alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Regina S. and Others, Children Alleged to be Abused. Otsego County Department of Social Services, Respondent; Betty T., Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 418]

—Peters, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Otsego County (Humphreys, J.), entered February 15, 1994, which, *inter alia,*granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, for custody of respondent’s children for a period of one year.

In 1992, respondent, the mother of three children born in 1987, 1989 and 1990, was found to have engaged in conduct toward the children constituting neglect. In September 1992, Family Court issued an order directing that the children be placed in the temporary custody of petitioner and thereafter with respondent under an order of supervision for six months. This order was continued for an additional six months by Family Court in March 1993 and was renewed by order of September 22, 1993. Family Court included in its September 22, 1993 order the requirement that respondent was to "supervise her children”. .

In October 1993 and November 1993, petitioner filed petitions alleging that respondent had violated Family Court’s order of September 22, 1993 based on her failure to provide her children with adequate supervision.

Following a hearing, Family Court concluded that respondent had violated the order of September 22, 1993 by her failure to provide her children with adequate supervision and awarded custody of respondent’s children to petitioner.

On this appeal, respondent contends that Family Court erred in that it failed to specifically state in its decision or order that respondent’s failure to comply with the prior order of supervision was done "willfully and without just cause” (Family Ct Act § 1072). This contention is without merit.

Family Court Act § 1072 does not state that the specific phrase "willfully and without just cause” must be used in the court’s decision to validate it. That section provides that Fam*730ily Court may take certain specified judicial action "if, after [a] hearing, the court is satisfied by competent proof that the parent * * * [violated the terms of an order of supervision] willfully and without just cause”. It is evident from a reading of Family Court’s decision and order herein that the court found respondent’s failure to supervise her children to be willful and without just cause. To require Family Court to quote the exact words of *Family*Court Act § 1072 would serve no valid purpose.

Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, Yesawich Jr. and Spain, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL TATE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

FAMILY AUTO GROUP, INC., a

California corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-56087

D.C. No. 

2:14-cv-08738-SJO-MRW

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 6, 2017** 

Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, BYBEE, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

We vacate the district court’s dismissal of this action, and we remand for

reconsideration in light of Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley, LLC, No.

15-55633.

VACATED and REMANDED. Costs on appeal awarded to Plaintiff.

FILED

JUL 10 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Tate v. Family Auto Grp., Inc., No. 15-56087

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, acquiescing dubitante:

I acquiesce dubitante for the reasons articulated in my separate opinion in

Karczewski v. DCH Mission Valley, LLC, No. 15-55633.

FILED

JUL 10 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination

of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

DEC 1 2000

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH FREDERICK DEYULIA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

JOHN W. SUTHERS, Executive

Director, Colorado Department of

Corrections; FRANK LUNA, Warden;

ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE

STATE OF COLORADO,

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 00-1073

(D.C. No. 00-Z-40)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRORBY , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Joseph Frederick DeYulia appeals from the district court ’s denial

of his habeas petition, filed pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 1

 Under the

provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, petitioner must
-2-

obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) before his appeal can proceed before

this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Because the district court denied

petitioner’s motion for COA, petitioner must demonstrate “a substantial showing

of the denial of a constitutional right” before COA can issue. See id.

§ 2253(c)(2). Petitioner also seeks leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis ;

that request is granted.

In his habeas application, petitioner challenged imposition of a mandatory

parole period as part of his criminal sentence. He claimed the provision violated

the separation of powers doctrine and double jeopardy, and, because his parole

was revoked, resulted in a period of incarceration greater than the presumptive

maximum for his crime. The district court rejected these issues on the merits

and denied petitioner’s habeas application. On appeal, petitioner argues these

same issues. We construe petitioner’s allegations liberally, as required by Haines

v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

Our review of petitioner’s arguments and the applicable law convinces

us that, for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court ’s order dated
-3-

January 18, 2000, petitioner has not demonstrated the denial of a constitutional

right. Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability is DENIED and the

appeal is DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero 

Circuit Judge
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. SYLVESTER JOHNSON, *ET ALS.,*DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Argued May 8, 1962

Decided May 8, 1962.

*327
      *Mr. M. Gene Haeberle*argued the motion for the appellants.

*Mr. Norman Heine*argued the motion for the respondent.

Pee Ctjeiam.

The defendants moved before the trial court for (1) permission under *R. R.*1:25A to interrogate the jurors to pursue further an issue which the record shows was theretofore fully litigated, see *State v. Johnson,*34 *N. J.*212, 216-218 (1961), as a step preliminary to a contemplated action in the United States District Court and (2) a stay of execution to permit a review by the United States Supreme Court of our judgment affirming an earlier order, see *State v.*Johnson, 37 *N. J.*19 (1962).

The trial court denied the motion. Leave to appeal *in forma pauperis*was granted and the State then moved before us for judgment.

As to (1) we see no merit. As we have said, the issue was fully litigated in the earlier proceeding. The moving papers on the present application contain mere conclusions without facts to support them. At oral argument counsel for defendants was asked to be more specific but nothing material was revealed. If the United States District Court should see any basis for relief, *R. R.*1:25A would of course not inhibit that tribunal.

As to (2) we see no reason to grant the motion for a stay.

The order of the trial court is affirmed. Mandate shall issue forthwith. The application for a stay therefrom is denied.

*For affirmance of judgment and denial of*stay—Chief Justice Weintratjb, and Justices Jacobs, Eeaitcis, Peoctoe, Hall, Schettino and Haneman—7.

*For*reversal—Hone.
Case No. 13,821.

#### The TELEGRAPH.

[Cited in Wallis v. Chesney, Case No. 17.110. Nowhere reported; opinions of district and circuit courts not now accessible.]
Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350) In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2013 (the Report) of TICC Capital Corp. (the Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Jonathan H. Cohen, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that: (1)

          The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and (2)

          The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant. /s/ Jonathan H. CohenName: Jonathan H. Cohen Date: November 12, 2013
- 1 -

 
4. Severability. If any section or provision of this Note is held invalid, theremainder of this Note shall not be affected thereby.5. Notices. All notices, requests, demands, or other communications required orpermitted under this Note shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have duly given or made on thedate of service if served personally on the party to whom notice is to be given, on the date oftransmission if sent by telex, telecopier or telegraph, or on the fifth (5th) day after mailing ifmailed to the party to whom notice is to be given, by first class mail, registered or certified,postage prepaid, properly addressed as follows:       To Payee: 335 Tomahawk Drive    Palm Desert, CA 92211       To Maker: 1313 Alton Gloor Boulevard, Suite J    Brownsville, Texas 98526or to such other addresses as shall be furnished in writing from time to time.6. Waivers. The Maker and all endorsers of this Note hereby waive notice,presentment, protest and notice of dishonor.7. Attorney’s Fees. If the Payee or any assignee engages the services of any attorneyfor the purpose of enforcing this Note, or any provision thereof, the Payee or assignee shall beentitled to recover his reasonable expenses and costs in enforcing this Note, including attorney’sfees.8. Governing Law. This Note and the legal relations between the Maker and the Payeeshall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Note as of the date first abovewritten.       “MAKER”       RIO VISTA ENERGY PARTNERS L.P.  By: Rio Vista GP LLC, general partner       /s/ Ian Bothwell     Print Name: Ian Bothwell
 
- 2 -

 
**SCHEDULE I**Rio Vista Energy Partners L.P. Assets
 
- 3 -
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

The undersigned, Alessandra Bordon, President, and Franco Perrotta, Chief Financial Officer of Tryx Ventures Corp., hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
| (1) | the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Tryx Ventures Corp. for the period ended September 30, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Tryx Ventures Corp. |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Dated:  November 14, 2005 

/s/ Alessandra Bordon

Alessandra Bordon, President

(Principal Executive Officer)

/s/ Franco Perrotta

Franco Perrotta

Chief Financial Officer

(Principal Financial Officer and

Principal Accounting Officer)

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to Tryx Ventures Corp. and will be retained by Tryx Ventures Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Philadelphia School District, to use, *v.*George W. Myers Company, Appellant.

Argued November 20, 1968.

Before Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.

*611
      *Lionel B. Gumnit,*for appellant.

*James Dessen,*for appellee.

January 15, 1969:

Opinion

Pee Cueiam,

Judgment affirmed.
#### CITY OF PASSAIC, PETITIONER-PETITIONER, v. BOTANY MILLS, INC., *ET AL.,*RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

See same case below: 72 *N. J. Super.*449.

*Mr. William N. Gurtman*for the petitioner.

*Mr. Nicholas Martini, Mr. Vincent E. Hull, Mr. Ezra W. Karhus*and *Mr. Thomas E. Dufy*for the respondents.

May 14, 1962.
Exhibit 21.1

SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

|Legal Name                                                  |  | Country       
|----------------------------------------------------------- |  | --------------
|Websense International Limited                              |  | Ireland       
|Websense Holdings International Limited                     |  | Ireland       
|Websense Japan K.K.                                         |  | Japan         
|Websense Canada, Inc.                                       |  | Canada        
|Websense Mauritius                                          |  | Mauritius     
|Websense SC Holdings Limited                                |  | United Kingdom
|Websense SC Operations Limited                              |  | United Kingdom
|Websense UK Limited                                         |  | United Kingdom
|Websense France S.A.R.L.                                    |  | France        
|Websense Italy S.r.l.                                       |  | Italy         
|Websense Brazil Gerenciamento e Segurance de Internet Ltda. |  | Brazil        
|Websense Deutschland GmbH                                   |  | Germany       
|Websense (Australia) Pty. Ltd                               |  | Australia     
|Websense Software Services India Private Limited            |  | India         
|Websense Network Security Technology R&D (Beijing) Co. Ltd. |  | China         
|Websense BV                                                 |  | Netherlands   
|PortAuthority Technologies, Inc.                            |  | United States 
|Security Software Websense Israel Ltd.                      |  | Israel        
|SurfControl, Inc.                                           |  | United States 
|SurfControl Limited                                         |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl China Limited                                   |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl GmbH (Austria)                                  |  | Austria       
|SurfControl (Israel) Limited                                |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl (Canada) Limited                                |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl (Japan) Limited                                 |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl On-Demand Limited                               |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl (UK) Limited                                    |  | United Kingdom
|SurfControl Pty. Ltd                                        |  | Australia     
|SurfControl Overseas Limited                                |  | United Kingdom
|Beijing SurfControl Network Security Co. Ltd.               |  | China         
|SurfControl SAS                                             |  | France        
|SurfControl GmbH (Germany)                                  |  | Germany       

---



QuickLinks
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CITY OF HIALEAH EMPLOYEES’

RETIREMENT SYSTEM

, Derivatively on Behalf of Nominal Defendants nCINO, INC. (f/k/a Penny HoldCo, Inc.) and nCINO OpCo, Inc. (f/k/a nCino, Inc.),

Plaintiff

- Below

, Appellant,

v.

INSIGHT VENTURE PARTNERS, LLC

, INSIGHT HOLDINGS GROUP, LLC, JEFFREY L. HORING, PIERRE NAUD É

, SPENCER G. LAKE, STEVEN A. COLLINS, JON DOYLE, PAM KILDAY, WILLIAM RUH, and GREG ORENSTEIN,

Defendants

- Below, Appellees,

and

nCINO, INC. (f/k/a Penny HoldCo, Inc.) and nCINO OpCo, Inc. (f/k/a nCino, Inc.),

Nominal Defendants

- Below, Appellees. § § § § § § § § No. 30 , 2024 § § Court Below

– Court of § Chancery of the State of § Delaware § § C .A . No. 2022

- 0846 § § § § § § § § § § §

Submitted: September 4, 2024

Decided: September 12 , 2024

Before SEITZ

, Chief Justice; VALIHURA

, TRAYNOR

, LEGROW

, and

GRIFFITHS

, Justices , constituting the Court en B anc

.

ORDER

After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, and

following oral argument

, we find it evident that the judgment of the Court of2

Chancery should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons stated in the

M emorandum O pinion dated December 28, 2023

, and the O rder s granting the

Insight defendants’ and nCINO defendants’ motion s to dismiss dated December 29,

2023

.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Court of

Chancery is AFFIRMED

.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths

Justice
446 A.2d 679

#### Commonwealth v. Keller, Appellant.

Submitted November 30, 1981.

John Joseph Moran, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant;' Nathaniel W. Boyd, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

Before BROSKY, WIEAND and MONTEMURO, JJ.

Order affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Terrance Stevens, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 303]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (Penal Law § 220.21 [1]; § 20.00) and conspiracy in the second degree (Penal Law § 105.15).

The contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the controlled substance has not been preserved by a motion to dismiss " 'specifically directed’ ” at the alleged defect in the proof *(see, People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10,19, quoting *People v Cona,*49 NY2d 26, 33, n 2; *see also, People v Cedeno,*219 AD2d 828), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice *(see,*CPL 470.15 [6] [a]).

The contention that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel is without merit *(see, People v Hobot,*84 NY2d 1021, 1022; *People v Flores,*84 NY2d 184). Equally lacking in merit is the contention that County Court erred in admitting into evidence certain audio tapes of conversations between the codefendant and a third person *(see, People v Lubow,*29 NY2d 58; *People v Maderic,*142 AD2d 892). Defendant was not denied his right to be present at a material stage of the proceedings because he was not present at the audibility hearing regarding those tapes *(cf, People v Dokes,*79 NY2d 656, 659-660). Because defendant neither took part in nor witnessed the conversations that were taped, he had no ''peculiar knowledge that would be useful in advancing defendant’s or countering the People’s position” *(People v Dokes, supra,*at 660). Moreover, the record does not show that defendant either requested an audibility hearing or objected to the admission of the tapes into evidence *(see, People v Serrano,*170 AD2d 714, *lv denied*77 NY2d 967).

Defendant was not denied his constitutional *(see, People v Taranovich,*37 NY2d 442, 445) or statutory *(see, People v Kendzia,*64 NY2d 331, 337) right to a speedy trial.

Finally, we decline to vacate the verdict in the interest of justice as requested by defendant. (Appeal from Judgment of *938Erie County Court, Rogowski, J.—Criminal Possession Controlled Substance, 1st Degree.) Present—Pine, J. P., Fallon, Wesley, Doerr and Davis, JJ.
#### Leopold G. Beatse, *Respondent, v.*Thomas R. Sharp, *Receiver, etc., Appellant.*

Judgment and order denying new trial affirmed, with costs. Opinion by

Dykman, J.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 54 (Wednesday, March 21, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13306-13307]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5155]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Bureau of Land Management

[OR-936-1310-07; HAG-07-0086; WAOR60869]


Notice of Proposed Reinstatement of Terminated Oil and Gas Lease 
WAOR60869; Washington

AGENCY: Bureau of Land Management, Interior.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Under the provisions of 30 U.S.C. 188(d) and (e), and 43 CFR 
3108.2-3(a) and (b)(1), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) received a 
petition for reinstatement from Meany Land & Exploration, Inc., for 
competitive oil and gas lease WAOR60869 for lands in Yakima County, 
Washington. The petition was filed on time and was accompanied by all 
the rentals due since the date the lease terminated under the law.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Donna Kauffman, Land Law Examiner, 
Minerals Section, BLM Oregon/Washington State Office, PO Box 2965, 
Portland, Oregon 97208, (503) 808-6162.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The lessee, Meany Land & Exploration, Inc., 
has agreed to the amended lease terms for rentals and royalties at 
rates of $10.00 per acre or fraction thereof, per year and 16\2/3\ 
percent, respectively. The lessee has paid the required $500 
administrative fee and $163 to reimburse the Bureau of Land Management 
for the cost of this Federal Register notice.
    The lessee has met all the requirements for reinstatement of the 
lease as set out in Section 31(d) and (e) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 
1920 (30 U.S.C. 188). Therefore, the Bureau of Land Management is 
proposing to reinstate lease WAOR60869, effective October 1, 2006, 
subject to the original terms and conditions of the lease and

[[Page 13307]]

the increased rental and royalty rates cited above. No other valid 
lease has been issued affecting the lands.

Patrick H. Geehan,
Chief, Minerals Section.
[FR Doc. E7-5155 Filed 3-20-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4310-33-P