DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE

Additional Actions Needed 

to Enhance Program 

Efficiency and Resource 

Management

Statement of David C. Maurer, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Crime, 

Terrorism, Homeland Security, and 

Investigations, Committee on the 

Judiciary, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT

Wednesday, April 10, 2013

GAO-13-505T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-505T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

Homeland Security, and Investigations, 

Committee on the Judiciary, House of 

Representatives

April 10, 2013

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Additional Actions Needed to Enhance Program

Efficiency and Resource Management 

Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2012, DOJ’s $27 billion 

budget funded a broad array of 

national security, law enforcement, and 

criminal justice system activities. GAO 

has examined a number of key

programs where DOJ has sole 

responsibility or works with other 

departments and recommended 

actions to improve program efficiency 

and resource management. This

statement summarizes findings and 

recommendations from recent GAO 

work in the following five areas: (1) 

overlap and potential duplication in 

DOJ grant programs; (2) DOJ’s 

management of undisbursed funds 

from BVP grant awards whose terms 

have ended; (3) potential duplication in 

DOJ and Treasury asset forfeiture 

programs; (4) DOJ’s management of 

asset forfeiture funds; and (5) overlap 

among DOJ and other federally funded 

field-based information sharing entities. 

This statement is based on prior 

products GAO issued from February 

2012 through April 2013, along with 

selected updates obtained from April 

2012 through April 2013. For the 

selected updates on DOJ’s progress in 

implementing recommendations, GAO 

analyzed information provided by DOJ 

officials on taken and planned actions. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made several 

recommendations to DOJ in prior 

reports to help improve program 

efficiency and resource management. 

DOJ generally concurred with these 

recommendations and is taking actions 

to address them. 

What GAO Found

In July 2012, GAO reported that the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) more than 

200 grant programs overlapped across 10 key justice areas, and that this overlap 

contributed to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or 

similar purposes. GAO has recommended, among other steps, that DOJ conduct 

an assessment to better understand the extent of grant program overlap and 

determine if consolidation is possible. DOJ has begun taking related actions, but 

it is too early to assess their impact. 

In February 2012, GAO reported that DOJ’s Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP)

Program—a source of funding for law enforcement ballistic- and stab-resistant 

body armor—had not taken steps to deobligate about $27 million in unused funds 

from grant awards whose terms had ended. GAO recommended that DOJ 

deobligate these funds and, for example, apply the amounts to new awards or 

reduce requests for future budgets. DOJ officials have since deobligated $2 

million and plan to deobligate the rest by the end of April 2013. DOJ officials plan 

to apply the funds toward fiscal year 2014 BVP grants. 

In September 2012, GAO reported that DOJ and the Department of the Treasury

(Treasury) conducted potentially duplicative asset management activities related 

to the seizure and forfeiture of assets associated with federal crimes. For 

example, GAO reported that each agency maintains separate tracking systems 

for seized and forfeited property. GAO recommended that DOJ and Treasury 

conduct a study to determine the feasibility of consolidating their asset 

management activities. In March 2013, DOJ officials reported that DOJ and

Treasury had agreed upon an approach to conduct the study and assess 

potential costs, but that meetings between the departments were still ongoing 

and the study had not been finalized.

In July 2012, GAO reported that annual revenues from DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture 

Fund exceeded annual expenditures, allowing DOJ to carryover $844 million at 

the end of fiscal year 2011, in part to reserve funds for the next fiscal year. 

However, DOJ does not clearly document how it determines the amounts that 

need to be carried over. GAO recommended that DOJ more clearly document 

how it determines the carryover amounts. DOJ officials reported that they plan to 

provide this information, but as of March 2013, had not yet determined how to 

present the information. 

In April 2013, GAO reported on overlap in activities and services across fieldbased entities operated or supported by DOJ, the Department of Homeland 

Security, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy that may share terrorismrelated information, among other things. GAO identified 91 instances of overlap 

in some analytical activities, such as disseminating information on similar issue 

areas, such as terrorism. GAO recommended, in part, that the federal agencies 

collaborate to hold the entities accountable for coordination and assess where 

practices that enhance coordination could be applied. DOJ generally agreed with 

the intent of the recommendations, but stated that DOJ has already taken steps 

to promote coordination. The steps, however, do not establish an accountability 

mechanism for monitoring coordination or assessing practices. 

View GAO-13-505T. For more information, 

contact David C. Maurer at (202) 512-8777or 

maurerd@gao.gov
Page 1 GAO-13-505T 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our 

prior work on ways in which the Department of Justice (DOJ) can 

increase efficiencies and better manage its resources across key 

programs. In fiscal year 2012, DOJ’s enacted budget was $27 billion, and 

its appropriation was among the top ten of all federal agencies. As the 

fiscal pressures facing the nation continue, it is increasingly important for 

DOJ and other executive branch agencies to improve the efficiency and 

effectiveness of government programs. This is especially important given 

DOJ’s leading role administering a wide array of programs to fulfill its 

mission to, among other things, enforce the law and to provide federal 

leadership in preventing and controlling crime.

As requested, my testimony today is based on our recent work examining 

programs across an array of DOJ components. In some of these program 

areas, DOJ has sole responsibility, while in others DOJ works with other 

departments and agencies. This statement addresses five key program 

areas where we highlighted opportunities for, and made 

recommendations to address, enhanced program efficiency and resource 

management:1 (1) identifying and mitigating unnecessary overlap and 

duplication in DOJ grant programs,2 (2) deobligating undisbursed grant 

funds from Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program awards whose 

grant terms have ended,3 (3) consolidating operations of DOJ and 

Department of the Treasury (Treasury) asset forfeiture programs,4

 

1

Some of the reports included in this statement contain additional findings and 

recommendations that we do not address here because they did not specifically address 

improvements in program efficiency and resource management. Some of the 

recommendations are directed both to DOJ and other federal agencies with which joint 

efforts will be required to address necessary improvements.

(4) 

2

Overlap occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar goals, engage in similar 

activities or strategies to achieve them, or target similar beneficiaries. Duplication occurs 

when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the 

same services to the same beneficiaries.

3

A deobligation is the cancellation or downward adjustment of previously incurred 

obligations.

4

Asset forfeiture refers to the process of confiscating money or property that represents 

either proceeds of crimes or property used in the commission of crimes.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-505T 

improving overall management of asset forfeiture funds, and (5) 

strengthening coordination and reducing unnecessary overlap across 

field-based entities (e.g., units, centers, and task forces) that may share 

law enforcement and terrorism-related information.

My statement is based on reports addressing each of these areas issued

from February 2012 through April 2013, and includes selected updates 

obtained from April 2012 through April 2013. For our prior reports, we 

analyzed documentation, such as grant solicitations and program policies 

and procedures, and interviewed relevant DOJ officials responsible for 

managing DOJ’s grant and asset forfeiture programs, and its field-based 

information-sharing entities. More information about the scope and 

methodology of our prior work can be found in those reports.5 To update 

the status of DOJ’s efforts to address the recommendations we made in 

these reports, we collected information from DOJ program officials on 

actions they have taken or planned in response. We conducted our work 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DOJ awards federal financial assistance to state and local governments, 

for-profit and nonprofit organizations, tribal jurisdictions, and educational 

 

5

See, respectively, GAO, Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the 

Risk of Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment, GAO-12-517

(Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012); Law Enforcement Body Armor: DOJ Could Enhance 

Grant Management Controls and Better Ensure Consistency in Grant Program 

Requirements, GAO-12-353 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2012); Asset Forfeiture 

Programs: Justice and Treasury Should Determine Costs and Benefits of Potential 

Consolidation, GAO-12-972 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2012); Justice Assets Forfeiture 

Fund: Transparency of Balances and Control over Equitable Sharing Should Be Improved, 

GAO-12-736 (Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012); and Information Sharing: Agencies Could 

Better Coordinate to Reduce Overlap in Field-Based Activities, GAO-13-471 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 4, 2013). 

Background 

DOJ Grants Administration
 

Page 3 GAO-13-505T 

institutions, to help prevent crime, assist victims of crime, and promote 

innovative law enforcement efforts. Federal financial assistance programs 

provide funding pursuant to statutory authorization and annual 

appropriations through formula grants, discretionary grants, cooperative 

agreements, and other payment programs, but are all generally referred 

to as grants.6 From fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2012, 

approximately $33 billion has been appropriated to support the more than 

200 grants programs that DOJ manages.7

DOJ administers its grant programs through three granting agencies—the 

Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the Office on Violence Against Women 

(OVW), and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office. 

OJP is the largest of DOJ’s granting agencies, and its mission to develop 

the nation’s capacity to prevent and control crime, administer justice, and 

assist crime victims is broader than that of OVW or the COPS Office. 

OJP’s bureaus and offices administer grant programs that address victim 

assistance, technology and forensics, and juvenile justice, among other 

things. One such grant program is the BVP program, which was created 

following enactment of the Bulletproof Vest Partnership Grant Act of 

1998,8 and provides grants on a competitive basis to state and local law 

enforcement agencies to assist in their purchasing of ballistic-resistant 

and stab-resistant body armor. The COPS Office grant programs focus on 

advancing community policing, which generally involves cooperation 

between police departments and community residents in identifying and 

developing solutions to crime problems. OVW administers grant programs 

related to domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking.

 

6

Formula grant programs are noncompetitive awards based on a predetermined formula, 

typically established in statute. Discretionary grants are usually awarded on the basis of a 

competitive selection process. A cooperative agreement is a type of federal financial 

assistance similar to a grant except the federal government is more substantially involved 

with the grant. Payment programs typically take the form of reimbursements to state and 

local law enforcement entities for purchases such as body armor. 

7

In addition to fiscal year funding from 2005 through 2012, this amount includes $4 billion 

appropriated in fiscal year 2009 through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 

2009 (Recovery Act). Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 129-30, which includes $10 million 

for salaries and expenses to manage, administer, and oversee the grant programs. This 

approximate amount does not reflect amounts, if any, that have been rescinded, 

reprogrammed, or transferred.

8 Pub. L. No. 105-181, 112 Stat. 512.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-505T 

DOJ and Treasury both operate asset forfeiture programs that are 

designed to prevent and reduce crime through the seizure and forfeiture 

of assets that represent the proceeds of, or were used to facilitate, federal 

crimes. Each department also maintains a separate fund that is the 

receipt account for the deposit of forfeitures.9 Over the years, a series of 

laws has been enacted that has expanded forfeiture from drug offenses to 

money laundering, financial crimes, and terrorism-related offenses. In 

addition to depriving criminals of property used or acquired through illegal 

activities, these programs are designed to enhance cooperation among 

foreign, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies through the 

equitable sharing of assets recovered through the program, and, as a byproduct, produce revenues in support of future law enforcement 

investigations and related forfeiture activities. A number of federal law 

enforcement organizations participate in DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund

(AFF), including the U.S. Marshals Service, which serves as the primary 

custodian of seized and forfeited property for the program. Once property 

is forfeited to the government, it is subsequently sold, put into official use, 

destroyed, or transferred to another agency. Cash and monetary 

instruments that have been forfeited and property that has been forfeited 

and sold are subsequently deposited in the forfeiture fund. In fiscal year 

2012, the value of total assets in the AFF was approximately $5.97 

billion.10 Money collected in the funds is used to pay for expenses related 

to the asset forfeiture program and for other law enforcement initiatives.

DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) operate or support, through grant 

funding or personnel, five types of field-based information-sharing entities 

that may collect, process, analyze, or disseminate information in support 

of law enforcement and counterterrorism-related efforts, as shown in table 

1.

 

9

The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 established the Department of Justice 

Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF). Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 310, 2302 (codified as 

amended at 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)). Likewise, the Treasury Forfeiture Fund Act of 1992 

established the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) as a successor to what was then the 

Customs Forfeiture Fund. Pub. L. No. 102-393, § 638 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. 

§ 9703). 

10U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, Assets 

Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund Annual Financial Statements, Fiscal Year 

2012. Audit Report 13-07, January 2013. Washington, D.C. Total assets include cash and 

noncash assets, net investments, and fund balances.

Asset Forfeiture 

Field-Based InformationSharing Entities
 

Page 5 GAO-13-505T 

Table 1: Field-Based Information-Sharing Entities

Entity Description

Joint Terrorism Task Forces • Funded and managed by DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to prevent, 

preempt, deter, and investigate terrorism, as well as to apprehend terrorists

Field Intelligence Groups • Part of the FBI that supports FBI investigations by collecting and analyzing 

intelligence and sharing this information with the FBI and, when applicable, its law 

enforcement and intelligence partners

Regional Information Sharing Systems 

centers

• Funded through grants administered by DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance to 

help combat major crimes and terrorism, and promote officer safety by linking 

federal, state, local, and tribal criminal justice agencies through secure 

communications and providing information-sharing resources and investigative 

support

State and major urban area fusion centers • Funded by a variety of state and federal sources—including DOJ and DHS 

grants—to serve as intermediaries for sharing terrorism and other threat-related 

information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, territorial, and 

private sector homeland security partners

a

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 

(HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers

• Supported by ONDCP grant funds to assist in the disruption and dismantlement of 

drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations by preventing or mitigating 

associated criminal activity. HIDTA program resources may also be used for 

terrorism investigations and prevention activities

Source: GAO analysis of field-based information-sharing entities. 

a

A fusion center is a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that combines resources, expertise, 

or information at the center with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, 

investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. See 6 U.S.C.§ 124h(j)(1).

In general, the five types of entities in our review were established under 

different authorities and have distinct missions, roles, and responsibilities. 

As of January 2013 there were a total of 268 of these field-based entities 

located throughout the United States, and DOJ, DHS, and ONDCP 

provided an estimated $129 million in fiscal year 2011 to support three of 

the five types of entities.11

 

11The three types of field-based entities include Regional Information Sharing Systems 

centers, state and major urban area fusion centers, and High Intensity Drug Trafficking 

Areas Investigative Support Centers. The National Fusion Center Association reported 

fusion center funding based on self-reported responses from 57 of 77 fusion centers. Data 

on funding estimates for the other two types—Joint Terrorism Task Forces and Field 

Intelligence Groups—are classified.
 

Page 6 GAO-13-505T 

In July 2012, we reported that DOJ’s more than 200 grant programs 

overlapped across 10 key justice areas, and that this overlap contributed 

to the risk of unnecessarily duplicative grant awards for the same or 

similar purposes.12

In addition, we found that OJP, OVW, and the COPS Office did not 

routinely share lists of current and potential awardees to consider both 

the current and planned dispersion and purposes of all DOJ grant funding 

before finalizing new award decisions. Our work found instances where 

DOJ made multiple grant awards to applicants for the same or similar 

purposes without being aware of the potential for unnecessary duplication 

or whether funding from multiple streams was warranted. We also 

reported that OJP, OVW, and the COPS Office had not established 

policies and procedures requiring consistent coordination and information 

sharing among its granting agencies. Further, we found that OJP and 

OVW used a separate grants management system than the COPS Office, 

limiting their ability to share information on the funding they have awarded 

or are preparing to award to a recipient.

We also recognized that overlapping grant programs 

across programmatic areas result in part from authorizing statutes. 

Further, we recognized that overlap among DOJ’s grant programs may be 

desirable because such overlap can enable DOJ’s granting agencies to 

leverage multiple funding streams to serve a single justice purpose. 

However, we found that the existence of overlapping grant programs is an 

indication that agencies should increase their ability to monitor where 

their funds are going and coordinate to ensure that any resulting 

duplication in grant award funding is purposeful rather than unnecessary, 

and we made recommendations to reflect these needed improvements.

13

To better identify and address the challenges associated with potential 

unnecessary duplication, we made a total of eight recommendations. DOJ 

According to COPS Office 

officials, its mission and grant management processes are different 

enough to necessitate a separate system. However, OJP officials told us

that its system has been and can be modified with minimal investment to 

accommodate different grant processes.

 

12We based this assessment on our review of all 253 grant award announcements that 

OJP, OVW, and the COPS Office published on their websites for fiscal year 2010. See 

GAO-12-517. 

13We included some of these related findings in GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities 

to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance 

Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012). 

DOJ Has Steps Under 

Way to Reduce the 

Risk of Unnecessary 

Duplication in Its 

Grant Programs
 

Page 7 GAO-13-505T 

concurred with all eight of our recommendations. Five of the 

recommendations specifically relate to ways in which DOJ can improve 

program efficiency and resource management, and these are that DOJ

• conduct an assessment to better understand the extent to which the 

department’s grant programs overlap with one another and determine 

if grant programs may be consolidated;

• coordinate within and among granting agencies on a consistent basis 

to review potential or recent grant awards from grant programs that 

DOJ identifies as overlapping, before awarding grants;

• require its grant applicants to report all federal grant funding, including 

all DOJ funding, that they are currently receiving or have recently 

applied for in their grant applications;

• provide appropriate OJP, COPS Office, and OVW staff access to both 

grant management systems; and

• ensure its comprehensive study of DOJ grant management systems 

assesses the feasibility, costs, and benefits of moving to a single 

grants management system, including the steps needed to harmonize 

DOJ grant processes, so that any variation in how granting agencies 

manage their portfolios is not an encumbrance to potential system 

unification.

DOJ has taken steps to partially address these recommendations. 

Specifically, DOJ has formed an assessment team, composed of OJP, 

OVW, and COPS Office representatives, to review all of the department’s 

fiscal year 2012 grant program solicitations, or announcements, and 

categorize them by several elements. These elements include program 

type, eligible grant funding recipients (e.g., states, localities, tribes, and 

law enforcement agencies), target grant award beneficiaries (e.g., victims 

and juveniles), allowable uses of the funds, and locations funded. The 

assessment team is also developing criteria to identify potentially 

duplicative programs and then plans to assign risk levels of potential 

duplication to those that have multiple solicitations addressing similar key 

components. According to DOJ officials, the assessment team plans to 

conclude its work later in 2013. 

In addition, OJP has granted read-only access of its grants management 

system to OVW and the COPS Office to allow pertinent staff in those 

offices to access the most up-to-date OJP grant information. Further, OJP 

officials said that they are exploring ways in which more data systems 

may be used for coordinating grants. DOJ officials anticipate that 

eventually, agencies can leverage the information in these systems 

during the preaward process to avoid funding potentially overlapping and 

duplicative grant activities; however, DOJ’s plans rest upon completion of 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-505T 

the assessment team’s work. Officials told us that upon receipt of the 

assessment team’s findings, they plan to work to develop and support a 

targeted and strategic approach to reviewing applications across all three 

granting agencies before making grant award decisions. DOJ officials 

noted that as part of this approach, DOJ plans to establish policies and 

procedures to govern coordination efforts. Thus, completion of this 

assessment could better position DOJ to take more systemic actions—

such as improved coordination and potential consolidation of its 

programs—to limit overlap and mitigate the risk of unnecessary 

duplication.

DOJ has also initiated a feasibility study of moving to a single grants 

management system that includes the identification of the steps needed 

to harmonize grant processes, among other factors such as return on 

investment. Since this study—like DOJ’s other efforts to address all of our 

recommendations—is still under way, it is too soon to tell whether the 

department’s actions will fully address each of the recommendations. 

We have also previously reported on and made recommendations related 

to DOJ’s BVP grant program.14 In February 2012, we reported that DOJ 

had designed several controls for the BVP program to ensure grantee 

compliance with program requirements, among other things, but could 

take additional action to further reduce management risk. For example, 

we found that from fiscal years 2002 to 2009, the BVP program had 

awarded about $27 million in BVP grants to grant recipients who did not 

ultimately seek reimbursement.15 Since the grant terms for each of these 

grantees had ended, the grantees were no longer eligible for 

reimbursement and DOJ could deobligate these funds.16

 

14

To improve 

DOJ’s resource management, we recommended that DOJ deobligate 

undisbursed funds from grants in the BVP program whose terms have 

GAO-12-353. 

15The BVP program has generally funded, on a reimbursable basis, up to 50 percent of 

the cost of the body armor a jurisdiction procures with its available BVP funds. 

16DOJ obligates the grant funding at the time it makes the award. When grantees 

request—and DOJ approves—more money than the grantees eventually use during the 

term of the grant, the money can be deobligated. Our original report describes a number 

of circumstances in which this situation can occur, including when grantees purchase 

body armor using other sources of funding. 

DOJ Has Not Yet 

Deobligated Unused 

BVP Funds 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-505T 

ended. Further, we noted that since the BVP program received about $24 

million in fiscal year 2012, deobligating this $27 million could have 

significant benefits. For example, deobligating this funding could enable 

the department to apply the amounts to new awards or reduce requests 

for future budgets. The department concurred with this recommendation 

and has since deobligated $2 million. In early April 2013, DOJ officials 

stated that they expect to complete the deobligation process before the 

end of April 2013. They also said the process is time-intensive because it 

has involved reconciliation among multiple data and financial 

management systems. DOJ officials stated that they plan to use the 

deobligated funds toward fiscal year 2014 BVP awards.

In September 2012, we found that DOJ and Treasury had made limited 

progress to consolidate their asset forfeiture property management 

activities.17 Specifically, the departments had made limited progress in 

sharing storage facilities or contracts, and they had not fully explored the 

possibility of coordinating or consolidating the management of their 

assets to achieve greater efficiencies, effectiveness, and cost savings. As 

a result, each department maintained separate asset-tracking systems, 

separate contracts, and separate storage facilities, which we found to be 

potentially duplicative. For example, DOJ and Treasury maintain four 

separate asset-tracking systems—DOJ maintains one system and 

Treasury maintains three—to support their respective asset forfeiture 

program activities, and these four tracking systems have similar 

functionalities.18

 

17

According to DOJ and Treasury data, the cost of 

developing, maintaining, and overseeing their four asset-tracking systems 

in fiscal year 2011 totaled $16.2 million for DOJ’s asset-tracking system 

and $10.4 million for the three Treasury asset-tracking systems 

combined. Further, we found that in some cases, storage facilities are 

located in the same geographic area. For example, both the U.S. 

Marshals Service—the primary custodian of DOJ’s seized assets—and 

GAO-12-972. 

18The Consolidated Asset Tracking System (CATS) is the system of record for the DOJ 

program. Treasury uses three asset tracking systems: (1) the Treasury Seized Asset and 

Case Tracking System (SEACATS), which is the system of record for the Treasury 

program; (2) the Asset Forfeiture Tracking and Retrieval (AFTRAK) system that 

Treasury’s Internal Revenue Service uses; and (3) the Forfeiture and Seizure Tracking

(FASTRAK) system that DHS’ U.S. Secret Service uses. Two of the three asset tracking 

systems used in the Treasury program—AFTRAK and FASTRAK—are owned and 

operated by the DHS.

DOJ and Treasury 

Have Not Yet Studied 

the Feasibility of 

Consolidating Asset 

Forfeiture Activities
 

Page 10 GAO-13-505T 

Treasury maintain vehicle storage facilities, 40 percent of which are within 

20 miles of each other.

DOJ and Treasury officials noted that when Congress passed a law 

establishing the Treasury Forfeiture Fund in 1992, it recognized the 

differences in the programs’ missions, which warranted creating separate 

programs, and this encouraged independent operational decisions that 

eventually created additional differences between the two programs. Both 

programs are designed to reduce and prevent crime. DOJ’s asset 

forfeiture program represents the interests of law enforcement 

components within its department as well as several components outside 

the department, while Treasury’s program represents the interests of 

Treasury and DHS components.19 We recognized the separate legal 

authorities of the two funds, but noted that those legal authorities did not 

preclude enhanced coordination within programs. Thus, we 

recommended that DOJ and Treasury conduct a study to determine the 

feasibility of consolidating potentially duplicative asset management 

activities including, but not limited to, the use of asset-tracking systems 

and the sharing of vendor and contract resources. The departments 

concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2013, DOJ officials 

reported that DOJ and Treasury representatives had met several times in 

the fall of 2012 and thereafter agreed upon an approach to conduct the 

study and assess potential costs. DOJ officials noted that they would 

continue to meet with their Treasury partners to execute their plan. Since 

work remains under way, it is too soon to tell whether the departments’ 

actions will fully address the recommendation.

 

19The components outside of Justice are the United States Postal Inspection Service; the 

Food and Drug Administration; the United States Department of Agriculture, the Office of 

the Inspector General; the Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security; and the 

Defense Criminal Investigative Service. 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-505T 

In July 2012, we reported on the growth of revenues and expenses in 

DOJ’s AFF from fiscal years 2003 to 2011, and the need for transparency 

in DOJ’s process for carrying over funds from one fiscal year to the 

next.20 Each year, DOJ earns revenue from the proceeds of the forfeited 

assets it collects. It then pays its expenses, which include payments to 

victims and the costs of storing and maintaining forfeited assets. DOJ 

uses any balance to help cover anticipated expenses in the next fiscal 

year that may not be covered by that year’s revenues, and this is known 

as carrying over funds. For example, at the end of fiscal year 2003, DOJ 

carried over approximately $365 million to cover expenditures in the next 

fiscal year. In contrast, at the end of fiscal year 2011, DOJ carried over 

$844 million to cover expenses into fiscal year 2012. After DOJ reserves 

funds to cover needed expenses, DOJ declares any remaining funds to 

be an excess unobligated balance and has the authority to use these 

funds for any of the department’s authorized purposes.21 In recent years, 

DOJ also used these excess unobligated balances to cover rescissions.22

For example, in fiscal year 2011, DOJ used excess unobligated balances 

to help cover a $495 million AFF program rescission. Also, in fiscal year 

2012, DOJ used $151 million of the remaining AFF funds identified at the 

end of the fiscal year to acquire the Thomson Correctional Center in 

Thomson, Illinois.23

At the time of our review, when determining the amounts to carryover, 

DOJ officials reviewed historical data on past program expenditures, 

analyzed known future expenses such as salaries and contracts, and 

estimated the costs of any potential new expenditures. However, as we 

concluded on the basis of our findings in July 2012, without a clearly 

documented and transparent process, it was difficult to determine 

whether DOJ’s conclusions regarding the amounts that need to be carried 

 

20 GAO-12-736. Carryover consists of budget authority from the prior fiscal year that is 

available for obligation in the current fiscal year; that is, funds that are carried forward. 

21 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(8)(E).

22Rescissions cancel the availability of DOJ’s previously enacted budget authority, making 

the funds involved no longer available for obligation.

23 DOJ’s appropriations act for fiscal year 2013 specifies that DOJ may only obligate up to 

$10 million of the excess unobligated balances, and directs DOJ to use $154.7 million of 

available amounts for payments associated with joint law enforcement operations, as 

authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(I). Consolidated and Further Continuing 

Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 127, tit. II, div. B, § 218 (c), (d) Stat. 198, 

260, 

DOJ Has Not 

Documented the 

Process for Carrying 

Over Asset Forfeiture 

Funds from Year to 

Year 
 

Page 12 GAO-13-505T 

over each year were well founded. We recommended that DOJ clearly 

document how it determined the amount of funds that it would need to be 

carried over for the next fiscal year, a recommendation with which DOJ 

concurred. DOJ officials stated that they plan to include information on 

the basis for its decisions concerning the amount of funds to be carried 

over in future Congressional Budget Justifications, but as of March 2013, 

the decision on how to present the information was still pending. Since 

this information has not yet been made available, it is too soon to tell 

whether it will fully address the recommendation.

In April 2013, we identified overlap in some activities of five types of fieldbased information-sharing entities and concluded that DOJ, DHS, and 

ONDCP could improve coordination among the entities to help reduce 

unnecessary overlap in activities.24 In general, the five types of entities in 

our review were established under different authorities and have distinct 

missions, roles, and responsibilities. We reviewed their activities in eight 

urban areas and found overlap as each carried out its respective 

missions, roles, and responsibilities.25 Specifically, we identified 91 

instances of overlap in analytical activities and services, with more 

instances of overlap involving a fusion center and a Field Intelligence 

Group (54 of the 91 instances) compared with the other three types of 

entities.26

 

24

 For example, we found that in five of the eight urban areas, the 

fusion center, Regional Information Sharing Systems center, and the 

Field Intelligence Group disseminated information on all crimes—which 

can include terrorism and other high-risk threats as well as other types of 

crimes—for federal, state, and local customers including state and local 

police departments. In addition, we found 32 instances of overlap in 

investigative support activities across the eight urban areas reviewed, 

GAO-13-471. 

25For the purposes of our review, “mission area” refers to the area of work in which an 

entity conducts an activity (all-crimes, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics). 

26We defined six categories of analytical activities and services that entities can perform. 

Among these are collection management, which is the identification, location, and 

recording or storing of information used to support analysis; strategic analysis, which is 

the analysis of crime patterns, crime trends, or criminal organizations for the purpose of 

planning, decision making, and resource allocation; and analytical products, which involve 

the conversion of raw information into intelligence. We identified these categories by 

reviewing agency documents and interviewing agency officials to generate a list of 

analytical activities and services that entities potentially conduct. 

DOJ and Other 

Agencies Could 

Improve Coordination 

to Help Reduce 

Unnecessary Overlap 

in Field-Based 

Information Sharing
 

Page 13 GAO-13-505T 

with more instances of overlap involving a Regional Information Sharing 

Systems center and a fusion center (18 of the 32 instances) compared 

with the other three entities.27

To promote coordination, we recommended two actions. First, we 

recommended that the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, and the Director of ONDCP collaborate to develop a mechanism 

that would allow them to hold field-based information-sharing entities 

accountable for coordinating and monitor and evaluate the coordination 

results achieved. Second, we recommended that the Attorney General, 

the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of ONDCP work 

together to assess opportunities where practices that enhance 

coordination can be further applied. DHS and ONDCP concurred with 

both recommendations. DOJ generally concurred with both 

recommendations, but asserted that it was already actively promoting 

coordination and routinely seeking to identify efficiency gains. For 

example, DOJ cited its participation in summits with other agencies, 

including DHS, and the colocation of certain field-based entities as 

evidence in support of this. While these efforts are positive steps for 

sharing information and coordinating, we noted and continue to believe 

that they do not fully address the recommendations. We maintain that an 

accountability mechanism to ensure coordination could add valuable 

context to any existing interagency discussions while encouraging entities 

to engage in coordination activities, such as leveraging resources to avoid 

For example in one urban area, the 

Regional Information Sharing Systems center and the fusion center both 

conducted tactical analysis, target deconfliction, and event deconfliction 

within the same mission area for federal, state, and local customers. We 

reported that overlap, in some cases, can be desirable. In particular, 

overlap across analytical activities and services can be beneficial if it 

validates information or allows for competing or complementary analysis. 

Nevertheless, overlap can also lead to inefficiencies if, for example, it 

burdens law enforcement customers with redundant information.

 

27We defined five categories of investigative support activities and services that entities 

can perform. Among these are tactical analysis, which is the analysis of information 

regarding a specific criminal event that can be used immediately by operational units to 

further a criminal investigation, plan tactical operations, and provide for officer safety; 

target deconfliction, which is determining if multiple law enforcement agencies are 

investigating, for example, the same person, vehicle, weapon, or business; and event 

deconfliction, which is determining if multiple federal, state, or local law enforcement 

agencies are conducting an enforcement action (e.g., a raid, undercover operation, or 

surveillance) in proximity to one another during a specified time period.
 

Page 14 GAO-13-505T 

unnecessary overlap. Further, our recommendation calls for DOJ, DHS, 

and ONDCP to collectively assess opportunities to enhance coordination 

through whatever effective means they identify.

Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, and members of the 

subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

For further information about this statement, please contact David C. 

Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-

9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. In addition to the contact named above, the following 

individuals also made contributions to this testimony: Joy Booth, Assistant 

Director; Sylvia Bascope; Michele Fejfar; Heather May; Lara Miklozek; 

Linda Miller; and Janet Temko.

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(441147)
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