SIXTH DIVISION 

June 23, 2006 

No. 1-05-2320 

VISION POINT OF SALE, INC., an Illinois ) Appeal from the 

Corporation, ) Circuit Court of 

) Cook County 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

 ) 

GINGER HAAS, an Individual, and LEGACY ) 

INCORPORATED, an Illinois Corporation, ) Honorable 

) Peter Flynn, 

Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding 

PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the 

court: 

Defendants Ginger Haas and Legacy Inc. served requests to 

admit on plaintiff Vision Point of Sale (Vision). No officer of 

Vision signed the response Vision served on defendants, and 

Vision did not file the response in court. Defendants moved to 

deem their requests admitted. The trial court granted the 

motion, but at a later hearing the court sua sponte vacated the 

ruling and decided to allow Vision to file late its signed 

responses to the requests. The court certified for immediate 

review a question concerning limits on the factors a court may 

consider when deciding whether to grant an extension of time for 

filing a response to a request to admit facts. 

We hold that the court may consider any facts that help it 

"strike a balance between diligence in litigation and the 
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interests of justice." United States v. $30,354.00 in United 

States Currency, 863 F. Supp. 442, 445 (W.D. Ky. 1994). In 

particular, the court need not restrict its attention to the 

causes for the delay in the response to the request to admit. 

However, we find that the trial court here did not follow 

procedures mandated by Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 

183) when it decided to allow the late filing. Accordingly we 

vacate the order that gave rise to the certified question and we 

remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 BACKGROUND 

In July 2003 Haas quit the position she held with Vision and 

began working for Legacy, a direct competitor of Vision. Vision 

sued Haas and Legacy in February 2004 for tortious interference 

with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duties, and 

violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (765 ILCS 1065/1 et 

seq. (West 2002)). 

After an evidentiary hearing in May 2004 the trial court 

granted Vision a preliminary injunction in which the court 

ordered Legacy to purge from its computer system all information 

it obtained from Vision through Haas. Both Vision and Legacy 

advanced proposals for methods of ensuring that Legacy abided by 

the order. The court mapped a separate course in an effort to 

respond to both parties' legitimate concerns. The order, dated 

September 27, 2004, directed Legacy to purchase new computers and 

to allow Vision's experts to observe the copying and transfer of 
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files from the old computer to the new computers. The court also 

ordered Legacy to pay a large share of the fees for Vision's 

experts. 

On December 14, 2004, Legacy and Haas faxed to Vision a set 

of requests to admit. Vision sent its responses to the requests 

to Legacy and Haas on January 12, 2005. An attorney for Vision 

signed the responses, and an officer of Vision signed a 

verification of the responses. 

On April 1, 2005, Legacy and Haas moved to deem all of their 

requests admitted because Vision did not file its responses with 

the court and because only an attorney, and not an officer of 

Vision, signed the responses. On April 6, 2005, the clerk of the 

court file stamped a copy of Vision's responses; on April 26, 

2005, the clerk stamped a second copy of Vision's responses, this 

one bearing a signature, as well as a verification, of one of the 

officers of Vision. 

At the hearing on the motion to deem facts admitted, the 

court denied Vision's oral motion for leave to file its signed 

responses late. Because the officer of Vision had signed only 

the verification of the responses served in January, and not the 

responses themselves, and because Vision failed to file those 

responses with the court in January, the responses did not meet 

the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 216(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 

216(c)) and Rule 3.1(c) of the rules of the circuit court of Cook 

County (Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 3.1(c) (eff. May 1, 1996)). See Moy 
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v. Ng, 341 Ill. App. 3d 984 (2003). The trial court granted the 

motion of Legacy and Haas to deem all of the requests admitted. 

Also in April 2005, Vision petitioned for a rule to show 

cause, asking the court to enter sanctions against Legacy for 

Legacy's failure to pay fees as directed by the court's order of 

September 27, 2004. Vision supported the motion with documents 

showing that Vision had requested payment from Legacy of Legacy's 

share of the fees for the work of Vision's experts in supervising 

the transfer of files from Legacy's old computers to its new 

computers. 

On May 13, 2005, at oral argument on the motion for a rule 

to show cause, Legacy admitted that it had not made any payments 

under the order of September 27, 2004. Legacy argued that the 

court should reconsider that order. The court said: 

"You didn't come in on a motion to reconsider. 

You didn't come in on a motion for a protective order. 

 You didn't come in on a motion to clarify. 

You simply didn't pay ***. 

 * * * 

*** I am greatly troubled by the tenor of Legacy's 

response to the rule to show cause which consists not 

of explaining some difficulty in compliance, but rather 

in asserting that *** the underlying order of September 

27th, 2004, is wrong. And therefore, Legacy shouldn't 

have to obey it anyway. 
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While it is true that that order is interlocutory, 

it is also true that if Legacy really thought it didn't 

understand the order or wanted to take issue with the 

order, Legacy could have come in on a motion. 

On the other hand, I am, as I indicated, not 

impressed with plaintiff's argument that the only thing 

Legacy can do is pay. *** 

*** 

I also cannot avoid, in considering the events 

leading up to the rule to show cause and in listening 

to the parties' arguments this afternoon, comparing 

what can fairly be characterized as Legacy's conscious 

stubbornness with regard to the September 27th, 2004, 

order with Vision Point's inadvertent and technical 

non-compliance not with a Court order, but with Supreme 

Court Rule 216 ***. 

It is interesting that [Legacy and Haas], in 

argument, linked the continuing validity of the 

September 27th order and the allocations made in it to 

the discussions that we've had in the last few weeks 

regarding the requests to admit. 

The link is not instantly self-evident, but I 

agree with defendants that the link exists. 

Supreme Court Rule 219 authorizes a virtually 

unlimited variety of sanctions in the event a party 
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fails to comply with a Court order ***. 

 * * * 

I turn, then, to Supreme Court Rule 183. *** 

 * * * 

*** Rule 183 does not *** limit good cause to good 

cause for a failure to do an act on time. *** 

*** The good cause is for granting the extension 

of time. 

And it seems to me that if we look at good cause 

*** under all of the circumstances of the case, there 

is good cause for the Court to *** allow a late filing 

or correction of whatever violation has occurred. 

*** 

*** [W]e have, on the part of Vision Point, a 

technical and inadvertent failure to comply with the 

requirements of Moy and we have, on the part of Legacy, 

what I do believe to be a settled policy of 

recalcitrance with regard to the Court's Sepember 27th, 

2004, order *** and if we look at all of that in the 

context of the case law which says that the goal of all 

discovery procedures is a trial on the merits *** and 

that the purpose of sanctions should be not to punish, 

but to encourage compliance, in my opinion, the fair 

result here *** [is] to allow Legacy to present its 

challenges to the September 27th order and to the 
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invoices which Vision Point has submitted, but to 

vacate the Court's order refusing to grant Vision Point 

an extension under Rule 183 in order to clean up the 

technical non-compliance in its responses to the 

requests to admit." 

The court entered a written order dated May 24, 2005, that 

vacated the order that deemed requests admitted, and the court 

expressly allowed Vision an extension of time to file its 

responses to the requests for admissions. Vision responded to 

the requests to admit, this time with the signature of Vision's 

chief executive officer, and Vision filed its responses with the 

court. 

Legacy and Haas moved to reconsider the order of May 24, 

2005. In the alternative they sought certification of a question 

for appeal. The court denied the motion for reconsideration but 

certified for appeal the following question: 

"In determining whether 'good cause' exists under 

Supreme Court Rule 183 for the grant of an extension of 

time to remedy an unintentional noncompliance with a 

procedural requirement, may the Court take into 

consideration facts and circumstances of record which 

go beyond the reason for the noncompliance?" 

Haas and Legacy filed a timely application for leave to appeal 

under Supreme Court Rule 308. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308. This court 

granted the petition. 
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 ANALYSIS 

The parties agree that our interpretation of Supreme Court 

Rule 183 will determine our response to the certified question, 

so we review the issue de novo. Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings 

v. Bloomington-Normal Airport Authority, 357 Ill. App. 3d 929, 

933 (2005). The parties also ask us to "go beyond the question 

of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that 

gave rise to the appeal." Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 

(1995). We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion. 

Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 988. 

Supreme Court Rule 183 provides simply: 

"This court, for good cause shown on motion after 

notice to the opposite party, may extend the time for 

filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is 

required by the rules to be done within a limited 

period, either before or after the expiration of the 

time." 134 Ill. 2d R. 183. 

The rule on its face does not limit the factors the court may 

consider in determining whether a party has shown good cause for 

extending the time for filing. 

Our supreme court interpreted the rule in Bright, 166 Ill. 

2d at 208. The defendant there sought leave to file a late 

response to the plaintiff's requests to admit. The trial court 

denied the defendant's motion and certified for appeal a question 

concerning the effect of Rule 183 on the deadline for responses 
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to requests to admit. Our supreme court held that Rule 183 gives 

the trial court discretion to allow a party to serve a response 

to requests to admit after the expiration of the 28 day period 

specified in Rule 216. Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 208. The court 

added that the discretion to permit a late response "does not 

come into play under the rule unless the responding party can 

first show good cause for the extension." Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 

209. According to the court, 

"mere absence of inconvenience or prejudice to the 

opposing party is not sufficient to establish good 

cause under Rule 183 and the companion provision of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1007 (West 

1992)). The moving party must assert some independent 

ground for why his untimely response should be 

allowed." Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209. 

The court in Bright did not purport to delineate all the 

appropriate factors a trial court might take into account when 

deciding whether to grant an extension of time under Rule 183. 

The court held only that the lack of prejudice to a party 

requesting admissions, standing alone, did not constitute good 

cause for extending the time to respond to admissions. However, 

the court cited with approval Sims v. City of Alton, 172 Ill. 

App. 3d 694 (1988). In Sims the defendant failed to respond to 

the plaintiffs' requests to admit. On the day of trial the 

plaintiffs moved to deem the requests admitted. The defendant 
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sought leave to file a late response, arguing that its attorney 

had not received the requests to admit, many of the requests 

improperly sought the admission of conclusions of law, the 

requests concerned issues central to the case, and the plaintiffs 

would suffer no prejudice from the late response. The trial 

court granted the defendant leave to file the late response. 

The appellate court held: 

"[A] circuit court has wide discretion with regard 

to the requests to admit and may allow a late filing in 

order to prevent injustice. *** 

*** Here plaintiffs' request to admit facts went 

to the central issues of the case and the plaintiffs 

failed to show that the filing of defendant's late 

response prejudiced their case." Sims, 172 Ill. App. 

3d at 698. 

The court affirmed the decision to permit the late filing of 

responses to the requests to admit. 

Similarly, in Bluestein v. Upjohn Co., 102 Ill. App. 3d 672 

(1981), the defendant's lawyer carelessly failed to respond to 

requests to admit for nine months. The trial judge permitted the 

late filing because the requests concerned the central issue in 

the case. The judge said: 

"'[I]f I were to find those requests have been admitted 

by a lawyer's carelessness, without more, I would be 

depriving a party of his right to a trial by jury on a 
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basic issue in this case.'" Bluestein, 102 Ill. App. 3d 

at 678. 

The judge added that he would deem any request admitted if the 

plaintiff could show prejudice due to the late response. The 

appellate court affirmed, relying on the trial court's "inherent 

power to prevent injustice." Bluestein, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 678. 

Even when the appellate court has disallowed late responses 

to requests to admit, the court has acknowledged the trial 

court's discretion, and it has not purported to require strict 

adherence to the 28-day limit. See Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 991; 

Harris Bank St. Charles v. Weber, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1083 

(1998); Magee v. Walbro, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779-80 

(1988); Johannsen v. General Foods Corp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 296, 

300 (1986). We have found no court that limited the appropriate 

considerations for granting an extension of time to the causes 

for the delay. 

Some of the factors considered in Sims and Bluestein range 

well beyond the causes for the delay. The centrality of the 

issues to the case, like the prejudice to the parties, does not 

relate to the cause of the delay. The concerns addressed in Sims

and Bluestein relate directly to the interest in achieving 

substantial justice between the parties. 

Federal courts and the courts of other states have rules 

that permit late filings for good cause, much like our Supreme 

Court Rule 183. In addition to the factors emphasized in the 
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Illinois cases, the foreign courts have considered the responding 

party's good faith (Countee v. United States, 112 F.2d 447, 451 

(7th Cir. 1940)), the conduct of the party requesting admissions, 

especially in regard to other discovery (Marshall v. Sunshine & 

Leisure, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Fla. 1980)), and the 

length of the delay beyond the statutory deadline (Holt v. Best, 

750 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Mo. App. 1988)). We find that courts in 

Illinois have authority to consider all of these factors, and any 

other factors that bear on the balance the court must strike 

between the need for efficient litigation and the interest of 

achieving substantial justice between the parties. See generally 

H. Henry, Annotation, Time for Filing Responses to Requests for 

Admissions; Allowance of Additional Time, 93 A.L.R.2d 757 (1964). 

 Accordingly, we answer "yes" to the certified question. 

To reach its decision here the trial court considered 

factors outside the cause for the delay. Insofar as the court 

did so, we find no error. But the judge allowed the extension 

after deciding, sua sponte, to revisit his decision to deny 

Vision leave to file late its responses to the requests to admit. 

 The judge looked to Rule 183 as authority for permitting the 

late filing. At the hearing in April 2005, Vision orally moved 

for leave to file its responses late. However, neither before 

that hearing nor before the hearing on May 13, 2005, did Legacy 

and Haas receive any notice of a motion pursuant to Rule 183. 

Rule 183 requires a motion and notice to the party opposing 
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the party who seeks an extension of time for filing. While the 

trial court retains its inherent authority to reconsider its 

interlocutory rulings (People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2006); 

Geske v. Geske, 343 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885 (2003)), when the court 

exercises its authority to act sua sponte, it still must follow 

"otherwise applicable procedures, including notice of the 

proposed judicial action and the opportunity to argue against 

such action, as required in fairness to the litigants." People 

v. Edwards, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1100 (2005). 

Neither Vision nor the trial court followed proper 

notification procedures for a Rule 183 motion. Therefore, we 

vacate the order of May 24, 2005, and we remand for the filing of 

a written motion pursuant to Rule 183, with notice to Legacy and 

Haas, giving them an opportunity for a hearing on their 

objections to the motion. The court should take into 

consideration any facts bearing on the balance between the need 

for efficient litigation in full compliance with court rules and 

the interests of achieving substantial justice on the merits for 

the parties. The court need not restrict its attention to the 

causes for the delay in the responses to the requests to admit. 

The parties sought to raise other issues in their briefs. 

Rule 308 generally allows this court narrow jurisdiction to 

decide the question the trial court certified. Reich v. 

Gendreau, 308 Ill. App. 3d 825 (1999). While we may review the 

trial court's orders insofar as those orders gave rise to the 
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certified question (Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 208), we find that the 

other proposed issues fall outside the proper scope of our review 

under Rule 308. See Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 

3d 85, 88 (1991). 

Certified question answered; order vacated and cause 

remanded.

TULLY and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.