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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL L. OWENS, 

Petitioner, No. CIV S-04-2415 GEB GGH P

vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, et al., 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction for two

counts of first degree murder, one count of first degree burglary and two counts of attempted

robbery. Petitioner was also found to have personally used a firearm and as to the murder counts,

that he committed the murders in the course of a robbery and a burglary. Petitioner was also

found to have a prior felony conviction for robbery. Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate

term of 79 years and an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole for the murder

counts, doubled under the Three Strikes law. 

This action is proceeding on the first amended petition filed August 29, 2005. 

Petitioner raises the following claims: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel; 2) jury instruction

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error; 3) improper admission of character evidence. After carefully considering the record, the

court recommends that the petition be denied.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

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state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

In reviewing a state court’s summary denial of a habeas petition, this court must

“look through” the summary disposition to the last reasoned decision. See Shackleford v.

Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n. 2 (9 Cir. 2000)(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803- th

04, 111 S.Ct. 2590 (1991)).

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

Petitioner raised his claims alleging jury instruction error and improper admission

of evidence in his direct appeal. Only the California Court of Appeal issued a reasoned decision

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denying these claims. Accordingly, the court considers whether the denial of these claims by the

California Court of Appeal constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established

Supreme Court authority. Petitioner raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his

habeas corpus petitions filed in state court. Only the Superior Court issued a reasoned decision

addressing these claims. Respondent’s October 28, 2005, lodged document no. 6. Accordingly,

the court considers whether the denial of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims by

the Superior Court was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court

authority. 

III. Background

The opinion of the California Court of Appeal contains a factual summary. After

independently reviewing the record, the court finds this summary to be accurate and adopts it

below.

The prosecution alleged: Defendant and codefendant Leon Lampkin (whose trial

was severed from defendant’s) invaded the home of Alejandro and Leoncio

Jimenez, whom they believed to be drug dealers, to rob them. A gun battle

ensued inside the house. Defendant fatally shot both victims, but was shot three

times himself. Defendants escaped the house; Lampkin got away, but defendant

made it only to the street, then collapsed.

Defendant did not testify, but presented a defense claiming total innocence. On

defendant’s scenario, he happened to walk by the victims’ house at the wrong

moment, got shot through the open front door, and fell where he was shot.

Prosecution Case

The crimes and their investigation.

As of March 18, 1998, the date of the crimes, Alejandro Jimenez, his brother

Leoncio, and Alejandro’s 18 year old daughter Marisol lived at 6106 Alpine Way

in Linda, California. Marisol assumed her father was a drug dealer because he

always had a lot of cash, people were always coming and going at the house, and

people who arrived empty-handed left with packages.

On or before March 17, 1998, Marisol found $4500 in cash on the kitchen table

and took it. She visited her friend Crystal Barden, who lived at an apartment

complex called Countrywood Apartments, and told Crystal and others, including

Crystal’s sister Amber and Crystal’s boyfriend, Tony Burgos, about the money.

[Footnote 1]

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[Footnote 1: Codefendant Lampkin also lived at Countrywood Apartments

with his girlfriend, as did Stacie Tugend, the sister of one of defendant’s

ex-girlfriends. No direct evidence showed how defendants became aware

of the Jiminez brothers, but the jury could have inferred that some

indiscretion from Marisol’s circle filtered back to defendants.]

Marisol spent most of March 18, 1998, on a shopping spree in Marysville and

Sacramento, among other things using $2900 of the purloined cash to buy a car

for her boyfriend Michael Daehn. She returned home around 10:00 p.m.

Pulling into the driveway and looking toward the open front door, Marisol saw a

Hispanic appearing man in the entryway holding a gun to her uncle’s head.

[Footnote 2] The gunman shut the door. Marisol drove to a friend’s house nearby 

[Footnote 2: Shown a photo of codefendant Lampkin during trial, Marisol

testified that he had the same skin color as the man she saw, but she could

not positively identify him.]

and called 911, stayed on the line until she heard sirens, then walked half way

down the street with her friends. [Footnote 3.]

[Footnote 3: Marisol admitted that in interviews with the police she had

given accounts which differed in some details from that which she was

giving now, but she was confused, upset, and afraid at that time.]

Martin Dunn, who lived at 6076 Alpine Way, heard gunfire sometime around

10:00 p.m. Going outside to investigate, he heard someone asking for help. He

walked over and found defendant lying on the side of the road, bleeding from his

legs. Dunn told his girlfriend to call 911.

Mary Scales, who lived on the street behind Alpine Way, heard three popping

sounds around 10:20 p.m., followed by glass breaking. Looking outside, she saw

a man jumping a fence near her house. He was wearing a hooded sweatshirt and

holding a wooden object. He appeared to be around 5 feet 10 inches tall and thin;

he could have been Hispanic. [Footnote 4.] He was apparently trying to hide in the

shadows.

[Footnote 4: Like Marisol, when Scales was shown photos of Lampkin she

said he had the same skin color as the man she had seen, but she could not

identify him.]

Officers from the Yuba County Sheriff’s Office quickly responded to the 911

dispatch.

The first officer on the scene, Sergeant Long, arrived at 10:19 p.m. and found

defendant prone on the roadway of Alpine Way. Martin Dunn told Long that

defendant had been shot. When Long questioned defendant, he appeared to be in

pain, but not so much that he could not respond; however, he did not answer

Long’s questions about what had happened and how he had gotten shot.

/////

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An ambulance arrived soon after. When the emergency medical team rolled

defendant over, they found a .45-caliber bullet on the roadway. They took

defendant to the hospital where he was operated on. [Footnote 5.]

[Footnote 5: The operation included the removal of a .45 caliber bullet

from defendant’s body. Defendant had been shot in both legs and in the

abdomen. He also had a stress fracture in his left tibia running down from

an entrance wound, and a transverse fracture in his left leg, most likely

caused by walking or running on the leg after he was shot.]

Deputy Houston also responded to the dispatch call. When he arrived, Sergeant

Long asked him to take control of the crime scene. [Footnote 6.] His attention was 

[Footnote 6: At around 10:45 p.m. or 11:00 p.m., Houston yielded control

to Sergeant Marusin, who had just arrived. Sergeant Marusin took charge

of the investigation thereafter. Sergeant Marusin went through the house a

couple of times alone. He then decided to get a search warrant rather than

to continue to rely on Marisol’s consent to search because his superior

officer realized that Marisol might be a suspect. He resumed the search, in

the company of criminalists, around 6:00 a.m. on March 19, after

obtaining a warrant.]

directed to Marisol. Crying hysterically, she told him what she had seen and gave

him her house keys. She also told him that she could not tell whether defendant

was the man she saw inside the house.

Houston went to the house, pounded on the front door and yelled “Sheriff’s

Department,” but got no response. The door was locked. He opened it with the

key and entered with another officer.

In the living room Houston found one victim, later identified as Leoncio Jimenez,

lying supine with a bullet wound in his sternum; a .45 Colt semiautomatic pistol

lay at his feet, the slide locked back and the magazine empty. In the passageway

between the living room and the kitchen was another victim, later identified as

Alejandro Jimenez, lying on his side. [Footnote 7.]

[Footnote 7: A black knit stocking cap lay near Alejandro’s knees. Two

hairs found on the cap were collected for DNA analysis, but it could not be

done because the roots were missing. The hairs appeared straight and

brown.]

Each victim had about $5000 in cash on his person. Emergency medical

technicians, arriving at around 10:40 p.m., confirmed that the victims were dead.

Houston found numerous shell casings on the floor of the kitchen and living

room. A criminalist later determined that three were .45 caliber and nine were

nine millimeter.

Testing by Don Dunbar, a criminalist and firearms expert, disclosed that the .45-

caliber casings came from the Colt semiautomatic pistol found by Leoncio’s body,

and the nine-millimeter casings came from a Ruger semiautomatic pistol which

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the police found on the front lawn of the victim’s house on the night of the crimes. 

The ruger was identified by its serial number as a gun which Melanie Tugend and

Maurita Gilmer bought for defendant in August 1997, paying in cash, after he had

picked it out at a store. Autopsies of the two victims revealed Leoncio died as a

result of a gunshot wound to the heart. Alejandro had multiple gunshot sounds to

the chest and aorta from defendant’s nine-millimeter pistol.

Dunbar opined that both the bullet found on the street when defendant was moved

and the bullet surgically extracted from him came from the Colt found by

Leoncio’s body. (The police later discovered a Star .45 caliber pistol in the

bedroom of the victims’ house, but the expert opined that the bullets and casings

could not have come from that gun.)

A shotgun blast had damaged the ceiling of the back bedroom and laundry room. 

There was a spent shotgun shell on the floor and old shotgun wadding on the floor

near the kitchen/garage door. A hole in a pocket door between the laundry room

and kitchen matched the holes in the ceiling. The walls of several rooms

contained bullet holes and expended bullets.

A back window was broken, with shattered glass on the ground underneath. The

window frame and the broken glass had blood droplets on them. Sergeant

Marusin concluded that someone had escaped the house by jumping out the closed

window.

A sliding glass door leading from the backyard to the dining room was open and

intact. No blood was found in the back yard or on the porch beside the glass door.

Outside the house, at its northeast corner, the police found two black backpacks,

one made of leather and one of nylon. (Melanie Tugend testified that they

resembled backpacks she knew defendant to own in 1997.) One contained duct

tape, a baseball cap, and two 20-gauge shotgun shells; the other contained duct

tape, a latex glove, and a magazine with live round of nine-millimeter Winchester

ammunition, fitting the gun found on the lawn. The inside of the latex glove bore

one fingerprint, which a latent prints analyst identified as a match for defendant’s.

[Footnote 8.]

[Footnote 8: No fingerprints of defendant or DNA evidence pointing to

him were found in the house. However, his prints were found in his

mother’s Cadillac and on the manual for a nine-millimeter Ruger in a

locked file cabinet at the home of ex-girlfriend, Charlene Harden.]

In the area where defendant had been lying, the police found two bloodstained Tshirts, a pair of brown cloth gloves, and a pair of glasses. A large pool of blood

lay in the roadway. A blood trail led from there a few hundred feet to the end of

the victims’ driveway. No blood drops were found between the end of the

driveway and the house, or anywhere else in the exterior crime scene. [Footnote

9.]

[Footnote 9: Don Dunbar opined that someone shot at close or

intermediate range with a .45 caliber would not necessarily be

incapacitated immediately and might be able to move some distance

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before starting to lose blood. Thus, the beginning of a blood trail did not

necessarily show the victim’s location when hit.]

In front of a house about 400 feet west of the backyard of the victims’ house, the

police found a sawed-off shotgun and a claw hammer in the shrubs. The shotgun

had an expended shell in the chamber of the same type and color as the shells

found in the backpacks. The shotgun and hammer bore bloodstains.

DNA testing on blood samples collected in the investigation indicated that

defendant was the source of all blood found on the street, but not of the blood

found on the window frame, the broken glass, the shotgun, or the hammer. All of

those blood samples could have come from codefendant Lampkin.

A Cadillac belonging to defendant’s parents was parked in the driveway of a

nearby house not visible from the crime scene. The officers had to get the keys to

the car from defendant’s mother. On searching the impounded car, they

discovered a key ring on the front passenger seat. It held keys that opened the

door of codefendant Lampkin’s residence and operated his car.

A few days after the crimes, defendant’s ex-girlfriend Charlene Harden and her

friends Rebecca Smith and Mary Gorham forced open a locked file cabinet

belonging to defendant which was stored in Harden’s bedroom. It held several

types of ammunition, a box and an owner’s manual for a nine-millimeter Ruger

pistol, two ski masks, and papers bearing Melanie Tugend’s name. Harden asked

Smith and Gorham to dispose of the material. Instead, they stored it on Gorham’s

premises. Harden eventually brought the police over to retrieve it. Defendant’s

fingerprints were on the Ruger owner’s manual and the police found purchasing

documents for that gun at Tugend’s residence.

Defendant’s associations and activities.

Defendant knew codefendant Lampkin and Melanie Tugend from high school in

the early 1990's. Tugend became his girlfriend for a number of years. When

defendant would come over to stay the night with Tugend, he would bring

belongings in one of two black backpacks, one made of leather and the other of

nylon.

Tugend saw defendant and Lampkin together once in 1997. Lampkin was around

five feet nine inches tall and light skinned; he looked Hispanic and black. His

girlfriend Rebecca lived in the Countrywood Apartments. So did Tugend’s sister

Stacie.

In August 1997 defendant took Melanie Tugend shopping for a gun. After he

picked out the model he wanted, a nine-millimeter Ruger semiautomatic pistol,

she and Maurita Gilmer went back to the store, filled out the paperwork, and

bought the gun. Tugend took the weapon, its box, its operating manual, and some

shells and put them in a closet to which only she and defendant had keys. In

November 1997, after defendant and Tugend had broken up, he retrieved these

items from the closet.

/////

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In September 1997, defendant moved into an apartment with Maurita Gilmer.

[Footnote 10.]

[Footnote 10: Gilmer and defendant married in May 1998.]

They paid rent on time through November, but were late every month afterward

until March 1998 and bounced a rent check in February 1998. On March 12,

1998, a week before the crimes, they received a three-day notice to pay or quit.

On March 18, 1998, in the later afternoon, defendant visited Stacie Tugend at

Countrywood Apartments. After staying a short time, he said he was going over

to see if Lampkin was out of the shower.

Shortly after 7:00 p.m. on March 18, the phone rang at defendant’s home. Gilmer

answered. The speaker identified himself as “Leon.” Gilmer did not know him. 

She knew a friend of defendant named Leon Kage, but he was not the caller. The

phone rang again a bit later; this time, defendant answered. He told Gilmer he had

to pick “Leon” up. He said he would be right back, then left in his father’s white

Cadillac.

Around 8:00 p.m. on March 18, defendant stopped in at the home of Orlin Stearns

and Cookie Saunders, which is on Shasta Way near the intersection with Alpine

Way. Charlene Harden, the mother of defendant’s young son, was there. 

Defendant asked Harden to go with him; they left together.

Defendant, who was driving a Cadillac with a light-skinned male passenger

Harden did not know, told her he needed to pick up something near her residence. 

Harden drove home. Defendant came by around 8:15 p.m., carrying a black nylon

backpack. He went into Harden’s bedroom, where a locked filing cabinet was

stored to which he had the only key. He came out five minutes later with his

backpack. He left around 8:45 p.m.

Around 10:00 p.m., defendant returned to the Stearns’s house and asked if he

could park his Cadillac in the driveway. He promised to come back and get it

quickly. Stearns said it was all right. (The car was still parked in the driveway at

1:30 o’clock the next morning, after defendant had been taken to the hospital.)

Defense Case.

Gene Stober, a former narcotics investigator for the Yuba County Sheriff’s Office,

testified that Marisol’s account of her father’s and uncle’s activities was

consistent with small-scale drug dealing. Six years before trial, Alejandro’s name

had come up in a peripheral manner in a cocaine investigation; no evidence

suggested that he was part of a drug cartel. Stober had never heard of Leoncio.

During the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Sergeant Marusin testified that the officers

initially considered persons other than defendant and codefendant as suspects,

including Marisol (because of her theft), her boyfriend Michael Daehn (who was

of Asian descent but might have looked Hispanic to some people, and who did not

get along with Alejandro), and Joseph Leon, a known acquaintance of defendant

who could have been the “Leon” who called defendant’s home on the night of the

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crimes. However, all were excluded at an early stage of the investigation. 

Marusin never thought that the killings could have been in retaliation for the

victim’s drug activities.

Gunshot residue (GSR) testing is done to determine whether the person tested has

fired a particular gun or has been in the vicinity of a gun that was recently fired. 

The officers did GSR testing on Marisol, Daehn, Crystal Barden, and Tony

Burgos, among others. The officers brought a GSR kit to the hospital to test

defendant, but it was not done because he was in surgery and the officers thought

it useless to do the test after that. Sergeant Marusin decided not to do a GSR test

on defendant’s clothing because he thought he already had better evidence relating

to firearms, bullets, casings, and ballistics than a GSR test could provide.

[Footnote 11.]

[Footnote 11: Marusin considers GSR testing inconclusive because it

shows at most that the person or item tested was in the environment where

a gun was fired. It is “old technology” which his department no longer

uses very often. He believed it was done on certain people “just for drill

more than anything else.” Criminalist and firearms expert Don Dunbar

testified that the Department of Justice no longer uses GSR testing because

it is not very reliable: it can produce both false negatives and false

positives.]

Michael Daehn testified that he did not get along with Marisol’s father and that

most people did not like him. Marisol took the money from the house without

telling Daehn in advance; he had never told anyone of a plan to steal from her

father. Once she told him she had stolen the money, they created a cover story

together.

Marisol admitted that this was not the first time she had stolen from her father, but

the amounts had been much less before. He neglected her basic needs: he had not

bought her clothing since she turned 16 or food since she turned 17, and he had

laughed at her many times when she asked for money. She had told some of her

friends about that. However, she claimed she had a good and loving relationship

with her father. She also claimed a loving relationship with her uncle, although

they had had an argument a week before the crimes. She denied that the had tried

to rape her or that she had told anyone he did.

Crystal Barden testified that Marisol said on March 17, 1998, that she had round

$4500 or $5000, planned to take it, and intended to tell her father a cover story

about a burglary. Marisol also said that within the last couple of weeks her uncle

had come at her (although she did not use the word rape).

Tony Burgos testified that Daehn said before March 18 that he and Marisol were

planning to take money from her father.

Four eyewitnesses reported that they had seen a Hispanic man running from the

scene; they saw him at several different locations. Sergeant Marusin believed,

however, that three of the reports described the same person and the fourth

described a person unconnected to these crimes.

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One of these eyewitnesses , Robert Haldeman, was the person to whose house

Marisol had come to call 911. He was out walking in the neighborhood with his

girlfriend between 9:30 o’clock and 10:30 o’clock on the night of the crimes. 

They first saw a man in black clothes walking along the bushes, then saw him

again about 10:25 p.m. jogging in the opposite direction. He appeared around 5

feet 10 inches tall, 160 to 170 pounds, 25 to 30 years old, and African American

or Hispanic; his skin color was similar to that in a photo of codefendant Lampkin. 

When interviewed by the police, Haldeman had described the man as looking

Hispanic or Asian.

Joseph Leon, who used the “rap name” Leon Kage, testified that he was a good

friend of defendant and that they had performed rap music together. He had

suffered a conviction for robbery in 1994. He would tell a “little lie” for

defendant, but not “something major.”

On March 18, 1998, Leon was in Daly City, California, on a job. [Footnote 12.] 

[Footnote 12: He stayed in a motel, which he had named in an interview

with Sergeant Marusin. Now, however, he could not recall the name.]

He called defendant between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. to talk about a barbeque

planned for the weekend. He called twice. The second time a woman answered

and turned over the phone to defendant; they talked for several minutes. He did

not ask defendant to come and pick him up. [Footnote 13]

[Footnote 13: As mentioned above, Maurita Gilmer, who knew Leon,

testified that he was not the caller.]

Over defense objection, Leon was asked on cross-examination about defendant’s

knowledge of firearms. He testified that he had seen defendant with a gun in

December 1997, and that defendant sometimes sold guns; he had offered to sell

one to Leon. When shown a photograph of himself and defendant with a sawedoff shotgun, also over defense objection, he explained that the photo was taken in

1992 as a promotional shot for a rap album; he also pointed out that he was the

one holding the gun, not defendant.

Mark Cox testified that he had bought several guns from defendant, including a

nine-millimeter Ruger in January 1998. He sold it within a couple of days to a

Laotian named Sam. There was no paperwork involved in these transactions. 

Like Joseph Leon, Cox would tell a “little lie” for defendant, but not a big one.

Daniel Joseph, a defense firearms expert, examined the crime scene and

photographs of the scene. [Footnote 14.] Based on the physical evidence and on 

[Footnote 14: Defendant asserts that Joseph also testified as an expert in

“shooting reconstruction.” However, defendant’s record citation does not

support his implicit claim that Joseph qualified as an expert in that broad

field. At the page cited ,the trial court stated only that Joseph was

qualified to testify about “the characteristics of handguns,” including “the

ejecting patterns of certain handguns.”]

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certain assumptions about the trajectories of the bullets fired, he concluded that a

shooter firing a nine-millimeter pistol had entered the house in a crouch from the

garage, taking the occupants by surprise. If Alejandro, sitting at the kitchen table,

had been caught unawares in this manner, Leoncio, who was in the living room,

might have been unsure about the source of the firing and thought mistakenly that

it was coming from the front. Trying to return fire, he could have shot through the

front door as he moved across to the kitchen. The locations of the .45 caliber

from the living room, not the dining room. If the front door was open, there was a

line of sight to the end of the driveway form a range of positions in the living

room. This scenario would be impossible only if the front door had been locked

before shots were fired, since there were not bullet holes in that door. Joseph also

opined that it was very unlikely that anyone shot three times with a .45 caliber

from within 15 feet would not go down quickly.

Rebuttal.

The prosecution recalled Don Dunbar, its firearms expert, to respond to Joseph’s

testimony. After that testimony, Dunbar examined the crime scene and took

measurements to determine the positions from which shots could have been fired

from inside the house through an open front door without hitting anything inside. 

He concluded that from the most favorable position, with the door open 11 inches,

there would have been a four-foot-wide expanse visible at the driveway; from the

least favorable position, with the door open only two inches, there would have

been an expanse at the driveway of less than eight inches. If the door was closed,

shots could not have been fired from inside the house because there were no

bullets or bullet holes in the door.

Opinion of California Court of Appeal, Respondent’s Lodged Document 1, pp. 3-18.

IV. Discussion

A. Jury Instruction Error

Legal Standard

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985). Habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475

(1981); see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786

F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). The standard of review for a federal habeas court “is limited to

deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States

(citations omitted).” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. In order for error in

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the state trial proceedings to reach the level of a due process violation, the error had to be one

involving “fundamental fairness.” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 482. The Supreme Court has defined

the category of infractions that violate fundamental fairness very narrowly. Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct.

at 482.

Where, as in the present case, what is at issue is the failure to give an instruction,

petitioner’s burden is “especially heavy” because it has been held that “[a]n omission or an

incomplete instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.” Henderson

v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (1977). Moreover, a trial judge need not

instruct on a defense which would be inconsistent with petitioner’s theory of the case. Bashor v.

Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir. 1984). Failure to give a jury instruction under these

circumstances will not amount to a due process violation. Id.

The burden upon petitioner is greater yet in a situation where he claims that the

trial court did not give an instruction sua sponte. To the extent that petitioner rests his claim on a

duty to give an instruction sua sponte under rules of state law, petitioner has stated no federal

claim. Indeed, in the failure to give a lesser included offense instruction context, the Ninth

Circuit has flatly held in non-capital cases that the failure to give the instruction states no federal

claim whatsoever. James v. Reece, 546 F.2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1976). Therefore, in order to

violate due process, the impact on the proceeding from failure to give an instruction sua sponte

must be of a very substantial magnitude.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently held that there is no unreasonable

application of federal law where a state appellate court decided that a jury instruction’s single

incorrect statement of the “imperfect self-defense” standard did not render the instruction

reasonably likely to have misled the jury. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S. Ct. 1830

(2004).

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Analysis

Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by failing to

instruct on third party culpability. The California Court of Appeal denied this claim as follows:

Defendant contends the trial court erred prejudicially by failing to instruct the jury

on third-party culpability. Acknowledging that his counsel did not request such

an instruction, he argues in the alternative that counsel was ineffective for failing

to do so. We reject these contentions.

Instruction on third-party culpability is required only where direct or

circumstantial evidence links someone other than the defendant to the perpetration

of the crime and suffices to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. 

(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325; People v. Hall (1986) 41

Cal.3d 826, 833.)

So far as defendant means to suggest that the third party was codefendant

Lampkin, the evidence pointing to the codefendant did not raise a reasonable

doubt as to defendant’s guilt, since much of it directly implicated defendant.

So far as defendant means to suggest, however, that someone other than

codefendant was the culpable third party, he fails to support that suggestion. As at

trial, he speculates about alternative perpetrators ranging from Marisol Jiminez

and her boyfriend to unknown persons in the drug trade, but cites no evidence that

any such persons were actually linked to the crimes. Mere speculation about the

possible motives or opportunities of third persons, without more, does not justify

instruction on third party culpability. (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833.)

Since there was no substantial evidence to support an instruction on third-party

culpability as to anyone other than codefendant, the trial court had no duty to

instruct sua sponte on that theory. (See People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668,

680-681.) For that same reason, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to

request that instruction. 

Opinion of California Court of Appeal, Respondent’s Lodged Document 1, pp. 18-19.

For the reasons stated by the California Court of Appeal the court finds that the

trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury as to third party culpability did not involve a

violation of fundamental fairness. In the amended petition, petitioner states that the investigation

as to this claim is ongoing. Petitioner states that further facts will be presented following further

investigation or an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has presented no facts nor requested an

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 In his traverse, petitioner states that a request for an evidentiary hearing is forthcoming. 1

Petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing following the filing of his traverse on November

28, 2005. 

15

evidentiary hearing. Because the denial of this claim by the California Court of Appeal was not 1

an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority, this claim should be

denied. 

Petitioner also argues that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as to third

party culpability violated his right to present a defense. No reasoned state court opinion

addresses this claim. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal

prosecutions must comport with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness. We have long

interpreted this standard of fairness to require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct.

2528 (1984). The Supreme Court has also held that “[a]s a general proposition, a defendant is

entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient

for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct.

883 (1988).

Because petitioner’s lawyer did not request an instruction regarding third party

culpability, petitioner cannot argue that the trial court denied him his right to present a defense. 

In any event, as found by the California Court of Appeal, there was not sufficient evidence to

support such an instruction. After independently reviewing the record, the court finds that the

denial of this claim by the California Supreme Court was not an unreasonable application of

clearly established Supreme Court authority. Accordingly, this claim should be denied.

B. Improper Admission of Character Evidence

Petitioner argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of petitioner’s

financial problems and a photograph depicting him with a gun unrelated to the at-issue offenses. 

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Legal Standard

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) only on the basis

of some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is

unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton v. Cupp,

768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v.

Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state

issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377, 92 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (1972).

The Supreme Court has reiterated the standards of review for a federal habeas

court. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991). In Estelle v. McGuire, the

Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which had

granted federal habeas relief. The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the

evidence was incorrectly admitted under state law since, “it is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions.” Id. at 67-68, 112 S.

Ct. at 480. The Court re-emphasized that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for error in

state law.” Id. at 67, 112 S. Ct. at 480, citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S. Ct. 3092,

3102 (1990), and Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874-75 (1984) (federal courts

may not grant habeas relief where the sole ground presented involves a perceived error of state

law, unless said error is so egregious as to amount to a violation of the Due Process or Equal

Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). 

The Supreme Court further noted that the standard of review for a federal habeas

court “is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States (citations omitted).” Id. at 68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. The Court also stated that in

order for error in the state trial proceedings to reach the level of a due process violation, the error

had to be one involving “fundamental fairness,” Id. at 73, 112 S. Ct. at 482, and that “we ‘have

defined the category of infractions that violate “fundamental fairness” very narrowly.’” Id. at 73,

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112 S. Ct. at 482. Habeas review does not lie in a claim that the state court erroneously allowed

or excluded particular evidence according to state evidentiary rules. Jammal v. Van de Kamp,

926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Moreover, any lack of “fundamental fairness” is not

determined de novo, but only determined if fairly specific Supreme Court authority had so

designated such a situation prior to the finality of petitioner’s conviction.

Discussion

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim regarding admission of

the photograph on the following grounds:

Defendant contends the trial court erred prejudicially by admitting the photograph

of himself and Joseph Leon, who was holding a shotgun, over his objection. We

conclude that any error was harmless.

Defendant asserts the photograph was irrelevant and highly prejudicial character

evidence whose introduction deprived him of a fair trial under the due process

clause of the United States and California Constitutions. Assuming that these

contentions are properly before us despite defendant’s failure to show by record

citation that he raised these grounds for his objection, we see no deprivation of a

fair trial or due process. (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 610-612, see

also People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1035.)

Assuming for the sake of argument the photograph was erroneously admitted,

defendant can show no prejudice.

Thus, in the photograph, defendant was not holding the shotgun, Leon was. Even

assuming that evidence of defendant’s familiarity with guns might have had some

tendency to prejudice him, defendant himself put on far more damaging evidence

on this point: Leon himself testified that defendant regularly sold guns, and Mark

Cox testified that he had personally bought three guns from defendant. 

Furthermore, it was undisputed that defendant enlisted Melanie Tugend and

Maurita Gilmer to act as straw buyers for him in purchasing the Ruger ninemillimeter pistol that killed the victims. Thus, even if the photograph at issue had

a potential for prejudice that outweighed its probative effect, that potential was de

minimis in light of the other undisputed evidence of defendant’s involvement with

guns.

Moreover, the case against defendant was very strong. The firearms evidence tied

him directly to the killing, he owned the backpacks which were found full of

incriminating evidence outside the victims’ house, he owned and had sole access

to the locked file cabinet at Charlene Harden’s residence which contained further

incriminating evidence, he received a call from “Leon” and said he was going to

go pick him up a few hours before the killing, he was seen later in the evening

driving with a passenger whose description corresponded to codefendant’s, he

went into the locked file cabinet at Harden’s residence carrying a backpack and

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removed something before leaving, he parked his parents’ Cadillac in a driveway

near the victims’ house but not visible from it shortly before the crimes, his gun

was found at the crime scene, and when found on the street just after the crimes,

he would not tell the officers how he came to be there. His defense depended on

the claim that he was simply walking by the victims’ house and got shot through

the open door, but (1) Marisol Jimenez testified that someone inside the house

closed the door before the shooting began; 2) the first officer to reach the house

after the shootings found the door locked; 3) there were no bullets or bullet holes

in the door; 4) it defied common sense that anyone inside a house where a gun

battle was raging would take the time to fire at an innocent passerby outside the

house; 5) defendant’s gun was found at the crime scene; and 6) it was never

explained why defendant would have been walking by the victims’ house at that

moment for any innocent reason. Thus, even if we assumed the trial court abused

its discretion by admitting the photograph, defendant can show no prejudice from

its admission because it is not reasonably probable defendant would have

achieved a more favorable result had the photograph been excluded. (People v.

Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.)

Opinion of California Court of Appeal, Respondent’s Lodged Document 1, pp. 20-22. 

First, the Supreme Court has not found that the admission of propensity evidence

is a matter of fundamental unfairness, and its preclusion a matter of Constitutional import. As

such, petitioner’s argument fails in this federal habeas context. Alberni v.McDaniel, 458 F.3d

860, 864 (9 Cir. 2006). th

Secondly, for the reasons stated by the California Court of Appeal, the court finds

that admission of the photograph did not violate fundamental fairness. Because the denial of this

claim by the California Court of Appeal was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court authority, this claim should be denied.

The California Court of Appeal also rejected petitioner’s claim challenging

admission of evidence regarding his financial problems:

Defendant contends the trial court erred prejudicially by permitting Maurita

Gilmer and defendant’s landlady Shirley Zeller to testify that defendant and

Gilmer had trouble paying their rent because it is impermissible to use evidence of

a defendant’s poverty to show his motive for committing theft or robbery. 

Assuming it was error to admit the evidence, once again, we see no prejudice.

Evidence of a defendant’s poverty to show a motive for theft or robbery is

generally barred because reliance on poverty alone is considered unfair to the

defendant and the prejudicial value of such evidence usually outweighs its

probative effect. (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 939; People v.

Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1024; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815,

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854.) Any error in admitting the evidence is necessarily harmless for the reasons

stated above in part II. Since the evidence aside from motive pointed so strongly

to defendant, and the prosecution did not need to prove motive in any event, there

is no reasonable probability that defendant would have obtained a better outcome

had the evidence of his late rent payments been excluded. (People v. Cudjo,

supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 610-612.)

Opinion of California Court of Appeal, Respondent’s Lodged Document 1, pp. 22-23.

For the reasons stated by the California Court of Appeal, the court finds that

admission of the evidence regarding petitioner’s financial problems did not violate fundamental

fairness. Because the denial of this claim by the California Court of Appeal was not an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority, this claim should be

denied.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Legal Standard

The test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel is set forth in 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). First, a petitioner must show

that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To this end, the petitioner must

identify the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable

professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. The federal court must then determine

whether in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professional competent assistance. Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “We strongly presume that

counsel’s conduct was within the wide range of reasonable assistance, and that he exercised 

acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d

695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland at 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 

Second, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693, 104 S. Ct. at 2067. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

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694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id., 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

In extraordinary cases, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated

based on a fundamental fairness standard. Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 391-93, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1512-13 (2000), (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 506 U.S. 364 (1993)).

The Supreme Court has recently emphasized the importance of giving deference

to trial counsel’s decisions, especially in the AEDPA context:

In Strickland we said that “[j]udicial scrutiny of a counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential” and that “every effort

[must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and

to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”

466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, even when a court is

presented with an ineffective-assistance claim not subject to §

2254(d)(1) deference, a [petitioner] must overcome the

“presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Ibid. (quoting Michel

v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)).

For [petitioner] to succeed, however, he must do more than show

that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test if his claim were

being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it

is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its

independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland 

incorrectly. See Williams, supra, at 411, 65 S. Ct. 363. Rather, he

must show that the [ ]Court of Appeals applied Strickland to the

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-699, 122 S. Ct. 1843,1852 (2002).

Analysis

Petitioner first argues that he was constructively denied the effective assistance of

counsel because his counsel was subject to disciplinary proceedings by the California State Bar.

On April 29, 1998, petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Meyer, was suspended from the practice of law for

six months and placed on probation for two years by the California State Bar. Amended Petition,

Exhibit C. This disciplinary action was based on counsel’s conduct in civil actions in which he

failed to promptly returned money owed to a client and keep adequate records, filed an

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unwarranted claim in state court and failed to pay sanctions, and failed to communicate with a

client regarding her decision not to file a lawsuit. Id. On January 20, 2000, petitioner’s counsel

resigned from membership in the State Bar. Id. At that time, further disciplinary proceedings

were pending against him. Id.

In Young v. Runnels, 435 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9 Cir. 2006) the Ninth Circuit found th

that merely because defense counsel is subject to disciplinary proceedings while representing a

client does not mean that he is presumptively incapable of providing effective assistance. Even

in a case where counsel was disciplined mid-trial but continued to represent the client, counsel’s

conduct was governed by the standards set forth in Strickland, supra. Young v. Runnels, 435

F.3d at 1043, citing United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682 (9 Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the th

court does not find that Mr. Meyer was per se ineffective based on the disciplinary proceedings

against him in the California State Bar. 

Petitioner next argues that his counsel was ineffective for arguing third party

culpability but then failing to request that the jury be instructed on this defense. As discussed

above, the California Court of Appeal found that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant this

instruction. The court agrees with this reasoning. Petitioner argues that had counsel properly

investigated the case he would have found evidence to support the third party culpability defense

and instruction. However, petitioner offers no evidence to support this speculation. 

Accordingly, the court does not find that petitioner was prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to

request an instruction regarding third party culpability.

Petitioner next argues that his counsel was ineffective because he went into trial

poorly prepared without adequate investigation into the facts of the case. In particular, petitioner

argues that the trial court authorized his counsel to hire expert witnesses, a forensic pathologist

and a ballistics expert. Petitioner argues that counsel did not hire a forensic pathologist and that

the ballistics expert hired by counsel was found to be unqualified. 

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Petitioner provides no evidence or argument regarding what testimony a forensic

pathologist could have provided that would have testified to. Nor does petitioner identify any of

the other expert witnesses counsel failed to hire. For these reasons, the court finds that petitioner

has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to call a forensic

pathologist and other unidentified experts, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

While petitioner’s ballistics expert was found to be unqualified to give his opinion

on crime scene reconstruction, petitioner does not discuss what the ballistic expert’s testimony

would have been and how it would have aided the defense. Without this information, the court

cannot determine whether the outcome of the proceeding would have been different had

petitioner’s counsel called a qualified ballistic’s expert. 

Petitioner next argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call witnesses

who saw another suspect running from the scene. Petitioner states that his counsel claimed that

two of the witnesses were unavailable because they had left the state and another was

uncooperative because he did not speak English. Petitioner claims that these witnesses stated

that they saw a Hispanic male, approximately 5'11" running from the scene in a different location

than Lampkin. Petitioner argues that this unknown individual matched the description given by

Marisol Jimenez of the man holding the gun to her uncle’s head. 

Petitioner is claiming that his counsel failed to adequately investigate whether a

third party was involved. The problem with this argument is that petitioner has still presented no

evidence to support his claim of third party liability. Nor has petitioner requested an evidentiary

hearing as to this claim. In any event, as discussed above, the evidence against petitioner was

strong. Evidence that a third party was present at the scene does not diminish petitioner’s

liability. In addition, petitioner concedes that counsel attempted to but was unable to locate these

witnesses. For these reasons, the court finds that petitioner has failed to meet his burden of

demonstrating either of the Strickland prongs, i.e. prejudice or that counsel acted unreasona bly.

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Finally, petitioner argues that the defense theory argued by counsel, i.e. that

petitioner was shot when he just happened to be walking by the crime scene, was unsupported. 

Petitioner argues that his counsel should have argued that petitioner was involved in a drug scene

that erupted in violence. The fact that the victims had large amounts of cash in their pockets

suggested that they had just received the money for drugs. Petitioner argues that had counsel

argued this theory of the case, which was supported by substantial evidence, it is reasonably

probable that he would have been convicted of second degree felony murder.

The court agrees that the defense argued by counsel was weak and unsupported by

the evidence. A defense that petitioner was involved in a drug deal gone bad was more plausible. 

However, the evidence supporting the burglary and robbery special circumstances, which

resulted in the first degree murder conviction, was strong. Evidence was presented from which a

jury could reasonably infer that petitioner and Limpkin were made aware that drugs and large

amounts of cash were in the victims’ residence. Backpacks resembling packs belonging to

petitioner were found near the scene. These packs contained duct tape, shotgun shells, a

magazine with a live round and a glove containing petitioner’s fingerprints. Based on the

contents of these backpacks, a jury could reasonably infer that petitioner intended to burglarize

and/or rob the victims. If petitioner merely intended to buy drugs from the victims, it is unclear

why these materials were at the scene. That petitioner parked his parents car at a nearby house

that was not visible from the crime scene also supports the inference that he intended to rob the

victims rather than buy drugs. 

In sum, there really was no good defense. The evidence against him was strong. 

For these reasons, the court does not find that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to pursue a

defense based on a drug deal gone bad. 

The denial of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims by the Superior

Court was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court authority. 

Accordingly, these claims should be denied.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 11/7/06

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

owen2415.157

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