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IN RE NEVAEH W. ET AL.*

(SC 19447)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued May 19—officially released July 28, 2015

Carolyn Signorelli, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general,

for the appellant (petitioner).

Erich H. Gaston, with whom was Patrick Heeran,

for the appellee (respondent mother).
Howard J. Wicker, for the minor children.
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. In this certified appeal, we must decide

whetherthe Appellate Court properly reversed the judgments of the trial court terminating the parentalrights of

the respondent mother as to her two minor daughters,

Nevaeh W. and Janiyah A.1 On appeal, the petitioner,

the Commissioner of Children and Families, asserts that

the Appellate Court improperly reversed the judgments

of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the

respondent on the ground that the trial court failed to

address, in writing, each segment of all seven statutory

factors contained in General Statutes § 17a-112 (k).2 We

agree with the petitioner and, accordingly, reverse in

part the judgment of the Appellate Court.3

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the

following relevant facts and procedural history. ‘‘The

respondent gave birth to [Nevaeh] in July, 2008. Shortly

thereafter, on September 4, 2008, the petitioner . . .

invoked an administrative ninety-six hour hold as to

Nevaeh due to the respondent’s alleged ‘substance

abuse, unaddressed mental health issues and unstable

housing.’ An order of temporary custody subsequently

was issued on September 8, 2008, and sustained on

October 23, 2008. The respondent later engaged in substance abuse treatment at Coventry House, an inpatient

facility, where Nevaeh was returned to her care and

custody under an order of protective supervision on

January 8, 2009. On April 3, 2009, the petitioner invoked

a second ninety-six hour hold as to Nevaeh after the

respondent was discharged from Coventry House for

noncompliance with program rules.

‘‘In March, 2010, after Nevaeh’s recommitment to the

petitioner, the respondent gave birth to Janiyah. Several

months after Janiyah’s birth, in January, 2011, Nevaeh’s

commitment was revoked and she was reunited with

the respondent under an order of protective supervision. On July 2, 2012, the respondent was arrested [for

interfering with an officer and failure to appear], whereupon an order of temporary custody was granted by

the court as to both children. The July 2, 2012 removal

was Nevaeh’s third removal and Janiyah’s first removal

from the respondent. On October 24, 2012, both children

were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care

and custody of the petitioner. On November 30, 2012,

the children were placed in a preadoptive home that

had previously served as a placement for Nevaeh in

2009 and 2010.

‘‘On February 22, 2013, the petitioner filed termination petitions with respect to the two children, alleging

that the respondent’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds that she had failed to rehabilitate,

and that she had abandoned the children. A joint trial

on the two petitions took place over two days, commencing on October 15, 2013, and ending on November
20, 2013. The respondent was represented at the trial

by counsel, as were the children.4 The petitioner called

four witnesses to testify in support of the petitions for

termination, and the respondent called two witnesses

to testify on her behalf. Thereafter, on January 27, 2014,

the trial court . . . rendered its decision. In a seven

page memorandum of decision, the court granted both

petitions on the grounds that the respondent had failed

to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation

to encourage the belief that within a reasonable time,

considering the age and needs of her daughters, she

could assume a responsible position in their lives, and

that termination of her parental rights was in the best

interests of her children.’’ (Footnotes altered.) In re

Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 158–60, 107 A.3d 539

(2014). Thereafter, the respondent appealed from the

judgments of the trial court to the Appellate Court.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the respondent

claimed, inter alia, that in the dispositional phase of

the proceeding, the trial court improperly determined

that termination of her parental rights was in the best

interests of hertwo children without making the written

findings required under § 17a-112 (k) (4). Specifically,

the respondent asserted that the trial court improperly

based its finding under § 17a-112 (k) (4) solely on ‘‘the

children’s positive relationship with and likely future

adoption by their preadoptive foster parents, without

considering or making written findings as to the children’s feelings and emotional ties with respect to her,

as expressly required by [§ 17a-112 (k) (4)].’’ Id., 172.

The Appellate Court agreed with the respondent, concluding that the trial court’s finding with respect to

§ 17a-112 (k) (4) was ‘‘utterly unresponsive to the mandatory statutory requirement that the court consider

and make written findings as to the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 175.

Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed in part the

judgments of the trial court and remanded the case for

further proceedings on the dispositional phase of the

termination proceeding. Id., 176. This appeal followed.5

On appeal to this court, the petitioner asserts that

the Appellate Court improperly reversed the judgments

of the trial court for failure to make written findings

pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) because it made findings

regarding the factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k). The

petitioner further asserts that any possible failure by

the trial court to state its findings regarding the factors

set forth in § 17a-112 (k) was cured by subsequent articulations. Finally, the petitioner asserts that, in any

event, the alleged failure would be harmless. In

response, the respondent asserts that the Appellate

Court properly reversed the judgments of the trial court

as they related to the determination that termination

was in the best interest of the children. Specifically, the

respondent asserts that the Appellate Court properly
concluded that the trial court failed to make written

findings as to the factor enumerated in § 17a-112 (k)

(4), and that such a failure requires reversal of the trial

court’s judgments. We agree with the petitioner.

We first set forth the applicable standard of review.

To the extent that the petitioner’s claim requires us to

interpret the requirements of § 17a-112 (k), our review

is plenary. See In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 499, 78

A.3d 797 (2013). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,

we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts

of [the] case, including the question of whether the

language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us

first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .

When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also

look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history

and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the

legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to

its relationship to existing legislation and common law

principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 499–500.

In the present case, the Appellate Court concluded

that the trial court failed to comply with § 17a-112 (k)

(4) because it failed to set forth express written findings

as to the children’s emotional ties with the respondent.

We disagree.

Section 17a-112 (k) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except

in the case where termination is based on consent, in

determining whether to terminate parental rights under

this section, the court shall consider and shall make

written findings regarding . . . (4) the feelings and

emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s

parents, any guardian of such child’s person and any

person who has exercised physical care, custody or

control of the child for at least one year and with whom

the child has developed significant emotional ties

. . . .’’6

In the present case, the trial court entitled a part of its

memorandum of decision: ‘‘Written Findings: General

Statutes §§ 17a-112 (k) and 45a-717 (1).’’ In this part of

the decision, the trial court listed each of the seven

factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k) and included written findings underneath each factor. The trial court

prefaced the portion of its opinion pertaining to § 17a112 (k) (4) with the following language: ‘‘Feelings and

emotional ties of the children with respect to the parents and any persons who have exercised physical care,
custody and control of the children for at least one year

and with whom the children have developed significant

emotional ties.’’ Immediately following that passage,

the trial court reached the following conclusion: ‘‘Both

children have been placed together with a preadoptive

resource who has expressed a willingness to adopt both

girls. They are comfortable, secure and safe.’’

The plain language of § 17a-112 (k) (4) directs the

trial court to consider the children’s emotional ties with

a long list of people in determining whetherthe termination of the respondent’s parental rights is in their best

interest. Nothing in that statute, however, required the

trial court to consider only the children’s emotional ties

with the respondent. To the contrary, at the time of

trial, both children had been living in the preadoptive

foster home for more than one year, and Nevaeh had

also been placed with the same family for approximately one additional year before that time. Therefore,

it was appropriate for the trial court to consider the

children’s emotional ties to the preadoptive foster family in considering whether termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest.

Accordingly, we disagree with the Appellate Court

that the trial court’s finding as to § 17a-112 (k) (4) was

‘‘utterly unresponsive to the mandatory statutory

requirement . . . .’’ In re Nevaeh W., supra, 154 Conn.

App. 175. To the contrary, this court has repeatedly

recognized that, in the dispositional stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance of permanency in

children’s lives. ‘‘This court has ‘noted consistently the

importance of permanency in children’s lives. In re

Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 181 Conn. 638, 646, 436

A.2d 290 (1980) (removing child from foster home or

further delaying permanency would be inconsistent

with his best interest); In re Victoria B., 79 Conn. App.

245, 263, 829 A.2d 855 (2003) (trial court’s findings were

not clearly erroneous where much of child’s short life

had been spent in custody of [petitioner] and child

needed stability and permanency in her life); In re Teshea D., [9 Conn. App. 490, 493–94, 519 A.2d 1232 (1987)]

(child’s need for permanency in her life lends added

support to court’s finding that her best interest warranted termination of respondent’s parental rights). Virtually all experts, from many different professional

disciplines, agree that children need and benefit from

continuous, stable home environments.’ . . . In re

Jeisean M., [270 Conn. 382, 400–401, 852 A.2d 643

(2004)].

‘‘ ‘Stable and continuous care givers are important to

normal child development. Children need secure and

uninterrupted emotional relationships with the adults

who are responsible for their care.’ 3 D. Kramer, Legal

Rights of Children (2d Ed. Rev. 2005) § 29:11, p. 185;

see also J. Goldstein et al., The Best Interests of the

Child: The Least Detrimental Alternative (1996) p. 19
(‘[c]ontinuity of relationships is essential for a child’s

healthy development’); see also In re Hanks, 553 A.2d

1171, 1178 (Del. 1989) (‘[N]o child can grow emotionally

while in limbo, never really belonging to anyone except

on a temporary and ill-defined or partial basis. . . . To

grow, the child needs at least the promise of permanency in relationships and some continuity of environment.’ . . .). ‘Repeatedly disrupted placements and

relationships can interfere with the children’s ability to

form normal relationships when they become adults.’

3 D. Kramer, supra, p. 185.’’ In re Davonta V., 285 Conn.

483, 494–95, 940 A.2d 733 (2008).

Indeed, this court has explicitly recognized that ‘‘[i]n

regard to children who have bonded with their foster

parents, ‘[o]nce new psychological relationships form,

separation from the new parents becomes no less painful and no less damaging to a child than separation

from natural or adoptive caregiving parents. Indeed, to

the extent that such separations are repeated (as in

multiple foster care placements), they make the child

more vulnerable and make each subsequent opportunity for attachment less promising and less trustworthy

than prior ones.’ J. Goldstein et al., supra, pp. 104–105.

Termination of a biological parent’s rights, by preventing further litigation with that parent, can preserve

the stability a child has acquired in a successful foster

placement and, furthermore, move the child closer

toward securing permanence by removing barriers to

adoption. See 3 D. Kramer, supra, § 28:2, p. 17. Even if

no adoption is forthcoming, termination can aid stability and lessen disruption because a parent whose rights

have been terminated no longer may file a motion to

revoke the commitment of the child to the custody of

the [petitioner] . . . or oppose an annual permanency

plan.’’ (Citation omitted.) In re Davonta V., supra, 285

Conn. 495–96.

In the present case, while the trial court’s memorandum of decision was not a model of clarity, the testimony before the trial court, on which it was privileged

to rely, essentially reflected these considerations in

relation to the children’s best interest, specifically, their

need for permanence and stability.

Furthermore, in considering the trial court’s findings

pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) (4), we are mindful that ‘‘an

opinion must be read as a whole, without particular

portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of

its holding. . . . Furthermore, we read an ambiguous

trial court record so as to support, rather than contradict, its judgment.’’(Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 306 Conn. 438, 453, 51

A.3d 334 (2012). Reading the trial court’s memorandum

of decision in the present case as a whole, we conclude

that the trial court did consider the factor set forth in

§ 17a-112 (k) (4), including the children’s emotional ties

to the respondent. Specifically, the trial court explained
at the beginning of the memorandum that ‘‘Nevaeh . . .

has been in [the petitioner’s] care on three separate

occasions. On September 4, 2008, Nevaeh . . . was

placed [on a ninety-six hour hold because the respondent] was homeless and had no way to care for the

child. She was committed to [the petitioner] in October,

2008 and reunified to the [respondent’s] care in January,

2009. In April, 2009, the child was placed in another

[ninety-six] hour hold and again committed to [the petitioner] after [the respondent] was discharged from a

drug treatment program for noncompliance. The child

was reunified with [the respondent] in December, 2010.

On July 2, 2012, Nevaeh was removed from [the respondent] for a third time.’’ The trial court continued: ‘‘[Janiyah] resided with [the respondent] until [Janiyah was]

removed with Nevaeh . . . on July 2, 2012. On November 30, 2012, both children were placed in a preadoptive

foster home. Nevaeh . . . has previously been placed

with this family for [more than one] year.’’ These findings by the trial court demonstrate that the trial court

did consider the children’s relationship with the

respondent.

Moreover, to the extent that there is any ambiguity

in the trial court’s memorandum of decision,that court’s

subsequent articulations sufficiently clarified its ruling.

‘‘It is well established that [a]n articulation is appropriate where the trial court’s decision contains some

ambiguity or deficiency reasonably susceptible of clarification. . . . [P]roper utilization of the motion for

articulation serves to dispel any . . . ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon which the trial

court rendered its decision, thereby sharpening the

issues on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 140, 989 A.2d 588

(2010).

In the present case, after this court granted the petitioner’s petition for certification to appeal and prior

to the appellate briefs being submitted by the parties,

pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2 (1)7 and 60-5,8

this

court ordered the trial court to ‘‘complete the trial court

record’’ by responding to, inter alia, the following question: ‘‘In its judgment granting the termination of parental rights petition as to the [respondent], did the trial

court consider [§ 17a-112 (k) (4)]?’’ The trial court

answered this question in the affirmative and further

articulated as follows: ‘‘As to the feelings and emotional

ties of the children with respect to their parents, any

guardians of such children’s persons and any person

who has exercised physical care, custody or control of

the children for at least one year and with whom the

children have developed significant emotional ties, the

court found that [Nevaeh] and [Janiyah], as siblings,

are placed together and appear to be doing very well

and are comfortable in their current placement. The

current placement is a preadoptive resource for both

children. On April 25, 2013, this court . . . granted the
petitioner’s motion to cease visitation of [the respondent] as to [Neveah] upon the recommendation of [Nevaeh’s] therapist citing Neveah’s refusal to see [the

respondent or her] father and her need to feel more

secure and to process her trauma. The children’s foster

mother, who was a credible witness, described [Neveah’s] reactions when being picked up for visits with

[the respondent] or [her] father as ‘crazy, screaming,

kicking, crying, yelling I don’t wanna go.’ . . . The foster mother described [Neveah] and [Janiyah] as each

other’s best friend.’’9

Thereafter, the trial court filed a supplemental articulation. In the supplemental articulation, the trial court

further clarified that it relied on the credible testimony

of social workers from the Department of Children and

Families, and the foster mother detailing the instability

in the children’s lives, positive changes made while

in the foster home, Neveah’s negative reaction to the

respondent and the very strong bond between Neveah

and Janiyah. The trial court further clarified that it had

relied on testimony by Ines Schroeder, a psychologist

who was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic

psychology. The trial court detailed that Schroeder had

testified as follows: ‘‘Given the information I received

during the evaluation as well as finding out a bit more

about what’s happening with the children at that point

I felt it was much more important to provide stability

and permanency for the children than to consider continued attempts to reunify.’’

‘‘Parental termination litigation, including the present

case, often involves testimony from various child welfare professionals. ‘The testimony of professionals is

given great weight in parental termination proceedings.

. . . It is well established that [i]n a case tried before

a court,the trial judge is the sole arbiter ofthe credibility

of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific

testimony. . . . The credibility and the weight of

expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and

the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony

[it] reasonably believes to be credible. . . . On appeal,

we do not retry the facts or pass on the credibility of

witnesses. . . . It is the quintessential function of the

fact finder to reject or accept certain evidence, and to

believe or disbelieve any expert testimony. . . . The

trier may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the

testimony of an expert offered by one party or the

other.’ . . . In re Carissa K., 55 Conn. App. 768, 781–

82, 740 A.2d 896 (1999). Nevertheless, although the trial

court may rely on expert testimony, it ultimately must

make its own independent determination as to the best

interest of the child. In re Jeisean M., [supra, 270 Conn.

398] (‘[a]lthough we often consider the testimony of

mental health experts . . . such expert testimony is

not a precondition of the court’s own factual judgment

as to the child’s best interest’ . . .). In sum, we must

defer to both the trial court’s weighing of the expert
testimony presented and the trial court’s independent

factual determination as to what was in [the child’s] best

interest.’’ In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 488–89. On

the basis of the record before us, we conclude that the

foregoing articulations clarify any ambiguity in the trial

court’s original memorandum of decision and establish

that the trial court considered the emotional ties of the

children pursuant to § 17a-112 (k) (4).

The respondent asserts that we should not rely on

the articulations by the trial court because they are

improper attempts by the trial court to revise its decision. Having fully considered the respondent’s claim,

we decline her invitation to ignore the articulations.

Practice Book §§ 60-2 and 60-5 give this court the power

to order the trial court to articulate the basis of its

decision and to further perfect the record for our

review. Indeed, the importance of the role of articulations is highlighted by Practice Book § 61-10 (b), which

was recently amended in 2013 and presently provides

in relevant part: ‘‘The failure of any party on appeal to

seek articulation . . . shall not be the sole ground

upon which the court declines to review any issue or

claim on appeal. If the court determines that articulation of the trial court decision is appropriate, it may

remand the case pursuant to Section 60-5 for articulation by the trial court within a specified time period.

. . .’’ As the commentary to § 61-10 explains: ‘‘Subsection (b) was adopted to effect a change in appellate

procedure . . . . In lieu of refusing to review [an]

issue, when the court determines that articulation is

appropriate, the court may now remand the case to

the trial court for an articulation and then address the

merits of the issue after articulation is provided.’’ In the

interest of judicial economy and proper presentation of

the issues on appeal, this court has repeatedly ordered

the trial court to articulate the factual and legal basis

for its decisions and this court has relied on those

articulations to resolve the issues on appeal. See, e.g.,

State v. Kelly, 313 Conn. 1, 4, 95 A.3d 1081 (2014);

Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 308 Conn. 87, 94,

61 A.3d 461 (2013). Accordingly, we conclude that the

Appellate Court improperly determined that the trial

court failed to make the appropriate findings under

§ 17a-112 (k) (4).

The petitioner also claims that the trial court was

not obligated to make explicit written findings as to

each aspect of the seven factors enumerated in § 17a112 (k) as these factors are only guidelines. In support

of her claim, the petitioner relies on In re Eden F., 250

Conn. 674, 741 A.2d 873 (1999). In In re Eden F., this

court concluded that, ‘‘[a]lthough [General Statutes

(Rev. to 1999)] § 17a-112 (d) (1) and (2)10 mandated

that the trial court make written findings regarding the

timeliness, nature, extent and reasonableness of the

efforts made to reunify parent and child, § 17a-112 contained nothing to indicate that any such finding was a
prerequisite to the termination of parental rights. Thus,

when the petitions in this case were filed, the factors

to be considered under [that statute] served only to

guide the trial court in making its ultimate decision

whether to grant the termination petition. See, e.g., In

re Christine F., 6 Conn. App. 360, 369, 505 A.2d 734,

cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 809, 508 A.2d 769 (1986)

(termination in best interest of child despite trial court’s

conclusion that strong emotional ties existed between

mother and child).’’ (Footnote added.) In re Eden F.,

supra, 690–91.

Although we have not had the occasion to explicitly

address whether a trial court is obligated to make

explicit written findings as to each aspect of the seven

factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k) since In re Eden

F., we take the opportunity to do so herein. As we

explained in In re Eden F., ‘‘the fact that the legislature

[had interpolated] objective guidelines into the openended fact-oriented statutes which govern [parental termination] disputes . . . should not be construed as a

predetermined weighing of evidence . . . by the legislature. Where . . . the record reveals that the trial

court’s ultimate conclusions [regarding termination of

parental rights] are supported by clear and convincing

evidence, we will not reach an opposite conclusion

on the basis of any one segment of the many factors

considered in a termination proceeding . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

691.

Indeed, as this court has previously explained, ‘‘[t]he

balancing of interests in a case involving termination

of parentalrights is a delicate task and, when supporting

evidence is not lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination as to a child’s best interest is entitled to the

utmost deference. . . . Although a judge [charged with

determining whether termination of parental rights is

in a child’s best interest] is guided by legal principles,

the ultimate decision [whether termination is justified]

is intensely human. It is the judge in the courtroom

who looks the witnesses in the eye, interprets their

body language, listens to the inflections in their voices

and otherwise assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the cold transcript.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) In re Davonta V., supra, 285 Conn. 497.

Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in In re Eden F.

that, although a trial court shall consider and make

written findings regarding the factors enumerated in

§ 17a-112 (k), a trial court’s determination of the best

interests of a child will not be overturned on the basis

of one factorif that determination is otherwise factually

supported and legally sound.

In the present case, we conclude that the trial court’s

finding as to the children’s best interest is factually

supported and legally sound. Therefore, we will not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed in

part and the case is remanded to that court with direction to affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

1 We note that the trial court also rendered judgments terminating the

parental rights of the minor children’s respective fathers. Those judgments

are not, however, at issue in the present appeal. Consequently, in the interest

of simplicity, we refer to the mother of the minor children as the respondent.

See In re Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 157 n.1, 107 A.3d 539 (2014).

2 General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental

rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written

findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered,

provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to

facilitate the reunion ofthe child with the parent;(2) whetherthe Department

of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family

pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,

as amended; (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and

agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to

which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order; (4) the

feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents,

any guardian of such child’s person and any person who has exercised

physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with

whom the child has developed significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the

child; (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child

to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited

to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child

as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court

may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions,

and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the

guardian or other custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a

parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with

the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the

child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic

circumstances of the parent.’’

3 On appeal to the Appellate Court, the respondent claimed that two of

the trial court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous. See In re Nevaeh

W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 160–71, 107 A.3d 539 (2014). The Appellate Court

rejected those claims and, accordingly, affirmed the judgments of the trial

court in part. Id., 158. That portion of the Appellate Court’s judgment is not,

however, at issue in the present appeal.

4 We note that counsel for the minor children has adopted the petitioner’s

appellate briefs before both the Appellate Court and this court. See In re

Nevaeh W., 154 Conn. App. 156, 159 n.3, 107 A.3d 539 (2014).

5 This court granted the petitioner’s amended petition for certification to

appeal limited to the following issues: (1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court properly

conclude that . . . § 17a-112 (k) provides that the trial court is deprived of

authority to enter a dispositional order of termination of parental rights if

it fails to address in writing each segment of all seven statutory factors?’’;

and (2) ‘‘If the answer to question one is in the affirmative, did the Appellate

Court properly conclude that the remedy for a trial court’s failure to address

in writing each segment of all seven statutory factors is reversal of the

judgment?’’ In re Nevaeh W., 316 Conn. 915, 113 A.3d 69 (2015).

6 For the full text of § 17a-112 (k), see footnote 2 of this opinion.

7 Practice Book § 60-2 (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The supervision and

control of the proceedings on appeal shall be in the court having appellate

jurisdiction from the time the appeal is filed, or earlier, if appropriate, and,

except as otherwise provided in these rules, any motion the purpose of

which is to complete or perfect the record of the proceedings below for

presentation on appeal shall be made to the court in which the appeal is

pending. The court may, on its own motion or upon motion of any party,

modify or vacate any order made by the trial court, or a judge thereof, in
relation to the prosecution of the appeal. It may also, for example, on its

own motion or upon motion of any party: (1) order a judge to take any action

necessary to complete the trial court record for the proper presentation of

the appeal . . . .’’

8 Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the court deems it

necessary to the proper disposition of the cause, it may remand the case

for a further articulation of the basis of the trial court’s factual findings or

decision. . . .’’

9 On appeal to the Appellate Court, the respondent asserted that the trial

court’s findings as to § 17a-112 (k) (1), (2) and (4) were improper. See In

re Nevaeh W., supra, 154 Conn. App. 172 n.8. The Appellate Court did not

reach the respondent’s claims regarding the trial court’s findings under

§ 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2) because it reversed the judgment of the trial court

as it related to the dispositional phase on the ground that the trial court’s

findings under § 17a-112 (k) (4) were improper. Id.

In the order for articulation, this court ordered the trial court to articulate

its decision as it related to § 17a-112 (k) (1), (2) and (4). In its response,

the trial court further articulated its findings as to § 17a-112 (k) (1), (2)

and (4).

On appeal to this court, the respondent does not renew her claims related

to § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2) and neither party addresses these claims in their

brief. Accordingly, we address the trial court’s findings only as they relate

to § 17a-112 (k) (4).

We note, however, that even if we were to consider the respondent’s

claims regarding the trial court’s findings under § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2),

we would conclude that the trial court’s memorandum of decision and

articulations demonstrate that its findings under § 17a-112 (k) (1) and (2)

are factually supported and legally sound.

10 We note that subsection (d) of § 17a-112 was redesignated as subsection

(k) in 2000. See Public Acts 2000, No. 00-137, § 1.