alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 58592.

protests 180519-K, 196408-K, and 206028-K (New York).

#### Daprato Statuary Co. *v.*United States,

*465Opinion by

Mollison, J.

When the case was originally called for trial, plaintiff’s witness identified some of the articles in question as having been carved or cast in .Italy by or under the supervision of an artist from models which had been originally made in the United States or in Italy by a sculptor. At a subsequent hearing, it was stipulated that the merchandise concerning which the witness had testified “consists in fact of works of art, that is, copies of statuary valued at not less than $2.50 each.” On the record presented, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
#### In the Matter of Westchester County Department of Social Services, on Behalf of Brian M., a Child Alleged to be Neglected, Appellant, v Linda G. et al., Respondents.

[633 NYS2d 581]

—In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Family Court, Westchester County (Braslow, J.), dated July 8, 1994, which, after a fact-finding hearing, dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The threshold consideration in a proceeding to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect is whether the agency discharged its statutory obligation to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship *(see, Matter of Nassau County Dept, of Social Servs. [James M.] v Diana T.,*207 AD2d 399, 400; *Matter of Tammy B.,*185 AD2d 881, 882). Here, the Family Court properly dismissed the proceeding based on the agency’s failure to establish its diligent efforts by clear and convincing evidence *(see, Matter of Star Leslie W.,*63 NY2d 136, 140; *Matter of Sheila G,*61 NY2d 368; *Matter of Devon C,*186 AD2d 738, 739).

The petitioner’s contention that its efforts were frustrated because of the mother’s lack of cooperation is unavailing. The record reveals that the mother missed certain planning conferences and that some of her scheduled visits with her son were cancelled because of her own failure to confirm that she would be attending. However, the mother was hospitalized during the period when some of these visits and conferences were scheduled and, on several occasions, the agency scheduled visits only when the mother took the initiative to see the child. Additionally, there was a period of more than a month when there was no casework activity because the caseworker was in the hospital.

While it is true that a parent must assume a measure of initiative and responsibility, "to fault parents for a lack of cooperation presupposes that the agency has fulfilled, or been utterly frustrated in its efforts to fulfill, its own statutory obligations to strengthen the parental relationship, including specifically a duty to provide .'services and other assistance to the parents so that problems preventing the discharge of the child from care may be resolved or ameliorated’ ” *(Matter of Jamie M.,*63 NY2d 388, 393-394, quoting Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [fl [3]; *see, Matter of Shantelle W.,*185 AD2d 935, 939-940). Although the petitioner Should not be required to secure services for the mother which are merely duplicative of *457those already received *(see, Matter of Star A.,*55 NY2d 560, 565), on this record, there is no indication that the mother was provided any services directed at or appropriate to the goal of family reunification. Balletta, J. P., Miller, O’Brien and Copertino, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Fonzo Grant, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 150]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Robert Haft, J., at trial; Felice Shea, J., at sentence), rendered March 17, 1992, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled *156substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third and fifth degrees and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 6 to 12 years, 6 to 12 years and 3 to 6 years, respectively, unanimously affirmed.

We reject defendant’s claim of improper "bolstering”. Testimony which provides a narrative of the events leading to a defendant’s arrest and an explanation for why the officers ultimately arrested a particular defendant is proper *(People v Candelario,*156 AD2d 191, *lv denied*75 NY2d 964). In addition, in "buy and bust” cases, an arresting officer’s testimony as to a confirmatory drive-by identification is admissible and does not constitute bolstering *(.People v Alvarez,*211 AD2d 425, *affd 86*NY2d 761; *People v Rosado,*191 AD2d 262, *Iv denied*81 NY2d 1019).

Defendant’s summation claim is not preserved (CPL 470.05 [2]). In any case, the isolated comment of the prosecutor of which defendant now complains, even if not an accurate statement of the specific testimony to which it referred, was fairly inferable from other evidence adduced, and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Nardelli and Williams, JJ.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v JAMES MORGAN, Lance Corporal, U. S. Marine Corps, Appellant

18 USCMA 184, 39 CMR 184

No. 21,653

March 14, 1969

*Lieutenant V. L. Evans,*JAGC, USNR, was on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Commander Walter F. Brown,*JAGC, USN, was on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

PER CuRiam:

*We*granted review in this case to determine whether Article 38(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 838, had been complied with. The record reflects that, at the outset, a *pro forma*inquiry was made to determine whether the accused had been advised of his rights concerning counsel as set forth in Article 38(b) of the Code.

In United States v Donohew, 18 USCMA 149, 39 CMR 149, decided March 7, 1969, we held that this type of inquiry constituted *minimal*compliance with Article 38(b). However, as we stated in *Donohew:*

> *“We*believe the seriousness of the situation dictates that *the record should contain the accused’s personal response to direct questions incorporating each of the elements of Article 38(b), as well as his understanding of his entitlement thereunder.*

> *185
>       *“Accordingly, the record in each special or general court-martial convened more than thirty days after the date of this*[Donohew] *opinion should reflect this requirement has been met.*United States v Rinehart, 8 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212.” [Emphasis supplied in part.]

The decision of the board of review is affirmed.
<page>

                                  EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

    In connection with the annual report of AcuNetx, Inc. (the "Company") on
Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Interim Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

        1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
    material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company.

Date: March 31, 2008

                       By: /s/ RONALD A. WALDORF
                           ---------------------
                           Ronald A. Waldorf,
                           Interim Chief Financial Officer

This Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed "FILED" by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report,
irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER 

OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME 

COURT OF DELAWARE:

GERARD F. GRAY

Petitioner. 

§

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ 

No. 74,2020

Submitted: February 24, 2020

Decided: February 28, 2020

ORDER

 It appears to the Court that:

(1) Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated December 9, 2016, Gerard F. 

Gray, Esquire (“the Petitioner”) was publicly reprimanded and placed on a two-year 

period of probation with specific conditions. The Petitioner has filed a petition for 

termination of probation. 

(2) As required for termination of probation under Rule 20(a) of the Delaware 

Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, the period of probation has expired and the 

Petitioner has filed the necessary affidavit. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel does 

not oppose the termination of probation. 
2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the probationary period is 

terminated and Gerard F. Gray, Esquire is discharged from probation. 

 BY THE COURT:

 /s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves

 Justice
#### In the Matter of FRANK A. DOLAN, an attorney at law.

Por the order: *Mr. Adrien B. Hommell.*

Por the respondent: *Mr. Bdward J. O’Mwra.*

June 29, 1962.

Respondent suspended for six months and until further order of the court. Opinion reported at 38 *N. J.*119.
- Bureau of the Fiscal Service
- Intra-Governmental Payment and Collection
- Metric Resources
- IPAC Stats for January 2023

# IPAC Transaction Count January 2023

Table may scroll on smaller screens
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

RAUL MONTANEZ-HERNANDEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-1652

September 27, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for

Pinellas County; Pat Siracusa, Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

CASANUEVA, SILBERMAN, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
Exhibit 110.18



 Exhibit 10.18 

FIRST AMENDMENT 
 TO THE

 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 

BY AND BETWEEN 
 TOPS
MARKETS, LLC & RON FERRI 
 WHEREAS, Tops Markets, LLC (the “Company”) and Ron Ferri entered into an
Employment Agreement (the “Agreement”), effective October 23, 2014; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company and Ron Ferri wish to
amend the Agreement. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, the Agreement is amended in the following respect: 

1. Effective January 1, 2015 (the “Effective Date”), Section 2 of the Agreement is hereby deleted and the following
paragraph substituted in its place: 
 2. Compensation 

In addition to your annual base salary as set by the Board of Directors of the Company (“Board”) from time to time
(“Annual Base Salary”), for so long as you are employed by the Company, you will be eligible to receive an annual cash bonus (the “Annual Bonus”) in a target amount set by the Board from time to time, determined and
payable under and in accordance with the General Manager Incentive Plan of the Company as in effect from time to time. 
 ******* 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this First Amendment to the Agreement this
11th day of November, 2014. 
  

			
	TOPS MARKETS, LLC
		
	By:		 /s/ Frank Curci

	Name:		Frank Curci
	Title:		Chairman
	
	 Ron Ferri

Ron Ferri
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Douglas S. Norman, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary of Interchange
Corporation, certify that:  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Interchange
Corporation;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to
the period covered by this quarterly report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this quarterly report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations
and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented
in this report;4.
    
    The small business issuer other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e))
for the registrant and have:  a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed
under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the small business issuer, is made known to us by
others within the small business issuer, particularly during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;b)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business
issuers disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by
this report based on such evaluation; andc)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the small
business issuers internal control over financial reporting that
occurred during the small business issuers most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the small business issuers internal control
over financial reporting; and  5.
    
    The small business issuers other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
financial reporting, to the small business issuers auditors and the
audit committee of small business issuers board of directors (or
persons performing the equivalent functions):  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal controls over financial
reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
small business issuers ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial data; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the
small business issuers internal control over financial
reporting. Date: November 19, 2004
    
    /s/ Douglas S. NormanDouglas S. NormanChief Financial Officer and Secretary(Principal Financial Officer)
No. 48568.

#### Protest 7593-K of Saul Woolwitch (New York).

*221Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

The invoice showed that the merchandise consists of handkerchiefs in the piece shipped from England. Depositions, taken under commission, of the departmental manager of the shippers of the merchandise and of the managing director and salesman of the manufacturers of said handkerchiefs were found entirely insufficient to prove that the component material of chief value of the handkerchiefs is linen. On the record presented the protest was overruled. *United States*v. *Bacharach*(T. D. 44612) and *United States*v. *Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co.,*(T. D. 45337) cited.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED LAKOTA
TECHNOLOGIES, INC AND FROM SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                          65,413
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   18,312
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,268)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                99,938
<PP&E>                                          84,091
<DEPRECIATION>                                (12,263)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 228,991
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,711,493
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     5,662,968
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   228,991
<SALES>                                        257,316
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               257,316
<CGS>                                          159,209
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  159,209
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            12,262,709
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             437,042
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (12,588,149)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (12,588,149)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (12,588,149)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.36)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.36)


</TABLE>
SERVED: JUNE 26, 2012 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

IN THE MATTER OF 

AVIATION REP AIR SOLUTIONS, INC. 

FAA DOCKET NO. [TO BE ASSIGNED] 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

FDMS NO. FAA-2012-0474 

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDING 

This proceeding (heretofore designated as Case No. 2011 WP91 03 31) has been assigned 

to Administrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin. All future pleadings and other 

communications regarding this proceeding shall be served on the Judge, the FAA Hearing 

Docket, and the other persons on the attached Service List. 

Attachment - Service List 
SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 · 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1 0001 

ONE COPY 

Robert L. Toms, Jr., Respondent's Counsel 

Gibson Rivera & Toms LLP 

527 South Lake A venue, Suite 105 

Pasadena, CA 9110 1 

TEL: 626-405-1122 

FAX: 626-405-8966 

Michael F. McKinley, Complainant's Counsel 

Senior Attorney, Enforcement Division, AGC-300 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

TEL: 202-267-7100 

FAX: 202-267-5106 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office ofHearings, M-20 "c 

U.S. Department ofTransportation 

1200New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (Ell-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-2139 Attorney-Advisor 

202-366-5121 Staff Assistant 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2012-0474 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

1 

Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Sqj.te 2WIOOO, Washington, 

DC 20591, Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 

-2-
#### CHARLES BACON, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ATLANTIC CITY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, RESPONDENT-PETITIONER.

See same case below: 72 *N. J. Super.*541.

*Messrs. Lloyd, Horn, Megargee & Steedle*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Isaac G. Ginsburg*for the respondent.

April 30, 1962.
Before the Third Division,

May 9, 1958

No. 61909.

#### Quon Quon Company *v.*United States,

protests 138983-K, etc. (Los Angeles).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the items of merchandise marked “A” consist of decorated earthen figures similar in all material respects to exhibits 1, 2, and 4 the subject of Abstract 60180, the claim at 10 cents per dozen pieces and 50 percent ad valorem under paragraph 211 as colored earthenware articles was sustained as to said items. It was further stipulated that the items marked “B” consist of decorated earthen figures similar in all material respects to the merchandise, other than exhibits 1, 2, and 4, the subject of Abstract 60180. As to said articles, 75 percent of the merchandise represented by each such item was held dutiable at 10 cents per dozen pieces and 50 percent ad valorem under paragraph 211 as colored earthenware articles, and 25 percent of such merchandise was held dutiable at 70 percent under paragraph 212 as colored vitrified ware.

DISSENTING OPINION

Donlon, Judge:

I concur in so much of the majority decision as relates to merchandise represented by the items marked with the letter “A” and the initials of the examiner on the invoices accompanying the entries covered by these protests.

*546In *Quon Quon Company*v. *United States,*37 Cust. Ct. 315, Abstract 60180, the record of which is incorporated in the record now before us, I dissented in part, and I again dissent from so much of the majority decision here as relates to merchandise represented by the items marked with the letter “B” and the initials of the examiner on the invoices accompanying the entries covered by these protests.

There is nothing of record in connection with the “B” items of merchandise that indicates such difference in composition as would support the arbitrary designation of 75 percent of each such item as being colored earthenware articles and 25 percent of each such item as being colored vitrified ware, with related tariff consequences. How improbable such an arbitrary division would be, is pointed up in at least one such lot of merchandise. Item 4017 consists of 149 earthen figures. The stipulation before us would have us find that 111% of these figures are colored earthenware articles and that 37% of these figures are articles made of colored vitrified ware. Absent more particular proofs, the stipulated facts as to the figures of “B” items put too heavy a tax on credulity.

As pointed out in my dissenting opinion in the incorporated case, great weight is to be given to a stipulation of facts, but a stipulation is not conclusive of the facts. The court may inquire. Here, as in the *Quon Quon Company*case, *supra,*the items of merchandise described in the invoices as identical are not shown to be, in fact, so considerably different as the stipulation would have us believe.