alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### George A. Cincotta, Jr., Respondent, v Diana J. Cincotta, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 527]

—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant former wife appeals, as limited by her brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O’Brien, J.), entered November 16, 1993, which, *inter alia,*after a nonjury trial, granted the plaintiff former husband a credit for $117,000 in separate property used to make improvements of the marital residence, *307denied her application for maintenance, and limited her award of counsel fees to $5,000.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law and the facts and as a matter of discretion, by deleting the eighth and ninth decretal paragraphs thereof, and substituting therefor a provision awarding each party 50% of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for entry of an appropriate amended judgment.

The primary asset of the parties was the marital residence, purchased in 1984 for $310,000 and sold in 1992 for $480,000. When distributing the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, the trial court gave the plaintiff former husband a credit for $117,000 for separate property used to make improvements to the marital residence. This was error.

The evidence at the trial established that the improvements to the marital residence were a joint effort of both parties. The plaintiff former husband acknowledged that the defendant former wife, an interior designer, undertook much of the supervision of the work. It is clear from the record that she participated in planning the renovations. Any appreciation in the value of the marital residence resulting from the improvements was attributable to the contributions and efforts of the defendant former wife as well as the financial contributions of the plaintiff former husband *(see, Lasaponara v Lasaponara,*215 AD2d 448; *Butler v Butler,*171 AD2d 89),. and the defendant former wife is entitled to share in the appreciation in the value of the marital residence attributable to the improvements *(see generally, Price v Price,*69 NY2d 8; *Elkus v Elkus,*169 AD2d 134).

In any case, neither party established what portion of the appreciation in the value of the marital residence was attributable to the improvements and what portion of the appreciation was attributable to other factors such as market forces *(see, Coffey v Coffey,*119 AD2d 620, 622-623; *cf, Fish v Fish,*161 AD2d 979).

Under all of these circumstances, we deem it appropriate that each party receive 50% of the proceeds from the marital residence *(see, Lasaponara v Lasaponara, supra; Butler v Butler, supra).*

The remaining contentions of the defendant former wife are without merit. Miller, J. P., Altman, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.
No. 50506.

#### Protests 57295-K, etc., of Brooks Bros. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel the court found that the facts herein agreed upon were such as to bring the case within the holding in *John Barr*v. *United States*(11 Cust. Ct. 88, C. D. 801), which record was incorporated herein. (See *John Barr*v. *United States,*324 U. S. 83, decided February 5, 1945.) In accordance therewith it was held that the cur*272rency of the invoices should be converted at 'the buying rate in the New York market at noon on the day of exportation (the “free” rate of exchange for pounds sterling), as certified by the Federal Reserve bank and set forth by the collector on each of the entries. The protests were sustained to this extent.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

216 

CA 11-02071 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ. 

 

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN NAIL IT 

CONSTRUCTION, INC., DOING BUSINESS AS CARLSON 

CONSTRUCTION, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

 

AND ORDER

GERALD CARLSON AND TARA CARLSON, ALSO KNOWN AS 

TARA HUSTON, RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS.

SELLSTROM LAW FIRM, LLP, JAMESTOWN (STEPHEN E. SELLSTROM OF COUNSEL),

FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. 

BLY, SHEFFIELD, BARGAR & PILLITTIERI, JAMESTOWN (LANA M. HUSTON OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County

(James H. Dillon, J.), entered June 15, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant

to CPLR article 75. The order remanded this matter to the American

Arbitration Association for new proceedings in accordance with its

“Regular Track” procedures. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs for reasons stated in the decision

at Supreme Court.

Entered: March 16, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.2

                        CERTIFICATION OF CFO PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Alamosa (Delaware), Inc.
(the "Company") for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Kendall
Cowan, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

         (3)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (4)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and results of
              operations of the Company.



     /s/ Kendall Cowan
--------------------------------------
Name:    Kendall Cowan
Title:   Chief Financial Officer
Date:    March 28, 2003



This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Alamosa (Delaware), Inc. and will be retained by Alamosa (Delaware),
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
April 3, 1945

No. 50094.

Suit 4470.

#### Balfour, *Guthrie & Co., Ltd.*v. *United States.*

C. D. 815 affirmed February 7, 1945. C. A. D. 300.
No. 53575.

protest 144714-K (New York).

#### Ciba Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Cole, J.

The undisputed facts showed that the product in question is a color or dye soluble in water, used for blueing textiles, principally bleached cotton cloth, making it whiter, and that it is obtained, derived, or manufactured, in whole or in part, from toluene, a product provided for in paragraph 1651. The established facts bring the merchandise in question within the provision in paragraph 28 (a), as amended. The claim of the plaintiff was therefore sustained.
OFFICE OF **7liE** AflORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS AUSTIN

Honozsble 0. H. 

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of your letter to this dspart

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county has trene dlatriot to tie Stram PutUo ~ohool t &hOOl **DbJtrict** in P&O Ph-itO CGlUlt~.


### advise a8 follotrr

“A perrorr

who 16 thk rife of one of *e Sohoof Bowa 

### meaers or Ruah creek 

### m4 8he ir aho 

### tha Sirtar of amther meaiber of the Rub Creek Board, bar made a~liGat%OKl 

### to the Stn8’n Sohool Board for the porition of sci~ool Eur Crlver to trussport the Rush Cr*6k Studentr to the straun Sohoo~.’

### Honorable 0. II. rPlll58maon,

w&e i%

You then inquire if such employment by the Strawn toard Is lqal.

Artisle 432, Penal Cade, provld.8 a8 followa

*so 

### orfiaer of th58 state or uq orfleer of an y di r t r l c t, I)l l 

### reheal dirtriot, * l l ‘01 mem

### ber of any 8chool di8txiot, l l l 

### oreated by or under authority oi t hi8 

### State, l ik l lUk&~==@L~~~~W~~o~~~ c c 7 nfl.m~

t he appo int w ant t o an y l l a 

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### d9ga-e. by aif ty, 

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### such b o ar d 0 * l as rhl ah 8uoh pe rson 80 rppolntlngorvotingnuybe amtmber,rh+athe ralery, + 0 + or oaa&nnsatlon of nroh appointee 58 

### to be 

### paid for, **diraot2.y** 

### or indiraotl~,**out of**  

### or iraa publila

fund8 OF feb8 of office 05 ans kind or ahmoter sbatsoever.m
Article 433, Penal Code, provido8 es ~0110~s:
***Tha inhibition,**  **ah** forth in **thir** law rhall apply to and inolude + o e pub&+ l Ohoo1 truetoes.*



### It doea not appear fmnn pour oonmunicetionthat the applloant Sar th8 bun 

### drlver~r po8ltlon in qazeatloni8 related 

### rfthln any of the proh5blteddegree8 tG any of the Bard Member8 of the Strarm Independent SG‘hGO~ DiatriOt, -Oh Board oomntf

### tutes the asp10 5ng aganog in tha in&ant oraeg md we amum that no mush 

### re

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### Thme being no conetltutlonal 

### or statutoryinhibitiGn against l uGh 

### employment,gur inquiry 

### la ansmered in the off5mmtlve.

Said appuoa&, Of GOU?SO~ IUUBtm8et the POqUl~nents of 

### Articls 2687a, Revlead 

### Civil Statutoa, md of ZGctlcn 5 ?f ArticlG6667b **Vexmoa*s****Aswatatbd Revised**  Civil **Sktuto8,** 

### both u 8d5Ab by tti pr0~58;ms 0r 

### senate 3lll 1,19of the Portyeighth Lag5rlature. 

### (V.T.S.L.8.(18th Mg., R.S., pe 

### U.)

I,. 3. PtGsalbA

Aeeistanf LaP-8
#### MOE GREEN, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, AND JEAN GREEN, PLAINTIFF, v. BUCK BROTHERS CO., AND JOHN R. HAMILTON, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS, v. ROSEMARY DAWICKI, *ET AL.,*THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS.

Argued December 19,1967

Decided December 22,1967.

*Mr. John A. Gleeson*for appellants *(Messrs. Mead, Glee-son, Hansen & Pantages,*attorneys; *Messrs. Gassert and Murphy,*of counsel; *Mr. Joseph A. Gtarhen, Jr.,*on the brief).

*Mr. Julius B. Poppinga*for respondent *(Messrs. Seaman, Williams & Seaman,*attorneys; Messrs. McGorler *& English,*of counsel).

Pee Ctjeiam.

The judgment is affirmed for the reasons expressed in the majority opinion of Judge Leonard in the Appellate Division, 98 *N. J. Super.*187.

*For affirmance*— Chief Justice Weinteatjb and Justices Jacobs, Eeakcis, Peootoe, Goldmark, Schettino and Hanemak—7.

*For*reversal—None.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,036-01

EX PARTE DANIEL F. LONGORIA JR, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 12-05-5213-CR-(1) IN THE 221 DISTRICT COURT ST

FROM MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of murder and

sentenced to life imprisonment. The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Longoria v.

State, No. 09-13-00169-CR (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jun. 25, 2014)(not designated for publication). 

Applicant contends that he was denied his right to file a petition for discretionary review

because counsel mailed the notification that his conviction had been affirmed to the incorrect

address. 
2

Appellate counsel filed an affidavit with the trial court. Based on that affidavit, the trial court

has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law that Applicant is entitled to relief. The trial court

recommends that relief be granted. Ex parte Riley, 193 S.W.3d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). 

We find, therefore, that Applicant is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time petition

for discretionary review of the judgment of the Ninth Court of Appeals in Cause No. 09-13-00169-

CR that affirmed his conviction in Cause No. 12-05-05213-CR from the 221 District Court of st

MontgomeryCounty. Applicant shall file his petition for discretionaryreview with this Court within

30 days of the date on which this Court’s mandate issues.

Delivered: June 3, 2015

Do not publish
Before the Third Division,

March 4, 1952

No. 56456.

protests 669819-G, etc. (New York).

#### Cresca Co., Inc., et al. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 53 (Tuesday, March 20, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 13081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5063]



[[Page 13081]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Docket T-1-2007]


Foreign-Trade Zone 38 - Spartanburg County, SC, Application for 
Temporary/Interim Manufacturing Authority, Kittel Supplier USA, Inc., 
(Automotive Door Trim Components), Duncan, SC

    An application has been submitted to the Executive Secretary of the 
Foreign-Trade Zones Board (the Board) by the South Carolina State Ports 
Authority, grantee of FTZ 38, requesting temporary/interim 
manufacturing (T/IM) authority within FTZ 38 at the Kittel Supplier 
USA, Inc. (KSU) facility in Duncan, South Carolina. The application was 
filed on March 12, 2007.
    The KSU facility (25 employees) is located at 201 Commerce Court 
within the Highway 290 Commerce Park in Duncan (Site 3). Under T/IM 
procedures, KSU would assemble automotive door trim components (HTSUS 
8708.29) for the U.S. market and export. Foreign components that would 
be used in the assembly activity (up to 100[percnt] of total purchases) 
include: aluminum frames, B pillars, C and D pillars, waist race bolts, 
division bars, fasteners, and rubber seals (duty rates: 2.0, 
2.5[percnt]).
    FTZ procedures would exempt KSU from Customs duty payments on the 
foreign components used in production for export to non-NAFTA 
countries. On domestic shipments transferred in-bond to U.S. automobile 
assembly plants with subzone status, no duties would be paid on the 
foreign components within the door trim components until the finished 
vehicles are subsequently entered for consumption, at which time the 
finished automobile duty rate (2.5[percnt]) could be applied to the 
foreign components. For the finished door trim components withdrawn 
directly by KSU for customs entry, the finished automotive part rate 
(2.5[percnt]) could be applied to the foreign inputs noted above.
    Public comment is invited from interested parties. Submissions 
(original and 3 copies) shall be addressed to the Board's Executive 
Secretary at the following address: Office of the Executive Secretary, 
Room 2814B, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, NW., 
Washington, DC 20230-0002. For further information, contact Pierre Duy 
at <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c2b2aba7b0b0a79da6b7bb82abb6a3eca6ada1eca5adb4"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="c4b4ada1b6b6a19ba0b1bd84adb0a5eaa0aba7eaa3abb2">[email protected]</span></a>, or (202) 482-1378. The closing period for 
receipt of comments is April 19, 2007.
    A copy of the application will be available for public inspection 
at the Office of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board's Executive Secretary at 
address listed above.

    Dated: March 12, 2007.
Andrew McGilvray,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-5063 Filed 3-19-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-S


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-6785

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus RONALD SMITH, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CR-92-58) Submitted: September 9, 1999 Decided: September 15, 1999 Before ERVIN, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Ronald Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Donald Ray Wolthuis, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on April 8, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on April 13, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray , 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: Ronald Smith appeals the district court’s orders denying his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence anddenying his motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and the district court’s orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Smith , No. CR-92-58 (W.D. Va. Apr. 13, 1999 * & May 20, 1999). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Before the Third Division,

June 4, 1959

No. 63134

#### “21” Brands, Inc. *v.*United States,

protests 58/12397, 58/12398, and 58/12503 (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

At the trial, it was stipulated that no allowance was made on certain cases of liquor, reported by the inspector as manifested, not found. In accordance with stipulation of counsel and following *United States*v. *Browne Vintners Co., Inc.*(34 C.C.P.A. 112, C.A.D. 351), it was held that duty *405and internal re'v enue tax are not assessable npon tbe quantities reported by tbe inspector as manifested, not found.
# C_2007241EN.01001001.xml

| 13.10.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 241/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.10.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 241/10

---

Corrigendum to information supplied by Member States regarding State aid granted under Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 110 of 16 May 2007
  )

(
  Official Journal of the European Union C 110 of 16 May 2007

(2007/C 241/05)

On page 7, Aid XS 90/07, seventh line ‘Budget’, second column:

for:

for:

‘... EUR 0,7 million ...;’,

read:

read:

‘... EUR 0,1 million ...’.

---
(Reap. Dec. 8273)

#### The London Gramophone Corporation *v.*United States

Entry No. 830293, etc.

(Decided December 22, 1953)

*Barnes, Richardson & Colburn*for the plaintiff.

*Warren E. Burger,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Olivee, Chief Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule “A,” hereto attached and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the Acting Assistant Attorney General in Charge of Customs and the attorneys for the plaintiff, subject to the approval of the Court, that the merchandise covered by the appeals to reappraisement enumerated in Schedule A, hereto attached and made a part hereof, consists of long-playing gramophone records imported from Great Britian.

> That the issues involved in the appeals to reappraisement enumerated in Schedule A are similar in all material respects to the issues involved in *The United States*v. *International Expediters, Inc. (Winsor & Newton, Inc.),*Customs Appeal No. 4739, decided by the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals January 14, 1953, 40 C. C. P. A. 148, C. A. D. 511.

> That on or about the date of exportation of the merchandise herein involved, such or similar merchandise was not freely offered for sale in the principal markets of Great Britain either for home consumption or for export to the United States; neither on the date of exportation was such or similar imported merchandise freely offered for sale in the principal market of the United States.

> That the cost of production, as such cost is defined in Section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, for the long-playing records covered by the appeals to reap-praisement enumerated in Schedule A is as follows:

> 10-inch long-playing record- — 45.23d per record

> 12-inch long-playing record — 55.42d per record

> That the record in *The United States*v. *International Expediters, Inc. (Winsor & Newton, Inc.),*Suit 4739, 40 C. C. P. A. 148, C. A. D. 511, be incorporated in the record in the appeals to reappraisement enumerated in Schedule A and that such appeals are submitted on this stipulation.

On the agreed facts, I find the cost of production, as that value is defined in section 402 (f) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values were as follows:

> 10-inch long-playing record — 45.23d per record

> 12-inch long-playing record — 55.42d per record

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 December 21, 2018

p1217

Order 

Clerk

December 21, 2018

154384(28)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 154384

COA: 333652

Shiawassee CC: 15-007177-FH

NOEL MARCIAL HADLEY,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for demand for certification of compiled laws is 

DENIED.