385; sales of, 354-55; self-sufficiency

in, 351

Mauritania: relations with, 324

Mauritius: in Southern African Develop- ment Community, 306

Mbeki, Govan, 277, 320 Mbeki, Thabo, 326; as deputy president,

lxii, 85, 190, 261; as successor to Mandela, lxv, 279 Mda, Peter, 58 MDM. S*<?Mass Democratic Movement

media: censored, 301-2; ethnic distribu- tion in, 297; removal of restrictions on, 75 Meiring, George, 382 men: circumcision of, 129; life expect- ancy of, 105; migration of, for work,

147; Nguni, 147; San, 6; status of, 6; wages of, 154; Zulu, 113, 333 Methodist Church: and apartheid, 143; members of, 135; missionaries from,

139 Mexico: relations with, 324

Meyer, Roelf, 263

mfecane ("crushing"): background to, 19-

20; causes of, 19; missionaries in, 140; outcomes of, 20-24, 127; refugees

from, 24,120,124,140, 333 Mfengu people, 120, 140 Mhlakaza, 141

migration: by blacks, xlviii, xlix, li, 3, 8-9, 332; caused by mfecane, 24, 333; quali- fications for, 148; restrictions on, 19,

56; by whites, xlix, 1, 3, 63, 148

Military Area Radio Network (MARNET), 342

military assistance: from Britain, 350

military conscription, 335, 369

military cooperation: with Israel, 323; on

technology, 351

military intelligence, 340, 377-81, 380,

381; budget for, 382

military officers, 369; from homeland

armies, 369; from liberation armies, 369

military police: women in, 348

Military Psychological Institute, 376

military strategy: under Shaka, 21, 115, 333

military training, 370

Milner, Alfred, 39-40, 149

Milner's Peace, 41-43; failures of, 43

minerals, 95, 98; discovery of, 1, 4, 33-34; economic importance of, 173; export

of, 194, 207, 210,211,214

miners: Sotho, 123; strikes by, 48, 337;

Zulu, 115

mines: closing of, 208; development of, 194; geographic distribution of, 205,

210, 211, 212; migration to, for work,

1, li, 34-35, 129, 147; number of, 207;

taxes on, 191 Mines and Works Act (No. 12) (1911),

li-lii, 44, 188 Mines and Works Amendment Act

(1926), 49, 188

Mineworkers' Union, 296

mining: of copper, 205; of coal, 212-13;

of diamonds, 95, 205; foreign invest- ment in, 175, 196-97; of gold, 33, 34,

95, 180, 205; of iron, 205; as percent- age of gross domestic product, 180,

205; of platinum, 95, 98; procedures,

207; of uranium, 214, 356 mining industry, 173, 205-14; color bar

in, 48, 49, 130; electricity for, 224; employment in, 199, 213; environ- mental problems caused by, 101, 102; expansion of, 175, 205; importance of, 91, 175, 245; revenues of, 207; wages

in, 207

Ministers' Council, 254

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 304; Depart- ment of Foreign Affairs, 304

Ministry of Information, 262

Ministry of Law and Order, 262, 386

Ministry of Native Affairs, 56

Ministry of Posts, Telecommunications,

and Broadcasting, 262

Ministry of Safety and Security, 262, 386

Ministry of Transport, 228, 234; Chief

Directorate of Civil Aviation, 234

Ministry of Transport, Posts, and Tele- communications, 228

Minority Front, 293

missionaries, 119, 138; American, 139;

British, 25, 139; Dutch, 139; French,

24, 139; German, 139; message of, 139-40; and mfecane, 140; Muslim,

511
South Africa: A Country Study

138; relations of, with Africans and

Europeans, 140; Scandinavian, 139;

schools of, 146, 148, 149

Mitterrand, Francois, 321 mixed-race people. See coloureds MK. See Umkhonto we Sizwe Mlambo, Johnson, 292 Mlangeni, 141 Mmabatho, 266

M-Net, 237, 302 MNR. See Mozambican National Resis- tance Mobuto Sese Seko, 315

Modise, Joe, 300, 354 Mokhehle, Ntsu, 361 Molopo River, 94, 1 00 Mondale, Walter, 68 Mondi paper manufacturing, 220 Montreal Protocol, 238

Mopeli, Kenneth, 125 Mormons, 135 Morocco: arms shipments to, 354; rela- tions with, 324 Moroka, James, 59

Moseneki, Dikgang, 292 Moshoeshoe, King, 23-24, 124; religion

under, 140; wars of, with British, 30 Moshoeshoe II, King, 361 Mossel Bay: fishing near, 222; manufacturing in, 224; port of, 233 Mothopeng, Zephania, 76 Mounted Riflemen's Association, 382-83

mountains, 98 Mountain Zebra National Park, 240 Movimento Popular de Libertacao de

Angola. See Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola

Mozambican National Resistance

(Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana—MNR; Renamo), lvi-lvii; sup- port for, 67, 310, 312, 343, 360 Mozambique, 66-67; Afrikaner farmers

in, 313; border with, 360; civil war in, 357, 360; electricity imported from,

225; ethnic groups in, 127; independence for, lvi-lvii, 67, 357; intervention in, 357, 358, 359; investment in, 197; language in, 111; Mandela's visit to, 313; migrant workers from, 163;

military cooperation with, 375; mili- tary support for, 309-1 0, 343; rail ser- vice, 231; refugees from, 163, 312-13;

relations with, 311-13; in Southern

African Development Community,

306; trade with, 196; workers from,

204-5 Mpande, 28 Mpanza, James, 53 MPLA. See Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola

Mpondo (Pondo) people, 112, 117, 120;

social system of, 1 Mpumalanga: agriculture in, 217, 218;

capital of, 266; livestock in, 219; manufacturing in, 226; representation of, in parliament, 263

Mswati, 23 Mthethwa people, 18, 20, 114; incorporated into Zulu state, 21; social system

of, 10; Zulu among, 18 Mufamadi, Sydney, 300, 387 Mugabe, Robert, 67; in foreign affairs, 310,312,362

Mulder, Connie, 70; purged, 69

Multiparty Negotiating Council, 265 Munitions Production Office, 350 Muslims {see also Islam), 132, 134; geo- graphic distribution of, 146; number

of, 135, 145 Muslim Student Association, 146 Muslim Youth Movement, 146

Mzilikazi, 24; defeated by Voortrekkers, 28

Nactu. See National Council of Trade

Unions

Namaqua (Nama) people, 135 Namibia {see also South-West Africa):

dependence of, on South Africa, 360; elections in, 318, 360; ethnic groups

in, 134, 135; independence of, 311,

318, 331, 360; invasion of, 67, 70; investment in, 311; rail service, 231;

religion in, 136; South African control

of, 67, 310, 331, 342; in Southern Afri- can Customs Union, 196, 307, 311; in Southern African Development Community, 306; trade with, 311; troops in, 318, 344; United Nations administration of, 310

Nasionale Pers (National Press) , 284

Natal colony: agriculture in, 218; blacks

in, 32, 115; education in, 148; popula512
Index

tion of, 31 Natal homeland. See KwaZulu homeland

Natalia, Republic of (see also Natal col- ony), 28; annexed by British, 29; established, 28; population of, 28

Natal Mounted Police, 382

Natal province, 255; political conflict in, 257, 391 National AIDS Convention of South

Africa, 160 National Assembly: under constitution of 1993, 259, 263; distribution of parties in, 275, 280; members of, 263; women in, 167 National Council of Trade Unions

(Nactu), 202, 292, 296 National Council on Alcoholism and

Drug Dependence, 164 National Cultural Liberation Movement. See Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe National Defence Force. See armed

forces National Democratic Movement (NDM),

74, 289 National Education and Training

Forum, 153

National Education, Health, and Allied Workers' Union, 202

National Institute for Defence Research, 350

National Institute for Economic Policy, 178

National Intelligence Agency, 380, 381 National Intelligence Coordinating

Committee, 380-81

National Iranian Oil Company, 322

National Manpower Commission, 204, 296

National Milk Board, 219-20

National Parks Board, 240 National Party of South Africa (NP):

formed, lii, 47; in Great Depression,

50; members of, 48; merged with

South African Party, 50, 284

National Party (NP) {see a&oHNP), 283-

86; and apartheid reform, lxiii, 285-

86; cabinet appointments, 261; cooperation of, with African National Congress, 298; education under, 150; in elections, xlvii, liii, lxii, 58, 84, 130,

132, 249, 275, 284, 286, 331, 335; in government, lxiii, 268, 269; in

National Assembly, 275; opposition of, to reform, 70; organization of, 284-

85; platform of, liii, 54, 130, 149, 284; recruitment for, 286; and religion,

141; secret meetings of, with African National Congress, 256; splits within, 285; support for, 58; transformation

of, 283-84, 285; transition talks, lix-lx, 250, 257 National Peace Accord (September

1991), 80, 257, 390

National Peacekeeping Force, 368-69;

deployed, 368; disbanded,369

National Peoples' Party: in elections, 71; members of, 71 National Petroleum Refiners of South

Africa, 322 National Policy for General Affairs Act

(No. 76) (1984), 152, 188

National Riflemen's Reserve, 335 national security, 339-48; civilian defense, 342; management system, 340-12

National Socialism: Afrikaner support

for, 52, 150 National Strategic Intelligence Act (No.

39) (1994), 380

National Tourist Bureaus, 240

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de

Angola—UNITA), lvi-lvii, 314; aid to, 359-60 National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), 202; labor

actions of, 202

National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)

,

72, 202 National Union of South African Stu- dents (NUSAS), 63, 295 National Welfare Act (No. 100) (1978), 162 Native Administration Act (No. 42)

(1956), 57

Native Educational Association (NEA),

37

Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15) (1911), 44, 188

Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (No. 48) (1953), 200

Native Laws Amendment Act (1937), 51; opposition to, 52

513
South Africa: A Country Study

Native Laws Amendment Act (No. 54)

(1952), 51 Native Laws Commission, 54

Natives Land Act (No. 27) (1913), li-lii, 45, 175, 188; extended, 55, 175; opposition to, 45, 46; repealed, lix, 79

Natives Representative Council, 51; abolished, 55 Native Trust and Land Act (No. 18) (1936), 51, 175, 188; opposition to, 52; repealed, 79 Naude, Beyers, 143

navy, 338-39, 373-75; control of, 373;

fleet of, 373; headquarters of, 373;

insignia, 377; installations, 339, 373; joint exercises of, 375; marine corps, 339; missions of, 375; number of per- sonnel in, 373; origins of, 338; ranks, 377; repairs, 375; reserves, 373; retrenchment of, 339; training, 373; uniforms, 376-77; women in, 348, 373 Ndebele language (isiNdebele), 120; as official language, 109; speakers of, 112-13 Ndebele people (amaNdebele) , 23-24,

111, 120-22; ancestors of, 120; conflicts of, with Voortrekkers, 27-28,

120; geographic distribution of, 121, 122; under Kruger, 120-21; migrations of, 120, 121; population of, 121,

122; ruled by Cecil Rhodes, 34 NDM. See National Democratic Move- ment Ndwandwe people, 18, 20; annihilated

by Shaka, 21 NEA. See Native Educational Association Nedbank, 242 Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk. See Dutch Reformed Church

Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk, 142

Nelspruit, 266; military headquarters in, 367

neo-Nazi groups, 52, 83 Netherlands: de Klerk's visit to, 77; rela- tions with, 324; settlers from, xlix, 133 New Africa Investment, Ltd., 244 New Order party, 52 newspapers (see also journalists; media),

304; languages of, 304; suspension of, 302 New Zealand: teachers from, 149 Ngqika Xhosa: chiefdom of, 119; homeland of, 119

Ngqika, Chief, 140 Ngubane, Jordan, 58 Nguni languages, 111-22 Nguni people, 111-22; age-groups of, 147; economy of, 113, 333; education

of, 147; geographic distribution of, 10; history of, 90; households of, 113;

political organization of, 113; population of, 111; settlement patterns of, 113; social system of, 10, 147; sub- groups of, 111 Ngwane I, 117 Ngwane people, 18, 23

nickel, 98; deposits, 210 Niger-Congo language family, 111

Nigeria: relations with, 315-16, 361 Nixon, Richard, 67-68

Nkobi, Thomas, 300 Nkomati Accord (1984), 312 Non-Aligned Movement: membership

in, 325 Nongqawuse: prophecy of, 31, 141 North Africa: in World War I, 334-35; in World War II, 338, 383 Northern Cape: agriculture in, 218; capital of, 266; ethnic distribution in, 131;

livestock in, 219; mining in, 205, 210,

211; representation of, in parliament,

263; urbanization rate in, 107 Northern Province, 98; age dependency

ratio in, 105; agriculture in, 217, 218;

capital of, 266; representation of, in parliament, 263; urbanization rate in, 107 North-West Province: agriculture in, 217;

capital of, 266; representation of, in parliament, 263

NP. See National Party Nsanwisi, Hudson, 128 Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South

Africa, 214

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968),

214, 355

nuclear power plants, 223, 224, 225

nuclear weapons, 214, 355-57 Nujoma, Sam, 360 NUM. See National Union of Mineworkers NUMSA. See National Union of Metal- workers of South Africa NUSAS. See National Union of South

514
Index

African Students Nyawuza dynasty, 1 20 Nzo, Alfred, 262, 305

OAU. See Organization of African Unity

Office of the Public Protector, 259, 395;

established, 272, 395

Official Secrets Act (No. 16) (1956), 57

oil (see also petroleum): deposits, 99; embargo on, 68, 81, 192, 350; exploration, 212; fields, 212; imports of, 180,

185, 190, 195, 212; from Iran, 68, 190,

192, 320, 322; processing of, 212, 322; production, 176; reserves, 212; supplies of, 68, 173; synthetic, 214, 227

Olifants River, 100 OPEC. See Organization of the Petro- leum Exporting Countries Operation Iron Fist, 79 Oppenheimer, Harry, 70 Orange Free State, 130, 255, 265; agri- culture in, 217; defeat of Lesotho by, 30; education in, 148; established, 1, 29; independence of, 30; political

organization of, 29; populations of, 30; relations of, with Republic of South Africa, 39; residence restric- tions of, 133; topography of, 95 Orange River, 94, 99 Orange River Colony: incorporated into

British Empire, 41 Orange River Sovereignty, 30 Orange Union. S^Oranje Unie

Orange Workers. See Oranjewerkers

Oranje Unie (Orange Union) party, 43

Oranjewerkers (Orange Workers), 289 Order of the Boer Nation, 388 Ordinance 50 (1828), 26; opposition to, 26 Organization of African Unity (OAU),

82; election observers from, 83, 275; exclusion from, 357; membership in, 305, 325; Pan-Africanist Congress rec- ognized by, 291; trade ban of, 192 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): embargo by, 68, 185, 192, 350

Organization of the Zulu. S^Inkatha ya kwa Zulu Ossewabrandwag (Oxwagon Sentinel)

paramilitary organization, 52

Ovambo people, 335, 344 Oxfam, 354 Oxwagon Sentinel. See Ossewabrandwag

paramilitary organization

PAC. See Pan-Africanist Congress

Pahad, Aziz, 262, 305

Pakistan: relations with, 305

Palestine: in World War I, 335

Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), 60-61,

291-92; activities of, 291; armed strug- gle of, lvi, lviii, 61-62, 65, 249, 291,

292; banned, lv, 61, 291; in elections,

lxii, 275, 292; foreign relations by, 305; formed, 60, 276, 282, 291; international recognition of, 291; in National Assembly, 275; platform of, lx, 291;

reaction of, to reforms, lx, 76, 83, 83-

84; reorganized, 292; unbanned, lix, 75, 292, 332

Pan-Africanist Students' Organisation

(PASO), 292

paramilitary organizations, 52, 382; inte- grated into armed forces, 257

parastatals, 176, 186, 189-90; administration of, 189; defense, 340, 352; electricity, 176, 222, 224; government

loans to, 189; industrial, 186, 225; pri- vate-sector participation in, 189; ser- vice, 186; shares in, 189-90; for

shipping, 231-32; steel, 222

Paris Club: loans from, 183 parliament (see also under individual

houses): bills in, 264; candidates for, 263; under constitution of 1993, 259, 263-64; dress code, 264; languages of, 264; members of, 263; separate houses

by race, lviii, 70, 71, 254; sessions of, 264; women in, 167 Parliamentary Committee on Intelli- gence Act (No. 40) (1994), 380 PASO. See Pan-Africanist Students'

Organisation

passes (identity papers): abolished, 56;

British institution of, 25

pass laws: abolished, 70; under apartheid, 56; arrests under, 57; under British, li, 4, 35, 42; enforcement of, 42, 69-70; in Kimberly, 35; protests

against, 60, 165, 166 pastoralism: of Khoikhoi, 6, 31; of

515
South Africa: A Country Study

Nguni, 113; of Voortrekkers, 29, 31 patron-client relationship: of Tswana,

126 peace committees, 80 Pedi language (sePedi, seSotho sa Leboa), 123; as official language, 109

Pedi people {see also Sotho people), 122, 123-24

Pedi state, 32; wars of, 36, 124

Peires, Jeffrey B., 119

penal code, 392-94 Penguin Islands, 360 People against Gangsterism and Drugs,

lxiv Peres, Shimon, 324

periodicals, 304

Perskor, 304

Peru: arms shipments to, 354 petroleum {see also oil), 212-14; imports

of, 212; pipelines, 229; processing of, 212; reserves, 212

Petronet, 229

PFP. See Progressive Federal Party Phatudi, Cedric, 124 Phosphate Development Corporation

(Foskor), 189, 227; privatization of, 190

Phuthaditjhaba, 125

Pietersburg, 266; military headquarters

in, 367

pipelines, 229, 235

Pirow, Oswald, 52

Plaatje, Solomon X, 46

platinum, 95, 98, 209-10; discovery of, 209; geographic distribution of, 209; production of, 205; reserves of, 209 Pokelajohn, 292

police, 164, 340, 382-388; and apartheid

reform, lviii, lxiv, 385, 396; attacks on,

lviii, 72; under British, 25; brutality, 384, 395; complicity in violence, 84, 395; ethnic distribution in, 25, 385; headquarters, 387; history of, 382-84;

intelligence, 380; materiel of, 385; military support for, lviii, 383; misconduct

by, lxiv, 386; municipal, 386; national, 386; number of personnel in, 384,

386; organization of, 387; powers of,

liv, 383-84; recruitment for, 386;

regional, 386; reorganization of, 386;

reserves, 384, 386; special constables, 384; spending on, 192; supplemental

duties of, 384; support by, for Inkatha Freedom Party, 82, 84, 389-91, 395;

training, 385, 387; unions, 387-88;

youth wing, 384

Police Act (No. 7) (1958), 383

Police Amendment Act (No. 70) (1965), 383

Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union

(Popcru) , 387

Police Reserve, 384

political crimes, 272

political demonstrations, 174; against

apartheid, lviii, 255, 276, 368; against

pass laws, 60

political elites, 297-301; Afrikaner, 297, 298, 301; black, 298, 299; evolving,

298; from labor, 298; white, 298

political harassment, 274

political parties (see also under individual

parties), 275-93; Afrikaner, 250, 288-

89; fourth force, 289; neo-Nazi, 250; reorientation of, 275; unbanned, lix, 275, 332

political reform, 69, 70, 332; coloureds under, 132; international pressure

for, 5; negotiations for, 5; opposition

to, 70, 72; reaction to, 75, 77

political repression, 4; of journalists, 301-2

political sanctions, 249, 350

political violence {see also violence), lxiv, 78, 81, 83, 177, 250; by African

National Congress, lvi, lviii, 395; among blacks, 74, 386; attempts to contain, 80, 368; deaths from, 72, 74, 391; in homelands, 72, 127, 128; by

Pan-Africanist Congress, lvi, lviii; police complicity in, 84, 395; and

press censorship, 301-2; by students,

146; in townships, 72, 368-69 Pondo (Mpondo) people, 117, 120 Popcru. See Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Liber- tacao de Angola—MPLA) , lvi-lvii, 359

population, 103-7; age distribution in, 105; density, 66, 104, 106, 265; distri- bution of, 106-7, 185; environmental impact of, 239; growth, 1, 15, 33, 63, 104-5, 239

population counts: of Africans, 44, 103;

516
Index

of Afrikaners, 129; of Asians, 44, 133; of Bantu speakers, 32; of Bophuthatswana, 104, 126, 346; of British, 133; of Cape Malays, 132; of Ciskei, 104, 347; of coloureds, 44, 131, 132; of Europeans, 14, 15, 133; of Greeks,

133; of Griqua, 131; in homelands, 63, 104; of Indians, 44, 133; ofJews, 133;

in Johannesburg, 34; of Khoikhoi, 7, 15, 32; of mixed-race people, 32; in 1980, 104; in 1989, 272; in 1991, 104;

in 1992, 104; in 1994, 104; in 1996,

lxiii; of Portuguese, 133; of slaves, 14, 15; in Sotho state, 24; in Union of South Africa, 44; in urban areas, 107; of whites, 31, 44, 63; Afrikaners, 129;

Asians, 104; blacks, 70, 104; Christians, 135; coloureds, 104; in poverty, 186;

whites, lvii, 70, 104 Population Registration Act (No. 30)

(1950), 55; repealed, lix, 79-80 population statistics: age dependency

ratio, 105; birth rate, 105; death rate, 105; fertility rate, 105; infant mortality

rate, 105; life expectancy, 105; sex

ratio, 105 Poqo (Blacks Only), 61, 291 port authority. See Portnet Port Elizabeth: airport at, 234; fishing

near, 222; manufacturing in, 223; mili- tary headquarters in, 367; naval instal- lation, 339; port of, 232, 233

Portnet (port authority) , 222, 229, 232

ports, 231-33; development of, 194; for- eign visits to, 373-75

Portugal: colonies of, 66-67; explorers

from, 10, 90; fishing rights of, 222; immigrants from, 133; traders from,

11; trade with, 19, 33

postal service, 235, 238; privatization of, 190; in Universal Postal Union, 238; upgraded, 238

Potchefstroom: military headquarters in, 367 Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education (see also Christian

College), 149

poverty, 200; among Afrikaners, lii, 47,

50; attempts to alleviate, 177; among

blacks, lxii, lii, 186, 203; in homelands,

66, 185; population in, 186 president (see also executive branch):

under constitutions, 259-61, 362-63;

election of, 259-61; as head of armed

forces, 362

president, state, 71; Botha as, 71; cabinet

of, 254; de Klerk as, lix, 74, 285; powers of, 254; term of, 254

President's Council, 254, 255

press (see also journalists; media; newspapers): censored, 301; suppression of, 301-2

Pretoria: climate in, 100; ethnic groups

in, 133; military headquarters in, 367

Pretoria Minute (August 1990), 256 Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging

(PWV; see also Gauteng) province, 292

Pretorius, Andries, 28

prices: government influence on, 186

Prince Edward Island, 94

Prior, Andrew, 293

prisoners: categories of, 392; children as, 392; ethnic distribution of, 391; liter- acy training for, 392; number of, 391; parole of, 392; political, 394; women

as, 392

prison sentences, 392-94; correctional

supervision, 392; death penalty, 393; whipping, 393-94

Prisons Service Reserve Force, 392

prison system, 391-92

private sector: participation in parastatals, 189

privatization, 178; under Botha, 190; debate over, 187; under Mandela, 190; opposition to, 190; revenues from, 190

professional class, 119 Programme of Action, 59

Progressive Federal Party (PFP) (see also Democratic Party), 70, 289; in elections, xlvii, 74; formed, 58

Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (No.

55) (1949), 55

property: right to own, 79

Protection of Information Act (1982), 302 Protestantism (see also under individual

denominations), 135; missionaries of, 24

Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol)

(1987), 238

provinces, 255

provincial councils, 255

PSA. See Public Service Association

517
South Africa: A Country Study

Publications Act (No. 42) (1974), 302

Publications Control Board, 302

Public Safety Act (No. 3) (1953), 57

Public Service Association (PSA) , 388

Public Service Commission, 259

Purified National Party, 50, 284 PWV. See Pretoria-WitwatersrandVereeniging

PX (parcel delivery), 229

Queenstown: manufacturing in, 224 QwaQwa homeland, 125, 265; gender

ratio in, 105; population of, 125; self- government for, 66, 254

racial discrimination. See discrimination radio, 237-38, 302-4; languages of

broadcast, 237-38; receivers, 302; sta- tions, 237, 303-4

Radio RSA, 238

Rajbansi, Amichand, 71 railroad authority. See Spoornet

railroads, 229-31; administration of, 229; commuter, 229-30; construction of, 194; electrification of, 229; freight, 230-31; luxury, 231; modernization

of, 230; private, 230; unification of, 229, 231 Ramaphosa, Cyril, 72, 300; as successor

to Mandela, 279 rand (currency). Sounder currency Rand, the. See Witwatersrand Randgold, 208

Rapport, 304 RDP. See Reconstruction and Develop- ment Programme

Reconstituted National Party (Herstigte

Nasionale Party—HNP), 68, 289; in

elections; platform of, 68 Reconstruction and Development Pro- gramme (RDP), 156, 177-80;

adopted, 178; environment under,

239; foreign contributions to, 324; housing under, 220; industry under,

211; priorities of, 178; spending on,

156, 178; taxes to support, 178-79 Record of Understanding (1992), 82,

257; protests against, 82

reference book (see also passes) , 56-57

refugees, 370; illegal, 360; internal, 164;

from mfecane, 24; from Mozambique,

163; number of, 164; repatriation of, 164,312-13

regional provincial councils, 255

religion (see also under individual sects), 135-46; and apartheid, 133, 135, 141-

44; and death, 138; historical back- ground, 136^11

religion, African, 136-38; beliefs, 144-

45; and education, 147; healing

dances of, 136 Rembrandt tobacco group, 242 Renamo. See Mozambican National

Resistance Representation of Natives Act (No. 12)

(1936), 51 Republic of South Africa: established, lv, 253 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act (No. 110) (1983). See constitution of 1984

Republic Unity Movement, 289 Reservation of Separate Amenities Act

(No. 49) (1953), 56, 188; repealed, lix, 78, 256

Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana. See Mozambican National Resistance

Restitution of Land Act (No. 22) (1994), 188-89

Retief, Piet, 28 Reunited National Party (HNP). See Herenigde (Reunited) National Party Reuters, 304 Rharhabe chiefdom, 119 Rhodes, Cecil: diamond mining by, 33; gold mining by, 34; invasion of South

African Republic by, 39; political activities of, 34, 39-40 Rhodesia (see also Southern Rhodesia), 357 Rhodes University, 154 Richards Bay: naval installation, 339;

port of, 232

Riekert Commission. See Commission of

Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the

Utilisation of Manpower

rivers, 99-100; pollution of, 102, 239

Rivonia trial, 61, 277

roads (see also Autonet), 233-34; construction of, 178; fatality rates on, 234; system of, 233; vehicles on, 233-34 Robben Island, 94

518
Index

Rolong kingdom, 18 Rolong people, 126; alliance of, with

Voortrekkers, 28; social system of, 10 Roman Catholic Church. See Catholic Church, Roman

Romania, 323

Roos, Tielman, 47

rural areas: education in, 148; electricity

in, 224; ethnic groups in, 133; health

care in, 156; manufacturing in, 224; telephones in, 237

Russian Federation: relations with, 305, 322

Russian Orthodox Church: members of, 135 Rwanda: arms shipments to, 354

SABC. See South African Broadcasting

Corporation

SABC Radio, 302 SABC Television, 302 SACP. See South African Communist

Party SACTU. See South African Congress of Trade Unions

SADF. See armed forces Safmarine. See South African Marine

Corporation

Sage Bank, 242

SAIC. See South African Indian Congress Saldanha Bay: fishing in, 222; port facili- ties at, 211, 232, 233; rail facilities at, 211

Salisbury Island: naval base, 373

Samcor. See South African Motor Corporation SANAC. See South African Native Affairs Commission

Sand River Convention (1852), 30 sangoma (diviner), 137, 144 Sanlam. See South African National Life Assurance Company

San people {see also Khoisan people), 5-

7, 125; diet of, 134; economy of, 134; family structure of, 6; geographic dis- tribution of, 7, 134; labor by, 16; occu- pations of, 6; origins of, 89; religion

of, 136-37; social organization of, 134

Sansco. See South African National Stu- dent Congress Santarn. See South African National Trust

Company

SAP. See South African Party Sappi paper manufacturing, 220 SAPU. See South African Police Union

Sarowiwa, Ken, 315 SASO. See South African Students'

Organisation SASOL. See South African Coal, Oil, and

Gas Corporation

Sasolburg oil refinery, 322

SASS. See South African Secret Service

Satour. See South African Tourism Board

Sauer, Paul, 54

Savimbi, Jonas, 314

schools: under apartheid, 146; denominational, 56, 148; destruction of, 152;

district, 148; enrollment in, 154; European, 147-48; government, 154; inte- gration of, 154; mission, 146, 148, 149; number of, 154; private, 154; reli- gious, 150; secondary, 148; segregation of, liv, 56, 148-49; teachenpupil

ratios in, 153; technical, 155; ward,

148 Seaward Defence Force, 338

Sebe, Lennox, 347; ousted, 347

secret societies, 48

security concerns. See internal security

security legislation, 57

Sedibe, Jackie, 348-49

segregation: under apartheid, liv, 55-57;

in closed compounds, 35; of courts,

35; of land, 45, 51; origins of, 90-91; of schools, liv, 56; signs for, 56; unequal resources in, 56-57 Sekhukhune, 32

Sekwati, 124 Seme, Pixley Ka Isaka, 46, 276

Senate: under constitution of 1993, 259,

263; members of, 263-64 Sending Kerk. See Dutch Reformed Mission Church

Senzangakona, 21 Separate Amenities Act. See Reservation

of Separate Amenities Act

Separate Representation of Voters Act

(No. 46) (1951), 55-56 Separate Representation of Voters Amendment Act (No. 30) (1956), 56

sePedi. See Pedi language

Serfontein, Hennie, 294

services sector: employment in, 199;

519
South Africa: A Country Study

growth of, 180; parastatals in, 186; as percentage of gross domestic product, 180

seSotho. SeeSotho language

seSotho sa Leboa. See Pedi language

settler society: origins of, 13-18

seTswana. SeeTswana language Seventh Day Adventist Church: members

of, 135; schools run by, 56 Shaka Zulu, 3, 20, 114-15, 333; assassina- tion of, 23; career of, 20-23; as chief, 20, 21; life of, 20-21; military strate- gies of, 21, 115, 333; relationship of, with Dingiswayo, 21; wars of, 21-22,

115 Shangaan people, 127, 128; geographic

distribution of, 127; homeland of, 128; population of, 111

Sharpeville massacre, lv, 276

sheep, 6, 9, 31, 134, 215, 219; number of, 219

shipping, 231-33 Shona people: ruled by Cecil Rhodes, 34 Shoshangane, 21 Sigcau, Botha, 300

Sigcau, Stella, 300

silver: production of, 205 Simonstown: naval base, 373; port of, 233

Singapore: relations with, 324

Sisulu, Walter, 58, 59, 276, 281; arrested,

60, 61; imprisoned, 61, 277; released from prison, 256, 332

siSwati. SeeSwzui language

Slachter's Nek Rebellion (1815), 25

slavery, 135; end of, 25, 26; initiation of, 12-13, 174

slaves, 16; freedom for, 1, 139; importation of, 3, 11-13; population of, 14,

15; reliance on, 15, 24; and religion, 139; sources of, 12-13; treatment of, 25

Slovo, Joe, 167, 278, 280, 282; career of, 282-83; as minister of housing, 283; philosophy of, 283; in transition, lx Smith, Harry, 30; recalled, 30-31

Smith, Ian, 66-67, 309; support for, 357

Smuts, Jan C, 43, 284; as deputy prime

minister, 50; as defense minister, 334; education under, 149; as prime minister, 48, 52 Smuts government: parastatals under,

187; strikes under, 48

Sobhuza, 23 SobhuzaII,Kingll7

Sobukwe, Robert, 60, 292; death of, 61; imprisoned, 61 Sobukwe Forum, 292 SOCCER. See Sports Organisation for

Collective Contributions and Equal

Rights

Social Democratic Federation, 280

Soekor. See Southern Oil Exploration

Corporation Sofasonke ("We shall all die together")

Party, 53 Solomon ka Kinuzulu, King, 286 sorghum, 118, 217

Soshangane, 128 Sotho languages, 111, 125; as official lan- guage, 109 Sotho people (BaSotho), 122-27; ancestors of, 90; customs of, 129; education

for, 155; ethnic identity of, 23; families

of, 123; geographic distribution of, 111, 122; occupations of, 123; popula- tion of, 111, 122, 124; resistance

against British, 30; and San people,

125; Southern, 124-25 Sotho state, 23-24; origins of, 23; population of, 24; refugees in, 23; wars of, 36 Sotho-Tswana people, 125-27; ancestors

of, 122; geographic distribution of, 10; migrations of, 122; occupations of, 122; political system of, 122-23; social system of, 10, 122 South Africa Act (1909), 253 South African Agricultural Union, 189 South African Airways, 190, 229, 234-35;

administration of, 234; fleet, 234; ser- vice, 235 South African Army Women's College, 348 South African Aviation Corps. See air force South African Broadcasting Corporation

(SABC), 237, 302; board, 302-3; reor- ganization of, 237 South African Cape Corps, 345 South African Catholic Defence League,

143 South African Central Statistical Service, 105 South African Chamber of Mines, 159-

520
Index

60, 207

South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation (SASOL), 189, 223; govern- ment investment in, 227; imports by, 226; stock offerings of, 190; and synthetic fuels, 214, 227 South African College (see also University of Cape Town) , 1 49 South African Communist Party (SACP),

liv, 82, 202, 276, 277, 280-83; armed

struggle of, 249; cooperation of, with African National Congress, 278, 280, 282, 299; founded, 280; members,

282; in National Assembly, 280, 283;

racial distribution in, 280; support for, 283; unbanned, lix, 75, 282, 332 South African Confederation of Labour, 296 South African Congress of Trade Unions

(SACTU),59, 296 South African Council of Churches, 144 South African Defence Forces (SADF).

See armed forces South African Employers' Consultative Committee on Labour Affairs, 296 South African Human Rights Committee, 395 South African Indian Congress (SAIC),

59; in Congress of the People, 59 South African Indian Council, 254 South African Institute of Medical

Research, 159 South African Institute of Race Relations, 104, 391 South African Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor), 49, 189, 225; privatization

of, 190; stock offering of, 189-90, 225 South African Marine Corporation (Saf- marine), 231-32 South African Media Council, 293 South African Medical and Dental Council, 161 South African Medical Service, 336, 375-

76; organization of, 376; retrench- ment of, 376; veterinary services of, 376 South African Medical Service College, 376 South African Medical Service Nursing

College, 376 South African Medical Service Training

Centre, 376

South African Military College, 365 South African Military Nursing Service, 348 South African Motor Corporation (Samcor),226 South African National Defence Force.

See armed forces South African National Life Assurance Company (Sanlam), 47, 50, 242, 284 South African National Student Congress (Sansco), 295 South African National Trust Company

(Santam) , 47, 50 South African National Tuberculosis

Association, 157 South African Native Affairs Commission

(SANAC),42

South African Native College at Fort Hare {see also University of Fort Hare)

,

154, 155 South African Native Convention

(1909), 45 South African Native National Congress

(see also African National Congress):

formed, 45,276

South African Naval College, 373 South African Naval Staff College, 373 South African Nursing Council, 161 South African Party (SAP), 43, 284; merged with National Party, 50, 284 South African Police. See police South African Police Service. See police South African Police Union (SAPU), 387

South African Politics (Thompson and

Prior), 293 South African Press Association, 304

South African Press Council, 301 South African Rail Commuter Corporation, 230 South African Railways and Harbours

Administration, 228, 234 South African Red Cross, 161 South African Republic (Zuid Afrikaan- sche Republiek) , 29; annexed by the

British, 38, 130; established, 29; inde- pendence of, 30; political organiza- tion of, 29; populations of, 30;

relations of, with Germany, 39; rela- tions of, with Orange Free State, 39; Rhodes's invasion of, 39; suffrage in, 38-39, 40 South African Reserve Bank, 241; direc521
South Africa: A Country Study

tors of, 241; functions of, 241; and

gold-mining industry, 241; policies of, 241 South African Secret Service (SASS),

380, 381 South African Students' Organisation

(SASO), 63-64; banned, 65; established, 63; platform of, 63-64 South African Tourism Board (Satour)

,

240 South African Transport Services (see

also Transnet) , 228 South African War (1899-1902), li, 40-

41, 43, 90, 333; consequences of, 130,

149; origins of, 124 South African Welfare Council, 162 South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation

Zone, 326 Southern African Customs Union, 196,

307, 309, 311 Southern African Development Community: members of, 306; membership

in, 305, 306, 326 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, 326 Southern Namib Desert, 98 Southern Oil Exploration Corporation

(Soekor), 189, 212 Southern Rhodesia (see also Rhodesia; Zimbabwe) , 67, 358; independence of, 309, 357; relations with, 309 South-West Africa (see also Namibia):

apartheid in, 310; invasion of, 334,

337, 358-59; South African control of, 67, 310, 335, 357; war in, 338 South-West Africa People's Organisation

(SWAPO), 67, 70, 311, 344, 357, 359, 360 South-West Africa Territorial Force, 343, 344; number of personnel in, 344;

organization of, 344 Soutpansberg Mountains, 98

Soviet Union (see also Russian Federation): materiel from, 277, 360; rela- tions of, with De Beers, 209, 322;

relations with, 322; trade with, 195

Sowetan, The, 304 Soweto: pollution in, 103; uprising

(1976), lvii, 64-65, 150-52

Spain: arms shipments to, 354; fishing

rights of, 222 Spear of the Nation. See Umkhonto we

Sizwe

Special Forces, 343; ethnic distribution

in, 3 44-45; missions of, 343-45; organization of, 343, 344, 345 Spoornet (railroad authority) , 229

Sports Organisation for Collective Contributions and Equal Rights (SOCCER), 292

squatter communities, xlviii, li, 53, 103-

4, 279; attempts to eliminate, 62; eth- nic distribution in, 107; security

sweeps in, 389

Stals, Chris, 244

Standard Bank of South Africa, 242

Star, The, 304

state of emergency: of 1985, lviii, 73; of

1994, 84

State Security Council, 340-41; members

of, 341; organization of, 341; role of, 341; secretariat, 341; work committee,

341

Status of Union Act (1934), 253

Statute of Westminster (1931), 253

steel industry, 176, 211, 222, 226; production, 225

Stellenbosch: agriculture in, 15

strikes, 65-66, 202; by blacks, 72, 200,

202; costs of, 203; deaths in, 202; by

miners, 48, 53, 72, 337; by students,

64, 146; suppression of, 334, 337

structural adjustment program, 194

Strydom, J.G.: as prime minister, 58

Strypoortberg mountain range, 98

student associations (see also South Afri- can Students' Organisation), 64;

strikes of, 64

students: percentage of black, 155; segre- gation of, 154-55; strikes by, 64, 146

Subcouncil on Defence, 368

subsidies: for agriculture, 176, 187; for bread, 228

suffrage. See voting

sugar, 29, 31,91, 218; export of, 215 Sunday Times, 304 Suppression of Communism Act (No.

44) (1950), liv, 57 Supreme Court, 259; decisions of, 55;

divisions of, 270; judges in, 270 Sun City, 1 27 SWAPO. See South-West Africa People's

Organisation

Swartberg Mountains, 99

522
Index

Swaziland: background of, 23, 117; inde- pendence of, 67, 117; judges in, 309; and KaNgwane, 117; language in, 111; police training in, 385; population of, 116; rail service, 231; relations with, 308-9, 358; in Southern African Cus- toms Union, 196, 307, 309; in South- ern African Development Community,

306; trade with, 307; transportation

links with, 307; workers from, 204-5

Swazi language (siSwati), 111; speakers

of, 112-13

Swazi people, 111, 116-17; ancestors of, 90; geographic distribution of, 111; migrations of, 117; population of, 116

Swazi state, 23-24, 32-33; origins of, 23;

social system of, 117 Sweden: relations with, 324 Swellendam: agriculture in, 15; social organization of, 15

Switzerland: trade with, 195

Table Bay: Dutch supply station in, 11-

12; economy of, 15; expansion of community at, 13-14; social organization

of, 15 Taiwan. See China, Republic of

Tamil, 1 33 Tambo, Oliver, liv, 58, 59, 276; arrested,

60; exiled, lvi, 61 Tanzania, 355; airlines, 235; in Southern

African Development Community, 306

Tau, 18 Taung people, 18

taxes: base, 191; corporate, 191; excise, 191, 192; on gold mines, 191; on

imports, 176, 191, 192, 194; imposed

by British, 1, 30, 42, 126; income, 192;

to support Reconstruction and Devel- opment Programme, 178; value-added (VAT), 191

teachers: importation of, 149; numbers

of, 154; ratios of, to students, 153;

rural, 148; salaries of, 154; shortages

of, 146; training of, 155 TEC. See Transitional Executive Council

technikons (technical schools), 155 telecommunications, 235-38, 301-4;

data transmission, 237; employment

in, 237; privatization of, 190 telephones: under apartheid, 236-37;

cellular, 236, 237; number of, 236; in rural areas, 237; service, 236-37; sys- tem, 236

television, 237, 302-4; in homelands,

237; languages of broadcast, 237; sets, 302; stations, 303-4 Telkom, 190, 235-36; earnings, 235; ser- vices, 235 Tembu National Church, 37

Terreblanche, Eugene, lxi, 391 terrorism: against apartheid, 61, 70; crackdown on, 70; by whites, 388

Thailand: relations with, 324 Thembu people, 112, 117, 119-20, 299;

royal clan of, 120; and Xhosa, 119-20 Thompson, Leonard, 293 Thonga people, 127

Threads ofSolidarity: Women in South Afri- can Industry, 1900-1980 (Berger) , 165

Tile, Nehemiah, 37 Times Media, 304

titanium, 210 Tlhaping people, 18, 126

tobacco, 118, 242; exports of, 196, 215;

taxes on, 191, 192 Tomlinson Commission, 55 Tonga people, 127

topography, 95-98

Total Onslaught, 131, 340, 358

Total Strategy, 131, 340, 358, 380; imple- mentation of, 341 tourism, 197, 240-41; attractions, 240; investment in, 197; number of visitors, 240

townships: crackdown on, 79; ethnic dis- tribution in, 107, 109, 128; security sweeps in, 389; tribal designations for, 109; violence in, lviii, 72, 368-69

trade {see also exports; imports), 192-96; with African countries, 196, 306-7,

307-8, 311, 313-14, 361; by Africans,

33; with Arabs, 33; by Bantu speakers,

9; balance, 195; with Britain, 195; and

copyright infringement, 319; dependence on, 193-94; employment in, 199; with Europeans, 19, 33, 195, 196; with Germany, 195; with Italy, 195; in

ivory, 19, 29, 174; withJapan, 195, 210; by Khoikhoi, 7, 11, 174; routes, 11; sanctions, 192, 350; solicitation of, 179; with Soviet Union, 195; with Swit- zerland, 195; with United States, 195,

523
South Africa: A Country Study

196, 210, 316, 318, 320; of Voortrekkers, 29

trade unions. See labor unions

Transitional Executive Council (TEC),

82, 249, 257, 257; armed forces under,

368; installation of, 83 Trans-Karoo Train, 231 Transkei homeland, 62, 119, 265; armed

forces of, 346, 347, 363; border with, 360; coup in, 347; economy of, 181; independence for, 62, 66, 107-9, 254; population of, 104; transition of, from

apartheid, 80

Trans-Natal Train, 231 Transnet, 228-29; airlines under, 234;

divisions of, 229

Trans-Oranj Train, 231 Transport and General Workers' Union,

202

transportation, 173, 228-35; airports, 234; boycotts of, 60; contribution of, to economy, 180; by commuters, 229-

30, 233-34; links with southern Africa, 307, 361; motor vehicles, 226, 233-34;

ports, 194, 231-33; privatization of, 190; roads, 233-34; subsidies, 179; ura- nium for, 356

Transvaal, 1; agriculture in, 217; education in, 148; incorporated into British Empire, 41; malaria in, 158; mining

in, 205, 209, 211

Transvaal Province, 255, 265

Treaty of Amiens (1802) , 18 Trekboers (see also Boers) , 14-18; discon- tents of, 17; expansion by, 17, 175; labor practices of, 25; social organization of, 16-17; wars of, with Africans,

15, 17, 115

Trekkers. S&eVoortrekkers

Treurnicht, Andries, 64, 70, 75, 285

tribe, 107, 109

Trust Bank, 242 Truth and Reconciliation Commission,

272, 396-97; criticisms of, 396-97; tes- timony to, lxiv Tshawe dynasty, 119

tshiVenda. SeeVenda. language

Tsonga language (xiTsonga) , 1 28; as offi- cial language, 111 Tsonga people, 127-28; ancestors of, 127; education for, 155; geographic

distribution of, 127; homeland of, 128;

occupations of, 127; population of, 111, 127; social structure of, 127; sub- groups of, 127; under Zulu, 127-28 Tsonga-Shangaan language group, 111, 128 Tswana language (seTswana), 126; as

official language, 111 Tswana people (BaTswana) (see also Sotho-Tswana people), 122, 125-27;

culture of, 126; education for, 155; geographic distribution of, 126, 127;

legal system of, 126; population of, 111, 126; social system of, 126; wars of, 36, 126

tuberculosis, 156-57; among blacks, 156-57; deaths from, 157, 160; intro- duction of, 156; rate of infection, 156-

57, 160; spread of, 156 Tugela River, 100

Tunisia: relations with, 324

Tutu, Desmond, lxiv, 72, 144, 396

UDE See United Democratic Front Uganda: airlines, 235 Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the

Nation; Umkhonto; MK), 61, 277, 307; integration of, into armed forces, 363,

365, 367, 368-69; women in, 348 Umzimvubu River, 100 unemployment, xlviii, 146-47, 199, 200, 204 UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Uniao Nacional para a Independencia

Total de Angola. See National Union

for the Total Independence of Angola

Union Defence Force, 334; conscription

in, 335; established, 334; number of personnel in, 334, 335; organization

of, 334 Union of South Africa, 130, 253; estab- lished, li, 43-44, 253; government

style of, 44; population of, 44 Union Steel (Usco), 225 UNITA. ^National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

United Arab Emirates: arms shipments

to, 354 United Bank, 242 United Democratic Front (UDF), 72, 293, 294-95; affiliates of, 295; banned,

524
Index

74, 295; disbanded, 295; members of, 72, 295; platform of, 72, 294; unbanned, lix, 75, 295, 332 United Nations, 82; administration of Namibia, 310; African National Congress in, 277; arms embargo by, lvi, 68, 192, 325, 350-51, 353; election observers from, 275; membership in, 305,

325; opposition of, to apartheid, lvi, 68; Pan-Africanist Congress recognized by, 291; peacekeeping missions,

306; sanctions, 81, 192, 350 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 79, 164, 307 United Nations Human Rights Commission, 394 United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) , 83, 325 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ),312

United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), 310-11 United Party, 74, 284 United Press International, 304 United South African Party (UP), 50; in

elections, 53-54, 58; platform of, 54

United South Africa National Party, 284 United States: constructive engagement

of, 317; de Klerk's visit to, 77; invest- ment from, 197, 320; missionaries

from, 139; naval visit to South Africa, 375; relations with, 316-20; sanctions

by, 73, 80, 192, 193, 316, 350; tensions with, 318-20; trade with, 195, 196, 210,316, 320,354

United States Bureau of the Census, 104 United States Committee on Refugees, 164 United States Comprehensive Antiapart- heid Act (1986), 192, 318; conditions

of, 77-78, 318; sanctions of, lifted, 80 United States Export-Import Bank: prohibition on loans from, 192 United States Intelligence Authorization Act (1987), 318 United States-South Africa Binational Commission, 320 United Workers' Union of South Africa, 202, 296

Universal Postal Union, 238

universities: administration of, 155-56; under apartheid, 154; black, 154-55;

coloured, 154-55; desegregation of, 155; enrollment in, 155; faculty and

staff of, 155, 297; Indian, 154-55; inte- grated, 154; religious, 149; segregation of, 56, 149, 154-55; strikes in, 64; types of, 155; white, 154

University of Cape Town {see also South

African College), 149, 154, 156

University of Fort Hare, 155

University of Natal, 154

University of the North, 155

University of the Orange Free State {see

also Grey College), 149

University of the Witwatersrand, 154, 156 UNOMOZ. See United Nations Operation in Mozambique

UNOMSA. See United Nations Observer

Mission in South Africa UNTAG. See United Nations Transitional

Assistance Group

Upington: airport at, 234

uranium, 212, 355; exports of, 214, 323; highly enriched, 214; mines, 214;

prices, 214; production of, 205, 213-

14, 214; reserves, 213, 225 urban areas: blacks in, lvii, 63, 66, 109,

123, 166; ethnic distribution in, 107; growth of, 176; manufacturing in, 223-24; population in, 107; whites in, 63, 109; workers in, 166 Urban Foundation, 107, 265

urbanization, 53; rates of, 107 urban migration, xlviii Uruguay: joint military exercises with, 375

Usco. See Union Steel

Vaal River, 99 Vambo (Ovambo) people, 335, 344 vanadium: deposits, 210; exports, 211;

prices, 211; production of, 205, 211;

reserves, 21

Vance, Cyrus, 390, 394

van den Bergh, HendrikJ. (H.J.), 62, 69

Vanderbijl Engineering (Vecor), 225 van Riebeeckjan, 11, 138-39

van zyl Slabbert, Frederik, 70 VAT. See tax, value-added VaVenda. See Venda people

Vecor. See Vanderbijl Engineering

525
South Africa: A Country Study

Venda chiefdoms, 18 Venda homeland, 265, 347-48; armed

forces of, 346, 347-48, 363; border

with, 360; economy of, 129, 181; inde- pendence for, 66, 107-9, 254, 347; malaria in, 158; migrant remittances

to, 129; population of, 104; transition

of, from apartheid, 80 Venda language (luVenda, tshiVenda),

111, 128; as official language, 111 Venda people (VaVenda), 128-29; cul- ture of, 128, 129; education for, 155; population of, 111, 128; religion of, 129; social system of, 129

Venetia: diamonds in, 209 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie. See Dutch East India Company

Verwoerd, Hendrik R, 150; assassination

of, 62; as minister of native affairs, 56;

as prime minister, liv, 58, 150

Victoria Falls Power Company, 224

Viljoen, Constand, 288-89 violence, lxiv, 388-91; community

response to, lxiv, 388-89; government

response to, 389-91; patterns of, 388;

state-sponsored, 389-91, 395; against women, 395-96 VOC. See Dutch East India Company

Volkskas (People's Bank), 50, 242, 284

Volkstaat Council, 264-65

Volkstaat Council Act (No. 30) (1994), 264

Voortrekker Monument, 51 Voortrekker republics, 1, 28-29; blacks

in, 32; incorporated into British Empire, 41; occupations in, 29; populations of, 30, 31 Voortrekkers ("Trekkers"), 1; alliances of, with Africans, 28; conflicts of, with

Africans, 27-28, 30, 120, 124; geo- graphic distribution of, 27; occupations of, 31; taxes imposed on, 30; Zulu massacre of, 28 Voortrekkers (scouting organization), 284

Vorster, John, 53, 62; as prime minister,

62, 68

Vorster government, 68-69; scandal in, 69

voters: education of, 274; eligible, li-lii, 274; harassment of, 274; number of

registered, 272; turnout of, xlvii

voting: by coloureds, 55, 132; pressure to expand, 68; restrictions on, 51, 55,

272; in South African Republic, 38-39,

40; by women, 49

Wage Act (1925), 49

wages: adjustment of, 245; of agricultural

workers, 91; of blacks, xlviii, 65, 127, 129, 174, 199, 202; of men, 154; of

miners, 207; of whites, xlviii, 199; of women, 154, 166

Walvis Bay, 360; administration of, 311, 371 War of Independence, First, 38 War of Independence, Second, 43

wars, 332-34; of Africans and British, 25, 26, 30; of Africans and Dutch, 12, 13, 17, 27-28; of mfecane, 24; weapons in, 333 Washington, Booker T., 45

Washington Star, 69

water: distribution, lxiii, 178, 306, 311;

pollution, 102, 239; shortages, 99, 101, 333; use, 101 Waterberg mountain range, 98 Wegener, Alfred, 94

welfare, 162-64; for the aged, 162-63; demand for, lxiii; for the disabled,

162-63; food programs, 186; improve- ments in, 178; pensions, 162-63; for

refugees, 163-64 Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society, 139 Western Cape province: agriculture in, 217, 218; capital of, 266; elections in, 268; ethnic distribution in, 107, 131; manufacturing in, 226; mining in, 205, 211; representation of, in parlia- ment, 263; urbanization rate in, 107 West Germany. See Germany, Federal

Republic of wheat: imports of, 217; production of, 31,176,217

White Liberation Army, 388 White People's Front, 388 White Protection Movement (Blanke

Bevrydingsbeweging—BBB), 289 White Republican Army, 388

whites (see also Afrikaners; British): birth rate of, 105; classification of, liii, 55; death rate of, 105; and disease, 158-

526
Index

59; divisions among, 68-71; employ- ment of, 199; farming by, 175-76, 215; land of, 175, 189; life expectancy of, 105; living standards of, 91, 177;

migration of, to South Africa, 1, 3, 63; opposed to apartheid, 61; as percent- age of population, lvii, 70, 104; in police force, 385; political affiliations

of, 59, 280; in political elite, 297, 298;

political representation for, lviii, 71, 254; politics of, 57-58; population of, 31, 44, 63; population growth of, 105; privileges for, 175; religion of, 135; segregation of, 55-56, 63; terrorism

by, 388; voting by, xlvii; wages of, xlviii, 199 White Wolves, 388 White Workers' Protection Association (Blankewerkersbeskermingsbond)

,

296

Who's Who in South African Politics (Gastrow), 298 Wiehahn, Nicolas, 296 Wiehahn Commission, 69, 200, 296

wine: grapes for, 14, 15, 31, 91, 218; pro- duction of, 31, 218, 222 wine country, 240 Witsenberg Mountains, 98

Witwatersrand ("the Rand"): gold in, 34, 207; mining in, 205, 209, 212; topogra- phy of, 95 Wolfson, Tony, 102 Wolton, Douglas, 281 Wolton, Molly, 281 women, 164-67; Afrikaner, 166; and

apartheid, 56, 165-66; in armed

forces, 336, 337, 348-49, 371, 373; in cabinet, 262; discrimination against,

56; employment of, 166, 204; as house- hold heads, 147; influence of, 165; life expectancy of, 105; Nguni, 147; in politics, 167; as prisoners, 392; rights of, 167, 278; San, 6; status of, 6, 164-65;

violence against, 395-96; voting by, 49; wages of, 154, 166; Zulu, 113 Women's Auxiliary Air Force, 337 Women's Auxiliary Army Service, 348 Women's Defence of the Constitution League {see also Black Sash) , 165-66 Women's Rights Peace Party, 292

wool: exports of, 33, 215, 219; production of, 31

workers (see also labor): African, 65, 115, 123, 147, 176, 199, 280-81; agricultural, 91; domestic, 199, 203; foreign,

163-64, 204-5; illegal, 164; indentured, 29, 42; rights of, 203; training

for, 204; treatment of, 25, 176; urban,

166; white, 280-81

Worker's List Party, 292 work force (see also labor) , 198-99; Sotho

in, 123; women in, 166, 204; Zulu in, 115 World Tourism Organization, 240-41 World War I, 46-48, 334-35, 349; casualties in, 335; opposition to, 46-47 World War II, liii, 52-53, 281, 335, 337,

337, 339, 349, 383; casualties in, 335, 338

Worrall, Dennis, 289

Xhosa lands: annexed by British, 30 Xhosa language (isiXhosa): grammar

book for, 119; as official language,

109; speakers of, 112-13, 118, 119-20 Xhosa people (amaXhosa), 17, 18, 111-

12, 117-20; ancestors of, 118; destruction of, 30-31; economy of, 118; edu- cation of, 148, 155; geographic

distribution of, 126; homelands for, 119; languages of, 118; livestock of, 219, 333; marriage of, 140-41; migrations of, 118, 332; origins of, 90; politi- cal organization of, 118-19;

population of, 117; in professional

class, 119; religion of, 119, 137; rulers

of, 119; social system of, 10, 118; sub- groups of, 18, 117-18; and Thembu

people, 119-20; wars of, with Boers,

17, 129-30; wars of, with British, 25,

27, 30, 36; witch hunts by, 140 Ximoko Progressive Party, 292

xiTsonga. S^Tsonga language

Xuma, Alfred, 59

You, 304

Yugoslav republics: arms shipments to, 354

Zaire: arms shipments to, 354; military

cooperation with, 375; police training

527
South Africa: A Country Study

in, 385; rail service, 231 Zambia, 355; intervention in, 359; rail service, 231; relations with, 313-14,

358, 361; in Southern African Devel- opment Community, 306; trade with,

196, 307, 313-14; transportation links with, 307 ZANU-PF. See Zimbabwe African

National Union-Patriotic Front Zimbabwe {see also Southern Rhodesia),

309-10; border with, 360; ethnic

groups in, 122, 127; independence of,

lvii, 309; invasion of, 67, 343, 359; lan- guage in, 111; police training assis- tance from, 387; relations with, 309; in Southern African Development Community, 306; trade with, 196, 310;

transportation cooperation with, 231 Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) , 67

zinc, 210 Zion Christian Church, 144-45; and

apartheid, 145; established, 144; members of, 144; theology of, 144-45

zirconium, 210 Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek. See South

African Republic Zulu consciousness, 21-22; under apartheid reform, 78 Zulu Kingdom, 116

Zululand, 115 Zululand Planters' Union, 115 Zulu language (isiZulu), 128; as official language, 109; speakers of, 112-13 Zulu people (amaZulu), 111, 113-16, 299-300; age-groups of, 333; armed

uprising by, 42, 115; autonomy for, 288; geographic distribution of, 127;

livestock of, 219; military operations

of, 114, 333, 334; origins of, 18, 90;

political affiliations of, 116; population of, 113; religion of, 137-38; social system of, 10, 113; values of, 116; in work force, 115 Zulu state, 32; cleavage of, 28; decline of, 115; expansion of, 22, 90, 114-15, 127-28; migration of, 90; political

organization of, 21, 114; under Shaka,

20-23; wars of, 22, 36, 115, 130, 333 Zulu Washermen's Guild (Amawasha),

115 Zuma, Jacob, 300 Zuma, Nkosazana, 1 62 Zwangendaba, 21 Zwide, 20

528
Contributors

Rita M. Byrnes is Senior Analyst, African Studies, Federal

Research Division, Library of Congress.

Nancy L. Clark is Associate Professor of History, California

Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, California.

Joshua Sinai is Senior Analyst, International and Security Studies, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Joseph P. Smaldone is Chief, Weapons and Technology Control

Division, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

and adjunct professor, Georgetown University and University of Maryland.

Robert Thornton is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Anthropology, University of the Witwatersrand,

Johannesburg, South Africa.

William H. Worger is Associate Professor of History, University

of California, Los Angeles.

529

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-36 Dominican Republic

550-98 Albania and Haiti 550-44 Algeria 550-52 Ecuador

550-59 Angola 550-43 Egypt

550-73 Argentina 550-150 El Salvador

550-111 Armenia, Azerbaijan, 550-113 Estonia, Latvia, and

and Georgia Lithuania

550-169 Australia 550-28 Ethiopia

550-176 Austria 550-167 Finland

550-175 Bangladesh 550-173 Germany

550-112 Belarus and Moldova 550-153 Ghana

550-170 Belgium 550-87 Greece

550-66 Bolivia 550-78 Guatemala

550-20 Brazil 550-174 Guinea

550-168 Bulgaria 550-82 Guyana and Belize

550-61 Burma 550-151 Honduras

550-50 Cambodia 550-165 Hungary

550-166 Cameroon 550-21 India

550-159 Chad 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-77 Chile 550-39 Indonesia

550-60 China 550-68 Iran 550-26 Colombia 550-31 Iraq

550-33 Commonwealth Carib- 550-25 Israel bean, Islands of the 550-182 Italy

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550-90 Costa Rica 550-34 Jordan

550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory 550-114 Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,

Coast) Tajikistan, Turkmeni550-152 Cuba stan, and Uzbekistan

550-22 Cyprus 550-56 Kenya

550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-81 Korea, North

531
550-41 Korea, South 550-37 Rwanda and Burundi

550-58 Laos 550-51 Saudi Arabia

C CA O A 550-24 Lebanon 550-70 Senegal

CCA OO 550-38 Liberia CCA 1 OA 550-180 Sierra Leone

550-85 Libya 550-184 Singapore

550-172 Malawi 550-86 Somalia

550-45 Malaysia 550-93 South Africa

C CA 1 /T1 550-161 Mauritania 550-95 Soviet Union

C CA HC\ Mexico cca nn Spam

C CA T/T 550-76 Mongolia CCA C\C 550-96 Sri Lanka

550-49 Morocco 550-27 Sudan

550-64 Mozambique 550-47 Syria

C CA 1 C 550-35 Nepal and Bhutan C CA /CO 550-62 Tanzania

C CA O O 550-88 Nicaragua C CA CO 550-53 Thailand

CCA 1 CT jjO-IS / Nigeria c ca on jjO-89 Tunisia

550-94 Oceania 550-80 Turkey

550-48 Pakistan 550-74 Uganda

C CA A a Panama C CA A*7 550-97 Uruguay

jjU— I jo Paraguay jjU— /

1

Venezuela

C CA 1 O C 550-185 Persian uuli States CCA O^ 550-32 Vietnam

550^2 Peru 550-183 Yemens, The

550-72 Philippines 550-99 Yugoslavia

550-162 Poland 550-67 Zaire

550-181 Portugal 550-75 Zambia

550-160 Romania 550-171 Zimbabwe

532





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