INFORMATION 

SHARING

Agencies Could Better 

Coordinate to Reduce 

Overlap in Field-Based 

Activities

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2013

GAO-13-471

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

 

Highlights of GAO-13-471, a report to 

congressional requesters

April 2013

INFORMATION SHARING

Agencies Could Better Coordinate to Reduce 

Overlap in Field-Based Activities

Why GAO Did This Study

Federal agencies and state and local 

governments have established fieldbased entities (e.g., centers and task 

forces) nationwide that share terrorismrelated information, among other 

things. GAO was asked to assess

these entities. This report addresses 

(1) the extent to which these entities 

are distinct, fragmented, overlapping, 

or duplicative; (2) the extent to which 

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP hold entities 

accountable for coordinating and have 

assessed coordination opportunities; 

and (3) how, if at all, DOJ, DHS, and 

ONDCP incorporate information on the 

results entities achieve when making 

funding decisions. GAO analyzed 

entities’ missions, activities, and 

coordination efforts in eight selected 

urban areas that range in geographic 

dispersion and risk. Although not 

generalizable, this analysis provided 

insights. This is a public version of a 

sensitive report GAO issued in March 

2013. Information the Federal Bureau 

of Investigations (FBI) deemed 

sensitive has been redacted.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that ONDCP work 

with HIDTA officials to establish time

frames to connect systems; DHS, DOJ, 

and ONDCP develop measures to hold 

entities accountable for coordination 

and assess opportunities to enhance 

coordination; and the PM-ISE report on 

the results of the agencies’ efforts to 

assess coordination. DHS, ONDCP, 

and the PM-ISE concurred. DOJ 

generally agreed with the intent of the 

recommendations, but disagreed with 

their underlying premises that DOJ 

was not already taking such actions. 

GAO believes these actions do not 

fully address the recommendations as 

discussed further in this report.

What GAO Found

Five types of field-based information-sharing entities are supported, in part, by 

the federal government—Joint Terrorism Task Forces, Field Intelligence Groups, 

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, state and major urban 

area fusion centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) 

Investigative Support Centers—and have distinct missions, roles, and 

responsibilities. However, GAO identified 91 instances of overlap in some 

analytical activities—such as producing intelligence reports—and 32 instances of 

overlap in investigative support activities, such as identifying links between 

criminal organizations. These entities conducted similar activities within the same 

mission area, such as counterterrorism, for similar customers, such as federal or 

state agencies. This can lead to benefits, such as the corroboration of 

information, but may also burden customers with redundant information. GAO 

also found that RISS centers and HIDTAs operate three different systems that 

duplicate the same function—identifying when different law enforcement entities 

may be conducting a similar enforcement action, such as a raid at the same 

location, to ensure officer safety—resulting in some inefficiencies. RISS and 

HIDTA have taken steps to connect two of the systems, but HIDTA does not 

have target time frames to connect the third system. A commitment to time

frames would help reduce risks to officer safety and potentially lessen the burden 

on law enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems. 

Agencies have neither held entities accountable for coordinating nor assessed 

opportunities for further enhancing coordination to help reduce the potential for 

overlap and achieve efficiencies. The Departments of Justice (DOJ) and 

Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP)—the federal agencies that oversee or provide support to the five types 

of field-based entities— acknowledged that entities working together and sharing 

information is important, but they do not hold the entities accountable for such 

coordination. A mechanism that enables agencies to monitor the results of 

coordination efforts could encourage more coordination, help reduce any 

unnecessary overlap and leverage resources. Officials in the eight urban areas 

said that practices such as having representatives from other agencies on 

governance boards and colocating entities where possible enhanced 

coordination, information sharing, and efficiencies—in their view, reducing the 

potential of unnecessary overlap. Federal agencies have not assessed the extent 

to which such practices could be further implemented and, therefore, may be 

missing opportunities to maximize benefits. The Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE)—which manages efforts to enhance 

sharing governmentwide—has not reported on specific coordination efforts 

across the entities. Including agencies’ assessment progress in the annual 

reports to the Congress would enhance accountability.

The agencies collect information on entities’ results, but vary in the extent to 

which they consider the results when they make decisions about future funding. 

For example, agencies may consider other factors—such as risk and threats—

rather than results, or funding decisions may be determined by state grant 

recipients or set in part by statutory or other requirements. View GAO-13-471. For more information, 

contact Eileen R. Larence at (202) 512-8777 

or larencee@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Letter 1 

Background 7

Field-Based Entities Have Distinct Missions, but Can Conduct 

Overlapping Activities 9

Federal Agencies Do Not Hold Entities Accountable for 

Coordinating and Have Not Assessed Coordination Mechanisms 

to Help Reduce the Potential for Overlap 33

Agencies Collect Information on the Results Entities Achieve, but 

Vary in How They Consider Such Data when Making Decisions 

about Future Funding 41

Conclusions 45

Recommendations for Executive Action 46

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 47

Appendix I Additional Information about Entities Included in Our Review 52

Appendix II Federal Deployment of Personnel to Fusion Centers 56

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 59

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Justice 62

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 66

Tables

Table 1: Missions of Field-Based Information-Sharing Entities in 

Our Review 15

Table 2: Systems with Deconfliction Functions That RISS Centers 

and HIDTAs Operate 28

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figures

Figure 1: Nationwide Locations of the Five Types of Field-Based 

Information-Sharing Entities in Our Review 14

Figure 2: Analytical Activities and Services Conducted in the Same 

Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the Eight Urban 

Areas in Our Review 18

Figure 2: Analytical Activities and Services Conducted in the Same 

Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the Eight Urban 

Areas in Our Review (continued) 19

Figure 3: Investigative Support Activities and Services Conducted 

in the Same Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the 

Eight Urban Areas in Our Review 24

Figure 3: Investigative Support Activities and Services Conducted 

in the Same Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the 

Eight Urban Areas in Our Review (continued) 25

Figure 4: Use of Systems with Event Deconfliction Functions by 

State 30
Page iii GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Abbreviations

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DHS I&A DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis

DOJ Department of Justice

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBINet Federal Bureau of Investigation Network

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FIG Field Intelligence Group

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HSDN Homeland Secure Data Network

HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program

ISA IPC Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy 

Committee

ISE Information Sharing Environment

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

NVPS National Virtual Pointer System

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

PM-ISE Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment

RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems

SAFETNet Secure Automated Fast Event Tracking Network

TFO task force officer

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Page 1 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 4, 2013

Congressional Requesters

Sustaining a national information-sharing capability to efficiently and 

effectively gather, analyze, and disseminate law enforcement, public 

safety, and terrorism-related information is critical to our nation’s efforts to 

combat criminal and terrorist threats.1 Over the past three decades, 

federal agencies and state and local governments have established a 

number of entities (e.g., units, centers, and task forces) nationwide that 

may—in all or in part—collect, process, analyze, or disseminate 

information in support of law enforcement and counterterrorism-related 

efforts. The federal government—specifically, the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)—operates or, through grant 

funding or personnel, supports five types of these field-based informationsharing entities. Specifically, these include the following:

• Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are funded and 

managed by DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), aim to 

prevent, preempt, deter, and investigate terrorism and related 

activities affecting the United States as well as to apprehend 

terrorists.

• Field Intelligence Groups (FIG), which are part of the FBI, support 

FBI investigations through the collection and analysis of intelligence 

that is used to create a variety of analytical products and share these 

products with the FBI’s law enforcement and intelligence partners 

when applicable to those partners’ missions. 

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) centers, which are 

funded through grants administered by DOJ’s Bureau of Justice 

Assistance (BJA), support regional law enforcement, public safety,

 

1

For purposes of this report, terrorism-related information encompasses “terrorism 

information,” which includes “weapons of mass destruction information” and “homeland 

security information” consistent with section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), as amended, as well as law 

enforcement information relating to terrorism or the security of the homeland. See Pub. L. 

No. 108-458, § 1016(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-65 (2004) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 

§ 485(a)). See also Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 892(f), 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified at 6 

U.S.C. § 482(f)).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

and homeland security efforts to, among other things, combat major 

crimes and terrorist activity, and promote officer safety by linking 

federal, state, local, and tribal criminal justice agencies through 

secure communications and providing information-sharing resources 

and analytical and investigative support.

• State and major urban area fusion centers (fusion centers), which 

are funded through a variety of federal and state sources, including in 

part through DHS and DOJ grants, are state and locally-owned and 

operated to serve as intermediaries for sharing terrorism and other 

threat-related information between the federal government and state, 

local, tribal, territorial, and private sector homeland security partners.

• 2 

• High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Investigative 

Support Centers, which are funded through grants administered by 

ONDCP, aim to support the disruption and dismantlement of drugtrafficking and money-laundering organizations through the prevention 

or mitigation of associated criminal activity. HIDTA program resources 

may also be used to assist law enforcement agencies in investigations 

and activities related to terrorism and the prevention of terrorism.

Given that more than one federal agency is involved in supporting the 

efforts of these five types of field-based entities, you asked us to examine 

the entities’ activities, coordination, and funding. This report addresses (1) 

the extent to which these field-based entities are distinct, fragmented, 

overlapping, or potentially duplicative; (2) the extent to which DOJ, DHS, 

and ONDCP hold these entities accountable for coordination and have 

assessed opportunities for coordination to reduce overlap and duplication

and what practices, if any, select entities have reported using to 

coordinate and achieve efficiencies; and (3) how, if at all, DOJ, DHS, and 

ONDCP incorporate information they collect on the results that these 

field-based entities achieve when making funding decisions for them. 

This report is a public version of the prior sensitive report that we 

provided to you. The FBI deemed some of the information in the prior 

 

2 A fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that combines 

resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such 

agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. See 

6 U.S.C. § 124h(j)(1).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

report as For Official Use Only (FOUO) in the context of the report. 

Therefore, this report omits the locations of the eight urban areas 

included in our review.

3 The information provided in this report addresses 

the same questions as the sensitive report. Also, the overall methodology 

used for both reports is the same. 

To address the first objective, we analyzed agency documentation 

relevant to the authorities, missions, activities, and customers of the five 

types of entities, including strategies and annual reports. We analyzed 

2011 DHS data on the missions, governance, and capabilities of fusion 

centers and interviewed DHS officials responsible for collecting these 

data, and we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. We also interviewed officials responsible for overseeing the 

programs from the federal agencies supporting the entities, specifically 

DOJ’s FBI and BJA, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A), 

and ONDCP’s HIDTA program, to obtain information on how the entities 

were carrying out their missions in the field, the types of services and 

activities the entities performed, and customers of the entities’ services. 

Further, we selected eight urban areas for review where one of each of 

the five types of entities was either physically located or had jurisdiction, 

and to reflect a range of factors, including variation in risk based on DOJ’s 

25 Cities Project, colocation of the entities, and geographic dispersion.4

We obtained funding and personnel data for fiscal year 2011 for each of 

the fusion centers, RISS centers, and HIDTA Investigative Support 

Centers in the eight urban areas in our review from fusion centers, BJA, 

and ONDCP, respectively.5

 

We interviewed fusion center, BJA, and ONDCP officials responsible for 

collecting the data to discuss the data they provided, and we determined 

 

3

The U.S. Census Bureau, for example, has described an urban area as a densely 

developed residential, commercial, and other nonresidential area, and has identified two 

types of urban areas: “urbanized areas” of 50,000 or more people and “urban clusters” of 

at least 2,500 and less than 50,000 people. See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. 53,030 (Aug. 24, 

2011). We do not identify the eight urban areas we reviewed in this report since the FBI 

deemed this information as sensitive in the context of this report.

4

For DOJ’s High-Risk Metropolitan Area Interoperability Assistance Project, DOJ selected 

25 cities based on criteria including the perceived risk of a terrorist attack and population 

size.

5

We do not report specific funding and personnel levels of JTTFs and FIGs since FBI 

deemed these data are classified. 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In addition, within 

each urban area, we collected documents, such as annual reports, and 

interviewed management officials responsible for the entity’s operations 

to identify its mission, activities, and customers. Additionally, within each 

urban area, we interviewed officials from either a state or a local law 

enforcement agency that received information from one or more of the 

entities in the area (i.e., a customer) to assess their satisfaction with the 

quantity, quality, and timeliness of the information shared. We did not 

determine the frequency or extent to which a particular customer agency 

received information from an entity. Rather, we selected the law 

enforcement agencies to include those that could receive products and 

services from the five types of information-sharing entities in our review. 

In total, we conducted interviews with officials from 37 entities and eight 

law enforcement agencies across our eight urban areas.6 While the 

information obtained from these interviews cannot be generalized to all of 

the entities or all law enforcement agencies nationwide, the interviews 

provided insight into the types of activities each entity conducts and 

customer perspectives about information received from these entities, 

respectively.

To assess potential fragmentation, overlap, and duplication within each 

urban area, we collected each entity’s description of its activities and the 

associated mission areas and customers for which these activities are 

conducted. 7 We provided the entities with our summary of the information 

we collected to review for accuracy, and incorporated technical comments 

as appropriate. We applied criteria from our prior work on fragmentation, 

overlap, and duplication across the federal government to determine if 

 

6

While we conducted interviews with officials from each of the five types of entities in all 

eight urban areas, we met with a total of 37 entities for various reasons. For example, in 

one urban area, the fusion center and HIDTA are combined and are therefore counted as 

1 entity. Additionally, in four instances, an entity’s jurisdiction spanned more than one of 

our selected urban areas. In these four instances, we used information from the entities 

for both of the urban areas. Last, in two urban areas, we conducted interviews with an 

additional fusion center that served the urban area.

7

For purposes of this report, “mission area” refers to the focus of the work in which an 

entity conducts an activity. We focused on activities performed in three such mission 

areas—all crimes, which can include terrorism and other high-risk threats as well as other 

types of crimes; counterterrorism; and counternarcotics. 
 

Page 5 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

any activities were conducted in the same or similar mission areas for the 

same or similar customers within each urban area.8

To address the second objective and to identify efforts underway to 

improve coordination and information sharing among the entities and the 

federal agencies, including participation in interagency groups such as 

the Information Sharing and Access Interagency Policy Committee (ISA 

IPC) within the Executive Office of the President, we analyzed 

documentation—including the 2007 National Strategy for Information 

Sharing and the 2011 and 2012 reports to Congress on federal efforts to 

implement an Information Sharing Environment (ISE).9 We also included 

questions about coordination efforts, information sharing, and forums for 

collaboration in our interviews with entity officials in the eight urban areas 

and analyzed practices that officials identified as promoting coordination 

and enhancing information sharing. We also interviewed the Program 

Manager, who is responsible for overseeing implementation of and 

managing the ISE, as well as officials from the FBI, BJA, DHS I&A, and 

ONDCP with responsibility for overseeing or providing support to the 

entities. We compared these efforts against criteria in standard practices 

for program management10 and in our prior work related to federal 

collaboration11 to determine the extent to which agencies have 

implemented such efforts. To assess the extent to which the agencies 

hold the entities accountable for coordinating with each other and to 

determine the extent to which coordination with other field-based entities 

is assessed, we analyzed the types of information, such as performance 

metrics, the entities provide the agencies regarding coordination and 

 

8

See, for example, GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, 

Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

9

The ISE is a statutorily mandated government-wide approach to facilitate the sharing of 

terrorism-related information. See 6 U.S.C. § 485. The ISA IPC is responsible for advising 

the President on, among other things, developing policies and standards necessary to 

establish, implement, and maintain the ISE and includes representatives from DOJ and 

DHS. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(g) (establishing an Information Sharing Council, the 

responsibilities of which were subsequently subsumed by the ISA IPC).

10Program management standards we reviewed are reflected in the Project Management 

Institute’s The Standard for Program Management, Second Edition © (2008).

11See GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).
 

Page 6 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

interviewed officials who are responsible for overseeing the entities’ 

information-sharing efforts.

To address the third objective, we analyzed agency and entity 

documentation, such as information on fiscal year 2011 spending, to 

identify the amount of funding the FBI, BJA, DHS, and ONDCP have 

dedicated to support the entities.12 Additionally, we analyzed funding data 

reported by fusion centers to the National Fusion Center Association.13 To 

assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed FBI, BJA, DHS, and 

ONDCP officials responsible for the entity’s operations, as well as 

National Fusion Center Association officials, to discuss the funding data 

they provided, and we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable 

for our purposes. To determine the types of information the agencies 

collect on the results and contributions of the entities, we analyzed 

performance management and grant guidance. We also interviewed 

officials who are responsible for overseeing or providing support to the 

entities about how the agencies provide funding or make funding 

available to the entities and what factors, if any, are considered when 

making decisions about future funding.

We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to April 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 

12We selected 2011 because it was the most recent, complete year of data at the time of 

our review.

13The National Fusion Center Association is an organization that represents and provides 

an independent consolidated voice for state and local fusion centers. 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 

2004 (Intelligence Reform Act), as amended, required the President to 

take action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related information by 

creating an information-sharing environment.14 In April 2005, the 

President designated a Program Manager—a position situated within the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence—to, among other things, 

plan for, oversee implementation of, and manage the ISE. Consistent with 

the Intelligence Reform Act, the Program Manager intends for the ISE to 

provide the means for sharing terrorism-related information in a manner 

that—to the greatest extent practicable—ensures a decentralized, 

distributed, and coordinated environment that builds upon existing 

systems and leverages ongoing efforts. The Program Manager is to 

submit annual reports to Congress, as required by the Intelligence 

Reform Act, on the state of the ISE and information sharing across the 

federal government.15 Among other things, the reports examine the extent 

to which the ISE is being implemented by agencies that possess or use 

terrorism-related information, operate systems within the ISE, or 

otherwise participate in the ISE. For example, the 2012 ISE annual report 

to Congress describes how agencies have fared against established 

performance measures and highlights accomplishments, including 

examples of progress toward information-sharing goals.16

DOJ and DHS are among the ISE mission partners, that is, the bureaus 

and agencies of federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the private 

sector; and foreign governments that contribute to the nation’s homeland 

security and counterterrorism missions.17 ONDCP is involved in the ISE 

through its coordination with DHS regarding efforts to enhance 

 

14See 6 U.S.C. § 485.

15See 6 U.S.C. § 485(h).

16Program Manger, Information Sharing Environment, Information Sharing Environment: 

Annual Report to the Congress, National Security Through Responsible information 

Sharing (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2012). 

17In addition to DOJ and DHS, the ISE mission partners include the Department of 

Defense; Department of State; Office of the Director of National Intelligence; National 

Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office; U.S. Coast Guard; state, local, territorial, and 

tribal governments; and the private sector.

Background 

Information Sharing 

Environment and Role of 

the Information Sharing 

and Access Interagency 

Policy Committee
 

Page 8 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

partnerships between HIDTA Investigative Support Centers and fusion 

centers.

In July 2009, the administration established the ISA IPC to, among other 

things, identify future information-sharing priorities.18 With representation 

of participating ISE agencies and communities, the ISA IPC is responsible 

for advising the President and Program Manager in developing policies, 

procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards necessary to establish, 

implement, and maintain the ISE.19 The ISA IPC formally charters 

subcommittees, including a Fusion Center Sub‐Committee that focuses 

on coordinating federal support to fusion centers by providing guidance 

and standards for how federal resources are applied to help ensure 

information sharing between and among fusion centers and all levels of 

government. This sub‐committee is cochaired by the FBI and DHS, and 

includes members from, among others, BJA and ONDCP, as well as a 

representative from the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, which 

is made up of members representing law enforcement and homeland 

security agencies from all levels of government and is an advocate for 

state, local, and tribal law enforcement.20

 

18The ISA IPC assumed the functions and responsibilities of the former Information 

Sharing Council, which had been established pursuant to section 1016(g) of the 

Intelligence Reform Act. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(g).

19In addition to DOJ, the FBI, and DHS, the ISA IPC consists of representatives from the 

Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, 

Department of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of the 

Interior, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Transportation, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Agency, Office of Management and Budget, Office 

of the Director of National Intelligence, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

20The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council was established in May 2004 under 

DOJ’s Global Information Sharing Initiative Advisory Committee, which serves as a 

Federal Advisory Committee to the U.S. Attorney General. The council advocates for 

state, local, and tribal law enforcement’s efforts to develop and share criminal intelligence 

for the purpose of promoting public safety and securing the nation. The council and its 

research arm, the Global Intelligence Working Group, are charged with advising and 

providing recommendations to the U.S. Attorney General on issues relating to advancing 

the use of technology, standards, and collaboration between agencies in the area of 

criminal intelligence.
 

Page 9 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

In 2010, we were directed to identify programs, agencies, offices, and 

initiatives with duplicative goals and activities within departments and 

government-wide and report annually to Congress.21 In March 2011 and 

February 2012, we issued our first two annual reports to Congress in 

response to this requirement.22 The annual reports describe areas in 

which we found evidence of fragmentation, overlap, or duplication among 

federal programs. Using the framework we established in these reports, 

we used the following definitions for the purpose of assessing field-based 

information-sharing entities:

• Fragmentation occurs when more than one federal agency (or more 

than one organization within an agency) is involved in the same broad 

area of national interest.

• Overlap occurs when multiple programs have similar goals, engage in 

similar activities or strategies to achieve those goals, or target similar 

beneficiaries. Overlap may result from statutory or other limitations 

beyond the agency’s control.

• Duplication occurs when two or more agencies or programs are 

engaging in the same activities or providing the same services to the 

same beneficiaries.

In general, while the five types of field-based entities in our review were 

established under different authorities, each type of entity may engage in 

the sharing of information. In addition, while these entities also have 

distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities, we identified overlap in 

various analytical activities. For example, for the eight urban areas in our 

review, we identified overlap in how entities produce and disseminate 

intelligence reports. We also identified overlap in how entities provide 

investigative support activities and services, such as providing tactical 

analysis, which entities conducted in the same mission area for similar 

customers in the eight urban areas in our review. Additionally, RISS 

centers and HIDTAs both operate systems with functions to ensure law 

enforcement officers are not conducting a similar type of enforcement 

 

21See Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 21, 124 Stat. 8, 29-30 (2010), 31 U.S.C. § 712 Note.

22GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save 

Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011), 

and GAO-12-342SP. 

Our Work on 

Fragmentation, Overlap, 

and Duplication

Field-Based Entities 

Have Distinct 

Missions, but Can 

Conduct Overlapping 

Activities
 

Page 10 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

action or investigating the same target, and HIDTAs can improve efforts 

to reduce risks to law enforcement officers’ safety.

The five types of field-based entities in our review were established under 

different authorities and by, or with support from, different agencies at 

different times over the past three decades. However, each type of entity 

may engage in counterterrorism-related efforts and terrorism-related 

information sharing. Terrorism-related information, for example, has no 

single source and is derived by gathering, fusing, analyzing, and 

evaluating relevant information from all levels of government. This 

information can be used by federal, state, local, and tribal government 

organizations for multiple purposes, including supporting activities to 

prevent terrorist attacks. Since it involves the efforts of several federal 

agencies, terrorism-related information sharing is by definition fragmented 

and can produce unique perspectives when information from multiple 

sources is combined. However, this fragmentation can be 

disadvantageous if activities are not coordinated, as well as if 

opportunities to leverage resources across entities are not fully 

exploited.23

Specifically, RISS centers and HIDTAs have been in existence since 

before the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and 

focus primarily on combating criminal conspiracies or drug-trafficking 

organizations; however, both are also authorized to dedicate resources to 

engage in or support counterterrorism-related efforts. For example, the 

RISS program, which originated in 1974 and is administered by BJA, 

supports the ability of federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement 

member agencies to identify, target, arrest, and prosecute criminal 

conspirators.24 There are six RISS centers, and each focuses on all 

crimes, which may include efforts on activities and conspiracies related to 

 

23According to the 2012 ISE Annual Report to the Congress, effective and responsible 

information sharing requires a strong commitment and participation from agencies. The 

Program Manager for the ISE’s mission includes promoting partnerships across federal, 

state, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector, as well as internationally.

24See 42 U.S.C. § 3796h (authorizing the Director of BJA to make grants and enter into 

contracts with state, tribal, and local criminal justice agencies and nonprofit organizations 

for the purposes of identifying, targeting, and removing criminal and terrorist conspiracies 

and activities spanning jurisdictional boundaries).

Field-Based Entities Were 

Established under 

Different Authorities and 

May Engage in 

Counterterrorism-Related 

Efforts 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

terrorism.25 Similarly, the HIDTA program was established in 1988 and is 

a federally funded program administered by ONDCP that brings together 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into task forces that 

conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in designated 

areas.26 The HIDTA program is focused on counternarcotics; however, 

HIDTA program resources may be used to assist law enforcement 

agencies in investigations and activities related to terrorism and the 

prevention of terrorism.27 There are 28 HIDTAs, and each has an 

Investigative Support Center that serves to support the HIDTA program 

by providing analytical case support, promoting officer safety, preparing 

and issuing drug threat assessments, and developing and disseminating 

intelligence products.28

The other three types of entities—JTTFs, FIGs and fusion centers—were 

generally established, or in the case of JTTFs expanded, after September 

11, 2001, to more effectively address the threat of terrorism, among other 

things. Specifically, the FBI increased the number of JTTFs and 

established FIGs. JTTFs, which consist of FBI special agents, as well as 

federal, state, and local task force officers (TFO), pursue leads, gather 

evidence, respond to threats and incidents, make arrests, provide security 

for special events, conduct training, and gather intelligence related to 

 

25“All crimes” can include terrorism and other high-risk threats as well as other types of

crimes. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 

to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, enacted in October 

2001, amended 42 U.S.C. § 3796h by specifically including language related to 

multijurisdictional terrorist conspiracies and activities. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 701, 115 

Stat. 272, 374 (2001).

26The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established ONDCP and authorized the designation of 

any specified area of the United States as a high intensity drug trafficking area. See Pub. 

L. No. 100-690, § 1005(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4186-87 (1988). The Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 subsequently established the HIDTA program. 

See Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. VII, § 707, 2681, 2681-686-87 (1998) (codified as amended 

at 21 U.S.C. § 1706). 

27See 21 U.S.C. § 1706(g) (addressing the use of resources for terrorism-related 

activities, as added pursuant to the Office of National Drug Control Policy Authorization 

Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-469, § 301, 120 Stat. 3502, 3518-3524). 

28There are 32 HIDTA Investigative Support Centers—1 in 27 of the 28 HIDTAs, in 

addition to the Southwest Border HIDTA, which has a center for each of its five regions. 

The Southwest Border HIDTA includes the following five regions: Arizona, California, New 

Mexico, South Texas, and West Texas. 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

threats, among other counterterrorism-related activities.29 Since 

September 2001, the number of JTTFs has increased from 35 to 103.30 In 

addition, the FBI established the first FIG in 2003 to coordinate, manage, 

and execute all of the functions of the intelligence cycle, including 

collection, analysis, production, and dissemination, for the FBI in the field. 

FIGs are teams of FBI intelligence analysts, special agents, language 

analysts, and financial analysts, among others, working in each of the 56 

FBI field offices to analyze information from cases in their field office and 

share intelligence locally and nationally.

Similarly, after the September 2001 attacks, state and local governments 

began to establish fusion centers. They did so in part to serve as 

intermediaries within states and localities for the gathering, receipt, 

analysis, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal 

government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners, 

and to fill gaps in information sharing that the federal government alone 

could not address. As defined by the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, a fusion center is “a collaborative effort 

of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that 

combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing 

the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, 

and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”

31 As of January 2013, 77 

fusion centers were located in states and major urban areas throughout 

the country.32 While fusion centers are owned and operated by state and 

local agencies, the federal government encourages fusion centers to

 

29The FBI is responsible for the coordination of all intelligence and investigatory activity 

involving federal crimes of terrorism, and carries out this responsibility through its JTTFs 

and FIGs. 

30Each JTTF is housed in an FBI field office or resident agency. The FBI has 56 field 

offices (also called divisions) centrally located in major metropolitan areas across the 

United States and Puerto Rico. The FBI also has a total of about 400 resident agencies 

located in smaller cities and towns.

31See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(j)(1). 

32Our analysis was based on data as of January 2013. An additional fusion center was 

reported by agency officials in February 2013. States have designated primary fusion 

centers to serve as the main intermediaries for information sharing. In general, these 

fusion centers are statewide in jurisdiction and are operated by state entities, such as the 

state police or bureau of investigation. In addition, several major urban areas have 

established their own fusion centers, which are regional centers that usually cover large 

cities with substantial populations and numerous critical infrastructure sites and may be 

operated by city or county law enforcement or emergency management agencies. 
 

Page 13 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

become interconnected with one another and the federal government in a 

national network capable of sharing terrorism-related information. Further, 

the federal government supports centers through deployed personnel, 

security clearances, connectivity to federal systems, and grant funding, 

among other things. More information about each of these types of 

entities is included in appendix I.

In total, as of January 2013, 268 units of the five types of field-based 

entities were located throughout the United States, as shown in figure 1.33

In fiscal year 2011, federal agencies provided an estimated 72 full-time 

personnel to support fusion centers or HIDTA Investigative Support 

Centers in the eight urban areas we reviewed. RISS centers do not have 

any full-time federal personnel. In fiscal year 2011, federal agencies 

provided an estimated $64.6 million to support RISS centers, fusion 

centers, and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers in the eight urban 

areas.34 

 

33At one location, a fusion center and HIDTA were combined and therefore counted as 

one entity.

34We do not identify funding and personnel information for JTTFs and FIGs, since the FBI 

deemed this information as classified.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figure 1: Nationwide Locations of the Five Types of Field-Based Information-Sharing Entities in Our Review

Note: Six entities located in U.S. territories are not depicted in this figure.
 

Page 15 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

The five types of field-based entities have distinct missions, as shown in 

table 1, as well as distinct roles and responsibilities, which are generally 

consistent with their missions.

Table 1: Missions of Field-Based Information-Sharing Entities in Our Review

Entity Mission

JTTFs To detect and investigate terrorists and terrorist groups and prevent them from carrying out terrorist acts 

directed against the United States. 

FIGs To collect, gather, analyze, produce, and disseminate actionable intelligence to lead and support FBI 

investigative and intelligence programs, and to inform the intelligence community partners, and other 

federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement. 

RISS centers To support law enforcement efforts nationwide to combat illegal drug trafficking, identity theft, human 

trafficking, violent crime, and terrorist activity; and to promote officer safety. 

Fusion centers To serve as the primary focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt and sharing of 

terrorism-related information.a

The missions of fusion centers vary based on the environment in which the center operates. Some have 

adopted an approach that provides information and analysis specifically related to counterterrorism. 

Others take an all-crimes approach, which can include terrorism and other high-risk criminal threats 

related to terrorism, as well as other types of crimes. Yet others also incorporate an “all-hazards” 

approach that recognizes the role of information sharing in responding to any disaster, whether natural 

or man-made. Finally, some centers identify their missions as addressing combinations of these 

approaches.b

HIDTA Investigative 

Support Centers

To aid in the disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP documents.

a

The National Strategy for Information Sharing.

b

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.

For example, consistent with its mission to detect and investigate 

terrorists and terrorist groups and prevent them from carrying out terrorist 

acts directed against the United States, JTTFs, among these entities, are 

solely responsible for conducting counterterrorism investigations.35 RISS 

centers and HIDTA Investigative Support Centers both have missions, 

roles, and responsibilities that include supporting investigations. However, 

RISS centers focus on all crimes and support law enforcement agencies 

and officers from the beginning of an investigation to the prosecution and 

 

35The FBI is responsible for the coordination of all intelligence and investigatory activity 

involving federal crimes of terrorism, and carries out this responsibility through the JTTFs. 

Accordingly, none of the other entities are responsible for conducting counterterrorism 

investigations. HIDTA task forces conduct counternarcotics investigations. 

Entities Have Distinct 

Missions, Roles, and 

Responsibilities 
 

Page 16 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

conviction of criminals. HIDTA Investigative Support Centers, on the other 

hand, focus on narcotics-related matters and support the HIDTA drug 

task force initiatives in their respective areas in the identification, 

targeting, arrest, and prosecution of key members of criminal drug 

organizations. FIGs and fusion centers both gather, analyze, and 

disseminate intelligence. However, consistent with their mission, FIGs are

responsible for serving as the FBI’s intermediary for information sharing 

and collaboration among the FBI; the U.S. intelligence community; fusion 

centers; and other federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement, 

government, and private sector entities.

36 Fusion centers, which are state 

or locally owned and operated, conduct these activities to serve as state 

and local intermediaries for information sharing and collaboration among 

the national network of fusion centers, and other federal, state, local, and 

tribal law enforcement; government; and private sector entities. In 

general, the purpose of fusion centers is to improve information sharing 

within their states or localities, and between state and local agencies and 

the federal government to help prevent terrorism or other threats. Indeed, 

the National Strategy for Information Sharing states that fusion centers 

“will serve as the primary focal points within the state and local 

environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related information.” 

However, the missions of individual fusion centers vary to meet the 

specific state and local needs of their jurisdictions. The strategy also 

states that it recognizes the sovereignty of state and local governments 

and understands that fusion centers are owned and managed by state 

and local governments.

 

36The missions of the FIGs and the JTTFs are defined in accordance with Executive Order 

12333, as amended, which designates the FBI as the responsible entity for domestic 

investigations of terrorist and counterintelligence threats to the United States, as well as 

coordinating domestic activities of the intelligence community.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

In carrying out their respective missions, roles, and responsibilities, 

entities in the eight urban areas in our review conducted activities that 

overlap. That is, the entities may conduct similar analytical or 

investigative support activities or services in support of similar goals in the 

same mission areas (e.g., all crimes, counterterrorism, and 

counternarcotics) for similar customers (e.g., federal, state, and local 

agencies).37 Across the eight urban areas, 34 of the 37 field-based 

entities we reviewed conducted an analytical or investigative support 

activity that overlapped with that of another entity. Overlap in these 

activities can lead to benefits, such as validating information for 

customers, or inefficiencies, such as burdening customers who use 

resources to sort through redundant information.

As shown in figure 2, in each of the eight urban areas in our review, we 

identified instances of overlap in analytical activities and services 

conducted by field-based entities for similar customers in the same 

mission area.38

 

37For purposes of this report, we defined the mission area of “all crimes” as any crime 

including, but not limited to, terrorism, narcotics, gangs, money laundering, fraud, and 

identity theft; the mission area of counterterrorism as the practices, tactics, techniques, 

and strategies adopted to prevent or respond to terrorist threats or acts, both real and 

imputed; and the mission area of “counternarcotics” as the practices, tactics, techniques, 

and strategies adopted to prevent or respond to use, possession and distribution of illegal 

drugs.

38For purposes of this report, we defined six categories of analytical activities and other 

services that entities can perform: (1) collection management, which is the identification, 

location, and recording or storing of information used to support analysis; (2) strategic 

analysis, which is the analysis of crime patterns, crime trends, or criminal organizations for 

the purpose of planning, decision making, and resource allocation; (3) analytical products, 

which involves the conversion of raw information into intelligence; (4) threat or risk 

assessments, which are documents that analyze the propensity for threat or risk in a 

certain time or place; (5) criminal bulletins and publications, which are bulletins or 

publications that highlight criminal activity; and (6) dissemination, which is the distribution 

of information to customers. We identified these categories by reviewing agency 

documents and interviewing agency officials to generate a list of analytical activities and 

services that entities potentially conduct.

Some Entities Conduct 

Overlapping Analytical and 

Investigative Support 

Activities and Services in 

Selected Urban Areas

Analytical Activities and 

Services 
 

Page 18 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figure 2: Analytical Activities and Services Conducted in the Same Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the Eight Urban 

Areas in Our Review
 

Page 19 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figure 2: Analytical Activities and Services Conducted in the Same Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the Eight Urban 

Areas in Our Review (continued)
 

Page 20 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Notes: We focused our analysis on whether an entity conducted an activity for federal, state or local 

customers. Therefore, entities could also conduct these activities for other customers, such as for 

tribal agencies or to meet internal needs. In addition, entities did not report whether customers for 

whom an activity was conducted were considered to be primary or secondary customers. 

Accordingly, the figure indicates whether an activity was conducted, not the frequency or prevalence 

of that activity. For example, the amount of time and resources dedicated to each activity conducted 

by the entities may vary. For the purposes of this report, we defined six categories of analytical 

activities and other services that entities can perform: (1) collection management, (2) strategic 

analysis, (3) analytical products, (4) threat or risk assessments, (5) criminal bulletins and publications, 

and (6) dissemination.

a

Collection management is the identification, location, and recording or storing of information used to 

support analysis.

b

Strategic analysis is the analysis of crime patterns, crime trends, or criminal organizations for the 

purpose of planning, decision making, and resource allocation.

c

Analytical products involve the conversion of raw information into intelligence.

d

Threat or risk assessments are documents that analyze the propensity for threat or risk in a certain 

time or place.

e

Criminal bulletins and publications are bulletins or publications that highlight criminal activity.

f

Dissemination is the distribution of information to customers.

First, looking across mission areas and entities, we identified more 

instances of overlap in analytical activities and services being conducted 

in the mission areas of all crimes and counterterrorism compared with the 

mission area of counternarcotics. Specifically, out of the 91 instances of 

overlap—in which more than one type of entity in the same urban area 

conducted the same analytical activity or service for similar customers in 

the same mission area—41 were in the mission area of all crimes, and 33 

were in the mission area of counterterrorism compared with 17 that were 

in the mission area of counternarcotics. We also identified more instances 

of overlap involving a fusion center and a FIG compared with the other 

three types of entities. Out of the 91 instances of overlap, 88 involved a 

fusion center, 59 involved a FIG, and 54 involved both a fusion center and 

a FIG.39 For example, in the one urban area, the fusion center and FIG 

both produced all-crimes analytical products, threat and risk 

assessments, and criminal bulletins and publications, as well as 

disseminated all-crimes information, for federal, state, and local 

customers.

 

39Entities may not provide all products and services to all customers based on 

considerations including classification and the need to know.
 

Page 21 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Second, we identified more instances of overlap in the category of 

dissemination compared with other analytical activities and services. For 

example, in five of the eight urban areas, the fusion center, RISS center, 

and FIG disseminated information in the mission area of all crimes for 

federal, state, and local customers. In addition, in seven of the eight 

urban areas, the fusion center and FIG both disseminated information in 

the mission area of counterterrorism. For example, according to officials 

at one local law enforcement agency, the fusion center and the FIG in 

their area both produce and disseminate counterterrorism analytical 

products, such as “Terrorism Indicators” or “Possible High Value Targets.” 

The broad missions of fusion centers as state and local entities increase 

the potential for overlap in analytical activities and services. One 

explanation for the overlap in activities conducted in the all-crimes 

mission area is that fusion centers conduct activities related to a range of 

criminal activity in addition to terrorism-related information sharing. 

Officials from 7 of the 10 fusion centers that we interviewed in our eight 

urban areas reported that their fusion centers were initially established 

with an all-crimes mission, and officials from the other 3 fusion centers 

reported that they expanded the missions of their centers to include all 

crimes. Officials from all 3 of these fusion centers explained that they 

expanded the missions of their fusion centers to include all crimes 

because of the nexus, or link, of many crimes to terrorist-related activity. 

In addition, officials from all 3 of these fusion centers explained that they 

also expanded their missions in an effort to better serve state and local 

customers. This is consistent with nationwide information. According to 

data collected by DHS as of 2011, 63 of 72 fusion centers reported that 

the fusion center’s mission included all crimes, and 54 of 72 fusion 

centers reported that the center’s mission included counterterrorism.40

Five fusion centers reported that their mission was exclusively related to 

counterterrorism. In addition, the overlap in counterterrorism, as well as 

the overlap between fusion centers and FIGs, can be explained by fusion 

centers’ unique role as state and local entities. As previously mentioned, 

fusion centers and FIGs both, among other things, analyze and 

disseminate intelligence. However, fusion centers generally conduct 

these activities to serve as state and local intermediaries, while FIGs 

generally conduct these activities to serve as the FBI and U.S. 

 

40Fusion centers could report one or more missions, such as all crimes, counterterrorism, 

or all hazards. 
 

Page 22 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

intelligence community intermediaries. Thus, while both types of entities 

may conduct similar analytical activities and services, they are doing so 

for different purposes. For example, officials from all 10 of the fusion 

centers that we interviewed explained that their analysts infuse state or 

local perspectives with information that they receive from federal partners 

to provide customers with relevant context.

Overlap in analytical activities and services can be beneficial, for 

example, by increasing entities’ focus on sharing information, validating 

information, or allowing for competing or complementary analysis; 

however, it can also lead to inefficiencies, such as burdening customers 

with redundant information. Officials from six of the seven state and local 

law enforcement customer agencies we interviewed stated that when 

entities have information, they feel the need to share it through the 

production of analytical products and dissemination of information.41 For 

example, an official from one local law enforcement agency explained 

that the benefit of entities disseminating information is that they are 

ensuring that information gets to those that need it. Additionally, officials 

from all seven of these agencies said that they expect to get all available 

information to make decisions to protect the citizens in their jurisdiction. 

Moreover, officials from three of the seven customer agencies we 

interviewed stated that receiving similar information from more than one 

entity enables them to validate and corroborate information. Further, 

officials from DHS and BJA noted benefits of competing or 

complementary analytical products. For example, different entities may 

draw different conclusions from the same or similar data given their 

unique missions and differing customers, perspectives, or jurisdictions. 

However, while officials from all seven state and local law enforcement 

customer agencies had varying preferences regarding the frequency and 

amount of information they receive from entities, officials from four of 

these agencies stated that receiving redundant information is 

burdensome.42 For example, an official from one local law enforcement 

agency stated that when entities forward original products, criminal 

 

41One of the eight state and local law enforcement customer agencies included in our 

review did not comment on overlap in activities conducted by entities.

42According to FBI officials, actions to ensure coordination for product dissemination are 

largely dependent upon the relationship with each fusion center; with differences between 

their intelligence products, not all fusion center products are sent to FIGs and FBI FIG 

products are not always appropriate for dissemination to fusion centers.
 

Page 23 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

bulletins, and publications without coordinating them, this leads to law 

enforcement leadership getting inundated with redundant information. 

This has led him to devote time to developing processes to ensure that 

his e-mail inbox does not reach capacity, because then he would not be 

able to receive additional e-mails that may contain important information. 

Entity officials in the eight urban areas in our review provided examples of 

efforts they have taken to coordinate products, among other things, that 

have helped to address instances of unnecessary overlap, which we 

discuss later in this report.

As shown in figure 3, we also identified instances of overlap in 

investigative support activities and services conducted by entities for 

similar customers in the same mission area.43

 

43For purposes of this report, we defined five categories of investigative support activities 

and services that entities can perform: (1) tactical analysis, which is the analysis of 

information regarding a specific criminal event that can be used immediately by 

operational units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations, and provide 

for officer safety; (2) equipment and money loans, which are the loaning of specialized 

investigative equipment or money to support investigations; (3) computer forensics and 

enhancement services, which involves the retrieval of information from computers and 

digital storage media and the enhancement of audio or video recordings; (4) target 

deconfliction, which is determining if multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating, 

for example, the same person, vehicle, weapon, or business; and (5) event deconfliction, 

which is determining if multiple federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies are 

conducting an enforcement action (e.g., a raid, undercover operation, or surveillance) in 

proximity to one another during a specified time period.

Investigative Support Activities 

and Services 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figure 3: Investigative Support Activities and Services Conducted in the Same Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the 

Eight Urban Areas in Our Review
 

Page 25 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figure 3: Investigative Support Activities and Services Conducted in the Same Mission Areas for Similar Customers in the 

Eight Urban Areas in Our Review (continued)
 

Page 26 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Notes: The figure includes activities and services that support investigations, and does not include the 

activity of investigating a case. We focused our analysis on whether an entity conducted an activity 

for federal, state or local customers. Therefore, entities could also conduct these activities for other 

customers, such as for tribal agencies or to meet internal needs. In addition, entities did not report 

whether customers for whom an activity was conducted were considered to be primary or secondary 

customers. Accordingly, the figure indicates whether an activity was conducted, not the frequency or 

prevalence of that activity. For example, the amount of time and resources dedicated to each activity 

conducted by the entities may vary. While the JTTF does not itself offer some particular services, they 

are or can be provided by other subcomponents of the local FBI field office of which the particular 

JTTF is a part. For the purposes of this report, we defined five categories of investigative support 

activities and services that entities can perform: (1) tactical analysis, (2) equipment and money loans, 

(3) computer forensics and enhancement, (4) target deconfliction, and (5) event deconfliction.

a

Tactical analysis is the analysis of information regarding a specific criminal event that can be used 

immediately by operational units to further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations, and 

provide for officer safety.

b

Equipment and money loans refers to the loaning of specialized investigative equipment or money to 

support investigations.

c

Computer forensics and enhancement services involve the retrieval of information from computers 

and digital storage media and the enhancement of audio or video recordings.

d

Target deconfliction is determining if multiple law enforcement agencies are investigating, for 

example, the same person, vehicle, weapon, or business.

e

Event deconfliction is determining if multiple federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies are 

conducting an enforcement action (e.g., a raid, undercover operation, or surveillance) in proximity to 

one another during a specified time period.

First, looking across mission areas and types of entities, we identified 

more instances of overlap in investigative support activities and services 

being conducted in the mission area of all crimes compared with the 

mission areas of counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Specifically, out 

of the 32 instances of overlap—in which more than one type of entity in 

the same urban area conducted the same investigative support activity or 

service for similar customers in the same mission area—25 were in the 

mission area of all crimes. Additionally, more instances of overlap 

involved a RISS center and fusion center compared with the other three 

entities. Out of the 32 instances of overlap, 27 involved a RISS center, 23 

involved a fusion center, and 18 involved both a RISS center and a fusion 

center. For example, in one urban area, the RISS center and fusion 

center both conducted tactical analysis, target deconfliction, and event 

deconfliction in the mission area of all crimes for federal, state, and local 

customers. The RISS center and fusion center in this urban area also 

both provided equipment and money loans in the mission area of all 

crimes for state and local customers.

Second, looking at investigative support activities and services, we 

identified more instances of overlap in tactical analysis, such as link 

analysis or telephone toll analysis, compared with other investigative 
 

Page 27 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

support activities and services.44 Specifically, in seven of the eight urban 

areas, the RISS center and fusion center both conducted tactical analysis 

in the mission area of all crimes. In four of these seven urban areas, the 

RISS center and fusion center conducted all-crimes tactical analysis for 

federal, state, and local customers. In another two of these urban areas, 

the RISS center and fusion center conducted the activity for state and 

local customers. In the remaining urban area, the RISS center and fusion 

center conducted the activity for federal customers. For example, while 

officials from the RISS center in one urban area acknowledged that other 

entities, including the fusion center, in their urban area also conducted allcrimes tactical analysis, they stated that they have an active and close 

working relationship with these other entities. Specifically, to coordinate 

all-crimes tactical analysis, the RISS center’s Field Service Coordinator 

attends bimonthly regional intelligence meetings alongside 

representatives from the other entities, and provides technology to and 

receives training from the fusion center.45 Entity officials cited efforts they 

have taken to coordinate and address unnecessary overlap, which we 

discuss later in this report.

RISS centers and HIDTAs operate duplicative deconfliction systems—

that is, systems that aim to ensure law enforcement officers are not 

conducting enforcement actions at the same time in the same place or 

investigating the same target—which could pose risks to officer safety 

and lead to inefficiencies. RISS and HIDTA officials have taken steps to 

connect target deconfliction systems—those that inform agencies when 

they are investigating the same individuals, weapons, vehicles, or 

businesses—and two of three event deconfliction systems. However, 

HIDTA officials have not finalized plans to make the remaining event 

deconfliction system interoperable with the other two systems, which 

could further reduce risks to officer safety and lessen the burden on law 

enforcement agencies that are currently using multiple systems to notify 

agencies when they are conducting conflicting enforcement actions.

 

44Link analysis is the analysis of information that shows relationships among varied 

subjects suspected of being involved in criminal activity. Telephone toll analysis is the 

analysis of incoming and outgoing telephone calls, which can help investigators to 

establish ties between suspects. 

45RISS field service coordinators are individuals with law enforcement backgrounds who 

initiate regular contact with law enforcement and public safety agencies and provide 

tailored training and consultation to those agencies. 

Efforts to Make Systems 

That Deconflict Operations 

Interoperable Could 

Reduce Risks to Officer 

Safety and Inefficiencies
 

Page 28 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Specifically, the RISS and HIDTA programs operate three separate 

systems that have (1) event deconfliction functions to determine when 

multiple federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies are conducting 

enforcement actions (e.g., raids, undercover operations, or surveillances) 

in proximity to one another during a specified time period, or (2) target 

deconfliction functions, which determine if multiple law enforcement 

agencies are investigating, for example, the same person, vehicle, 

weapon, or business. In 2009, RISS developed RISSafe to provide event 

deconfliction to its members and those not being served by another 

system. Individual HIDTAs have used the Secure Automated Fast Event 

Tracking Network (SAFETNet) system, which has had event deconfliction 

functions, among other functions, since 2001 to help ensure officer safety. 

In 2009, the HIDTA program introduced deconfliction features into the 

Case Explorer system that differed from SAFETNet by providing a free 

service that is tied to its performance management process. Table 2 

provides details about the features of these three systems.

Table 2: Systems with Deconfliction Functions That RISS Centers and HIDTAs Operate

RISS-operated HIDTA-operated

RISSafe Case Explorer SAFETNet

Type of deconfliction

Event √ √ √

Target √ √

Features

Open to law enforcement and criminal justice agencies √ √ √

Manages information about people, places, and vehicles √ √ √

Operates a watch center to put law enforcement agents in contact with one 

another

√ √ √

Direct entry/24-hour access √ √ √

Plots events geospatially, notifying the user of any conflicts within a defined 

radius

√ √ √

Can enter only future events √ √

Source: GAO use of ONDCP and RISS information. 

Note: While HIDTAs operate two of the systems, individual HIDTAs can use any or all of the three 

systems.

Law enforcement officers generally enter events into a deconfliction 

system electronically or by calling a watch center. Individuals operating a 

watch center plot the location of the event on a map and notify the officer 

for whom contact information is available in the system of other officers 

who have entered conflicting events into the same system. When events 
 

Page 29 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

are not deconflicted, officer safety can be at risk. For example, HIDTA 

officials responsible for operating Case Explorer stated that, as a result of 

not deconflicting an undercover operation, an undercover officer was shot 

and killed by other law enforcement officers because the other officers did 

not know that an undercover officer was close to them. In addition, HIDTA 

and RISS officials described instances when officers did not deconflict 

drug busts, which led to undercover officers from different agencies 

drawing guns on one another thinking the other officers were drug 

dealers. The officials added that, had the events been deconflicted, the 

officers would have been aware of one another’s presence.

However, RISS and HIDTA officials said that the use of more than one 

system with deconfliction functions increases the possibility of events not 

being coordinated because users have entered an event into only one 

system but not all of the systems. As shown in figure 4, law enforcement 

agencies in 12 states use more than one system to deconflict events. 

RISS and HIDTA officials stated that all of the systems are open to law 

enforcement agencies, and law enforcement agencies may choose one 

over the other based on preference, experience, or their affiliation with a 

particular RISS center or HIDTA. Duplicative event deconfliction systems 

may also lead to inefficiencies. For example, according to RISS officials, 

law enforcement agencies have expressed frustration in having their staff 

spend time entering information into multiple systems to ensure that their 

investigations are not conflicting with those of other agencies. These 

RISS officials also noted that the agencies could be jeopardizing officer 

safety if they choose to enter information into one system when more 

than one is available.
 

Page 30 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Figure 4: Use of Systems with Event Deconfliction Functions by State

RISS and HIDTA officials have already taken steps to reduce duplication 

in target deconfliction systems; however, these steps do not address the 

duplicative event deconfliction systems. Recognizing that target 

deconfliction can increase efficiency by connecting officers who may be 

working on the same or related cases, RISS centers and HIDTAs, along 

with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the International Justice and

Public Safety Network and the National Alliance of State Drug 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Enforcement Agencies developed a National Virtual Pointer System 

(NVPS). The system connects existing investigative target deconfliction 

databases and notifies federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement 

agencies participating in NVPS when an active investigative target they 

are investigating is also being investigated by another participant. NVPS 

facilitates target deconfliction and, as of March 2013, interoperability with 

existing event deconfliction systems is not being pursued.

In September 2012, RISS and HIDTA officials signed a memorandum of 

understanding to coordinate efforts to make two of the three duplicative 

event deconfliction systems—RISSafe and Case Explorer—interoperable; 

however, the memorandum of understanding did not include SAFETNet.46

RISS and HIDTA officials stated that interoperability will be completely 

effective only with participation from all three systems, and risks to officer 

safety could remain with one system missing from the effort. The 

memorandum of understanding did not include SAFETNet because the 

13 HIDTAs that operate the system and the contractor that provides 

support stated that they were going to first continue their ongoing efforts 

to make revisions to the target deconfliction function of SAFETNet—

intended to link the users of this function—before they would consider 

changes to the event deconfliction function. RISS and HIDTA officials 

said that they chose to move forward with the memorandum of 

understanding and their efforts to make two of the systems interoperable 

with the intent of trying to integrate SAFETNet at a later date. While RISS 

and HIDTA officials noted that they had been discussing these issues 

since early 2012, they stated that the memorandum is a first step and was 

signed to demonstrate their recognition of the importance of officer safety, 

the need to coordinate operational and investigative efforts, and the need 

to leverage usage of proven systems and programs.47 RISS and HIDTA 

officials stated that they tested the software that would allow the two 

 

46RISS and HIDTA officials stated that they favor interoperability over consolidation of the 

systems to increase officer safety and efficiency without having to rely on a single system, 

which could result in a single point of failure. These officials have not estimated the full 

cost to make the systems interoperable. RISS received a $150,000 grant for the effort, 

and HIDTA officials used existing funds to integrate Case Explorer, describing the 

expense as nominal.

47In the 2012 report to Congress on efforts to implement the ISE, the Program Manager 

identified event deconfliction as a test scenario that suggested that maturity of the 

systems depends on community involvement, common standards, and integration. 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

systems to be interoperable in December 2012 and expected to complete 

the effort in 2013.

RISS and HIDTA officials stated that the HIDTAs that operate SAFETNet 

have expressed interest in making SAFETNet interoperable with the other 

two systems once SAFETNet users are linked. However, according to 

RISS officials, SAFETNet officials have not provided a target time frame 

for when they would finish linking SAFETNet users and have stated that 

this effort needs to be completed before they can commit to joining 

RISSafe and Case Explorer. Identifying milestones and time frames is 

consistent with best practices for program management.48 We have also 

reported that ensuring that all relevant participants are included is a key 

factor to the successful implementation of collaborative efforts.49 The 

effort to make the deconfliction systems interoperable, thus far, has not 

fully addressed these considerations. SAFETNet officials recognize the 

need for interoperability; however, milestones and time frames for 

completing the actions needed to link SAFETNet users and then join 

efforts to make the three systems interoperable would help to ensure that 

all parties involved accomplish their goals in a defined period of time. This 

could help achieve interoperability of all three event deconfliction 

systems, prevent delays in efforts to maximize the efficiency of the 

systems, and ensure the safety of officers by preventing incidents in the 

field.

 

48Program management standards we reviewed are reflected in the Project Management 

Institute’s The Standard for Program Management, Second Edition © (2008). One of these 

practices is developing milestone dates to identify points throughout the project to 

reassess efforts under way to determine whether project changes are necessary.

49GAO-12-1022. 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP acknowledge the importance of the entities 

working together and sharing information; however, they do not hold the 

entities accountable for coordinating with one another. A mechanism that 

holds entities accountable for coordination and enables agencies to 

monitor and evaluate the results of their efforts, such as performance 

metrics related to coordination, could help provide the agencies with 

information on the effectiveness of coordination among field-based 

entities and help reduce any unnecessary overlap in entities’ efforts. 

Officials in the eight selected urban areas we reviewed cited the inclusion 

of partners on governance boards and field-based entities’ physical or 

virtual colocation as two practices that helped to enhance coordination, 

information sharing, and efficiencies—in their view, reducing the potential 

for unnecessary overlap and duplication in their analytical and 

investigative support activities. DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not fully 

assessed the extent to which such practices could be applied nationwide 

to increase the benefits already being realized in some urban areas.

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have processes in place to collect and measure 

information on the capabilities or performance of the entities in 

information sharing, but do not specifically hold field-based entities 

accountable for coordinating with one another. Accordingly, coordination 

is not a specific expectation in the entities’ performance management 

systems, and agencies do not track or measure the extent to which 

entities in urban areas are coordinating to leverage resources, 

collaborate, and reduce overlap. For example, according to FBI officials, 

the FBI has several performance metrics that hold JTTFs and FIGs 

accountable for sharing information, but none specific to coordinating with 

other field-based entities in their urban areas. RISS centers report 

performance indicators to BJA, such as the number of officers with 

access to their systems and the number of products and services 

provided in a given year, but these measures do not address coordination 

with other entities. DHS I&A officials stated that they are currently 

developing a set of performance measures to help determine how 

effectively the centers are meeting certain targets by collecting 

information on fusion centers’ coordination with other fusion centers; 

however, whether the measures will collect information related to the 

centers’ coordination with other field-based information-sharing entities 

has not yet been determined. HIDTA Investigative Support Centers also 

have a performance measurement program that holds them accountable 

for referring leads to other HIDTAs and other agencies, but the program 

does not include measures about the HIDTA’s ability to coordinate with 

other entities.

Federal Agencies Do 

Not Hold Entities 

Accountable for 

Coordinating and 

Have Not Assessed 

Coordination 

Mechanisms to Help 

Reduce the Potential 

for Overlap

Agencies Do Not Take 

Steps to Hold Entities 

Accountable for 

Coordination, Limiting 

Efforts to Reduce Overlap 

and Duplication
 

Page 34 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

As members of the ISA IPC Fusion Center Subcommittee, participating 

senior officials from DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have established 

coordination as a goal and have worked together to share and 

standardize practices, such as developing criteria for allocating resources 

to fusion centers, but have not established a mechanism to monitor, 

evaluate, and report results to ensure that entities are coordinating with 

each other.50 Coordination can reduce unnecessary overlap to ensure 

that the activities and products of the entities complement rather than 

duplicate those of other entities. Further, officials from the FBI, BJA, DHS, 

and ONDCP each stated that coordination among the entities is essential 

in accomplishing individual missions. However, these officials told us that 

they ultimately rely on the leadership of their respective field-based 

entities to ensure that successful coordination is occurring because the 

leaders in the field-based entities are most familiar with the other 

stakeholders and issues in their areas, and are best suited to develop 

working relationships with each other. For example, the FBI special 

agent-in-charge at each field office is expected to reach out to law 

enforcement and private sector stakeholders and potential partners in 

their respective areas. However, officials at 22 of the 37 entities stated 

that successful coordination depends most on personal relationships and 

can be disrupted when new leadership takes over at an entity. 

Specifically, they noted that the potential for overlap and duplication can 

increase when new leaders assume they understand the roles and 

activities of the other entities. Establishing a mechanism to measure 

coordination would hold entities accountable for working with other 

entities and help to reduce overlap. Officials at 20 of 37 entities stated 

that measuring and monitoring coordination could alleviate the process of 

starting over when new personnel take over at a partner entity and ensure 

that maintaining coordinated efforts is a priority.

We have previously reported that high-performing organizations use their 

performance management systems to strengthen accountability for 

results, specifically by placing greater emphasis on fostering the 

necessary coordination both within and across organizational boundaries 

 

50As discussed earlier, the ISA IPC, with representation of participating ISE agencies and 

communities, is responsible for advising the Program Manager in developing policies, 

procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards necessary to establish, implement, and 

maintain the ISE.
 

Page 35 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

to achieve results.51 Individual accountability for collaborative efforts can 

be reinforced through performance management systems by identifying 

competencies related to collaboration and setting performance 

expectations for collaboration. Incorporating performance metrics that 

emphasize collaboration and coordination with partners can benefit 

multiagency efforts. These efforts are further enhanced when 

mechanisms are developed to monitor, evaluate, and report on the results 

of the collaborative effort.52 A mechanism that holds field-based entities 

accountable for coordinating with each other and enables agencies to 

monitor and evaluate these efforts could help DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP, 

working through the ISA IPC, to provide agencies with information about 

the effectiveness of coordination among field-based entities and provide 

additional incentives for personnel in the field to strengthen coordination 

efforts.

Officials at each of the 37 entities in the eight urban areas we reviewed 

described how practices such as serving on one another’s governance 

boards or, in some cases, colocating with other entities allowed or could 

allow them to achieve certain benefits. These include better 

understanding the missions and activities of the other entities, 

coordinating the production of analytical products, and sharing resources 

such as subject matter experts. In their view, this helped to increase 

coordination, leverage resources, and avoid or reduce the negative 

effects of unnecessary overlap and duplication in their analytical, tactical, 

and dissemination activities.53

Twenty-seven of the 37 entities had a governance board that was 

responsible for the management of the entity. Specifically, these boards 

were responsible for managing the operations of the entities, promoting 

information sharing, developing standards, and overcoming obstacles to 

 

51GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual 

Performance and Organizational Success, GAO-03-488 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 

2003).

52GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2003).

53We asked officials from each of the entities which entities they coordinate with, how this 

coordination is facilitated, and how they address unnecessary overlap and duplication 

within their urban area. 

Officials in Eight Selected 

Urban Areas Identified 

Two Practices That 

Enhanced Coordination 

and Helped Reduce 

Unnecessary Overlap and 

Duplication 

Inclusion of Partners on 

Governance Boards 
 

Page 36 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

sharing information across levels of government. Officials from each of 

the 10 entities with at least one member of another entity on their 

governance board said they were able to better understand each others’ 

missions, more readily identify areas of overlap, and share resources, 

which enhanced coordination. For example, officials from a RISS center 

stated that serving as a member of a JTTF board allowed the center to 

detail an analyst to the task force. The JTTF benefitted because the RISS 

analyst showed it the types of support the RISS center can provide, and 

the RISS center benefited because the analyst acquired training on 

counterterrorism investigations that could be taken back to the center. 

Officials that had members from other entities on their boards as well as 

those who did not stated that participating on each others’ boards 

facilitated or could facilitate the ability to readily identify overlapping 

activities. For example, participants on these boards were able to 

determine when similar analytical products from more than one entity 

were being produced and avoid overlap and duplication by deciding to 

produce a collaborative product or share resources, such as data 

systems. In one urban area, the governance board of a fusion center

included members from the JTTF and the FIG. Center officials stated that 

having these entities represented on the board helped the JTTF and FIG 

better understand the mission of the fusion center. With this increased 

understanding, both sides looked at how they could use each other’s 

agents, analysts, and subject matter experts as resources. Officials from 

9 other entities stated that governance board participation from the other 

entities allowed them to adopt a regionalized approach that incorporated 

the expertise of all parties in developing strategies that avoided 

unnecessary overlap and duplication of activities. For example, activities 

such as preparing threat assessments for major events became 

collaborative efforts with roles and responsibilities discussed and agreed 

upon at governance board meetings.

Officials in the eight urban areas in our review also reported that varying 

degrees of colocation helped them to avoid unnecessary overlap through 

the coordination of analytical and tactical activities and sharing of 

resources, such as analysts with a particular area of expertise. Entities in 

the eight urban areas used various models of colocation including 

combining entities, sharing physical space, operating within shared 

networks, and having federal personnel colocated at the entity. As 

examples, officials from two colocated entities in our review stated that 

colocating and combining, as well as creating shared information spaces 

in a virtual environment, allowed them to share information more 

efficiently, develop more sophisticated products, and increase 

Physical or Virtual Colocation 

of Entities
 

Page 37 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

coordinated and collaborative efforts. Physical colocation allowed for 

increased efficiencies as the overhead cost of operating the entities, such 

as facilities, supplies, and utilities, was shared.

Officials at entities that were not colocated recognized the benefits of 

colocation and agreed that, under the right circumstances, colocation 

could increase the effectiveness of coordination and efficiencies. In one 

urban area, a fusion center and a HIDTA Investigative Support Center 

combined their locations, staff, and activities. While funding sources for 

the two sides were distinct, the staff worked across the fusion center and 

HIDTA and were able to shift their focus onto the prioritized mission 

needs of the center. For example, during a national sporting event, staff 

that usually focused on counternarcotics helped in monitoring potential 

non-drug-related threats to the area. In another urban area, entities 

operated separately but were physically located within the same building, 

making communication and collaboration more convenient. At entities we 

visited in three urban areas, staff used computer systems to create 

virtually colocated environments, which allowed partners to have a 

presence in a shared data and communications system while operating 

from their own physical space. For example, one fusion center has 

established a virtual information-sharing system in which federal, state, 

and local law enforcement and non-law enforcement partners can post 

and retrieve information related to suspicious activities, security concerns, 

and security-related information that affects the entire urban area or 

region. According to fusion center officials, this approach was useful in 

areas where partner agencies’ jurisdictions covered a large geographic 

area, since law enforcement agents could participate virtually in a fusion 

center or HIDTA while being physically located in a different area.

In addition to citing these models of colocation, officials in each of the 10 

fusion centers in our review stated that colocating federal personnel, such 

as FBI special agents or DHS intelligence officers, with fusion centers 

was a practice that benefits, or could benefit, their centers. We present 

these officials’ perspectives on the benefits of having deployed federal 

personnel in their centers as well as the status of FBI and DHS personnel 

deployed to fusion centers in appendix II. 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have not assessed the extent to which practices 

that could enhance coordination and help reduce unnecessary overlap 

and duplication in activities—such as participation on governance boards 

and colocation—could be applied more comprehensively nationwide 

across these field-based entities. Activities such as participation on 

governance boards and colocation are consistent with practices and 

mechanisms that we have previously reported federal agencies have 

used to implement interagency collaborative efforts, as well as with 

guidance provided to the entities by DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP. For 

example, we reported that colocation can be a mechanism that can 

facilitate collaboration between agencies.54 Further, guidance for fusion 

centers states that governance structures should include representatives 

from the federal government in at least an advisory capacity and should 

also include local representatives from the FBI (i.e., the JTTF and FIG) 

and components of DHS, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. According to the 

guidance, the governance structures should also consider including or 

coordinating with HIDTAs as appropriate to the center’s mission and 

location. The FBI also directs its field offices to emphasize the importance 

of representation in fusion centers by ensuring FBI executive 

management’s participation on fusion center governance boards and 

advisory councils. Additionally, HIDTAs are directed and guided by 

executive boards comprising an equal number of federal and nonfederal 

(i.e., state, local, and tribal) law enforcement leaders.

However, entities nationwide do not all use practices such as governance 

boards and colocation. Specifically, according to survey data collected by 

DHS I&A, 11 of 72 fusion centers do not have governance boards, and 

not all entities with governance boards include members of the other 

entities. For example, of the 37 entities in our review, 27 had governance 

boards and 10 included members from other entities. Entities’ experience 

with governance boards demonstrates that providing increased 

participation from entities on one another’s governance boards could 

foster more effective collaboration. Additionally, while officials from each 

of the entities in the urban areas in our review expressed the benefits of 

colocation, they stated that agencies had not fully explored opportunities 

to engage in the various forms of colocation. For example, 16 fusion 

 

54In addition, we reported that other mechanisms, such as clarifying roles and 

responsibilities, agreeing on common terminology and definitions, and developing written 

guidance and agreements, could facilitate coordination between agencies. See 

GAO-12-1022 for more information.

Agencies Have Not 

Assessed Practices That 

Enhance Coordination to 

Help Identify Additional 

Opportunities to 

Coordinate and Reduce 

Overlap
 

Page 39 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

centers are colocated with JTTFs, and six JTTFs and four FIGs are also 

colocated with HIDTA Investigative Support Centers.55 While the focus of 

HIDTAs is counternarcotics, five of seven HIDTA directors stated that 

colocation with JTTFs and FIGs has strengthened, or would strengthen, 

their ability to share information, build databases, provide training 

opportunities, deconflict targets, and exchange best practices. Therefore, 

agencies may have additional opportunities to apply these types of 

practices.

DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP have begun to take some steps to discuss these 

issues. For example, the Fusion Center Sub‐Committee of the ISA IPC 

brought its members and others together to discuss how to establish 

stronger partnerships between fusion centers and HIDTAs, and to further 

define the operational roles, responsibilities, and relationships among 

these entities. As a result of this meeting, participating fusion center and 

HIDTA officials determined that, under the right circumstances, the 

colocation or integration of fusion centers and HIDTA Investigative 

Support Centers may bring significant benefits, but this should not be 

advocated as a universal approach because it may not be practical in all 

cases. According to agency officials present at the meeting, while the 

participation of entities on each others’ boards and colocation were 

discussed as potentially beneficial practices, the subcommittee did not 

explore the extent to which these or other coordination practices could 

benefit additional entities across the nation. The subcommittee also did 

not identify characteristics of locations that promote successful colocation 

or specific locations where colocation could benefit the entities. Rather, 

the intent was to provide a forum to share practices, and the 

subcommittee did not have a plan to implement or promote specific 

practices nor to further assess their greater applicability.

According to the Program Management Institute’s Standard for Program 

Management, organizations should determine the value of a project’s 

benefits, such as an assessment of participation on governance boards or 

collocation, identify the interdependency of benefits in different programs, 

and assign responsibilities and accountability for the realization of those 

benefits.56 An assessment of participation on governance boards and the 

 

55Additionally, four FIGs and seven HIDTA Investigative Support Centers are colocated 

with fusion centers. None of the RISS centers are colocated with another entity.

56Program management standards GAO reviewed are reflected in the Project 

Management Institute’s The Standard for Program Management, Second Edition. ©2008.
 

Page 40 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

colocation of these entities in specific geographic areas, as well as other 

practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary 

overlap, could better position DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP, working through 

the ISA IPC, to assist the entities. Such an assessment could identify 

characteristics that make these practices successful, inform whether 

additional governance boards or colocated entities should be pursued, or 

determine whether other opportunities to leverage resources and 

increase cost efficiencies and operational capabilities exist.

Further, as required by the Intelligence Reform Act, the Program Manager 

is to submit annual reports to Congress. Accordingly, the Program 

Manager has reported on the benefits and importance of promoting 

partnerships and developing standards and has highlighted progress and 

successes, such as implementing privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 

protections and strengthening cybersecurity in the annual reports to 

Congress on implementing the ISE.57 These reports, however, have not 

included information about specific coordination efforts across these five 

types of entities.58 According to the Program Manager, past reports have 

focused on broader issues such as strengthening the safeguarding of 

terrorism-related information, but including information on specific 

coordination efforts among the five types of field-based entities in future 

reports would provide beneficial information to the information-sharing 

environment. We have previously reported that defining and articulating a 

common outcome; developing mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and 

report on results; and reinforcing agency accountability for collaborative 

efforts through agency plans and reports can help enhance and sustain 

coordinated efforts among agencies.59 The inclusion of the results of such 

an assessment conducted by DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP—including any 

additional coordination practices identified, efficiencies realized, or 

actions planned—in the ISE annual report to Congress could help the 

Program Manager hold agencies accountable for completing the 

 

57The ISE Annual Report to Congress is submitted in pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 485(h), which 

specifies 10 categories of information the report must include.

58Although information about specific coordination among entities participating in the ISE 

is not among the 10 categories of information required for inclusion in the annual reports, 

including such information would be consistent with the categories of information that the 

annual reports presently address. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(h)(2).

59 GAO-06-15. 
 

Page 41 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

assessment and disseminate its results to further enhance collaborative 

efforts and efficiencies across agencies.

FBI, BJA, DHS, and ONDCP collect information on the results that JTTFs, 

FIGs, RISS centers, fusion centers and HIDTA Investigative Support 

Centers achieve. Although some of these agencies consider the results 

when they make decisions about future funding, others consider different 

factors—such as risk and threats—rather than results, or do not directly 

make decisions about future funding.

According to FBI officials, the FBI gathers information on the results that 

JTTFs and FIGs achieve through annual field office reports and other 

performance reviews. Specifically, each field office is subject to 

semiannual performance reviews and submits an annual report in order 

for the FBI to assess how well each field office identifies and addresses 

threats in its area. According to FBI officials, the reviews and annual field 

office report contain data on established performance measures for the 

FIG and all investigative programs, including counterterrorism task forces 

such as the JTTFs. For example, the FBI tracks FIG results, such as the 

number of strategic intelligence reports produced and requests for 

information received, and collects various case-related results from 

JTTFs, including the number of investigations conducted and information 

sources developed.

FBI officials responsible for the oversight of the JTTFs and FIGs stated 

that the reviews are primarily used to report and assess field office 

performance. They also reported that the FBI allocates funding and 

resources to its field offices based primarily on the prevalence of risks 

and threats within a region. The FBI funding that supports all resources 

for the FIGs and the JTTFs is congressionally appropriated and scored to 

Agencies Collect 

Information on the 

Results Entities 

Achieve, but Vary in 

How They Consider 

Such Data when 

Making Decisions 

about Future Funding

The FBI Uses Data on 

JTTFs and FIGs to 

Evaluate Performance, but 

Determines Funding 

Levels Based on Relative 

Threats and Risks in a 

Region
 

Page 42 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

the National Intelligence Program.60 Uses of these funds, for example, 

include the salaries of FBI special agents that serve on the JTTF through 

allocations to FBI field offices, as well as other JTTF operational costs, 

including rental of office space, information technology requirements, and 

support for participating state and local TFOs, including vehicles and 

overtime pay.

Consistent with RISS program grant guidance, in conducting grant 

oversight, BJA collects information on various results that each RISS 

center achieves. According to RISS and BJA officials, BJA collects 

information quarterly on results that member agencies achieve that can 

be attributed to the products and assistance they receive from RISS 

centers, including the number of resulting arrests and the value of 

narcotics, currency, and property seizures during investigations that RISS 

centers supported. For example, according to the quarterly reports, in 

2011, law enforcement agencies used RISS services on cases that 

resulted in more than 5,000 arrests and $43 million in narcotics, currency, 

and property seizures. BJA also collects other data on RISS centers, 

such as the number of state and local law enforcement agencies that are 

members of each center and the number of analytical products each 

center developed. According to BJA officials responsible for overseeing 

the RISS program, the agency collects information on RISS centers’ 

results to fulfill grant management requirements.

BJA officials stated that RISS center directors use information regarding 

the needs of the state and local law enforcement agencies that are 

members of each center when making recommendations to BJA about 

funding for individual centers, and the agency considers each center’s 

work when approving final funding decisions. According to BJA officials 

that administer the grant program, BJA provides RISS directors with the 

total funding amount available for the RISS program, and RISS directors 

unanimously recommend funding amounts for each RISS center. RISS 

center directors covering the urban areas in our review reported that they 

consider multiple factors when deciding how much funding to 

 

60Discretionary funding through the National Intelligence Program supports national 

security goals and reflects a deliberative process to focus funding on the most critical 

capabilities, curtail personnel growth, and invest in more efficient information technology 

solutions. We do not present data on the specific funding levels of JTTFs and FIGs in this 

report since the FBI deemed these data classified.

BJA Gathers Information 

on RISS Centers’ Results 

for Grant Oversight and 

Considers Centers’ Work in 

Approving Funding 

Allocations to Centers
 

Page 43 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

recommend, such as each center’s geographic coverage, the size of its 

member agencies, and the types of services the center provides to its 

members. According to BJA officials, BJA reviews the recommendations 

to ensure that they are consistent with the work submitted for the centers 

in previous grant cycles and that each center has submitted all financial 

and progress reports required by the grant. These officials added that, on 

the basis of this review, BJA makes a final funding decision.

Annually, DHS I&A collects information on the progress fusion centers 

have made in meeting baseline capabilities—a defined set of standards 

developed by DHS and DOJ, in conjunction with fusion centers, that 

centers should achieve to be considered capable of performing basic 

functions in the national information-sharing network.61 Among the 

baseline capability information that DHS I&A collects and tracks are four 

critical capabilities—including a center’s ability to analyze threat 

information and disseminate intelligence products to stakeholders—as 

well as other capabilities, such as the ability to protect individuals’ privacy, 

civil rights, and civil liberties. For example, in reporting on fusion centers’ 

progress in achieving the four critical capabilities, in 2011 DHS reported 

that at least 75 percent of fusion centers, or 54 centers, had approved 

plans, policies, or standard operating procedures for each of the critical 

capabilities.

DHS provides grants to individual states and urban areas that can be 

used to support fusion centers. Starting with fiscal year 2011, DHS 

modified requirements in the Homeland Security Grant Program 

(HSGP)—which is administered through the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) and provides funding that states and local 

jurisdictions can use to support fusion centers—to state that any federal 

funds centers receive must be used to fill gaps in critical capabilities 

 

61During this annual assessment process, DHS collects data to evaluate the maturity of 

fusion center capabilities, which helps state and local leaders identify areas to strengthen 

capabilities and provides a basis to justify investment requests, The assessment process 

focuses primarily on measuring fusion center implementation of the baseline capabilities 

and is conducted in two phases: (1) an online self-assessment completed by fusion center 

directors that details the progress their centers have made in achieving capabilities and 

(2) validation of the self-assessments by DHS through structured interviews with fusion 

center directors. Following the completion of the annual assessment process, DHS 

publishes the findings in an annual report that describes the aggregate capability of the 

centers as well as recommendations to further strengthen and mature fusion center 

capabilities.

DHS Collects Data on 

Fusion Center Capabilities 

and Has Efforts Under Way 

to Gather Data on 

Performance
 

Page 44 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

identified through its annual assessment process.62 Further, DHS I&A and 

FEMA required that fusion center applicants identify the corresponding 

baseline capability they will address in their proposals to state grant 

recipients for portions of federal grant funding. To strengthen the 

coordinated use of grant funds, DHS also required that HSGP funds that 

are used to support intelligence or fusion-related activities (e.g., 

intelligence units) are integrated or coordinated with the respective state 

or local fusion center. 

DHS has also recognized the need to develop performance measures to 

capture data that demonstrate the value of the national network of fusion 

centers in support of national information-sharing and homeland security 

goals. In September 2010, we recommended that DHS define steps to 

develop and implement a set of standard performance measures for 

fusion centers to show the results that the centers are achieving and the 

value they are adding to federal information-sharing efforts.63 According to 

DHS I&A officials, DHS, in coordination with fusion center directors and 

other federal partners, has identified an initial set of five performance 

measures, including the number of products that two or more fusion 

centers jointly produce and the number of requests for information from 

other fusion centers that are addressed. Further, according to these 

officials, the agency is leading efforts to define more measures during 

2013 and plans to work with FEMA to identify potential ways to 

incorporate performance-reporting requirements into the HSGP process.

ONDCP has established a performance management process that 

requires HIDTAs to submit, among other results, five measures 

specifically related to HIDTA Investigative Support Center performance 

that serve, in part, as the basis for future funding decisions. These 

measures include (1) the number of cases in which the center provided 

analytical support and (2) satisfaction ratings from stakeholders of the 

support provided and strategic intelligence products disseminated by the 

center. As part of ONDCP’s performance management process, each 

 

62HSGP grants are awarded to states and localities and can be used to support a number 

of homeland security efforts, including fusion centers. 

63GAO, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build and 

Sustain Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure Results, GAO-10-972 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2010).

ONDCP Collects Data on 

How Well Centers Are 

Meeting Performance 

Targets, and HIDTAs Use 

These Data when Making 

Funding Decisions
 

Page 45 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

HIDTA executive board annually sets target goals for each of these 

measures. ONDCP officials stated that both they and the HIDTA 

executive boards review the performance measure results to ensure that 

Investigative Support Centers meet their goals, the boards also consider 

these results when deciding the amount of future funding to dedicate to 

the center. In addition to results, HIDTA executive boards consider other 

factors, such as the expected needs of its members and availability of 

staff, when determining the level of funding that initiatives, including 

Investigative Support Centers, will receive.64 For example, ONDCP 

officials stated that in cases where center performance was less than 

expected, HIDTAs could provide ONDCP with an appropriate explanation 

regarding the variance in performance allowing for appropriate decisions 

to be made in the budget approval process. 

The efforts of JTTFs, FIGs, RISS centers, fusion centers, and HIDTA 

Investigative Support Centers to gather, analyze, and disseminate law 

enforcement, public safety, and terrorism-related information are essential 

for our nation’s homeland security. Similarities in their activities and 

customers can provide benefits through competing or complementary 

analysis and corroboration of reports. However, these similarities could 

also lead to unnecessary overlap and duplication that reduce the 

effectiveness of their activities and create inefficiencies. For example, 

HIDTAs and RISS centers both have systems with deconfliction functions 

that can save the lives of officers by preventing conflicting operations. 

However, the lack of interoperability requires officers, in some cases, to 

input their events into the three systems with duplicative functions, which, 

if not done, increases the likelihood of risks to officers and inefficiencies. 

Agencies recognize the need for the systems to be interoperable and 

have some efforts under way to make them so. However, articulating time

frames for the completion of these efforts would help ensure their 

success. Further, with multiple entities supporting investigations through 

tactical and analytical support, the coordination of similar activities can 

create opportunities to leverage resources and reduce the potential for 

unnecessary overlap or inefficiencies. DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP do not 

hold field-based entities accountable for coordinating with each other, nor 

do they assess opportunities for additional coordination. With a 

 

64ONDCP awards grants to HIDTAs. Generally, the total level of funding allocated to each 

HIDTA is to be not less than the amount received in the prior fiscal year. See, e.g., Pub. L. 

No. 112-74, 125 Stat. 786, 895 (2011). 

Conclusions 
 

Page 46 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

mechanism to track and evaluate how field-based entities are working 

together, agencies can identify successful coordination practices and 

where those practices can be implemented. Obtaining insight into how 

well coordination is working can help agencies ensure that field-based 

entities are maximizing opportunities to reduce overlap, collaborate, and 

leverage resources. In addition, officials from each of the entities stated 

that practices such as participating on one another’s governance boards 

and various forms of colocation help them understand other entities’ roles 

and create such opportunities. However, agencies have not fully explored 

the extent to which these and other practices can be applied nationwide 

across the five types of field-based entities and may be missing 

opportunities to share facilities and resources, better meet customer 

needs with collaborative products, and achieve benefits through 

increased interaction. Further, by identifying characteristics that make 

these practices successful and assessing geographic areas in which they 

can be applied, agencies can expand their use.

Recognizing that agencies are taking steps to ensure that two of the three 

systems officers use to deconflict their law enforcement actions are 

interoperable, we recommend that the Director of ONDCP work with the 

appropriate HIDTA officials to develop milestones and time frames for 

actions needed to make the third system, SAFETNet, interoperable in 

order to prevent unnecessary delays in reducing risks to officer safety and 

lessening the burden on law enforcement agencies that are currently 

using multiple systems.

To promote coordination as a practice to help avoid overlap, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney 

General, and the Director of ONDCP work through the ISA IPC or 

otherwise collaborate to develop a mechanism, such as performance 

metrics related to coordination, that will allow them to hold field-based 

information-sharing entities accountable for coordinating with each other 

and monitor and evaluate the coordination results achieved.

To help identify where agencies and the field-based entities they support 

could apply coordination mechanisms to enhance information sharing and 

reduce inefficiencies resulting from overlap, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of 

ONDCP work through the ISA IPC or otherwise collaborate to identify 

characteristics of entities and assess specific geographic areas in which 

practices that could enhance coordination and reduce unnecessary 

overlap, such as cross-entity participation on governance boards and 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 47 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

colocation of entities, could be further applied. The results of this 

assessment could be used by the agencies to provide recommendations 

or guidance to the entities to create coordinated governance boards or 

colocate entities, which can result in increased efficiencies through 

shared facilities and resources and reduced overlap through coordinated 

or collaborative products, activities, and services.

To help ensure that an assessment of practices that could enhance 

coordination and reduce unnecessary overlap is shared and used to 

further enhance collaboration and efficiencies across agencies, we 

recommend that the Program Manager, with input from the ISA IPC 

collaborating agencies, report in the ISE annual report to Congress the 

results of the assessment, including any additional coordination practices 

identified, efficiencies realized, or actions planned.

We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DHS, DOJ, 

ONDCP, and the Program Manager for the ISE for review and comment. 

DHS and DOJ provided written comments: Comments from DHS are 

reprinted with sensitive information omitted in appendix III, and comments 

from DOJ are reprinted in full in appendix IV. DHS concurred with the two 

recommendations that apply to it and reported steps it was taking to 

address them. In written comments, DOJ stated that the department 

generally agreed with the goal or intent of the two recommendations

made to it; however, it did not concur with the premises underlying the 

two recommendations. ONDCP and the Program Manager for the ISE did 

not provide written comments on the draft report. However, in an e-mail 

dated March 8, 2013, ONDCP General Counsel concurred with the three 

recommendations made to it, and in oral comments obtained on March 7, 

2013, the Program Manager concurred with the fourth recommendation. 

With respect to the second recommendation to collaborate to develop a 

mechanism to hold field-based information-sharing entities accountable 

for coordinating with each other, DHS concurred and stated that each 

agency should develop mechanisms appropriate to its respective 

missions in order to effectively oversee the field activities for which it is

responsible or, in the case of state and local fusion centers, the activities 

with which they coordinate. DHS stated that it has included two measures 

in the 2012 Fusion Center Assessment that respectively measure the 

number of Suspicious Activity Reports submitted by fusion centers that 

result in an FBI investigation and the number of fusion center analytical 

products authored by two or more fusion centers. While we agree that 

both measures do hold fusion centers accountable for coordinating a 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 48 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

specific information sharing activity, they do not fully address the 

recommendation to hold centers accountable for coordinating activities 

and services with each of the other entities in an effort to look for 

additional ways to limit any overlap and better leverage resources. As the 

report recognizes, to this end, DHS I&A is developing additional 

performance measures for the Fiscal Year 2013 Fusion Center 

Assessment, expected to begin in August 2013, that will explore the 

degree to which fusion centers collaborate with other field-based 

information-sharing entities and with federal partners to develop analytic 

products. Since DHS is developing the measures and expects to 

complete this action in August 2013, it is too soon to know what specific 

measures DHS will include and whether they will fully address the intent 

of the recommendation. 

DOJ, in its letter, stated that it generally agreed with the goal of the

second recommendation to develop a mechanism to hold field-based 

information-sharing entities accountable for coordinating with each other,

but that it did not concur that the department was not already actively 

promoting coordination. For example, officials stated that DOJ has 

participated in summits with other agencies, including DHS, in an ongoing 

dialogue on efficient and effective coordination of information sharing in 

the field. While these efforts are positive steps for sharing information and 

coordinating to improve sharing, the efforts do not fully address the 

recommendation to develop a mechanism for accountability and 

monitoring coordination across all five entities included in the review. We 

maintain that such a mechanism that specifically and directly holds fieldbased entities accountable for coordinating with one another could add 

valuable context to the type of dialogue DOJ describes while encouraging 

entities to maintain working relationships when new leadership is 

assigned and engage in coordination activities, such as leveraging 

resources, to avoid unnecessary overlap. 

With respect to the third recommendation to collaborate and assess 

where successful coordination practices could be further applied, DHS 

concurred and stated that it supported working through the ISA IPC, since 

its work includes the identification and implementation of best practices 

and operational improvements in the sharing of information. DHS added 

that it has collected information on the other entities’ participation on 

fusion center governance boards, as well as the colocation of these 

entities to ensure that the fusion centers benefit from the perspective of 

their stakeholders and partners. This is a positive step in gaining insights 

into identifying fusion centers where these and other practices can be 

applied. With similar input from DOJ and ONDCP, an assessment of this 
 

Page 49 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

information could allow the agencies to identify where it might be 

appropriate to apply these and other practices across entities. It is too 

soon to know how DHS will use the information it has collected in 

collaboration with the other agencies, but DHS stated it will work with us 

to define specific and measurable outcomes in response to the 

recommendation. 

In its letter, DOJ stated that it agreed with the general intent of the third 

recommendation to collaborate and assess where successful 

coordination practices could be further applied, but did not concur with the 

premise that the department does not already routinely seek to identify 

potential efficiency gains and that colocation is something that should be 

a goal in and of itself. DOJ stated that it does encourage entities to 

explore efficiencies that can be gained by, for example, cross-entity 

participation or colocation in circumstances where appropriate and 

efficient. However, DOJ stated that what is appropriate and efficient is 

highly dependent on local circumstances, and a one-size-fits-all approach 

will not work because of variation in the entities, regions, and laws under 

which they operate. We agree, and the report states that colocation 

should not be advocated as a universal approach because it may not be

practical in all cases. Accordingly, the recommendation calls for the 

agencies that operate or otherwise support these entities to collectively 

assess opportunities to enhance coordination through whatever effective 

means they identify. 

Additionally, DOJ stated that a comparison of the FIGs and JTTFs with 

the other entities overgeneralizes their activities since they are 

operational while the others are analytical. Similarly, DHS stated that the 

comparison of FIGs with fusion centers overgeneralizes the unique nature 

of the entities’ products and their intended recipients. The report outlines 

the distinct missions, authorities, roles, and responsibilities of each of the 

entities, noting the JTTFs’ unique role in conducting counterterrorism 

investigations. Further, we acknowledge that entities serve as 

intermediaries to different customers, while each has a broader role in 

sharing information with its partners as appropriate. DOJ’s letter also 

commented on the generalizeability of our analysis. We selected eight 

urban areas to explore activities conducted and coordination mechanisms 

across the five entities in its review. On the basis of our analysis, we 

identified instances of reported overlap in activities and also examples of 

where coordination was working well across the entities. The report states 

that the results from the eight urban areas are not generalizeable, and 

thus we made recommendations for agencies to assess practices that we 

identified that were working well, as well as other coordination practices, 
 

Page 50 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

to identify additional opportunities nationwide to coordinate and reduce 

any unnecessary overlap in entities’ activities.

DHS and DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated 

as appropriate.

We are providing copies of this report to the Attorney General, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of ONDCP, the Program 

Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, and interested 

congressional committees. The report is also available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any 

questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or 

larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Eileen R. Larence

Director, Homeland Security and Justice
 

Page 51 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

List of Requesters

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate

The Honorable Tom A. Coburn, M.D. 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member 

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Peter T. King

Chairman

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Lamar Smith

House of Representatives

The Honorable Patrick Meehan

House of Representatives

The Honorable Brian Higgins

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Additional Information about 

Entities Included in Our Review

Page 52 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

This appendix provides an overview of each of the five types of fieldbased information-sharing entities included in our review.

The RISS program, which originated in 1974, supports the ability of local, 

state, federal, and tribal law enforcement member agencies to identify, 

target, arrest, and prosecute criminal conspirators.1 The program, which 

the Bureau of Justice (BJA) administers, consists of six multistate 

regional information analysis centers that offer services—including 

information and intelligence sharing, investigative and case support, and 

officer safety and deconfliction—to member agencies in their respective 

regions. RISS centers serve member agencies in all 50 states, U.S. 

territories, Canada, England, Australia, and New Zealand. RISS centers 

focus on all crimes; however, they also may focus their efforts on 

activities and conspiracies related to terrorism.2

Established in 1988, the HIDTA program is a federally funded program 

administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) that 

brings together federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies into 

task forces that conduct investigations of drug-trafficking organizations in 

designated areas.3 Before designating an area as a HIDTA, the Director 

of ONDCP must consider the extent to which the area is a significant 

center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or 

distribution; state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have 

 

1

See 42 U.S.C. § 3796h (authorizing the Director of BJA to make grants and enter into 

contracts with state, tribal, and local criminal justice agencies and nonprofit organizations 

for the purposes of identifying, targeting, and removing criminal and terrorist conspiracies 

and activities spanning jurisdictional boundaries).

2

“All crimes” can include terrorism and other high-risk threats as well as other types of 

crimes. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 

to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, enacted in October 

2001, amended 42 U.S.C. § 3796h by including language specifically related to 

multijurisdictional terrorist conspiracies and activities. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 701, 115 

Stat. 272, 374 (2001).

3

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 established ONDCP and authorized the designation of 

any specified area of the United States as a high intensity drug trafficking area. See Pub. 

L. No. 100-690, § 1005(c), 102 Stat. 4181, 4186-87(1988). The Office of National Drug 

Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 1998 subsequently established the HIDTA program. 

See Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. VII, § 707, 2681, 2681-686-87 (1998) (codified as amended 

at 21 U.S.C. § 1706).

Appendix I: Additional Information about 

Entities Included in Our Review

Regional Information 

Sharing Systems 

(RISS) Program 

High Intensity Drug 

Trafficking Areas 

(HIDTA) Program
Appendix I: Additional Information about 

Entities Included in Our Review

Page 53 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

committed resources to respond to the drug-trafficking problem in the 

area, thereby indicating a determination to respond aggressively to the 

problem; drug-related activities in the area are having a significant 

harmful impact in the area and in other areas of the country; and a 

significant increase in allocation of federal resources is necessary to 

respond adequately to drug-related activities in the area.4 As of March

2013, ONDCP had designated 28 HIDTAs. 

A statutory purpose of the HIDTA program is to reduce drug trafficking 

and drug production through information sharing.5 Thus, among other 

initiatives, every HIDTA has an Investigative Support Center that serves 

to support all of the investigation and interdiction initiatives in the HIDTA 

by providing analytical case support, deconfliction, issuing drug threat 

assessments, and developing and disseminating intelligence products. 

There are 32 HIDTA Investigative Support Centers—1 in 27 of the 28 

HIDTAs, in addition to the Southwest Border HIDTA, which has a center 

for each of its five regions.6 The HIDTA program is focused on 

counternarcotics; however, HIDTA program resources may be used to 

assist law enforcement agencies in investigations and activities related to 

terrorism and the prevention of terrorism.7

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) established the first JTTF in 

1980 in its New York City field office after recognizing the value of the 

task force concept—which it began using in the prior year to jointly 

investigate bank robberies with the New York City Police Department—

and subsequently applied the concept to counterterrorism. The FBI 

continued to expand the terrorism task force concept to field offices after 

September 2001, increasing the number of JTTFs from 35 to 103. The 

FBI has 56 field offices (also called divisions) centrally located in major 

metropolitan areas across the United States and Puerto Rico. Within field 

offices, there are a total of about 400 resident agencies located in smaller

 

4

See 21 U.S.C. § 1706(d).

5

See 21 U.S.C. § 1706(a)(2)(A).

6

The Southwest Border HIDTA includes the following five regions: Arizona, California, 

New Mexico, South Texas, and West Texas.

7

See 21 U.S.C. § 1706(g) (addressing the use of resources for terrorism-related activities, 

as added pursuant to the Office of National Drug Control Policy Authorization Act of 2006, 

Pub. L. No. 109-469, § 301, 120 Stat. 3502, 3518-3524).

FBI Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces (JTTF)
Appendix I: Additional Information about 

Entities Included in Our Review

Page 54 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

cities and towns. Each JTTF is housed in an FBI field office or resident 

agency.

JTTFs, which consist of FBI special agents, as well as federal, state, and 

local task force officers (TFO), pursue leads, gather evidence, respond to 

threats and incidents, make arrests, provide security for special events, 

conduct training, and gather intelligence related to threats, among other 

counterterrorism-related activities. According to the 2012 Information 

Sharing Environment (ISE) annual report to Congress, JTTFs are 

dedicated to sharing information among their partners to investigate 

terrorism and coordinate counterterrorism efforts.

The FBI established the first FIG in 2003 to coordinate, manage, and 

execute all of the functions of the intelligence cycle, including collection, 

analysis, production, and dissemination, for the FBI in the field. FIGs are 

teams of FBI intelligence analysts, special agents, language analysts, and 

financial analysts, among others, working in each of the 56 FBI field 

offices to analyze information from cases in their field offices and share 

intelligence locally and nationally.

After the September 2001 attacks, state and local governments began to 

establish fusion centers, in part to serve as intermediaries within states 

and localities for the gathering, receipt, analysis, and sharing of threatrelated information among the federal government and state, local, tribal, 

territorial and private sector partners, and to fill gaps in information 

sharing that the federal government alone could not address. As defined 

by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007, a fusion center is “a collaborative effort of two or more federal, 

state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, 

expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such 

agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to 

FBI Field Intelligence 

Groups (FIG)

Fusion Centers
Appendix I: Additional Information about 

Entities Included in Our Review

Page 55 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

criminal or terrorist activity.”

8 As of January 2013, there are 77 fusion 

centers located in states and major urban areas throughout the country.9

 

8

See 6 U.S.C. § 124h(j)(1).

9

Our analysis was based on data as of January 2013. An additional fusion center was 

reported by agency officials in February 2013. States have designated primary fusion 

centers to serve as the main intermediaries for information sharing. In general, these 

fusion centers are statewide in jurisdiction and are operated by state entities, such as the 

state police or bureau of investigation. In addition, several major urban areas have 

established their own fusion centers, which are regional centers that usually cover large 

cities with substantial populations and numerous critical infrastructure sites and may be 

operated by city or county law enforcement or emergency management agencies. 
Appendix II: Federal Deployment of Personnel 

to Fusion Centers

Page 56 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

This appendix provides information about the deployment of federal 

personnel, specifically FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

personnel, to fusion centers.

Officials from each of the 10 fusion centers in our review stated that 

colocating federal personnel at fusion centers was a practice that 

benefits, or could benefit, their center. The FBI and DHS deploy 

personnel such as special agents, intelligence officers, and reports 

officers to fusion centers to perform a number of duties ranging from the 

collection of intelligence to training state and local counterparts.

According to officials from each of the 10 fusion centers, colocating 

representatives from the FBI and DHS allowed or could allow fusion 

center products and services to incorporate more information from these 

agencies, ensuring consistency in content and format with information 

being released from those agencies. Fusion center officials in each of the 

urban areas noted that, while not all of the fusion centers have dedicated 

DHS or FBI staff, having an on-site presence at fusion centers facilitates 

collaborative products between the agencies and the fusion centers. For 

example, officials in 8 of the 10 fusion centers reported that their analysts 

worked with the FBI to develop joint products ranging from threat 

assessments associated with major events to guides on identifying 

tattoos and terminology used by extremist groups. Additionally, officials in 

each of the 10 fusion centers said that the presence of FBI and DHS 

personnel allows or could allow fusion centers to have products reviewed 

and checked against federal sources before they are disseminated,

preventing duplicative or erroneous information from reaching 

stakeholders. In one urban area, an FBI analyst stated that the review 

process improved the quality and relevance of the fusion centers’ 

products. For example, before the review process was in place, the FBI 

received some outdated and incorrect information from the local fusion 

center. In one case, they recognized the information in a threat bulletin 

because they had determined it to be a nonthreat 2 years prior. Both the 

FIG and the fusion center officials in this urban area stated that errors 

such as this have not occurred since the FBI has had a presence in the 

fusion center.

Officials in all 10 of the fusion centers also stated that an important 

benefit of having FBI or DHS personnel at the center is access to 

classified information systems such as the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation Network (FBINet), which is the FBI’s primary network 

system for communicating Secret information, including intelligence 

pertaining to national security, and DHS’s Homeland Secure Data 

Appendix II: Federal Deployment of 

Personnel to Fusion Centers
Appendix II: Federal Deployment of Personnel 

to Fusion Centers

Page 57 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Network (HSDN), which is a classified network for DHS, its components, 

and other partners. According to FBI officials, policies on FBINet access 

require the presence of FBI personnel, and according to the FBI, the 

network allows deployed FBI personnel to more fully collaborate with 

fusion center personnel by providing them with Secret information, 

including investigative case files and intelligence pertaining to national 

security. Officials in one urban area that did not have FBI personnel at 

their fusion center stated that not having access to FBINet limited their 

ability to access classified information. In another urban area, the fusion 

center director stated that access to FBINet was limited to when the parttime FBI agent deployed to the center was in the office. The fusion center 

director stated that the arrangement reduced the effectiveness of having 

access to the system because the information is needed when events 

occur. For example, if a crime was committed, it may take a day or more 

to access FBI information on the suspect. Fusion center officials stated 

that while access to HSDN does not require the presence of DHS 

personnel, navigating the system with DHS personnel on site allows them 

to find information more quickly and provides them with a better sense of 

the information that is available.

DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS I&A) and the FBI have 

initiatives underway to deploy personnel to fusion centers. For example, 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

require that DHS, in coordination with fusion center officials, assign DHS 

officers and intelligence analysts to fusion centers.1 DHS I&A has an 

initiative to deploy intelligence officers to each of the fusion centers. 

Similarly, the FBI, in its 2011 Information Sharing Report highlighted the 

importance of the coordination of information sharing among FBI field 

offices, their FIGs, and the fusion centers. The FBI identified the JTTFs 

as the principals for operational-level coordination with fusion centers.2

FBI field offices plan to designate at least one experienced intelligence 

analyst to fusion centers depending on the extent to which a center has, 

among other criteria, a focus on counterterrorism and the ability to house 

secure systems such as FBINet. DHS and FBI officials stated that they 

are continuing to work toward these goals. In 2012, DHS had 164 

 

1

See 6 U.S.C. § 124h.

2

Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Information Sharing Report 2011, (Washington, 

D.C.: 2011).
Appendix II: Federal Deployment of Personnel 

to Fusion Centers

Page 58 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

personnel deployed to fusion centers, including 98 from DHS I&A.3 The 

FBI had 95 personnel deployed to 59 fusion centers, with 47 embedded 

full-time in 29 fusion centers and 48 working on a part-time basis. As 

centers become more mature, and as resources allow, both DHS and the 

FBI plan to increase the number of personnel deployed to centers and 

introduce personnel in those centers that currently do not have federal 

staff.

 

3

Other DHS components with personnel deployed to fusion centers include the U.S. Coast 

Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security 

Administration. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 59 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 60 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 61 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 62 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Justice
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 63 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 64 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Justice

Page 65 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing
Page 66 GAO-13-471 Field-Based Information Sharing

Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Mary Catherine Hult, Assistant 

Director; Kevin Heinz; Justine Lazaro; Christine Ramos; Yanina Golburt 

Samuels; Katherine Davis; Eric Hauswirth; Tom Lombardi; and Amanda 

Miller made significant contributions to the work.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441146)
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