JULY 2012

 The Human Toll of Reconstruction or

Stabilization during Iraqi Freedom

SIGIR Special Report Number 2:

Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

SIGIR SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 2 

THE HUMAN TOLL OF RECONSTRUCTION OR STABILIZATION 

OPERATIONS DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Special Report, July 27, 2012 
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 1

Reconstruction or Stabilization Casualties 3

Deaths 3

Wounded 5

Kidnappings 5

Military Deaths 6

Civilian Deaths 9

United States Civilians 9

Third-country Nationals 9

Iraqi Civilians 10

Civilians Whose Nationality Is Unknown 10

Lessons for Consideration 11

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 12

Sources 14

Appendix B—Management Comments 18

Appendix C—Acronyms 20

Appendix D—Report Team Members 21
1 

Introduction 

This report is dedicated to the memory of Paul Converse, a SIGIR auditor who died on March 

24, 2008, after being wounded during an indirect fire attack in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Five 

other SIGIR employees were wounded while working in the Green Zone during 2007. 

Since its creation by the Congress in November 2003, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction (SIGIR) has produced about 400 reports, including audits, inspections, lessons 

learned studies, and Quarterly Reports to the Congress. Collectively, these reports comprise a 

comprehensive account of what the American taxpayers received for the approximately $60 

billion the Congress made available for the reconstruction or stabilization of Iraq. None of 

SIGIR’s previous reports focused on the human cost of the multitudinous efforts to rebuild Iraq’s 

infrastructure, train Iraqi police and security forces, and re-structure Iraq’s governmental 

institutions. This report attempts to close that reporting gap. 

Thousands of civilian and military personnel who deployed to Iraq since 2003 devoted their 

energies to stabilizing and reconstructing the war-torn country. Stories abound of service 

members and civilians killed while performing duties related to reconstruction or stabilization 

operations. This second SIGIR Special Report gathers together all available data regarding the 

human toll of U.S. reconstruction or stabilization efforts during Operation Iraqi Freedom and 

offers two lessons for consideration. 

Background 

SIGIR’s second Special Report presents a record of the reconstruction and stabilization-related 

deaths that occurred in Iraq from May 1, 2003 (the declared end of major combat operations), 

through August 31, 2010. We did not count deaths from Operation New Dawn, which began on 

September 1, 2010, and continued through December 15, 2011, when U.S. forces finally 

withdrew. When SIGIR began this project, Operation New Dawn was still active, so data 

gathered about that operation would have been incomplete. 

Defining Reconstruction or Stabilization 

Section 3001(i)(2) of Public Law 108-106 defines reconstruction contracts under SIGIR’s 

purview as: 

any major contract or other agreement that is entered into by any department or agency of 

the United States government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise 

made available for the reconstruction of Iraq with any public or private sector entity for 

any of the following purposes: 

(1) To build or rebuild physical infrastructure of Iraq. 

(2) To establish or reestablish a political or societal institution of Iraq. 

(3) To provide products or services to the people of Iraq. 
2 

DoD refers to reconstruction or stabilization missions as “stability operations.” DoD Instruction 

3000.05 defines stability operations as “encompassing various military missions, tasks, and 

activities conducted outside the United States, in coordination with other instruments of national 

power, to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government 

services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” 

For this report, we counted a casualty as reconstruction- or stabilization-related if: 

1. The casualty occurred on a mission that was inherently reconstruction- or stabilizationfocused. Examples include U.S. Army Civil Affairs projects, DoD’s program to train 

Iraqi Security Forces, Iraq Project and Contracting Office projects, and Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program projects; or 

2. The primary mission of the affected party at time of death was specifically related to 

reconstruction or stabilization. Examples include missions to award microgrants, train 

Government of Iraq officials, inspect a water treatment plant, escort convoys carrying 

reconstruction materials, or personnel movements to or from project sites. 

We did not count the following as reconstruction- or stabilization-related: 

1. Casualties that occurred during combat missions, such as route clearance missions, 

patrols, raids, ambushes, or other lethal missions normally associated with traditional 

combat operations. 

2. Casualties that occurred during combat support missions, such as resupply missions, 

local area census-taking, mosque monitoring, or meetings with Iraqis to gain 

intelligence. (Convoy casualties were counted only if the convoy was specifically 

identified as carrying reconstruction materials.) 

3. Casualties that occurred from accidents. 

4. Suicides or homicides. 

5. Deaths as a result of natural causes. 

6. Casualties that occurred before May 1, 2003 (the declared end of major combat 

operations in Iraq). 

 
3 

Reconstruction or Stabilization Casualties 

Deaths 

SIGIR identified a total of 719 people killed while engaged in reconstruction or stabilization 

activities in Iraq between May 1, 2003, and August 31, 2010. This number includes 318 

Americans (U.S. military, federal civilian employees, and U.S. civilian contractors), 111 thirdcountry nationals, 271 Iraqis and 19 of unknown nationality who were working in support of the 

U.S. reconstruction or stabilization mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The actual number of deaths related to reconstruction or stabilization activities is certainly higher 

than 719. For several reasons, an exact calculation is not possible. First, no agency managed a 

central database for reconstruction or stabilization casualties. Each U.S. government entity 

involved in Iraq’s reconstruction—the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State 

(DoS), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—maintained its own 

employee casualty database. The Department of Labor (DoL) maintains a database of civilian 

contractors of all nationalities that were killed in Iraq who worked for or were contracted by 

U.S.-based companies or were insured through U.S. insurance carriers and notified DoL through 

the Defense Base Act. 

Second, the databases we could access often did not contain enough detail to confirm whether a 

casualty was stabilization- or reconstruction-related. For example, there were 1,047 military 

casualties where the type of mission could not be determined. 

Finally, there was no central source of information on third-country nationals or Iraqi civilians 

killed while working on or in support of U.S. projects. Table 1 shows the results of our database 

review. See Appendix A for more details on SIGIR’s methodology. 

Table 1—Reconstruction related deaths in Operation Iraqi Freedom (May 1, 2003 

to August 31, 2010) 

Americans suffered 44% of the total reconstruction or stabilization-related deaths, including 264 

from the Department of Defense (37%) and 54 U.S. federal civilian employees and U.S. civilian 

contractors (8%). 

Iraqis suffered at least 271 deaths while working on U.S.-supervised reconstruction or 

stabilization efforts (38%). 
4 

Third-country nationals incurred 111 casualties (15%). An additional 19 people (3%) were 

killed whose nation of origin could not be determined (they were either third-country nationals or 

Iraqis).1

 

Where possible, we have documented the type of project each person was working on at the time 

of his or her death, organizing the data into three categories: infrastructure and governance, 

police training, and Iraqi armed forces training. 

 The infrastructure and governance category includes all projects that addressed the civil 

reconstruction of Iraq such as those developing electrical, water, oil, health care, and 

transportation infrastructure; and those developing Iraq’s civil society such as education 

and human rights. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was the principal 

participant in this category, but USAID, DoS, and other federal agencies also played 

important roles. The category includes DoD’s Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) projects. 

 The police training category includes all projects and activities undertaken to rebuild 

Iraq’s police force through the recruitment of new police, the creation of new training 

academies, and the re-training of retained Iraqi police officers. DoD led this effort, 

supported by civilians retained under a DoS-managed contract. 

 The Iraqi armed forces training category includes all projects and activities in support of 

establishing and training the Iraqi armed forces. DoD had the lead on this effort. 

The majority of reconstruction-related casualties occurred in the infrastructure and governance 

category, which chiefly included projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

(IRRF), the Economic Support Fund, and the CERP. The majority of deaths, amounting to at 

least 513 personnel (71%), died supporting projects seeking to develop Iraq’s infrastructure and 

civil society. The majority of deaths were Iraqi (240). 

The police training category proved very dangerous as well, accounting for 145 casualties (20%). 

Multiple appropriations funded the programs in this category, including the IRRF, the Iraq 

Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Army Operations and Maintenance funds, and the State 

Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) fund. Most 

casualties in this category involved Department of Defense personnel (97), the agency managing 

this mission. Sixteen U.S. civilian contractors, twenty-two contracted Iraqis, four third-country 

nationals, and six others of unknown nationality (all interpreters) were killed while training the 

Iraqi police. 

Finally, the Iraqi armed forces training category had 61 casualties (8%): 48 U.S. military, 3 U.S. 

civilians, 9 Iraqis (mostly interpreters working for the U.S. military), and 1 person of unknown 

nationality. The IRRF, the ISSF, and Army Operations and Maintenance funds supported the 

Iraqi armed forces development and training. 

 

1

 Percentages add up to more than 100% due to rounding. 
5 

Wounded 

Combing through various sources, we identified at least 786 people reportedly wounded while 

performing reconstruction or stabilization-related missions in Iraq. This included 289 U.S. 

service members, 17 U.S. civilians, 109 third-country nationals, 334 Iraqis and 37 others 

(nationality undetermined). 

Although records provided by USACE, USAID, and the Army—and some open source 

information—contained death notices, we found no formal recordkeeping system maintained by 

any agency that provided enough detail to determine what mission a person was performing 

when he or she was injured. Thus, we could not develop a reliably comprehensive accounting of 

persons wounded or injured personnel during reconstruction or stabilization operations. As with 

the total death number, the actual number of wounded or injured is probably much higher than 

what we found. 

Kidnappings 

We accounted for at least 198 people kidnapped while working on U.S.-supervised 

reconstruction or stabilization projects. USACE reported at least 148 Iraqis kidnapped while 

working on USACE reconstruction projects from May 2006-December 2007. USAID reports 

identified 42 Iraqis as well as 8 third-country nationals kidnapped while working on USAID 

projects from 2004-2010. We do not know how many of these kidnap victims were taken simply 

because of their involvement with U.S. reconstruction efforts or how many were later freed. 
6 

Military Deaths 

The United States military suffered a total of 4,409 deaths during Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

including 3,479 hostile deaths and 930 non-hostile deaths (see Table 2).2

 

Table 2—Total U.S. Military Casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom (May 1, 2003 to 

August 31, 2010) 

Of the 3,479 hostile deaths, 3,376 were killed after the declared end of major combat operations 

on May 1, 2003. Of those, SIGIR could determine the missions for 2,359 personnel or about 

70%. Of this complement, we identified 264 hostile deaths as having occurred while the 

deceased was performing a reconstruction or stabilization mission (11%). Table 3 shows the 

results of our analysis. 

 

 

2

 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began on March19, 2003, and formally ended on August 31, 2010. The 

Department of Defense tracks casualties by service and in several categories. These statistics are periodically 

updated and available at the Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD) Defense Manpower Data Center 

(DMDC) website: https:www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties_oif.xhtml. The data in Table 2 is taken from the 

DMDC website as of July 6, 2012. 
7 

Table 3—U.S. Military Casualties Related to Reconstruction or Stabilization in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (May 1, 2003 to August 31, 2010) 

Army 

Army personnel accounted for 2,492 of the casualties occurring between May 1, 2003, and 

August 31, 2010. SIGIR was able to determine the missions for 1,840 of these casualties or 

74%. We found that 234 were killed while performing duties related to reconstruction or 

stabilization operations (13%). 

Approximately 48% of the Army’s reconstruction or stabilization-related casualties occurred in 

the infrastructure and governance category. The police training category suffered 37% of the 

casualties, and the Iraqi armed forces training category accounted for 15%. 

Army commissioned officers were more likely than enlisted soldiers to be killed on 

reconstruction or stabilization missions. Twenty-five percent of all Army officer deaths occurred 

during these operations. Officers generally played a larger role in reconstruction or stabilization 

missions. For example, the transition teams that trained the Iraqi police forces and national 

security forces were more officer-heavy than maneuver unit platoons of similar size. 

Table 4 shows the results of our analysis. 

Table 4—Yearly U.S. Army Casualties Related to Reconstruction or Stabilization 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (May 1, 2003 to August 31, 2010) by Mission 
8 

Marines 

Marines accounted for 795 of the hostile deaths that occurred between May 1, 2003, and August 

31, 2010. SIGIR was able to determine the mission for 436 of these casualties, or 55%. Of these 

436 deaths, we found that 21 or 5% occurred during reconstruction or stabilization operations. 

Navy and Air Force 

The Navy and the Air Force suffered 90 hostile deaths between May 1, 2003, and August 31, 

2010. SIGIR was able to determine the mission for 53 of these casualties or 57%. We found 

that four Navy personnel were killed while working in reconstruction or stabilization operations, 

while the Air Force suffered five casualties. 
9 

Civilian Deaths 

We defined civilian casualties to include U.S. citizens, third-country nationals, and Iraqi citizens 

working in support of a reconstruction or stabilization project. As with each death category 

previously reviewed, civilian death data is incomplete due to weak data management systems. 

Nevertheless, we were able to calculate that at least 455 civilians were killed by hostile acts 

while working on reconstruction or stabilization operations in Iraq. 

United States Civilians 

SIGIR identified 321 U.S. civilians who died during Operation Iraqi Freedom, including 220 

whose mission at time of death we could determine. Of those, SIGIR found that 54 were killed

while performing duties related to reconstruction or stabilization projects (25%). Table 5 shows 

the results of our analysis. 

Table 5—U.S. Civilian Deaths Related to Reconstruction in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (May 2003-August 2010) 

Third-country Nationals 

Data on third-country nationals killed in Iraq while working under U.S.-funded contracts is 

incomplete because of the paucity of information on what third-country nationals may have been 

working on at time of death. USAID, whose chief mission in Iraq was reconstruction or 

stabilization, provided us with casualty data from its implementing partners. USACE and Army 

reports sometimes referenced third-country nationals who were killed. Open-source articles also 

contained information on third-country nationals killed while working on reconstruction or 

stabilization projects. From data drawn from these various sources, we identified 111 thirdcountry nationals killed while working on reconstruction or stabilization missions in Iraq. 

USAID 

USAID identified 24 third-country nationals employed by its implementing partners who were 

killed. USAID’s data categorizes all non-Iraqi employees working for its implementing partners 

as expatriates, including Americans, but it could not tell us whether any of its reported casualties 

were Americans. All of USAID’s third-country national deaths occurred while conducting 

infrastructure and governance missions. 
10 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Twenty third-country nationals were killed supporting USACE reconstruction efforts during 

OIF, including16 killed while providing security for USACE reconstruction or stabilization 

projects. In addition, 10 third-country nationals were killed while transporting reconstruction 

materials on other reconstruction convoys that USACE tracked. 

Open-source Information 

From open-source articles, SIGIR identified 57 third-country nationals killed on reconstruction 

or stabilization missions that were not noted by any other agency. 

Iraqi Civilians 

There was no central database of Iraqi civilians killed while supporting U.S. reconstruction or 

stabilization projects. SIGIR identified at least 271 Iraqis who were killed while working on 

reconstruction or stabilization projects. This included 95 reported by USAID, 91 reported by 

USACE, 40 other local national contractor deaths noted from previous SIGIR inspections, 30 

identified from open-source articles, and 15 identified in official DoD records and significant 

activity logs. 

Many of the Iraqis killed on such reconstruction or stabilization operations served as interpreters. 

This number does not include Iraqi Security Forces killed while partnering with American 

transition teams or maneuver units, or “Sons/Daughters of Iraq” security forces funded by CERP. 

USACE provided comprehensive casualty data for third-country nationals and Iraqis only from 

May 2006 through August 2008. USACE also provided other data on some casualties from 

2009. 

In all likelihood, there were significantly more Iraqi civilian casualties killed while working on 

U.S.-supervised reconstruction or stabilization efforts than the available data revealed. 

Civilians Whose Nationality Is Unknown 

SIGIR found 19 instances where the nationality of the civilian fatality could not be determined. 

For example, a casualty report might refer to a fatality as an interpreter or a driver but not 

provide any information about the victim’s nationality. 

 
11 

Lessons for Consideration 

SIGIR identified two lessons for consideration. 

1. Reconstruction or stabilization operations conducted in combat zones present 

potentially lethal threats to all participants, including military, contractors, U.S. 

government civilians, third-country nationals, and host country citizens. Planning for 

such operations must anticipate this threat.

Reconstruction or stabilization operations are sometimes described as “soft,” “non-kinetic,” or 

“non-lethal” missions, but when they occur in a combat zone, these characterizations are a 

misnomer. The human losses suffered in Iraq (and outlined in this report) underscore the point 

that when such operations are conducted in combat zones, they are dangerous for everyone 

involved, military and civilian, U.S. and non-U.S. alike. Given the broad risks inherent in such 

operations, leaders and planners should consider threat mitigation when deciding to conduct 

reconstruction or stabilization operations missions in combat zones. 

2. Poor casualty data management during reconstruction or stabilization operations 

obscures the actual human cost of such operations. Reliably integrated databases must 

be developed and implemented prior to commencing future reconstruction or 

stabilization operations.

One measure of the cost of reconstruction or stabilization operations is the number of casualties 

suffered. Without accurate records, there cannot be a reasonably complete evaluation of the 

human cost of reconstruction or stabilization efforts. U.S. agencies involved in such missions 

should develop systems that effectively track all casualty data related to stabilization or 

reconstruction operations. 
12 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

In conducting this analysis, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) relied 

primarily on official casualty reports from the military services and agencies involved in 

reconstruction to determine the number of reconstruction-related deaths during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), from May 1, 2003–August 31, 2010. SIGIR did not include data prior to May 1, 

2003, the end of combat operations, or data from Operation New Dawn, which lasted from 

September 1, 2010, until December 15, 2011. At the time SIGIR began this project, Operation 

New Dawn was still active, so data gathered about that operation would have been incomplete. 

SIGIR contacted the Department of Defense (DoD); the Departments of the Army, Air Force, 

and Navy; the Department of State (DoS); the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID); the Department of Labor (DoL); the United States Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE); and several insurance carriers and private companies for casualty information. The 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations Integration Center provided access to 

classified military “Significant Activity” data. 

SIGIR focused on the 3,479 hostile deaths and not the 930 non-hostile deaths (those who died 

because of accident, suicide, or natural causes). Official casualty investigations provided the 

best information, but in many cases an official investigation was not available (see the section on 

“Sources” for further explanation). The official casualty investigations that were available noted 

specifically the mission service members were performing when they were killed. In some cases 

units conducted multiple missions on the same patrol, of which a reconstruction mission was 

one. 

Based on these definitions, we counted a casualty as a reconstruction or stabilization casualty if: 

 the casualty occurred on a job that was inherently reconstruction or stabilization focused. 

 the primary mission at the time of death was specifically related to reconstruction or 

stabilization. 

We did not count the following as a reconstruction or stabilization casualty: 

 casualties that occurred during combat missions, such as route-clearance missions, 

patrols, raids, ambushes, or other lethal missions normally associated with traditional 

combat operations 

 casualties that occurred during combat support missions, such as resupply missions, local 

area census-taking, mosque monitoring, or meetings with Iraqis to gain intelligence 

(Convoy casualties were counted only if the convoy was noted as specifically carrying 

reconstruction materials.) 

 casualties that occurred from accidents 

 suicides and homicides 

 deaths as a result of natural causes 
13 

 casualties that occurred before May 1,2003 (the declared end of major combat operations 

in Iraq) 

American maneuver units frequently “partnered” with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) on combat 

missions, particularly in the later stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Partnering was encouraged 

and later made mandatory for all but sensitive missions in order to assist in the development of 

the ISF and to demonstrate to the Iraqis “what right looks like.” Service members who became 

casualties while partnered with ISF units were not considered to have died while on a 

reconstruction-related mission unless the mission itself was reconstruction- or stabilizationrelated. For example, a soldier assigned to an infantry battalion partnered with an Iraqi Army 

unit on a reconnaissance mission would not be considered to be involved in a reconstructionrelated activity. A soldier partnered with an Iraqi Army unit to attend a school project grand 

opening would be. 

In 2004 the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was created to 

develop, train, and assist the ISF. To speed the development of the ISF at lower unit levels 

(down to battalion level), MNSTC-I formed small “transition teams.” Transition teams were 

small groups of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers specifically designed to 

embed with various types of ISF units and provide hands-on assistance. Unlike maneuver units, 

the transition teams’ primary purpose was development of the ISF. For this reason, transition 

team members whose deaths were hostile deaths were considered reconstruction- or 

stabilization-related. 

It was possible to reasonably conclude that a service member was not performing a 

reconstruction or stabilization mission by noting the type of unit to which the service member 

was assigned, the Military Occupational Specialty of the service member, the summary 

description provided to the public, and/or the date of the casualty. Some examples of casualties 

we did not count include the following: 

 an Air Force non-commissioned officer assigned to a logistics readiness squadron killed 

while in a long-haul convoy near the Kuwaiti border 

 a Navy petty officer assigned to an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit 

 a soldier assigned to a transportation unit on a logistics convoy not noted as carrying 

reconstruction materials 

 a soldier assigned to a Special Forces team or Ranger battalion 

Information from insurance carriers was not detailed enough to determine what mission a 

contractor was performing when he or she was killed. However, in some cases it was possible to 

determine the duty the contractor was performing based on the type of contract. For example, a 

civilian hired to provide food service to American forces would not be considered killed while 

working on reconstruction. A civilian hired to advise the Iraqi government or build a project 

would be considered killed while working on a reconstruction mission, unless the person died of 

natural causes, accident, suicide, or homicide. 
14 

Sources 

The various U.S. government agencies involved in Iraq reconstruction, notably DoD, DoS, and 

USAID, maintain separate casualty databases and statistics. DoL tracks the numbers of 

contractors of all nationalities killed in Iraq who worked for U.S.-based companies or were 

insured through U.S. insurance carriers. 

SIGIR contacted each of the federal agencies involved in reconstruction or stabilization in Iraq 

and several others who had potentially useful casualty information. They are summarized below: 

Department of Defense. DoD tracks casualties by service and classifies them in several 

categories. These statistics are periodically updated and available at the Statistical Information 

Analysis Division (SIAD) Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) website: 

https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties_oif.xhtml 

DMDC casualty statistics do not identify the mission an individual was engaged in when he or 

she was killed. This level of detail is frequently located at the service level, most often in the 

official casualty investigations maintained at the respective service’s human resource commands. 

Casualty information from OIF released publicly by DoD included general information such as 

when and where the death occurred and to what city, state, unit, or agency a service member or 

civilian belonged. Although casualty details evolved and improved over time, usually the 

information available publicly did not provide enough detail to determine the mission the person 

was performing when he or she was killed. “Killed while performing combat duties in 

Baghdad,” for example, was often the only information released. 

DoD also provided data from its Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker 

(SPOT). This data included the names, dates, and locations of deaths and injuries of American 

contractors serving in Iraq. When used with other information, this list helped to identify 

American civilians killed performing reconstruction or stabilization missions in Iraq. 

Army. SIGIR reviewed more than 1,200 official casualty records at the Army Human Resources 

Command and at Army Central Command (ARCENT). The Army also provided casualty 

information about 160 federal (mostly DoD contractors) and non-federal civilians who were 

killed during OIF. 

These official records often contained details on the mission a soldier was performing at the time 

of his or her death. In some cases, individual records provided details on missions during which 

multiple soldiers and sometimes civilians were killed. For example, an IED that killed two 

soldiers in one event might be listed under only one name. 

Army casualty policy evolved over the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Investigations were 

conducted according to guidance contained in Army Regulation 15-6. These investigations, 

which are classified, were normally completed by brigade-sized or smaller units. Unlike 

casualty information that was made public, the investigations provided details about the missions 

soldiers were performing when they were killed. 
15 

Prior to April 2006, casualty investigations were required only for operational accidents or 

potential friendly fire casualties. On April 7, 2006, the Army required Army Regulation 15-6 

investigations for all hostile deaths. These investigations were held at the unit (usually brigade) 

level. 

In December 2009, then-Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) issued instructions making MNC-I 

the single repository for all death investigations in Iraq. The order required units to send all such 

investigations (past, present, and future) to MNC-I. When MNC-I disbanded in December 2009, 

United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) became the repository for all Iraq death investigations. All 

OIF casualty records on file in Iraq were transferred in November 2011, to ARCENT at Shaw 

Air Force Base, South Carolina, shortly before USF-I disbanded and redeployed from Iraq. 

Prior to March 26, 2010, Army Human Resources Command at Ft. Knox, Kentucky, received a 

copy of Army Regulation 15-6 investigations when families of deceased soldiers requested a 

copy. Since then, Army Human Resources Command also receives a copy of all Army 

Regulation 15-6 death investigations. 

As a result of this evolving policy and the constant rotation in and out of Iraq of brigade-sized 

units, some official Army casualty investigations were not on file at either Army Human 

Resources Command or Army Central Command, especially for casualties before 2006. 

Marines. The U.S. Marine Corps Casualty Section provided a list of Marines killed during OIF 

and gave SIGIR access to investigations on file at their headquarters in Quantico, Virginia. The 

Marines investigate hostile deaths differently than the Army. The commander of a Marine killed 

in combat conducts a “Preliminary Inquiry” as soon as possible after a casualty has occurred. If 

the commander determines that the cause of death was clearly the result of enemy contact and 

there was nothing suspicious about the death (such as, for example, suicide or fratricide), the 

inquiry is considered complete. A very small number of hostile deaths ever received a more 

rigorous “Command Investigation.” In most cases, a preliminary inquiry does not contain 

enough detail to determine what specific mission a Marine was conducting when he was killed. 

Navy and Air Force. The Navy and Air Force provided SIGIR with lists of their OIF casualties 

containing brief descriptions of the events. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. USACE provided SIGIR with information on Iraqis and thirdcountry nationals killed during OIF while providing security for USACE movements and 

projects. USACE provided daily Situation Reports from May 2006–December 2007 and other 

casualty reports from 2008 and 2009 that included details of contractor casualties on USACEsupervised projects as well as other reconstruction projects. USACE supervised reconstruction 

operations centers in Iraq that tracked the movement of all reconstruction logistics convoys, 

including those supporting non-USACE reconstruction efforts. 

In finalizing this report, we considered written comments from the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, dated July 20, 2012, on a draft of this report. We addressed these comments as 

appropriate, and their comments are printed in their entirety in Appendix B. 

Department of State. The Department of State provided lists of employees and American 

citizens (non-military) killed in Iraq. The list of American citizens killed during OIF contains 
16 

the name, date, location, and usually a brief description of the cause of death. The total number 

of American civilians killed during OIF came primarily from this list. 

USAID. USAID provided SIGIR with a chart showing the numbers of killed, wounded, and 

kidnapped contractors employed by them who were casualties in Iraq from 2004-2010 (this 

included the first three months of “Operation New Dawn”—October–December, 2010). 

Department of Labor and Insurance Carriers. DoL maintains information on contractors of 

all nationalities that were killed or injured in Iraq. This data is submitted to them by insurance 

carriers that document deaths and lost time due to injuries. DoL provided SIGIR a list of the 

contractors killed or injured during Operation Iraqi Freedom, but this information does not 

identify the mission a contractor was on when he or she was killed. Of the dozens of insurance 

companies who insure contractors, only six reported any Iraqi contractor deaths to the DoL. 

SIGIR contacted three of the largest insurance carriers who reported deaths, but they did not 

have the detail necessary to determine what mission a civilian was performing when he or she 

was killed. 

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). JIEDDO maintains a 

database of Significant Activity reports from OIF. These reports identify attacks against 

Coalition Forces, ISF, or Iraqi civilians, as well as significant missions by Coalition Forces or 

ISF against insurgents and terrorists. JIEDDO provided SIGIR with the significant activity 

reports they had on file that discussed fatalities. 

Normally just a few paragraphs, significant activity reports do not have the level of detail 

contained in official casualty investigations. However, they were useful to help determine the 

missions of the casualties that could not be identified using service official investigations, in 

particular USMC casualties. 

Open-Source Casualty Sites. In some cases SIGIR used open-source documents to confirm or 

deny what a particular person was doing when he or she was killed. Open-source documents 

were used only if details of a casualty were not available through official investigations or in 

significant activities files. Obituaries and unit memorials available online provided useful 

information. 

Open-source casualty sites available on the internet such as “icasualties.org” and 

“iraqbodycount.org” contained less information about military casualties than what was available 

through official sources. They were, however, useful for providing basic information about 

civilian casualties and links to other open sources. 

Contractors. Several of the largest companies that sent civilian contractors to Iraq provided 

SIGIR with information on casualties they suffered. These included Aegis, ArmorGroup 

International (G4S), DynCorp International, Erinys, Global Linguistics Solutions, and Kellogg 

Brown & Root (KBR). 

Third-Country Nationals and Iraqi Civilians. The Government of Iraq did not track the 

number of Iraqi civilians killed specifically while working on U.S.-funded or supervised 

reconstruction or stabilization missions. In some cases official casualty investigations or 
17 

significant activity logs noted third-country national and Iraqi civilian casualties who were also 

killed in attacks that harmed Americans. 

Previous SIGIR Reports. SIGIR documented cases of violence directed at contractors and 

Americans in previous inspections and reports that were not reported elsewhere: 

 24 Iraqi construction workers killed while building the Basrah Children’s Hospital 

(SIGIR Report 08-160; one of the 24 was also noted in USACE data) 

 Three Iraqi construction workers killed while working on the al-Kharkh Courthouse 

(SIGIR Report 06-058) 

 Three Iraqi workers killed at the Baghdad Municipal Waste Landfill (SIGIR Report 06-

067) 

 Three Iraqi construction workers killed at the Nassiriyah Water Treatment plant (SIGIR 

Report 07-116) 

 Five Iraqis killed while working on the Fallujah Wastewater Treatment Facility (SIGIR 

Report 08-144) 

 Two Iraqi construction workers killed at the Rabeaa Point of Entry Screening Facility 

(SIGIR Report 09-172) 

 One subcontractor site manager murdered in his office and several others injured while 

working on the Khan Bani Saad Correctional Facility (SIGIR Report 08-138) 

 
18 

Appendix B—Management Comments 
19 
20 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoL Department of Labor 

DoS Department of State 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USMC U.S. Marine Corps 
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Appendix D—Report Team Members 

This report was prepared under the direction of Craig Collier, Senior Advisor to the Special 

Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The following employees also directly contributed to this report: 

Christie Jones (SIGIR) 

Timothy Reuter (Contractor, Caerus Associates) 

Shauna Sweet (Contractor, Caerus Associates)