Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 121 / Friday, June 22, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 37605 

telephone (415) 399–7442 or email at 

D11-PF-MarineEvents@uscg.mil. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Coast 

Guard will enforce a 100 foot safety 

zone around the fireworks barge during 

the loading, transit, and arrival of the 

fireworks barge to the display location 

and until the start of the fireworks 

display. From 9 a.m. until 2 p.m. on July 

4, 2012, the barge will be loading off of 

Pier 50 in position 37°46′28′′ N, 

122°23′06′′ W (NAD 83). From 7 p.m. to 

8:30 p.m. on July 4, 2012 the loaded 

barge will transit from Pier 50 to the 

launch site near Sausalito, CA in 

position 37°51′30′′ N, 122°28′29′′ W 

(NAD83). Upon the commencement of 

the fireworks display, scheduled to take 

place from 9:15 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. on 

July 4, 2012, the safety zone will 

increase in size and encompass the 

navigable waters around and under the 

fireworks barge within a radius 1,000 

feet around the launch site near 

Sausalito, CA in position 37°51′30′′ N, 

122°28′29′′ W (NAD83) for the City of 

Sausalito’s Fourth of July Fireworks 

Display in 33 CFR 165.1191. This safety 

zone will be in effect from 9 a.m. to 9:45 

p.m. on July 4, 2012. 

Under the provisions of 33 CFR 

165.1191, unauthorized persons or 

vessels are prohibited from entering 

into, transiting through, or anchoring in 

the safety zone during all applicable 

effective dates and times, unless 

authorized to do so by the PATCOM. 

Additionally, each person who receives 

notice of a lawful order or direction 

issued by an official patrol vessel shall 

obey the order or direction. The 

PATCOM is empowered to forbid entry 

into and control the regulated area. The 

PATCOM shall be designated by the 

Commander, Coast Guard Sector San 

Francisco. The PATCOM may, upon 

request, allow the transit of commercial 

vessels through regulated areas when it 

is safe to do so. This notice is issued 

under authority of 33 CFR 165.1191 and 

5 U.S.C. 552(a). In addition to this 

notice in the Federal Register, the Coast 

Guard will provide the maritime 

community with extensive advance 

notification of the safety zone and its 

enforcement period via the Local Notice 

to Mariners. 

If the Captain of the Port determines 

that the regulated area need not be 

enforced for the full duration stated in 

this notice, a Broadcast Notice to 

Mariners may be used to grant general 

permission to enter the regulated area. 

Dated: June 6, 2012. 

Cynthia L. Stowe, 

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the 

Port San Francisco. 

[FR Doc. 2012–15264 Filed 6–21–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 9110–04–P 

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

Copyright Office 

37 CFR Part 201 

[Docket No. 2012–6] 

Registration of Claims to Copyright 

AGENCY: Copyright Office, Library of 

Congress. 

ACTION: Statement of Policy; Registration 

of Compilations. 

SUMMARY: The Copyright Office issues 

this statement of policy to clarify the 

practices relating to the examination of 

claims in compilations, and particularly 

in claims of copyrightable authorship in 

selection and arrangement of exercises 

or of other uncopyrightable matter. The 

statement also clarifies the Office’s 

policies with respect to registration of 

choreographic works. 

DATES: Effective June 22, 2012. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert Kasunic, Deputy General 

Counsel, Copyright GC/I&R, P.O. Box 

70400, Washington, DC 20024–0400. 

Telephone (202) 707–8380; fax (202) 

707–8366. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 

Copyright Office is issuing a statement 

of policy to clarify its examination 

practices with respect to claims in 

‘‘compilation authorship,’’ or the 

selection, coordination, or arrangement 

of material that is otherwise separately 

uncopyrightable. The Office has long 

accepted claims of registration based on 

the selection, coordination, or 

arrangement of uncopyrightable 

elements, because the Copyright Act 

specifically states that copyrightable 

authorship includes compilations. 17 

U.S.C. 103. 

The term ‘‘compilation’’ is defined in 

the Copyright Act: 

A ‘‘compilation’’ is a work formed by the 

collection and assembling of preexisting 

materials or of data that are selected, 

coordinated, or arranged in such a way that 

the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 

original work of authorship. 

17 U.S.C. 101 (‘‘compilation’’). This 

definition’s inclusion of the terms 

‘‘preexisting material’’ or ‘‘data’’ suggest 

that individually uncopyrightable 

elements may be compiled into a 

copyrightable whole. The legislative 

history of the 1976 Act supports this 

interpretation, stating that a compilation 

‘‘results from a process of selecting, 

bringing together, organizing, and 

arranging previously existing material of 

all kinds, regardless of whether the 

individual items in the material have 

been or ever could have been subject to 

copyright.’’ H.R. Rep. 94–1476, at 57 

(emphasis added). 

Viewed in a vacuum, it might appear 

that any organization of preexisting 

material may be copyrightable. 

However, the Copyright Act, the 

legislative history and the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Feist Publications, 

Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 

346 (U.S. 1991), lead to a different 

conclusion. 

In Feist, interpreting the congressional 

language in the section 101 definition of 

‘‘compilation,’’ the Supreme Court 

found protectable compilations to be 

limited to ‘‘a work formed by the 

collection and assembling of preexisting 

material or data that are selected, 

coordinated, or arranged in such a way 

that the resulting work as a whole 

constitutes an original work of 

authorship.’’ Feist at 356, quoting 17 

U.S.C. 101 (‘‘compilation’’) (emphasis 

by the Court). The Court stated: 

The purpose of the statutory definition is 

to emphasize that collections of facts are not 

copyrightable per se. It conveys this message 

through its tripartite structure, as emphasized 

above by the italics. The statute identifies 

three distinct elements and requires each to 

be met for a work to qualify as a 

copyrightable compilation: (1) The collection 

and assembly of pre-existing material, facts, 

or data; (2) the selection, coordination, or 

arrangement of those materials; and (3) the 

creation, by virtue of the particular selection, 

coordination, or arrangement, of an 

‘‘original’’ work of authorship * * *. 

Not every selection, coordination, or 

arrangement will pass muster. This is plain 

from the statute. * * * [W]e conclude that 

the statute envisions that there will be some 

fact-based works in which the selection, 

coordination, and arrangement are not 

sufficiently original to trigger copyright 

protection. 

Feist, 499 U.S. at 357–358 (U.S. 1991) 

The Court’s decision in Feist clarified 

that some selections, coordinations, or 

arrangements will not qualify as works 

of authorship under the statutory 

definition of ‘‘compilation’’ in section 

101. However, a question that was not 

present in the facts of Feist and 

therefore not considered by the Court, is 

whether the selection, coordination, or 

arrangement of preexisting materials 

must relate to the section 102 categories 

of copyrightable subject matter. 

In Feist, Rural Telephone’s 

alphabetical directory was found 

deficient due to a lack of originality, i.e., 


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of sufficient creativity. Had the items 

contained in the directory (names, 

addresses and telephone numbers) been 

selected, coordinated, or arranged in a 

sufficiently original manner, there is no 

question that the resulting compilation 

would have fit comfortably within the 

category of literary works—the first 

category of copyrightable authorship 

recognized by Congress in section 102. 

But what if an original selection, 

coordination, or arrangement of 

preexisting material did not fall within 

a category of section 102 authorship? 

For instance, is a selection and 

arrangement of a series of physical 

movements copyrightable, if the 

resulting work as a whole does not fit 

within the categories of pantomime and 

choreographic works or dramatic works, 

or any other category? 

Although the Feist decision did not 

address this question, the Copyright 

Office concludes that the statute and 

relevant legislative history require that 

to be registrable, a compilation must fall 

within one or more of the categories of 

authorship listed in section 102. In 

other words, if a selection and 

arrangement of elements does not result 

in a compilation that is subject matter 

within one of the categories identified 

in section 102(a), the Copyright Office 

will refuse registration. 

The Office arrives at this conclusion 

in accordance with the instruction of 

the Supreme Court in Feist: ‘‘the 

established principle that a court should 

give effect, if possible, to every clause 

and word of a statute,’’ citing Moskal v. 

United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109–110 

(1990). Applying this principle, the 

Office finds that in addition to the 

statutory definition of ‘‘compilation’’ in 

section 101, Congress also provided 

clarification about the copyrightable 

authorship in compilations in section 

103(a) of the Copyright Act: 

The subject matter of copyright as specified 

by section 102 includes compilations and 

derivative works, but protection for a work 

employing preexisting material in which 

copyright subsists does not extend to any 

part of the work in which such material has 

been used unlawfully. 

17 U.S.C. 103(a). (emphasis added). 

Section 103 makes it clear that 

compilation authorship is a subset of 

the section 102(a) categories, not a 

separate and distinct category. Section 

103 and the definition of ‘‘compilation’’ 

in Section 101 also mark a departure 

from the treatment of compilations 

under the 1909 Act, which listed 

composite works and compilations as 

falling within the class of ‘‘books.’’ The 

1976 Act significantly broadened the 

scope of compilation authorship to 

include certain selection, coordination, 

or arrangement that results in a work of 

authorship. But that expansion also 

makes it clear that not every selection, 

coordination, or arrangement of material 

is copyrightable. Only selection, 

coordination, or arrangement that falls 

within section 102 authorship is 

copyrightable, i.e., is selected, 

coordinated, or arranged in such a way 

that the resulting work as a whole 

constitutes an original work of 

authorship. Moreover, section 103 

provides that compilations fall within 

‘‘[t]he subject matter of copyright as 

specified by section 102,’’ and the 

legislative history of the 1976 Act 

confirms what this means: ‘‘Section 103 

complements section 102: A 

compilation or derivative work is 

copyrightable if it represents an ‘original 

work of authorship’ and falls within one 

or more of the categories listed in 

section 102.’’ H.R. Rep. 94–1476 at 57 

(1976) (emphasis added). 

This requirement indicates that 

compilation authorship is limited not 

only by the tripartite structure of the 

statutory definition of ‘‘compilation,’’ 

but that in addition, a creative selection, 

coordination, or arrangement must also 

result in one or more congressionally 

recognized categories of authorship. 

Although the statute together with the 

legislative history warrant this 

conclusion, it is far from obvious when 

the statutory definition of 

‘‘compilation’’ is read in isolation. 

Moreover, other portions of the 

legislative history have obscured this 

interpretation. 

The legislative history states that the 

term ‘‘works of authorship’’ is said to 

‘‘include’’ the seven categories of 

authorship listed in section 102 (now 

eight with the addition of ‘‘architectural 

works’’), but that the listing is 

‘‘illustrative and not limitative.’’ H.R. 

Rep 94–1476, at 53. If these categories 

of authorship are merely illustrative, 

may courts or the Copyright Office 

recognize new categories of 

copyrightable authorship? Given that 

Congress chose to include some 

categories of authorship in the statute, 

but not other categories, did Congress 

intend to authorize the courts or the 

Copyright Office to recognize 

authorship that Congress did not 

expressly include in the statute? For 

instance, the decision to include 

‘‘pantomimes and choreographic works’’ 

as a new category of authorship that did 

not exist under the 1909 Act was the 

subject of much deliberation, including 

a commissioned study and hearings. 

Copyright Office Study for Congress. 

Study No. 28, ‘‘Copyright in 

Choreographic Works,’’ by Borge 

Varmer; Copyright Law Revision, Part 2, 

Discussion and Comments on Report of 

the Register of Copyrights on the 

General Revision of the U.S. Copyright 

Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary 

(February 1963) at 8–9. Similarly, the 

decision not to include typeface as 

copyrightable authorship was a 

deliberate decision. H.R. Rep 94–1476, 

at 55. Could Congress have intended the 

courts or the Office to second-guess 

such decisions, or accept forms of 

authorship never considered by 

Congress? 

Again, the answer lies in the 

legislative history. First, the legislative 

history states that ‘‘In using the phrase 

‘original works of authorship,’ rather 

than ‘all the writings of an author,’ the 

committee’s purpose was to avoid 

exhausting the constitutional power of 

Congress to legislate in this field, and to 

eliminate the uncertainties arising from 

the latter phrase.’’ H.R. Rep 94–1476, at 

51. Thus, one goal of the illustrative 

nature of the categories was to prevent 

foreclosing the congressional creation of 

new categories: 

The history of copyright law has been one 

of gradual expansion in the types of works 

accorded protection, and the subject matter 

affected by this expansion has fallen into one 

of two categories. In the first, scientific 

discoveries and technological developments 

have made possible new forms of creative 

expression that never existed before. In some 

of these cases the new expressive forms— 

electronic music, filmstrips, and computer 

programs, for example—could be regarded as 

an extension of copyrightable subject matter 

Congress had already intended to protect, 

and were thus considered copyrightable from 

the outset without the need of new 

legislation. In other cases, such as 

photographs, sound recordings, and motion 

pictures, statutory enactment was deemed 

necessary to give them full recognition as 

copyrightable works. 

Authors are continually finding new ways 

of expressing themselves, but it is impossible 

to foresee the forms that these new 

expressive methods will take. The bill does 

not intend either to freeze the scope of 

copyrightable technology or to allow 

unlimited expansion into areas completely 

outside the present congressional intent. 

Section 102 implies neither that that subject 

matter is unlimited nor that new forms of 

expression within that general area of subject 

matter would necessarily be unprotected. 

The historic expansion of copyright has 

also applied to forms of expression which, 

although in existence for generations or 

centuries, have only gradually come to be 

recognized as creative and worthy of 

protection. The first copyright statute in this 

country, enacted in 1790, designated only 

‘‘maps, charts, and books’’; major forms of 

expression such as music, drama, and works 

of art achieved specific statutory recognition 

only in later enactments. Although the 

coverage of the present statute is very broad, 

and would be broadened further by explicit 

recognition of all forms of choreography, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 121 / Friday, June 22, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 37607 

1The court in Open Source Yoga Unity did not 

address section 102(b). See also the discussion of 

Open Source Yoga Unity below. 

there are unquestionably other areas of 

existing subject matter that this bill does not 

propose to protect but that future Congresses 

may want to. 

Id. (emphasis added.) 

This passage suggests that Congress 

intended the statute to be flexible as to 

the scope of established categories, but 

also that Congress also intended to 

retain control of the designation of 

entirely new categories of authorship. 

The legislative history goes on to state 

that the illustrative nature of the section 

102 categories of authorship was 

intended to provide ‘‘sufficient 

flexibility to free the courts from rigid 

or outmoded concepts of the scope of 

particular categories.’’ Id. at 53 

(emphasis added). The flexibility 

granted to the courts is limited to the 

scope of the categories designated by 

Congress in section 102(a). Congress did 

not delegate authority to the courts to 

create new categories of authorship. 

Congress reserved this option to itself. 

If the federal courts do not have 

authority to establish new categories of 

subject matter, it necessarily follows 

that the Copyright Office also has no 

such authority in the absence of any 

clear delegation of authority to the 

Register of Copyrights. 

Interpreting the Copyright Act as a 

whole, the Copyright Office issues this 

policy statement to announce that 

unless a compilation of materials results 

a work of authorship that falls within 

one or more of the eight categories of 

authorship listed in section 102(a) of 

title 17, the Office will refuse 

registration in such a claim. 

Thus, the Office will not register a 

work in which the claim is in a 

‘‘compilation of ideas,’’ or a ‘‘selection 

and arrangement of handtools’’ or a 

‘‘compilation of rocks.’’ Neither ideas, 

handtools, nor rocks may be protected 

by copyright (although an expression of 

an idea, a drawing of a handtool or a 

photograph of rock may be 

copyrightable). 

On the other hand, the Office would 

register a claim in an original 

compilation of the names of the author’s 

50 favorite restaurants. While neither a 

restaurant nor the name of a restaurant 

may be protected by copyright, a list of 

50 restaurant names may constitute a 

literary work—a category of work 

specified in section 102(a)—based on 

the author’s original selection and/or 

arrangement of the author’s fifty favorite 

restaurants. 

An example that has occupied the 

attention of the Copyright Office for 

quite some time involves the 

copyrightability of the selection and 

arrangement of preexisting exercises, 

such as yoga poses. Interpreting the 

statutory definition of ‘‘compilation’’ in 

isolation could lead to the conclusion 

that a sufficiently creative selection, 

coordination or arrangement of public 

domain yoga poses is copyrightable as a 

compilation of such poses or exercises. 

However, under the policy stated 

herein, a claim in a compilation of 

exercises or the selection and 

arrangement of yoga poses will be 

refused registration. Exercise is not a 

category of authorship in section 102 

and thus a compilation of exercises 

would not be copyrightable subject 

matter. The Copyright Office would 

entertain a claim in the selection, 

coordination or arrangement of, for 

instance, photographs or drawings of 

exercises, but such compilation 

authorship would not extend to the 

selection, coordination or arrangement 

of the exercises themselves that are 

depicted in the photographs or 

drawings. Rather such a claim would be 

limited to selection, coordination, or 

arrangement of the photographs or 

drawings that fall within the 

congressionally-recognized category of 

authorship of pictorial, graphic and 

sculptural works. 

As another example, Congress has 

stated that the subject matter of 

choreography does not include ‘‘social 

dance steps and simple routines.’’ H.R. 

Rep. 94–1476 at 54 (1976). A 

compilation of simple routines, social 

dances, or even exercises would not be 

registrable unless it results in a category 

of copyrightable authorship. A mere 

compilation of physical movements 

does not rise to the level of 

choreographic authorship unless it 

contains sufficient attributes of a work 

of choreography. And although a 

choreographic work, such as a ballet or 

abstract modern dance, may incorporate 

simple routines, social dances, or even 

exercise routines as elements of the 

overall work, the mere selection and 

arrangement of physical movements 

does not in itself support a claim of 

choreographic authorship. 

A claim in a choreographic work must 

contain at least a minimum amount of 

original choreographic authorship. 

Choreographic authorship is considered, 

for copyright purposes, to be the 

composition and arrangement of a 

related series of dance movements and 

patterns organized into an integrated, 

coherent, and expressive whole. 

Simple dance routines do not 

represent enough original choreographic 

authorship to be copyrightable. Id. 

Moreover, the selection, coordination or 

arrangement of dance steps does not 

transform a compilation of dance steps 

into a choreographic work unless the 

resulting work amounts to an integrated 

and coherent compositional whole. The 

Copyright Office takes the position that 

a selection, coordination, or 

arrangement of functional physical 

movements such as sports movements, 

exercises, and other ordinary motor 

activities alone do not represent the 

type of authorship intended to be 

protected under the copyright law as a 

choreographic work. 

In addition to the requirement that a 

compilation result in a section 102(a) 

category of authorship, the Copyright 

Office finds that section 102(b) 

precludes certain compilations that 

amount to an idea, procedure, process, 

system, method of operation, concept, 

principle or discovery, regardless of the 

form in which it is described, explained, 

illustrated, or embodied in such work. 

In the view of the Copyright Office, a 

selection, coordination, or arrangement 

of exercise movements, such as a 

compilation of yoga poses, may be 

precluded from registration as a 

functional system or process in cases 

where the particular movements and the 

order in which they are to be performed 

are said to result in improvements in 

one’s health or physical or mental 

condition. See, e.g, Open Source Yoga 

Unity v. Choudhury, 2005 WL 756558, 

*4, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1434 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 

(‘‘Here, Choudhury claims that he 

arranged the asanas in a manner that 

was both aesthetically pleasing and in a 

way that he believes is best designed to 

improve the practitioner’s health.’’).1

While such a functional system or 

process may be aesthetically appealing, 

it is nevertheless uncopyrightable 

subject matter. A film or description of 

such an exercise routine or simple 

dance routine may be copyrightable, as 

may a compilation of photographs of 

such movements. However, such a 

copyright will not extend to the 

movements themselves, either 

individually or in combination, but only 

to the expressive description, depiction, 

or illustration of the routine that falls 

within a section 102(a) category of 

authorship. 

The relationship between the 

definition of compilations in section 

101 and the categories of authorship in 

section 102(a) has been overlooked even 

by the Copyright Office in the past. The 

Office has issued registration certificates 

that included ‘‘nature of authorship’’ 

statements such as ‘‘compilations of 

exercises’’ or ‘‘selection and 

arrangement of exercises.’’ In retrospect, 

and in light of the Office’s closer 

analysis of legislative intent, the 


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37608 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 121 / Friday, June 22, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

Copyright Office finds that such 

registrations were issued in error. 

The Office recognizes that in one 

unreported decision, a district court 

concluded, albeit with misgivings, that 

there were triable issues of fact whether 

a sufficient number of individual yoga 

asanas were arranged in a sufficiently 

creative manner to warrant copyright 

protection. See Open Source Yoga 

Unity, discussed above. However, that 

court did not consider whether section 

102(a) or (b) would bar a copyright 

claim in such a compilation. 

The Copyright Office concludes that 

the section 102(a) categories of 

copyrightable subject matter not only 

establish what is copyrightable, but also 

necessarily serve to limit copyrightable 

subject matter as well. Accordingly, 

when a compilation does not result in 

one or more congressionally-established 

categories of authorship, claims in 

compilation authorship will be refused. 

Dated: June 18, 2012. 

Maria A. Pallante, 

Register of Copyrights. 

[FR Doc. 2012–15235 Filed 6–21–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 1410–30–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Parts 9 and 721 

EPA–HQ–OPPT–2011–0577; FRL–9352–7] 

RIN 2070–AB27 

Significant New Use Rules on Certain 

Chemical Substances; Withdrawal of 

Significant New Use Rules 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: EPA is withdrawing 

significant new use rules (SNURs) 

promulgated under the Toxic 

Substances Control Act (TSCA) for 

seven chemical substances which were 

the subject of premanufacture notices 

(PMNs). EPA published these SNURs 

using direct final rulemaking 

procedures. EPA received a notice of 

intent to submit adverse comments on 

the rule. Therefore, the Agency is 

withdrawing these SNURs, as required 

under the expedited SNUR rulemaking 

process. EPA intends to publish in the 

near future proposed SNURs for these 

seven chemical substances under 

separate notice and comment 

procedures. 

DATES: This final rule is effective June 

26, 2012. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

For technical information contact: 

Kenneth Moss, Chemical Control 

Division (7405M), Office of Pollution 

Prevention and Toxics, Environmental 

Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania 

Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20460–0001; 

telephone number: (202) 564–9232; 

email address: moss.kenneth@epa.gov. 

For general information contact: The 

TSCA-Hotline, ABVI-Goodwill, 422 

South Clinton Ave., Rochester, NY 

14620; telephone number: (202) 554– 

1404; email address: TSCAHotline@epa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Does this action apply to me? 

A list of potentially affected entities is 

provided in the Federal Register of 

April 27, 2012 (77 FR 25236) (FRL– 

9343–4). If you have questions regarding 

the applicability of this action to a 

particular entity, consult the technical 

person listed under FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT. 

II. What rule is being withdrawn? 

In the Federal Register of April 27, 

2012 (77 FR 25236), EPA issued several 

direct final SNURs, including SNURs 

for seven chemical substances that are 

the subject of this withdrawal. These 

direct final rules were issued pursuant 

to the procedures in 40 CFR part 721, 

subpart D. In accordance with 

§ 721.160(c)(3)(ii), EPA is withdrawing 

these rules issued for seven chemical 

substances which were the subject of 

PMNs P–10–548, P–10–550, P–10–551, 

P–10–552, P–10–553, P–10–554, and P– 

10–555 because the Agency received 

notice of intent to submit adverse 

comments. EPA intends to publish 

proposed SNURs for these chemical 

substances under separate notice and 

comment procedures. 

For further information regarding 

EPA’s expedited process for issuing 

SNURs, interested parties are directed to 

40 CFR part 721, subpart D, and the 

Federal Register of July 27, 1989 (54 FR 

31314). The record for the direct final 

SNUR for these chemical substances 

that are being withdrawn was 

established at EPA–HQ–OPPT–2011– 

0577. That record includes information 

considered by the Agency in developing 

this rule and the notice of intent to 

submit adverse comments. 

III. How do I access the docket? 

To access the electronic docket, 

please go to http://www.regulations.gov 

and follow the on-line instructions to 

access docket ID number EPA–HQ– 

OPPT–2011–0577. Additional 

information about the Docket Facility is 

provided under ADDRESSES in the 

Federal Register of April 27, 2012 (77 

FR 25236). If you have questions, 

consult the technical person listed 

under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT. 

IV. Statutory and Executive Order 

Reviews 

This final rule revokes or eliminates 

existing regulatory requirements and 

does not contain any new or amended 

requirements. As such, the Agency has 

determined that this withdrawal will 

not have any adverse impacts, economic 

or otherwise. The statutory and 

executive order review requirements 

applicable to the direct final rule were 

discussed in the Federal Register of 

April 27, 2012 (77 FR 25236). Those 

review requirements do not apply to 

this action because it is a withdrawal 

and does not contain any new or 

amended requirements. 

V. Congressional Review Act 

The Congressional Review Act, 5 

U.S.C. 801 et seq., generally provides 

that before a rule may take effect, the 

agency promulgating the rule must 

submit a rule report to each House of 

the Congress and the Comptroller 

General of the United States. EPA will 

submit a report containing this rule and 

other required information to the U.S. 

Senate, the U.S. House of 

Representatives, and the Comptroller 

General of the United States prior to 

publication of the rule in the Federal 

Register. This rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’ 

as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). 

List of Subjects 

40 CFR Part 9 

Environmental protection, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

40 CFR Part 721 

Environmental protection, Chemicals, 

Hazardous substances, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements. 

Dated: June 15, 2012. 

Maria J. Doa, 

Director, Chemical Control Division, Office 

of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. 

Therefore, 40 CFR parts 9 and 721 are 

amended as follows: 

PART 9—[AMENDED] 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 9 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 135 et seq., 136–136y; 

15 U.S.C. 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2601–2671; 

21 U.S.C. 331j, 346a, 348; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 33 

U.S.C. 1251 et seq., 1311, 1313d, 1314, 1318, 

1321, 1326, 1330, 1342, 1344, 1345 (d) and 

(e), 1361; E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR, 

1971–1975 Comp. p. 973; 42 U.S.C. 241, 

242b, 243, 246, 300f, 300g, 300g–1, 300g–2, 

300g–3, 300g–4, 300g–5, 300g–6, 300j–1, 


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