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54–986 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–806 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2011 

HEARING 

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON

S. 3676 

AN ACT MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT 

FINANCING, AND RELATED PROGRAMS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2011, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

Department of State 

United States Agency for International Development 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

PATTY MURRAY, Washington 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BEN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

JON TESTER, Montana 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

CHARLES J. HOUY, Staff Director 

BRUCE EVANS, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

TOM HARKIN, Iowa 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

Professional Staff 

TIM RIESER

NIKOLE MANATT

JANETT STORMES

PAUL GROVE (Minority) 

MICHELE WYMER (Minority) 

LASHAWNDA SMITH (Minority) 

Administrative Support 

RACHEL MEYER
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

Page 

Department of State: Secretary of State ................................................................ 1 

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2010 

U.S. Agency for International Development .......................................................... 73 

(1) 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2011 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:30 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Mikulski, Landrieu, Specter, Gregg, 

Bennett, Bond, Brownback, and Voinovich. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

SECRETARY OF STATE

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. Secretary Clinton, I commend you for your unbelievable energy, not only in the work you do at the State Department but around the world in representing the United States. I understand this is one of four times you’re going to be testifying here 

on Capitol Hill and we appreciate it very much, Madam Secretary. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Depart- ment of State and foreign operations totals $56.6 billion. It’s a 10.6 

percent increase over last year. Most of the increase is for three 

countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 

For the remainder of the world, the increase is about the rate of 

inflation and, as the President has pointed out, the total request 

for foreign operations is about 1 percent of the entire Federal budget. 

If we cut all these programs, it wouldn’t make a dent in our deficit but it would cause many other problems around the world, especially as it would affect America’s leadership position. 

The funds are all we have, besides the U.S. military, to protect 

the security and other interests of the American people in an increasingly dangerous and divisive world. 

That is not to say we can’t do more to get full value for our tax 

dollars, that’s always been mine and Senator Gregg’s goal on this 

subcommittee. If there are programs that are not effective or no 

longer necessary, then we will eliminate them. As we listen to the 
2 

complaints about broken Government or paralysis in Washington, 

this is a bill that, over the past number of years, has had overwhelming bipartisan support. 

If anybody wants to see whether bipartisanship still exists in 

Congress, they do not have to look any further than this subcommittee. Every member of this panel, Republican and Democrat 

alike, has a stake in what’s in here. We work together. For example, our global health programs help to prevent outbreaks of deadly 

viruses and other infectious diseases that are only a plane ride 

away. If such viruses spread and become pandemics, they could kill 

millions of people, including Americans. 

Funding provided in this bill also addresses the continuing need 

to stop terrorism, organized crime, and other transnational crime 

that are growing threats to Americans and the citizens and governments of other nations, especially governments whose institutions 

are prone to corruption. There are many other examples. 

We know this budget is not going to solve every problem in the 

world but at least it ensures that the United States is equipped to 

play a leadership role. 

The Secretary has done her part and, Madam Secretary, I must 

say I appreciate the fact that you have been the face of America 

around the world. I know that it is physically strenuous, both for 

you and your staff, but it is important that you are there. 

Today, more than ever, we appreciate the need for fully staffed 

and secure embassies, effective diplomacy, and strong alliances. I 

want to commend the dedicated men and women of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), who are serving America here at home and at posts 

around the world and, I should note, often at great personal risk. 

After Senator Gregg makes his opening remarks and the Secretary testifies, we’ll have 7-minute rounds for questions. The Senators will be recognized in order of arrival, alternating back and 

forth. 

Senator Gregg. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JUDD GREGG

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to second 

your opening comments. I especially want to pick up where you left 

off which is saying thank you to not only yourself, Madam Secretary, but the extraordinary staff that works for you at the State 

Department. 

Those of us who’ve had a chance to travel to some more severe 

regions in this world, such as Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, of 

course Iraq, recognize that the men and women who serve us in the 

State Department are on the frontlines and doing an extraordinary 

job of trying to carry out American policy and assist those nations 

in moving toward more democratic forms of government and to be 

constructive citizens in the world. They put their lives at risk as 

our military people do, and we very much appreciate their service. 

I also want to thank you personally for what you’re doing. Your 

presentation around the world has been extraordinary and it’s been 

very positive for us, for our Nation, to have you out there as our 

spokesperson, along with the President, of course. 
3 

There are so many areas of concern that come to mind that rather than taking them all up in my opening statement, I’d rather 

hear your thoughts on them. 

So I will turn to you, but I just want to highlight one that doesn’t 

get a lot of attention and that is an issue I’ve had interest in for 

almost 15 years now which is to make sure that you have the best 

technology and the best capability so that the support is there for 

the people who do such wonderful things for us in the field. I’d be 

interested in your thoughts on where we stand in that area and 

also in the area of facilities. 

I’d like to spend some time on that. I’m especially concerned 

about the cost of the Iraqi mission and the new building and the 

complex there and how that’s going to drain away funds from other 

initiatives. 

I’d rather hear from you than talk myself. So I’ll turn it over to 

you, Madam Secretary. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. Secretary Clinton, please go ahead. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy, and 

Senator Gregg, and members of the subcommittee.It really is a 

pleasure to be back here in the Senate and to be with all of you 

today. 

When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my 

commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core pillars of American power. Since then, I have been heartened by the 

bipartisan support of this subcommittee and the rest of Congress 

and I want to take this opportunity to thank you on behalf of the 

men and women who work every day around the world at the State 

Department and USAID who put our foreign policy into action, and 

I will certainly convey the very kind words of both the chairman 

and the ranking member to them. 

The budget we’re presenting today is designed to protect America 

and Americans and to advance our interests and values. Our fiscal 

year 2011 request for the State Department and USAID totals 

$52.8 billion. That’s a $4.9 billion increase over 2010. Of that increase, $3.6 billion will go to supporting efforts in frontline states, 

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 

Other funding will grow by $1.3 billion and that is a 2.7 percent 

increase and with that money, we will address global challenges, 

strengthen partnerships, and ensure that the State Department 

and USAID are equipped with the right people, the right technology, and the right resources. 

Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, I’ve been reminded again of the 

importance of American leadership. I’m very proud of what our 

country has done. We will continue to work with our Haitian and 

international partners to address ongoing suffering and transition 

from relief to recovery. 

I’m also well aware that this is a time of great economic strain 

for many Americans here at home. As a former Senator, I know 

what this means for the people you represent. For every dollar we 

spend, we have to show results. That is why this budget must support programs vital to our national security, our national interests, 

and our leadership in the world, while guarding against and root-
4 

ing out waste, redundancy, and irrelevancy. I believe this budget 

achieves those goals. 

These figures are more than numbers on a page. They tell the 

story of the challenges we face and the resources we need to overcome them. We are fighting two wars that call on the skill and sacrifice of our civilians as well as our dedicated military troops. 

We’ve pursued a dual-track approach to Iran that has exposed its 

refusal to live up to its responsibilities and helped us achieve a 

new unity with our international partners. Iran has left the international community little choice but to impose greater costs and 

pressure in the face of its provocative steps. We’re not working actively with our partners to prepare and implement new measures 

to pressure Iran to change its course. 

We have achieved unprecedented unity in our response to North 

Korea’s provocative actions, even as we leave the door open for a 

restart of the Six Party Talks, and we’re moving closer to a fresh 

nuclear agreement with Russia, one that advances our security 

while furthering President Obama’s long-term vision of a world 

without nuclear weapons. 

With China, we are seeking areas of common purpose while 

standing firm where we differ. We’re making concrete our new beginning with the Muslim world. We’re strengthening partnerships 

with allies in Europe and Asia, with our friends here in the hemisphere, with countries from those that are rising and emerging 

powers to those who have challenges, and we’re working hard every 

day to end the impasse and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 

At the same time, we’re developing a new architecture of cooperation to meet transnational global challenges, like climate 

change, the use of our planet’s oceans, proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction, health problems which, as the chairman said, are 

no respecter of boundaries. 

In so many instances, our national interests and the common interests converge and so from our hemisphere across the world we 

are promoting human rights, the rule of law, democracy, Internet 

freedom. We’re fighting poverty, hunger, disease, and we’re working to ensure that economic growth is broadly and inclusively 

shared. 

Now our agenda is ambitious, I admit that, but I think the times 

demand it. America is called to lead and we need the tools and resources to exercise our leadership wisely and effectively. We can 

bury our heads in the sand and pay the consequences later or we 

can make hard-nosed targeted investments now, addressing the security challenges of today while building a more lasting foundation 

for the future. 

Let me just highlight three areas where we’re making significant 

new investments. First, the security of frontline states. In Afghanistan this past year, we’ve tripled the number of civilians on the 

ground and this presence will grow by hundreds more with the $5 

billion in this budget. Our diplomats and development experts are 

helping institutions, expand economic opportunities and provide 

meaningful alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce violence 

and Al Qaeda and join their fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace. 
5 

In Pakistan, our request includes $3.2 billion to combat extremism, promote economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. This includes funding of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative. 

Our request also includes a 59 percent increase in funding for 

Yemen to help counter the extremist threat and build institutions 

there, as well. 

In Iraq, we’re winding down our military presence and establishing a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian efforts will not 

and cannot mirror the scale of the military presence, but they, 

rather, should provide assistance consistent with the priorities of 

the Iraqi Government and the United States. So our request includes $2.6 billion for Iraq. 

These are resources that will allow us to support the democratic 

process, ensure a smooth transition to civilian-led security training, 

and operational support. These funds will allow civilians to take 

full responsibility for programs and the Defense budget for Iraq 

will be decreasing by about $16 billion and that’s a powerful illustration of the return on civilian investment. 

We are blessed, as we all in this room know, with the best troops 

in the world and we’ve seen that time and time again in today’s 

wars, but we also need to give our civilian experts the resources 

to do the jobs we’re asking them to do and this budget takes a step 

in the right direction. It includes $100 million for a State Department Complex Crisis 

Fund, replacing the 1207 Fund which the Defense Department 

used to direct money toward crisis response. It also includes support for the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund which 

previously fell under the Defense Department, as well. 

The second major area is investing in development. So we’re 

making targeted investments in fragile societies which, in our 

interconnected world, bear heavily on our own security and prosperity. These investments are a key part of our effort to get ahead 

of crises rather than just responding to them. 

The first of these is in health. Building on our progress treating 

HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global Health Initiative will 

invest $63 billion over 6 years, starting with $8.5 billion in fiscal 

year 2011, to help our partners address specific diseases and build 

strong sustainable health systems. 

The administration has also pledged to invest at least $3.5 billion 

in food security over 3 years and this budget includes a request for 

$1.6 billion, of which $1.2 billion is funded through the State Department. This will focus on countries that have developed effective, comprehensive strategies where agriculture remains central to 

prosperity and hunger is widespread. 

On climate change, we’ve requested $646 million to promote the 

United States as a leader in green technology and to leverage other 

countries’ cooperation, including through the Copenhagen Accord, 

which for the first time brings developed and developing countries 

together. This is part of the administration’s total request of $1.4 

billion to support core climate change activities in developing nations. 

Our request also includes $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance. Our efforts in Haiti have made clear that State and USAID 
6 

must be able to respond quickly and effectively, but we believe 

these initiatives will enhance American security and they will help 

people in need and they will give the American people a strong return on this investment. 

Our aim is not to create dependency but, rather, to help countries learn to fish, as the old Proverb tells it, and what we want 

to do is focus on equality and opportunity for women and girls because we know that is the key driver of economic and social 

progress. 

And then, finally, our third area of investment. None of what we 

intend to do can be accomplished if we don’t recruit, train, and empower the right people for the job. 

The State Department and USAID are full of talented and committed public servants, but we have too often neglected to give 

them the tools they need to carry out their missions on the ground 

and rather than building our own expertise, we have too often relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight and often at 

greater cost. 

This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by over 

600 positions, including an additional 410 for the State Department 

and 200 for USAID. It will also allow us to staff the standby element of the Civilian Reserve Corps which is a crucial tool in our 

efforts to respond to crises. 

Now while deploying these personnel generates new expenses in 

some accounts, it will reduce costs by changing the way we do business. As we are ending our over-reliance on contractors, we’re actually showing we can save money, plus bringing these functions inside and improving oversight and accountability. 

So, Mr. Chairman and ranking member and members, one thing 

should be clear from this budget, the State Department and USAID 

are taking a lead in carrying out the United States’ foreign policy 

and national security agenda. 

As we finish the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), we have a unique opportunity to define the 

capabilities we need and to match resources with priorities. This 

budget aligns our investments with the strategic imperatives of our 

time. 

The QDDR will also help ensure we are more effective and accountable. As I have reported to you before, filling the first-ever 

Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources with 

Jack Lew, a former OMB Director, has given us an extra advantage in developing this budget and reviewing it to make sure that 

every item is economical and effective. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

Now at this time of change and challenge around the world, we 

need to make these investments and I believe that this subcommittee understands why. I look forward to your questions, but 

even more so I look forward to working with you in partnership in 

the months and years ahead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement follows:] 
7 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

Thank you very much, Chairman Leahy and Senator Gregg and members of the 

subcommittee. It really is a pleasure to be back here in the Senate and to be with 

all of you today. When I was last here to discuss our budget, I emphasized my commitment to elevating diplomacy and development as core pillars of American power. 

Since then, I have been heartened by the bipartisan support of this committee and 

the rest of Congress. And I want to take this opportunity to thank you, on behalf 

of the men and women who work every day around the world at the State Department and USAID who put our foreign policy into action. And I will certainly convey 

the very kind words of both the Chairman and the Ranking Member to them. 

The budget we are presenting today is designed to protect America and Americans 

and to advance our interests and values. Our fiscal year 2011 request for the State 

Department and USAID totals $52.8 billion. That’s a $4.9 billion increase over 2010. 

Of that increase, $3.6 billion will go to supporting efforts in ‘‘frontline states’’—Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. Other funding will grow by $1.3 billion, and that is 

a 2.7 percent increase, and with that money we will address global challenges, 

strengthen partnerships, and ensure that the State Department and USAID are 

equipped with the right people, the right technology, and the right resources. 

Over the past 6 weeks in Haiti, I have been reminded again of the importance 

of American leadership. I am very proud of what our country has done. We will continue to work with our Haitian and international partners to address ongoing suffering and transition from relief to recovery. 

I am also well aware that this is a time of great economic strain for many Americans here at home. As a former Senator, I know what this means for the people 

you represent. For every dollar we spend, we have to show results. That is why this 

budget must support programs vital to our national security, our national interests, 

and our leadership in the world, while guarding against and rooting out waste, redundancy, and irrelevancy. I believe this budget achieves those goals. These figures 

are more than numbers on a page. They tell the story of the challenges we face and 

the resources we need to overcome them. 

We are fighting two wars that call on the skill and sacrifice of our civilians as 

well as our dedicated military troops. We have pursued a dual-track approach to 

Iran that has exposed its refusal to live up to its responsibilities and helped us 

achieve a new unity with our international partners. Iran has left the international 

community little choice but to impose greater costs and pressure in the face of its 

provocative steps. We are now working actively with our partners to prepare and 

implement new measures to pressure Iran to change its course. 

We have achieved unprecedented unity in our response to North Korea’s provocative actions, even as we leave the door open for a restart of the Six-Party Talks. 

And we are moving closer to a fresh nuclear agreement with Russia—one that advances our security while furthering President Obama’s long-term vision of a world 

without nuclear weapons. 

With China, we are seeking areas of common purpose while standing firm where 

we differ. We are making concrete our new beginning with the Muslim world. We 

are strengthening partnerships with allies in Europe and Asia, with our friends 

here in our hemisphere, with countries from those that are rising and emerging 

powers to those who have challenges. And we are working hard every day to end 

the impasse and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. 

At the same time, we are developing a new architecture of cooperation to meet 

transnational global challenges like climate change, the use of our planet’s oceans, 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, health problems—which, as the Chairman said, are no respecter of boundaries. In so many instances, our national interest and the common interest converge, and so from our hemisphere across the 

world, we are promoting human rights, the rule of law, democracy, Internet freedom; we are fighting poverty, hunger, and disease; and we are working to ensure 

that economic growth is broadly and inclusively shared. 

Now, our agenda is ambitious, I admit that, but I think the times demand it. 

America is called to lead—and we need the tools and resources to exercise our leadership wisely and effectively. We can bury our heads in the sand and pay the consequences later, or we can make hard-nosed, targeted investments now—addressing 

the security challenges of today while building a more lasting foundation for the future. 

Let me just highlight three areas where we are making significant new investments. 

First, the security of frontline states. In Afghanistan, this past year, we have tripled the number of civilians on the ground, and this presence will grow by hundreds 

more with the $5 billion in this budget. Our diplomats and development experts are 
8 

helping build institutions, expand economic opportunities, and provide meaningful 

alternatives for insurgents ready to renounce violence and al-Qaida and join their 

fellow Afghans in the pursuit of peace. In Pakistan, our request includes $3.2 billion to combat extremism, promote economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. This includes funding of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman initiative. Our request also includes a 59 percent increase in funding for 

Yemen, to help counter the extremist threat and build institutions there as well. 

In Iraq, we are winding down our military presence and establishing a more normal civilian mission. Our civilian efforts will not and cannot mirror the scale of the 

military presence, but they rather should provide assistance consistent with the priorities of the Iraqi Government and the United States. So our request includes $2.6 

billion for Iraq. These are resources that will allow us to support the democratic 

process, ensure a smooth transition to civilian-led security training and operational 

support. These funds will allow civilians to take full responsibility for programs, and 

the Defense budget for Iraq will be decreasing by about $16 billion—and that’s a 

powerful illustration of the return on civilian investment. 

We are blessed, as we all in this room know, with the best troops in the world, 

and we have seen time and time again in today’s wars. But we also need to give 

our civilian experts the resources to do the jobs we’re asking them to do. And this 

budget takes a step at the right direction. It includes $100 million for a State Department complex crisis fund—replacing the 1207 fund which the Defense Department used to direct money toward crisis response. It also includes support for the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, which previously fell under the Defense Department as well. 

The second major area is investing in development. So we’re making targeted investments in fragile societies—which, in our interconnected word, bear heavily on 

our own security and prosperity. These investments are a key part of our effort to 

get ahead of crises rather than just responding to them. The first of these is in 

health. Building on our progress treating HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis, our Global 

Health Initiative will invest $63 billion over 6 years, starting with $8.5 billion in 

fiscal year 2011, to help our partners address specific diseases and build strong, sustainable health systems. The Administration has also pledged to invest at least $3.5 

billion in food security over 3 years, and this budget includes a request for $1.6 billion, of which $1.2 billion is funded through the State Department. This will focus 

on countries that have developed effective, comprehensive strategies, where agriculture remains central to prosperity and hunger is widespread. On climate change, we’ve requested $646 million to promote the United States as 

a leader in green technology and to leverage other countries’ cooperation—including 

through the Copenhagen Accord, which for the first time brings developed and developing countries together. This is part of the Administration’s total request of $1.4 

billion to support core climate change activities in developing nations. 

Our request also includes $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance. Our efforts in 

Haiti have made clear that State and USAID must be able to respond quickly and 

effectively. 

But we believe these initiatives will enhance American security, and they will 

help people in need, and they will give the American people a strong return on this 

investment. Our aim is not to create dependency, but rather to help countries learn 

to fish, as the old proverb tells it. And what we want to do is focus on equality and 

opportunity for women and girls, because we know that is the key driver of economic and social progress. 

And then finally, our third area of investment. None of what we intend to do can 

be accomplished if we don’t recruit, train, and empower the right people for the job. 

The State Department and USAID are full of talented and committed public servants, but we have too often neglected to give them the tools they need to carry out 

their missions on the ground. And rather than building our own expertise, we have 

too often relied on contractors, sometimes with little oversight and often at greater 

cost. This budget will allow us to expand the Foreign Service by over 600 positions, 

including an additional 410 for the State Department and 200 for USAID. It will 

also allow us to staff the standby element of the Civilian Reserve Corps, which is 

a crucial tool in our efforts to respond to crises. Now, while deploying these personnel generates new expenses in some accounts, it will reduce costs by changing 

the way we do business. As we are ending our over-reliance on contractors, we’re 

actually showing we can save money, plus bringing these functions inside and improving oversight and accountability. 

So, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member and members, one thing should be clear 

from this budget: The State Department and USAID are taking a lead in carrying 

out the United States’ foreign policy and national security agenda. As we finish the 
9 

first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we have a unique opportunity to define the capabilities we need and to match resources with priorities. 

This budget aligns our investments with the strategic imperatives of our time. The 

QDDR will also help ensure we are more effective and accountable. As I have reported to you before, filling the first-ever Deputy Secretary of State for Management 

and Resources with Jack Lew, a former OMB director, has given us an extra advantage in developing this budget and reviewing it to make sure that every item is economical and effective. 

Now, at this time of change and challenge around the world, we need to make 

these investments. And I believe that this committee understands why. I look forward to your questions. 

But even more so, I look forward to working with you in partnership in the 

months and years ahead. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

IRAN

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Let me first ask 

you about a country that concerns all of us: Iran. 

We know that the Iranian people have relied on the Internet and 

satellites to get news, often of the outside world, but sometimes 

even of what’s going on in their own country. 

The Iranian Government has spent millions of dollars to block 

Internet and social media connections inside of Iran. To me that’s 

a sign of a regime that is afraid of its own people and that wants 

to hide its actions from the rest of the world. 

In an earlier time, oppressive regimes trapped their people behind an Iron Curtain. The Iranian Government is trying to muzzle 

its people behind an electronic curtain, and I’m troubled by what 

they’re doing, not just to their own people but also stopping the 

programs of other countries. 

You made a recent speech, which I thought was superb, at the 

Newseum spelling out principles of global Internet freedom for the 

benefit of people everywhere and that was well received around the 

globe. 

It appears that Iran has broken international agreements by 

doing this, is that correct? 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Senator LEAHY. We have worked with the State Department and 

others on this issue. Beginning in fiscal year 2008, we provided 

funds to facilitate Internet communication by people around the 

world in closed societies. 

I noticed an article in the Washington Post on February 18 that 

mentioned the National Security Council discouraged the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the Board that oversees the Voice of 

America (VOA) and other U.S. international broadcasters, from 

signing a statement with the BBC and Deutsche Welle denouncing 

Iranian jamming of their broadcasts. In the end, VOA ended up 

signing that statement. 

Is there disagreement in the administration of the need to 

strongly protest internationally this violation of international 

agreements by Iran? 

Secretary CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, there is no disagreement. As 

I said in my Internet Freedom speech, the development of new 

tools that enables citizens to exercise their rights of free expression 

and virtual assembly, because I think it’s rooted in both, needs to 

be protected and advanced, and we need these new tools, particularly in Iran but not only in Iran. 
10 

So the State Department is looking very closely at what more we 

can do to try to work with the private sector in partnership to 

unblock the Internet, to get information flowing, to speak out 

against the kinds of abuses that we see going on out of Internet. 

We are providing funds to groups around the world to make sure 

that these new tools get to the people who need them. We are— 

we have been assisting in those areas for some time and thanks to 

this subcommittee, which has helped to pioneer the funding for 

these efforts, but there’s so much more that we can and should do 

and inside the State Department, I’ve created a group of young 

tech-savvy diplomats. 

We’re doing what we call ‘‘21st Century Statecraft’’ and they are 

working, again as I say, with the private sector, this is not all just 

American government efforts, in order to be able to unjam and circumvent with our technologies the kind of blockades that the Iranians are using. 

There’s still a lot to be done and I think that the discussion inside the administration is what are the most effective ways of 

doing it. Some of the technology, for example, that we would very 

much like to see used to unblock Iran is very valuable technology. 

We have to be careful about how it is utilized so it doesn’t get into 

the wrong hands. 

Senator LEAHY. Sure. 

Secretary CLINTON. We’re focused on this, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEAHY. But we also have to be working, I would assume, 

with other countries if there’s a violation of a bilateral agreement. 

I’ve heard that some of their blocking efforts not only block satellite transmission into neighboring countries but in one instance 

as far away as Italy. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, when they bring down the cellphone 

networks, that has broad ramifications. 

Senator LEAHY. The satellite is not just Voice of America. I know 

we’ve tried to tighten bilateral sanctions against Iran, targeting the 

Revolutionary Guard. We’re seeking the support of Russia, China, 

and other countries for U.N. sanctions. 

Are there other things we should be doing? I know the House 

and Senate have passed legislation imposing sanctions on petroleum companies that do business with Iran. What about that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, we support the purpose 

and the principles of the bills, both the bill in the House and the 

sanctions bill that recently was passed by unanimous consent here 

in the Senate. 

We want to have as strong a partnership with the Congress as 

possible. We need to enlist every possible tool that we can bring to 

bear on this, and we look forward to working with the Congress. 

What we’re hoping for is that whatever sanctions emerge from the 

conference committee have some flexibility that will support our 

ongoing efforts because you rightly pointed out, we are working 

very hard with our partners in the Security Council. 

We’ve already made it clear that we stand ready to do both unilateral and multilateral sanctions on top of whatever comes out of 

the Security Council, but while we’re in the midst of these negotiations, it would be very useful for us to be in close consultation with 
11 

the Congress so that whatever is done here supplements and supports what we’re trying to get done in the Security Council. 

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS

Senator LEAHY. Let us follow up on that in another discussion. 

The administration has requested increases in Economic Support 

Fund assistance for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. I worry about 

the billions that were wasted in the years past because there 

seemed to be an emphasis on burn rates more than on results. I 

think you and I should discuss that more as we go forward with 

the bill. 

TRAVEL TO CUBA

I will also be talking to you about a group of Vermont high school 

students who wanted to travel to Cuba to set up a sister school relationship with Cuban students. After doing their own research, 

and getting ready for the trip, they ran into U.S. travel restrictions. 

It seems so beneath a nation as powerful as ours to tell kids they 

can’t go back and forth and talk to students in Cuba. They can go 

to Russia, they can go to China, they can go everywhere else. Then 

there’s Cuba. It makes no sense. You don’t have to answer, but 

we’ll talk further about that. 

Senator Gregg. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

JORDAN

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, one of our closest allies in the Middle East is Jordan and they’ve really borne the 

brunt of a lot of our policies in the forms of cost of refugees and 

border security issues. They requested $300 billion additional assistance in the supplemental. 

I was wondering if the administration supports this request. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Gregg, as you know, Jordan is 

a stalwart ally and their work with us over the years has been extraordinarily helpful. 

We, in this budget, hit the targets that were set in the memorandum of understanding that we—we certainly abide by which 

gives us about over $600 million. The supplemental amount is 

something that we are considering and looking at. 

Obviously in this time of real budget constraints, it’s—it’s a challenge, but we know how much Jordan has done. We just have to 

try to see whether it’s—it’s doable within the confines of the budget. 

Senator GREGG. Well, considering what we’re spending in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, Pakistan, it would seem to me to be dollars well 

spent and probably have a much better impact in the area of stabilization in the region. 

Let me ask you two specific areas that I’d be interested in getting your thoughts on because they appear to be energizers of most 

of our problems. 

The first is the issue of where you think the Palestinian issue is 

going and where you think Israel is going in relationship to Palestine, and, second, the issue of the India-Pakistan relationship 
12 

and what we’re doing to try to create some comity there so that we 

can take advantage of our friendships or participate with the 

friendships in both countries. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator Gregg, those are two issues 

that we spent a lot of time working on. 

MIDDLE EAST

First, with respect to the Palestinians, there are really two aspects of our engagement with the Palestinian Authority. The first 

is our continuing effort under the leadership of former Senator 

Mitchell for the Israelis and the Palestinians to resume negotiations. 

We hope that that will commence shortly. We think it’s absolutely essential that they begin to talk about the final status issues 

that divide them, that have perpetuated the conflict over all of 

these years, but we’re well aware of the difficulties that confront 

us on this. 

At the same time, we continue to work with the Palestinian Authority to support their efforts to build their capacity, particularly 

in security. General Dayton has done a superb job working with 

Prime Minister Fayed in creating a Palestinian Security Force that 

is respected by the Israelis, that demonstrates a capacity to perform under difficult circumstances. 

We have encouraged other countries to provide funding directly 

to the Palestinian Authority so that they can help build their judicial system, their prosecutorial system, their corrections system. 

It’s not enough just to have a good security force, you’ve got to have 

the rest of the law enforcement, judicial apparatus functioning, and 

we’re getting support to do that given directly to the Palestinian 

Authority. 

So on both of those tracks, there are certainly challenges ahead, 

particularly on the first, the political negotiation track, but the 

progress that is being made on the second track actually increases 

the leverage and the credibility of the Palestinians in negotiations 

with the Israelis. 

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Second, with respect to India and Pakistan, we’ve encouraged the 

resumption of the direct talks which were suspended when President Musharraf left office. Those talks between President 

Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh had actually been quite productive, particularly in producing results on the ground in Kashmir, but they’ve been in abeyance now for I think slightly more 

than 2 years. 

So we’ve encouraged both countries to begin a dialogue. They are 

going to be doing so. There will be a meeting within days, as I recall the date, and we are sensitive to the concerns that they each 

have that it’s—it’s their issues that they have to address, but we 

continue to raise it and make the case to each separately as to why 

it’s in their mutual interests to proceed. 

What’s going on in Pakistan right now is very significant. The increasing efforts by the Pakistani Military and Intelligence Services 

to capture Taliban leaders, which they’ve done, to work with the 

United States, both on the civilian and the military side, better to 
13 

assist in what they’re doing to reclaim territory from Swat to North 

Waziristan. 

We’re trying to create a new relationship with Pakistan that is 

of longer duration and—and making the Pakistanis know that 

we’re in it for the long term. 

With India, we’ve had a very successful start to this administration building on, frankly, the success and the investment of the 

prior two administrations in working with India, creating more opportunities for investment, more relationship-building between our 

two governments. 

So I think that in these two areas, which are two of the most significant areas for America’s long-term security, we are working 

very hard and, you know, trying to make even, you know, very 

small but significant progress in any way we can. 

SYRIA

Senator GREGG. Thank you. I noticed we just appointed an Ambassador to Syria. There has been some slight opening, very slight 

opening of dialogue there. 

Can you tell us where you see that going? 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, we have. We decided to return an 

Ambassador. We’ve been without one since 2005. We have a very 

experienced diplomat, Robert Ford, who has served in Iraq as the 

political director, is fluent in Arabic, lots of experience in the region. 

I agree with your characterization that there’s a slight, a slight 

opening for us to build on. We’ve had high-level visits, highly ranking Members of Congress have also gone to Syria in the last year, 

but there are a lot of issues between our Government and the Syrian Government, and we’ve been absolutely clear about those 

issues. 

Just recently Under Secretary Bill Byrnes had very intense substantive talks in Damascus and we have laid out for the Syrians 

the need for greater cooperation with respect to Iraq, the end to interference in Lebanon, and the transport or provision of weapons 

to Hezbollah, a resumption of the Israeli-Syrian track on the peace 

process which had been proceeding through the auspices of the 

Turks the last years, and generally to begin to move away from the 

relationship with Iran which is so deeply troubling to the region as 

well as to the United States. 

There are many specifics under each of those big ticket items 

that we have discussed with the Syrians and, you know, we are 

going to resume ambassadorial level representation, but these 

issues have to be addressed continually. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. Senator Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Madam Secretary, it’s so great to welcome 

you back to the Senate. We miss you, and we know today you’ve 

really presented an appropriations request representing your role 

as the CEO of the State Department as well as America’s top diplomat. 

Reading the budget, I see where the President, with your advice 

and to us, meets compelling human need around the world. It’s in 

our strategic interest. It re-establishes relationships with treasured 
14 

allies, and I know I speak in a heartfelt way that the focus on 

women and girls in development. 

Also, I note the—your desire to reinvigorate and re-establish the 

professionalism that once was the hallmark of AID. So we appreciate that. 

IRAN

Let me get right to my questions. One—one, I want to associate 

myself with the remarks of Senator Leahy about Iran and we 

would hope to discuss after this hearing how we could follow up on 

that close alignment, but do you—I’m concerned that there is a 

lack of intensity in the international arena as we push or advocate 

for sanctions. 

My concern is that Russia and China are slow walking us. You 

might or might not want to comment on that, but is it your view 

and the administration’s view that we’ll move with our own sanctions after the international community acts or are we not going 

to wait for them or is that yet to be determined? 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your 

encouragement and support of our initiatives, particularly around 

women and girls. I—I appreciate that very much. 

With respect to Iran, I feel the intensity of our efforts very personally because I have been out there engaged in bilateral and 

multilateral diplomacy with countries that we are moving toward 

an acceptance of the need for greater pressure on Iran. 

You know, when President Obama came to office, he very clearly, 

and I think correctly, laid out what we needed to do. He said, look, 

we’ll extend our hand, but you have to unclench your fist, and from 

the very beginning he said we will have a two-track process. We 

will engage, but it’s a two-way street. There has to be something 

coming back and we will pursue pressure and sanctions in order 

to change behavior and to send as clear an international signal as 

possible that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons will not be allowed. 

Now, I believe that because of the President’s policy of engagement, we are in a much stronger position today than we would 

have been in the absence of all of our efforts. We have kept the socalled P5∂1, which is the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 

China, Russia, and us, united until now. We have issued very 

strong statements, with both Russia and China signing on, endorsing this dual track approach. 

We have demonstrated to countries that are somewhat ambivalent, to say the least, about going against Iran what it is we are 

trying to achieve and pointing out the problems that Iran poses to 

them. 

So just in the last, you know, month, I’ve attended a London conference on Afghanistan and Pakistan but spent an enormous 

amount of time in bilateral negotiations with all of the major parties about Iran. I went to Saudi Arabia and Qatar last week. I’m 

on my way to Latin America next week, and Iran is at the top of 

my agenda, and in the Security Council our negotiations are very 

intensely under way. 

There’s been an enormous amount of work done by the Treasury 

Department and the State Department to design sanctions that 

will be aimed at the Revolutionary Guard. I think we’ve made tre-
15 

mendous progress with Russia and I believe it is due to the President’s engagement with Medvedev and our very clear, consistent 

message over this past year about the way we see Iran which the 

Russians now are endorsing. 

With China, because of their dependence on Iranian oil, our arguments to them are somewhat different, that because of their dependence, they, above all, should be supporting a sanctions pressure track because an arms race in the gulf that would further destabilize the major oil producers is not in China’s interests and I 

think we’ve made a lot of progress. 

Now we don’t come out and do a press conference every time we 

have these meetings, but I have seen over the past year the attitudes about Iran evolve. So even countries that are still not sure 

they want to sign up to sanctions, they’re not sure they want to oppose them, they now understand why the United States views 

Iran’s behavior as a threat. 

And, finally, Senator, I want us to work in tandem as a United 

States Government. The administration and the Congress together 

focused on what are the smartest, toughest sanctions that can be 

legislated that will assist our efforts because we want to make sure 

that we don’t send wrong messages before we get everybody signed 

up to whatever we can achieve internationally. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you very much, Madam Secretary. It’s very clear we appreciate your personal hands-on robust 

involvement in moving this agenda forward and we salute you for 

identifying the risk of a lackluster response to Iran that would not 

only endanger our security, treasured allies’, but also the rest of 

the world. So we thank you for that. 

We also want to thank you for your speech on China and the 

cyber world. Senator Bond and I are on the Intelligence Committee. 

I’m on a task force on the—on the cyber terrorism issue. We want 

to work—today, this is not the environment to have this conversation. A more classified one would be appropriate. 

But I believe that cyber terrorism, cyber intrusion is really one 

of the biggest threats facing the United States and the free world. 

If the terrorists can attack and steal our ideas or place our critical 

assets into jeopardy, it is—has the potency that I believe is far 

more dangerous than even nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. So that’s a topic for other discussion. 

HAITI

But I’d like to just shift in my time left to a compassion issue 

which is Haiti. We really want to salute the administration and 

work with the Congress on our response to Haiti as well as President Bill Clinton’s Global Initiative. 

I worry about compassion fatigue, not of our country but of allies, 

and I wonder how you see that and, number 2, what do you see 

are the future sustained efforts? 

I represent a substantial number of NGOs that are 

headquartered in Maryland, like Catholic Relief, and then there’s 

another issue that I’d like you to consider and follow up with your 

staff. That is the issue of amputees. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 
16 

Senator MIKULSKI. In all of the terrible tragedy, so much of the 

population has suffered amputation. My colleague, Senator Leahy, 

has been one of the leaders. I had the great honor of being with 

him in Mozambique where he had created a low-tech but highly effective industry where people who had been victims of land mines, 

children, adults, the elderly, and I saw where they could make 

their own products that could help them sustain themselves in a 

very rugged environment. 

I was so proud of what Senator Leahy did, and I really bring this 

to the attention that Senator Leahy, with his leadership as the 

Chair, your work in Haiti, that we take special attention to that. 

I’ve reached out to the Bloomberg School of Public Health. I have 

a list of people who’ve done this around the world where there are 

models and lessons learned, but again it was the Leahy leadership 

in Africa and your work here because what I fear is, after the TV 

cameras leave and we want to go rebuild a country that’s 80 percent agriculture, they won’t be able to do the work and also could 

that also be another source of employment right there in country. 

So you might not have the answer today, but I’d like to lay that 

out as a policy direction that perhaps we could pursue. 

Secretary CLINTON. Could I take a little time, Mr. Chairman, to 

respond because this is—— 

Senator LEAHY. Sure. 

Secretary CLINTON. I was smiling because I had a meeting—— 

Senator LEAHY. I should note that the Secretary, when she was 

in—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. Are you all aware of this? 

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. The Senator supported me on every 

one of these efforts to help with amputees—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, he’s been the leader. 

Senator LEAHY [continuing]. As has the Senator from Maryland. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I was meeting with Dr. Roj Shah, our 

new USAID Administrator, telling him about this work that Senator Leahy has led and that so many of us supported for exactly 

the reasons that you’re pointing out, Senator Mikulski. 

The amputation issue is going to be one we have to address. 

We’re trying to put together a plan now and I would like to come 

back to all of you who are concerned about this to make sure that 

you know what we’re doing, that we have all the information you 

have at your fingertips, the experience that resides here on this 

subcommittee, and that we have adequate funding to address it because I think that is a wonderful compassion initiative for the 

United States. 

But to your other point, Senator, I am very heartened by what 

I see happening in the international community. Every single country in the Western Hemisphere has contributed something to Haiti 

and they have made a collective commitment of money, plus individual countries, like Brazil and Mexico, that have more capacity, 

but even poor countries, like Guatemala. The Dominican Republic 

has been extraordinary in what it has done for its neighbor. 

We’re having a conference that is co-hosted by the United States, 

the United Nations, and major donor countries at the United Nations on March 31 to really nail down these commitments. 
17 

The United States is working very closely with the Haitian Government to stand up a development authority that will be supported to fulfill the reconstruction and recovery work now that the 

relief phase is ending. 

But I think this is an opportunity for us. Our military performed 

admirably and just completely eliminated any of those old canards 

about the United States military in our hemisphere. We had a very 

robust public diplomacy effort. 

Under Secretary Judith McHale, whom you know, drove this and 

we basically looked at every press coverage in the world about 

what we were doing in Haiti. If there was a story that was inaccurate or unfair, we immediately responded and the net result is 

that I think the United States is seen as the leader that we have 

been in doing this work. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, that’s fantastic. My time is up. I have— 

I have a constituent who’s in a Burmese prison and I’d like to talk 

to you. Your staff has been great, but I’d like to talk with you 

about more, perhaps other avenues for his release. 

Secretary CLINTON. Good. 

Senator LEAHY. And the Secretary’s been wonderful in being accessible to us. I want to make sure everybody gets a chance before 

she has to leave. 

Senator Bond has been one of the hardest-working members of 

this subcommittee. I want to make sure he gets a chance to be 

heard. 

Senator BOND. Mr. Chairman and I join with you and Senator 

Gregg in issuing a very warm welcome to the Secretary back to the 

Senate and I certainly join them in applauding your leadership at 

the State Department. 

I personally am delighted with your active support of the concept 

of smart power, particularly in nations where we see the threat of 

extremist violent terrorism in Islamic lands threatening not only 

their people, our interests, their neighbors, but the United States, 

and smart power, through the use of diplomatic efforts, personal 

visits, economic cooperation, two-way trade, investment, and educational exchanges can work. 

But one of the things that I have seen as I’ve traveled around 

the world is the great need for more of your personnel on the 

ground and I join with Senator Gregg in supporting—and the 

chairman—in supporting your budget to rebuild our civilian foreign 

assistance capacity. That’s very important. 

ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

As you may know, as you know, I’m interested in Southeast Asia 

which the 10 nations comprise our fifth largest two-way trading 

partner, equal—exports equal almost what we send to China, and 

the keystone of that whole area is Indonesia. 

I thank you for recognizing Indonesia’s importance. One of your 

first official visits was ensuring that the President can go there. No 

better—no better example of our friendship, and I just visited with 

President Yudhoyono last month who was interested in far more 

United States investment and participation. 
18 

And I guess the first question is does the administration support 

any conditionality at all on the foreign military assistance, foreign 

aid and foreign assistance to Indonesia? 

Secretary CLINTON. Senator, thank you for those—those comments, and as you know, President Obama will be going to Indonesia—— 

Senator BOND. Right. 

Secretary CLINTON [continuing]. In March with his family, and 

we have been working hard with the Indonesian Government to be 

able to be in a position where we can resume support for vital security functions and we are looking at ensuring that the Indonesian 

democracy that has taken hold there will make sure that there’s 

no resumption of any human rights abuses or other kinds of behaviors that we, you know, deplore. 

This is an area where Chairman Leahy has been a real leader. 

We hope to be able to come before the President’s trip and brief you 

on how we would like to be able to move into a new era of cooperation because the Indonesians have been very helpful to us on 

counterterrorism. I think a lot of what they’ve done in their own— 

in dealing with their own threats has really been first, you know, 

first-rate in the sense of the results that they’ve gotten, but we just 

have to make sure that we’re complying with all the legislative criteria and we think we can do that. 

Senator BOND. Well, Madam—Madam Secretary, I believe there’s 

a new era. It’s been totally changed. 

Secretary CLINTON. I do. 

Senator BOND. President Yudhoyono has reformed the military, 

a former general. He stepped out of the military. He’s working to 

establish—and we need much stronger cooperation to make sure 

the military leaders understand that they are under civilian rule. 

We need to fight corruption and—and ensure continued support. 

They need our active support militarily but they need the support 

of private businesses and I—as I’ve visited those countries, I find 

that American business people abroad are penalized, facing double 

taxation. 

I visited Thailand. The American Chamber of Commerce, there 

is probably one of the best public diplomacy outreaches we have. 

They have adopted school programs. They’re constructing playgrounds, libraries, water tanks, water filtration, helping children 

with dental deformities, but the problem is that our system of taxation penalizes the CEOs, so all the American companies that 

could be leading for America have to be Australians, Brits, or Kiwis 

because of our extra-territorial taxation. 

I just—I know that’s a sensitive subject. I’ve been fighting it, but 

what’s your view of the role that private American businesses’ investment and participation in developing countries can do to 

strengthen our relationship? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, I believe very strongly that American 

business is critical to American interests and American security 

and prosperity. 

I met this morning with two of our leading company CEOs, Indra 

Nooyi from Pepsico and Jeff Immelt from GE, talking about how 

the State Department and our commercial diplomacy efforts need 
19 

to be more in support of what American businesses are doing because the competition is so rough. 

Senator BOND. Right. And we—if we—with the double taxation, 

the punitive taxation, we penalize them putting American CEOs 

in—in charge of it. 

AFGHANISTAN

I have lots more questions, but on—I want to turn to Afghanistan. My staff met with Joann Herring, who’s founded the Marshall 

Fund Charities and during Charlie Wilson’s Days in the 1980s, she 

was working to help the people of Afghanistan. She has some views 

on a comprehensive approach to reconstruction and development 

bringing NGOs together, and I would ask, number 1, that you at 

least give a hearing to them. They would like USAID dollars. I 

hope you’ll consider that. 

AGRICULTURE

Also, I hope that you will—that the additional funds for USAID 

will help them take agricultural experts. For 2 years, this subcommittee supported me in putting $5 million in the budget to 

send agriculture extension agents several years ago to Afghanistan. 

They never got one there. The Missouri National Guard has the 

Agricultural Development Team which is making a tremendous difference in Nangahar Province. 

I hope that there can be continued cooperation and providing 

military—military-civilian support for improving agriculture, teaching them not only to fish but to grow crops. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, again, I mean, you are singing 

my song here because we are absolutely committed to agricultural 

exports. 

I don’t know if this subcommittee has gotten a copy of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy. If not, we 

will get copies to you. But in the section on Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agricultural Sector, just a few highlights. Eight-ninety agricultural experts, 64 from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA), 25 from USAID, on the ground in Afghanistan, working 

in the south and the east sectors with our PRTs, our district support teams. 

We’ve got USAID issuing vouchers to farmers in 18 provinces, 

particularly in Helmand and Kandahar, for inputs offering, you 

know, better fruits, assistance with irrigation and the like, and, finally, we’re doing a high-impact irrigation initiative because all of 

our agricultural experts have told us that’s key. 

But there’s a lot more, Senator, that I would like you to know 

about because you have been right about this for years and I think 

finally we’re getting around to implementing it and we are looking 

for assistance from land grant colleges and asking, as well, that as 

we embed our civilians in with our military, which is how we’re 

getting into these combat or post-combat zones, that we have the 

support that is needed to be able to get out there and deliver these 

services to farmers and we’re doing that. 

Senator BOND. I look forward to talking with the appropriate 

staffers on your team about that because there’s much that we can. 

Thank you. 
20 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much. Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, 

Madam Secretary. It’s wonderful to see you back, and let me just 

begin by thanking you for the very admirable way that you have 

represented our country. Many of us are extremely proud. I know 

it’s a very, very difficult job that you have and you do it very well 

on our behalf. 

I also want to follow up with what Senator Bond said, that I specifically appreciate your partnership with Secretary Gates to marry 

the hard power of our military with the smart power of our diplomacy over the long run. I believe that is going to pay huge dividends and it’s been missing in the last several years and you have 

really filled the bill there. 

I also want to acknowledge, as Senator Mikulski said, thank you 

for always putting women in the forefront of this debate because, 

as you know, women can be the drivers of economic growth and social stability around the world. They’re often left out at our peril 

because no plans really work without them being at the table and 

I think often they’re left out, but with your leadership, they have 

not been. 

ORPHANS

In one particular area, Madam Secretary, I wanted to ask you 

some questions about something you and I have worked on for 

many years together and that is the rights of the world’s children, 

particularly orphans. This has been in the news from day one in 

Haiti, but it really should be news all over the world because conservative estimates have about the number pegged at somewhere 

about a 163 million orphans. We don’t know the real number. We 

know that there are some issues with those definitions. UNICEF’s 

definition is a little bit different than other definitions. 

But my point is this or my question is this. Senator Inhofe and 

I and other members in a bipartisan way have introduced a bill 

called The Families for Orphans Act which is pending before the 

Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate now. This bill would establish in the State Department an opportunity to focus on the 

plight of orphans and to promote the simple but profound concept 

that children belong in families. They don’t belong in institutions. 

They can’t raise themselves on the streets. If we want to stop trafficking, if we want to stop exploitation of children, prostitution of 

children, the best thing to do would be to put them under the 

watchful eye and care of a family. So that’s what our bill attempts 

to do. 

Could you give us your views about our efforts there, if you’re familiar with the specific aspects of this bill, please comment, but 

what are your general views about what we could do to focus our 

efforts and the world’s efforts to really connect orphans to families 

that need them or children that need families? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, let me start by acknowledging 

and thanking you for your passion about this. You and I have both 

worked together on this and talked over many years about it, but 

you’ve been the leader. You have really demonstrated a heartfelt 

commitment to the world’s children in so many different aspects. 
21 

I share that commitment and I am looking for the best way forward, how we can realize the positive results that we both see, because I share your conviction that, you know, the best place for a 

child is in a family and it may not be a family with a mother and 

a father, it might be grandparents, it might be older siblings, it 

might be aunts or uncles or even in some societies extended families, and so there are three areas that I think we have to focus on. 

One, there is in many parts of the world no capacity for absorbing orphans and no real sense of adoption or fostering in any organized institutional way. So I think we need to up our outreach to 

provide education, technical capacity, to help countries because in 

some countries adoption is really against the culture and so if 

they’re not some blood connection, the child has nowhere to go, and 

I think there’s a slow change in this but we have to do more in a 

public diplomacy outreach way and I’d like to work with you on 

that. 

Second, in times of crisis, we have to have our systems in place, 

we certainly saw that in Haiti, because there’s a lot of misunderstanding, there’s confusion in any disaster. So we’re working on 

kind of a lessons learned from—from disasters, from conflict situations about what more can be done, and we need high-level advocacy. 

We have a Children’s Office in the State Department. It would 

be, you know, my preference that we sort of build that up because 

I want it embedded. I don’t want it to be—I don’t want this to be 

an add-on. I want it to be permeate what I’m trying to do with 

women, is to permeate the Department so that women are part of 

the policy. If you’re serving in Europe or Africa are part of the policy. If you’re doing outreach in Angola, we are just going to try to 

permeate. 

I want the same attitude about children. So we need—we need 

better education, more technical capacity, more direction and support, and I’d like to work with you to make sure that what we’re 

doing will actually have the results that we both seek. 

Senator LANDRIEU. And I appreciate that, and I thank you for 

pointing out that in many countries of the world there isn’t the 

same urgency or appreciation for the strength of families that exists in America, but just because people can’t appreciate that 

doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s not the right thing and I appreciate your commitment. 

One figure that I want to throw out today because these figures 

are hard to come by and some people throw up their hands and say 

the problem is overwhelming, we can’t address it, but I want to 

leave you with these numbers. If you just took 50 percent of the 

estimated orphans, Senator, Secretary Clinton, that would be 

roughly 70 million children. 

There are 2.5 billion families in the world. So if only 21⁄2 percent 

of families in the world, only 21⁄2 percent opened up their homes 

and their hearts, there would be no orphans left in the world. So 

while these numbers seem overwhelming, when you put them in 

perspective to how many parents would adopt, how many families 

want to open up their homes, how many churches, synagogues and 

mosques are willing to step up, it’s just the government enterprises 

have to get themselves better organized. 
22 

So I know you’re a great leader in this area. I look forward to 

working with you, and I know that your position is generally 

against institutional care and for care in families. 

So thank you very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 

leadership on this issue, as well. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator. We all know the 

amount of time and effort you have spent on this issue and I applaud you for it. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, I’ve got three areas that I’m going to mention and I’m hopeful that you’ll be able to respond to at least one of them and if we 

don’t get a second round, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that the people that are here would respond to them to me in writing. 

First of all, I want to congratulate you on putting together a 

great team. I don’t know of any Secretary of State that’s had more 

on their plate than you have and I do understand that you can’t 

do it alone. 

I also applaud the fact that you have created two Deputy Secretaries, one for management and one for policy. As you know, I’ve 

been critical of the former administration because they didn’t pay 

enough attention to management. 

I want to tell you that the most important—one of the most important things you’ve done for your people is the issue of location 

pay—— 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes. 

Senator VOINOVICH [continuing]. And I hope that that is reflected 

in this budget. The Foreign Relations Committee hasn’t yet set out 

their vision, I guess, for the next 5 years, but that’s important. 

Second of all, I’d like to say that where the Visa Waiver Program 

has worked, they have less work than they had before because of 

that program. 

And last but not least, the Embassies. I visited a couple of countries and they’re really pleased with those Embassies and I think 

it’s important to the countries because it indicates to them that the 

United States is really interested in them and their future. 

ASSISTANCE FOR EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Last week I was in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, 

Kosovo, and Serbia with Senator Shaheen, and I know you’re focused on Iraq and Iran and Afghanistan, but probably more than 

maybe some other Secretary of State, I know that you’re interested 

in that region. We have spent a lot of time, a lot of money, and I’m 

concerned that if we don’t pay attention to it, all of the progress 

that we have made may be—may be for naught. 

The good news, when I visited these countries, they didn’t mention the FMA or IMET, but what they did mention was the State 

partnership that they have with our states. This wasn’t in this trip 

but when I was in Latvia the last time, the Latvian group going 

to Afghanistan had the Michigan National Guard serving under it 

and I know that the Ohio Guard is doing a fantastic job in Serbia 

today. Just to hear their Defense Minister talk about that partnership, it just gives me goose bumps. 
23 

Second of all, you know that their budgets are not very good. 

They’ve got the same problems we have, but they’re helping us, 

many of them, in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and they care about the 

regions. 

It’s interesting. Each of these countries, you know, they’re concerned about themselves, but they realize they have a symbiotic relationship with the other countries that—that are there and their 

vision is my vision, that they all get in the European Union (EU), 

they become part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), and then become part of the EuroAtlantic Alliance, and a 

couple of things they’re concerned about. 

One is EU membership. They know that there’s fatigue today in 

the European Union and many of them were using it as an incentive to get them to do some things they wanted to do but they’re 

afraid that they’ll never in the European Union. 

Most of them were concerned about Bosnia. Put in a nutshell, the 

Butmir Process has not worked. No progress will be made on that, 

they think, and this is the consensus, till after the election, but 

what they’re worried about is that in the election, they’ll poison the 

well so that after the election, the issue of changing the Constitution to give it more flexibility is not going to occur and they argue 

strenuously for Bosnia getting into the European Visa Waiver Program and they also think it’s very important that some indication 

of their getting IPMAP is—is—or MAP is going to—is going to happen. 

And their concern is that Dodik right now and his president, one 

of the three presidents is in favor of—of NATO membership, but 

after the election, they think possibly this thing would just blow up 

and then we’ll have a black hole there in that part of the world. 

In addition to that, they’re all concerned about Kosovo because 

you know the court’s going to decide one way or the other on 

Kosovo and when I talked with Prime Minister Thaci, I said, ‘‘You 

ought to be thinking about what’s going to happen here,’’ and I 

talked to the Serbs. ‘‘You’ve got to think about what’s going to happen on the ground,’’ and I think it’s real important that the State 

Department encourage them to do that. 

AFGHANISTAN

The last part of this deals with—with Afghanistan. I had—I was 

honored that Holbrook spent a couple hours. I went over there and 

spent—I was absolutely impressed with what they’re doing, but I 

don’t think that we have been candid enough with the American 

people about the commitment that we’re going to have to make in 

Afghanistan if we intend to be successful. 

Now you’ve mentioned some of the things that you’re doing, but 

this is not going to be next year or the year after. This is maybe 

5 to 10 years. It could even be more than that if we’re going to create an environment where the Taliban, who—you know, it’s with 

them, you know, it’s Alakbat, okay. That’s what you’re dealing with 

and so you’re going to have to really do a lot of work there to 

counter that and get people to feel good about it and you’re also 

going to have to make—and you should level with the American 

people. Okay? 
24 

The last time around, if you remember, we were there is that we 

did not level with the American people about the commitment that 

we’re going to have to make. We’re just kind of—and we need to 

put it out. This is a commitment we’re going to have to make. The 

Europeans, by the way, also want to know about the commitment 

in terms of military and in terms of their—what do you call them— 

P—— 

Secretary CLINTON. PRTs. 

Senator VOINOVICH. PRTs, and I congratulate you on getting 

them all together. They don’t feel like we’re just telling them what 

to do. There’s a consensus and you’ve got to keep doing it, but I 

think it’s really important that—that we level with the American 

people and the world about what kind of commitment we’re going 

to have to make to be successful in Afghanistan. 

And last but not least, I’m concerned about whether Karzai’s 

going to do his thing and if you recall in terms of Iraq, we laid out 

a whole list of things they promised to do and then we used metrics 

to see whether or not they did them or not, and I would think that, 

rather than having it come from Congress, that you’d give some serious consideration to saying here’s what they did, we’re going to 

monitor their progress so that you can keep us informed and the 

American people that they’re doing what they’re supposed to do because if they don’t do what they’re supposed to do, we’re in—we’re 

in big trouble. 

ASSISTANCE FOR EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I don’t think there’s a thing 

you said that I disagree with and I thank you for your interest and 

focus on southern Europe. 

We are very concerned, as well, about the direction we see Bosnia heading. We need to have more attention paid. We need to 

partner with the Europeans so that they are committed. We are obviously a strong supporter of the countries in southern Europe 

going into the EU. We think it has a lot of benefits for the countries but also the broader effort for integration in Europe and the 

TransAtlantic Alliance. But we also think, with respect to NATO, 

that we have to make clear what it would take to get MAP and 

then move Bosnia forward. 

I think, you know, Senator, that your attention to these issues 

is something that I’d like to take more advantage of because you 

have been consistently concerned and involved. I share your wariness about what happens after the court decision in Kosovo and I 

think I’d like to follow up with you to make sure that we convey 

to our Serbian friends and our Kosovar friends that this has to be 

managed in the right way. 

AFGHANISTAN

And, finally on Afghanistan, I agree that we have to be as candid 

as possible. We can’t lay down a clear path forward and say this 

is the way it’s exactly going to be, but we can certainly set the general direction and we have said consistently that our, you know, 

our goal is to transition military security to the Afghans and we’ve 

seen some real progress under General McChrystal and General 

Caldwell in improvements in Afghan security, both Army and po-
25 

lice recruitment and retention and performance, but we are going 

to have a long-term civilian relationship and we think we need 

that. We think that’s going to be in America’s interests, and I agree 

with you that we need to make that as clear as we can, and we 

want also to use the metrics that we’ve developed that I would 

hope have been shared with you, but if not, we will, as to how 

we’re going to try to hold the Karzai Government accountable. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator LEAHY. Senator Specter. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, 

thank you for taking on the job and the hard work and successful 

work you’re doing. We miss you in the Senate but we like to see 

you where you are. 

SYRIA

Thank you for the call from your Deputy Bill Burns about his 

trip to Syria. 

The question on my mind that I alerted him to this yesterday as 

to whether the stalemate might be broken between Syria and 

Israel on negotiations if the President were to invite them to the 

Oval Office. 

Back in 1995, Senator Hank Brown and I were in India and 

Prime Minister Rao brought up the subject of his interest in having 

the subcontinent nuclear-free and asked us to convey that message 

to Prime Minister Bhutto whom we saw the next day and we made 

a recommendation to President Clinton to consider calling them in. 

I had recalled the tremendous success that President Clinton had 

with Yassir Arafat and Shimon Peres and Rabin that memorable 

day on the White House Lawn. 

Would you give consideration to that process? I have gotten to 

know the Assads, both the father and the current president, and 

I think the right nudge could push them to the table. We came very 

close in 1995, came very close in 2000. The Turks have been in the 

process of mediating, but would you consider that? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I certainly will look at anything that might break the stalemate. I’m not sure that that would 

be acceptable or doable to all of the parties involved, but certainly 

our goal is to help facilitate a resumption of talks between Israel 

and Syria. We think it’s absolutely necessary for Israel’s security 

and future to try to move the whole region toward a more peaceful 

state. So we’ll certainly take—take any idea you have under consideration because you have been—I don’t know how many times 

you’ve been to Syria by now. 

Senator SPECTER. Eighteen. 

Secretary CLINTON. Eighteen. It’s more than anybody else that I 

personally know. So we take what you say and that’s why Under 

Secretary Burns called to report to you. We take what you say, you 

know, very seriously and we’ll certainly consider it. 

Senator SPECTER. I have been concerned about the gridlock in 

Congress for many reasons, but from what I have read and heard, 

it has had an impact on our stature internationally. 

The President came on with a great promise and, I think, did 

materially change the world’s view of the United States for a number of reasons and I think not only has President Obama been di-
26 

minished but so has the presidency and for that matter so has the 

ability of governance by the Congress of the United States, very, 

very problem-some, and we ought to be backing up the President 

on matters that he has to deal with of such gigantic importance. 

I read your statement across the board, Iran and North Korea 

and the Mid East and Afghanistan and everywhere. 

May the record show an affirmative nod? We trial lawyers use 

that procedure sometimes not being sure what the answer will be. 

What do you—what do you think? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I have great affection and admiration for the Senate. The 8 years I was privileged to serve here 

were extraordinarily meaningful to me, but unfortunately I have to 

agree with you. 

SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS

The gridlock over nominations is particularly troubling. We’re 

now, you know, what, more than 1 year into a new administration 

and whether you agree or disagree with a particular policy, a president deserves to have the people that he nominates serving him 

and I would earnestly request the attention of this committee to 

filling the USAID appointments. We finally got Dr. Shah nominated and confirmed. There was no delay on that, and I thank you 

for it, but he has no team and we’ve got to get that moving as 

quickly as possible. 

But I—I have to confess that when it came to some Assistant 

Secretary positions, some ambassadorial positions, it became harder and harder to explain to countries, particularly countries of significance, why we had nobody in position for them to interact with. 

So I—I think that, as we move forward, there are many things 

to argue about and I am the strongest advocate of people, you 

know, arguing out positions in a civil way that hopefully sheds 

more, you know, light than smoke, but on the question of nominations, I hope that we all can move more quickly and particularly 

on the AID front and the ambassadorial front. 

Senator SPECTER. Well, I will help you with that, but, Madam 

Secretary, beyond the confirmations, is my perception right or 

wrong that what has happened on gridlock goes beyond that? The 

weakening of the President? Everybody reads the public opinion 

polls. He’s not able to project the same kind of stature and power 

that he did a year ago because we’re—because he’s being hamstrung by—by the Congress and it has an impact on foreign policy 

which we really ought to do everything we can not to have partisanship influence. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I think there is certainly a 

perception that I encounter in representing our country around the 

world that supports your characterization. People don’t understand 

the way our system operates. They just don’t get it, and their view 

is—does color whether the United States is in a position, not just 

this President but our country is in a position going forward to 

demonstrate the kind of unity and strength and effectiveness that 

I think we have to in this very complex and dangerous world, and, 

you know, we’re always going to have differences between the executive and the legislative branch. 
27 

Having served on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, that’s par 

for the course. That’s democracy. You know, we’re not going to do 

anything that will undermine that, but I do think we have to be 

attuned to how the rest of the world sees the functioning of our 

Government because it’s an asset. It may be an intangible asset 

but it’s an asset of great importance and as we sell democracy and 

we’re the lead democracy in the world, I want people to know that 

we have checks and balances, but we also have the capacity to 

move, too. 

So it is—it is a concern of mine, and I—I hope that we can figure 

out a better way to address it. 

Senator SPECTER. No more questions, Mr. Chairman, but a comment. 

IRAN

On Iran, I hope you will figure out something that we can get 

the Chinese to go along with, which is tough enough, to get some 

sense out of Iran because that boiling pot is not going to simply 

boil forever. 

And the final comment is I know you’ve done a great deal on the 

three hikers in Iran, one of whom lives in the Philadelphia suburbs, Joshua Fattal, but whatever in addition can be done, it would 

be greatly appreciated in many quarters. 

Secretary CLINTON. Thank you, sir. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. I’m going to yield back to Senator 

Bennett, but on Iran, I’m going to leave with you and your staff 

an op-ed in the New York Times by Roger Cohen about what we 

prevent from going to Iran. One of the things he suggests we 

shouldn’t be preventing is the equipment they might need to get on 

the Internet. That’s kind of a layman’s description of it. 

I would look at that especially as they’re working so hard to 

block the Internet, anything we can do there which will get around 

the government’s censorship would be helpful. 

Secretary CLINTON. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I just want to respond to Mr. Cohen’s column. It references a pending license that 

was held up in the Treasury Department. That has now been 

moved, perhaps there’s a cause and effect there, and it is now in 

the State Department and we intend to act on it expeditiously. 

Senator LEAHY. As the old serials on radio would say, my work 

here is done. 

Senator Bennett. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

join, Madam Secretary, my colleagues in welcoming you back to 

your old stomping grounds. Seeing you on the other side of the 

table is a different kind of reaction, but we’re always happy to see 

you, regardless of the circumstance. 

Coming as late in the questioning as I do, I won’t rehash many 

of the things that have been said by my colleagues, but I will not 

let the opportunity to mention Iran and the Iran Sanctions Act go 

unchosen. I won’t have to add anything to the things that have 

been said, but I believe that’s extremely important, whatever you 

can do to see to it that the Russians and the Chinese are helpful 
28 

to us here. I won’t go into territory about what I think may be happening with both Russia and China because I don’t want to say 

anything that makes any particular headlines. 

But I understand from reading history that Ronald Reagan used 

to drive Mikhail Gorbachev crazy by quoting the old Russian aphorism ‘‘Trust but verify,’’ and Gorbachev finally said to Reagan in an 

outburst, ‘‘You keep saying that,’’ and I think he did keep saying 

that and we should keep saying that. 

So with respect to Iran and what the Russians and the Chinese 

are doing, just remember the Russian proverb that an American 

president enjoyed so much. 

So I will turn to two subjects that have not been raised, both of 

which are enthusiasms of mine that I’ve been involved with in the 

subcommittee while I’ve been on it. The first one is the Millennium 

Challenge Corporation and the second one is micro lending and 

micro enterprise. 

MICROLENDING AND MICROENTERPRISE

If I can start with the second first, just I’m very proud of the fact 

that as long as I’ve been on this subcommittee, the pressure for 

micro lending has always been strong and the number has always 

gone up and I don’t think there’s anything we can do that makes 

more sense in the poor parts of the world than encourage micro 

lending. 

I have some of the articles that have been produced by women 

who have received micro loans. They offered to make me a deal. I 

said no, I don’t want a discount, I’ll pay the full price for this because it’s still very low and I want you to be as encouraged as you 

can. 

Would you talk to Secretary Geithner to talk about increasing 

U.S. support at the World Bank? I’ve talked to the World Bank 

about this and I get lots of encouraging words back, but I’m not 

sure there’s been as much movement at the World Bank as perhaps 

there should be and I hope that the State Department will continue 

to be as supportive and increase as much as they possibly can in 

these budgetary times support for micro lending. 

Do you have a comment on that before we turn to the Millennium Challenge Corporation? 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I share your enthusiasm. I’ve 

worked in micro enterprise since 1983 in Arkansas. I championed 

it when I was First Lady and I supported programs, along with you 

and others, when I was a Senator and we are very focused on micro 

enterprise and we’re also looking at some new ways of accomplishing the goals of the Micro Enterprise Results and Accountability Act of 2004. 

We are looking at how we can fund institutions more effectively, 

leverage the money, and the World Bank is a big—has a big role 

in this. So I will gladly pass on your comments to Secretary 

Geithner. 

Senator BENNETT. Yeah. My own experience with the World 

Bank, as I say, is they talk a good fight but they get carried away 

with, well, we can do this, we can do that, and all these other 

things with respect to financial services, and—and that’s wonderful, but in the meantime make the loans. 
29 

Secretary CLINTON. Right. 

Senator BENNETT. Don’t study this thing to death—— 

Secretary CLINTON. Right. 

Senator BENNETT [continuing]. And look at possibilities. I want 

the possibilities to come true, but in the meantime let’s make the 

loans. 

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION

All right. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), I met 

with the new CEO whom I find very impressive, and the concern 

that many of us have with respect to the Millennium Challenge 

Corporation is that the current administration might take steps to 

curb its independence and one of its values, I think, has been that 

it is an independent agency with strong guidance from a board of 

directors which you chair. 

But can it maintain its independence or is there still conversation about folding it into something else that would make it more 

part of the State Department bureaucracy or the AID bureaucracy, 

and the budget is the lowest request that we’ve had since it began. 

I’d like you to address those two issues. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I do chair the board and I’m 

very, very proud and happy to do so and I have publicly applauded 

the Bush administration for both MCC and PEPFAR which I think 

were significant advances in how we think about and do development. 

There have been no conversations that I have been part of or 

that I’m aware of about curbing the independence of the MCC. I 

think that there are, as you know, some legislative fixes that need 

to be done so that compacts can be extended, so that money can 

be rolled over, and that the mission of the MCC really focused on 

the kind of conditions-based aid that will change behaviors and increase capacity can be supported more effectively. 

So I—I am a strong advocate of the MCC. I think actually some 

of the lessons that we have learned from the MCC are part of our 

QDDR process and will be influencing how we do aid elsewhere, 

but, you know, it won’t surprise you, I’m not telling you anything 

you don’t know, that there is a division of opinion within the Congress concerning the MCC. There are very strong supporters and 

there are very strong detractors. 

But I think that on balance the MCC has proven itself. I think 

its—its independence has been beneficial, but I do want it to be 

seen as part of our overall efforts, not that it’s going to be in any 

way undermined, but that it is part of how we deliver aid. It’s not, 

you know, some add-on that is stuck out in left field. It is something that is integral to what the United States Government is 

doing and it’s a model that I happen to hold in high regard. 

Senator BENNETT. Well, I recognize there are some strong supporters and some strong opponents. Put me down as a strong supporter, and my—my goal is—is not to fund monuments overseas. 

We go overseas and we see U.S. money going to create something 

which then isn’t maintained or doesn’t provide any long term. I 

want to fund movement, movements toward the kinds of developments that are long term and become sustaining, and I think the 

MCC has that particular vision. 
30 

So I applaud your support and if you need any support on this 

side in this subcommittee, why, put me down as one who’s available. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, Senator, I just want to make sure that 

the record accurately reflects, thanks to the good information from 

my team here, we’re actually increasing the MCC budget. We have 

a 15 percent increase over fiscal year 2010. We’ve asked for $1.279 

billion. That’s a $174 million over fiscal year 2010. So we’re increasing the MCC budget by 15 percent. 

Senator BENNETT. Oh, I’ll get back into that then. Thank you. I 

appreciate that. 

Secretary CLINTON. If you have any questions, please call us. 

Senator BENNETT. I will. 

Secretary CLINTON. We’ll walk through them with you. 

Senator BENNETT. Thank you. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Bennett. Senator Brownback. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 

Madam Secretary. Appreciate you being here, appreciate the way 

you represent us around the world and your high energy levels. I’m 

sure it takes every bit of it. 

Secretary CLINTON. Yes, it does, Senator. 

Senator BROWNBACK. I’ve got a couple of items I want to run 

through with you, all of which you’re familiar with, but a couple 

really need your action. 

INTERNET FREEDOM

We’ve appropriated to the State Department I think it’s $20 million for Internet firewall, getting through the Internet firewall. I 

was at your speech that you gave on this recently over at the 

Newseum. Congressman Wolf and I wrote you about this in 2009. 

Senators Specter, Casey, Kauffman, Kyl, and I wrote you about 

this. 

We’ve allocated the money to the State Department but State 

Department hasn’t given any of it to the Global Internet Freedom 

Consortium. This is the group I found the most effective in doing 

this. They believe they could get a capacity in the anti-firewall area 

from 1.5 million now people that can get through these firewalls to 

50 million users a day with the amount of money we put forward. 

I got two letters here to you from basically Chinese dissident 

groups and Iranian dissident groups saying would you please allocate this money to the Global Internet Freedom Group? 

There’s a recent Washington Post report from an unnamed senior 

administration spokesman saying the reason they’re not going to 

the Global Internet Freedom Consortium is because the Chinese 

Government would ‘‘go ballistic’’ if this were done. These are—a 

number of these are Chinese dissidents that are operating in these 

firewall items but they’ve been very successful on rudimentary, no 

help from the U.S. Government and with it, they can smash 

through the Iranian firewall and probably the Chinese firewall, as 

well, and I just would really urge you to look at it. 

I’m going to give you these two letters—— 

Secretary CLINTON. Good. Thank you, sir. 
31 

Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. From those groups because 

that’s in your wheelhouse already. You’ve spoken about it. You’ve 

got the money. We need to get it to a good group. 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Second, I know you’ve been to Congo a few months back. That’s 

been a personal interest of mine and Senator Durbin’s, as well. I 

think we have the chance here to defund the militias that are— 

that are really just wreaking havoc all over Eastern Congo but the 

key is the—the minerals, conflict commodities. It’s the—it’s—it’s 

the blood diamonds issue, only got four commodities you’re dealing 

with, and I think at the core of the issue is that—that we require 

companies that are going to sell products into the United States, 

they’ve got to have a license on the products, a license on the minerals coming out. 

We want you to sell the minerals, Congo. We want you to be able 

to get the income, but on an item like coltan that’s in cellphones 

that Congo has 80 percent of the African coltan and then it comes 

out and these militias, this is the way they fund themselves is they 

kind of operate the concessions or let people come and go, and then 

that funds the soldiers. 

If we could just require licensing on minerals that come out of 

Congo, I really think—and this by the big companies, I really think 

it would defund the militias and much of this goes away, not all 

of it but a lot of it. In the blood diamonds case in West Africa, this 

thing mostly defunded the militias which is what we got to do. We 

got to get the money away from the militias and there’s a bill in 

both the House and the Senate. We have companion bills in each 

House that would do this. 

We’ve worked for several years to work with the companies, with 

the government, you know, that—that this is a way that could do 

this without hurting Congo and without hurting the businesses. So 

I think we’ve found how to do it, but we really need your backing 

and support and I don’t know of anything that could—could help 

that war-weary place and it’s—it’s probably—it’s hard to say, but 

this probably is the worst suffering in the world right now, is in— 

is in Eastern Congo and it’s big, it’s big. I mean, it’s 60 million people in Congo. 

SUDAN

The third item is Sudan. I was pleased to see this recent agreement signed on Darfur. I’m going to watch and see if it—if it actually holds, but Southern Sudan, as you know, is going to be voting 

fairly soon on whether to move out of the Union with Northern 

Sudan. They’ve been—you know they’ve had a conflict for a long 

period of time. 

I would really hope that State Department and the White House 

could start working with Southern Sudan more like a country and 

helping them get established and visible. I’ve thrown out, you 

know, that if the President or if you could meet with the leadership 

of Southern Sudan, the President could meet in the White House 

with them as a statement of support for them. 

They’ve got—I’ve been urging them, saying why don’t you get a 

basketball team together and start traveling in America with the 
32 

Southern Sudanese. They’ve got—you know, the Dinka Tribe dominated and they’re very tall. They’ve got 10 guys, Mr. Chairman, 

over seven feet tall playing basketball in Southern Sudan. 

So I’m saying just show up. You may get beat up by 40 points 

but everybody’s going to say where did these guys come from and 

I thought—I told them, I said, ‘‘I don’t know of a better way to get 

on the view screen in America faster than showing up with four 

guys over seven feet tall playing basketball.’’ 

MIDDLE EAST

Anyway, just if you could work with them, I think it’s really an 

important phase, and I want to finish my comments with you on 

this. This is—this is a really tough one, I know, but I think it’s 

time for us to review our Embassies in Israel and review again 

with the depth of review moving it from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 

Long issue, old issue. I know all of the thorns that are around it, 

but it seems to me that now is a good time to do this, that we’re 

starting to talk about a two-state solution, have for a couple years. 

Another key issue is the final status of Jerusalem. This is a negotiation just between us and the Israeli Government. I think it 

would be a very strong statement. It’s the only capital in the world 

where we don’t put our Embassy in the capital city. It would be obviously well received by the Israelis. It might irritate the Iranians. 

I’m okay with irritating the Iranians right now with everything 

that they’re doing. I realize it has broader impact, but I think, you 

know, these things have timings to them, as you know better than 

anybody, and I think this is ripe now for a discussion to begin, particularly when we’ve had now a couple years of discussion about a 

two-state solution. 

I think we need to be clear that we believe Jerusalem’s the capital of Israel and we’re going to—we’re going to act that way. 

So I thank you for considering these comments and would love 

to work with you on any of them. 

Secretary CLINTON. Well, we will get back to you on all of them, 

Senator, because each and every one of them is very important. I 

appreciate your concerns about them. 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator LEAHY. The hearing record will remain open until Monday, March 1, for the submission of any written questions for the 

Secretary. I know we’ve gone beyond the time that was allocated 

for the hearing. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Question. I was surprised that the budget recommends a cut of $87 million from 

the fiscal year 2010 level for aid for refugees. Given what we know about the pressures on this account, aren’t you essentially forcing us to rob funds from other accounts to be sure that the most vulnerable people are not disproportionally hurt? 

Answer. Supporting humanitarian assistance to and the protection of refugees, internally displaced populations, other conflict victims, stateless people, and vulnerable migrants remains a top Administration priority. While the President’s fiscal 

year 2011 MRA request of $1.605 billion is lower than the fiscal year 2010 appro-
33 

priated level of $1.693 billion, it represents a 9 percent increase over the fiscal year 

2010 MRA request of $1.48 billion. To assist in meeting humanitarian requirements 

in fiscal year 2011, the Administration also requested $45 million in the Emergency 

Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund to meet urgent and unexpected 

needs. The Administration will continue to monitor worldwide humanitarian needs 

closely. 

Question. You have requested another $25 million to support Jewish migrants to 

Israel, which is the only instance in which we carve out an amount of funds for a 

designated group of refugees. The Congress has consistently supported this. Would 

you support similar carve outs for other designated groups of migrants, for example, 

Somalis who seek refuge in Yemen, and if not why not? 

Answer. The Humanitarian Migrants to Israel program provides a critical service 

to Jewish migrants to Israel. While the Administration appreciates congressional 

support for this program, we would not support similar carve outs for other populations that we assist. The Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) account is a 

humanitarian contingency account that serves the needs of refugees and conflict victims worldwide. Given the fluid and ever-changing nature of humanitarian situations, the flexibility provided within the MRA account to respond to needs as they 

arise is critical to ensuring the effectiveness of this assistance. 

Question. You are requesting a $25 million cut in aid for Europe, Eurasia and 

Central Asia. These include the former Soviet republics, where democracy is being 

threatened every day. Given the importance of strengthening our relationships with 

the people of these countries, why does cutting these programs make sense? 

Answer. We agree with you that strengthening our relationships with the people 

of the countries of Eurasia and Central Asia is critically important to the people of 

the United States. We recognize the backsliding that has occurred in the establishment of democracy in these countries—from flawed elections to stifling of media outlets. 

We believe that the Administration’s request for AEECA funding is appropriate 

and reflects the needs of this region relative to critical priorities in other parts of 

the world. The fiscal year 2011 request of total assistance (all accounts) for Europe, 

Eurasia, and Central Asia reflects only a 2.5 percent reduction (compared to the fiscal year 2010 estimate). The proposed allocations for fiscal year 2011 programs in 

the democracy and governance area in the Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account represent only a 2.3 percent reduction from the fiscal 

year 2010 estimate—slightly less than the overall 3.4 percent reduction in the account as a whole. 

Though some needs in the region have increased, other areas require fewer resources. Some nations in the region are beginning to make real progress on economic and political reform. In addition, other nations have significant energy wealth 

which they are applying to support their own development, and which require our 

continued diplomatic efforts—but not much more money—in order to try to bring 

human rights and other important issues to the fore. Thanks to prior U.S. investment some non-governmental organizations and legacy institutions are now a sustained presence supporting democratic and economic reform in many countries. 

Finally, past investments in building the capacity of local organizations have allowed us to utilize indigenous expertise for program implementation, thereby permitting some cost savings within the fiscal year 2011 level. Moreover, we are using 

our experience to be more strategic in selecting the most cost-effective interventions 

and are leveraging more sources of other USG and donor funding to complement our 

assistance. In short, we believe that the levels of funding in the fiscal year 2011 

AEECA request will permit us to continue to promote the transformation of these 

countries into market-based democracies respectful of human rights and committed 

to the rule of law. 

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN CIVILIAN SURGE

Question. You are requesting an increase of $1.4 billion for the Economic Support 

Fund. The bulk is it is for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, which is separate from 

the $1.8 billion you have requested for Afghanistan, $344 million for Pakistan, and 

$517 million for Iraq in the supplemental. 

I understand the motivation to increase aid to these countries given what is at 

stake, but we have seen how difficult it is to spend money effectively. The previous 

Administration wasted billions in top-down programs, and measured results by the 

so-called ‘‘burn rate’’—how fast money was spent, often through big contractors and 

corrupt governments. You are asking for a lot more money, and that means spending bigger and faster. Shouldn’t we spend less, go slower, work from the ground 
34 

up—in other words, fundamentally change the way we spend money in these countries? 

How much are we spending through Afghanistan’s central government, and given 

press reports that top Afghan officials, including President Karzai’s family, are getting rich and buying mansions in Dubai, are these the people we should be working 

with? 

Answer. We have provided over $700 million to the Karzai government between 

fiscal year 2002–2009. We are using this assistance to build Afghan government capacity, which will help the Afghan government gain the trust of its people through 

the delivery services. This direct assistance is also transferring ownership and responsibility of our assistance to Afghanistan to the Afghan people. 

The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is our primary vehicle for 

channeling resources through the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s (GIRoA) budget. This mechanism, which we monitor carefully, strengthens 

GIRoA’s capacity to prioritize, direct and allocate resources. The ARTF also improves aid effectiveness by serving as a collective platform for donor funding, reducing the need to deal with all donors bilaterally. The governance and fiduciary framework for the ARTF has strict systems in place to increase accountability, transparency, and safeguards to ensure proper oversight of U.S. taxpayer (and donor) resources. We review the financial management, procurement and expenditure systems of 

key ministries to help them increase their capacity to accept U.S. direct assistance. 

Assessments (financial and procurement) to determine Ministries’ ability to account 

for and manage funds and execute services are conducted at Ministries we intend 

to fund with direct assistance. Ministries are recertified every 3 years. The USAID 

controller leads this effort. 

At the same time, we are taking a multi-pronged approach to tackling corruption 

in Afghanistan. The U.S. government, with the broader international community, is 

prepared to help the Afghan government implement its strategy with programs designed to: (1) improve the transparency and accountability of Afghan government institutions to reduce corrupt practices; (2) improve financial oversight; (3) build Afghan capacity to investigate, prosecute, sanction and/or remove corrupt officials 

from power; and, (4) help Afghans educate the public about efforts to reduce corruption and improve the resources available for the public to demand and participate 

in transparent and accountable governance. Initiatives already underway include 

the Major Crimes Task Force, the Anti-Corruption Unit at the Attorney General’s 

office, and new programmatic support for the High Office of Oversight. We are also 

working with the Afghan Parliament to ensure ethics training is part of orientation 

for new members of parliament, and oversight assistance training is provided for 

members working on the national budget. 

Strengthening the Government accountability and service delivery is a key component of our larger strategy for stabilizing Afghanistan. Along with our diverse 

counter corruption initiatives, our programs to provide qualified civilian technical 

advisors and put in place sound auditing and payment transmission systems will 

be an important step toward stemming corruption and achieving our larger national 

security goals in Afghanistan. 

Question. Talking about ground up approaches to development, you have probably 

read or at least heard of Greg Mortenson’s book ‘‘Three Cups of Tea’’ about building 

schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan. His schools, with the support of local villagers, 

cost a fraction of the schools we build and they are not destroyed by the Taliban. 

His approach may not be the answer for everything we are trying to do, but what 

have we learned from Mortenson’s experience and how are we applying those lessons? 

Answer. Two key components of Greg Mortensen’s approach to building schools 

in Pakistan and Afghanistan are community buy-in and long term investment. Both 

concepts continue to ground USAID education programming in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan as we move forward implementing USG strategy in this politically strategic region. The involvement of the community is a critical aspect of sustainable 

development in the education sector; USAID provincial programs in education incorporate input of local leadership and provide support for school management committees and parent teacher councils. In addition to fostering community involvement, 

USAID/Afghanistan and USAID/Pakistan demonstrate a long-term commitment to 

education by building capacity of government agencies on the district, provincial, 

and Federal levels and of nongovernmental organizations. These combined efforts to 

improve access to, quality, and governance in education throughout both countries, 

particularly in underserved areas and those vulnerable to extremism. 

I would also like to provide you with a bit of background on USAID’s construction 

of schools in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since 2002, USAID, in conjunction 
35 

with the Ministry of Education (MoE), has built or refurbished over 680 schools 

throughout Afghanistan, at a total cost of $58 million. The preferred school design 

of the MoE is an eight-classroom school. As a Government agency, USAID follows 

the direction of the host government’s MoE. 

The MoE estimates that an eight-classroom primary school costs approximately 

$160,000, while the cost of high schools differs greatly based on their size and the 

equipment to be provided. Construction costs can vary significantly depending on a 

number of factors, including remoteness of location, difficulty of terrain, land availability and the security environment. 

Without knowing the particulars—including size and location—of Greg 

Mortenson’s schools, it is difficult to compare construction costs. One of the key factors could be that Moretnson may be using local materials, such as mud or brick, 

and that the school may not be earthquake-resistant. Indeed, traditional Afghan 

construction is very inexpensive but does not produce the types of buildings that 

will last over time nor stand up to earthquakes. To the extent possible, USAID uses 

local materials if they meet International Building Code (IBC) standards, however, 

some traditional materials are often not long-lasting and not of a high quality. 

As of 2008, all USAID-funded buildings must be constructed to IBC standards. We 

are not aware of any other donor in Afghanistan requires these higher standards, 

but we believe it is essential that U.S. Government funded buildings adhere to these 

international standards in areas that are prone to earthquakes, and so we accept 

the higher costs and longer timeframes necessary to construct high quality buildings 

for school children and their teachers. 

The cost of construction for USAID-funded schools in Pakistan ranges from 2,100– 

5,600 Pakistani Rupees per Square foot (U.S. $25–$66). USAID-constructed schools 

are built to the Zone Four Earthquake Rating (the highest possible) and apply the 

internationally accepted Uniform Building Code. 

Question. There have been articles in the New York Times and Washington Post 

about secret prisons in North Korea. It described horrific conditions, where prisoners—mostly critics of the regime or their relatives—are worked and tortured to 

death. That was disturbing enough, but the article also said that U.S. policy is focused on the nuclear issue, and that human rights and specifically the treatment 

of political prisoners is not a significant part of the discussion. Is that correct? 

Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about the human rights situation in North Korea, including its labor and political prison camps. Human rights 

are a top priority and addressing human rights issues will have a significant impact 

on the prospect for closer U.S.-DPRK ties. 

The State Department’s annual Human Rights Report reports that an estimated 

150,000 to 200,000 persons, many of whom die from torture, starvation, disease, and 

exposure, are held in a type of political prisoner camp known as the kwan li so. As 

noted in both the Department’s Human Rights Report and Trafficking in Persons 

Report, the North Korean regime reportedly continues to use forced labor as part 

of an established system of political repression. 

The Department currently funds a number of programs which seek to increase the 

free flow of information into and out of North Korea, document human rights 

abuses, including those occurring in political prisoner camps, and build the capacity 

of defector-led organizations to protect the human rights of all North Koreans. Additionally, the Department of State will allocate approximately $3.5 million in fiscal 

year 2010 for programming to promote democracy, rule of law, and human rights 

in North Korea. 

We also continue to work though multilateral organizations, such as the U.N. 

Human Rights Council (HRC), and bilaterally with other governments, including 

our regional partners, to improve human rights in North Korea. We are currently 

cosponsoring a resolution at the U.N. HRC, which specifically censures the use of 

torture and political prisoner camps. We see human rights as an integral part of 

the United States’ North Korea policy, and will raise our concerns at every appropriate opportunity in the Six-Party Talks framework. 

Ambassador Robert King, the Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights 

Issues, oversees North Korean human rights issues as a part of the Office of the 

Special Representative for North Korea Policy and participates in all relevant discussions in accordance with congressional intent. 

Question. I think there is a lot of concern that despite Senator Mitchell’s efforts, 

negotiations on a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians have not 

produced the results we had hoped for. A year has passed, and Israel continues to 

expand settlements in the West Bank and the Palestinians continue to fight among 

themselves. 
36 

Are those of us who believe a peace agreement is necessary to the success of our 

broader foreign policy goals in the region overstating its importance? If real progress 

is not made this year, do you think we should rethink our approach? 

Answer. Comprehensive Middle East peace remains important to broader American foreign policy goals in the region. When Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas met in Washington on September 2, 2010 to launch direct talks, they 

agreed to pursue a framework agreement within twelve months. That remains the 

goal. 

Unfortunately, we have not made as much progress as we or the parties would 

have liked. We knew this effort would be difficult and that we would hit hurdles; 

and we are always assessing the merits of our approach and seeking ways to promote progress toward the two state solution in the most realistic way possible, 

knowing the risks and constraints of the environment in which we operate. Both 

parties have asked for continued U.S. engagement with the parties and that is what 

we intend. Moving forward we will engage both on the core issues of the conflict 

and with a deepened commitment to Palestinian state-building, and step up the 

American approach including by offering new ideas and bridging proposals as necessary. 

Question. The Administration is putting together a supplemental request for relief 

and reconstruction in Haiti. A lot of people here will want to support that. The 

American people have shown tremendous generosity in helping the Haitian people 

during this disaster, and we want to help Haiti rebuild—hopefully to a better place 

than they were before the earthquake. 

But money, without effective leadership, will not solve Haiti’s problems. While the 

current government is an improvement over the past, it was barely functional before 

the earthquake and will be unable to play a leadership role for the foreseeable future. There is a need for effective leadership, whether by the United Nations, 

United States, or some coalition of international donors and agencies. Given the 

amount of foreign aid wasted or stolen in Haiti, any long term reconstruction strategy, for Congress to support it, needs to be credible. The Haitian Government obviously needs to be consulted and involved, but a strategy whose success depends on 

the performance of the government would not be credible. 

Do you agree or disagree, who is in charge of rebuilding Haiti, is there a strategy, 

and how do we avoid the mistakes of the past? 

Answer. A key guiding principle of the USG strategy in Haiti is that the ultimate 

responsibility for rebuilding the country rests in the hands of the sovereign nation 

of Haiti and the Haitian people. It is our responsibility to see that U.S. Government 

resources spent toward accomplishing the reconstruction of Haiti are effectively 

managed, and transparently administered with proper oversight while we are helping Haiti to rebuild. There are a number of proposed mechanisms being discussed 

among Government of Haiti officials, multilateral institutions and bilateral donors 

for the management of reconstruction resources that would entail Haitian leadership along with credible systems of transparency and accountability. The United 

States strongly supports the development of mechanisms for oversight and management of the reconstruction program that will promote the effective, transparent and 

accountable use of resources. 

Question. There have been reports that funds have been cut from other disaster 

relief programs in order to support the Haiti relief operation. Is this correct, are 

funds for Sudan or other humanitarian crises being cut? 

Answer. Since IDA is a contingency account used to respond to natural and complex disasters world-wide, its flexibility allows OFDA to program funds as necessary 

to meet emergencies. While a significant amount of IDA funding is being directed 

to respond to the devastation from Haiti earthquake, the impact to other OFDA programs can be minimized if a supplemental is approved in a timely fashion (no later 

than the third quarter of the fiscal year). 

Humanitarian needs in Haiti can be met with current IDA resources, but funding 

availabilities for other programs world-wide may be temporarily reduced. USAID is 

hopeful that the IDA account will be replenished by a supplemental, which will 

allow OFDA to restore other programs to originally planned levels. In the mean 

time, OFDA will work with partners to meet critical needs with currently available 

funding and avoid programming gaps. 

However it should be noted that if a supplemental does not materialize, or is not 

available until late in the fiscal year, there will unfortunately be major impacts to 

OFDA’s programs world-wide. 

Question. The $1.4 billion Merida Initiative, which Congress funded, was to be for 

3 years. But for fiscal year 2011 you are requesting another $292 million for Mexico 

for the same purposes. Is this part of a longer term strategy with Mexico—sort of 

‘‘Merida Plus’’, and if so, where can we get a copy of the strategy, who was consulted 
37 

about it, how many years is it for, how much will it cost, and what results do you 

predict if the demand for illegal drugs in the United States, and the flow of guns 

from the United States, continues? 

Answer. The Merida Initiative was announced in 2007 as a partnership among 

the governments of the United States, Mexico, and the countries of Central America 

to confront the violent national and transnational gangs and organized criminal and 

narcotics trafficking organizations that plague the entire region. To date, Congress 

has supported this Initiative with $1.324 billion in funding for Mexico. The fiscal 

year 2011 budget request includes $310 million for Mexico—$292 million in INCLE, 

$10 million for ESF, and $8 million in FMF. 

Following extensive Department discussions, including within the interagency 

community, and especially with Congress, we have now broadened our focus to include the Caribbean under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, renamed our 

Central America efforts as ‘‘CARSI’’ (the Central America Regional Security Initiative), and are refocusing on ways to improve citizen safety—something consistently 

ranked high among societal concerns in all countries of the region. 

Beginning with the Merida Initiative and moving ‘‘Beyond Merida’’ in Mexico, the 

United States is forging strong partnerships to enhance citizen safety in affected 

areas by fighting drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, illicit arms trafficking, money-laundering, and demand for drugs on both sides of the border. 

At bilateral working group meetings leading up to the March 23rd Merida U.S.- 

Mexico High Level Consultative Group, the governments of the United States and 

Mexico agreed on new goals to broaden and deepen our cooperation to effect lasting 

change. As a result of these new goals, we are accelerating our efforts to support 

and strengthen democratic institutions in Mexico (especially police and judicial institutions) and civil society organizations. We are also expanding our border focus 

beyond interdiction of contraband to include facilitation of legitimate trade and travel; and we are cooperating in building strong communities resistant to the corrupting influence of organized crime. As discussed in recent briefings with congressional staff, future programs to increase Mexican capacity and to institutionalize our 

partnership will focus on four goals: —Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups.—The United States and Mexico will continue to collaborate to disrupt and dismantle organized criminal groups. We will 

do so by focusing our efforts on intelligence collection and analysis, training and 

equipping special units, enhancing investigative capacity, conducting targeted 

work against money laundering, improving interdiction capability, building effective command and control centers across Mexico, and developing effective 

task forces. —Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and Respect for Human 

Rights.—The United States will partner with Mexico to help institutionalize justice-sector reforms to sustain the rule of law and respect for human rights. We 

will continue large-scale institution building projects with security and judicial 

institutions at the Federal level and expand these efforts to include additional 

Federal agencies and to State and local institutions. The goal of these efforts 

is to support sustainable changes in the judiciary to strengthen the rule of law, 

promote respect for human rights, and engage with civil society. 

—Create a 21st Century Border.—Our goal is to create efficient, economically competitive border crossings along the U.S./Mexican border that ensure ‘‘secure twoway flows’’ of travelers and trade. We will also work to improve enforcement 

cooperation between ports of entry. Our immediate law enforcement challenge 

is to greatly reduce the flow of drugs to the north, and guns and bulk cash to 

the south. 

—Build Strong and Resilient Communities.—Mexico will take the lead to enhance 

the rule of law, promote respect for human rights, and create a culture of lawfulness by targeting specific areas for building community organizations, reducing demand for drugs, encouraging civil society participation, creating sustainable economic opportunities, and promoting community cohesion and violence 

reduction strategies. The United States will support specific, geographically focused programs that advance these goals. 

The United States and Mexican governments agree in principle to this framework 

for cooperation and are working together closely to determine the scope of action 

within each programmatic area. Broadly, and within this context, we are moving 

away from equipment purchases, such as aviation, and into an engagement that reinforces progress by institutionalizing Mexican capacity to sustain the rule of law 

and respect for human rights, build more responsive and transparent institutions, 

promote full civil society participation, transform the nature of our borders, and provide intensive technical assistance and training. We will also encourage enhanced 

cooperation with regional partners, including along Mexico’s southern border with 
38 

Guatemala and Belize. The $310 million fiscal year 2011 request for Mexico, along 

with considerable GOM efforts in these areas, complements the comprehensive and 

balanced USG strategy on our side of the border to reduce drug demand by focusing 

on prevention, treatment, and enforcement, and expanded efforts stop illegal arms 

and bulk cash flowing south into Mexico. 

We are hopeful that we can strengthen U.S. national security by helping the 

Calderon Administration break the power of the drug trafficking organizations and 

institute lasting institutional reforms that will continue into future Mexican Administrations. Assistance under the Merida Initiative, and other regional efforts 

throughout the Hemisphere, is strategically targeted to make an impact on the need 

for improved citizen safety and security. As we move forward, we will continue to 

assess progress and the impact of our assistance. We especially look forward to continued and regular dialogue with Congress as an integral part of this ongoing review. 

Question. I and other Members of Congress, and the Administration, have urged 

the Mexican Government to conduct a credible, transparent, and thorough investigation of the murder of American citizen Bradley Will, and the 17 other Mexicans who 

were killed in Oaxaca in 2006. Instead, the Mexican Government arrested and accused an innocent man of killing Mr. Will, and he languished in prison until a court 

finally ordered his release. Can you assure me that you will insist that these cases 

be thoroughly and credibly investigated? 

Answer. The Department of State has and will continue to raise the case of the 

death of American citizen Bradley Will with the Government of Mexico. We have 

made it clear to the Mexican Government that we expect a thorough and credible 

investigation of all evidence by Mexican authorities with a view to identifying and 

prosecuting the individual or individuals responsible for this heinous act. 

On the issue of other Mexican citizens who were killed in Oaxaca in 2006, we 

have raised these as part of our regular dialogue regarding human rights issues 

with the Government of Mexico. 

Question. For years, there has been talk about the need to reform the foreign aid 

budget. There has been any number of commissions, studies, reports and countless 

recommendations, all with little effect. This Administration has its own studies underway, at least one at the NSC and your Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development 

Review (QDDR). Given the strong views in Congress and the special interests with 

a stake in the status quo, what do you hope to accomplish this year to make foreign 

aid more efficient and effective? 

Over the years, USAID has seen its autonomy decrease, as it lost control of its 

budget and no longer has a policy office. Whole pieces of foreign aid have been shifted to the State Department or the Millennium Challenge Corporation. In my opinion, USAID’s effectiveness has been weakened as a result. I will also ask USAID 

Administrator Shah this question when he testifies next month, but what steps do 

you plan to rebuild USAID and restore some of its autonomy? 

Answer. To make foreign aid more efficient and effective, State and USAID work 

closely with other agencies in the field, under the direction of the Chief of Mission, 

to coordinate our assistance activities. In Washington, we are taking specific steps 

to ensure close coordination. For example, under our Global Health Initiative, we 

are working collaboratively with USAID and Health and Human Services to review 

all of our associated health programs in a number of countries. We will enter into 

new long-term partnerships building on prior U.S. international health programs 

and work with our 80 partner countries to strengthen health systems and improve 

sustainable health outcomes, with a particular focus on women, children and 

newborns. 

The fiscal year 2011 request is critical to helping USAID become the world’s premier development agency. The request includes resources for hiring an additional 

200 officers at USAID and—under the strong leadership of Administrator Shah— 

for building a robust policy, planning and evaluation capacity. USAID is playing a 

leading role in the management of priority development initiatives such as working 

to improve global health and food security around the world. In each of these areas 

USAID will show that it can have impact, make tough choices about how resources 

are used to get the most bang-for-buck, and serve as a whole-of-government platform that invites in other partners to maximize efforts against specific goals and 

outcomes. 

CLIMATE CHANGE

Question. The Administration committed at Copenhagen to contributing a total of 

$1 billion over 3 years in new funds to protect tropical forests, improve forest management, and increase carbon sequestration in tropical forests. I strongly support 
39 

this, and it builds on what this subcommittee has been doing for years to protect 

tropical forests. How do you plan to meet the $1 billion commitment by fiscal year 

2012? 

Answer. In Copenhagen, the United States and five other developed countries col- lectively pledged $3.5 billion over the 2010–2012 periods for REDD∂ (Reducing 

Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) activities, with the United States 

pledging $1 billion as its share of the total. We are on a path to meet that commitment. 

The fiscal year 2010 appropriation included $233 million in ‘‘Sustainable Landscapes’’ for forest-related climate change funding for State, USAID, and Treasury. 

This includes a ‘‘core’’ allocation of $153 million, as well as $80 million in USAID 

biodiversity funding that has direct climate benefits. The fiscal year 2011 request 

for State, USAID, and Treasury includes $347 million for sustainable landscapes. 

In addition to this fiscal year 2010 and 2011 ‘‘core’’ funding from State, USAID, 

and Treasury, additional USAID activities, as well as assistance activities by MCC 

and possibly other USG agencies, contribute to our climate change goals. We are 

currently reviewing those assistance portfolios to identify other existing or planned 

fiscal year 2010 and 2011 assistance activities that meet the REDD∂ criteria and 

contribute toward our Copenhagen REDD∂ pledge. 

We are confident the Administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, still to be 

formulated, combined with the fiscal year 2010–11 assistance mentioned above, will 

allow us to meet the $1 billion commitment. 

Question. The budget request proposes adding American Centers, expanding 

English language programs, increasing public diplomacy programs to Muslim-majority countries, expanding the initiative specifically for Pakistan, and increasing the 

Department’s efforts with the Internet and other electronic media tools. This subcommittee has been very supportive of the Department’s public diplomacy programs, 

particularly the educational and cultural exchange programs. What are the Department’s priorities for public diplomacy programs, what gives you confidence that 

these programs are working and should be expanded, and how can we be sure that 

educational and cultural exchange programs will continue to grow? 

Answer. First of all, thank you and the rest of the committee members for your 

continued support of public diplomacy. 

The core mission of public diplomacy is to support the achievement of U.S. foreign 

policy goals and objectives, advance national interests and enhance national security 

by informing and influencing foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening 

the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world. 

To that end the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Judith 

McHale, after an 8 month review of the current state of public diplomacy and public 

affairs, has just recently rolled out a strategic framework for public diplomacy. After 

consulting with members of the hill, NGOs, representatives from academia, and 

Public Affairs Officers, Under Secretary McHale found that in significant ways our 

public diplomacy was working well to advance America’s interests. But the review 

also revealed a great degree of consensus about what needs to be changed to align 

it to current priorities and guide our efforts going forward. 

As part of this review, we identified five strategic imperatives: to pro-actively 

shape global narratives; expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships; 

counter violent extremism; better inform policy-making; and, redeploy resources in 

strategic alignment with shifting priorities. Moving forward, we are taking steps to 

ensure that all our activities support these requirements. 

Creating or maintaining American Centers, increasing English language training, 

appropriately using Internet technology and social media and increased engagement 

in Muslim majority countries are all means by which we can better achieve the strategic imperatives laid out above. 

As noted in your question, a great deal of our public diplomacy efforts have been 

focused on Pakistan. Last summer, Under Secretary McHale, working closely with 

our Embassy in Islamabad, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Richard Holbrooke, USAID and DOD, drafted the Pakistan Communications Plan, 

a copy of which will accompany this response. 

The Pakistan Plan has four broad goals: expand media outreach, counter extremist propaganda, build communications capacity, and strengthen people-to-people 

ties. Our plan links elements of traditional public diplomacy with innovative new 

tools. For instance, recognizing that extremist voices dominate in some of Pakistan’s 

media markets, we instituted a rapid response unit and a 24-hour multilingual hotline for the Embassy to respond to attacks, threats, and propaganda from the 

Taliban, al Qaeda, and their sympathizers. This approach reversed a previous approach of not actively countering such propaganda. It has been an uphill battle but, 
40 

as our voice gets more frequent play, the impact on the discourse in Pakistan’s 

media has been noticeable. 

As we strengthen our people-to-people ties with Pakistanis, our aim has been to 

increase positive American presence on the ground in Pakistan. To do this we are 

focusing on more exchanges, more presence, more Lincoln Centers, more face-to-face 

meetings with engaged citizens in Pakistan, and more non-official contacts between 

Pakistanis and Americans in Pakistan. 

A key component of face-to-face engagement is our educational and cultural exchange programs for which I have every confidence that these programs will continue to play an increased role in the success of our foreign policy objectives. Exchange levels have increased significantly in the last couple of years and we are 

looking to increase that trend while ensuring that resources are being placed strategically and appropriately and that proper oversight and evaluations are being carried out. 

Under Secretary McHale and I agree that in this day and age it is critical that 

we engage with foreign publics like never before. It is the relationships built upon 

year after year that matter and that ultimately help us to better realize our foreign 

policy objectives. 

EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF CONTRACTORS

Question. Over the past several years, the Department’s Inspector General and 

the Special Inspectors General for Iraq and Afghanistan have identified systemic 

problems in the Department’s contract management, including inadequate oversight 

of the contractor’s work, overpayments to contractors, and delayed project completion. 

What changes, within what timeframe, is the Department implementing to address these problems, which are responsible for the waste of millions of dollars? 

Answer. The Department of State is committed to strengthening our contract 

management processes. In the last 2 years, the Office of Acquisitions Management 

(A/LM/AQM) created a strategy and established a business process for audits of A/ 

LM/AQM contracts. We developed a close and professional working relationship with 

the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) which are the Department’s audit agencies for major programs. We 

also issued an A/LM/AQM operational policy pertaining to audit services to ensure 

staff is aware of the policy. This strategy ensures that the Department meets contract administration responsibilities required by the Federal Acquisition Regulations 

(FAR). During fiscal year 2009, the Department initiated 12 external audits of significant programs. In addition to financial audits, we initiated a series of business 

system audits to review contractor accounting and internal controls, billing systems, 

estimating systems, labor system controls, subcontractor systems, and property 

management systems in conjunction with audits of specific contracts on a pre-award 

and post-award basis. The Quality Assurance Branch works closely and successfully 

with contracting officers, the Office of Inspector General, and program offices to obtain documentation, provide answers to audit related questions, support negotiations, and reach settlement agreements. 

Since 2008, A/LM/AQM has also significantly improved our contract close-out 

process. A/LM/AQM designed an effective business process and formed a team of 

close-out specialists, trained to identify contractual and budget issues, perform contract analysis, and to reconcile and document obligations and payments. This team 

is developing standard operating procedures for all of our contract managers to follow and is training their colleagues in A/LM/AQM on our new business process. In 

fiscal year 2010, as of February 24, 2010, nearly 500 contracts have been closed out, 

with $16.5 million in deobligations of unliquidated funds. 

The Department is continuing to examine other improvements to contract oversight through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review with USAID acquisitions offices. 

Question. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $3.1 billion for Department 

of State operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This includes a significant 

increase in civilian staff throughout these countries. Given the severe security constraints on State Department and other U.S. Government civilians in these countries, how are you going to use these people effectively and at the same time ensure 

their safety? 

Answer. Achieving progress in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq will require continued dedication and sacrifice not only by our military personnel, but also by the 

more than 2,000 U.S. government civilians currently serving in those countries. 

While security remains a concern in many parts of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, 

the civilian increase can still be used effectively, without compromising civilian safe-
41 

ty or our mission. For example, the increase in Afghanistan, coordinated by the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, includes top experts from 10 different U.S. government departments and agencies. Many have previous experience 

in Afghanistan or Iraq. In Afghanistan, these experts contribute to the mission in 

the field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces 

are operating and many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President 

Obama are deploying. They work alongside our military forces in critical districts 

where ISAF is focusing its efforts in 2010, and partner with Afghans to enhance the 

capacity of national and sub-national government while helping to rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors. 

In Afghanistan, U.S. civilians move into dangerous areas only after ISAF has 

completed clearing operations, which allows the Afghan government, U.S. civilian 

experts and ISAF to deliver an integrated package of basic services. 

Question. I held a hearing in the Judiciary Committee recently about the roles 

of State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau 

of Investigation in the Christmas Day bombing attempt, and what changes are 

needed to prevent a similar incident from occurring again. At that time, the Department of State indicated that the visa process was under review to determine what 

improvements and changes are needed. 

What is the status of the Department’s efforts to improve the visa process, and 

what if any improvements are included in the fiscal year 2011 budget request? 

Answer. We took immediate action to improve the procedures and content requirements for Visas Viper cable reporting that will call attention to the visa application 

and issuance information that is already part of the data that we share with our 

national security partners. All officers have been instructed to include complete information about all previous and current U.S. visa(s) when a Visas Viper cable is 

sent. This instruction includes guidance on specific methods to comprehensively and 

intensively search the database of visa records by conducting a wide-parameter, 

‘‘fuzzy search,’’ leveraging an existing search capability, when searching our comprehensive repository of visa records in the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). 

Searches conducted in this manner will identify visa records despite variations in 

the spelling of names as well as in dates of birth, places of birth, and nationality 

information. Visas Viper cables sent after December 2009 contain this more complete information. 

Since the Presidentially ordered Security Review, there have been exigent 

changes in the thresholds for adding individuals to the Terrorist Screening Database, No Fly, and Selectee lists. The number of revocations has increased substantially as a result. As soon as information is established to support a revocation, an 

entry showing the visa revocation is added electronically to the Department of 

State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and shared in real time 

with the DHS lookout systems used for border screening. 

The State Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and we 

use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, we have revoked more 

than 57,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including over 2,800 for suspected links 

to terrorism. Currently, we are reviewing the procedures and criteria used in the 

field to revoke visas and will issue new instructions to our officers. Revocation recommendations will be added as an element of reporting through the Visas Viper 

channel. We have provided additional guidance to the field on use of the broad authority of visa officers to deny visas on security and other grounds. Instruction in 

appropriate use of this authority has already been a fundamental part of officer 

training for years. 

We have been actively using this revocation authority as we perform internal reviews of our data against watchlist information provided by partner agencies. We 

are reviewing all previous Visas Viper submissions and cases that other agencies 

are bringing to our attention from the No Fly and Selectee lists, as well as other 

sources. In these reviews, we have identified cases for revocation and also confirmed 

that substantial numbers of individuals in these classes hold no visas and, of those 

few who did, a great many were revoked prior to the current review. 

We are implementing a new generation of visa processing systems that will further integrate information gathered from domestic and overseas activities. We have 

enhanced our automatic check of CLASS entries against the CCD as part of our ongoing process of technology enhancements aimed at optimizing the use of our systems to detect and respond to derogatory information regarding visa applicants and 

visa bearers. We are accelerating distribution to posts of an upgraded version of the 

automated search algorithm that runs the names of new visa applicants against the 

CCD to check for any prior visa records. This enhanced capacity is available currently at 83 overseas posts, with the rest to follow soon. 
42 

We are deploying an enhanced and expanded electronic visa application form, 

which will provide more information to adjudicating officers and facilitate our ability 

to detect fraud. We are working with our interagency partners on the development 

and pilot-testing of a new, intelligence-based Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) system that will make full use of the additional application data. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget for Consular Affairs includes significant resources to 

fund ongoing and new activities for the Visa Office. All activities will be funded with 

fee revenues included in the new schedule of fees. These activities include: Global 

Visa System creation, advanced biometric search capabilities, datasharing with relevant agencies and other advancements. 

Question. Do you think that adding Department of Homeland Security Visa Security Units at overseas embassies would improve the security of the consular visa 

issuance process? 

Answer. The Department of State has a close and productive partnership with the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including the Visa Security Program 

(VSP) of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Over the past 7 years both 

agencies have increased resources significantly, improved procedures and upgraded 

systems devoted to supporting the visa function. We support the assignment of Visa 

Security Officers to selected overseas posts where they work together with Consular 

Officers and Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigators (ARSO–I) to advance 

the nation’s border security initiatives in the following areas: extending the border 

overseas; capitalizing on the visa process to identify national security threats; identifying unknown threats; sharing information and conducting liaison activities; providing training and advice; and investigating terrorism, human trafficking, alien 

smuggling, marriage fraud. 

We work closely with the ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs) established abroad and 

with domestically based Visa Security Program supporting those units. VSUs currently operate at 14 visa adjudicating posts in 12 countries. Since January 19, 2010, 

we have received requests from ICE to open four additional VSUs and to augment 

staff at two existing VSUs. The Chiefs of Mission have approved the four new VSUs 

and one request for expansion with one request for expansion pending. 

Question. An article in the February 23rd Washington Post describes problems in 

moving forward with the planned Security Training Facility in Maryland. The most 

troubling issues mentioned in the article include missteps by Federal officials, poor 

communication with the local communities affected by the Training Facility operations, and the State Department’s acknowledgement that there hasn’t been adequate analysis on whether building a single facility is more cost-effective than the 

current leasing of various different sites. 

The article also questions the economic impact of the project for the local community and States that the Department acknowledges that there may be delays due 

to the public opposition and possible legal challenges. 

What is the State Department doing to address these problems and have you determined whether building a single facility is the most cost-effective approach to 

providing security training to its employees? If not, shouldn’t that have been done 

well before this point? 

Answer. The Department of State (DoS) and General Services Administration 

(GSA) recognize and understand the concerns of Queen Anne’s County residents regarding this proposed project. It is our goal to work in conjunction with the citizens 

of this community to ensure that the proposed facility benefits the surrounding area 

and any adverse impacts are minimal. 

To that end, project overview and public scoping meetings were held in early January, marking the beginning of the public participation process. Additional public 

meetings were conducted on February 16 and February 23, and the public comment 

period was extended from January 15, 2010 until March 12, 2010. In those meetings, we shared the evaluation criteria guiding the selection of a preferred site, provided general background information about the purpose and need of the project, 

and requested feedback from local residents and community groups about what 

issues should be studied and what areas may need to receive a greater level of attention during the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. 

The NEPA process is the tool by which the public is invited to comment and identify impacts that they believe may result from the proposed development. The comments will be part of the NEPA analysis that will be published in the draft Environmental Assessment (EA). Upon publication of the EA, the public will have another 

opportunity to participate in a 30-day comment period. The findings will be used 

to modify the plans and operations for the facility to avoid or mitigate any impact. 

Development of the site cannot, and will not, begin until the NEPA process is completed. 
43 

Additionally, the DoS and GSA accepted numerous invitations from local organizations and community groups for open discussions, and are also working to establish community liaison positions that will strengthen the dialogue with the local 

community and continue it on a more regular basis. We also invited the public to 

submit feedback on the proposed training center at any time, by calling the dedicated phone line at (215) 446–4815 or emailing FASTC.info@gsa.gov. 

According to a 2007 DoS Office of the Inspector General report, the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security’s (DS) training facilities are not adequate to accommodate the 

Bureau’s training. The dispersal of instructors and students among different facilities throughout the greater Washington, DC, metropolitan and surrounding areas 

is a barrier to effective team building, communication, and operational efficiency. 

The operating cost to conduct training at the current patchwork of 19 facilities exceeds $19 million annually. Students and instructors shuttle between facilities that 

extend from West Virginia to the Maryland suburbs at a significant productivity 

cost to employees. Several off-site annexes used for training are sub-standard facilities. 

The Department, over a 15-year period, has pursued possible locations for a consolidated training facility in Maryland, Virginia, and Washington, DC. DS collaborated extensively with other agencies (Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs and Border Protection, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense and others) to discuss facility sharing and opportunities for co-location. During this process, DS learned that these agencies were 

training at maximum capacity, and could not offer exclusive scheduling opportunities. Furthermore, they could not accommodate our highly specialized programs or 

our diverse and voluminous student population (Foreign Service Officers, Foreign 

Service Nationals, etc.) and unique curriculum (i.e., aggressive driving/ambush/kidnap scenarios, weapons of mass destruction and medical courses, explosives, heavy 

firearms, etc.). 

DS also vigorously explored expanding existing facilities. DS concluded that existing facilities have been expanded to capacity and unable to meet the demands of 

an increase in Foreign Service and other personnel who will serve in high/critical 

threat environments based on an expected augmentation of U.S. foreign affairs reconstruction and stabilization efforts in failing or transitioning states/regions. 

Question. Were existing sites, including local military facilities with excess space 

capacity, considered and evaluated as part of the decisionmaking process? If so, 

which sites were considered and what were the reasons for deciding to instead build 

a new site? If existing sites were not considered, why not? 

Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) has been pursuing space for a 

consolidated training facility for more than 15 years. This search has included seeking available land for purchase or exclusive use from other Federal agencies, operating military bases, and military bases scheduled to close as a result of the 2005 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendations, as well as facility sharing 

and opportunities for co-location. Other agencies with whom DoS has approached 

over the years to share their facilities include the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Defense, and others. 

In addition to seeking new land, DS also vigorously explored expansion of existing 

facilities, but concluded that those facilities are already at full capacity. Over the 

past several years, some of the following Federal/military/or commercial facilities 

have been investigated as potential sites for a consolidated DS hard skills training 

center: 

—Camp Dawson, WV; 

—National Conservation Training Center, WV; 

—Summit Point Raceway Associates, WV (Privately owned land-lease with DoSowned buildings); 

—Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; 

—Agricultural Research Center, Beltsville, MD; 

—Indian Head Naval Surface Weapons Center, MD; 

—Fort AP Hill, VA; 

—Quantico Marine Base, VA; 

—Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Cheltenham, MD; 

—Fort Pickett, VA; and 

—U.S. Army Research Facility, Blossom Point, MD. 

None of the agencies or locations listed above were able to accommodate the highly specialized programs (i.e., driving tracks, firing ranges and mock-urban environments), student populations (Foreign Service Officers, Locally Employed Staff, etc.), 

and relatively unique curriculum and mission needs of DS. 
44 

Therefore, during the summer of 2009, a search for other available land was initiated by the General Services Administration (GSA), Region 3/Philadelphia, on behalf of the Department. Following a search of declared excess Federal property and 

commercially listed private lands, both GSA and the Department concurred additional site options were needed. GSA posted an announcement seeking interested 

parties on the Federal Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov) on June 29, 

2009. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. INOUYE

Question. Madame Secretary, as briefly mentioned, Hawaii will have the great 

honor of hosting the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2011 Leader’s 

Meeting. My constituents have expressed some concerns about anticipated securityrelated expenses that will be associated with this event. It is my understanding that 

last year’s Group of Twenty Summit, which was hosted by Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, resulted in cost overruns incurred by the State and local governments. The 

APEC 2011 Leader’s Meeting will be quite an undertaking, and it is my hope that 

the State of Hawaii can look forward to the full cooperation of the Department of 

State and all the other coordinating Federal agencies. Would you please speak to 

the interagency cooperation, coordination, and cost-sharing anticipated between the 

various Federal agencies and Hawaii’s local government? 

Answer. The Department of State is the lead coordinating agency for U.S. participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and will work with 

a strong interagency team to arrange the hosting of APEC in 2011. Of the $89 million anticipated spending by State in fiscal year 2011, we expect that over one-half 

will be spent in Hawaii. The majority of the APEC 2011 meetings will take place 

during fiscal year 2011, and much of the Hawaii costs will also be incurred in fiscal 

year 2011. However, Leaders Week security costs will fall in the fiscal year 2012 

budget period. Diplomatic Security officers have briefed officials in Hawaii on obtaining National Security Special Event Status and have requested that Hawaii prepare a budget of anticipated costs. Governor Lingle has also discussed the matter 

with Secretary Napolitano, and the Departments of State and Homeland Security 

will coordinate closely in this matter. The State Department looks forward to working closely with Congress, the interagency team and officials in Hawaii to ensure 

successful meetings in 2011. 

Question. The East-West Center was created by Congress 50 years ago to promote 

the relationship between the United States and its neighbors throughout and across 

the Pacific Ocean. I appreciate the support the Department has expressed for public 

diplomacy, and a commitment to promoting the concept of citizen diplomacy. These 

are key concepts promoted by the East-West Center and facilitated by its exchanges 

and educational programs. The Center is a key stakeholder and participant planning and preparing for the APEC 2011 Leader’s Meeting. As the Center looks forward to its next 50 years, how do you see the Center’s extensive alumni network 

throughout Asia and the Pacific region, exchange programs, capacities, and partnerships complementing efforts by the Department, and how might its tremendous resources be further utilized? 

Answer. The Department of State greatly values the East-West Center’s achievements in strengthening relationships between the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, and in addressing global issues. The Center is providing important support to our efforts to prepare for the United States’ hosting of APEC in 2011, particularly preparations for the 2011 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting. 

For 50 years, the East-West Center has played a vital part in bridging cultural, 

educational, political, economic and social distances between the United States and 

the Asia-Pacific region. I appreciated the opportunity to speak at the Center as part 

of its anniversary celebrations, and to engage with students who will be among the 

next generation of leaders in promoting stronger U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations. 

The East-West Center has served as an important forum for meetings between 

senior U.S. officials and leaders from the Asia-Pacific region, including the Heads 

of State of many Pacific islands nations. It also brings together journalists, security 

experts, educators and other professionals in many fields that are important to our 

relationship. Its 58,000 alumni, organized into 50 chapters, form a significant international network of influence, and our Embassies help to support the efforts of these 

alumni overseas. 

As the United States further develops our partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region, 

the East-West Center offers a unique venue and expertise to foster cooperation and 

encourage the sharing of ideas. The Center’s efforts to promote broader systemic 

and globalized thinking in the Asia-Pacific region helps build a common under-
45 

standing of issues and values among publics and professionals, facilitating the State 

Department’s work. We anticipate that the Center will become an even more valuable part of the overall U.S. public diplomacy effort in East, South, and Southeast 

Asia and the Pacific in the coming years, and we look forward to continued collaboration with this important institution. 

Question. The Asia-Pacific region continues to gain more attention in the media, 

whether due to economic, trade, or security matters. With the benefit of having a 

year in your position as the Secretary, I am curious how you see the U.S. role in 

the region growing, adapting, and changing in the next few years? 

Answer. The United States’ revitalized relationship with the Asia-Pacific region 

will continue to grow in the next few years. We have a strong interest in continuing 

our economic and strategic leadership, and Asia has a strong interest in the United 

States remaining a dynamic economic partner and a stabilizing influence. 

We will remain a resident power in the region contributing to the stability that 

makes economic progress possible. Our economies will remain inextricably linked. 

American companies export $320 billion in goods and services to the Asia-Pacific region every year, creating millions of jobs. We will continue to work through APEC 

with other regional economies to foster free and open trade and investment and 

growth that is more inclusive, balanced, and secure. 

We will enhance our partnerships with our friends in the Asia-Pacific region to 

meet global security and humanitarian needs. We will continue to work together to 

help prevent nuclear proliferation, support our common interests in Afghanistan, 

combat piracy off the Horn of Africa and more. 

Our people-to-people links will continue to grow with more than 13 million Americans tracing their ancestry to that part of the world. Hundreds of thousands of students from the Asia-Pacific region study in the United States, and the number of 

American students is increasing at universities in Asia. 

The next few years will present the possibility for greater regional cooperation. 

We are building the architecture to meet the challenges faced by the region. Our 

alliance relationships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines are among the most successful bilateral partnerships in modern history and 

will remain the cornerstone of our regional involvement. We are building toward 

launching a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia and will continue to 

strengthen relationships with other key players, including China. We are also exploring strengthened multilateral cooperation across the region. 

Question. Last April I shared with you my concerns regarding the Western and 

Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and specifically, the importance of 

bigeye tuna (BET) to Hawaii’s economy. 

The Hawaii longline fleet has been under limited entry regulation for 15 years 

while other nations (including China and Taiwan) have increased their number of 

boats by 50 percent and increased their fishing exponentially by entering into multiple charter agreements with other nations—which are not closely tracked. The 

WCPFC established a BET quota of 4,200 metric tons for the U.S. longline fleet for 

2006–2008. For 2009–2011 that quota was reduced to 3,750 metric tons. The purse 

seine industry in the United States also catches BET, often taking more as unwanted bycatch than the longline industry takes as a target species. 

Our longline industry has informed us repeatedly about the challenges associated 

with operating within this quota, particularly in light of the fact that China and 

Taiwan do not appear to be honoring the quota limits. To that end, the fishermen 

in Hawaii have taken the initiative to map out potential charter agreements with 

Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 

in order to legally take additional catch and ensure a steady supply to the American 

market. However, the WCPFC has not adopted mutually agreed upon parameters 

for charter agreements, and there is currently no governing mechanism for how they 

are entered into or agreed upon, which is something we encourage the WCPFC to 

take up at future meetings. 

Our challenges are twofold: How do we secure meaningful enforcement measures 

to ensure that all WCPFC signatories abide by their quota while supporting the efforts of our domestic industry to provide a high quality, reliable supply of fresh seafood to the American market? Even though the Regional Fishery Management Organizations such as the WCPFC focus on international issues, I urge State to work 

with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to take into account the 

effect of international negotiations on domestic industry. How can State assist with 

moving this forward? 

Answer. The Department of State works closely with NOAA on issues related to 

the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Both agencies 

take seriously the responsibility of making decisions that affect U.S. economic interests, and our negotiators work diligently to balance those interests with the con-
46 

servation imperatives and priorities in the most equitable manner possible. In particular, in recognition of the special circumstances surrounding the operation of the 

Hawaii-based U.S. longline fleet, our negotiators, on two separate occasions, fought 

for and secured special accommodations for that sector of the industry, which were 

described in detail in a May 4, 2009 letter to you from Assistant Secretary Verma. 

Together, these provisions ensure that reductions in the quota for the U.S. Hawaiibased fleet are significantly less than the cuts faced by the fleets of other developed 

States. 

Even so, we fully recognize the challenge in working to ensure that all WCPFC 

participants abide by the quotas for bigeye tuna pursuant to WCPFC Conservation 

and Management Measure 2008–01. At this time, we have no evidence to indicate 

or to suggest that other WCPFC members, including those mentioned in your question, are exceeding their established quotas. At the same time, we recognize that 

the process for monitoring of catches and collection of information is still under development and the information available to us to assess the current situation is imperfect. A large part of our response to the challenges you have identified must be 

to continue to strengthen the programs within the WCPFC for monitoring, control 

and surveillance of fishing activities to ensure a greater level of transparency in 

fishing operations in the region. 

The WCPFC took an important step in this direction at its December 2009 meeting with the adoption of a measure to monitor and regulate the transshipment of 

fish caught in the WCPFC Convention Area. Under this measure, all transshipments of fish by longline vessels will be observed and recorded by an observer 

on board either the fishing vessel or the carrier vessel receiving the fish. (Similar 

provisions apply to other fleets.) In our view, this measure closes a significant gap 

in our ability to monitor catches and ensure compliance with agreed measures. Unreported transshipment of fish is one way that vessels can avoid having catches 

counted against their national quotas. We will also continue to push for higher levels of observer coverage on foreign longline fleets, recognizing the U.S. fleet operates 

with the highest level of coverage of any fleet in the region. 

The issue of charter operations is one that we are considering carefully. Under 

certain circumstances, charter operations can provide an effective and legitimate 

means for small island developing States and territories to develop their domestic 

fisheries without incurring large capital expenditures. At the same time, we are concerned that, without clear rules and guidance on the nature and extent of allowable 

charter operations, such operations could allow some fishing States to increase their 

catches without having that catch count against their national quota, but instead 

against the quota of a small island developing State or territory, with little direct 

link to the development of the domestic fishery in the State or territory in question. 

Under this latter scenario, the catch limits for some distant water fishing nations 

would have little meaning and the conservation benefits of CMM 2008–01 would be 

significantly diminished. 

Finally, another way to address concerns about the status of bigeye tuna, is to 

explore ways to reduce catches of juvenile bigeye tuna in the tuna purse seine fishery, especially the fishery associated with fish aggregating devices or ‘‘FADs.’’ At 

present, different groups are exploring various options with respect to the development of different fishing gear and techniques to reduce catches of juvenile bigeye 

tuna. WCPFC members are looking to the United States for leadership in this endeavor. In our view, although this work is expensive and would require a multi-year 

funding commitment, the United States should seek to join these ongoing efforts 

and contribute to them in a material way. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

Question. Madame Secretary, as you are aware, on April 1, 2008, the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption went into full force in the United States. Since 

that time, the number of intercountry adoptions has decreased dramatically from 

over 22,000 in 2004 to just over 13,000 last year. For the most part, this is because 

countries of origin have shut adoption processes down due to concerns of fraud and 

abuse. It has been my experience that governments in these countries are both willing and wanting to receive guidance from the United States in building a system 

of intercountry adoption that is both safe and effective. What is the State Department currently doing to meet this need? 

Answer. The reasons for the decline in numbers of intercountry adoptions vary 

from country to country. The United States is only one of several receiving countries 

experiencing such a trend. However, since the United States adopts on a greater 

scale than all other countries, the decline in raw numbers is larger. The majority 
47 

of intercountry adoptions into the United State occur from a handful of countries 

of origin. When those few countries of origin alter their intercountry adoption practices and requirements, the impact on our overall numbers is disproportionately 

large. 

Over 70 percent of the reduction in fiscal year 2009 was in the number of children 

adopted from Guatemala, where the Guatemalan National Council on Adoption announced in September 2008, that it would not accept any additional adoption cases, 

because, among other things, the Government of Guatemala has not yet met its obligations under the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (the Convention) and 

has not yet put into place the required safeguards. This year, due to our strong interest in encouraging Guatemala’s efforts to reform its adoption system, and pending a determination about whether the program is consistent with Convention 

standards, the United States has asked to participate in a limited 2 year Guatemalan pilot program to allow for the adoption of a number of special needs children. 

Nearly 20 percent of the fiscal year 2009 reduction in intercountry adoptions was 

from China, which is making fewer children eligible for intercountry adoption, while 

the numbers of prospective adoptive parents from traditional receiving countries has 

been increasing. As a result the wait time for healthy young children is increasing. 

However, the wait time for older children and those with special needs remains low. 

Russia and Vietnam also registered notable declines. The Department remains in 

close contact with the governments of Russia and Vietnam on adoption matters. 

The United States takes a multi-faceted approach in working with other countries 

on adoption issues. The Convention is an important tool in helping the United 

States promote intercountry adoption practices that focus on the best interests of 

each child. The accreditation process for adoption service providers who wish to operate in Convention countries establishes clear, strong, enforceable standards. Although the accreditation process is only a few years old, it is our judgment that U.S. 

efforts in accreditation have ‘‘raised the performance bar,’’ and helped to improve 

the standard for services provided in non-Convention as well as Convention adoptions. 

As the U.S. Central Authority for the Convention, the Department of State encourages and supports implementation of best practices in child protection and welfare in order to achieve Convention goals of incorporating intercountry adoption in 

an integrated child protection and child care system. As a matter of policy, we take 

every opportunity to encourage all countries to take the necessary steps toward joining and properly implementing the Convention. For example, the Kyrgyz Republic, 

which is not party to the Convention, halted intercountry adoptions in 2008 over 

concerns of corruption and fraud in the adoption process. The Department has engaged the Kyrgyz government at the highest levels on numerous occasions to encourage the strengthening of safeguards in the adoption process and accession to the 

Convention. In addition to these efforts, we have advanced the issue through outreach programs that included sending a U.S. adoption expert to the Kyrgyz Republic 

last year, and sponsoring an adoption-themed study tour to the United States for 

senior Kyrgyz officials. 

Another country not party to the Convention is Vietnam. Adoptions from Vietnam 

were suspended in 2008. However, the United States remains in frequent contact 

with the government of Vietnam on adoption matters. Discussions have focused on 

the broad range of child welfare responsibilities encompassed by the Hague Adoption Convention, the principles underlying the Convention, and the practical requirements for implementing procedures that the Convention requires. 

Cambodia is a member of the Hague Adoption Convention, but due to fraud, irregularities, and an insufficient legal framework to provide safeguards for the protection of children, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suspended adoptions from Cambodia on December 21, 2001. Despite accession to the 

Convention in 2007, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has been unable to 

implement Hague-compliant procedures necessary to meet its treaty obligations. 

Working in cooperation with the Hague Permanent Bureau (HPB), as well as with 

several receiving countries, the United States has sought to provide assistance for 

Cambodia’s establishment of implementing legislation necessary for an ethical and 

transparent adoption program that meets Convention standards. The United States 

has supported efforts by the HPB and joined a receiving country Working Group 

comprised of Convention states to provide coordinated input on Hague law and procedures to the RGC. The United States also supports UNICEF’s continuing work 

with the RGC to implement law, as well as improve and strengthen the child welfare system in Cambodia. As part of a multi-country assistance grant to UNICEF, 

the USAID Displaced Orphan’s and Children’s Fund (DCOF) is providing approximately $1 million for this purpose. 
48 

Finally, the United States supports the work of the Hague Permanent Bureau as 

it responds to inquiries from countries on intercountry adoption issues. The Department has an ongoing and active record of sponsoring and participating in the work 

of the Hague Conference on Private International Law’s Inter-Country Adoption 

Training and Technical Assistance Program (ICATAP). Created in 2007, ICATAP 

provides assistance directly to governments that are planning to ratify or accede to 

the Convention, or have already done so but are experiencing difficulties with implementation. The United States contributed $200,000 in 2008 to the Hague Permanent Bureau’s Supplementary Budget, which funds ICATAP and other child welfare 

programs. 

Question. As you know, one of the founding principles of the Hague is that children are best served in a family. Under what is called its principle of subsidiarity, 

convention countries agree to pursue family reunification and domestic adoption before allowing a child to be adopted by a family in another country. Convention countries also agree that institutionalization and long term foster care are not considered 

permanent and should therefore not be used as long term solutions. Madam Secretary, I am concerned that while it appears to be U.S. policy that intercountry 

adoption should take precedence over long term foster care and institutions, our 

practice appears to be quite the opposite. 

Can you confirm that it is in fact the U.S. policy that long term foster care and 

institutionalization are not long term solutions and should therefore not be given 

preference over intercountry adoption? 

Answer. Yes, that core Convention principle reflects our policy as well. In situations where children will not be reunited with their families, permanency planning 

should be undertaken as quickly as possible. Long-term foster care or institutionalization is not in the best interests of children. The principle of subsidiarity as expressed in the Convention stands for the principle that national adoption be given 

precedence over intercountry adoption. However, the practice of stopping intercountry adoptions pending the development of a viable national adoption system or 

enactment of long-term child care reform, in most cases runs contrary to the core 

‘‘best interests of the child’’ principle of the Convention. 

Question. As you know, one of the many challenges in addressing the needs of orphan children in Haiti is the lack of a universally accepted definition of what is an 

orphan. In fact, the often cited estimate that there were 380,000 orphans in Haiti 

prior to the earthquake include children who had one living parent and/or extended 

family. What can the United States do to assist the Government of Haiti in developing the data necessary to better understand what children’s precise needs are? 

Answer. The United States is actively assisting the development of the data necessary to better understand children’s precise needs by providing expert technical 

assistance to the U.S. mission child protection team, technical assistance and transport for GOH/UNICEF assessments of the needs of children in hundreds of orphanages in the Port au Prince area, and by supporting nationally representative surveys 

such as periodic Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) and a recent survey of 

child trafficking, restaveks, and child victims of violence. 

The figure of 380,000 is the UNICEF estimate of the number of children under 

18, before the earthquake, who had lost one or both parents. Of this number, 

330,000 children had lost one parent and 50,000 had lost both parents. The great 

majority of these children were living with the surviving parent (if a single orphan) 

or with extended family members, usually a grandparent or aunt or uncle. 

Prior to the earthquake, only 67 of an estimated 600 residential care centers (referred to as ‘‘orphanages,’’ though many of the children have one or both parents 

living) had been registered with the Government of Haiti (GoH). Because a majority 

of these centers were unregistered, there is little official data or statistics on children living in these conditions. Approximately 300 of these centers were located in 

Port-au-Prince and the surrounding earthquake-affected area. 

The USG is supporting the GoH and UNICEF to map and build a database of 

children’s residential care centers to facilitate stronger oversight through registration and monitoring in the future. As of March 1st, the UNICEF-led Child Protection Sub-cluster (CPSC) had completed assessments in 280 residential care centers. 

More than 17,000 children were residing in 205 of the assessed centers. The remaining assessed centers were found to be no longer hosting children. 

With USAID support, Haiti carried out Demographic and Health Surveys in 

1994–1995, 2000, and 2005–2006. The 2005/6 survey included information for children under 18 about whether the parents are alive, whether the children live with 

their parents and the relationship to other members of the household. The United 

States can assist the Government of Haiti to conduct another such survey as soon 

as possible, preferably with additional questions about the changes in these rela-
49 

tionships following the earthquake. If possible, the survey should be accompanied 

by special data collection on children who live in residential care centers. 

Question. The UNHCR stipulates 2 years as a ‘‘reasonable period’’ for the tracing 

of and reunification with parents or other surviving family members. Understanding 

the detrimental effects of prolonged institutionalization, particularly for children 

ages 0 to 5, what is the United States plan for ensuring that children are not placed 

in institutions for significant portions of those 2 years? 

Answer. The duration of the tracing process varies per child and is largely influenced by prospects for success, as well as the age and specific needs of the child 

and the circumstances of the child’s interim care placement. It is the USG’s view 

that it would be inappropriate to mandate 2 years of tracing before decisions about 

long-term placement and care are made, particularly for young children. With adequate resources, we believe that the GOH capacity could be developed so that, when 

a child is identified as currently not living with a family, a ‘‘best interests of the 

child’’ determination (BID) could be made for each child. Once a BID is completed, 

then placement decisions about short and long-term care could be made concurrently. 

The following are priorities that USAID aims to address for child protection in 

Haiti: 

—Assist reunited families to remain intact and viable through social and economic 

support; 

—Reduce the number of children abandoned (as measured by new admissions to 

orphanages); 

—Increase the number of children in family-based interim and long-term care in 

communities (e.g. family reunification, kinship care, foster care, small group 

homes, supervised independent living for older children, adoption); 

—Reduce the number of children living in orphanages; and, improve the quality 

of care for children living in orphanages awaiting a family placement; and 

—Strengthen the capacity of the Government of Haiti to build and lead a national 

child protection program based on international standards, robust monitoring 

and evaluation, an expanded cadre of professional social and child welfare workers. 

Question. As you are well aware, U.S. Federal law requires that State and local 

officials who place children in foster care are to pursue the primary goal of family 

reunification, while at the same time, developing an alternative permanency plan 

for the child. If the family reunification efforts fail, then the alternate plan will already be in place and well on its way to completion. This practice, which is called 

concurrent planning, is intended to reduce the total period of time a child will remain in out of home care before being permanently placed with a family. Is this 

an approach that the United States might encourage its international partners to 

consider adopting so that children in Haiti are not spending unnecessary time in 

non-permanent situations? 

Answer. Yes, we are aware of and support the concept of concurrent planning for 

children in care. We note that the main problem in Haiti before and after the earthquake is that the GOH does not have a functioning child welfare system, including 

the sophisticated social work capacity required to engage in case-by-case analysis 

of each child’s situation and needs so that, if needed, a concurrent plan could be 

written, approved, and executed. Now that so many children are in need of emergency care, such as food and shelter, the immediate priority has been to focus on 

those needs first. 

Question. Long term solutions to the issues facing Haiti’s orphan children will undoubtedly require the mobilization and coordination of both traditional and non-traditional partners. Have you given any thought about how you might mobilize faith 

based, corporate and professional partners around the goal of providing families for 

orphan children? 

Answer. Yes, a great deal of thought has been given to the mobilization of such 

partners. Faith-based partners in particular have long played a central and seminal 

role in assisting children and are well positioned to scale-up such services. USG 

agencies are currently working with a variety of faith-based partners in Haiti to address the needs of orphans and vulnerable children. 

Question. This year will mark the third year of the 10-year memorandum of understanding between Israel and the United States on important military assistance 

to Israel. The President’s budget request for FMF to Israel—$3 billion—is the 

amount noted in the MOU and we are appreciative of the President’s ongoing commitment to ensure Israel has the tools it needs to defend itself. What do you perceive to be the security threats Israel faces today? How will this assistance help to 

enhance security and stability in Israel and throughout the region? 
50 

Answer. Support for Israel’s security is a cornerstone of our Middle East policy. 

Israel faces potential threats from a number of sources, including terrorist organizations such as Hizballah and Hamas, as well as states including Iran. Our Foreign 

Military Financing (FMF) memorandum of understanding is intended to contribute 

to Israel’s ability to defend itself from these regional threats by committing the Administration to seek congressional approval to provide Israel $30 billion in FMF 

over a 10-year period, beginning in fiscal year 2009. The United States provided 

Israel with $2.55 billion for fiscal year 2009, and forward-funded $555 million of 

Israel’s $2.775 billion fiscal year 2010 FMF allocation via the fiscal year 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act. 

Israel uses this assistance both to procure U.S.-origin defense articles, ranging 

from ammunition to advanced weapons systems and training, and to develop and 

support its own defense industry. U.S. assistance will help ensure that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge over potential threats, preventing a shift in the 

security balance of the region, and safeguarding U.S. interests. Our assistance is 

also aimed at building Israel’s confidence to make historic concessions necessary for 

comprehensive regional peace. 

Question. The President’s request included $400.4 million in economic assistance 

for the West Bank and Gaza ‘‘to strengthen the Palestinian Authority as a credible 

partner in Middle Eastern peace and continue to respond to humanitarian needs in 

Gaza.’’ The request also states that this assistance ‘‘will provide significant resources to support the stability of the PA, economic development of the West Bank, 

and increase the capacity of the PA to meet the needs of its people.’’ Can you tell 

us how these funds will be disbursed? What specific projects will be funded and 

through what specific mechanisms? What portion of these funds will be used for humanitarian assistance in Gaza? Are you confident that there are safeguards in place 

to ensure this assistance reaches its intended recipients and does not land in the 

hands of Hamas or benefit Hamas? If yes, can you please provide an explanation 

of the safeguards in place? Answer. The Department’s $400.4 million request in fiscal year 2011 for the West 

Bank and Gaza Economic Support Funds (ESF) program supports the Palestinian 

Authority’s (PA) development and institution-building priorities through the following bilateral economic support: —Up to $200 million in direct budget support to the PA. 

—$72.5 million for the delivery of basic education, health, and water services. 

—$81.4 million in programs to help develop the environment for growth in the 

Palestinian private sector. —$15.5 million in food, medical, and other humanitarian assistance for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. 

—$31 million to enhance democratic reform, respect for human rights and the 

rule of law, and increase civic engagement. 

The more than $400 million ESF requested in fiscal year 2011 will continue support for priority reform and institution-building priorities identified by the PA, and 

will be disbursed primarily through either new or existing USAID and MEPI contracts or grants with international organizations, U.S. non-governmental organizations, and local vetted organizations. As noted above, the Administration has requested $15.5 million for humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and Gaza for 

fiscal year 2011. At this stage, USAID cannot predict the exact amount that will 

be spent on humanitarian assistance in Gaza versus the West Bank. The decision 

on funding for Gaza will be based on the changes in the situation and the evolving 

needs. 

The United States has installed safeguards that will ensure that our funding is 

only used where, and for whom, it is intended, and does not end up in the wrong 

hands. USAID and MEPI provide all project assistance through International organizations, U.S. non-governmental organizations and local vetted organizations. Before making an award of either a contract or a grant to a local NGO, USAID or 

MEPI, as appropriate, checks the organization against information in U.S. government databases. USAID and MEPI also check these organizations and the organization’s principal officer, directors, and other key individuals through law enforcement 

and other systems accessed by USAID’s Office of Security. All NGOs applying for 

grants from USAID and MEPI are required to certify, before award of the grant will 

be made, that they do not provide material support to terrorists. These organizations also work with local organizations through sub-grants. All local sub-grantees 

are likewise vetted to ensure no terrorist connections. 

Once an award has been made, USAID and MEPI have established procedures 

to safeguard U.S. investments and ensure the transparency and integrity of U.S. assistance. In order to ensure that funding through local and U.S. NGOs is used only 

for agreed upon purposes, all NGOs are required to submit quarterly financial re-
51 

ports on how funds are spent. Also, all direct USAID grantees, contractors, and significant sub-grantees and subcontractors’ local costs are audited by USAID’s Inspector General on an annual basis. In addition, the Mission’s vetting procedures are 

the subject of regular GAO audits. 

Before transferring U.S. taxpayer dollars to the PA as budget support, the Secretary of State certifies that the PA maintains a Single Treasury Account; has eliminated all parallel financing mechanisms outside of the treasury account; and established a single comprehensive civil service roster and payroll. The PA is only authorized to use budget support funds for purposes approved by USAID. In 2008 and 

2009, U.S. budget support was tied to specific PA expenditures, i.e., payment of debt 

to Israeli energy or utility companies and private sector financial institutions providing credit for purchases from these companies. Vetting of specific private sector 

creditors is a prerequisite to disbursements of funds. Funds are transferred into a 

separate local currency sub-account of the PA’s Single Treasury Account, and 

USAID had access to all information pertaining to the separate sub-account in order 

to monitor funds. The PA must notify USAID in writing when disbursements are 

made from the separate sub-account, including the amount disbursed and the recipient. The Regional Inspector General also audits each cash transfer. We anticipate 

using the same process for fiscal year 2011 budget support. 

In addition to tight USG procedures and controls, the PA, under Prime Minister 

Fayyad, has undertaken substantial economic and fiscal reforms that have increased 

transparency and accountability. The PA’s budget, including revenue sources and 

actual expenses and commitments, is publicly available on the Ministry of Finance’s 

website. In addition, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) has taken a number of additional steps to increase fiscal oversight and streamline budget execution, including 

by establishing a General Accounting Department and a Computerized Accounting 

System to link the MOF to line ministries and ensure that funds are used for their 

intended purpose. 

Question. The President also requested $150 million for security assistance for the 

Palestinian Authority, indicating these funds will support reform of the Palestinian 

security sector. This is an increase of $50 million over last year’s funds. Please explain the reason for this increase. 

Answer. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) will 

use most of the $50 million increase in funding over fiscal year 2010 levels to train, 

equip and garrison an additional Special Battalion of the Palestinian Authority’s 

(PA) National Security Force (NSF). The total fiscal year 2011 request of $150 million provides enough funds to train, equip, and garrison three Special Battalions. 

This level of funding will bring us to our goal of training and equipping a total of 

10 battalions (including one in reserve) and garrisoning nine. 

INL will direct a portion of this additional request to provide training, equipment, 

infrastructure, and technical assistance to prosecutors, investigative police, and prison officials in the Justice and Corrections Sectors to complement our security force 

programs. 

Question. In December, you acknowledged that efforts to engage Iran in negotiations on its nuclear program had not had the desired results, saying, ‘‘I don’t think 

anyone can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind 

of positive response from the Iranians.’’ Iran continues to enrich uranium, test missiles and work on its heavy water reactor. The global community cannot sit idly by 

as Iran continues to build a nuclear weapons capability. Can you provide us with 

an overview of the Administration’s strategy to prevent Iran from obtaining and 

using a nuclear weapon? 

Answer. The Administration remains committed to its dual-track strategy to address Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, which ultimately presents Iran 

with two choices: It can fulfill its international obligations under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and to the U.N. Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency, or it can face increasing international pressure and condemnation for 

its activities. 

At the moment, our focus is on getting the international community to consider 

new multilateral sanctions, while also implementing all existing U.N. Security 

Council resolutions through national measures. We believe that these kinds of multilateral pressures can most effectively underscore to the Iranian government the 

cost of defying the international community. They are also the most difficult for Iran 

to evade. 

We also continue to work independently and with our allies to take measures to 

deny Iran access to the technology and know-how it needs to develop further its nuclear program, while underscoring our continued support for a peaceful nuclear energy program in Iran. We are also working with our partners to prevent Iran from 

abusing the international financial system to facilitate its proliferation activities. 
52 

Finally, we are working with our counterparts on the IAEA Board of Governors 

to support the IAEA’s investigation into Iran’s nuclear program and compliance 

with its obligations. Through the IAEA’s investigation, we have learned much concerning Iran’s activities and many questions have been raised that reinforce our 

concern regarding the nature of Iran’s nuclear intentions. We support fully the 

IAEA’s efforts to address those questions. 

Question. As part of the administration’s sanctions effort, will the State Department begin to implement the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) by making determinations 

about companies investing in the Iranian petroleum sector? 

Answer. The Department of State takes its obligations under the Iran Sanctions 

Act (ISA) very seriously and we have reviewed many reports of potentially 

sanctionable activity under the Act. In addition to this ongoing process, we recently 

conducted a preliminary review of a number of reported activities that were mentioned in a letter sent from 50 Members of the House to President Obama in October and a letter sent to me by Senator Kyl and 10 other Senators in November. During the course of this review, we found the activities of some companies to be problematic and therefore warranting more thorough consideration under the standards 

delineated in the ISA. We are continuing to collect and assess information on these 

cases. 

We work aggressively on three fronts to ensure that our review of such reports 

is serious and thorough and that we have a rigorous process in place for implementation of the ISA. First, we raise in our bilateral engagement with numerous countries the need to strengthen our cooperation in promoting a united front for restricting investment in Iran’s energy sector. Second, we supplement our efforts by working with our Embassies overseas to collect information on potentially sanctionable 

activity. Finally, we review with the intelligence community reports of activities of 

some companies that warrant further scrutiny under the ISA. Through these mechanisms we ensure that credible reports are examined fully while reports with no substance are put to rest. It is worth noting that the Iranian government, in its efforts 

to deny its increasing international isolation, promotes and publicizes all manner of 

transactions and purported investments that may or may not have any truth to 

them. 

If the Secretary makes a final determination that sanctionable activity has occurred, Congress will be notified promptly. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

Question. We saw with the Sean Goldman case that international parental abduction is a major problem. Although we were able to secure a positive outcome in that 

case with your help, many other parents are still struggling to bring their children 

home and it is clear that the current system falls short. What are you doing to improve the Department’s ability to locate and help safely return American children 

who are victims of international parental abduction? 

Answer. The Department has designated the Office of Children’s Issues (CI) in the 

Bureau of Consular Affairs as the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague Convention 

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Abduction Convention) 

and to work with parents and our posts abroad on cases of international parental 

abduction to countries that are not Hague partners. CI works to reunite parents 

with abducted children and has expanded in size as the number of international parental child abductions has grown. In the last year alone, the Department has hired 

21 new employees in the Office of Children’s Issues to work exclusively on abduction 

cases, bringing total staff for the issue of abduction to over 70 employees spread 

among five issue-specific and geographic branches. In addition, the management 

structure of CI has been expanded and a number of new higher-graded positions 

have been introduced. The CI Director is a member of the Senior Foreign Service. 

A Senior Advisor will also be added to provide senior management with analysis 

and policy recommendations. Additionally, in the fall of 2009, CI added a Diplomatic 

Security officer to its staff to strengthen its cooperation with law enforcement authorities. These additional resources will enable CI to continue to broaden its prevention-related activities, improve its ability to locate abducted children abroad, ensure consistently high levels of service among case workers, improve training, and 

carry out more vigorous bilateral and multilateral engagement with countries that 

are parties to the Hague Abduction Convention, and those that are not. 

These bilateral and multilateral efforts are critical to resolving cases of international parental child abduction. As the Goldman case with Brazil demonstrated, 

complying with the Hague Abduction Convention and returning children remains an 

ongoing challenge for some countries. When countries fail to comply with the Hague 
53 

Abduction Convention, the Department, in coordination with other treaty party 

countries and the Hague Conference on Private International Law, offers technical 

assistance and guidance. The Department participates in and helps to sponsor judicial seminars on the Convention in party countries across the globe. In the last few 

years alone, the Department has participated in judicial conferences or training in 

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Israel, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Spain. 

The Department has seen how its diplomatic efforts can produce positive results. 

As recently as 2007, for example, Germany was one of the most difficult countries 

from which to recover an abducted child. But active engagement with Germany 

through quarterly bilateral meetings has resulted in consistent and prompt action 

by German courts. Germany has returned 17 children to the United States over the 

past 2 years. 

Intensive cooperation with other Convention countries has also been critical to enhancing our ability to stop abductions before they happen. When the Department 

becomes aware that a parent may be in the process of abducting a child from the 

United States to another country, it works with U.S. law enforcement to stop the 

departure from the United States. Once the abductor is on the way to another country, the Department works with officials in other Convention countries to intercept 

the taking parent, if possible. In 2009, these efforts resulted in the prevention of 

147 abductions from the United States to 61 different countries. 

The Department is engaged in multilateral efforts to obtain better cooperation 

from countries that are not parties to the Convention. In Japan, for instance, our 

ambassador has recently joined his counterparts from Australia, Canada, France, 

Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom in a persistent effort both to 

encourage Japan to recognize foreign custody orders and to adjust its laws so that 

Japan can join the Hague Abduction Convention. The Department will continue and 

increase these efforts with Japan and around the world in the coming months. 

The Department’s abduction staff is expert in the field, speaks 21 different languages, and works closely with embassies and consulates around the world to do 

everything the Department legally can to assist parents in preventing abduction and 

recovering their children. CI has developed resources for left-behind parents that 

are easily accessible, regardless of a parent’s immigration status, English-language 

capability, or financial situation. These include: information on our website at travel.state.gov; a 24-hour toll-free number for parents; lists of attorneys abroad and in 

the United States; a language line for parents who do not speak English; law enforcement liaison; and victim assistance resources. The CI Staff are available to assist 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, worldwide. An improved website focused on 

international child abduction and intensified outreach programs in domestic and 

international fora are contributing to public awareness of both the problem and of 

resources to combat it. 

The Department assisted in the return of 422 children to the United States from 

other countries during fiscal year 2009. During the same period, 132 children were 

returned from the United States to their countries of habitual residence. More detailed information about international parental child abduction cases and the Department’s work to resolve longstanding cases will appear in the Department’s upcoming 2010 Report to Congress on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the 

Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Previous reports can be found online 

at www.travel.state.gov/childabduction. 

Question. Eighty-five years ago, Haiti’s tropical forest covered 60 percent of the 

country. Today, that number has fallen to less than 2 percent. As we work to fight 

global warming, this environmental degradation has serious implications for Haiti 

and the world. What role will environmental issues such as reforestation play in the 

long-term recovery plan for Haiti? 

Answer. Root causes of environmental disaster in Haiti include acute poverty, 

rapid population growth and unplanned urbanization. In the short term, it is critical 

to convert hillsides to tree-based perennial agriculture to improve soil conservation. 

Lessons learned from decades of reforestation programs demonstrate that, if a tree 

has value, a farmer is likely to maintain and manage it; if not, it will likely disappear. Therefore, strengthening tree crop value chains is an approach with proven 

ability to restore degraded landscapes. 

USAID/Haiti’s Watershed Initiative for National Natural Environmental Resources (WINNER) Project, an agricultural and watershed management program, 

applies best practices such as this. WINNER is already active in the Cul-de-Sac watershed where Port-au-Prince is located, as well as the Cabaret, Mirebalais, Archaie 

and Gonaives regions of Haiti. Prior to the January 12, 2010 Haiti earthquake disaster, the United States planned to invest $126 million in the project over the next 

5 years. WINNER is strengthening the value chains for tree crops and focusing on 
54 

tree crops with high value (such as mango) as these are effective incentive to hillside farmers to plant and manage perennial crops. 

In addition to tree crops, the USG strategy in Haiti also includes plans to promote 

cleaner and more efficient cooking technologies, such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG), 

to decrease charcoal consumption and reduce the rate of deforestation and environmental degradation. After completing a rigorous assessment of the potential market 

for improved cooking technologies, the USG will implement a program that will address market barriers such as high upfront costs or lack of awareness and achieve 

large-scale reduction of charcoal consumption over a 5-year period. Beneficiaries are 

likely to include households, food vendors and energy-intensive businesses such as 

laundries and bakeries. 

Finally, a Programmatic Environmental Assessment will be conducted for proposed earthquake reconstruction activities, which will pay close attention to addressing these issues across the mission’s portfolio of projects. 

Question. I applaud President Obama’s immediate rescission of the Mexico City 

Policy, also known as the Global Gag Rule, upon taking office. What impact did the 

previous 8 years of this policy have on women’s health? What impact does uncertainty surrounding this policy have on organizations’ ability to address these critical 

health challenges? 

Answer. During the period in which the Mexico City Policy (MCP) was in place, 

all family planning funds were successfully programmed with an emphasis on the 

countries with the greatest need. This included funds that might have otherwise 

gone to international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that chose not to 

work with USAID while the policy was in place. 

More than 450 foreign NGOs elected to accept assistance subject to the MCP and 

received USAID funding. USAID programs demonstrated continued success during 

this period—shown by an increase in modern family planning use among married 

women from 33 to 39 percent between 2001 and 2008 in 38 countries with USAIDassisted family planning programs which have data over this period. Since the rescission of the MCP, the USG has had the opportunity to reengage with additional 

experienced and qualified family planning providers working at the grassroots level, 

furthering our work to meet the growing demand for voluntary, safe family planning 

and other critical health services. We expect that should this situation change, these 

organizations would reassess their decision to work with USAID. 

Question. Aid programs too frequently focus on one problem and fail to provide 

the integrated approach necessary for successful development. What is the Administration doing to better integrate U.S. development programs on food security, 

health, the environment, and family planning? 

Answer. USAID has made great strides in establishing mechanisms to ensure that 

its development activities are undertaken within the framework of a comprehensive 

and integrated development approach, which employs strategic multi-sector 

synergies for improving performance and producing greater results. For example, 

the Agency’s new USG Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative (GHFSI) is 

multi-disciplinary and being developed and undertaken with a cross-cutting sector 

approach that includes the direct participation of development experts from a wide 

variety of sectors—including agriculture, environment, nutrition, maternal and child 

health, education, infrastructure, gender, and family planning and reproductive 

health. Similarly, one of the principles of President Obama’s new Global Health Initiative (GHI) is integration with other sectors to ensure a cross-cutting sector approach that will benefit from the development linkages within USAID and across 

the USG. In addition, USAID’s Global Climate Change Agency Policy Coordinating 

Committee (APCC) is working closely with the GHFSI APCC, the GHI Interagency 

Team and the Agency’s Extended Water Team to identify integrated approaches to 

the four programs. Designed to address the unique settings of each development and 

humanitarian challenge, this comprehensive integrated management structure 

strengthens USAID’s development efforts, and particularly, the Agency’s new initiatives both in Washington and the field. 

Under the GHI and in the Agency approach generally, USAID is engaging in 

smart integration to maximize gains from development funds. Using an increasingly 

integrated and coordinated approach, several principles derived from experience 

serve as a guide. These principles focus on: 

—Country-led coordination and strategic decisionmaking on integration of services 

is required for the sustainability of development; 

—All partners—public and private—are important in maximizing achievement of 

outcomes in limited resource settings; 

—Integration of U.S. programs must be based on specific country circumstances; 
55 

—Integration and coordination have a cost—they add a level of complexity and 

administrative burden to programs that must be weighed against the urgency 

of rapid results; 

—Resources are required to research, monitor and evaluate the expected causal 

relationship between increased integration and outcomes; 

—In order to build country capacity for integration, systems and structures (such 

as the health system) should be a deliberate focus of U.S. assistance with documentation on the impact on outcomes; and 

—Critical assessment of other multilateral and bilateral investments and increased coordination will be essential to the achievement of ultimate success. 

Question. I was pleased to see the increase in funding for the Clean Technology 

Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. How will these two programs address the national security threats caused by global warming? 

Answer. Climate change poses a significant threat to the national security of nations around the globe. Variations in weather patterns caused by rising temperatures threaten to create dangerous changes in the climate system, increasing floods 

and droughts, altering natural resource availability, and creating conditions likely 

to cause regional conflict and destabilize security situations throughout the world. 

Given the urgency of the climate challenge and the threats it poses to national security, it is essential to be able to mobilize and disburse climate assistance quickly 

and effectively. The CIFs, which were launched just 2 years ago as a partnership 

of developed and developing countries, are doing just that. 

The Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund (together, the Climate Investment Funds or ‘‘CIFs’’) have become an essential pillar of the international community’s effort to mobilize funding to help developing countries mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change. With 

$6.3 billion pledged so far, the CIFs constitute the largest multilateral fund dedicated to climate assistance. Funds mobilized under the CIFs are being utilized to 

help those countries which are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change increase their resilience and capacity to adapt to its effects which will in turn reduce 

national security concerns caused by effects like changes in natural resource availability. Those funds mobilized to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions are working to 

directly address climate change by limiting the increase in temperature rise and reducing the source of the problem which poses such extensive national security concerns throughout the world. 

Question. As you have stated, the Middle East Peace process has effectively 

stalled. How do you plan to reestablish the trust of the parties and move the peace 

process forward? 

Answer. We are pursuing a two-pronged approach toward comprehensive peace 

based on the two-state solution: first, to encourage the parties to enter direct negotiations to reach an agreement on all permanent status issues; and second, to help 

the Palestinians build their economy and the institutions that will be necessary 

when a Palestinian state is established. The two objectives are mutually reinforcing. 

Our goal is to re-launch direct, bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians as soon as possible with a 24-month timeline for their successful conclusion. We expect that all concerned will demonstrate the leadership to make bold 

commitments and take bold actions to make peace possible. 

Question. We saw with the Sean Goldman case that international parental abduction is a major problem. Although we were able to secure a positive outcome in that 

case with your help, many other parents are still struggling to bring their children 

home and it is clear that the current system falls short. What are you doing to improve the Department’s ability to locate and help safely return American children 

who are victims of international parental abduction? 

Answer. The Department has designated the Office of Children’s Issues (CI) in the 

Bureau of Consular Affairs as the U.S. Central Authority for the Hague Convention 

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Abduction Convention) 

and to work with parents and our posts abroad on cases of international parental 

abduction to countries that are not Hague partners. CI works to reunite parents 

with abducted children and has expanded in size as the number of international parental child abductions has grown. In the last year alone, the Department has hired 

21 new employees in the Office of Children’s Issues to work exclusively on abduction 

cases, bringing total staff for the issue of abduction to over 70 employees spread 

among five issue-specific and geographic branches. In addition, the management 

structure of CI has been expanded and a number of new higher-graded positions 

have been introduced. The CI Director is a member of the Senior Foreign Service. 

A Senior Advisor will also be added to provide senior management with analysis 

and policy recommendations. Additionally, in the fall of 2009, CI added a Diplomatic 

Security officer to its staff to strengthen its cooperation with law enforcement au-
56 

thorities. These additional resources will enable CI to continue to broaden its prevention-related activities, improve its ability to locate abducted children abroad, ensure consistently high levels of service among case workers, improve training, and 

carry out more vigorous bilateral and multilateral engagement with countries that 

are parties to the Hague Abduction Convention, and those that are not. 

These bilateral and multilateral efforts are critical to resolving cases of international parental child abduction. As the Goldman case with Brazil demonstrated, 

complying with the Hague Abduction Convention and returning children remains an 

ongoing challenge for some countries. When countries fail to comply with the Hague 

Abduction Convention, the Department, in coordination with other treaty party 

countries and the Hague Conference on Private International Law, offers technical 

assistance and guidance. The Department participates in and helps to sponsor judicial seminars on the Convention in party countries across the globe. In the last few 

years alone, the Department has participated in judicial conferences or training in 

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, France, Israel, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Spain. 

The Department has seen how its diplomatic efforts can produce positive results. 

As recently as 2007, for example, Germany was one of the most difficult countries 

from which to recover an abducted child. But active engagement with Germany 

through quarterly bilateral meetings has resulted in consistent and prompt action 

by German courts. Germany has returned 17 children to the United States over the 

past 2 years. 

Intensive cooperation with other Convention countries has also been critical to enhancing our ability to stop abductions before they happen. When the Department 

becomes aware that a parent may be in the process of abducting a child from the 

United States to another country, it works with U.S. law enforcement to stop the 

departure from the United States. Once the abductor is on the way to another country, the Department works with officials in other Convention countries to intercept 

the taking parent, if possible. In 2009, these efforts resulted in the prevention of 

147 abductions from the United States to 61 different countries. 

The Department is engaged in multilateral efforts to obtain better cooperation 

from countries that are not parties to the Convention. In Japan, for instance, our 

ambassador has recently joined his counterparts from Australia, Canada, France, 

Italy, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom in a persistent effort both to 

encourage Japan to recognize foreign custody orders and to adjust its laws so that 

Japan can join the Hague Abduction Convention. The Department will continue and 

increase these efforts with Japan and around the world in the coming months. 

The Department’s abduction staff is expert in the field, speaks 21 different languages, and works closely with embassies and consulates around the world to do 

everything the Department legally can to assist parents in preventing abduction and 

recovering their children. CI has developed resources for left-behind parents that 

are easily accessible, regardless of a parent’s immigration status, English-language 

capability, or financial situation. These include: information on our website at travel.state.gov; a 24-hour toll-free number for parents; lists of attorneys abroad and in 

the United States; a language line for parents who do not speak English; law enforcement liaison; and victim assistance resources. The CI Staff are available to assist 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, worldwide. An improved website focused on 

international child abduction and intensified outreach programs in domestic and 

international fora are contributing to public awareness of both the problem and of 

resources to combat it. 

The Department assisted in the return of 422 children to the United States from 

other countries during fiscal year 2009. During the same period, 132 children were 

returned from the United States to their countries of habitual residence. More detailed information about international parental child abduction cases and the Department’s work to resolve longstanding cases will appear in the Department’s upcoming 2010 Report to Congress on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the 

Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Previous reports can be found online 

at www.travel.state.gov/childabduction. 

Question. According to the Justice Department, Teodoro Nguema Obiang, the forest and agriculture minister of Equatorial Guinea and the son of its president, has 

accumulated most if not all of his wealth through corruption while the people of 

Equatorial Guinea live in severe poverty. Nonetheless, Mr. Obiang has been granted 

multiple visas to enter the United States in violation of U.S. law and reportedly purchased a $35 million home in Malibu. Why has Mr. Obiang continued to receive 

visas despite U.S. anti-kleptocracy laws? What are you doing to enforce those laws 

and commitments? 

Answer. The Department of State is committed to combating kleptocracy and corruption internationally and to use Presidential Proclamation 7750 and other provi-
57 

sions to deny entry to corrupt foreign government officials. We are aware of the concerns you raise and of ongoing congressional interest in Mr. Obiang. Under Section 

222(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act visa records are considered confidential, and therefore I cannot comment on any individual case. The Department would 

be happy to share such relevant information in a closed setting. 

Combating corruption is a foreign policy priority for the Department. We coordinate and cooperate with other Departments to foster a comprehensive approach including by law enforcement and other agencies. In our overall international 

anticrime strategy we recognize the central role of corruption, as the ‘‘grease’’ that 

facilitates virtually all transnational illicit activities, from drug trafficking to terrorist financing. We take the role of Presidential Proclamation 7750, which allows 

for denial and revocation of corruption foreign government officials and their families, very seriously. However, it is only one part of our Anti-Corruption Policy 

Framework. 

The United States has been a leader on anticorruption issues globally: 

—With the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, the United 

States was the first country to criminalize foreign bribery. 

—In 1999 the USG developed and launched the premier government-to-government event, the Global Forum, the first-ever international conference on corruption and how to combat it. 

—The first multilateral enunciation of the No Safe Haven policy for kleptocrats 

and their ill-gotten assets occurred at Evian in 2003. Each G–8 summit since 

then has sought to deepen political commitment and foster concrete action. The 

G–20 has also undertaken similar anticorruption commitments. 

—The U.S. International Anti-Kleptocracy Strategy was promulgated in 2006, in 

part to spur greater interagency cooperation in taking concrete action against 

kleptocrats and their assets. 

—Denial and revocation of the visas of kleptocrats continues to play an important 

role in both of the preceding initiatives. 

—The United States supported the negotiation and implementation of the United 

Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which entered into force in 

December 2005, and was ratified by the Senate in 2006. It now has 143 States 

Parties. 

—The United States supported the UNCAC as the first truly global anticorruption 

treaty and the most comprehensive anticorruption instrument. It has chapters 

on criminalization and law enforcement, prevention, recovery of stolen assets, 

international legal cooperation, and technical assistance. In November 2009, the 

United States helped lead its Conference of Parties to establish a comprehensive review mechanism, a significant and rare accomplishment for a United Nations instrument. 

—Another key treaty is the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The United States 

was a leader in the OECD’s push to tackle foreign bribery. The OECD Convention has many similarities with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 

and targets the supply side of the corruption equation. The United States is an 

active participant in the treaty’s peer review process and the Working Group 

on Bribery. 

—The United States also supports and participates in regional treaties or initiatives in the Americas (Inter-American Convention), Western and Eastern Europe (Council of Europe/GRECO), Middle East/North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. These are useful to bring together countries to press each other on 

progress and to share good practices. 

—The USG is one of the largest donors of technical assistance in anticorruption 

and good governance. In fiscal year 2009, the Department of State and USAID 

provided a total of over $1 billion in anticorruption and related good governance 

assistance. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL

Question. Last September, Secretary Clinton announced the administration’s new 

strategy of engagement with the Burmese regime. We are now 6 months into the 

new strategy, what tangible benefits have come about as a result of the new approach? Has the denial of Aung San Suu Kyi’s appeal led to a reevaluation of the 

engagement policy? 

Answer. Last year the Administration launched a review of Burma policy, acknowledging that neither sanctions nor engagement alone had succeeded in influencing Burma’s generals to adopt a course of reform. The conclusions of the policy 

review reaffirmed our fundamental goals in Burma. We want a democratic, pros-
58 

perous Burma that respects the rights of its people. To achieve that end, the administration decided to engage Burmese authorities in a senior-level dialogue while 

maintaining the existing sanctions regime and expanding humanitarian assistance. 

We understood at the outset that this process would be long and difficult, in particular given the regime’s focus on this year’s planned elections. We have not yet 

achieved concrete progress on our core concerns and with respect to the electoral 

process, the regime has taken a step backwards. However, our new approach has 

helped advance the interests of the United States, both in Burma and in the wider 

region. Through our senior-level dialogue, we have been able to get our message in 

directly to senior leaders in Nay Pyi Taw and we have had been able to meet with 

imprisoned democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the first time in years. The 

channels of communication we developed through our dialogue were instrumental 

in securing the release of Kyaw Zaw Lwin (aka Nyi Nyi Aung), a U.S. citizen imprisoned on politically motivated charges. More broadly, our outreach to Burma and 

our determination not to allow Burma to be an obstacle to a strong U.S.-ASEAN 

relationship has strengthened the position of the United States in Southeast Asia. 

We were able to hold the first ever meeting between the United States and ASEAN 

at the leaders’ level and to sign on to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. 

We continue to monitor and evaluate events in Burma carefully and have and will 

continue to adjust our strategy as necessary to advance our policy goals. 

Question. What is the Department of State’s understanding of Burmese nuclear 

capabilities and ambitions? 

Answer. We closely follow Burma’s pursuit of nuclear technology, ostensibly for 

peaceful scientific applications, as well as reports that Burma is pursuing a clandestine nuclear program. 

Burma joined the IAEA in 1957, acceded to the NPT in 1992, and signed a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in 1995. Burma is also a Party to the 1995 Treaty 

of Bangkok that established the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In 

1997, Burma established a Department of Atomic Energy and in 1998 passed an 

Atomic Energy Law. The IAEA provides training to Burmese nuclear researchers 

through a number of Technical Cooperation projects, most involving nuclear applications in medical research, food, and agriculture. 

After several years of bilateral discussions between Burma and Russia, Moscow 

agreed in 2007 to provide a small pool-type research reactor to Burma, conditioned 

on the reactor being under IAEA safeguards. While there has been little or no movement on implementing this agreement, Burmese students have been studying nuclear science at several Russian universities and institutes for several years. 

It is incumbent on Burma, as a signatory to the NPT and the Bangkok Treaty 

and as a member of the IAEA, to be transparent in all its nuclear undertakings and 

live up to its international obligations. In addition, we urge Burma to modify its 

Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) with the IAEA and implement the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. 

Question. Please characterize the relationship between North Korea and Burma. 

Answer. Burma and North Korea have clearly both been subject to substantial 

international scrutiny for numerous aspects of their behavior, including disregard 

for human rights and for international standards on nonproliferation. We are concerned, in particular, about the military relationship between North Korea and 

Burma. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874 requires all member 

states to prohibit the procurement by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels 

or aircraft, of conventional arms and related materiel, nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, and other WMD-related items from North Korea. The UNSCRs also 

prohibit any associated technical, training, advice, services, or assistance. The Burmese government has publicly committed to enforcing UNSCR 1874 fully and transparently, and we have reminded the Burmese of their obligations under both 

UNSCRs 1718 and 1874. We have encouraged all states, including Burma, to be 

vigilant and transparent in their dealings with North Korea. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Question. Does the Administration support any conditionality on FMF assistance 

for Indonesia? 

Answer. Indonesia is the world’s third-largest democracy. Over the last decade, 

it has undergone a democratic transformation to become a stable and peaceful nation. It is committed to democratic reform and has become an ally in promoting democracy and human rights in the region, including through the Association of 

Southeast Asian Nations. As part of its transformation, the Indonesian government 

has taken significant steps to reform its military, emphasizing respect for human 
59 

rights, and generally maintained effective civilian control of the military. Indonesia 

is also an important partner of the USG on a broad range of issues, including combating terrorism and addressing maritime security threats in the region. The Department supports Indonesia’s efforts to address these security-related areas that 

are of mutual concern to both our countries, including by providing FMF assistance. 

Given Indonesia’s progress in promoting and protecting human rights and our 

close collaboration on security issues, we believe FMF assistance to Indonesia is 

warranted without conditionality. 

Question. Can you describe for us the role our International Affairs programs play 

in helping spur economic growth here at home and creating American jobs? How 

do these programs help U.S. businesses and entrepreneurs to remain competitive in 

the global market place? 

Answer. The State Department supports the efforts of U.S. companies and farmers to expand their business through exports. As flourishing international trade requires at least two parties, our efforts support U.S. businesses wishing to export and 

also help our trading partners develop so that those countries will have a healthy 

demand for those exports. The Department promotes U.S. exports by providing advocacy on behalf of U.S. companies, urging enforcement of intellectual property 

rights, and helping to develop high-potential overseas markets. State Department 

officers manage the commercial function at 96 U.S. missions worldwide that have 

no U.S. Commercial Service presence. State Department officers also provide vital 

political and economic insight to U.S. companies about foreign countries. U.S. Embassies and Consulates are key advocates for U.S. business overseas. Embassies can 

offer U.S. exporters critical country-specific insight on markets, assist in commercial 

and investment disputes, and provide expertise on local judicial systems. Our advocacy efforts are to ensure that exporters of U.S. goods and services get fair and equitable treatment in foreign markets. 

On the other side of the trade equation, State and USAID foreign assistance programs help developing country economies grow, resulting in increased demand for 

U.S. goods and services over time. More directly, some U.S. Trade Capacity Building 

(TCB) programs help countries streamline customs and other import administration 

procedures and improve trade-related infrastructure, thereby lowering the cost of 

U.S. products in those markets and opening up new export and job opportunities 

for U.S. suppliers. Other TCB programs help countries comply with their trade commitments under bilateral Free Trade Area agreements and the World Trade Organization, such as their commitments to ensure that agriculture and food safety standards are based on sound science. 

Question. I note with concern that funding overall for Southeast Asia took a $22 

million cut below the fiscal year 2010 enacted level. Can you provide me with an 

overview of where some of these cuts were made and why a reduction in overall 

funding? 

Answer. The United States must have strong relationships and a strong and productive presence in Southeast Asia. This region is vital to the future of not only the 

United States and each of the ASEAN countries, but to the world’s common interests: a significant and trade-oriented regional economy; a critical strategic location; 

and a set of countries that will be key to any solutions we pursue on climate change, 

counterterrorism, global health, and so much else. Our fiscal year 2011 request for 

Southeast Asia increased by $65 million (11.2 percent) over our fiscal year 2010 request. While there are always more assistance needs in the region than we are able 

to fund, given current budget realities, this increase strongly reflects the importance 

of Southeast Asia to the Administration. Not all regions in the Department experienced an increase, or even a straight-line; some were reduced from the fiscal year 

2010 request level. The Department faces difficult choices in allocating limited foreign assistance funding, and the ability to fund Frontline States necessarily requires 

trade-offs in funding in other regions, including Southeast Asia. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Question. The French government has recently announced its plans to sell several 

Mistral-class helicopter carriers to Russia and a French company is reportedly negotiating to sell tanks as well. A Russian admiral, Vladimir Vysotsky, stated recently 

that if Russia had had a Mistral ship during the Georgia war in 2008 it could have 

won the conflict in 40 minutes. Baltic States such as Estonia are furious over the 

ship sale and it is a direct threat to Georgia and our national interests, as well as 

our billion dollars in rebuilding assistance. Do you share the concerns raised by our 

NATO allies? Most importantly, does the sale violate the Wassenaar Arrangement 
60 

on Export Controls as well as the European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports? 

Answer. We understand that reports of this potential sale have raised concerns 

among some of Russia’s neighbors. Inflammatory comments from a senior Russian 

military officer added to this anxiety. We would urge all parties to focus on efforts 

to promote stability in the region and avoid actions that could escalate tensions. I 

made these points when I met with President Sarkozy in January. 

Export control decisions in the Wassenaar Arrangement are left to national discretion. The European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports, to which the 

United States is not a party, sets criteria under which EU countries are obligated 

to assess arms export licenses. Implementation is an internal matter for each EU 

party. 

Question. As of today, Russia is continuing to build military bases and station 

elite troops in regions of Georgia not under the Georgian government’s control. 

What concerns does the United States have toward the sale of advanced weapons 

to Russia that could be used in a future conflict against Georgia or a NATO ally? 

Answer. The United States supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 

within its internationally recognized borders. We are concerned about recent Russian announcements to introduce additional military facilities and troops into the 

Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We would regard such actions to 

be in violation of the August and September 2008 ceasefire agreements and the 

principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and host nation consent for the stationing of foreign forces. We support the ongoing Geneva talks, which established 

the Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms (IPRMs) to increase communication and transparency among the parties to the conflict and decrease the escalation 

of tension along the ceasefire lines. We continue to emphasize the importance of restarting the South Ossetian IPRM. 

Russia’s possible procurement of a French Mistral-class helicopter carrier has 

raised concerns among some of Russia’s neighbors. While we recognize that arms 

sales are a sovereign decision for individual countries to make in keeping with international law and treaty obligations, we continue to follow these developments closely, and we urge all parties to focus on efforts to promote stability in the region and 

avoid actions that could escalate tensions. These points have been raised at highlevels with the French government. 

Question. A recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee report determined that 

the United States should move forward and rearm the Georgian government with 

the weapons it needs to defend its territory. Do you support this step? If not, why? 

If so, when will the United States begin the sale of arms to an ally that is deploying 

1,000 troops to Afghanistan? 

Answer. The Administration remains committed to supporting Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Our security assistance and military engagement 

with Georgia is focused on rebuilding Georgia’s defense and security architecture. 

This approach is consistent with Georgia’s objectives in its NATO Annual National 

Program. It also helps Georgia advance toward NATO membership by supporting 

Georgian defense modernization and reform and improving Georgia’s ability to contribute to international security operations. Our focus in the near term is enhancing 

self-defense capabilities through an emphasis on doctrine, personnel management, 

education, and training. 

Additionally, the United States is assisting the Georgian Armed Forces by training and equipping four infantry battalions for successive deployment to Afghanistan, 

around twice a year for 2 years. Georgian forces will sustain this rotation without 

caveats, and will fight alongside the U.S. Marines as part of NATO’s International 

Security Assistance Force in Regional Command—South, Helmand Province, to conduct distributed operations in a counter-insurgency environment. The first Georgian 

battalion of approximately 750 troops began training September 1, 2009 and will deploy to Afghanistan in April for six months. Three follow-on battalions will be 

trained and deployed to Afghanistan in 7-month rotations. 

Question. In a letter exchange between Secretary Clinton and Senators Feingold, 

Brownback, and Durbin, the State Department stated that it had begun mapping 

the mineral rich zones controlled by armed militias in the Congo. When will this 

map be made available to the public and/or Members of Congress? The letter also 

indicated that the State Department is considering additional efforts to address conflict minerals in the Congo. What are these ‘‘additional efforts’’ that the State Department is exploring to address conflict minerals in the Congo? 

Answer. The map of mineral-rich zones and armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which was mandated in Public Law 111–84, will be made 

available to the appropriate congressional committees and the public shortly. 
61 

In terms of additional efforts, we plan to strengthen our public diplomacy to draw 

attention to the conflict minerals challenge; to enhance diplomatic outreach with the 

DRC, in the region and with countries in the supply chain; to intensify engagement 

with the private sector to discourage illegal minerals trade; to continue examining 

and further expand reporting on the link between illegal exploitation of natural resources, corruption, and human rights abuses in the State Department’s annual 

human rights report on the DRC; and to contribute to the work of the United Nations Security Council’s Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Committee’s 

Group of Experts (UNSC DRC Group of Experts) on due diligence guidelines for importers, processing industries and consumers of mineral products. 

Question. What are the current programs within both the State Department and 

USAID to improve the livelihood prospects of communities affected by human rights 

abuses in eastern Congo, particularly victims of sexual and gender based violence? 

Answer. USAID social protection programs in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo (DRC) include economic strengthening activities for survivors of sexual and 

gender-based violence and their families. Economic assistance is also provided to 

other highly vulnerable women. Current programs include: —Program for Psychosocial Support and Reintegration of Survivors of Sexual and 

Gender-Based Violence in Eastern DRC.—Implemented by Cooperazione 

Internazionale (COOPI), operating in Ituri District, Orientale Province and 

Maniema Province, funded at $4,945,045 (December 15, 2008, to December 14, 

2011). COOPI and its local partners are providing medical, psychosocial, socioeconomic, and legal support to 24,000 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. Through this project, 4,000 survivors benefit from income generating activities each year through self-help groups and women’s NGOs. —ESPOIR: Ending Sexual Violence by Promoting Opportunities and Individual 

Rights.—Implemented by International Rescue Committee, operating in North and South Kivu Provinces, funded at $7,000,000 (September 17, 2009, to September 30, 2012). IRC and its local partners are providing medical, psychosocial, socio-economic, and legal support to 14,500 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence. IRC’s sub-grant to Women-for-Women International is supporting more than 6,000 women in income-generating activities and vocational 

training. —Program for Assistance and Reintegration of Abducted Girls and Boys and Other 

Gender-based Violence Survivors.—In partnership with UNICEF (COOPI is the 

implementing partner), operating in Ituri District, Orientale Province, funded 

at $1,511,644 (July 20, 2006, to December 31, 2009). This program assists girls 

and boys formerly associated with armed groups, many of whom are affected 

by sexual and gender-based violence, with social and economic reintegration. 

Community-based reintegration includes returning to school and engaging in income-generating cooperatives for vulnerable children (children who have been 

separated directly from armed groups, as well as children who encounter challenges in reintegrating with their families, particularly girls and girl mothers). 

—USAID Food for Peace programs in the DRC provide livelihood assistance to 

displaced and other highly vulnerable people in North and South Kivu, areas 

most affected by insecurity, human rights abuses, and sexual and gender-based 

violence. Development food aid programs support individuals and small farmers’ 

associations to increase agricultural productivity through training and food-forwork programs. 

—USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance programs support livelihood 

activities for vulnerable individuals in eastern DRC. In fiscal year 2009, 

USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance provided $33 million for agriculture and food security, economic recovery and market systems, humanitarian coordination and information management, health, logistics and relief 

commodities, nutrition, protection, shelter and settlements, and water and sanitation programs. 

—The Department of State Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration provided 

more than $45 million in fiscal year 2009 for humanitarian programs for refugees and internally displaced persons from and in DRC. Funding includes programs for agriculture and food security, education, emergency food assistance, 

health, protection for refugees and internally displaced persons, livelihoods, psychosocial services, refugee integration, sexual and gender-based violence protection and response, shelter, and water and sanitation programs. 

Question. What resources, including personnel, are dedicated both within the 

State Department and USAID to the issue of conflict minerals in the Congo? 

Answer. The United States dedicates significant financial and personnel resources 

to address illicit mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. We have supported incorporation of the mining issue into the mandates of both the U.N. Mission 
62 

in the Congo (MONUC) and the U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC. Through 

USAID, we support livelihoods programs for Congolese artisanal miners who are the 

great majority of miners nationwide. Through the U.S. Department of Labor, we 

fund programs to remove child laborers from the mines and enroll them in school. 

Embassy Kinshasa is working with the DRC Ministry of Mines to support the implementation of the country’s 2002 Mining Code, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is training Congolese border and customs police 

in interdiction techniques. 

Question. Please explain the decrease in the State Department’s budget request 

for peacekeeping operations in Sudan, an account that among other things is used 

to professionalize the SPLM and provide communications and other equipment for 

the military. 

Answer. The State Department’s $42 million budget request for non-assessed 

peacekeeping operations in Sudan is the same in fiscal year 2011 as it was in fiscal 

year 2010. Congress appropriated $44 million, $2 million more than the Administration’s request, for voluntary peacekeeping operations in Sudan in fiscal year 2010. 

At this time, the request of $42 million will be sufficient to advance the Department’s fiscal year 2011 programs for supporting the Government of Southern Sudan’s (GoSS) goals and objectives to transform its military, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), into a professional military body. 

Question. Can the United States include radar for the SPLM capable of detecting 

aerial attack within its peacekeeping operations budget request or as part of another State Department funding vehicle? 

Answer. Section 7070(f)(5) of the fiscal year 2010 Department of State, Foreign 

Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act authorizes the provision of 

‘‘non-lethal military assistance, military education and training, and defense services controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations’’ to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), provided that the Secretary of State provides Congress 15-days advance notice of her determination that the provision of such items 

is in the U.S. national interest. Deputy Secretary Steinberg made this determination on February 3, 2010, with respect to fiscal year 2010 funds. As a general matter, a radar system would be considered non-lethal assistance, although the exact 

configuration of radar and its integration into a weapons system could change this 

conclusion. 

Currently, the priority use of peacekeeping operations (PKO) funds supporting the 

development of the SPLA is as outlined in the fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 

congressional budget justifications—namely the transformation of the SPLA into a 

professional military—and does not include providing a radar system to the SPLA. 

Question. What resources, including personnel, is the State Department employing to monitor and report on human rights conditions throughout Sudan? 

Answer. The human rights situation in Sudan is poor, and human rights abuses 

continue to be wide-ranging. The Obama Administration is committed to improving 

the situation. 

The State Department monitors human rights abuses through a collaborative 

process that involves personnel both in the field, including at Embassy Khartoum 

and Consulate Juba, and in the United States. Our staff has regular contact with 

human rights activists, victims of abuse, and non-governmental organizations in 

Sudan. Special Envoy Gration also travels extensively in Sudan, and he regularly 

raises human rights issues with his high-level counterparts in Khartoum and in 

Southern Sudan. Finally, United States Government (USG) personnel based in 

Washington, DC, meet regularly with a variety of Sudanese diaspora, civil society, 

and advocacy groups to discuss human rights issues. We place a high value on these 

discussions, and we work to ensure that we follow-up on the information and concerns presented to us by these constituencies. 

The USG, through the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

and Labor, issues Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the International Religious Freedom Report. The Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat 

Trafficking in Persons issues the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Taken together, these reports provide detailed information on human rights issues in Sudan. 

The State Department also continuously collaborates with the United Nations on its 

efforts to monitor the human rights situation. We have successfully worked to ensure that the U.N. Human Rights Council maintains a reporting and monitoring 

mechanism focused on Sudan, through the establishment of the independent expert 

on the situation of human rights in Sudan. We also continue to closely follow the 

work of the U.N. Panel of Experts on Sudan. 

Question. As we’ve seen in Darfur, many non-Arab Sudanese Muslims have longstanding grievances against the central government in Khartoum that can lead to 
63 

conflict. What is the State Department doing to help prevent new crises among 

marginalized peoples and regions in Sudan? 

Answer. The United States government (USG) has a long standing commitment 

to the people of Sudan. The central Sudanese government in Khartoum has 

marginalized many groups of non-Arab Muslims throughout various regions within 

Sudan, and we have long been greatly concerned about the marginalization of these 

populations. We continue to pursue policies and implement programs that will help 

to mitigate the effects of marginalization by the government and promote 

peacebuilding and conflict resolution within marginalized communities. Additionally, the USG continues to work tirelessly to achieve the goals of the Sudan Strategy, including full implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 

that ended the North-South civil war and a definitive end to violence, gross human 

rights abuses, and genocide in the Darfur region. 

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, the people of Sudan have made progress in developing a stable political environment where 

residents can work and live without the overt threat of violence. However, parts of 

Darfur, Southern Sudan, the Three Areas and Eastern Sudan remain volatile and 

are flashpoints for destabilization. The U.S. Government is working with international partners to support Sudanese communities to prevent or moderate conflict 

in these flashpoints so that problems do not escalate and interfere with Sudan’s 

higher political processes. The State Department and USAID will implement complementary programs. USAID efforts focus primarily on supporting state and local 

governments, organizations, and communities to manage conflict, to provide economic alternatives to raiding and banditry, and to implement reconciliation processes important to a sustainable peace in Sudan. State Department activities focus 

primarily on building state and local capacity to stabilize the security and political 

situation. 

Question. Revenue-sharing from the oil sector is a key element of the CPA. What 

is the State Department doing to ensure Khartoum lives up to its promises to share 

oil revenues with the South? 

Answer. Over the course of 2009, the United States Government (USG) brought 

together the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 

Movement (SPLM) to address outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 

implementation issues, including issues related to the sharing of oil revenues. Due 

to this U.S.-led Trilateral initiative, the two parties signed 10 Points of Agreement 

in August 2009, one of which was devoted to wealth-sharing and oil revenue. Following this agreement, the Government of National Unity (GoNU) returned approximately $52 million to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), a sum that was 

incorrectly deducted from monthly oil revenue transfers to finance election activities. While in the past, GoNU payments to the GoSS had been late or partial, as 

of December 2009, the parties broadly agreed that the GoNU shall transfer the full 

oil revenue amount allotted to the GoSS. As a result, all agreed-upon arrears have 

been paid to the GoSS by the GoNU. 

During the Trilateral Process, the two parties also agreed to an independent audit 

of the oil sector, to determine whether the payments made to the GoSS represented 

the full amount due under the CPA. While progress has been slow in obtaining approval from relevant government bodies for the audit to move forward, it is hoped 

that the audit can proceed after the formation of new national and regional governments in the wake of April’s elections. 

Question. What is the State Department doing to persuade Khartoum’s economic 

partners, particularly those with major investments in the oil sector such as China, 

India, and Malaysia, to use their influence to encourage Khartoum to implement the 

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) fully and to avoid the resumption of a destructive, and economically disruptive, North-South civil war? 

Answer. A key part of the U.S. Sudan strategy is reinvigorating and strengthening international attention to outstanding Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 

implementation issues. The United States Government (USG) continues to work 

with all international stakeholders to bring attention to remaining CPA issues such 

as demarcation of the North/South border and appointment of commissions for the 

Southern Sudan and Abyei referenda. Central to this is the promotion of sustainable 

economic development and stability in both Northern and Southern Sudan. This is 

an area in which China, other major investors in Sudan, and the United States have 

the same objectives. We continue to urge all countries, especially those with key interests in the oil sector, to advocate for continued attention to this matter as a central part of CPA implementation. U.S. officials discuss these issues regularly with 

their foreign counterparts. Additionally, we are engaging with all international 

stakeholders to coordinate international support for negotiations on post-referendum 
64 

arrangements, an important component of which will be oil sector development and 

continued North/South oil revenue sharing. 

Question. The State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom has 

been without an Ambassador for International Religious Freedom for over a year. 

Given both President Obama’s remarks in Turkey and Egypt and Secretary Clinton’s remarks in Qatar regarding the importance of addressing religious freedom, 

when can we expect someone to be nominated for this post? 

Answer. A candidate for the position of Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom has been identified and is in the vetting process. We look forward 

to the announcement from the White House. 

International Religious Freedom remains a top focus for both the President and 

the Secretary of State. The Office of International Religious Freedom continues to 

pursue a robust agenda of monitoring and promoting religious freedom under the 

leadership of a Senior Foreign Service Officer. Religious Freedom issues are regularly raised by the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor, Michael Posner, as well as other State Department principals. 

Question. There continues to be severe and ongoing religious freedom violations 

in Vietnam, including the active suppression of independent religious activity and 

the detention and arrest of members of particular religious organizations for their 

religious freedom advocacy. As the State Department makes Country of Particular 

Concern (CPC) designations under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) 

this year, what criteria, specific to Vietnam, will be used to determine whether Vietnam will be re-designated a CPC? 

Answer. The State Department applies the statutory standard found in IRFA Sec. 

(3)(11) to determine whether a country should be designated a CPC, and will consider CPC designations, as warranted, for all countries found to be, in the words 

of the Act, committing ‘‘systematic, ongoing, egregious violations’’ of religious freedom. 

We are concerned about a number of religious freedom violations in Vietnam, including treatment during the past year of Buddhist monks and nuns of the Plum 

Village Order who were evicted from two pagodas, as well as the use of force against 

Roman Catholics in property restitution disputes. We are also watching closely 

whether the Government of Vietnam will fulfill its commitment to register more religious congregations. 

After being designated a CPC in 2004, Vietnam addressed its most serious violations (religious prisoners, church closings, forced renunciations, and the lack of a 

transparent registration system) and instituted policies and practices to protect religious freedom. The State Department removed Vietnam from the list in 2006 because it no longer fit the criteria of a CPC under the IRFA. Each year, we carefully 

monitor the status of religious freedom in Vietnam and reevaluate whether it merits 

designation as a CPC. We will report on further developments in Vietnam in our 

next International Religious Freedom Report, due in September. 

Question. Secretary of State Clinton has publicly spoken about the importance of 

freedom of worship. Is the Administration prioritizing the freedom of worship as a 

matter of diplomacy and if so, in what way? Does the Administration see any distinction between freedom of religion, as defined by international standards such as 

the ICCPR, and freedom to practice or worship? 

Answer. International religious freedom remains a central component to our promotion of human rights around the world. Promoting all aspects of freedom of religious belief and expression remains a high priority in our diplomatic efforts, as reflected in President Obama’s Cairo speech in June, where he emphasized that ‘‘freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together.’’ In meetings with 

government leaders around the world, State Department officials consistently raise 

concerns regarding violations of religious freedom, and the annual International Religious Freedom Report is an important tool in that effort. 

As a matter of international human rights law, there is a difference between the 

terms ‘‘freedom of religion’’ and ‘‘freedom of worship,’’ and one encompasses the 

other. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights describes the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as including freedom 

to manifest one’s religion or belief ‘‘in worship, observance, practice and teaching.’’ 

Freedom of worship is a component of the broader freedom of religion. As an informal matter, the terms ‘‘freedom of religion’’ and ‘‘freedom of worship’’ have often 

been used interchangeably through U.S. history, including in this Administration. 

Question. International NGOs continue to report on periodic violent attacks 

against Burmese Rohingya refugees in Thailand and Bangladesh. What resources 

are the State Department and USAID employing to offer assistance to the Rohingya 

refugees? How is the State Department engaging the governments of Thailand and 

Bangladesh regarding the protection of Rohingya refugees? 
65 

Answer. We are closely following the situation of Burmese Rohingya refugees and 

asylum seekers in Bangladesh, Thailand and elsewhere in the region. The State Department and USAID are very concerned by credible reports of a growing humanitarian crisis among the unregistered Rohingya population residing outside of 

Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh and the increased numbers of arrests and 

push-backs to Burma at the border. We are urging the Royal Thai Government to 

provide assistance to Rohingya ‘‘boat people’’ distressed at sea who are encountered 

in international waters near Thailand or within Thai waters, in accordance with 

international maritime law and practice. In fiscal year 2009, the State Department provided more than $2 million in funding to several international humanitarian organizations to provide assistance and 

protection activities to both the registered and unregistered Rohingya populations 

in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and elsewhere in the region. These organizations include ActionAid, Handicap International, Action Contre La Faim and the 

International Organization for Migration. Humanitarian assistance includes the provision of healthcare, water and sanitation, education, vocational skills training, conflict resolution, community mobilization, mental health and psychosocial support, 

gender-based violence prevention and response, and access to essential services for 

Persons with Disabilities. USAID implements development programs in Southeast 

Bangladesh on sectors that include population, health, energy, natural resource 

management, and democracy and governance. PACOM is constructing seven multipurpose cyclone shelters and schools. Given the sizeable Rohingya population in 

Southeast Bangladesh, these programs also indirectly benefit the unregistered 

Rohingya. 

We are urging the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) to allow UNHCR to properly 

document the unregistered Rohingya population to ensure its protection. We also 

urge the GOB to respect the principle of non-refoulement, to investigate allegations 

of abuse, and take actions as necessary. UNHCR has also gained agreement with 

the Government of Burma to expand operational space in Northern Rakhine State. 

Third-country resettlement remains an important strategic durable solution for 

some Rohingya refugees in the region. The eventual voluntary repatriation of refugees from Burma in safety and dignity and when conditions allow is also another 

solution. Both the registered and unregistered Rohingya, recognized as Persons of 

Concern by UNHCR, need freedom of movement and access to opportunities for 

work, which would enable them to become self-reliant and improve their chances for 

voluntary repatriation. 

The issue of the Rohingya is complex with a strong international dimension that 

requires a concerted effort by affected countries in the region. Thailand and Bangladesh have an important role to play in the Bali Process, where the Rohingya situation is being addressed regionally, to help combat people smuggling, trafficking 

in persons, and related transnational crimes in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. 

The State Department continues to urge UNHCR to work in close coordination with 

IOM through the Bali Process in developing a coordinated regional response and 

comprehensive plan of action with affected countries to address the plight of the 

Rohingya. 

Question. How is the State Department engaging Japan in diplomatic discussions 

regarding International Child Parental Abduction (IPCA) issues? At what level are 

these discussions occurring? What has been the outcome of these discussions thus 

far? 

Answer. For several years, IPCA has been a high priority as the number of children abducted to Japan has steadily increased. Japan has consistently opposed signing the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This places United States left-behind parents of abducted children to Japan at 

a great disadvantage given Japan’s family law system and traditions. 

The Embassy and the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and East Asian and Pacific Affairs continue to raise this issue during meetings with Japanese officials at all levels. Japanese officials have consistently stated that: 

—The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice are studying the Hague Convention. 

—Japanese family law is not consistent with the Hague Convention. 

—The Diet would have to pass the required legislation to change domestic law. 

However, as Japanese officials have recently begun to take IPCA more seriously, 

we have been more actively engaged on a number of fronts. On October 16, 2009, 

U.S. Ambassador to Japan Roos, and the Ambassadors of Canada, France, Italy, 

New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the deputy head of mission of Australia, demarched the new Minister of Justice about IPCA. They urged Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and take measures to improve access for parents separated from their children. A joint press statement was issued by the eight embas-
66 

sies following the meeting. On January 22, 2010, American Citizen Services Chief 

William Christopher and staff from the Office of Children’s Issues met with officials 

from Ministry of Justice to discuss Japan’s legal statutes as they relate to IPCA, 

in particular the legal definition of domestic violence, how courts determine custody 

in divorce cases, and mechanisms used to enforce court orders. 

On January 30, 2010, Ambassador Roos, accompanied by the same six ambassadors and one deputy head of mission from other embassies in Japan, demarched 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada about IPCA. The Ambassadors urged 

Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and to take measures to improve access 

for parents separated from their children. Minister Okada expressed appreciation 

for the meeting and stated that the new government must decide how to deal with 

IPCA. There was good media coverage of the meeting and the statement in both 

Japan and overseas. 

The third annual symposium on IPCA was held from March 17–18 in Tokyo. The 

symposium brought together key stakeholders and professional counterparts from 

the co-hosting nations in an expert level forum. The event was in response to Japanese Justice Minister Keiko Chiba’s October 2009 expression of interest in learning 

about the experiences of Hague signatory nations. 

Our joint efforts have encouraged Japanese officials to more seriously consider the 

issue of child abduction and look for ways to address both accession to the Hague 

Convention and resolution of current cases. We are encouraged by the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs’ decision to establish the Division for Issues Related to Child Custody, and we expect this to be an avenue for discussion of individual cases. 

Question. The budget request to combat Trafficking in Persons seems inadequate. 

If the State Department and USAID were to have more resources devoted to combating trafficking, how would they be used? 

Answer. The Department of State (DOS) uses foreign assistance funds to stimulate governments to take action to combat trafficking in persons (TIP) through 

criminal justice sector improvements, trafficking prevention programs, and support 

for protection and assistance services to victims. Funds for these anti-trafficking 

programs are critical to fulfilling the mandate of the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Act (TVPA) of 2000 and our bipartisan policy priorities. 

Since 2006, the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP) 

which manages a portion of the State Department’s anti-TIP funds has funded a 

mere fraction of the requests received, which is approximately $21 million of the 

over $288 million requested. G/TIP has seen a 325 percent increase in requested 

funds for anti-trafficking projects in a 4 year period from $45 million in fiscal year 

2006 to over $288 million in fiscal year 2010. G/TIP’s most recent solicitation resulted in 531 Statements of Interest for fiscal year 2010 funding, which is a significant increase from the previous year’s 372 proposals. 

If an increase in funding to combat TIP were appropriated, DOS and USAID 

would look to: 

—Fund a greater percentage of the proposals received for international anti-TIP 

projects; 

—Increase the number of innovative TIP prevention programs, including TIP-specific development projects; 

—Increase the number of TIP research projects to promote greater understanding 

of the scope of the problem and increase efficacy of USG anti-TIP resources; 

—Create dedicated training and technical assistance program to include recruitment and deployment of experienced counter-trafficking professionals in areas 

of victim assistance and protection, rule of law, and investigation and prosecution. 

Question. How is the Senior Policy Operating Group, which the State Department 

chairs, ensuring the coordination of anti-trafficking funding across the State Department and United States government per the mandate established in the TVPRA? 

Answer. The Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG) coordinates programs and 

policies at several levels: 

—Quarterly SPOG meetings.—G/TIP chairs quarterly, interagency meetings involving every USG agency involved in anti-trafficking programs—DOS, DOL, 

DOJ, DHS, and others. The quarterly meetings provide a forum for agencies to 

coordinate anti-trafficking policies and programs. 

—SPOG Committee meetings.—The SPOG created working-level committees to 

further its work, one of which is focused on grant-making. 

—SPOG Programs Review Process.—Before issuing anti-trafficking grants or contract funds, all USG agencies submit their proposed anti-trafficking actions for 

review by the other key SPOG members. Anti-trafficking program proposals are 

subject to a 7-day comment period, during which SPOG member agencies provide comments on whether the project will duplicate other USG activities, 
67 

whether the project presents opportunities for cooperation with other USG activities, and whether the project is consistent with USG anti-trafficking policy. 

—Fiscal Year Chart on USG Spending.—At the end of each fiscal year, SPOG 

staff gathers and organizes data on USG funds obligated in that fiscal year for 

TIP projects. 

Question. India has arguably the world’s largest Trafficking in Persons population, with its millions of bonded laborers. Given the importance of our bilateral 

relationship, is the State Department ensuring that combating trafficking in persons 

is conveyed as a strategic priority for the United States throughout all diplomatic 

discussions with the Government of India? 

Answer. The Department places great importance on the need to build a stronger 

partnership with the Government of India on addressing shared human trafficking 

concerns. We encourage the Indian government to research the phenomena of sex 

trafficking and bonded labor within India. Over the last year, Secretary Clinton and 

other senior officials have raised the issue of human trafficking with the Indian government and the Department continues to convey the priority the Obama Administration places on this human rights issue. We believe the Government of India is 

committed to combating human trafficking and in achieving faster progress against 

this global problem. 

Question. How is the State Department leveraging U.S. trade to further encourage 

other nations to actively combat trafficking in persons? 

Answer. The State Department is committed to expanding trade and market opportunities in developing countries to help create an environment not conducive to 

trafficking. Economic pressures make more people susceptible to the false promises 

of traffickers. Embassy employees worldwide provide country-specific data for the 

annual Trafficking in Persons report, as well as the Department of Labor’s Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) list of products made by 

forced labor and child labor in violation of international standards. Products on the 

TVPRA list are not permitted to be imported into the United States. 

Question. As Haiti has shown us all too clearly, disasters in general (and Haiti 

in particular) often necessitate expertise and resources specific to combating trafficking in persons in our protection response. What can the State Department learn 

from Haiti and how can the U.S. government best ensure preplanning is done such 

that the United States is ready to meet that need when the next disaster strikes? 

Answer. As past natural disasters have proved, commandeering the appropriate 

response on a wide-range of issues takes absolute coordination, communication, resources, and resolve. 

Specifically to trafficking in persons, the Department was actively involved in 

anti-trafficking efforts prior to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Office to 

Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons funded efforts in fiscal year 2008 by its 

non-government partners to: increase public awareness; create a whole of community efforts with targeted interventions, economic opportunity, and psychological 

support; and address the ‘‘restavek’’ issue in country. 

We were able to translate our pre-existing efforts into response in the immediate 

aftermath of the earthquake. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons was involved with the Child Protection Subcluster and it participated in a host 

of task forces and working groups to ensure a whole of government response that 

was both coordinated and concerted against trafficking. 

One of the challenges we face in combating human trafficking in post-natural disaster areas is the fact that many of these nations already are facing an uphill battle 

against modern slavery before the whole new set of post-disaster challenges emerge. 

We can learn from every experience in disaster response. Perhaps the greatest lesson in post-earthquake Haiti is recognizing that trafficking in persons must be 

interwoven in the disaster-response in the immediate, interim, and long-term plans. 

From the beginning, the United States Government must train itself to translate 

human trafficking and be mindful of the cultural contexts that increase vulnerability to TIP as a subset of the protection pillar of disaster response, whether it 

is child protection, protection against gender-based violence, or overall security 

issues. It cannot come days later, or after a news story breaks, but should be in 

pre-planning efforts across the board. 

Fortunately, we were aware of the increased likelihood of human trafficking in 

the days following the Haiti earthquake and worked around the clock to make sure 

we could supplement and strengthen our efforts. However, it is vital to ensure that 

the first boots on the ground are fully aware of the warning signs and the trends 

of human trafficking and are readily equipped to properly address this issue. 
68 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

Question. I am concerned about—and would appreciate your thoughts on—the 

pace of constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am particularly worried that 

the Presidential/Parliamentary campaign rhetoric in Bosnia this Fall will ‘‘poison 

the well’’ for the extension of NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Bosnia. I 

know you agree that we must continue to push Bosnia towards NATO and the EU, 

and not allow it to become an economic and political black-hole in Europe. I’m heartened that, in the Republik of Srpska, Prime Minister Dodik has stated his support 

for Bosnia’s membership in NATO despite great public opposition within his entity. 

What is your view on the possible extension of MAP—or a declaration by NATO 

of an intention to grant MAP—to Bosnia before the Fall elections? Senator Shaheen 

and I met with the leaders and foreign ministers of Slovenia, Croatia, BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia during our visit to the region last 

week, who all believed that such a step would be a positive signal to Bosnia’s leaders that NATO is serious about Bosnia’s future. 

Answer. The United States continues to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspirations for NATO and EU membership and we are working in Sarajevo and Brussels 

to encourage Bosnia along its Euro-Atlantic integration path. 

At the December 2009 NATO Foreign Ministerial, Allies noted that Bosnia and 

Herzegovina has made substantial progress in cooperation with NATO and urged 

its leaders to work together to pursue national integration and improve the efficiency and self-reliance of state-level institutions. Allies expressed support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s participation in MAP once it achieves the necessary progress 

in its reform efforts, and pledged to keep its progress under active review. 

In order to successfully participate in MAP, a country needs to have the institutional structures in place to make timely decisions and implement difficult reforms. 

We have made clear to the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina that they must demonstrate concrete evidence of a sufficient capacity for political decisionmaking and 

a level of government functionality to meet the commitments under MAP. 

The next opportunity to assess Bosnia and Herzegovina’s preparedness for MAP 

will come at the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Tallinn on April 22. We will 

continue to encourage Bosnia’s leaders to intensify their reform efforts and to demonstrate their commitment to advancing their aspirations. 

Question. The Iranian regime remains the single greatest threat to the peace and 

security of the Middle East. The neighboring nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which include the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, 

Qatar, and Kuwait, are valuable allies for the United States and have forged an important strategic partnership with us. The GCC represents an important bulwark 

against Iranian aggression. 

What other forms of cooperation can the United States pursue with the GCC to 

further strengthen our partnership and to enhance the regional security? 

Answer. The United States is actively working to strengthen our partnership with 

the GCC states via significant engagement on regional security, non-proliferation, 

alternative energy development (including nuclear energy and renewables), and support for economic diversification. 

On the political front, we consult with our Gulf partners to coordinate efforts to 

manage regional political, diplomatic, and security challenges, including threats 

posed by Iran. With respect to Iran, these consultations have resulted in Gulf country support for five U.N. Security Resolutions on Iran, increased vigilance and action against Iranian efforts to evade sanctions, active participation in a GCC-plus3 forum (with Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq), and increased U.S. security and military 

cooperation throughout the Gulf. 

Our political dialogue is complemented by a robust security relationship among 

the U.S. and Gulf States. Using multilateral exercises, training, and Foreign Military and Direct Commercial Sales, the United States strengthens the GCC nations’ 

capacity to defend against regional threats, thereby limiting their vulnerability to 

Iranian pressure. 

Similarly, we cooperate with Gulf States on counterproliferation issues. This 

growing cooperation is best exemplified by our cooperation with the UAE. In 2006, 

we initiated a senior-level bilateral counterproliferation dialogue (Counterproliferation Task Force or ‘‘CTF’’). The CTF meets annually in addition to supporting working groups that meet throughout the year. Since 2006, we have seen the UAE make 

significant progress on counterproliferation issues by actively enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolutions related to Iran and North Korea, participating 

in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear 

Terrorism, passing and implementing an export control law, and preventing trans-
69 

shipments of sensitive items from going to countries of proliferation concern such 

as Iran. 

Moreover, the United States is taking active steps, along with our Gulf allies, to 

provide a counterweight to Iran’s energy strategy. We have encouraged our regional 

partners to help us reduce international reliance on Iranian natural resources as a 

way to sharpen the choice for Iran—opt to comply with nuclear obligations or face 

further isolation. On civil nuclear energy issues, we concluded a landmark 123 

Agreement on civilian nuclear energy with the UAE in 2009 which includes the 

highest nonproliferation standards and a commitment by the UAE to forgo enrichment and reprocessing on its soil. This civil nuclear energy agreement represents 

a powerful countermodel to Iran in demonstrating how a country can pursue civil 

nuclear energy and still meet its international obligations. 

We are also actively engaged in building commercial ties with the GCC nations. 

Using tools such as our Free Trade Agreements with Bahrain and Oman, proactive 

commercial advocacy and technical assistance on commercial law development, the 

United States is encouraging expanded American commercial ties in the region. Not 

only does this expand U.S. business opportunities, but it also supports Gulf States’ 

efforts to diversify their economies. 

Question. The Conference Agreement for the fiscal year 2010 Departments of 

Transportation and Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act includes specific language stating that ‘‘The Conferees support the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s initiatives to combat 

anti-Semitism in Europe and Eurasia and expect the Coordinator for United States 

Assistance for Europe and Eurasia to provide adequate funding to ensure continued 

leadership within the OSCE.’’ 

Madam Secretary, can you provide me in writing with specific details of your 

team’s fiscal year 2010 work toward compliance with the expectations of the House 

and Senate conferees concerning U.S. financial support for OSCE efforts to combat 

anti-Semitism in Europe and Eurasia—including support for OSCE extra-budgetary 

programming efforts? 

Answer. The OSCE is committed to combating all forms of racism, xenophobia, 

anti-Semitism, and discrimination in the 56 participating States (pS). The United 

States supports efforts to ensure that OSCE commitments in the fields of tolerance 

and non-discrimination and freedom of religion or belief are implemented effectively. 

We believe the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 

projects should focus on those countries where the gap between commitments and 

practices is the greatest. The United States has successfully insisted that ODIHR 

treat freedom of religion as a fundamental freedom as well as an issue of promoting 

mutual respect (as demonstrated during the Supplemental Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of Religion in July 2009). We have successfully lobbied Chairs-inOffice to appoint or re-confirm the three special representatives on anti-Semitism, 

anti-Muslim discrimination, and discrimination against people of other religions including Christianity, who track government activity to promote respect for religious 

differences and ensure the rights of people of all faiths in the OSCE region. 

The fiscal year 2010 appropriation levels approved by Congress will enable the 

State Department will meet all U.S. financial obligations to the OSCE and will also 

provide voluntary contributions for elections support, U.S. personnel on secondment 

to the OSCE, and extra-budgetary projects. OSCE funding comes from a combination of the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (AEECA), and Diplomatic and Consular Affairs Program (D&CP) accounts. We expect to provide significant financial and extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE in support of the efforts of ODIHR and the OSCE Personal Representatives on tolerance to combat 

anti-Semitism throughout Europe and Eurasia. We continue to encourage the OSCE 

and the ODIHR to attach a high priority to combating anti-Semitism and we will 

continue to support the organization’s pioneering efforts in this area. We look forward to sending a delegation to a planned OSCE high-level conference on mutual 

respect and non-discrimination issues this summer and to engaging on a robust 

agenda there. 

Question. I would also appreciate from your team during the next 30 days a written strategic plan outlining the Department of State’s policy initiatives to combat 

anti-Semitism, including milestones, metrics, and expected future financial resource 

requirements from Congress. 

Answer. To effectively combat anti-Semitism, we are building strong channels of 

communication and collaborating with nongovernmental organizations. This includes greater engagement in interfaith efforts, active outreach among Muslim leaders, as well as reaching out to other groups that experience discrimination. 

The President has appointed Hannah Rosenthal as the new Special Envoy to 

Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. Special Envoy Rosenthal joined the Depart-
70 

ment of State in late November. Since that time she has traveled extensively both 

overseas and in the United States to advance her mandate. 

One of Special Envoy Rosenthal’s goals is to work more closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Enclosed please find her strategic outline to elevate and increase the visibility of the work that the OSCE does to combat 

anti-Semitism. 

On January 27, Special Envoy Rosenthal was part of the President’s delegation 

to the 65th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz commemoration in Poland. 

Prior to the actual ceremony at Auschwitz-Birkenau, she met with the Education 

Ministers from 29 countries to learn more about their Holocaust and anti-discrimination education. All 29 countries reported that they are implementing curriculum 

and activities to educate about the Holocaust and to confront intolerance. However, 

the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was not present 

at this gathering and none of the countries in attendance mentioned use of the 

ODIHR curriculum or expertise. Immediately after the ceremony, Special Envoy 

Rosenthal stayed on in Poland for several more days to better understand this situation. She went to Warsaw and had an excellent meeting with the staff at ODIHR, 

where she learned that ODIHR representatives had tried unsuccessfully to get invited to that Education Ministers’ meeting. She discussed how we can ensure that 

does not happen again, how to increase ODIHR’s visibility, and how best to get 

ODIHR the credit that is its due. 

ODIHR has virtually no funds for public relations and clearly needs people with 

higher visibility to talk about its mission, expertise, and accomplishments. To assist 

with this challenge, Special Envoy Rosenthal planned three major actions upon her 

return to Washington from Poland: a trip to Lithuania in April to discuss with the 

U.S. Embassy in Vilnius a proposal to develop a ‘‘training the trainers’’ approach 

to tolerance education; clearance for all her speeches in the United States and 

abroad to highlight the work of OSCE–ODIHR; and a new initiative to be rolled out 

at the OSCE high-level conference on tolerance and non-discrimination in Astana, 

Kazakhstan June 29–30. These are included in the attached outline. 

The outline was created after Special Envoy Rosenthal consulted with Rabbi Andrew Baker; ODIHR; Human Rights First; the Interparliamentary Coalition to Combat Anti-Semitism; the Co-Existence Trust of England; and several human rights 

NGOs in Poland, the United Kingdom, and domestically. 

Increasing the Visibility of the OSCE 

Hannah Rosenthal Speech Highlights 

Meetings with over 10 NGOs in Warsaw January 28–29, 2010. 

Jewish Council for Public Affairs annual conference February 22, 2010. 

Community Security Trust in London March 8, 2010. 

Yale Institute of Research on Anti-Semitism April 12, 2010. 

Testimony HFAC April 14, 2010. 

University, Kaunas, Lithuania April 27, 2010. 

ADL Leadership Conference May 3, 2010. 

Graduation speech Madison, Wisconsin May 15, 2010. 

Maryland Jewish Council May 27, 2010. 

Canadian Interparliamentary Council to Combat Anti-Semitism November 2010. 

Partnerships—promote to their members and activities, cover on websites 

Jewish Council for Public Affairs. 

American Jewish Committee. 

B’nai Brith. 

Anti-Defamation League. 

Human Rights First. 

Joint Distribution Committee. 

Simon Wiesenthal Center. 

Reiterate recommendations to governments 

Acknowledge and condemn anti-Semitism and hate crimes. 

Enact laws that address hate crimes. 

Strengthen enforcement and prosecute offenders. 

Train law enforcement. 

Undertake interagency, parliamentary and other special inquiries. 

Monitor and report on hate crimes, and ensure delineation for anti-Semitism. 

Strengthen anti-discrimination and human rights bodies. 

Reach out to NGOs. 

Speak out against official intolerance and bigotry. 

Encourage international cooperation and joint statements. 
71 

OSCE to publicize 

Help countries to meet obligation to collect and report hate crimes data to 

ODIHR. 

Make more visible three personal representatives. 

Expand administrative resources to support three representatives and provide 

public affairs capacity. 

Support ODIHR’s Tolerance and Non-Discrimination unit 

—Ensure law enforcement program participation; 

—ODIHR convene national points of contact and NGOs to build trust and cooperation between law enforcement agencies, civil society groups, and victims; 

—Distribute materials and reports widely; and 

—build funding through regular OSCE budget and extrabudgetary contributions. 

High-level conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination—June 2010. 

Develop a ‘‘side event’’ at the OSCE high-level conference in Kazakhstan June 29– 

30 to roll-out the ‘‘ART Initiative: Acceptance, Respect and Tolerance.’’ SEAS and 

USOSCE will bring 8–10 NGOs that work with governments to move beyond tolerance and advance acceptance and respect. Highlight their ‘‘best practices’’ with easyto-share demonstration models. The proceedings will be both videotaped and transcribed for official documents and websites for broad dissemination at conferences, 

country visits, State Department website, OSCE website, partners’ websites, etc. 

US Government and leadership 

ART promotion. 

Bilateral discussions. 

Funding and TA expertise. 

Human Rights Report and International Religious Freedom Report annually. 

Clearly state our freedom of expression issues. 

Clearly state our definition of anti-Semitism (and where it is part of anti-Israel 

rhetoric and activities). 

Award/Recognition program 

Develop an annual nomination and selection process for high visibility recognition 

to individual and organizational work to advance ART (acceptance, respect and tolerance). 

Question. Secretary Clinton, I understand that the Department of State recently 

entered into a contract with a new provider of crystal stemware to be used at all 

American embassies. 

Could you please explain the circumstances surrounding this award and the process by which the new vendor was selected? 

Answer. The Department of State had a new departmental requirement for leadfree crystal ware design, production, inventory management and fulfillment services 

for U.S. embassies. Department officials met with SDI, a company that had earlier 

been introduced to the Department of State by the Small Business Administration 

(SBA), to discuss the company’s capabilities in fulfilling the contract requirements. 

In accordance with complying with FAR 6.302–5, ‘‘Other Than Full and Open 

Competition, Authorized or Required by Statue,’’ the Contracting Officer sent an 

offer letter to SBA to negotiate and award a contract under the 8(a) program with 

SDI, an 8(a) program participant. SBA accepted the requirement into the 8(a) program and authorized DOS to negotiate a contract with SDI on May 18, 2008. A solicitation was released to the firm who then submitted a proposal. 

SDI subsequently informed the Department that they could not find a U.S. manufacturer of lead-free crystal, and planned instead to subcontract manufacturing to 

Orrefors/Kosta Boda, USA located in New Jersey. Market research conducted by the 

Department indicated there was no company that manufactured lead-free table top 

crystal ware in the United States. The Department evaluated SDI’s proposal, determined it to be technically acceptable and that the price was fair and reasonable. 

An award for a base year and four option years was made to SDI on September 24, 

2009, for a total ceiling for the contract of $5.4 million (total for 12-month base year, 

and four 12-month option years). 

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Madam Secretary. This hearing is 

recessed. 

[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., Wednesday, February 24, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the 

Chair.] 

(73) 

STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED 

PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL 

YEAR 2011 

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met at 10:35 a.m., in room SD–192, Dirksen 

Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy (chairman) presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Landrieu, Gregg, Bond, and Brownback. 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

STATEMENT OF DR. RAJIV SHAH, ADMINISTRATOR 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

Senator LEAHY. I know there are several other hearings going on 

and people are at different places. Dr. Shah, welcome to the subcommittee. We’ll talk about your budget request, and I might say 

and I’ve told you this privately, I sincerely appreciate the fact that 

a person of your intellect and enthusiasm has taken on this job. 

I think I told you one of the first times we talked, I wasn’t sure 

whether to offer you congratulations or condolences, but on behalf 

of the country I’m glad you’re there. 

I don’t envy you the job because USAID is in urgent need of reform and it is a formidable task and if it’s not fixed, there are those 

who are going to ask whether USAID as it is should continue. I 

think every member of this subcommittee supports USAID’s mission in one way or another, but I’ve heard on both sides of the aisle 

increasing concern about the performance of the agency. 

That doesn’t diminish in any way the many extraordinary 

USAID staff or ignore the important and often life-saving work 

which they and USAID’s implementing partners around the world 

do to help improve the lives of people in some of the world’s poorest 

countries. 

We provide billions of dollars for USAID’s programs and operations. So it stands to reason that a lot of that money is being used 

to positive effect. But I don’t think USAID is living up to its potential of what—and I can say this to you directly because you have 

the task of fixing what was done wrong before—the U.S. taxpayers 

and this subcommittee expect it to do. 
74 

Like many government bureaucracies, USAID suffers from a culture of arrogance that it knows best. Too often, it seems more comfortable dealing with elites of foreign countries than those people 

who have no voice. There is a disturbing detachment between some 

USAID employees in missions overseas who spend much of their 

time in comfortable offices, behind imposing security barriers, living in relatively high style, and the impoverished people they’re 

there to help, so much so that it’s hard to wonder how you can 

make a connection. 

I have nothing against suitable working and living conditions. 

We provide the funds for that. What concerns me is the way in 

some places USAID has become an ivory tower, distant from the 

trenches, writing big checks for big contractors and high-priced 

consultants and churning out self-serving reports filled with sometimes incomprehensible bureaucratic jargon. 

I’ve read them and I’ve sometimes wondered what did they say 

and, you know, English is my first language and they are written 

in English and I can’t understand them. 

Now there are many USAID staff and often they’re former Peace 

Corps volunteers who love to be out in the field doing hands-on 

work implementing, overseeing programs, but that’s become more 

the exception, not the rule. 

I also often hear the frustration of creative people who want to 

help, have so much to offer, but then they end up facing a closed 

door, and a closed mind, at USAID. They face a labyrinth of reporting requirements that are burdensome or almost a way of saying 

we don’t need you. 

I think USAID has to change its culture, change the way it does 

business, if it wants the kind of money that you’re here asking for. 

If it doesn’t change I will not vote for money for USAID and if I’m 

not going to vote for it, there are a lot of other people who may 

not. 

I’ll have some questions about your budget and I say this in this 

subcommittee, in the Senate, Republicans and Democrats, you will 

not find stronger supporters of your mission among the men and 

women on this subcommittee than anywhere else in the Senate and 

we want nothing more than for you to tell us how you plan to reform USAID. 

So here’s your chance, in plain English. Put your full statement 

in the record. But just tell us how are you going to make these 

changes and how are you going to restore USAID’s image on Capitol Hill? 

So over to you, Dr. Shah. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DR. RAJIV SHAH

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to first start by recognizing your deep commitment to 

USAID’s mission. I’ve had the opportunity to participate in some 

of your trips abroad from a distance when I was in a different role 

and I know the commitment you have to this mission supersedes 

any commitment to an institutional arrangement or a particular 

bureaucracy. I look forward to working with you to put a change 

agenda in place so that USAID does live up to your aspirations and 
75 

mine and those of the thousands of people that are still involved 

in USAID programs around the world. 

I think this is an important opportunity. In many ways I consider this a once-in-a-lifetime or once-in-a-generation type of opportunity. The President, the Secretary, members of this subcommittee, yourself, and other Members of Congress have all called 

for a more effective, transparent, and capable development enterprise. I think that is a legitimate call in an environment where our 

world is more interconnected and people care more about the development mission. 

I’m excited about being at USAID because the agency has a rich 

legacy of successfully introducing the green revolution, of bringing 

oral rehydration therapy and other health solutions to millions of 

children, and of creating higher education institutions in parts of 

the world. I was just in Pakistan and met graduates that were 

proud to have been supported by U.S. generosity. 

I also fully understand the need for change in the way we do 

business. The examples are really everywhere. I was just in Afghanistan where some of our staff reported errors in their paychecks during a pay period. That’s one example where our human 

resources system failed. There are others, but I think this highlights how acute the need is for performance improvement in many 

of our core operating functions. 

The planning, measurement, and capability to put together ideas 

and articulate them across the agency and, as you put it, relate to 

the reporting capabilities of the agency are very weak today. Having been here for a few months with a big interagency focus on 

Haiti, it took extraordinary measures for us to be able to produce 

the kind of data reporting and information on a daily and weekly 

basis so that our interagency colleagues could understand what’s 

working and what’s not working in the Haiti relief effort and try 

to fill gaps in assistance in a rapid way. We need to build better 

systems in that space. 

Our contracting model, as you highlight, needs real reform. I visited an institution just last week where we’ve provided about $4.5 

million over probably 31⁄2 years and have done wonderful work in 

supporting thousands of students to gain access to technical training in Afghanistan. At a cost of about $1,000 a student per year, 

they will graduate from a 2-year course and earn incomes of $300 

to $500 a month in areas like the construction trades, electrical 

wiring, ICT, and computer programming, but we probably spent 35 

percent more than we needed to in order to get that result. Having 

come from a place that had far fewer bureaucratic processes to address, I’ve seen development happen in a more efficient and a more 

direct way and think it can be done at USAID. 

You asked very specifically about a reform agenda that would 

better serve U.S. taxpayers and that is what we deeply believe in. 

Before the end of this month, we hope to roll out a new policy, 

planning, evaluation and budget capability at USAID that will 

allow us to be more accountable and make smarter decisions and 

real resource trade-offs, so that we’re not just chasing every need 

in an environment where needs are endless. We’ve all been to settings where we are overwhelmed by the extent of needs, but we are 
76 

focusing on those areas where we can get the most cost-effective 

impact and results for our investment. 

This summer I hope to launch a series of procurement reforms. 

This will not be easy because the agency has come to outsource a 

huge amount of work, including basic program design and program 

oversight activities, but we have a team in place to work on this 

issue. We’ve already put a Board of Acquisition and Assistance Review in place to review all contracts over $75 million. We will take 

that further by developing specific detailed guidelines for procurement reform that are based on the premise that we should be doing 

much more work in-house, especially related to program design and 

oversight. 

PREPARED STATEMENT

And finally, we will focus on human resources and evaluation in 

a very substantive way over the course of the summer and the fall. 

I think if we do these things, sir, we will be a more accountable 

agency, a more transparent agency, and a more effective agency. I 

share your passion and urgency around these points and appreciate 

your guidance and your opening comment. 

[The statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAJIV SHAH

INTRODUCTION/HAITI

Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Gregg, Members of the Subcommittee, I am 

honored to join you here today in support of the President’s fiscal year 2011 foreign 

operations budget request. 

It has been less than 4 months since I was sworn in as Administrator for the U.S. 

Agency for International Development. As you know, just days after my swearingin, the people of Haiti were struck by a tragedy of almost unimaginable proportions. 

The United States—and the American people—responded swiftly and aggressively 

to this unprecedented disaster—a response that reflected the leadership and compassion of our nation. 

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti, President Obama designated me as the Unified Disaster Coordinator and charged our government with 

mounting a swift, aggressive and coordinated response. In that capacity, USAID coordinated the efforts of the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and 

Health and Human Services. We worked collaboratively with the Government of 

Haiti and a host of other governments, the United Nations, other international organizations, NGOs, the private sector, and with thousands of generous and concerned 

individuals. Together we have provided a comprehensive response to a complex disaster whose scope far exceeds any other that the Administration has faced internationally and one that requires a continued aggressive and unique approach. 

Our unprecedented level of coordination in response to these challenges has 

shown results on the ground. With our partners, we launched the largest, and most 

successful international urban search-and-rescue effort ever—with more than 135 

lives saved by over 40 countries’ search and rescue teams in Haiti. In coordination 

with Haitian authorities, our military, the United Nations, and NGO colleagues, we 

created a fixed distribution network to surge food distribution to nearly 3 million 

people—the most robust urban food distribution in recent history. Within 30 minutes of landing on the ground, the U.S. military secured the airport, and in the 

hours that followed, rapidly expanded its capacity to well beyond pre-earthquake 

levels. The United States also helped to restore a critical sea port, thereby scaling 

up the delivery of essential goods and restoring commercial capacity. And our partners at the Department of Health and Human Services provided medical assistance 

that enabled an additional 30,000 patients to receive treatment. 

Nevertheless, we all know that Haiti faces a long and steep road to recovery. Reconstruction will take time and will require the shared commitment and resources 

of our international partners, working in concert with the Government and the people of Haiti. 
77 

We are requesting a total of $1.6 billion for the Department of State and USAID 

in supplemental funding for efforts in Haiti. Of that, approximately $501 million 

will be used to reimburse USAID for the emergency humanitarian response already 

provided through International Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace Title II. Of 

the funding requested in the supplemental for reconstruction , $749 million is requested for the Economic Support Fund to support Haiti’s critical recovery and reconstruction needs, including rebuilding infrastructure, supporting health services, 

bolstering agriculture to contribute to food security, and strengthening governance 

and rule of law. Finally, we have requested an additional $1.5 million for USAID’s 

Office of the Inspector General to ensure greater oversight of these funds. 

GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND OVERVIEW

Recovery in Haiti will continue to be a major focus for the foreseeable future. But 

we will not lose sight of the important work of strengthening USAID and helping 

other countries achieve their development goals. Investment in development has 

never been more strategically important than it is today. Even in the midst of difficult economic times domestically, helping nations to grow and prosper is not only 

the moral obligation of a great nation; it is also in our national interest. The investments we make today are a bulwark against current and future threats—both seen 

and unseen—and a down payment for future peace and prosperity around the world. 

As Members of this Subcommittee know very well, development is an essential 

pillar of our foreign policy. As President Obama said in Oslo last December, ‘‘Security does not exist when people do not have access to enough food, or clean water, 

or the medicine and shelter they need to survive.’’ Building the capacity of countries 

to meet these basic needs—and in turn, increasing dignity and opportunity for their 

people—is what guides our work and the resources we put behind it. 

While the scope and complexity of the world’s challenges have grown—from the 

food crisis to the global financial crisis, terrorism to oppression, climate change to 

pandemics—we have never had the technology, tools and global imperative for action that we have today. Together with other government departments and agencies, 

USAID is examining our policies, resources, and capabilities to determine how best 

to achieve our development objectives through the Presidential Study Directive on 

U.S. Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. 

And already, we are moving to face these challenges, guided by the following important principles: 

—Working in partnership, not patronage with the countries we serve; 

—Coordinating across U.S. agencies and among donors and partners for maximum impact; 

—Ensuring strategic focus with targeted investments in areas where we can have 

the greatest impact with measurable results and accountability; 

—Embracing innovation, science, technology and research to improve our development cooperation; and 

—Enhancing our focus on women and girls. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request will support development priorities that contribute directly to our national security. Specifically, our request is focused on three 

priority areas: 

—Securing Critical Frontline States.—$7.7 billion in State and USAID assistance 

will support U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. 

—Meeting Urgent Global Challenges.—$14.6 billion in State and USAID assistance will support local and global solutions to national and transnational problems, including global health, food security, poverty, disasters, and threats of 

further instability from climate change and rapid population growth. 

—Enhancing Aid Effectiveness and Sustainability.—$1.7 billion will support the 

ongoing rebuilding of USAID personnel and infrastructure. 

SECURING CRITICAL FRONTLINE STATES: AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND IRAQ

By far the largest component of our requested budget increase is dedicated to the 

critical states of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. We have made some progress in 

each of these countries, but we realize that significant challenges remain. 

Over the past several years, our focus in Afghanistan has been achieving greater 

stability and security. Working within a fully integrated civilian-military plan, our 

goal is to create space for economic investment and to lay the foundation for a more 

representative, responsible and responsive government. We believe these investments are key to providing sustainable security and stability in Afghanistan. 

We are gradually delivering more of our resources through public and private Afghan institutions and these efforts have been successful so far. We are performing 
78 

careful and diligent oversight and directing resources to local institutions and partners who perform well. 

We are beginning to see major improvements in the Afghan healthcare system. 

In 2002, just 8 percent of the population had access to some form of healthcare, but 

by 2009, that number had increased to 84 percent. 

We have also made significant strides in education. Under the Taliban, only 

900,000 boys and no girls were officially enrolled in schools. As of 2009, more than 

6 million children were enrolled, 35 percent of whom are girls. One of our biggest 

economic accomplishments in Afghanistan has been to begin to rejuvenate the agricultural industry. In November of last year, with USAID support, Afghan provincial 

farmer associations sent to India the first shipment of what is expected to be more 

than 3 million kilograms of apples this season. 

USAID has also been active in developing a coordinated Afghan energy policy, and 

helped advance new electricity generation capacity and provide 24-hour power for 

the first time in cities including Kabul, Lashkar Gah, and Kandahar City. With additional resources, we expect a half million people will benefit from improved transportation infrastructure. 

In Pakistan, our request supports ongoing efforts to combat extremism, promote 

economic development, strengthen democratic institutions, and build a long-term relationship with the Pakistani people. We are focusing on programs that help demonstrate the capacity of local civilian governance to meet the Pakistani people’s 

needs, and channeling assistance to less-stable areas to rebuild communities and 

support the Government of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts. 

USAID and our partners in Pakistan have made progress in several areas. In 

2009, we expanded educational opportunities, rebuilt schools and increased support 

for higher education. We trained 10,852 healthcare providers, 82 percent of whom 

were women, and provided essential care to nearly 400,000 newborns. Over the life 

of our program, we have helped treat 934,000 children for pneumonia, 1.6 million 

cases of child diarrhea, and provided DPT vaccines to 731,500 babies through training programs for healthcare workers. 

We have also focused on generating economic opportunities for the people of Pakistan, contributing to the country’s stability. USAID programs generated more than 

700,000 employment opportunities in 2009, including training more than 10,000 

women in modern agricultural techniques. 

The funding increase in fiscal year 2011 for Pakistan will help USAID reach approximately 60,000 more children with nutrition programs, increase enrollment in 

both primary and secondary schools by over 1 million learners, and support 500,000 

rural households to improve agricultural production. 

Finally, turning to Iraq, we have transitioned to a new phase in our civilian assistance relationship—shifting away from reconstruction toward the provision of assistance to bolster local capacity in line with Iraqi priorities. Indeed, we are working 

in partnership with the Government of Iraq whose investment in their own development matches or exceeds at least 50 percent of U.S. foreign assistance funds. 

Specifically, USAID is promoting economic development, strengthening the agricultural sector, which is the largest employer of Iraqis after the Government of Iraq, 

and increasing the capacity of local and national government to provide essential 

services. For example, USAID is strengthening public administration, strategic 

planning and project management in critical Iraqi ministries by supporting 180 

international post-graduate scholarships in programs related to public administration for Iraqis at universities in Cairo, Amman, and Beirut. The additional funding 

requested will also promote small and medium enterprise growth, strengthen the 

Iraqi private banking sector and increase access to lending for entrepreneurs engaged in new market opportunities resulting from improved stability. 

MEETING URGENT GLOBAL CHALLENGES

In addition to supporting these critical frontline states, we are targeting investments to assist with urgent global challenges that—if unmet—can compromise the 

prosperity and stability of a region or nation. 

First, global health, where we are requesting $8.5 billion in State and USAID assistance. Our request supports President Obama’s Global Health Initiative, which 

builds on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), launched by 

the Bush Administration, and other U.S. global health programs and will help our 

80 partner countries strengthen health systems and sustainably improve health outcomes, particularly for women, children and newborns. This initiative will be carried 

out in collaboration with the Department of State and the Department of Health 

and Human Services to ensure our programs are complementary and leave behind 

sustainable healthcare systems that are host-country owned. 
79 

With additional funding, we will build on our strong record of success in HIV/ 

AIDS, TB and malaria, and achieve results where progress has lagged, in areas 

such as obstetric care, newborn care and nutrition. The initiative will include a special focus on up to 20 countries where we will intensify efforts to ensure maximum 

learning about innovative approaches for working with governments and partners, 

accelerating impact and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of U.S. government investments. 

Second, to support global food security, we propose investing $1.2 billion for food 

security and agricultural programs, in addition to the $200 million set aside for nutrition programs that support the goals of improved global health and food security. 

These funds are in addition to the emergency and non-emergency food assistance 

we provide. There is a strong link between security and hunger, made clear in 2008 

when the global food price crisis led to a dramatic rise in food riots in more than 

30 countries around the globe. With these additional funds, we will work in countries in Africa, Central America, and Asia to combat poverty and hunger. Our work 

will draw upon relevant expertise across the United States government to deliver 

the most effective programs possible. 

Our third principal challenge is climate change. We propose to invest $646 million 

in our programs, part of the Administration’s overall request of $1.4 billion to support climate change assistance. USAID will support implementation of adaptation 

and sustainable landscape investments, as well as low-carbon development strategies, market-based approaches to sustainable energy sector reform and emission reductions, capacity-building and technologies to enhance adaptation and local resilience to climate change in partner countries. We plan to expand renewable energy 

programs in the Philippines, improving electric distribution systems in Southern Africa, and support high-level bilateral climate change partnerships with major economies like India and Indonesia. 

Finally, we remain focused on humanitarian assistance, including emergency and 

non-emergency food aid, where USAID and the Department of State propose to use 

$4.2 billion. The tragedy in Haiti brings clarity to both the critical need for America’s leadership on humanitarian assistance and the strong support from the American people that such efforts enjoy. This funding allows us to assist internally displaced persons, refugees, and victims of armed conflict and natural disasters worldwide. 

With the combined investments proposed in global health, food security, climate 

change and humanitarian assistance, we will build the capacity of countries to save 

lives and, through economic growth, help make people less vulnerable to poverty 

and the threat of instability that extreme poverty can represent. In so doing, we 

honor our basic values, strengthen our national security and promote our national 

interests. 

ENHANCING AID EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

All of the priorities I have outlined require well-trained personnel and robust infrastructure. We must treat development as a discipline. This requires strong capacities in evaluation, planning, resource management, and research to ensure we are 

incorporating best practices. At the same time, we must be able to recruit, hire and 

retain best in class development professionals. 

As we build our workforce, we must reclaim the Agency’s historical leadership in 

science and technology. We must also strengthen USAID’s capacities to identify, implement, and rigorously evaluate new and existing approaches that reward efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability. We must have the capacity to analyze, plan, 

and invest strategically for the long term. And most important, we must stay relentlessly focused on results—which means establishing baseline data, measuring 

progress, being transparent about both our successes and our failures—learning 

from both and improving our approach as we go forward. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request represents a vital investment in our human 

resources, and I want to thank the Committee for its foresight and support for the 

Development Leadership Initiative. The additional resources requested will allow us 

to bring on 200 new Foreign Service Officers, furthering our goal of doubling the 

size of our Foreign Service Corps. Fields of particular focus are education officers, 

economists, agriculturalists, stabilization, governance and reconstruction officers, 

global health officers and evaluation experts. 

This long-term investment in human resources is critical to help fill a shortage 

of experienced middle- and senior-level technical experts and managers. Equally important, by reducing our reliance on contractors to design and evaluate programs, 

we will not only save taxpayer dollars but also enable greater oversight and more 

effective program implementation. 
80 

Through these critical investments, we can achieve the development goals we 

have set around the world and restore USAID’s standing as the world’s premiere 

development agency. 

CONCLUSION

Our objective each day is to seek out these best practices, learn from them, and 

adapt them to everything we do. We are committed to transparency in both our successes and our failures—viewing both as opportunities to learn and improve. 

I know this is a time of great economic strain for so many Americans. For every 

dollar we invest, we must show results. That is why this budget supports programs 

vital to our national interests. The United States must be able to exercise global 

leadership to respond to crosscurrents of a complex world. This requires the effective 

use of all instruments of our national security—including development. We agree 

strongly with President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s vision of embracing development as indispensable to American foreign policy and national security. 

It is through this relentless dedication to results that we do justice to our motto, 

‘‘from the American people.’’ We do this not just by extending a helping hand, but 

by sharing the hopefulness of the American dream in places where hope remains 

shrouded by poverty, oppression and despair. 

In many cases, the balance between a future filled with fear and a future filled 

with hope is fragile. Every day, USAID tips the scale toward hope and opportunity. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. I, and I believe most people here, 

want USAID to succeed, but you talked about outsourcing and 

some of the other things that are being done. 

You said local hires are not being paid, but I’m sure that USAID 

employees, their paychecks came, and—no? 

PAYROLL ISSUES

Dr. SHAH. There were problems with payroll for the Foreign 

Service Limited (FSL) employees—differentials not paid, pay caps 

imposed, among other issues. The Foreign Service National staff 

and other employees are being paid and have not had payroll 

issues. 

Senator LEAHY. So that, it was a mechanical thing, this was not 

a case of money that ran out. Am I right? 

Dr. SHAH. Correct. It was entirely related to our internal process 

and we’ve already made that fix for that particular problem. 

POLITICAL APPOINTEES

Senator LEAHY. How many of your political appointees and other 

top positions are still waiting for final approval by the White 

House? What are you hearing as far as getting them approved? 

Dr. SHAH. We’ve made 36 political appointments that have joined 

and are currently working at the USAID. We’ve submitted 62 

names to the White House. A number of the Senate-confirmed individuals are through an initial process where I believe they’re on to 

the second stage of review and vetting. For me it’s an incredible 

priority to make sure we get a series of names up to the Senate 

so we fill the slate, but those are the numbers in terms of the 

progress we’ve had. 

Senator LEAHY. So you still have some that haven’t gone through 

the vetting at the White House? 

Dr. SHAH. Thirty-six have joined and are onboard. Of the Senateconfirmed, roughly one-half of them are through an initial vetting 

process but that only gets concluded when the White House, of 

course, announces the formal appointments. 
81 

AFRICA

Senator LEAHY. There was an Op-Ed in last Sunday’s New York 

Times by Bono entitled ‘‘Africa Reboots.’’ Did you have a chance to 

read that? 

Dr. SHAH. I did, sir. 

Senator LEAHY. For the others, it described his conversation with 

different African political leaders, artists, and entrepreneurs during a recent trip around Sub-Saharan Africa focused on aid and 

trade, governance, corruption, transparency, enforcing the rule of 

law, rewarding measurable results, and so on. 

I know the trip was exhausting but one that he found very 

worthwhile, and he and I talked about it. 

Is there anything in that, in his comments that would have relevance for USAID and the way you do business in Africa and other 

parts of the world? 

Dr. SHAH. Yes, sir, I believe so. The fundamental point he was 

making in that Op-Ed was that he believes Africa is in a place 

where there is strong innovative and capable leadership in government, in the private sector, and in civil society, and what I took 

away from the article was that it is incumbent upon us to find 

those change agents and those leaders and do the types of things 

that empower them to be successful and build on their capacity to 

offer real leadership. 

We’ve seen that in a number of ways. The article talked about 

the Mo Ibrahim Prize that essentially does that for very high-level 

African presidential leadership. I was at the Bill and Melinda 

Gates Foundation for nearly 8 years and we certainly got a lot of 

credit in that setting for finding innovative leaders and empowering them to be successful. 

One of the things I noted, and I shared this with part of the 

USAID team that runs a program called the Development Credit 

Authority, is in many cases the initial organization that found and 

supported the leaders that we were then helping to take to the 

next level, was USAID and USAID programs, USAID missions, and 

networks that had developed over many, many years of being 

present in countries. I think there is a base of capability and leadership and knowledge regarding who’s capable of offering real leadership, no matter what sector they come from. USAID has connections and networks that we can build on using some of the tools 

that are already at our disposal, like the Development Credit Authority, and other tools to support private sector and civil society 

organizations. 

USAID’S PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

I think our procurement process almost systematically excludes 

a lot of local leaders from being real participants in our efforts and 

that needs to be fixed in order to really help us be successful. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, in fact, there’s been a lot of delays in 

launching the USAID’s worldwide procurement software and system. This predated you being there, but it was scheduled to be 

completed in March 2008. I think now it has a completion date of 

June 2011 at a cost of around $100 million. 

Are you confident it’s going to be completed? 
82 

Dr. SHAH. That’s what I’m told. Part of what we’re doing is looking at the full range of procurement tools we have as part of this 

procurement reform that I hope to announce in June. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, let me pick up on that. 

If you call a mission abroad and they say, well, Dr. Shah’s on the 

phone, get the mission director, you say how are things going, and 

you’re told everything is fine. 

To what extent can you get objective information? Do you have 

confidence that you can get that kind of feedback if something isn’t 

working, whether it’s procurement, which obviously didn’t work 

with your predecessor because it wasn’t completed, but what’s your 

level of confidence that you can hear bad news as well as good 

news? 

Dr. SHAH. Well, you know, this may be surprising, sir, but it is 

high in the sense that I do hear regularly a fair stream of bad 

news. Some of it is related to mistakes that were made in following 

process and some of it is externally created mishaps that result in 

a poor outcome. 

My goal is to give people the space to come to me sooner with 

an identification of when those kinds of problems are likely to happen, as opposed to coming to me with ‘‘we screwed up’’ after the 

fact. Even in that area, I’m encouraged. 

I was recently in Afghanistan and we built a series of what I call 

data dashboards, which sector by sector identify four to five key 

metrics that would allow us to track our spending in that context, 

and whether it is having the impact we expect and having—and I 

know this is very mechanical, a small red, yellow, or green light 

indicator against each metric so you can see if we’re spending x 

amount of money in the education sector, are we improving the attendance rates for girls, educational quality and building capacity 

in the ministry in the sector that needs to sustain this effort. I 

found the dialogue there was very rich, very honest. 

People want to come forward with what they’re struggling with. 

If we can create the space for that and if we can create a culture 

that celebrates identifying what’s tough and coming up with innovative ways to address it head-on, I think the people and the staff 

are ready to stand up and participate in that. 

HAITI

Senator LEAHY. Well, one good example would be how objective 

a response you can get on our response in Haiti. There are a number of things that went right. There are a number of things many 

of us feel went wrong, and I would like, once you’ve had an evaluation of knowing what went right and what went wrong, I would 

like to sit down with you and see how objective a picture you got 

because we’re going to also have questions in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere, different problems, of course, different situations, but I want to know how objective the reports are that you 

receive. 

Dr. SHAH. Sir, I would look forward to the opportunity to do that. 

We’re engaged in a number of after action reports in that regard. 

I would just add that during the crisis and, of course, it’s an ongoing one, on a daily or weekly basis we were having the dialogue 

around which sectors were working more effectively and which 
83 

ones were not. Areas like sanitation and hygiene in particular, efforts to move and resettle individuals who were at risk of the floods 

and the rains, and we were able to rededicate ourselves and bring 

additional resources to help address some of those sectors that 

were going slower. 

So I appreciate the reporting that took place in that context, but 

I understand your point is a more fundamental one and I look forward to that opportunity. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much. We’ve been joined by Senator Gregg. I’ll yield to you and then we’ll get to Senator Landrieu. 

Senator GREGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Unfortunately, I apologize, Dr. Shah, I’m going to have to leave quickly for 

another meeting. 

But, first, I want to associate myself with the chairman’s opening 

remarks. I think he’s raised a number of very significant and important red flags for the agency, and this subcommittee has a very 

deep interest in making sure those are addressed. It’s a bipartisan 

interest and I hope you’ll respond to those concerns aggressively. 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET

Second, just a quick question: I look at the resources that are 

available and everything you folks want to do and they don’t 

match. Let’s even assume that you get significant increases—which 

is going to be difficult in the climate that we’re functioning in—but 

you’ve got the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), you’ve got 

the Feed the Future Initiative (FTF), and you’ve got the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and I don’t see 

how you do any of those three in as robust a way as you’re suggesting under the resources that are going to be available. 

So I’d like to get a sense of how you think you’re going to do that. 

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you, Senator. I would just say in a generic 

sense we recognize the need to do a better job of setting priorities 

and especially country by country, narrowing the number of sectors 

we might work in so that in each of those sectors we can build real 

technical excellence, stay committed for 5 or 10 years, and see the 

kind of big transformative outcomes we hope to see. 

So part of my leadership, I hope, over time is to narrow our focus 

in countries to those specific sectors that we think are most important in those particular countries and in a way that is consistent 

with how our resources are provided to us. 

Senator GREGG. Take, for example, PEPFAR and MCC. They’re 

supposed to be 10-year-type initiatives and yet I look at your budget and I’m wondering, well, they’re just sort of being atrophied a 

bit and replaced with this FTF Initiative. 

Dr. SHAH. Well, sir, with PEPFAR in particular, I could talk 

through how we’re approaching that because we have launched, as 

you know, the global health initiative and it’s our real aspiration 

to try and get much more efficiency out of the aggregate U.S. Government global health spending. 

So when we add up PEPFAR and CDC spending and USAID 

spending in the global health sector, I think the total budget request is a little bit over $8 billion for 2011. 

You know, I just saw data coming out of Ethiopia and 12 other 

countries where we did a substantive data call. There are real op-
84 

1 Roughly 60 percent of the PEPFAR budget allocated to State is implemented through 

USAID. 

portunities to be more efficient in getting this work done. There are 

environments where we’ll buy a viral load analyzer and put it in 

an environment where we’re serving very few patients and there’s 

a better way to do that. 

There are opportunities for us to integrate our work and by integrating our work across these various programs, to do a better job 

of providing skilled attendants at birth and reducing maternal mortality or do a better job of providing those specific prioritized interventions, like rotavirus and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines, for 

children to go after the big categories of unyielding child mortality. 

So I think our goal is to sort of look at the whole portfolio and 

identify how we can be more efficient in spending those resources 

while also achieving the direct disease outcomes. 

Senator GREGG. Dr. Shah, unfortunately, I have to leave. What 

I’d like to get from you, if you possibly can do this, is take your 

four or five biggest categories and you’ve just listed two of them, 

throw in MCC and FTF, and tell me what’s the 2 year, 3 year, 5 

year, 7 year, and 10 year projection for what you expect those categories to accomplish, how you expect them to be funded, and how 

you expect the funding of the categories to interrelate with each 

other in the context of the very stringent budget that we’re facing. 

I’d appreciate that. 

I apologize for having to run. 

Dr. SHAH. We will do that. Thank you. 

[The information follows:] 

LARGEST FUNDING CATEGORIES

Most USAID programs, as well as independent agencies such as MCC, do not 

have firm multi-year budget plans beyond the amount requested for fiscal year 

2011. Such plans are of course subject to the availability of funding provided in the 

annual appropriations process. In the case of major development assistance initiatives, the President has committed to seek predictable multi-year funding, which 

will be critical to achieving those initiatives’ goals. USAID is currently implementing the majority of funding in three of these—the Global Health Initiative, the 

Feed the Future Initiative, and the Global Climate Change Commitment. —Global Health Initiative (GM).—The President committed to provide $63 billion 

over 6 years to this expanded and comprehensive global health effort. Enacted 

appropriations from the GHCS account (both State and USAID portions) for fiscal year 2009 and 2010 and the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 

total $23.6 billion, leaving $33.4 billion to be funded over the remaining 3 years 

of the initiative (fiscal year 2012–2014) ($6.4 billion is to be funded from other 

accounts).1 By 2015, the GHI aims to reduce mortality of mothers and children 

under five, saving millions of lives; avert millions of unintended pregnancies; 

prevent millions of new HIV, tuberculosis and malaria infections; eliminate 

some neglected tropical diseases; and strengthen local health systems. —Feed the Future Initiative.—The President committed at least $3.5 billion to this 

initiative over 3 years (fiscal year 2010 through 2012). The enacted appropriation for fiscal year 2010 and the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 

total $2.7 billion, leaving $0.8 billion to be funded over the remaining year of 

the initiative. Additional funding would be required in fiscal year 2012 through 

fiscal year 2015 in order to achieve the goals of significantly reducing global 

poverty, hunger and under-nutrition laid out in the Administration’s ‘‘Feed the 

Future Guide,’’ released by Administrator Shah on May 20. 

Global Climate Change Initiative.—The President committed, along with other de- veloped countries, to provide approaching $30 billion in international climate finance over fiscal year 2010–2012. As part of this commitment, the USG also committed to provide $1 billion to REDD∂ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 

Forest Degradation Plus) between 2010–2012, and we are working to meet that 
85 

goal. The enacted appropriation for fiscal year 2010 and the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 total $2.4 billion in direct climate funding, plus additional 

funding from other agencies and co-benefits from other assistance programs. Because the United States did not commit to a specific percentage of this total amount, 

future international climate funding will be determined through the fiscal year 2012 

and subsequent budget processes. The USG also committed with other developed 

counties to jointly mobilize $100 billion per year in international climate finance by 

2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency from developing countries; this funding is intended to be a mix of public and private funding 

streams, and our out-year budgets will contribute toward the public finance portion 

of that goal. 

Senator LEAHY. Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Shah, thank 

you so much for being present this morning and for being so accessible. I’ve enjoyed our conversations on several opportunities since 

you’ve been in your current position and I’m impressed with your 

background and your enthusiasm for what you’re doing. 

I do have, though, some questions and issues I’d like to raise before I get into the specifics on Haiti which you and I spoke about 

on my return just last week. 

I’d like you to clarify for me and, Mr. Chairman, if the staff here 

can help, I’m having a little difficult time with the numbers in 

front of me understanding what exactly is your budget entailing. 

I see different figures. Is it $21 billion out of the total $52 billion? 

Could you just say what your understanding is of the amount of 

money under the control of USAID in this budget for this coming 

year 2011? 

Dr. SHAH. I believe it is approximately in that area. 

Senator LANDRIEU. $21 billion, roughly $21 billion out of $52 billion? 

Dr. SHAH. Correct. And I think one of the things we’re doing as 

part of putting in place a slightly reformed budget process is we 

will be able to do a better job of identifying those resources that 

are specific to USAID programs. 

The current process for budgeting doesn’t break it out that way. 

So it’s been difficult for me to get an answer to that question in 

a way that’s valid. That figure doesn’t necessarily include resources 

that might come to us through an MCC threshold program or 

PEPFAR or other funding streams. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, then I’m glad it’s not just me, Mr. 

Chairman, because my staff and I have been working on this for 

weeks and I’m glad that the head of the agency is having difficulty. 

Well, I’m not happy that the head of the agency is having difficulty 

understanding the budget that he’s tasked to manage, but it makes 

me feel better because we’ve been trying to break these numbers 

out to no avail. 

But I think, Mr. Chairman, it’s extremely important for this subcommittee, in order for us to continue our focus on helping to reform USAID and working for it to become a more effective agency 

as it is our primary arm of bilateral support to our allies and 

friends around the world, to really get a handle on it and to be able 

to break it down so we ourselves can understand where our focus 

needs to be. 

Senator LEAHY. It might also help with the State Department to 

let them know exactly where their money’s going, too. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, absolutely. 
86 

Senator LEAHY. I say this in defense of Dr. Shah. 

Senator LANDRIEU. You know, absolutely. I think it’s just critical, 

which brings me to my questions about Haiti. 

ORPHANS AND VULNERABLE CHILDREN

There’s no question that there were some important steps taken. 

The government and the officials that I met with down there were 

very appreciative of everything that the United States and the 

international partners had done in terms of life saving and distribution of food, et cetera, but as you are personally aware, the 

challenges to Haiti are just enormous, from just basic delivery of 

services, water, sanitation, housing, education, and I went down 

there with several Members particularly focused on children, all 

children but particularly vulnerable children, potentially orphaned 

children, and came away with a couple of thoughts about how we 

might want to proceed and wanted to ask you if you had some 

knowledge of the work going around the effort to provide for the 

first time in Haiti a universal free pre-K through 12 school system 

which may be shocking for people to know doesn’t exist in Haiti 

today. 

It might be one of the reasons why they’re the poorest nation in 

our hemisphere because they virtually have no fundamental school 

system accessible to most families and that the families that are 

sending their kids to school are sending them to inadequate, poorly 

staffed, non-certified teachers in a private setting which isn’t in 

itself a problem, except when it’s inadequate, and using a great 

deal of their small salary, which may be $2 a day, if that much, 

to fund the education of their children. 

Does USAID have a position about the importance or priority of 

this, and could you comment on your interest in potentially maybe 

targeting this as an area that we could see some real improvement? 

Dr. SHAH. I do. Thank you, Senator. I think, in part based on our 

conversation, we also are trying to identify specific budget line 

items that sit in sectors that are called housing or social services 

that would be education-related and pulling that out to back up 

what I’m about to say with the budget numbers. 

But the reality is we are committed to an education strategy in 

Haiti. We have for a number of years been working against a single 

multi-donor strategy that has really pulled the resources of donors 

together against a strategy that was primarily focused on primary 

education and the number of kids that had access to primary education and then secondarily focused, although many of our resources went into this, on teacher training and a number of other 

efforts to improve the quality of education in those environments. 

That was between $12 and $20 million a year, depending on 

which funding streams we count and we had every intention of continuing that going forward pre-earthquake. 

Given the earthquake, there’s obviously a huge need for reconstituted infrastructure and schools and we have built the budget for 

that into the housing budget and I do think that’s an area where 

we want to share with you the assumptions we used in the budget 

planning but we really do recognize the need and our capacity to 
87 

help fill the current gap by engaging in building schools that could 

serve as a platform for a broader range of services. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I would just suggest, Mr. Chairman, the 

members of our subcommittee, that as we look out into the reconstruction of Haiti, that helping the Haitian Government and working with international partners, I understand Canada and France 

want to help lead this effort, to put down as a cornerstone a free 

universal education system for Haiti accomplishes many goals, one 

of which, high on my agenda, is to prevent childhood abandonment. 

The hundreds of thousands of orphans, Mr. Chairman, that are 

in Haiti is because families in many instances give their children 

up hoping they can get an education at one of these over-crowded 

orphanages. They’re both maybe as familiar as they should be with 

the horrific circumstances, even in the best run of orphanages, that 

that’s not happening. 

So that’s, you know, one point, and if I could make my second 

point, I’m also concerned about USAID budget generally. In thinking about serving children, Dr. Shah, separate from their families, 

thinking about the importance of feeding children, providing their 

health, their education in and through families as opposed to sort 

of separate revenue streams that don’t support the permanency 

issue that are so important to children, either to stay with the families to which they’re born or to try to promote through the international laws that we now have developing adoption, both domestic 

and international. 

So I’d just ask you when you look at your budget think about if 

you’re serving children separate from their families, which is not 

the way we do this in the United States. Our system isn’t perfect, 

but our programs serve children in and through families which 

keeps our abandonment rate relatively low, keeps our adoption rate 

relatively high, okay, and so that’s just my final point about the 

way we structure our programs is serving children in and through 

families, and I’ll come back to a second round. 

Thank you. 

Senator LEAHY. Senator Brownback. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Shah, good 

to have you here, and, Mr. Chairman, my last appropriations cycle, 

I want to recognize you and your longstanding commitment to 

these difficult issues around the world. You’ve hung in here for 

years and done a great job of it and I really want to recognize and 

acknowledge that. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, Senator Brownback, on my time, I appreciate that very much. You’ve worked with me on landmines and on 

so many other issues and on issues of poverty, of health around the 

world, something that you don’t see in Kansas, I don’t see in 

Vermont, but part of our common humanity, we respond to and I 

applaud you for what you’ve done on that. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thanks. Thank you. Dr. Shah, I want to 

raise a couple issues, if I can with you. 

SUDAN

This is the watershed year for Sudan on the Comprehensive 

Peace Agreement. They had the vote. It seemed like some questionable issues happened on the presidential vote, but as you know, the 
88 

referendum on the south happens in January 2011. I mean, this is 

the big deal and my sense is that you probably will see the south 

separate from the north and they’re going to need a lot of help if 

they’re going to sustain it. 

This Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s been one of the great 

successes, I think, of foreign policy for the last decade or so for us 

that took a 20-year conflict in Africa and has ended. I’ve been involved in the issue. I’m sure you have. Yet you’ve cut the economic 

support funding for Sudan going into this watershed year and I 

really hope you look at other ways you can support that. 

I don’t know if you’ve been in the south of Sudan yet yourself. 

If you haven’t, I would sure urge you to put it high on your priority 

list. Great people, wonderful folks, but this is the big one and 

they’re going to need you guys’ help and focus. 

I’ve got a couple of other issues I want to raise with you, but I 

hope that’s something you can do. Have you been into the south of 

Sudan yet? 

Dr. SHAH. Not yet, sir, but I am planning to visit there in about 

1 month. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Good, good. You need to and they need us. 

NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES

On neglected diseases, this is an area that Senator Sherrod 

Brown and I have worked a lot on on getting a priority review process so that you can get some of the neglected diseases that so hit 

the Third World countries and this is kind of building off of Senator Gregg’s comment about where are you—how are you going to 

do all this with the money you’ve got, and I like your heart and 

I like your attitude, but there is a resource issue here and it’s unlikely to get a whole lot bigger just in the near term. 

Having said that, I’m the ranking member on the Agriculture 

Subcommittee which has Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and 

we’re pushing FDA to do a shortened pathway for neglected diseases as a way of reducing the cost of these things and trying to 

get more investment in them. 

I hope you can take a look at that and back this cause because 

this is the way we can get our marketplace to help fund these neglected diseases that typically hit the Third World and have very 

small markets. We can’t afford to have a process that costs $700 

million to develop a drug that has a market potential of a $150 million. I’m pulling that number out of the air but not the first number and that is being pursued by FDA now and if you were to get 

and your agency backing of that and get involved in this review 

process, we’ve got a special committee that’s set up to do this, good 

people on it, that can be a big help and I think it’s one where we 

can start to whittle away at some of these neglected diseases that 

cost us so much. 

AGRICULTURE

A final issue I wanted to throw out to you was the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) and USDA is building a National 

BioAgriTerrorism Facility. That may sound like a long ways away 

from your work but a good portion of the diseases they’re going to 
89 

study are animal diseases that come out of the Rift Valley. I think 

actually maybe as many as 10 of 12 are their primary targets. 

I think this is a chance for us to network with veterinarians 

trained in Africa and that region to scale up their ability or help 

train them because it helps us and then you’re off of somebody 

else’s budget, as well, and Department of Homeland Security’s 

which is a great place to be because that’s one we tend to think, 

well, okay, let’s put more money in this one and I think there’s a 

good chance that we could build some upscale programs of training 

better veterinary medicine people in Africa to be eyes and ears for 

us and help develop awareness of when some of these things are 

breaking out or what’s coming because the Rift Valley has been 

such a deadly zone for some really nasty things coming out. 

But we can use it to train up a level of people that can go back 

and do great things in a country. Part of the Green Revolution was 

Norman Borlaug training a generation of plant geneticists in the 

Third World. Why can’t we do that toward animal agriculture, particularly in Africa, that is a source of their wealth and revenue for 

so many people and do it under our security umbrella so it helps 

leverage your dollars? 

I point these out as ones that I think are key for us moving forward on some really meaty areas and I’m hoping in particular you 

can help us out with Sudan. I said I was going to end with that, 

but there’s one final thought. 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Senators Durbin, Feingold, and I sent you a letter on Congo, 

Eastern Congo. We’ve been involved in the conflict commodity issue 

in that area. I think it’s at the core of stabilizing Congo and probably four countries in that region if we can get the conflict commodities out of the means of commerce that funds the rebels in the 

regions. Similarly, it’s the blood diamonds of east Africa is what 

this amounts to. 

We asked you to look at putting on a mining specialist to really 

help track some of these issues and work on them. I hope you can 

look at it because I think it’s really key for us to get Congo and 

probably, as I mentioned, four countries in that region more stabilized so we get less money going to the protagonists that are in 

that region. 

That’s a lot, but I wanted to throw that out to you. 

Dr. SHAH. Thank you. Should I address that? 

Senator BROWNBACK. Go ahead. 

Senator LEAHY. Please. I know you’ve also had some firsthand 

experience with the Green Revolution. So please go ahead. 

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you. On Sudan, I appreciate the comments. I look forward to getting out to our offices there as soon as 

possible. We’ve provided, as you know, sir, $95 million in support 

for the election and the referendum activities, including some of 

the monitoring activities that have been more visible in recent 

days. 

We are very focused on expanding support for local governance 

and local service delivery in the south in anticipation of how important such activities will be in the future, and I would just use this 

as an opportunity to highlight the fact that our mission in Juba, 
90 

as you know, has nearly 17 U.S. direct hires and PSCs and 75 Foreign Service Nationals—professional and support staff, which 

makes us really the largest organized donor presence in that environment. 

We recognize the responsibility that comes with that to work 

with partners, including the World Bank and other donors, to try 

to mobilize efforts in a very connected way to those local leaders 

that have capacity there. 

NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES

On neglected tropical diseases, I completely agree with your 

point about a shortened development and approval cycle. I will follow up directly with Administrator Hamburg on that and I think 

there are also opportunities to work with the World Health Organization which has the mandate for those types of governing regulations for most of the countries where we would introduce those. 

The only thing I would add is that often the firms we work with 

in this space benefit from having simple market introduction plans, 

a thoughtful demand analysis, and a forecast for how product 

would get to needy populations and so sometimes small investments in those types of activities can unlock real private sector innovation and activity and we will follow up on that. 

FOOD SECURITY

And finally, on the question with respect to USDA and DHS, I’m 

actually quite familiar with that particular facility and I agree. I 

think there are tremendous opportunities with Rift Valley livestock 

diseases and with veterinary training which, of course, large vet 

gaps are a big gap here in the United States and abroad. 

As part of our Food Security Initiative, we’ve allocated $145 million for agricultural-related research for fiscal year 2011. A significant proportion of that would be executed in partnership with 

USDA and used in the livestock area where they do some unique 

work, both related to this facility and more broadly. So I look forward to moving that forward. I think that is a critical and completely unaddressed opportunity in the food security space. 

And finally, on Congo, I agree and, in addition, we’ve been working on following up based on that letter and will continue to share 

information with your office, but thank you. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the extra 

time. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Senator Brownback. 

PROCUREMENT

The thought occurred to me when we were talking earlier about 

how you evaluate these contracts. What’s your largest contract? 

Say $10, $50, $100 million? 

Dr. SHAH. I think significantly larger than that, sir. I don’t know 

which ones are the largest, but I’ve seen several that are several 

hundred million dollars. 

Senator LEAHY. Then I would keep the pressure on to get that. 

The system that was supposed to be ready in 2008, long before you 

were there, to get it ready, and I hope you understand when I ask 
91 

these questions, I think you are and will be an inspiration to the 

people in USAID. There are some superb men and women working 

at USAID. There are many who worry about the mission being 

overwhelmed by bureaucracy. They want you to give them the direction. They want to break through. They want to do the things 

that inspired them to come to USAID in the first place and so we’re 

putting in your lap years of neglect and problems and say please 

fix it. 

And you will have the support here to fix it. Senator Brownback 

mentioned neglected diseases, something that this subcommittee 

actually started focusing on about 5 years ago and now it has become, both in the last administration and this administration, an 

important priority and please keep it a priority. 

You’re being asked to increase your staff and programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan. Both countries face severe security threats. 

They have weak governments, endemic corruption, inadequate 

housing and office space for USAID personnel. And you can’t get 

USAID staff out in the field to monitor programs because of the obvious security problems. 

We learned in Iraq that spending lots of money quickly can end 

up withy a lot of fraud and waste. Now Afghanistan, the tribal 

areas of Pakistan, I can see the potential and I’m sure you can for 

enormous corruption and waste. 

How do you get a handle on that and protect the men and 

women who have to manage these programs? 

AFGHANISTAN

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you, sir. Having just returned from Afghanistan, I can attest to the fact that our more than 400 USAID 

staff there that are working as part of the overall mission experience, all of the things you just described, threats to their personal 

security, challenge around their ability to be mobile in areas where 

programs are active, and to some degree challenging housing situations, to say the least, but they are very committed to the work. 

In general, I think the way to address this is to break down our 

work into core sectors. 

In each sector, we are in the process of refining and developing 

a coherent strategic approach that clearly distinguishes between 

things we might do to achieve short-term security and stability objectives in the context of an active military campaign and how one 

builds a bridge to sustainable long-term development in those settings. 

To give you an example, I was in Arghandab, an area outside of 

Kandahar City, and in a 6-month period of time, through a combination of agricultural vouchers for inputs, some technical training, cash for work, short-term jobs programs,—— 

Senator LEAHY. Irrigation. 

Dr. SHAH [continuing]. And improvements in roads and irrigation, we’ve seen a huge improvement in agricultural productivity in 

that particular area, an area that covers about 35,000 people. Over 

a 6-month period those improvements have led, by all accounts, to 

significant improvements in the security and stability situation in 

that region, so much so that our military colleagues believe fewer 
92 

kinetic operations will be required in that particular space as a result. 

But we know that we have much more to do to track those resources that are getting spent and to make sure that we have a 

glide path where over 2 or 3 or 4 years we can take that spending 

to an appropriate per capita level of investment so that the Government of Afghanistan and other partners can sustain it over the 

long run and that’s been the focus of how that team is planning 

to take those programs forward. 

So I think it is doable. We just have to be focused on the right 

metrics as opposed to annual or monthly spend rates or something 

like that. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, yes, I don’t consider success based just on 

what the spend rate is, especially when you’re in an area where so 

much can be stolen. I wish we could go to a website and find that 

x number of dollars has gone to this NGO near Kandahar or wherever it might be and here’s what they’re spending it on. 

Dr. SHAH. I don’t believe I can find that online today. I do think 

we ought to get to that point. Part of what we try to do is—— 

Senator LEAHY. I want to avoid what happened in Iraq where, 

you know, cargo planes full of money came in. Now we’re still 

searching for the hundreds of millions of dollars that were stolen, 

probably billions of dollars, some by Americans, but certainly a lot 

by the people in the country we’re helping. 

Dr. SHAH. That’s certainly a risk, sir, and I think we are trying 

to put in place a system whereby whenever we invest directly in 

a ministry or a local institution, we put in place a significant certification process and reserve auditing capabilities that allow us to 

track resources as they’re spent in the health sector. The Ministry 

of Health in Afghanistan is perhaps a good example of that, where 

it took a number of years to build the actual financial disbursement and contracting mechanism in a transparent and accountable 

way and now we’re able to flow more resources through that system. I think that’s a model for what we’re trying to do. 

Senator LEAHY. Nothing would bring about more effort to cut off 

money if it turns out that it wasn’t spent well and I’m not—and, 

Dr. Shah, understand that I’m not expecting you to have total success in everything you try. 

When I was a prosecutor, I used to tell the assistants in my office 

who would tell me they’d never lost a case, I’d say then you’re not 

trying enough cases, and if you say we’ve never had a failure on 

any program, you’re not taking enough risks. Imagine the number 

of things Dr. Borlaug tried before he got where he was. You worked 

for the Gates Foundation and they set some pretty tight controls 

about what’s going to be successful, but they’ll be the first to admit 

that sometimes things don’t work. 

So keep trying. We’re going to be coming back on Haiti and again 

I really want to see when you have more material on what worked, 

and what didn’t. I will have more questions on Afghanistan and 

Iraq. I’ve been there and to Pakistan. I know the need, you’ve got 

some real, real problems there, and I look at, of course, Africa 

where we can do so much, provided the aid can get to the people. 

Senator Landrieu, you’ve been waiting patiently. 
93 

Senator LANDRIEU. That’s okay, Mr. Chairman. I’m very happy 

to follow your line of questioning and agree with your points and 

comments, and I, too, am very anxious for USAID to be reformed 

in a way that we can be effective, it can be expression of the values 

of the American people and their deep desire to be helpful and generous, but also their hesitancy to throw good money after bad, to 

not account for the millions of dollars they’re contributing, and it’s 

discouraging to them. 

This agency should operate in the most transparent, accountable 

way possible and when it operates that way, it encourages, I think, 

literally billions of dollars of private donations that Americans and 

American corporations and individuals, faith-based communities 

are willing to contribute to the effort, if they believe that it’s being 

done in a comprehensive and strategic way, which brings me to one 

of your strategic efforts I want to commend and ask you to commend and that is coordinating across U.S. agencies and other donors and partners country to country. 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

My experience in visiting not nearly as many countries as the 

chairman but at least a half dozen, is the common complaint that 

USAID does virtually no coordinating among its own agencies, let 

alone other NGOs, and you must be aware, Dr. Shah, that there 

are somewhere between 900 and 1,000 independent NGOs and 

IGOs operating in Haiti with virtually little coordination and again 

if USAID isn’t stepping up to do that coordination, my question is 

is Canada or is, you know, France? 

If we are not trying to coordinate, is there a country in the world 

that is tasked with coordinating so that these public and private 

monies in every country can be spent more strategically, and is 

that a role that you want USAID to take on? 

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you for those comments. I think in Haiti, 

in particular, I’d just share one anecdote, that 2 days into the crisis 

and the earthquake we made a small grant to InterAction in order 

to help them set up a hub to coordinate the activities of NGOs 

through that context. I think it was a good first step and it made 

a big difference, both because it brought especially the largest 

international NGOs that are the conduit for large streams of funding from a range of partners to a single point of coordination and 

it gave us someone to engage with when we wanted to address the 

NGO community specifically. 

Through that effort they were also able to identify certain NGOs 

that, frankly, were doing things that were counterproductive, and 

relatively irresponsible in terms of the way they were distributing 

food or doing other things that didn’t meet best practices. 

So I think that helped and that is an example of how USAID, 

through leveraging partners in that community, can do a better job 

of helping NGOs organize among themselves. 

The other comment I’d like to make on that is the Global Health 

Initiative, I think, is a good example of where we’re actually trying 

to turn the coordination point into the relevant country ministry. 

So if you look at Ethiopia or Tanzania, what we would ultimately 

like to do is have the Ministry of Health in those places (a) be 

aware of what their NGOs and our implementing partners are 
94 

doing in countries, (b) take some responsibility for offering direction to those NGOs, and (c) develop a financial sustainability plan 

so that there’s some sense of who’s going to provide these services 

in a sustained long-term way over 5, 7, or 10 years. I think if we 

can do those types of things, it will start to improve the coordination of those NGOs and, frankly, it will improve our partnership 

with countries who regularly complain that they don’t know where 

our money is going and they don’t know what we’re doing in their 

country. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I appreciate that and I heard in your 

answer that, yes, you’re committed to organization and coordination and even more importantly or equally importantly trying to 

build capacity within the countries the appropriate ministries to be 

able to identify and coordinate some of those activities, and I know 

that would be very important to the Haitian Government that, 

frankly, in their view expressed to me feels overwhelmed with just 

identifying the number of different groups and NGOs and coordinating that effort and you want NGOs to be helpful but they’re not 

a substitute for effective governance in country. 

UNICEF

Number 2. I have been over the years getting more and more 

concerned about UNICEF which is one of our—I think we contribute, Mr. Chairman, over $100 million to UNICEF and despite 

my personal conversations with leaders of UNICEF over time, 

Carol Bellamy when she led the organization, Ann Veneman, and 

now the incoming director, Tony Lake, I’m concerned about 

UNICEF’s position seemingly to be, despite comments to the contrary, their position against adoption, both in country and international. 

I want to know if you’ve come across any conversations with 

UNICEF or thoughts that you might have about ways that we 

could encourage UNICEF to understand the extraordinary capacity 

among families in the world, excess capacity, literally excess budgets within families, excess rooms within homes to take in orphans 

in an appropriate way when children are truly orphaned to give 

them a chance at a permanent nurturing family. 

Are you willing to maybe express some of these views to 

UNICEF or to work with me to kind of change a little bit of their 

outlook in this direction? 

Dr. SHAH. Yes, Senator, I am, and we had a chance yesterday to 

meet with Tony Lake and I think he’s also open to exploring what 

we can do differently to be more effective across the broad goal of 

child protection and using a broad range of strategies. 

I will say in Haiti, we had experiences where we worked effectively with UNICEF and experiences where things were challenging, but I do want to credit them with conducting a data collection exercise across the different institutions that were labeled orphanages that provided some basic data in what was otherwise a 

numbers-deficient environment to determine where the kids were, 

in which institutions, and how would we provide them with services. That sort of work did allow us, together with our military colleagues, to target those institutions for distribution of food and 

water in the early days of the crisis. 
95 

So, you know, I think there are areas where they’ve done effective work and there are probably areas where there could be an expansion of the thinking. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Okay. Well, I’ll look forward to working with 

you on that and just to finalize, the first lady of Haiti is extremely 

enthusiastic and excited and, of course, is a graduate of George 

Washington right here. The University Collaborative has really 

come together to support her and her work, really focused on this 

education opportunity for children in Haiti and for long-term development of Haiti, Mr. Chairman. 

I couldn’t think of a better way to invest U.S. dollars and I think 

our taxpayers would agree to give a free quality universal education to the 4.5 million children in Haiti that really have no access 

today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. There are so many opportunities and 

sometimes with the simple things. 

Dr. Borlaug and I were friends and I admired him greatly and 

I look at what he accomplished, but also I had mentioned earlier 

the Op-Ed piece by Bono. In fact, without objection, I’ll put that in 

the record at the end of this hearing. 

[The information follows:] 

[From The New York Times, April 17, 2010] 

AFRICA REBOOTS

(By Bono) 

I spent March with a delegation of activists, entrepreneurs and policy wonks 

roaming western, southern and eastern Africa trying very hard to listen—always 

hard for a big-mouthed Irishman. With duct tape over my gob, I was able to pick 

up some interesting melody lines everywhere from palace to pavement . . . 

Despite the almost deafening roar of excitement about Africa’s hosting of soccer’s 

World Cup this summer, we managed to hear a surprising thing. 

Harmony... flowing from two sides that in the past have often been discordant: 

Africa’s emerging entrepreneurial class and its civil-society activists. 

It’s no secret that lefty campaigners can be cranky about business elites. And the 

suspicion is mutual. Worldwide. Civil society as a rule sees business as, well, a little 

uncivil. Business tends to see activists as, well, a little too active. But in Africa, at 

least from what I’ve just seen, this is starting to change. The energy of these opposing forces coming together is filling offices, boardrooms and bars. The reason is that 

both these groups—the private sector and civil society—see poor governance as the 

biggest obstacle they face. So they are working together on redefining the rules of 

the African game. 

Entrepreneurs know that even a good relationship with a bad government stymies 

foreign investment; civil society knows a resource-rich country can have more rather 

than fewer problems, unless corruption is tackled. 

This joining of forces is being driven by some luminous personalities, few of whom 

are known in America; all of whom ought to be. Let me introduce you to a few of 

the catalysts: 

John Githongo, Kenya’s famous whistleblower, has had to leave his country in a 

hurry a couple of times; he was hired by his government to clean things up and then 

did his job too well. He’s now started a group called Inuka, teaming up the urban 

poor with business leaders, creating inter-ethnic community alliances to fight poverty and keep watch on dodgy local governments. He is the kind of leader who gives 

many Kenyans hope for the future, despite the shakiness of their coalition government. 

Sharing a table with Githongo and me one night in Nairobi was DJ Rowbow, a 

Mike Tyson doppelga ̈nger. His station, Ghetto Radio, was a voice of reason when 

the volcano of ethnic tension was exploding in Kenya in 2008. While some were encouraging the people of Kibera, one of the largest slums in Africa, to go on the rampage, this scary-looking man decoded the disinformation and played peacemaker/ 
96 

interlocutor. On the station’s playlist is Bob Marley and a kind of fizzy homespun 

reggae music that’s part the Clash, part Marvin Gaye. The only untruthful thing 

he said all evening was that he liked U2. For my part, I might have overplayed the 

Jay-Z and Beyonce ́ card. ‘‘They are friends of mine,’’ I explained to him, eh, a lot. 

Now this might be what you expect me to say, but I’m telling you, it was a musician in Senegal who best exemplified the new rules. Youssou N’Dour—maybe the 

greatest singer on earth—owns a newspaper and is in the middle of a complicated 

deal to buy a TV station. You sense his strategy and his steel. He is creating the 

soundtrack for change, and he knows just how to use his voice. (I tried to imagine 

what it would be like if I owned The New York Times as well as, say, NBC. Someday, someday . . .). 

In Maputo, Mozambique, I met with Activa, a women’s group that, among other 

things, helps entrepreneurs get seed capital. Private and public sectors mixed easily 

here, under the leadership of Luisa Diogo, the country’s former prime minister, who 

is now the matriarch in this mesmerizing stretch of eastern Africa. Famous for her 

Star Wars hairdo and political nous, she has the lioness energy of an Ellen Johnson 

Sirleaf, a Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala or a Grac ̧a Machel. 

When I met with Ms. Diogo and her group, the less famous but equally voluble 

women in the room complained about excessive interest rates on their microfinance 

loans and the lack of what they called ‘‘regional economic integration.’’ For them, 

infrastructure remains the big (if unsexy) issue. ‘‘Roads, we need roads,’’ one entrepreneur said by way of a solution to most of the obstacles in her path. Today, she 

added, ‘‘we women, we are the roads.’’ I had never thought of it that way but because women do most of the farming, they’re the ones who carry produce to market, 

collect the water and bring the sick to the clinics. 

The true star of the trip was a human hurricane: Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese entrepreneur who made a fortune in mobile phones. 

I fantasized about being the boy wonder to his Batman, but as we toured the continent together I quickly realized I was Alfred, Batman’s butler. Everywhere we 

went, I was elbowed out of the way by young and old who wanted to get close to 

the rock star reformer and his beautiful, frighteningly smart daughter, Hadeel, who 

runs Mo’s foundation and is a chip off the old block (in an Alexander McQueen 

dress). Mo’s speeches are standing-room-only because even when he is sitting down, 

he’s a standing-up kind of person. In a packed hall in the University of Ghana, he 

was a prizefighter, removing his tie and jacket like a cape, punching young minds 

into the future. 

His brainchild, the Ibrahim Prize, is a very generous endowment for African leaders who serve their people well and then—and this is crucial—leave office when 

they are supposed to. Mo has diagnosed a condition he calls ‘‘third-termitis,’’ where 

presidents, fearing an impoverished superannuation, feather their nests on the way 

out the door. So Mo has prescribed a soft landing for great leaders. Not getting the 

prize is as big a story as getting it. (He doesn’t stop at individuals. The Ibrahim 

Index ranks countries by quality of governance.) 

Mo smokes a pipe and refers to everyone as ‘‘guys’’—as in, ‘‘Listen, guys, if these 

problems are of our own making, the solutions will have to be, too.’’ Or, in my direction, ‘‘Guys, if you haven’t noticed... you are not African.’’ Oh, yeah. And: ‘‘Guys, 

you Americans are lazy investors. There’s so much growth here but you want to 

float in the shallow water of the Dow Jones or Nasdaq.’’ 

Mr. Ibrahim is as searing about corruption north of the Equator as he is about 

corruption south of it, and the corruption that crosses over... illicit capital flight, 

unfair mining contracts, the aid bureaucracy. 

So I was listening. Good for me. But did I actually learn anything? 

Over long days and nights, I asked Africans about the course of international activism. Should we just pack it up and go home, I asked? There were a few nods. 

But many more noes. Because most Africans we met seemed to feel the pressing 

need for new kinds of partnerships, not just among governments, but among citizens, businesses, the rest of us. I sense the end of the usual donor-recipient relationship. 

Aid, it’s clear, is still part of the picture. It’s crucial, if you have HIV and are 

fighting for your life, or if you are a mother wondering why you can’t protect your 

child against killers with unpronounceable names or if you are a farmer who knows 

that new seed varietals will mean you have produce that you can take to market 

in drought or flood. But not the old, dumb, only-game-in-town aid—smart aid that 

aims to put itself out of business in a generation or two. ‘‘Make aid history’’ is the 

objective. It always was. Because when we end aid, it’ll mean that extreme poverty 

is history. But until that glorious day, smart aid can be a reforming tool, demanding 

accountability and transparency, rewarding measurable results, reinforcing the rule 
97 

of law, but never imagining for a second that it’s a substitute for trade, investment 

or self-determination. 

I for one want to live to see Mo Ibrahim’s throw-down prediction about Ghana 

come true. ‘‘Yes, guys,’’ he said, ‘‘Ghana needs support in the coming years, but in 

the not-too-distant future it can be giving aid, not receiving it; and you, Mr. Bono, 

can just go there on your holidays.’’ 

I’m booking that ticket. 

In South Africa, with Madiba, the great Nelson Mandela—the person who, along 

with Desmond Tutu and the Edge, I consider to be my boss—I raised the question 

of regional integration through the African Development Bank, and the need for real 

investment in infrastructure... all the buzzwords. As Madiba smiled, I made a 

note to try not to talk about this stuff down at the pub—or in front of the band. 

‘‘And you, are you not going to the World Cup?’’ the great man chided me, changing the subject, having seen this wide-eyed zealotry before. ‘‘You are getting old and 

you are going to miss a great coming-out party for Africa.’’ The man who felt free 

before he was is still the greatest example of what real leadership can accomplish 

against the odds. 

My family and I headed home... just in time, I was getting carried away. I 

was going native, aroused by the thought of railroads and cement mixers, of a different kind of World Cup fever, of opposing players joining the same team, a new 

formation, new tactics. For those of us in the fan club, I came away amazed (as I 

always am) by the diversity of the continent... but with a deep sense that the 

people of Africa are writing up some new rules for the game. 

Senator LEAHY. But one of the things that really struck me, he 

was talking with women in Mozambique. That’s the first place we 

used the Leahy War Victims Fund. 

He quotes a woman who said, ‘‘Roads. We need roads. Today,’’ 

she added, ‘‘we women, we are the roads carrying things.’’ And I 

hear this over and over again. Don’t ship us huge containers of food 

and agricultural products from the United States. Help us build 

some simple roads. If you raise produce on a farm but to sell it, 

the market is 12 miles away, 15 miles away, but it’s going to take 

you 3 days to get it there, then it doesn’t do you any good to raise 

it. You can’t sell it. If you have a simple road, that 15 miles, you 

can get there in an hour’s time. 

JUSTICE REFORM

One last thing or last two things I’d like to talk about. One is 

justice reform. We spend tens of millions of dollars, maybe hundreds of millions of dollars to reform dysfunctional justice systems 

around the world. You can’t have a democracy, a real democracy 

without a functioning justice system. Honest prosecutors, honest 

and independent judges. 

Look at Central America and we see places where people get 

away with murder literally or where judges are bribed or intimidated. Haiti is another example. There’s never been the political 

will at the top. 

Is that an area where you will watch and evaluate because we’ll 

spend the money if you think it’s going to accomplish something, 

but I’ve been so disappointed seeing how little has been accomplished. 

Dr. SHAH. Yes, sir. We will watch that. I think you’re right to 

point that out and I would just highlight that it is both a combination of programmatic activity, training and supporting judges and 

prosecutors. There are some efforts. I was just part of the rehearsal 

concept drill in Afghanistan where there was a really substantive 

conversation about what it would actually take to support the informal justice system and the transition to more formality in that 
98 

system, as well. We’re trying some unique things in our program 

there. 

But I think you’re absolutely right and it often is understated 

that the political will to create space for that to be effective is a 

precondition to success at scale. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, I remember a group came here from one 

country to talk to me and they said, we want to look at your justice 

system and we talked about that. They asked, is it true that in the 

United States people actually sue the government on occasion? I 

said, yes, it happens often, and they said, and is it true that sometimes the government loses? I said, yes. They said, and so you then 

replace the judge? And then when I explained that, no, we don’t, 

they finally began to understand what an independent judiciary is, 

and we have so many people in this country willing to take the 

time to go to these countries and work with them and help them, 

but too often they get lip service while they’re there and then the 

bribes continue or the replacement of a judge who rules against the 

government or so forth. 

CLIMATE CHANGE

The administration plans to spend about $1.4 billion on climate change programs in fiscal year 2011, $646 million is through 

USAID and the State Department, part of it’s to protect forests. Of 

course, the Amazon is the largest and the most threatened from 

large hydro projects and agribusiness and logging and mining, a lot 

of it illegal. 

How much are you planning to spend for forest protection programs in Brazil or in the other Andean American countries? 

FOREST PROTECTION ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AMERICA

Dr. SHAH. In Brazil, USAID plans to spend 100 percent of the $14 million in Biodiversity and Sustainable Landscapes funds for 

forest protection programs in fiscal year 2010. 

The USAID Regional Program’s Initiative for Conservation in the Andean Amazon will spend $7 million this year on forest protection 

in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. 

USAID plans to spend the following amounts for forest protection 

programs in other South American countries in fiscal year 2010: 

Bolivia: $2.5 million in Biodiversity funds; Colombia: $3 million in 

Biodiversity and Sustainable Landscapes funds; Ecuador: $3.1 million in Biodiversity funds; Paraguay: $1 million in Biodiversity 

funds; and Peru: $7.5 million in Biodiversity and Sustainable 

Landscapes funds. 

In summary, USAID plans to spend the following amounts for 

forest protection programs: $14 million in Brazil, $7 million on the 

Regional Program, and $17.1 million in other South American 

countries. 

Total planned expenditures on forest protection programs is $38.1 million in fiscal year 2010. 

I’d also add that in the context of this, we’re also exploring certain private sector partnerships to see if we can partner with private foundations and other institutions that have an interest in 

this area and might partner with us in some of these initiatives in 

Indonesia and other parts of the world. 
99 

Senator LEAHY. Well, of course, at the same time the State Department and others are going to have to bring some pressure on 

some of the governments to actually do the things necessary. 

The Millennium Challenge Corporation requires governments to 

commit to do certain things if they want our aid, like reducing corruption or increasing their own budgets for healthcare and education. 

Do you think USAID should be doing the same thing? In other 

words, a quid pro quo, or is that naı ̈ve to think that you can do 

that in some areas? 

Dr. SHAH. I think, in general, the efforts to have long-term effective sustainable development that’s broad enough that it reaches a 

large percentage of a population in country does require some significant degree of country ownership. MCC, of course, encapsulates 

that in a very specific set of indicators that then gives them a go/ 

no go against a very large program in countries. 

I think the approach we’re taking, especially in the Food Security 

Initiative, is a little bit more specific. If a country is meeting its 

obligations to increase its domestic spending in agriculture, and 

they are signing up to bringing together all of the stakeholders and 

private sector partners against a country plan, then we will stand 

with them and help them build the capacity to be successful over 

the long run. 

So it’s a different, I think, interpretation of the concept, but the 

underlying concept that country ‘‘skin in the game’’ and country 

ownership is a precondition to long-term success I think was probably a shared one. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you very much. I’ll put the rest of my 

questions in the record. 

I’ll yield to Senator Bond. 

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Dr. 

Shah, I apologize to you both for arriving so late. I had a visit from 

a high White House official talking about a rather pressing issue 

that went on and one and on. 

Senator LEAHY. Aren’t they all? 

Senator BOND. Well, yeah, and I—but to me, this is extremely 

important and I’m delighted to welcome Dr. Shah today because we 

believe on—I know the chair and I agree that your leadership is 

critically important at this time. 

USAID may not get all the glory on TV but when you get out 

and help the world’s poorest people with global issues, clean water, 

child mortality, HIV, malaria, it’s integral to, I think, a broader national policy, smart power, which Secretary Clinton has advocated 

so strongly and I believe in, and I know, having traveled around 

the globe extensively, I’ve seen where USAID can be a tremendous 

force for winning the hearts and minds of the people in other countries and dealing with those problems that are a concern to us as 

good neighbors or people in my case Christians should do. 

But a key to expanding that service is getting enough Foreign 

Service officers in USAID. We want to do that. We need to see 

USAID build a core capacity and lessen its over-reliance on contractors, to increase accountability and effectiveness. 

Now, as you know, biotechnology is an important component of 

smart power. Not only does it contribute to food security and better 
100 

nutrition now, but it’s absolutely essential if we’re going to feed a 

global population of 9 billion people. We cannot get there without 

the most modern farming techniques and biotechnology. 

Dr. Shah, I know you’ve been a longstanding supporter of plant 

biotechnology. I want to—I can spend until early afternoon talking 

about that, but obviously I would not. 

ENERGY

I need to turn to another subject that’s of high priority. A couple 

weeks ago I visited India to discuss energy and a number of other 

matters. Energy, of course, is important in India as it is in the 

United States and they are overwhelmingly dependent upon coal to 

fuel their growth, to supply the energy to bring 1 billion population 

with tremendous poverty up to basic living standards and given the 

abundance and affordability of coal on their country, as ours, we 

have to make it cleaner, more efficient, and I was very impressed 

about an initiative USAID has undertaken in India. 

Over the course of the USAID-India Greenhouse Gas Pollution 

Prevention or GGPP Project, it has cumulatively avoided CO2 emissions from USAID-supported coal activities nearly a 100 million 

tons in the last 10 years. However, I was very concerned when U.S. 

and Indian officials told me that those efforts are no longer possible 

under constraints contained in a 2010 funding bill. 

The constraints direct that no funds shall be utilized for any nuclear, coal, or other fossil fuel technology or production and without 

that, India’s going to go back to burning coal without the reduction 

in emissions. They have made progress and I’d be very interested 

in hearing your thoughts on this and hope that we can work together with the chairman and the ranking member to find an appropriate solution that will allow us to resume making CO2 emission reductions and making coal more energy efficient and cleaner 

for the people of India. 

Where do you stand on that? 

Dr. SHAH. Well, thank you for mentioning that, Senator, and for 

highlighting some of the efforts that have been undertaken there. 

The low emission growth strategies for countries and especially 

mid-level economies is an important part of our overall Climate 

Change Program and will be a larger component of what we do 

going forward. We, of course, have, as part of the Climate Change 

Initiative, a broader approach but that’s an important piece. 

I’d have to look more specifically at the 2010 funding constraints 

that preclude us from being able to work—— 

Senator BOND. Would you look at that and get recommendations 

because I heard a very, very strong objection from both sides, both 

Indian and the people working for us in that country about the 

benefit that that project that was just cut off had provided. So if 

you would get back to me and obviously to the subcommittee, but 

I would like to see a copy of whatever you transmit to the chair 

and ranking member. 

[The information follows:] 
101 

2010 FUNDING CONSTRAINTS FOR THE USAID/INDIA GREENHOUSE GAS POLLUTION

PREVENTION PROJECT

To comply with fiscal year 2010 guidance from Congress, USAID is unable to use 

climate change funds to continue supporting activities under the Greenhouse Gas 

Pollution Prevention Project. USAID is reviewing whether other funds can be identified outside of the funds appropriated for Global Climate Change clean energy program to support the project which is designed to introduce cleaner coal technologies 

and better operating and maintenance equipment and practices to make coal-fired 

electricity plants more energy efficient and cleaner. The project also reduces CO2

emissions with respect to a business-as-usual situation where no interventions are 

made. 

To support the goals of the October 2009 Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation on Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Clean Energy and Climate Change between the United States and India, USAID is in the process of designing a new clean energy program to help India promote end-use energy efficiency 

and deploy renewable energy technologies that will reduce the need to build as 

many CO2 emitting coal-fired powerplants. The new program will support India’s efforts to transition to an economy that produces lower volumes of greenhouse gases 

while meeting their poverty reduction goals. 

Senator BOND. Let me jump back into my favorite area, biotechnology. You’re familiar with the Donald Danforth Plant Science 

Center and Roger Beachy. They’ve been improving crop yields even 

though Roger’s decamped to Washington and Cassava, for example, 

is a root crop that’s primary food for 750 million people. It’s a poor 

nutritional content, susceptible to many pathogens, particularly in 

Asia. One-third is lost every year to viral diseases and the Danforth Center has been the lead on two major projects to address nutritional content, have been focusing on increasing Casava’s zinc, 

iron, protein, vitamin A and E content, lowering the level of naturally occurring cyanide which we would think would want to be reduced, and reducing spoilage, and it’s also done research to increase folic acids and minerals in sweet potato and to develop more 

protein, enhance sorghum and peanuts, and they have research 

partners in Africa. 

Now, a lot of people normally talk about biotech and you can see 

a lot of people yawn, but this to me is key to feeding people, hungry 

people in the world, and I think projects like this will be critical 

in applying the most significant business thinking. 

I urge you to continue supporting plant biotech research in Global Hungry and Security Initiative, particularly in places like Africa 

and Southeast Asia. I’d like to hear your comments on USAID’s 

priorities in the area of plant biotechnology development. 

Dr. SHAH. Thank you, Senator. I’ll start by just acknowledging 

your leadership on this issue. I’ve had the chance to work with 

both the Danforth Center and Roger Beachy over the years and appreciate the unique leadership that those institutions and he 

brings. 

I think there’s been a false distinction in choice set up between 

overall sustainability and core productive agriculture productivity 

and I think we have an opportunity to be significant advocates for 

using the broad range of technological solutions against those core 

constraints that are holding back productive agriculture in much of 

the world and disproportionately in some of the poorest parts of the 

world where rain-fed production is the predominant form of production and where small holder producers suffer from hunger and 

starvation when they don’t have enough productivity. 
102 

We’ve identified and gone through a process of identifying a set 

of core traits and core crops in which we want to work. As you 

would acknowledge, cassava is, of course, the second highest source 

of calories in Africa and is a very important crop and on that list 

and traits, like improved biofortification, improved drought tolerance, improved use characteristics, like lower cyanide content, in 

cassava are all priorities in that—— 

Senator BOND. Sounds good to me. 

Dr. SHAH [continuing]. Context. 

We’re right now in the process of trying to ascertain what that 

means for our existing CRSP programs that fund U.S. land grant 

universities to work on a range of crops, peanuts, soybeans, sorghum, et cetera, and trying to take those CRSP programs and 

move them forward in a way that is more aligned against the set 

of priorities that have been identified by crop and by constraint 

and that unlock the broad set of tools and technologies that could 

be used to create advances. 

And I’d say the final piece is that we will remain committed to 

working with countries on regulatory systems and in country testing and training. What we have found, of course, is in areas like 

drought-tolerance maize, when a country, like Uganda, builds a 

testing facility on their own agriculture research station and invests in training their own scientists, that seems to unlock the political energy to put in place a regulatory system that allows their 

people to have access to those technologies. So we think that’s an 

important part of this, as well. 

Senator BOND. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Shah. Mr. Chairman, if you’d indulge me one more minute, talking about the regulatory matter is very important. 

I talked with the Secretary of Agriculture in India and other 

leaders. I talked to Secretary Bahsu and he understands the importance of transgenic seeds. Right now Aubergine, what you call eggplant, is the high controversy. I understand from a very good friend 

of ours that right now the Aubergine crop requires a 120 pesticide 

spray and the farmers won’t even eat the darn vegetable because 

there’s so much pesticide on it. 

I’ve talked with the Ambassador and others in India and they 

say, oh, well, we need to listen to our people who are concerned 

about it. They’re listening to NGOs who make their living off of 

raising fear about GMOs and as a result they are missing the opportunity to increase the harvest of a very important vegetable that 

can be produced with far less chemical pesticides. 

Mr. Chairman, again, please accept my sincere thanks and my 

apologies for this. 

Senator LEAHY. We’ve worked together on so many of these 

things and this will be your last hearing with the Director of 

USAID. 

Senator BOND. That’s why I wanted to get several bites, but I’m 

going to be—I hope he will contact me. We look forward to working 

with him because I—— 

Senator LEAHY. As I said before you came in, I’m delighted that 

he’s there because there have been problems at USAID that you 

and I have discussed before. 

Senator BOND. Oh, yes, I remember those. 
103 

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

Senator LEAHY. But I think Dr. Shah’s the right person at the 

right time and the right place and there are many, many very dedicated men and women at USAID and I think they breathed a sigh 

of relief when he arrived, and with that, we’ll stand in recess. 

Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Shah. 

Dr. SHAH. Thank you. 

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were 

submitted to the Agency for response subsequent to the hearing:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PATRICK J. LEAHY

TRANSITION INITIATIVE MODEL

Question. Although we often hear about how slow and bureaucratic most of 

USAID is, we hear the opposite about the Office of Transition Initiatives. That office 

focuses on conflict-prone countries, and countries making the transition from crisis 

to stability. The office is relatively small but agile, with flexibility to target resources quickly at the local level. Why can’t more of USAID function like that office? 

Answer. I am pleased that our Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is recognized 

for effectively and efficiently managing in very difficult and fluid situations. OTI is 

charged with responding to a particular set of countries that are conflict prone, are 

in conflict, or those in transition to stability. 

OTI’s business model involves flexible planning and management structures, including short-term strategies geared to short-term objectives along with systems for 

procurement, staff and monitoring/reporting developed for those purposes. These 

structures rely on constant innovation, rapid procurement systems, and intensive, 

hands-on management tailored to dynamic, fluid environments enabling OTI to 

react quickly to evolving situations on the ground. OTI fosters a culture of 

entrepreneurism while placing more authority in the field. Staff are encouraged to 

seek alternate solutions in program design and execution, and to support smallscale, rapid, and tactical investments in community or national projects that address a country’s transition or momentum toward recovery from conflict. 

The Agency does take OTI’s experience into account in its larger programming response. These include a greater focus on the use local implementing organizations, 

more rapid program monitoring and feedback systems, and flexible planning where 

authorities are in the field, which permits rapid programming responses. Additionally, having Indefinite Quantity Contracts (IQCs) in place as rapid response mechanisms will continue to be an important component to the Agency’s ability to respond 

more efficiently. 

As part of our Agency’s reform process, I am closely looking at OTI’s business 

model and lessons learned and will identify other elements which can be replicated 

to the rest of the Agency. I acknowledge that not all tools are applicable to longerterm development, but in a changing world, we must consider and integrate all the 

innovative approaches we can. 

USAID EFFECTIVENESS

Question. You have said that restoring USAID’s effectiveness is your top priority 

and that this will require USAID to make significant changes in the way that it 

is organized and operates. What do you mean by ‘‘restoring USAID’s effectiveness’’, 

what do you see as most needing change, and what changes are you making? 

Answer. I have recently outlined a new approach to high-impact development 

which will lie at the center of restoring USAID’s effectiveness. In four core areas 

we’re already putting this approach into practice. 

First, USAID is contributing to the U.S. commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), not simply by delivering services to those in need, but through 

building sustainable systems that will transform healthcare, education, food security 

and other MDG areas. 

Second, we are strengthening our ability to invest in country-owned models of inclusive growth and development success. USAID will promote these outcomes in a 

focused set of areas in countries that are reasonably well-governed, economically 

stable, globally connected and market oriented. We will undertake these enhanced 

efforts in a whole-of-government context using complementary assets like trade, private investment and diplomacy to increase the effectiveness of our development cooperation and increase the chances of success. 
104 

Third, we are identifying new ways of leveraging science and technology to develop and deliver tools and innovations which we believe can be transformational. 

I am proud of USAID’s past support for the Green Revolution, and this is the time 

to recalibrate our current science and research portfolio around today’s set of grand 

challenges such as climate change, global health, and food security. 

Finally, we need to continue to bring USAID’s expertise to bear on some of the 

most daunting national security challenges we face as a Nation including stabilizing 

countries like Afghanistan. 

Restoring USAID’s effectiveness requires more than these new focus areas. We 

have to transform the way we do work. USAID’s development experts will provide 

increased support to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship. USAID staff will 

be encouraged to take risks in a smart and calculated way to achieve greater returns in international development. To support this, we’re putting in place a range 

of policy reforms and new business models that will help our operations improve 

and enable our people to be development entrepreneurs. 

USAID is establishing a new policy bureau and resource planning capacity that 

will be instrumental in managing coherent development approaches and strengthening accountability for our work. In addition, USAID is planning to roll out a 

meaningful set of procurement reforms. These will involve doing a better job of 

building local capacity and investing in local institutions where we work overseas. 

This summer we will launch a set of talent management and human resource reforms that are key to our future as an effective Agency. This will include doing a 

better job of leveraging the skills and knowledge of USAID’s Foreign Service National staff. Finally, in the fall we will launch a major monitoring, evaluation and 

transparency initiative. 

I am convinced if we can re-establish a rigorous program evaluation function and 

be the most transparent development agency in the world, that the American people 

will increase their support of our work. I believe this package of reforms will restore 

USAID’s effectiveness and provide the means to restore the Agency to a world-class 

institution. 

PSD–7/QDDR

Question. What impact do you anticipate the White House’s ‘‘Presidential Study 

Directive on U.S. Development Policy’’ and the Secretary of State’s ‘‘Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review’’ will have on USAID? 

Answer. I anticipate that both exercises, which are closely coordinated, will have 

a very positive impact on USAID and U.S. global development efforts. Both the PSD 

and QDDR are premised on the strong belief in the importance of international development and of strengthening USAID. I am gratified by the support of President 

Obama and Secretary Clinton in this regard. 

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Question. One of the Administration’s new initiatives includes a request for $100 

million for a new ‘‘Global Engagement’’ account. My understanding is this account 

would provide economic growth, academic exchanges and partnerships, and other 

education-related assistance to partner countries with mainly Muslim populations, 

and would likely be administered by USAID. 

These are all things that USAID and the State Department already do. Why does 

a new account need to be created instead of providing support for these activities 

through existing mechanisms? Which countries are likely to receive this assistance? 

Answer. President Obama’s vision of Global Engagement is that the U.S. Government engages the world in a spirit of respect and partnership to achieve shared 

goals. One of his priorities in this area is to broaden the relationship between the 

United States and Muslim-majority countries around the world. The Department of 

State and USAID requested a separate line item to catalyze the start-up and initial 

tracking of funding for a cohesive set of activities to address the objectives of Global 

Engagement. 

This is not a request for a separate account, but rather a separate line item within the Economic Support Fund account. This will allow us to track the activities 

that are started-up with these funds, and these new activities will complement and 

strengthen ongoing foreign assistance efforts. In future years, we may incorporate 

these activities into ongoing program and country budgets. 

The countries to receive this assistance are still to be determined, and but will 

be regionally-diverse with significant Muslim populations. 
105 

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Question. USAID is dramatically increasing its staffing and programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both countries suffer from severe security threats, weak governments and corruption, and inadequate office and housing space for USAID personnel. 

We hear frequently how difficult it is for USAID staff to get out into the field to 

monitor programs. We also learned in Iraq that spending lots of money quickly in 

places like Afghanistan or the tribal areas of Pakistan is a recipe for waste, fraud 

and abuse. 

How are you dealing with these challenges, and are you trying to spend too much 

money too fast—as was the case in Iraq and Afghanistan by the previous administration? 

Answer. The issue of adequate oversight for and thoughtful expenditure of resources in an environment such as Afghanistan and Pakistan is a challenge that 

we face on a daily basis. In order to tackle that challenge and protect U.S. taxpayer 

funds, we are engaging in several concurrent efforts in both countries. I will mention them briefly here and provide additional detail below. Specifically, we are increasing our staffing (both program and oversight) in both countries; we are developing alternative mechanisms of oversight in those situations where direct access 

to activities is not yet possible; and, through the provision of technical assistance, 

we are increasing the capacity of local institutions to provide services to the population and make assistance efforts more sustainable. 

While USAID is increasing our staffing and programs in both Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, you are correct that it has been historically difficult for us to get out and 

monitor projects. As you are aware, we are working intensively with Missions in 

both countries to adequately plan, recruit, and retain qualified staff to be present 

both in the capital cities and throughout the countryside. These new personnel have 

a wide variety of backgrounds including financial management, agriculture, governance, and engineering and add much needed development assistance to these countries, while at the same time providing the essential oversight element to our activities. 

From a security perspective, Afghanistan and Pakistan will provide us with significant challenges for the foreseeable future insofar as access to activities is concerned. In light of that fact, we have developed alternative mechanisms of providing 

oversight to our activities in situations when direct access is not possible. In Afghanistan we are developing ‘‘movement agreements’’ with our military colleagues 

in order to enable our civilian PRT representatives to regularly access project sites 

within their respective provinces instead of being confined to their PRT. Furthermore, in both countries, we rely extensively on our locally engaged staff, Quality Assessment/Quality Control (QA/QC) contractors—the staff of which is largely locally 

employed, and implementing partners to provide oversight functions when direct access by United States direct hire personnel is not possible. 

As you are aware, we are working to change our business model to include increased implementation through local entities (government and private sector) that 

have been or will be assessed and certified to receive USAID funding directly. A 

large portion of requested funds for the fiscal year 2010 supplemental and fiscal 

year 2011 will be dedicated to that effort. This will serve to increase the capacity 

of national, provincial and local entities while making assistance more sustainable. 

Finally, I would also like to note that we work collaboratively with our Inspector 

General communtiy in both countries, who provide the needed audit and investigative review of activities to provide assistance in a well directed manner. 

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Question. A recent survey about the State Departments ICASS process, which 

consolidates agency administrative operations overseas like motor pools, 

warehousing, supplies, maintenance and other functions, was a logical idea to improve efficiency and save money. But the survey suggests that for USAID, ICASS 

has caused more problems than it has solved. 

The overwhelming majority of USAID overseas employees reported that their 

work had become harder and more costly. There were complaints about access to 

vehicles, billing mistakes, time consuming reporting, and an increase in tension between USAID and the State Department. Have you looked at this? Is it time to review the consolidation and determine whether it really makes sense for USAID? 

Answer. The Agency is working in collaboration with the Department of State to 

jointly review our experience with administrative consolidation through the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The QDDR leadership formed 

a Joint USAID/State Task Force to survey and examine the impact of consolidation 
106 

overseas recognizing that problems exist. The review is focusing on the 21 posts 

where USAID missions overseas are collocated on secure Embassy compounds and 

where functions have been substantially consolidated for 3 years. 

During the course of the QDDR Task Force review, the American Foreign Service 

Association (AFSA) sent out its own survey worldwide to all USAID employees of 

all employment categories, and the results show that the implementation of consolidation caused significant confusion and highlighted several support services and 

procedures that have been problematic at many Embassies. 

State Department and USAID management are addressing these problem areas 

in a systematic manner. Areas for improvement are being identified, and the Task 

Force will recommend measures to strengthen joint State/USAID support platforms 

within ICASS. Both the Department and USAID have affirmed that the goal of this 

review is to achieve optimum consolidation of overseas administrative services provided to State and USAID under the ICASS platform based on the principles of the 

most cost efficient, and effective service provision to support our respective diplomatic and development missions. 

The Task Force has reviewed existing consolidation data and annual ICASS Satisfaction Surveys, and detailed questionnaires were completed by both the USAID 

missions and the ICASS Service Providers (Embassy Management Officers). Existing cost data in Washington also is being reviewed, and USAID missions are providing updated cost information on post-consolidation operations. 

The interim data collected by the Task Force shows that improvements can be 

made that will result in a higher quality and more effective shared platform overseas that serves State and USAID as well as the many other U.S. Government 

ICASS customer agencies. The keys to making those improvements and to success 

in optimizing consolidation appear to be: (1) recognition that consolidation has been 

successful for most services at most posts, but that problems must be actively addressed; (2) improved accountability by the service provider; (3) communication on 

best practices, roles, and responsibilities; (4) incorporating additional flexibilities for 

USAID when necessary to meet the Agency’s mission-critical needs; and (5) addressing individual posts directly where broad service issues may exist. 

The Task Force study will help USAID and State reach agreement on shared 

principles for consolidating services in the future, and the QDDR operational plan 

will also seek to identify opportunities to enhance and optimize consolidation efforts 

at all posts. 

NGO TRANSPARENCY

Question. Budget transparency is a big issue these days, in an effort to reduce 

opportunities for corruption. USAID gives a lot of money to NGOs—nongovernmental organizations—for projects to promote transparency in other countries, but 

what about the NGOs themselves—do they have to make public their own project 

budgets so people can see what they are doing with the money they receive from 

USAID? 

Answer. U.S. NGOs (PVOS) that receive grants from USAID are awarded funding 

based on budgets submitted with their applications. Project budgets are part of 

grant agreements which, in turn, are public documents. Expenditures are reported 

quarterly and are subject to audit. As 501(c)(3) organizations, each must file an annual Form 990 with the Internal Revenue Service. PVOs registered with USAID 

must submit audited financial statements annually to the USAID Registrar. These 

include all funding received from USAID whether as grants or contracts. 

Question. If I want to know what NGO ‘‘x’’ is doing with money from USAID for 

a ‘‘rule of law’’ project, or a ‘‘budget transparency’’ project, or some other project, 

in the Philippines, or Mozambique, or El Salvador, can I go to a website and find 

a breakdown for how the funds are being spent—does USAID require this kind of 

transparency from its own grantees? If not, should it? 

Answer. At present there is no website where you can find out expenditure information for NGOs that have received funding from USAID. USAID does have an internal capacity for accrual reporting but this information only provides amounts obligated and gross expenditures, not budget details. For USAID to collect and enter 

detailed expenditure information for each contract and grant for website use would 

require a major investment in software development as well as staff time. 

Project budgets are part of grant agreements which, in turn, are public documents. The Agreement Officers’ Technical Representatives responsible for the 

awards receive quarterly financial reports and can request more detailed information on expenditures. All grants and contracts are subject to audit. 

While we would agree that to model the transparency they are encouraging 

through USAID-funded projects, PVOs and others should make their financial re-
107 

1While USAID supports greater transparency, there is recognition that the release of information may at times undermine other U.S. government priorities and interests. For this reason, 

the agency supports principled exceptions in line with FOIA guidelines. 

porting under our grants available to the public. USAID’s present grant agreements 

do not require this. This requirement could be added to all grant agreements but 

limitations exist on financial reporting requirements per U.S. Federal regulations 

(22 CFR 226.52). Should a member of the public request this information from 

USAID, it could be made available. 

Working with the Department of State, USAID is committed to increasing the 

ease of access by the public to information about foreign assistance expenditures 

and performance. While there are limits to the level of detail for individual grants 

and contracts that we will be able to provide to the public, we are aggressively 

working to improve our ability to respond to in-country information needs about 

USAID activities, and to provide more real-time, complete, and understandable information to the general public. 

In line with USAID’s demonstrated commitment to transparency, the agency supports NGOs adhering to similarly high standards in making expenditures public. A 

coalition of diverse international humanitarian and development NGOs is currently 

working to identify common principles of development effectiveness, including budget transparency. USAID is very supportive of this process and the desired outcome 

for greater downstream transparency 1. NGOs are in the best position to establish 

common reporting standards amongst their peers and we are supportive of their efforts in this area. 

GLOBAL HUNGER AND FOOD SECURITY INITIATIVE

Question. The President’s ‘‘Food for the Future’’ initiative calls for $3.5 billion over 

3 years to combat hunger through agricultural development and improved nutrition. 

The Administration has requested $1 billion for agriculture programs and $200 million for nutrition programs in fiscal year 2011 to support this initiative. 

I have seen many anti-hunger initiatives over the years, all well intentioned, and 

most have had positive impacts. But hunger remains a global problem. Assuming 

you get the funds you have requested and everything goes as planned, can you predict what portion of the world’s hungry people will no longer be hungry after this 

3 year initiative? 

Answer. As there is no fully agreed-upon number of the ‘‘world’s hungry,’’ even 

though the figure of 1 billion is commonly used, it is difficult to predict what portion 

of this population will no longer be hungry after the 3-year Feed the Future initiative. However, an international investment of $22 billion pledged by L’Aquila partners, which includes the Feed the Future initiative, invested in country-led, evidence-based strategies, will help to raise incomes, improve nutrition, and enhance 

food security in several ways: 

—Based on detailed cost-benefit analysis, we estimate that as a baseline level, 

donor programs can directly increase the incomes of at least 40 million people 

in developing countries, including 28 million people who are currently living on 

incomes of less than $2 per day and 13 million people living in extreme poverty 

on less than $1.25 per day. 

—We can amplify these returns through significant increases in investments in 

agricultural research, as well as its adaptation and dissemination. Through 

‘‘game changing’’ innovations like improved crop varieties, the direct benefits of 

other assistance programs can be extended to many millions of other beneficiaries. 

—These gains will be further amplified by the complementary investments by 

host country governments, and by private sector investors, both domestic and 

international. Our investments in infrastructure, extension services, and other 

areas, complemented by government public investments, will make private investments more attractive, adding to the impact of the program. 

—Based on our preliminary analysis, we can reach 25 million children in developing countries with a package of nutrition interventions that has been demonstrated to reduce child mortality, improve nutrition outcomes, and protect 

human capital. These interventions are projected to reduce the number of stunted children by nearly 10 million, and the number of underweight children by 

more than 4 million. 

Specifically, with regard to the U.S. Government’s Feed the Future initiative, our 

development and diplomatic support for game-changing policy reforms that expand 

opportunities for widespread private entrepreneurship—including full participation 

by women—can also accelerate a process of sustainable country-driven development 
108 

that extends the benefits of this initiative to millions more consumers who cannot 

be reached directly with project-based assistance as food supplies increase, prices 

decline and markets become more stable. 

Question. Is the President’s plan part of something bigger, coordinated with what 

other donors and governments in developing countries are doing? 

Answer. Yes, the Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative, also known as 

‘‘Feed the Future,’’ is part of the larger L’Aquila Global Food Security Initiative 

(AFSI). G8 and other donor countries have pledged $22 billion to increase investments in agriculture and nutrition to improve the lives of the world’s hungry. The 

USG has pledged $3.5 billion as its part of AFSI. That pledge is contingent on the 

availability of appropriated funds. 

The Feed the Future initiative has been developed to accelerate progress toward 

Millennium Development Goal #1 (MDG 1) in countries committed to achieving that 

goal of halving hunger and poverty by 2015. It is designed to improve the coordination and integration of USG resources capable of contributing to global food security 

now and in the future. Five principles will guide our common approach: Invest in 

country-owned food security plans; strengthen strategic coordination among key 

stakeholders; ensure a comprehensive approach; leverage the benefits of multilateral 

institutions; and deliver on sustained and accountable commitments. 

Further evidence of a larger effort is the Administration’s commitment to multilateral engagement through the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program 

(GAFSP), a new trust fund administered by the World Bank. The United States contributed approximately $67 million to the Fund in 2010. Other donors who have 

made commitments to the fund to date include Canada ($230 million), Spain ($95 

million), South Korea ($50 million) and the Gates Foundation ($30 million). 

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Question. You request $2.9 billion for Development Assistance, a $460 million increase from last year. The bulk of the increase is for agriculture and food security, 

climate change, and education programs. 

More money is one thing, and I strongly support these programs as I believe 

many others do. But using money effectively is another, especially in a time of budget constraints. What steps do you plan to take to get better results from the money 

you already have, before spending more? 

Answer. To achieve better results from existing resources, the Feed the Future 

(FTF) and the Global Climate Change (GCC) initiatives as well as USAID Basic and 

Higher Education programs will include robust monitoring and evaluation systems, 

as well as results frameworks that are underpinned by rigorous analyses. An expanded set of performance indicators will include the collection of baseline data for 

both initiatives that will focus on impact. The United States is working with other 

donors to ensure that we do not duplicate efforts. Within the U.S. Government, initiatives are being coordinated to leverage the technical expertise of various agencies 

providing more efficient delivery of assistance. Internally, USAID is aligning efforts 

to achieve far greater integration across its global, regional and country-focused programs. 

Furthermore, focusing on achieving better results includes not only an emphasis 

on monitoring and program evaluations, but also on communications, knowledge 

management and training for staff and USAID counterparts. 

CLIMATE CHANGE

Question. How much are you requesting globally for programs to protect biodiver- sity (the Congress provided $205 million in fiscal year 2010)? Answer. The Administration requested $113.9 million in fiscal year 2011 for biodiversity conservation. This request was developed through a bottom-up request 

process. USAID Missions faced a constrained budget scenario, requiring difficult 

choices in their budget requests for fiscal year 2011. 

MICROCREDIT LOANS

Question. The New York Times ran an article recently about lending institutions 

that charge exorbitant interest rates on micro-loans and reap big profits (see attached article, ‘‘Banks Making Big Profits from Tiny Loans’’). One bank in Mexico 

is cited as charging poor entrepreneurs an incredible 125 percent annual interest 

rate on its micro-loans. Your fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $230 million 

for micro-enterprise and micro-finance programs, which have consistently received 

support from this subcommittee. 

What is the average interest rate of loans charged by micro-lending institutions 

that receive USAID support, and how does this rate compare to the global average 
109 

for micro-loans? How frequently does USAID receive information on changes in the 

rates of interest these institutions charge? 

Answer. USAID does not currently collect information on the interest rates of its 

partners around the world; rather, it focuses its efforts on promoting development 

of sustainable microfinance sectors across the developing world, which requires that 

microfinance institutions be allowed to set competitive interest rates. USAID guidelines for its microfinance programs require responsible practices regarding interest 

rates and other lending policies. 

Recognizing that the need to ensure sustainability of micro-finance services in economic environments where investment risks are high often requires MFIs to establish relatively high interest rates, USAID provides a range of support to MFIs designed to improve efficiency, reduce risk and, thereby, to reduce the interest rates 

required for sustainable cost recovery. For example, USAID helps MFIs overcome 

the challenges of attracting a broad base of funding, introducing alternative delivery 

mechanisms to reduce operational costs, and identifying more efficient ways to reach 

remote, poor populations while keeping operating costs low. USAID also employs 

guarantee programs through the Development Credit Authority (DCA) to increase 

access to low-cost commercial funds for MFIs. 

USAID recognizes that competition works best when interest rates are presented 

to borrowers in clear and transparent terms, so that they have the ability to rationally choose among lenders. For this reason, USAID will be providing support this 

fiscal year to the ‘‘Smart Campaign’’ led by the Center for Financial Inclusion at 

ACCION International. As part of this initial pilot, the Campaign will work with 

MFIs around the world to ensure they provide transparent, respectful and prudent 

financial services, including transparency surrounding their interest rate. Therefore, 

while USAID does not currently collect information on the interest rates of its partners around the world, support for the Smart Campaign movement—as well as the 

anticipated push from donors, practitioners, and investors in the years to come— 

will help USAID continue to promote development of the microfinance sector, including competitive interest rates. 

According to USAID policy, before signing an agreement to provide assistance to 

any microfinance institution, the Mission must determine that the institution has 

full and effective latitude to set interest rates and fees at full cost-covering levels; 

the institution’s management is prepared to charge interest rates and fees on loans 

that are high enough to cover the program’s full long-run costs; the institution can 

attain full financial sustainability on the MFI’s financial service activities within no 

more than 7 years of the initial provision of USAID assistance; and the institution 

will use USAID assistance to expand the availability of financial services to microentrepreneurs and other poor people. 

Also, the MFI must have a plan to reach full financial sustainability, including 

a timetable and benchmarks to track its progress. USAID’s annual Microenterprise 

Results Report (MRR) tracks the financial sustainability of the MFIs supported by 

our funds. In fiscal year 2008, 75 percent of institutions were reported as fully sustainable. 

[From The New York Times, April 13, 2010] 

BANKS MAKING BIG PROFITS FROM TINY LOANS

(By Neil MacFarquhar) 

In recent years, the idea of giving small loans to poor people became the darling 

of the development world, hailed as the long elusive formula to propel even the most 

destitute into better lives. 

Actors like Natalie Portman and Michael Douglas lent their boldface names to the 

cause. Muhammad Yunus, the economist who pioneered the practice by lending 

small amounts to basket weavers in Bangladesh, won a Nobel Peace Prize for it in 

2006. The idea even got its very own United Nations year in 2005. 

But the phenomenon has grown so popular that some of its biggest proponents 

are now wringing their hands over the direction it has taken. Drawn by the prospect 

of hefty profits from even the smallest of loans, a raft of banks and financial institutions now dominate the field, with some charging interest rates of 100 percent or 

more. 

‘‘We created microcredit to fight the loan sharks; we didn’t create microcredit to 

encourage new loan sharks,’’ Mr. Yunus recently said at a gathering of financial officials at the United Nations. ‘‘Microcredit should be seen as an opportunity to help 

people get out of poverty in a business way, but not as an opportunity to make 

money out of poor people.’’ 
110 

The fracas over preserving the field’s saintly aura centers on the question of how 

much interest and profit is acceptable, and what constitutes exploitation. The noisy 

interest rate fight has even attracted Congressional scrutiny, with the House Financial Services Committee holding hearings this year focused in part on whether some 

microcredit institutions are scamming the poor. 

Rates vary widely across the globe, but the ones that draw the most concern tend 

to occur in countries like Nigeria and Mexico, where the demand for small loans 

from a large population cannot be met by existing lenders. 

Unlike virtually every Web page trumpeting the accomplishments of microcredit 

institutions around the world, the page for Te Creemos, a Mexican lender, lacks 

even one testimonial from a thriving customer—no beaming woman earning her 

first income by growing a soap business out of her kitchen, for example. Te Creemos 

has some of the highest interest rates and fees in the world of microfinance, analysts say, a whopping 125 percent average annual rate. 

The average in Mexico itself is around 70 percent, compared with a global average 

of about 37 percent in interest and fees, analysts say. Mexican microfinance institutions charge such high rates simply because they can get away with it, said 

Emmanuelle Javoy, the managing director of Planet Rating, an independent Parisbased firm that evaluates microlenders. 

‘‘They could do better; they could do a lot better,’’ she said. ‘‘If the ones that are 

very big and have the margins don’t set the pace, then the rest of the market follows.’’ 

Manuel Ramı ́rez, director of risk and internal control at Te Creemos, reached by 

telephone in Mexico City, initially said there had been some unspecified ‘‘misunderstanding’’ about the numbers and asked for more time to clarify, but then stopped 

responding. 

Unwitting individuals, who can make loans of $20 or more through Web sites like 

Kiva or Microplace, may also end up participating in practices some consider exploitative. These Web sites admit that they cannot guarantee every interest rate 

they quote. Indeed, the real rate can prove to be markedly higher. 

Debating Microloans’ Effects 

Underlying the issue is a fierce debate over whether microloans actually lift people out of poverty, as their promoters so often claim. The recent conclusion of some 

researchers is that not every poor person is an entrepreneur waiting to be discovered, but that the loans do help cushion some of the worst blows of poverty. 

‘‘The lesson is simply that it didn’t save the world,’’ Dean S. Karlan, a professor 

of economics at Yale University, said about microlending. ‘‘It is not the single transformative tool that proponents have been selling it as, but there are positive benefits.’’ 

Still, its earliest proponents do not want its reputation tarnished by new investors 

seeking profits on the backs of the poor, though they recognize that the days of just 

earning enough to cover costs are over. 

‘‘They call it ‘social investing,’ but nobody has a definition for social investing, nobody is saying, for example, that you have to make less than 10 percent profit,’’ said 

Chuck Waterfield, who runs mftransparency.org, a Web site that promotes transparency and is financed by big microfinance investors. 

Making pots of money from microfinance is certainly not illegal. CARE, the Atlanta-based humanitarian organization, was the force behind a microfinance institution it started in Peru in 1997. The initial investment was around $3.5 million, including $450,000 of taxpayer money. But last fall, Banco de Credito, one of Peru’s 

largest banks, bought the business for $96 million, of which CARE pocketed $74 

million. 

‘‘Here was a sale that was good for Peru, that was good for our broad social mission and advertising the price of the sale wasn’t the point of the announcement,’’ 

Helene Gayle, CARE’s president, said. Ms. Gayle described the new owners as committed to the same social mission of alleviating poverty and said CARE expected to 

use the money to extend its own reach in other countries. 

The microfinance industry, with over $60 billion in assets, has unquestionably 

outgrown its charitable roots. Elisabeth Rhyne, who runs the Center for Financial 

Inclusion, said in Congressional testimony this year that banks and finance firms 

served 60 percent of all clients. Nongovernmental organizations served 35 percent 

of the clients, she said, while credit unions and rural banks had 5 percent of the 

clients. 

Private capital first began entering the microfinance arena about a decade ago, 

but it was not until Compartamos, a Mexican firm that began life as a tiny nonprofit organization, generated $458 million through a public stock sale in 2007, that 

investors fully recognized the potential for a windfall, experts said. 
111 

Although the Compartamos founders pledged to plow the money back into development, analysts say the high interest rates and healthy profits of Compartamos, 

the largest microfinance institution in the Western Hemisphere with 1.2 million active borrowers, push up interest rates all across Mexico. 

According to the Microfinance Information Exchange, a Web site known as the 

Mix, where more than 1,000 microfinance companies worldwide report their own 

numbers, Compartamos charges an average of nearly 82 percent in interest and 

fees. The site’s global data comes from 2008. 

But poor borrowers are often too inexperienced and too harried to understand 

what they are being charged, experts said. In Mexico City, Maria Vargas has borrowed larger and larger amounts from Compartamos over 20 years to expand her 

T-shirt factory to 25 sewing machines from 5. She is hazy about what interest rate 

she actually pays, though she considers it high. 

‘‘The interest rate is important, but to be honest, you can get so caught up in work 

that there is no time to go fill out paperwork in another place,’’ she said. After several loans, now a simple phone call to Compartamos gets her a check the next day, 

she said. Occasionally, interest rates spur political intervention. In Nicaragua, 

President Daniel Ortega, outraged that interest rates there were hovering around 

35 percent in 2008, announced that he would back a microfinance institution that 

would charge 8 to 10 percent, using Venezuelan money. 

There were scattered episodes of setting aflame microfinance branches before a 

national ‘‘We’re not paying’’ campaign erupted, which was widely believed to be 

mounted secretly by the Sandinista government. After the courts stopped forcing 

small borrowers to repay, making international financial institutions hesitant to 

work with Nicaragua, the campaign evaporated. 

A Push for More Transparency 

The microfinance industry is pushing for greater transparency among its members, but says that most microlenders are honest, with experts putting the number 

of dubious institutions anywhere from less than 1 percent to more than 10 percent. 

Given that competition has a pattern of lowering interest rates worldwide, the industry prefers that approach to government intervention. Part of the problem, however, is that all kinds of institutions making loans plaster them with the ‘‘microfinance’’ label because of its do-good reputation. 

Damian von Stauffenberg, who founded an independent rating agency called 

Microrate, said that local conditions had to be taken into account, but that any firm 

charging 20 to 30 percent above the market was ‘‘unconscionable’’ and that profit 

rates above 30 percent should be considered high. 

Mr. Yunus says interest rates should be 10 to 15 percent above the cost of raising 

the money, with anything beyond a ‘‘red zone’’ of loan sharking. ‘‘We need to draw 

a line between genuine and abuse,’’ he said. ‘‘You will never see the situation of poor 

people if you look at it through the glasses of profit-making.’’ 

Yet by that measure, 75 percent of microfinance institutions would fall into Mr. 

Yunus’s ‘‘red zone,’’ according to a March analysis of 1,008 microlenders by Adrian 

Gonzalez, lead researcher at the Mix. His study found that much of the money from 

interest rates was used to cover operating expenses, and argued that tackling costs, 

as opposed to profits, could prove the most efficient way to lower interest rates. 

Many experts label Mr. Yunus’s formula overly simplistic and too low, a route to 

certain bankruptcy in countries with high operating expenses. Costs of doing business in Asia and the sheer size of the Grameen Bank he founded in Bangladesh 

allow for economies of scale that keep costs down, analysts say. ‘‘Globally interest 

rates have been going down as a general trend,’’ said Ms. Javoy of Planet Rating. 

Many companies say the highest rates reflect the costs of reaching the poorest, 

most inaccessible borrowers. It costs more to handle 10 loans of $100 than one loan 

of $1,000. Some analysts fear that a pronounced backlash against high interest 

rates will prompt lenders to retreat from the poorest customers. 

But experts also acknowledge that banks and others who dominate the industry 

are slow to address problems. 

Added Scrutiny for Lenders 

Like Mexico, Nigeria attracts scrutiny for high interest rates. One firm, LAPO, 

Lift Above Poverty Organization, has raised questions, particularly since it was 

backed by prominent investors like Deutsche Bank and the Calvert Foundation. 

LAPO, considered the leading microfinance institution in Nigeria, engages in a 

contentious industry practice sometimes referred to as ‘‘forced savings.’’ Under it, 

the lender keeps a portion of the loan. Proponents argue that it helps the poor learn 

to save, while critics call it exploitation since borrowers do not get the entire 

amount up front but pay interest on the full loan. 
112 

LAPO collected these so-called savings from its borrowers without a legal permit 

to do so, according to a Planet Rating report. ‘‘It was known to everybody that they 

did not have the right license,’’ Ms. Javoy said. 

Under outside pressure, LAPO announced in 2009 that it was decreasing its 

monthly interest rate, Planet Rating noted, but at the same time compulsory savings were quietly raised to 20 percent of the loan from 10 percent. So, the effective 

interest rate for some clients actually leapt to nearly 126 percent annually from 114 

percent, the report said. The average for all LAPO clients was nearly 74 percent 

in interest and fees, the report found. 

Anita Edward says she has borrowed money three times from LAPO for her hair 

salon, Amazing Collections, in Benin City, Nigeria. The money comes cheaper than 

other microloans, and commercial banks are virtually impossible, she said, but she 

resents the fact that LAPO demanded that she keep $100 of her roughly $666 10- 

month loan in a savings account while she paid interest on the full amount. 

‘‘That is not O.K. by me,’’ she said. ‘‘It is not fair. They should give you the full 

money.’’ 

The loans from LAPO helped her expand from one shop to two, but when she 

started she thought she would have more money to put into the business. 

‘‘It has improved my life, but not changed it,’’ said Ms. Edward, 30. 

Godwin Ehigiamusoe, LAPO’s founding executive director, defended his company’s 

high interest rates, saying they reflected the high cost of doing business in Nigeria. 

For example, he said, each of the company’s more than 200 branches needed its own 

generator and fuel to run it. 

Until recently, Microplace, which is part of eBay, was promoting LAPO to individual investors, even though the Web site says the lenders it features have interest 

rates between 18 and 60 percent, considerably less than what LAPO customers typically pay. 

As recently as February, Microplace also said that LAPO had a strong rating from 

Microrate, yet the rating agency had suspended LAPO the previous August, 6 

months earlier. Microplace then removed the rating after The New York Times 

called to inquire why it was still being used and has since taken LAPO investments 

off the Web site. 

At Kiva, which promises on its Web site that it ‘‘will not partner with an organization that charges exorbitant interest rates,’’ the interest rate and fees for LAPO 

was recently advertised as 57 percent, the average rate from 2007. After The Times 

called to inquire, Kiva changed it to 83 percent. 

Premal Shah, Kiva’s president, said it was a question of outdated information 

rather than deception. ‘‘I would argue that the information is stale as opposed to 

misleading,’’ he said. ‘‘It could have been a tad better.’’ 

While analysts characterize such microfinance Web sites as well-meaning, they 

question whether the sites sufficiently vetted the organizations they promoted. 

Questions had already been raised about Kiva because the Web site once promised that loans would go to specific borrowers identified on the site, but later backtracked, clarifying that the money went to organizations rather than individuals. 

Promotion aside, the overriding question facing the industry, analysts say, remains how much money investors should make from lending to poor people, mostly 

women, often at interest rates that are hidden. 

‘‘You can make money from the poorest people in the world—is that a bad thing, 

or is that just a business?’’ asked Mr. Waterfield of mftransparency.org. ‘‘At what 

point do we say we have gone too far?’’ 

WATER

Question. The Administration has requested $255 million for water sanitation and 

supply projects in fiscal year 2011. USAID funds water-related activities in various 

program areas such as agriculture, economic growth, nutrition, and health. Approximately how much will USAID spend on water-related activities in fiscal year 2011, 

across all programs? 

Answer. The Administration’s request for water programs in fiscal year 2011 is 

$260 million. Each year, additional amounts for all water activities normally include 

portions of other programs that help to improve water supply, sanitation and hygiene (WSSH), water resources management (WRM); water productivity (WP), and 

water-related disaster risk reduction (DRR). Those additional programs may include 

Disaster Assistance for WSSH (normally $90–$100 million), natural resources management programs contributing to WRM, agricultural sector productivity contributions to WP and broader disaster response and preparedness contributions to waterrelated DRR. Based on current projections, the total fiscal year 2011 USAID water 
113 

expenditures, once all attributions are included, can be expected to be between 

$500–$600 million. 

Question. The fiscal year 2010 State and Foreign Operations bill requires the relevant USAID bureaus and offices that support cross-cutting programs such as water 

to coordinate on a regular basis. In the case of water, how does USAID plan to better coordinate water activities and programs across bureaus? 

Answer. The Administration has now formed a new High-level Steering Group on 

Water that will be responsible for coordination of diplomatic and development activities related to water within State, USAID and the wider U.S. Government. As part 

of early actions on coordination, efforts are underway to better integrate water into 

the Administration’s fiscal year 2012 budget request, and to identify water-related 

aspects of the Administration’s new initiatives in Global Climate Change, Food Security and Global Health. Beyond these new efforts, USAID has been engaged in 

a vigorous ongoing coordination and communication process within the Agency’s 

Water Team, which is an informal coordination group with membership from all 

USAID functional and regional bureaus in Washington and all USAID missions 

overseas who are engaged in water sector activities, whether in health, economic 

growth, environment, energy, gender integration, agriculture, private sector business and finance or in other areas where water figures in development programs. 

WOMEN AND GIRLS

Question. For years, the Congress has tried to get USAID and the State Department to pay more attention to the needs of women and girls in our foreign aid programs. It has not been easy. This Administration seems to be more receptive, but 

good intentions do not always produce good results. How do you plan to address this 

issue? 

Answer. USAID is placing renewed emphasis on addressing the needs of women 

and girls throughout our foreign aid programs. Three areas in particular relate to 

staff training, new gender analysis and planning requirements, and the incorporation of gender considerations into new Administration initiatives, all reflecting 

USAID’s renewed commitment to women and girls. 

With regard to USAID’s new gender analysis and planning requirements, the 

Agency adopted new regulations in November 2009 that require gender analysis and 

the inclusion of gender within all of the Agency’s program planning, monitoring, 

contracting, and evaluation processes. In 2010, guidance on these new regulations 

was created to ensure staff is familiar with the regulations and understand how to 

comply with them. USAID is now also training program officers, contracts officers, 

and field staff in these new regulations. The new regulations also require USAID 

Missions to conduct gender analyses. In 2010, 20 gender assessments have been 

completed, are in process or planned, as compared to three completed in 2009, two 

in 2009 and three in 2007. 

In 2009, USAID also made it mandatory that all incoming Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) receive gender training. To date, 264 of USAID’s junior FSOs have been 

trained. USAID also conducted gender-based violence and trafficking in persons 

training for field staff from 19 countries in February 2010 and several more fieldbased trainings are scheduled. USAID is reviewing ways to improve measuring performance toward achieving gender equality as part of our renewed focus on monitoring and evaluation. 

Finally, all of the Administration’s new initiatives, Global Health, Global Climate 

Change, Global Engagement, and Feed the Future, have explicitly incorporated gender concerns. For example, the Feed the Future guide published in May 2010, emphasizes gender integration into all proposed food security investments. Global Climate Change Initiative (GCC) investments are being designed to promote women’s 

participation in the development of community-level strategies to increase community resilience to climatic risks. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) includes significant increases for programs that serve women and girls, including maternal and 

child health, family planning, nutrition and HIV/AIDS. The GHI will also support 

long-term, systemic changes to remove economic, cultural, social and legal barriers 

and to expand opportunities to increase the participation of women and girls in decisionmaking in the health sector. 

JUSTICE REFORM

Question. USAID has spent many tens of millions—probably hundreds of millions—of dollars in what has often been a futile effort to reform dysfunctional justice 

systems around the world. We recognize that justice is fundamental to democracy 

and stability. One need only look at Central America today to see what happens 

when people know they can get away with murder, or where judges can be easily 
114 

bribed or witnesses intimidated, to see the consequences. Violent crime and organized crime are flourishing. 

But without the political will to reform, we end up throwing away good money 

after bad. Haiti is another example. There has never been the necessary political 

will at the top and frankly, there still isn’t. Do you agree that in order to reform 

a country’s justice system the country’s own Ministry of Justice needs to be serious 

about reform? 

Answer. Indeed, reform of the justice system requires a commitment to reform by 

the Ministry of Justice as well as the political will to reform other parts of the government. The justice system is an important element of a functioning, transparent 

and accountable government. The Ministry of Justice, along with other ministries 

and agencies responsible for advancing the rule of law, are keys to success; while 

civil service reform is also necessary to ensure that government workers—including 

police, prosecutors, judges, and prison officials—are paid a living wage. If governments do not undertake this type of reform, thus reducing incentives for corruption, 

corruption will destroy developmental gains that might otherwise be realized. 

Even in places where democracy is in its infancy or is struggling, it is possible 

to foster momentum for change. There will be those in the business, academic, faith, 

media and even government communities who can be rallied to support the necessary changes in the justice system. In some places, it may be that facilitating this 

momentum is ‘‘Job #1’’ for USG representatives and other donors interested in the 

same result. 

One of the best ways to convince leaders that reform is in their best interest is 

through the empowerment of civil society. As civil society becomes stronger and civic 

education expands, citizens begin to understand the services that their governments 

should be providing and they are thus more likely to hold leaders accountable for 

their actions. This is not a quick process, but rather something that must be pursued with local change agents over a period of many years. Civil society empowerment should be a lynchpin for the USG’s promotion of democracy, good governance, 

and the rule of law. 

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

Question. USAID is using the term ‘‘country ownership’’ more and more. What 

does this mean in practice, and how does USAID’s concept of country ownership differ from that of the Millennium Challenge Corporation? 

Answer. For USAID, in practice, there have been three main aspects to ‘‘country 

ownership’’: (1) host country commitments to good governance and policy reform; (2) 

the extent to which the host country is a partner in the selection, orientation and 

design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the assistance program; 

and (3) the extent to which the host country invests in cost sharing arrangements 

to ensure the sustainability of the program. All of these aspects are relevant to both 

USAID and the MCC approaches to the delivery of foreign aid and are consistent 

with the growing body of knowledge on the link between country ownership and aid 

effectiveness. 

The MCC defines country ownership of an MCC compact as being ‘‘when a country’s national government controls the prioritization process during compact development, is responsible for implementation, and is accountable to its domestic stakeholders for both decisionmaking and results’’. Their model emphasizes country ownership from the selection process, through compact design and implementation, 

using host nation systems at all stages of the compact. 

For USAID, the concept of country ownership—focused on host nation participation in formulating and designing aid programs—has always been an integral part 

of its program planning. For example, USAID’s programming guidelines state that 

country development cooperation strategies which aim to promote transformational 

development must ‘‘align with host country strategies coordinated with a broad cross 

section of stakeholders, including the socially and economically disadvantaged.’’ Importantly, USAID’s historic operating model emphasized country presence specifically to work in collaboration with host country leaders and national stakeholders 

to build country capacity for development reforms. Bilateral Assistance Agreements 

have been used to set forth mutually agreed upon understandings between USAID 

and the host government of the timeframe, results expected to be achieved, means 

of measuring those results, resources, responsibilities, and contributions of participating entities for achieving defined priorities, goals and objectives. 

In light of our new approach to high-impact development and emphasis under the 

PSD–7 and QDDR exercises, USAID is currently reviewing its policies and business 

model to align them more intrinsically with aid effectiveness principles, including 

that of country ownership. We expect reforms in the way we do business to result 
115 

in greater use of host country development strategies, planning and financial management systems, and accountability to their own citizens for results from development investments. 

SELECTIVITY

Question. One of the things I like about the MCC is that it requires governments 

to commit to do certain things if they want our aid, like taking specific steps to reduce corruption, or increase their own budgets for heathcare and education. Do you 

think USAID should require governments to meet these types of benchmarks of 

progress in return for our aid? 

Answer. In accordance with its charter, the MCC uses ex-ante indicators of performance as the basis for selection of country partners—a principle known as ‘‘selectivity.’’ Given the relatively limited set of partner countries in which MCC operates, 

this ‘‘selectivity’’ has been useful as an incentive for potential partners to undertake 

their own reforms as a step toward eligibility for MCC assistance. USAID also considers ‘‘selectivity’’ to be important for the success of its transformational development programs, but works with a larger, more diverse universe of partners, and 

with a broader set of criteria. Key among a number of factors for selecting USAID 

partner country investments are: need, U.S. foreign policy interest, and the country’s own development priorities and commitment to reforms. As such, USAID’s approach to ‘‘selectivity’’ primarily informs decisions about how to engage, rather than 

whether to engage. 

As you know, the Obama administration is close to putting in place an overarching development policy. The policy is intended to focus strategically our goals 

and aspirations so that we can most effectively achieve them. We’re already putting 

a new approach to high-impact development into practice in a number of core areas, 

including strengthening our ability to invest in country-owned models of inclusive 

growth and development success. We have learned from recent country examples, 

the experience of MCC and from efforts like the Spence Commission of the value 

of focusing on a set of areas critical to inclusive growth in countries that are reasonably well-governed, economically stable, globally connected and market-oriented. We 

anticipate working with MCC, State and others to identify such countries where the 

foundations for progress are in place. In this new, more focused approach, USAID 

may consider the use of additional policy benchmarks to help more reliably identify 

a recipient country’s location along the development continuum. We may also learn 

from MCC’s approaches to monitoring and evaluation and ex-ante cost benefit analyses to help achieve greater transformational impact. 

GLOBAL HEALTH

Question. One of the four main components of the Administration’s Global Health 

Initiative is ‘‘doing more of what works and less of what doesn’t.’’ One would hope 

that would be a requirement of every Federal program. Since the GHI began in 

2009, has USAID ended any programs or activities that were not working, that has 

resulted in significant savings? Have any new initiatives achieved better results? 

Answer. Learning and accountability are critical to the success of the GHI, and 

we are increasing the rigor and transparency of monitoring and evaluation, with an 

emphasis on using data to help us identify critical problems and improvements 

throughout our programs. This lens will apply for both new and innovative approaches, as well as for those existing programs that may benefit from adjustments 

and improvements. 

We place strong emphasis on close tracking and evaluation because that ongoing 

process, in close dialogue with the country teams, will permit us to learn, respond 

and ultimately have tailored programs that are ‘‘smarter,’’ with greater country 

ownership, more partners, and more efficient and effective approaches than we 

would have designed in a ‘‘blueprint’’ manner. In GHI, as across this Administration’s development agenda, the findings from evaluations will be shared with decisionmakers in ways that are intended to create the best information for effective 

programming in the future. 

As part of our efforts to ensure country-led programs, we expect and welcome programs that are designed at the country level to best respond to the specific disease 

and health systems priorities in that country. Since the GHI’s inception, we have 

not ended programs or activities, but as we continue to work on the country-level 

roll-out, we will work with our country colleagues to hone and sharpen our existing 

efforts while learning from new and innovative approaches. 
116 

2 India, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan (southern), Uganda, Rwanda, Mali, Nigeria, 

Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Madagascar, Kenya, Haiti, Guatemala and Bolivia. 

MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH

Question. The European medical journal The Lancet recently reported that global 

maternal mortality deaths have decreased by 40 percent since 1980. But there are 

still about 350,000 cases of preventable maternal deaths annually around the globe. 

There are some who want to cut foreign aid. This is one area where those who 

care about women, children, and families can point to life-saving results. The Administration has requested $700 million for maternal and child health programs in 

fiscal year 2011, a significant increase of approximately $225 million over the fiscal 

year 2010 level. What do you plan to do, and what do you expect to accomplish, with 

this additional money? 

Answer. The additional funding will allow USAID to: 

Advance coverage of life-saving interventions in up to 31 countries 2 that are a priority for USAID MCH programs. 

The evidence suggests that focusing on the major causes of maternal, newborn 

and child mortality with simple interventions could prevent about two-thirds of 

child deaths, up to two-thirds of newborn deaths, and a large fraction of maternal 

deaths globally. 

—Some longstanding proven interventions need reinvigoration. For example, 

USAID will focus on increasing oral rehydration therapy (ORT) for diarrhea, including the use of zinc as an adjunct to ORT, in those countries where ORT use 

rates are stagnant or falling. 

—Other interventions need to be introduced or are ready to be scaled up, such 

as: 

—Active management of the third stage of labor (AMTSL) to prevent 

postpartum hemorrhage (PPH): USAID will expand full provision of this 

intervention (that can reduce PPH by up to 60 percent) to 75 percent of facility-level births in Mali, Mozambique, Malawi, Nigeria, Kenya, Mali, Tanzania 

and Bolivia. (In a multi-country survey of 10 countries in 2008, full application of AMTSL ranged from <1–31 percent.); 

—Management of severe preeclampsia/eclampsia with magnesium sulfate in facilities.—USAID will apply this life-saving intervention in up to 10 countries 

(with possible expansion to community level in 2 or 3 countries); 

—Essential newborn care and resuscitation.—These life-saving interventions 

will be introduced and a phased-in scale up will be launched in up to 13 countries, with substantial potential for public-private partnership with a manufacturer of innovative low-cost equipment for newborn resuscitation in several; 

—Integrated community case management (CCM) of malaria, diarrhea and 

pneumonia.—USAID will introduce or scale up case management in Cambodia, Nepal, Benin, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, 

Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia. In five of these countries, USAID will introduce rapid diagnostic tests for malaria to increase appropriate treatment of children with fever; and 

—Community-led total sanitation and sanitation marketing.—USAID will support these new behavior-focused approaches to improving sanitation in health 

programs in up to five countries. 

Increase coverage of care by frontline healthcare providers, especially midwives 

and community health workers, to provide the evidence-based interventions essential for mortality reduction. 

Gaps in human resources for health, in terms of numbers, skill mix and distribution, continue to pose a challenge for effective service delivery, particularly in underserved rural areas. While the human resource deficit is serious, there has been 

progress, particularly in Asia, but the problem in Africa is more challenging. USAID 

will: 

—Disseminate evidence on the effectiveness of alternative financing approaches, 

such as community-based health insurance and waivers of fees to increase the 

use of skilled birth attendants. USAID’s contribution to this dynamic field will 

influence key policy decisions by governments for use of their own and donor 

resources to reduce the financial barriers for families to access skilled care; 

—Accelerate the training and supervision of community health workers (CHWs), 

who can be extremely effective in providing preventive and curative care that 

saves lives. USAID expects to apply the newly developed and pilot-tested CHW 
117 

Functionality Tool in approximately five countries to catalyze policies and focus 

effort on the weakest components of national CHW programs; and 

—Expand support to midwifery pre-service education programs in five to seven 

sub-Saharan African countries, initiating or strengthening accreditation systems, to unlock the unending cycle of need for in-service training to develop 

basic skills. 

Invest in health systems that advance rational policies and improve individual 

and organizational capacity for sustainable development. 

USAID will selectively strengthen components of the health system critical to delivering the high-impact interventions needed to reduce child and maternal mortality. USAID will: 

—Expand support for the effective implementation of systems of procurement, 

storage and delivery of key pharmaceuticals and other essential commodities; 

—Rapidly expand quality improvement systems, including standards-based management and collaborative approaches in 15 countries—including Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, Malawi and Tanzania—as well as other innovative approaches to increase incentives to improve service delivery such as pay-for-performance; and 

—Expand activities to address the long-term sustainability of national health systems by strengthening the capacity of national and sub-national ministries of 

health to ensure services that are effective, non-discriminatory and responsive 

to local needs. 

Target the most vulnerable as maternal and child health programs are expanded, 

many of whom give birth and are treated for illness in the community setting. 

USAID will expand delivery of evidence-based interventions into communities 

where the poor and vulnerable face death outside of formal healthcare facilities. 

This will include enhancing the advocacy, policy, planning and budgeting capacity 

to support a basic package of integrated services that emphasizes the MCH needs 

of vulnerable women and children, while also—in line with Global Health Initiative 

(GHI) core principles—fostering women’s leadership, empowerment and access to 

these critical services. USAID will: 

—In six countries, introduce misoprostol, an effective uterotonic, to prevent postpartum hemorrhage in home deliveries where AMTSL cannot be provided by a 

skilled birth attendant; 

—Promote the management of newborn infections with antibiotics by trained 

CHWs in seven countries; and 

—Disseminate and promote examples of effective CHW programs—such as in 

Nepal where maternal mortality declined by 48 percent within 10 years and 

where antibiotic treatment for pneumonia by CHWs has contributed to dramatic 

reductions in child mortality—to policymakers and programmers in other countries and supporting development of national programs adapted from effective 

models. 

Expand monitoring and evaluation to ensure that results of USG investments are 

documented in a transparent way and lessons learned incorporated into our programs. 

Investing in regular, as well as intermittent, independent monitoring and evaluation of MCH programs is essential to improve health outcomes by tailoring approaches based upon evidence. USAID will enhance health information systems to: 

—Improve tracking of availability and stock-outs of drugs and other critical commodities; 

—Improve routine and periodic systems for measuring progress in all priority 

countries; 

—Better assess the quality of care being delivered; and 

—Monitor access to services and health outcomes, as an input to formulate sound 

policies and as a means to ensure accountability for results to donors. 

Expanded and accelerated monitoring will take place in all priority countries so 

that key indicators for tracking progress will be available for all 31 emphasis countries on an annual basis. 

Continue to support major international research and the advancement of new 

technologies and approaches to enhance MCH program effectiveness. 

To improve programs in the long run and to tackle some of the key problems facing health programs in diverse environments, it is essential to find and test innovations. New technologies and approaches are needed. Importantly, many of the most 

vulnerable choose to avoid or are geographically and culturally distanced from modern medicine. USAID will expand its work in finding innovations—both technological and human—to reach these vulnerable people. Additional funding will allow 

for a new generation of approaches to be investigated and further developed, such 

as: 
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—Cell phone and other communication technology (for communicating health messages, enhancing client care at a distance, improving the functioning of the referral system for obstetric and newborn emergencies, etc.); 

—New diagnostics and preventive approaches, such as a simple test to detect risk 

for impending eclampsia and other risk identification for pregnant women and 

newborns; 

—Improved therapeutic approaches, such as starting preeclampsia and eclampsia 

treatment in the community with a loading dose of magnesium sulfate before 

transfer to a hospital for definitive care; and 

—Effective behavior change strategies for client behaviors, such as stopping harmful infant nutrition practices, and for provider behaviors, such as eliminating 

demeaning and abusive behavior toward childbearing women. 

In all countries, regions, and global programs—consistent with the principles of 

the GHI—USAID will expand coordination and strategic integration of MCH programs with malaria, HIV/AIDS, and family planning programs, as well as strengthen partnerships with multilateral organizations, and other international and incountry partners. USAID will strengthen existing and build new public-private partnerships for the development and introduction of innovative health technologies and 

approaches, such as oxytocin Uniject to prevent postpartum hemorrhage, new methods of delivering chlorine-based drinking water disinfectants, and promotion of hand 

washing among caregivers as an important measure to prevent severe newborn infection. 

Ultimately, the impact of this work, along with investments prior to and after fiscal year 2011, will be measured in terms of mortality and lives saved by many countries in 2015 to document progress or attainment of Millennium Development Goals 

4 and 5. In the interim, USAID will provide evidence from all countries of improved 

policies to promote evidence-based practices, better quality of care, increased uptake 

of services by the poor, and increased use of life-saving interventions. 

H1N1

Question. At the beginning of the H1N1 outbreak there was difficulty in obtaining 

antivirals in desired quantities. Does USAID currently have any plans to acquire 

antivirals to help combat H1N1 globally and in places like West Africa where the 

virus is currently spreading? If no, please explain. If yes, how will USAID determine 

the proper amount of antivirals to acquire? Does USAID have long-term plans to 

acquire antivirals to distribute to affected countries to combat future pandemics? 

Answer. At present, USAID does not have any plans to stockpile antivirals. Because the World Health Organization (WHO) was able to independently establish 

a stockpile of more than 10 million doses of Tamiflu, it was determined that this 

stockpile was adequate for the current global needs and no USAID funds were required for this purpose. We are in constant contact with WHO and we monitor the 

situation very closely to determine if any USAID assistance in the stockpiling of 

antivirals is required. If assistance is required, USAID would support WHO’s ability 

to procure the needed antivirals. USAID stands ready to assist WHO in drug distribution, should that be necessary. We have played a major role in the area of vaccine and ancillary commodity distribution and can expand that role to antivirals if 

needed. USAID will continue to work with the other USG agencies and international organizations to determine the appropriate measures needed and how to 

best meet those needs. 

With respect to sub-Saharan Africa, USAID is working very closely with countries 

and international organizations to support improved surveillance of influenza 

through the provision of laboratory equipment and supplies, as well as supporting 

vaccination programs for health workers and pregnant women. By the end of May 

2010, USAID will have supported the delivery of more than 40 million doses of the 

H1N1 vaccine and ancillary materials to more than 60 countries worldwide. Additionally, USAID is supporting a global laboratory network to monitor the impact of 

the H1N1 virus as it spreads around the world, with a special focus in upgrading 

the surveillance and laboratory capacities of 26 countries in West and Central Africa 

and Central and South America—where such capacities were previously non-existent. While we are watching the situation in Africa very closely, sub-Saharan Africa 

only constitutes about 3 percent of the total number of H1N1 cases worldwide and 

less than 1 percent of the deaths attributed to H1N1. Strengthening the ability of 

countries to accurately detect H1N1 cases and monitor any changes in the trends 

of these cases is critical to rapid and effective response. USAID is constantly monitoring the trends in all regions and is prepared to mobilize support should the situation change significantly. 
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM JOHNSON

WHEAT STEM RESISTANCE WHEAT VARIETY

Question. This appropriations cycle I have requested additional funds for USDA 

to develop a Ug99 wheat stem resistance wheat variety. Can you tell me how agriculture programs at USAID complement the research conducted at USDA? Ug99 

would be devastating to my South Dakota producers, as well as producers throughout the world. What is your plan for developing a Ug99 wheat resistant variety? 

Answer. USAID has been the lead international development agency in responding to the wheat stem rust alarm first raised by Dr. Norman Borlaug some 5 years 

ago. After almost 50 years of durable resistance to this most dreaded disease of 

wheat, Ug99 appeared as a virulent new strain that threatened food security in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, but ultimately could greatly harm America’s 

farmers as well. The disease has not yet reached an epidemic stage, but with the 

right environmental conditions in South Asia, a food security disaster could result, 

including setting the stage for a global pandemic of Ug99 that would probably reach 

the U.S. wheat belt. 

To prevent this from happening, USAID has provided some $20 million in the last 

5 years for wheat research by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 

Research (CGIAR), in partnership with U.S. universities and USDA’s Agricultural 

Research Service, to identify and rapidly deploy resistance genes. USAID also supported expanded efforts by USDA’s Cereal Disease Laboratory in St. Paul to identify 

new sources of resistance to the pathogen. USAID and USDA also supported screening trials in disease hot-spots in East Africa, where global wheat varieties—including those from the United States and Canada—were screened for both susceptibility 

and resistance. It is estimated that over 80 percent of the world’s wheat varieties 

are susceptible, a fact that underscores the severity of the threat. In addition, the 

Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation established the Borlaug Global Rust Initiative, 

which links to both USAID and USDA, to respond to this threat and put in place 

expanded ability to monitor and control wheat rust pathogens in the future. 

CGIAR wheat breeding efforts have made excellent progress. Using the latest molecular techniques and genetic information from international partnerships, new varieties of wheat that are resistant to the new strain have been developed, forming 

a first line of defense against a potential epidemic. Over the last 2 years, USAID 

has deployed over $5 million in specially authorized ‘‘Famine Funds’’ to rapidly multiply and scale up production of resistant wheat seed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Nepal, Egypt and Ethiopia. We also have a partnership with India, which brings 

its own considerable resources to the effort. In addition, we also are working with 

global partners as part of a disease-surveillance effort to monitor movement of the 

disease, which has now moved as far as east Iran. 

It is important to recognize that, while we have taken vital steps and made good 

progress, more work is needed to build back the ‘‘durable resistance’’ that Dr. 

Borlaug achieved in the Rockefeller Foundation’s wheat program in Mexico in the 

1950s—the forerunner of CGIAR. USAID has worked closely with USDA’s Agricultural Research Service, U.S. universities and researchers in Australia, India and 

elsewhere around the world to ensure that resistant varieties are developed and 

food security protected. All of the resistant materials and genetic information about 

the disease and resistance to it are freely available from the various partners, especially the CGIAR, which has an explicit focus on sharing its products and information. These new sources of resistance are being used in USDA and U.S. university 

wheat breeding programs to develop varieties adapted to U.S. growing environments. Taken together, our overseas work aimed at protecting food security in the 

developing world is also helping to ensure that U.S. farmers continue to have access 

to high-yielding, resistant wheat varieties with the qualities our markets demand. 

Similarly, U.S. scientific capabilities are being shared through research collaborations around the globe, helping to strengthen food security. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

HAITI RECONSTRUCTION

Question. In the reconstruction process in Haiti, what is being done to enable 

local, community-based organizations to access funds? 

Answer. USAID recognizes that its work in the longer-term recovery and reconstruction phase must be both transparent and participatory. Therefore, USAID is 

developing a procurement strategy that will support transformational change in 

Haiti. 
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This procurement strategy will support the humanitarian response as well as the 

recovery and reconstruction phases in a way that is both country-led and builds 

local capacity. The following outlines procedures that are designed to ensure transparency, efficiency and broader outreach to attract new partners. 

For example, our New Partners Initiative: The USAID procurement strategy encourages and provides for greater use of local NGOs, and U.S. small, minority and 

women-owned businesses, and seeks to tap the expertise and energy of the HaitianAmerican community. Assessments of local NGOs are conducted and technical assistance provided to build their organizational capacity to receive direct awards. Direct engagement with the U.S. Haitian-American community helps the Diaspora understand the U.S. foreign assistance strategy and how to do business with USAID. 

Set-asides for U.S. small, minority and women-owned businesses will be maximized 

and public-private partnerships will be promoted. 

Question. How are you making certain that the large majority of the recovery and 

reconstruction funds for Haiti are going to services, supplies or other direct benefits 

and not organizational administrative costs? 

Answer. USAID shares Congress’ intent to get as many resources as possible into 

the hands of Haitian organizations and communities to achieve the goal of ‘‘building 

Haiti back better.’’ We are committed to working with a variety of organizations in 

the recovery and reconstruction effort, including local Haitian, Diaspora, American 

and international organizations. 

Working successfully toward results in difficult environments takes deliberate 

planning and considerate amounts of coordination at all levels. For this, development programs require some level of administrative support that provides for an effective and efficient infrastructure, designed to allow the program to reach its end 

goals. Salaries for local Haitian employees, for example may be considered an administrative cost. Yet, these costs also directly benefit the economy of Haiti. 

USAID is working diligently to maximize resources going directly to benefit the 

people and country of Haiti through careful negotiation of our grants and contracts 

and continuous oversight during implementation. USAID makes every effort to minimize fixed administrative costs when negotiating new mechanisms so that USG resources reach the maximum number of beneficiaries possible. This includes requesting mandatory cost share contributions and leveraging resources with the private 

sector to offset administrative costs. 

Question. What role will environmental issues such as reforestation play in the 

long-term recovery plan for Haiti? 

Answer. Root causes of environmental disaster in Haiti include acute poverty, 

rapid population growth and unplanned urbanization. In the short term, it is critical 

to convert hillsides to tree-based perennial agriculture to improve soil conservation. 

Lessons learned from decades of reforestation programs demonstrate that, if a tree 

has value, a farmer is likely to maintain and manage it; if not, it will likely disappear. Therefore, strengthening tree crop value chains is an approach with proven 

ability to restore degraded landscapes. 

USAID/Haiti’s Watershed Initiative for National Natural Environmental Resources (WINNER) Project, an agricultural and watershed management program, 

applies best practices such as this. WINNER is already active in the Cul-de-Sac watershed where Port-au-Prince is located, as well as the Cabaret, Mirebalais, Archaie 

and Gonaives regions of Haiti. WINNER was underway prior to the January 12, 

2010 Haiti earthquake and was modified to immediately address post-earthquake 

needs. The United States will continue to invest a total of $126 million in the 

project over the next 5 years. WINNER is strengthening the value chains for tree 

crops and focusing on tree crops with high value (such as mango) as these are effective incentive to hillside farmers to plant and manage perennial crops. 

In addition to tree crops, the USG strategy in Haiti also includes plans to promote 

cleaner and more efficient cooking technologies, such as liquid petroleum gas (LPG), 

to decrease charcoal consumption and reduce the rate of deforestation and environmental degradation. After completing a rigorous assessment of the potential market 

for improved cooking technologies, the USG will implement a program that will address market barriers such as high upfront costs or lack of awareness and achieve 

large-scale reduction of charcoal consumption over a 5-year period. Beneficiaries are 

likely to include households, food vendors and energy-intensive businesses such as 

laundries and bakeries. 

Finally, a Programmatic Environmental Assessment will be conducted for proposed earthquake reconstruction activities, which will pay close attention to addressing these issues across the mission’s portfolio of projects. 
121 

EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION

Question. Do you plan to add emergency contraception to the list of contraceptive 

commodities available for purchase by USAID missions and to make funds available 

to do so? 

Answer. USAID-supplied oral contraceptive pills are among the FDA-approved 

formulation that can be used for emergency contraception (EC). While USAID does 

not currently procure a dedicated EC product as part of its contraceptive commodity 

procurement program, USAID supplies information about the use of EC in a variety 

of its technical and training materials and supports sharing information about this 

contraceptive option with family planning clients in countries where EC is an approved contraceptive method. USAID has supported biomedical research on the 

mechanism of action, use, and effectiveness of EC, and in some countries supported 

operations research programs to determine EC use and need. 

While there is no current plan to add EC commodities to the list of commodities 

available for purchase by USAID, the Agency is currently reviewing its procurement 

policy and guidelines with respect to programming EC. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ARLEN SPECTER

INFLUENZA PANDEMIC PREPARATION

Question. I have been a consistent proponent of aggressive preparedness efforts 

at the Federal, State and local levels to reduce the threat of an influenza pandemic, 

and have worked with a series of HHS Secretaries—Secretaries Thompson, Leavitt 

and now Sebelius—to ensure that Congress provides the adequate resources to defend our country against a pandemic. As pandemics are global by definition, I know 

that USAID plays a major role in our preparation efforts. 

With regard to H1N1, in late February 2010, the World Health Organization 

elected to hold at the phase 6 pandemic alert level rather than move to a post-peak 

phase. As I understand it, the WHO experts based this decision on evidence of new 

spread of the H1N1 virus in West Africa, and the possibility of a second wave of 

illnesses as the Southern Hemisphere enters its winter months. I am also still keeping my eye on H5N1, which has already claimed lives in Egypt and Vietnam this 

year and has been reported in several other countries. 

I know USAID has taken steps to acquire pre-pandemic vaccines to combat these 

viruses on a global scale, and I applaud this effort. However, I am also aware of 

the important role of antivirals, such as Tamiflu, in combating influenza pandemics. 

It is my understanding that last year, USAID considered acquiring antivirals for the 

purpose of distribution to countries affected by the pandemic, but did not move forward because of a sense that H1N1 had waned. 

LONG-TERM PLANS TO COMBAT SPREAD OF PANDEMICS

What actions is USAID taking to counter the spread of H1N1 in regions seeing 

growing incidence of H1N1, such as West Africa? Does USAID currently have any 

plans to acquire antivirals to help combat this spread? If not, why? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2009, USAID programmed a total of $85 million to address 

the H1N1 virus, of which $50 million was appropriated as an emergency supplemental and $35 million was reprogrammed from USAID’s regular fiscal year 2009 

Avian and Pandemic Influenza (API) appropriation. USAID worked closely with 

other USG departments to coordinate efforts. USAID funds were allocated to activities that were best suited for USAID’s comparative advantage and in support of activities that were being conducted by other government entities. These funds have 

been used to support three lines of H1N1 related work: 

—Deployment of the H1N1 vaccine and related ancillary materials (syringes, needles, etc.). By the end of the May 2010 we expect to have supported the delivery 

of more than 40 million doses of the H1N1 vaccine and ancillary materials to 

more than 60 countries; 

—Support for a global laboratory network to monitor the impact of the H1N1 

virus as it spread around the world, with a special focus on upgrading the surveillance and laboratory capacities of 26 countries in West and Central Africa 

and Central and South America—where such capacities were previously non-existent; and 

—Support for community-based, non-pharmaceutical interventions in 28 countries 

through a coalition of the International Federation of Red Cross Societies, UN 

partners and NGOs. 
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Because the World Health Organization (WHO) was able to independently establish a stockpile of more than 10 million doses of Tamiflu, no USAID funds were used 

for this purpose. We are in constant contact with WHO and monitor the situation 

very closely to determine if any USAID assistance in the stockpiling of antivirals 

is required. At present no USAID funds are required for this purpose. 

Question. How does the acquisition and stockpiling of antivirals fit into USAID’s 

long-term plans to combat future pandemics? 

Answer. At present, USAID does not have any plans to stockpile antivirals in fiscal year 2011. The WHO stockpile is determined to be sufficient for combating future outbreaks. If this situation should change, USAID will work with the other 

USG agencies to determine the appropriate measures needed and how to best meet 

those needs. 

In fiscal year 2011, USAID plans to support the global laboratory network for continued monitoring of the H1N1 virus; these laboratory platforms would also be supported for monitoring of the emergence of other new dangerous pathogens. USAID 

is also continuing to focus on community based preparedness and non-pharmaceutical interventions that can be put into practice in the event of a pandemic. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Question. I sent you a letter in February about USAID’s programs and capacity 

to help address the underlying causes of conflict in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo, specifically the exploitation of minerals by armed groups. Your reply to that 

letter mentioned that your staffing resources ‘‘may not be sufficient to cover the 

complex minerals situation’’ and that USAID was considering hiring a ‘‘senior mining specialist.’’ First, does USAID’s Mission in the DRC have sufficient capacity and 

resources to focus on the resource dimensions of the conflict? And if not, does 

USAID’s budget request for the DRC reflect these needs? Also, has USAID hired 

a senior mining specialist and is this position reflected in USAID’s budget request? 

Answer. The USAID Mission is currently exploring options to add a dedicated senior mining expert. At the same time, our fiscal year 2011 budget request for DRC 

focuses on post-conflict programming to strengthen institutions of democracy and 

governance (notably justice reform), economic growth (with an emphasis on agriculture and food security), basic education and responding to sexual and genderbased violence. 

LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY

Question. What USAID programs and resources are currently dedicated to addressing the violence perpetrated by the Lord’s Resistance Army and assisting affected communities? Does USAID’s fiscal year 2011 budget request include resources 

to assist communities affected by the LRA? 

Answer. USAID programs in Haut and Bas Uele Districts (Orientale Province) 

currently fall in the realm of humanitarian assistance, due to limited access and a 

security situation that precludes stabilization, recovery, and development programming. USAID has responded favorably to the World Food Program’s Emergency Operation of LRA-affected areas of Orientale Province, with a nearly $4 million contribution in fiscal year 2010 funds. 

Current programs of USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance include: 

—Premie`re Urgence, Agriculture and Food Security, $2,105,085; 

—Mercy Corps Economic Recovery and Market Systems Orientale Province, 

$980,920; and 

—WHH Agriculture and Food Security, Economic Recovery and Market Systems 

Orientale Province, $1,998,755. 

USAID anticipates the need to program additional food and non-food humanitarian assistance from fiscal year 2011 FFP and OFDA appropriations. USAID’s 

constraints in responding to LRA-affected populations are directly related to security and access. It remains virtually impossible to implement programs in LRA-affected areas without putting the beneficiaries and implementers at serious risk of 

being targeted. 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Question. What specifically is USAID doing to address the conflict minerals problem and how does this fit within USAID’s budget request for the DRC? What are 

the current programs within USAID to improve the livelihood prospects of commu-
123 

nities affected by human rights abuses in eastern Congo, particularly victims of sexual and gender based violence? 

Answer. Illicit trade in minerals is a diplomatic and strategic challenge. Armed 

groups and renegade elements of the Congolese army control many of the mining 

sites and transit routes, while other militias are tied to elements in nearby countries. The ‘‘U.S. Government Strategic Action Plan on Conflict Minerals in the Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo’’ includes diplomatic and strategic responses 

as well as use of foreign assistance to strengthen institutional and regulatory capacity to formalize trade in minerals and socio-economic activities for affected communities. 

USAID’s analytical work contributed to the knowledge base around this complex 

set of issues and our programming supports key sectors such as improved governance, rule of law and economic development which are all essential to addressing 

the underlying vulnerabilities which allow conflict to be fueled through the rich resource base of the DRC. A number of USAID programs in southern and eastern 

DRC have sought to address issues, such as reintegration of ex-combatants and 

community-based economic recovery in conflict-affected areas as well as improved 

local governance of resource revenues. Comprehensive reintegration programs reduce the likelihood that ex-combatants will be recruited into illicit enterprises or rerecruited into armed groups that control much of illegal minerals trade. 

In support of the Strategic Action Plan on Conflict Mining, State and USAID are 

currently considering program options to: (1) strengthen trade route monitoring, 

through police training, to secure borders and track movement of resources; (2) develop safe transit routes through construction and rehabilitation of key roads; and 

(3) promote strategic, regulatory, and institutional reforms to formalize minerals 

trade and develop systems of traceability. 

In communities affected by human rights abuses, USAID promotes humanitarian 

assistance programs and supports stabilization and recovery through the use of Economic Support Funds and Public Law 480 developmental food aid programs. 

USAID’s fiscal year 2011 budget request does not specifically request funding to 

combat illicit mining. The ESF request, which includes funding for agriculture, microenterprise, water, and education, focuses on post-conflict programming to 

strengthen institutions of democracy and governance (notably justice reform), economic growth (with an emphasis on agriculture and food security), basic education 

and responding to sexual and gender-based violence. 

With respect to livelihoods for affected communities, USAID has requested fiscal 

year 2011 funding for stabilization and recovery ($2 million), Sexual and Gender 

Based Violence ($2.5 million) and Public Law 480 Development Food Aid ($30 million). 

Humanitarian Assistance 

In fiscal year 2010 to date, USAID has provided more than $6.3 million in humanitarian assistance, for agriculture and food security, health, nutrition, protection, 

and water and sanitation programs in the DRC. In fiscal year 2009, USAID provided nearly $34 million for humanitarian programs, many of which remain ongoing 

and include activities such as agriculture and food security, economic recovery and 

market systems, humanitarian coordination and information management, health, 

logistics and relief commodities, nutrition, protection, shelter and settlements, and 

water, sanitation, and hygiene program. 

Stabilization and Recovery 

Programs to improve livelihoods are an integral part of USAID’s stabilization and 

recovery programs, which support the return, reintegration and recovery and extension of state authority components of the International Security and Stabilization 

Support Strategy for Eastern DRC. International efforts are focused around six strategic axes, which include vital links to key mining areas. 

In fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009, USAID received supplemental appropriations which allowed us to support the following two projects: 

—The Promote Stabilization and Ex-Combatant Reintegration in North and South 

Kivu project ($8.2 million), which is in its early stages, targets 30 communities 

for peace-building and reconstruction activities. 

—The Support to the Stabilization Strategy along the Rutshuru-Ishasha Axis 

project ($5 million) has completed rehabilitation of 63 kms of road on one of six 

strategic axes (Rutshuru-Ishasha), allowing freedom of movement, trade and 

economic opportunity for at least 1 million people. The construction or rehabilitation of 13 administrative buildings, which will allow Congolese local government officials to deploy and provide services to the population, is ongoing. The 
124 

construction has created 550 short term jobs, and direct cash inflows into communities from these workers of approximately $200,000. 

Development Food Aid 

—Three Publicl Law 480, Title II, Multi-Year Assistance Programs ($42 million) 

provide employment and support recovery of livelihoods in eastern DRC. In 

South Kivu, USAID funds a program to reduce food insecurity, focusing on female-headed households and returnees. 

—In Northern Katanga, we manage a program to reduce food insecurity and in 

Goma, North Kivu, our program is designed to improve the food security status 

of vulnerable households and improve access to potable water. 

Social Protection 

—USAID is providing 6,000 women with income generating and vocation training 

through our 3-year project called ESPOIR (Ending Sexual Violence by Promoting Opportunities and Individual Rights, $7 million). 

—A different project ($4.9 million) is providing income generating activities and 

professional training for almost 4,000 women affected by SGBV. 

—A third project ($3.2 million) helps several hundred abducted children (who are 

often victims of sexual violence) per year return to school and engage in income 

generating activities. USAID also assists communities with food insecurity 

issues with particular attention given to female-headed households. 

Livelihoods in the Mining Sector 

—Good examples of programs addressing these underlying vulnerabilities are our 

comprehensive reintegration programs that reduce the likelihood of recruitment 

of ex-combatants into illicit enterprises or re-recruitment into armed groups 

that control much of illegal minerals trade. Additionally, USAID has implemented an innovative program to improve governance and reduce conflict associated with the exploitation of mineral resources. The program, a public-private 

partnership which leverages USAID funds, coupled with a larger private sector 

contribution by reputable mining companies operating in Katanga and focused 

on fostering corporate social responsibility and supporting alternative livelihoods for artisanal miners, who were operating in some cases illegally on private company land. The program also addresses critical human rights issues 

around the mining sites and strengthens conflict resolution mechanisms among 

artisanal miners. In addition, the program creates local development funds, 

which are in line with Congolese local government reform processes, in order 

to ensure that taxes gleaned from legal mining are invested back into community-driven development programs thus supporting economic and social development objectives as well as good governance objectives. 

—The success of this intervention led to the establishment of a joint U.S.-DRC 

Development Credit Authority activity ($378,000) to provide up to $5 million in 

loan guarantees for small and medium-scale enterprises in the key mining province of Katanga, where access to credit was practically nonexistent. 

—In Bafwasende, Orientale Province, where U.N. peacekeepers, the FARDC, and 

Mai Mai rebels all operated on a nature reserve rich with valuable minerals, 

USAID supported a program based on community-driven anti-corruption committees. The program focused on conflict resolution and succeeded in getting the 

Mai Mai to disarm, demobilize and stop pillaging the resources of the reserve. 

The lessons learned from this project are applicable to eastern DRC. 

—In addition to work with artisanal miners through the public-private partnership, USAID has also supported stand-alone programs focused on the unique 

challenges of artisanal miners. For example, in the town of Kolwezi in the 

southern Katanga copper belt, one project ($597,000) seeks to (1) promote reconciliation, cooperation, and understanding among artisanal and small-scale 

mining-related institutional actors; (2) prevent conflicts and risks to communities over resource access and use; (3) improve access to, and awareness of, 

pertinent mine legislation; and (4) establish a conflict resolution mechanism for 

disputes and conflicts. The lessons learned and best practices distilled from this 

and other innovative programs have been used to inform the design of a new 

multi-million dollar, multi-donor, multi-year program focused on the mining sector in the East. Called PROMINES, it is supported by the World Bank and the 

UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). USAID is currently not 

contributing funding to this project, but is exploring options for future support. 
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ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND FOR SUDAN

Question. Can you please explain why there is a decrease in the budget request 

for the Economic Support Fund for Sudan, an account that among other things is 

used for programs to promote basic education and help build infrastructure in 

Southern Sudan? 

Answer. The decrease in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account from fiscal 

year 2010 to fiscal year 2011 is primarily due to the decreased need for resources 

in fiscal year 2011 to fund activities that support the remaining major power-sharing benchmarks of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) such as public administration, civic participation and international observation. The overall decline 

in ESF however, does not signify a decrease in highly-needed programs to increase 

access to education or improve infrastructure. 

Per the CPA, the national elections, popular consultations and referenda processes in Sudan were to take place sequentially and be completed by January 2011. 

Originally scheduled for July 2009, the election was delayed four times before the 

April 2010 schedule was announced and implemented. USAID supported electoral 

activities with ESF from fiscal year 2008 regular appropriations, and fiscal year 

2008 and fiscal year 2009 supplemental funds. At the moment, the timeline for the 

referenda in January 2011 is holding. The timeline for popular consultations in 

Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states is less clear, due to postponed legislative 

and gubernatorial elections in Southern Kordofan which have yet to be implemented. However, we presently anticipate that these processes will be completed before fiscal year 2011 resources will be available for programming. 

SUDAN

Question. What resources and staffing needs has USAID incorporated into the fiscal year 2011 budget request that are dedicated to assist Sudan in all possible outcomes of the referendum, including a Southern Sudanese government that will need 

resources and technical assistance to begin a new chapter as a sovereign nation or 

the possibility of a failed referendum renewing a civil war in Sudan? 

Answer. Fiscal year 2011 will be a critical year for Sudan as it continues on the 

path toward peaceful democratic transformation. It will also be a year in which 

flexibility in U.S. assistance is required, pending outcomes of the referenda on the 

future status of southern Sudan and Abyei and popular consultations in Blue Nile 

and Southern Kordofan States. There will be an urgent need to support the outcomes and build consensus for these processes and the outcome of the general elections in April 2010 that are adjusting the power- balances in the national, regional, 

and State governments. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request represents a joint USAID and State Department estimate of program resources needed to assist Sudan in all possible outcomes 

of the southern Sudan referendum, whether southern Sudan votes for independence 

or chooses to remain part of a unified Sudan. To support these outcomes, USAID 

has worked closely with the State Department to plan for an immediate, expanded 

presence in Juba to implement programs critical to stabilizing the South in the critical pre-referenda period and immediate aftermath. The additional staff will bolster 

USG diplomatic functions and capacity for State-managed peace and security and 

rule of law programs which complement USAID’s robust programs and presence on 

the ground. USAID currently has 65 staff assigned to Juba, including both U.S. staff 

and foreign service nationals. 

Future USAID staffing requirements will vary depending on political events. 

USAID is reviewing multiple scenarios and analyzing associated staffing requirements for 2011 and 2012. 

USAID will continue to deploy staff, respond to humanitarian emergencies and 

support traditional development programs, such as investing in human capacity and 

health and expanding infrastructure and economic opportunities. In coordination 

with other donors, State and USAID will jointly implement resources to strengthen 

the capacity of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS), bolster rule of law institutions and capacity, and to mitigate and respond to conflict throughout Sudan. 

Transition and development programming 

USAID’s assistance will be geared toward addressing the threat of new or renewed conflict in the Three Areas, as well as a potential increase in tension between 

the north and the south in the run-up to the 2011 referenda. Consequently, a higher 

proportion of resources will be dedicated to conflict prevention and mitigation. 

USAID will continue to work on the extension of state authority throughout 

southern Sudan aiming to prevent conflict. Funding will also be directed at mediating and preventing conflict around post-2011 issues including cross border devel-
126 

opment; security and movement; and inter-ethnic relationships. USAID’s transition 

and conflict management program provides a quick and flexible mechanism for direct technical and material support to reinforce diplomatic efforts to address these 

issues. 

Supporting the development of democratic governance in southern Sudan and the 

Three Areas will continue to be critical regardless of the outcome of referenda and 

popular consultations. USAID assistance will build on efforts made since the signing 

of the CPA to strengthen capacity in core government functions to enable expanded 

service delivery, and deepen the accountability, transparency and responsiveness of 

key institutions in the GOSS and the Three Areas. Additionally, strengthening the 

legislative assembly that is inducted after the elections; enhancing government understanding of public views; building consensus between leaders and constituencies; 

strengthening the capacity of political parties to conduct outreach to and represent 

their constituents in the newly elected legislative assembly after the April 2010 elections; and, strengthening civic participation, bolstering civil society and expanding 

access to free and independent information will all continue to be elements of 

USAID assistance. Technical assistance and southern Sudan capacity-building will 

also align with post-2011 arrangements. 

USAID will monitor developments regarding Sudan’s subsequent post-CPA arrangements, which may include elections and other political processes. USAID, in 

coordination with the State Department, will program fiscal year 2011 ESF funding 

to begin supporting these processes. 

Humanitarian Assistance 

As with natural and complex disasters throughout the world, USAID remains prepared to respond to pre- and post-referendum deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Southern Sudan. USAID humanitarian programs are flexible and able to 

reallocate resources to meet emerging humanitarian needs. 

USAID has taken the following concrete steps to proactively prepare for potential 

post-referendum humanitarian needs in southern Sudan: 

—In order to rapidly respond to population displacement in southern Sudan, 

USAID supports an international organization to stockpile emergency relief 

supplies and to rapidly provide safe drinking water and dispatch mobile health 

clinics, as needed. 

—USAID supports strong local and international partners operating in rural 

areas of southern Sudan to provide assistance to recently returned populations 

and to prepare to respond quickly to potential outbreaks of violence in the 

months leading to and following the January 2011 referenda. Ongoing USAID 

support allows partners to continue to deliver essential basic services, with a 

focus on health, agriculture and food security, and water, sanitation, and hygiene in areas of highest population movement or IDP return depending on the 

scenario. 

—Depending on the magnitude of the deterioration, USAID remains prepared to 

rapidly deploy USAID humanitarian personnel to southern Sudan, ranging from 

regional advisors and field officers to assessment teams or a disaster assistance 

response team. 

The combination of these three capacities will ensure that USAID is able to respond to the immediate humanitarian impacts of the referenda in either scenario 

and within the current budget request. 

Independence Scenarios 

In a steady-state scenario where the referenda results in a peaceful separation, 

USAID expects humanitarian needs across Sudan to be roughly similar to 2009. 

USAID will continue to maintain both World Food Program (WFP) and private voluntary organization (PVO) food aid supplies, with PVO partners engaged in recovery 

activities in southern Sudan. 

However, populations could initially experience violence surrounding the results. 

The scale and scope of the humanitarian need will be proportional to the level and 

duration of violence. Should the resulting conflict be short-term in nature, the situation would require an immediate surge in humanitarian resources closely followed 

by complementary transition and/or development investments as has occurred in 

southern Sudan over the course of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement implementation (CPA), for example, following the violence in Abyei in May 2008 and in 

Akobo, Jonglei state, in early 2009. 

A longer-term conflict may result in the need for protracted humanitarian engagement requiring substantial financial and human resources. As conflict surrounding 

the referenda subsides, or if no violence occurs, humanitarian agencies can expect 

returns to increase. An increase in returns will necessitate a shift in the focus of 
127 

humanitarian programming to ensure that returns are adequately supported, resulting in additional resource requirements for humanitarian activities in the near-term 

and development activities in the medium- to long-term. 

Return to war Scenarios 

A return to war will require a significant increase in humanitarian resources to 

address mass displacements. The scale and scope of resources required to address 

a return to war will depend on the level and geographic spread of the violence and 

on the access our humanitarian partners have to populations in need. With respect 

to food, USAID would increase contributions, and partners would be positioned to 

expand beneficiary caseloads and programmatic coverage. In either case, USAID 

would plan to increase staff to bolster capacity on the ground, to include local staff 

for food security program monitoring. 

HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN SUDAN

Question. What resources and personnel is USAID employing to monitor and report on human rights conditions throughout Sudan? 

Answer. Human rights monitoring and reporting is currently not within USAID’s 

mandate in Sudan. As presently structured, U.S. Government long-term development assistance in Sudan to monitor and report on human rights is done by the 

Department of State. 

ASSISTANCE TO BURMESE REFUGEES

Question. International NGOs continue to report on periodic violent attacks 

against Burmese Rohingya refugees in Thailand and Bangladesh. What resources 

is USAID employing to offer assistance to the Rohingya refugees? 

Answer. USAID follows closely the situation of Burmese Rohingya refugees and 

asylum seekers in Bangladesh, Thailand, and elsewhere in the region. We are concerned by credible reports of a growing humanitarian crisis among the unregistered 

Rohingya population residing outside of Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh, 

and the numbers of arrests and push-backs to Burma at the border. 

U.S. Government efforts to address protection and assistance needs of the 

Rohingya refugee population are led by the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (State/PRM). In fiscal year 2009, State/PRM provided funding of more than $2 million to several international humanitarian organizations to assist both registered and unregistered Rohingya populations in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and elsewhere in the region. Humanitarian assistance 

for the Rohingya includes healthcare, water and sanitation, education, vocational 

skills training, conflict resolution, community mobilization, mental health and psychosocial support, gender-based violence prevention, and access to essential services 

for Persons with Disabilities. 

Cox’s Bazar, the southeast district where most Rohingya residing in Bangladesh 

live, is one of the poorest districts in the country. In addition to high levels of illiteracy and malnutrition, 73 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. 

Much of the conflict is the result of host-community and Rohingya competing for the 

region’s limited resources. The problems facing the Rohingya cannot be solved without addressing the issues of the broader host-community. 

USAID programs benefit the sizeable unregistered Rohingya population living in 

the Cox’s Bazar region of southeast Bangladesh. Health programs focus on low-cost 

family planning services, maternal and child healthcare, and treatment for tuberculosis through a network of non-governmental clinics. USAID environment programs protect natural resources and help people use resources sustainably, particularly those from tropical forests. Governance activities support greater transparency 

and citizen participation in the management of public resources at the local level. 

Additionally, USAID’s new 5 year, $210 million Public Law 480 Title II program 

throughout the country will support projects in Cox’s Bazar to promote economic development of the entire southeast portion of the country. U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM) is also constructing multi-purpose cyclone shelters and schools in southeast Bangladesh. 

With respect to USAID programs for vulnerable Burmese populations, USAID has 

not provided funds to assist Rohingya refugees as an identifiable subset of its programs. However, USAID implements humanitarian assistance programs for vulnerable Burmese along the Thailand/Burma border, and within Burma for people affected by Cyclone Nargis. Rohingya refugees living in these locations benefit from 

this assistance. 
128 

TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Question. The budget request to combat Trafficking in Persons seems inadequate. 

If USAID were to have more resources devoted to combating trafficking, how would 

they be used? 

Answer. The Administration is deeply committed to combating trafficking in persons. The President’s request for anti-trafficking programs increased from $31.5 million for fiscal year 2010 to $35.8 million for fiscal year 2011. Between 2001 and 

2009, USAID spent nearly $145 million on anti-trafficking projects in more than 70 

countries as part of the coordinated U.S. government effort to eradicate trafficking. 

USAID programs focus on prevention, protection, and prosecution and address both 

sex and labor trafficking of women, children, and men. 

Nearly 90 percent of USAID anti-trafficking programs over the last 3 years have 

focused on prevention and protection. While a focus on prevention and protection 

remains essential, increased focus on prosecution in coordination with other USG 

efforts and efforts to address labor trafficking require additional attention. Fortyfour percent of 2009 USAID anti-trafficking projects strengthen prosecution by helping foreign governments draft anti-trafficking legislation and train police and prosecutors. However, USAID evaluations and the TIP Report have demonstrated a 

need to increase law enforcement capacity to combat trafficking. Incorporating this 

type of capacity building into foreign assistance programs would be coordinated 

through the inter-agency Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG). Likewise, Agency 

assessments, the TIP Report, and the Department of Labor’s 2009 TVPRA list indicate a need for increased global attention to labor trafficking. Sixty-eight percent of 

our anti-trafficking programs since 2001 have addressed both labor and sex trafficking. 

AGRICULTURE

Question. How will USAID use the resources it has, such as programs like the 

Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), to help develop 

wheat variety resistant to Ug99 wheat stem, a disease that is destroying Africa’s 

wheat crop? Will that research be available to U.S. producers? How could USAID’s 

efforts on food security be improved? 

Answer. USAID has been the lead national development agency in responding to 

the wheat stem rust alarm first raised by Dr. Norman Borlaug approximately 5 

years ago. After almost 50 years of durable resistance to this most dreaded disease 

of wheat, Ug99 appeared as a virulent new strain that threatened food security in 

Africa, the Middle East and South Asia. While the disease has not yet reached an 

epidemic stage, it poses a significant threat to Africa’s farmers, and with the right 

environmental conditions in South Asia, a food security disaster could result. 

To prevent that from happening, USAID has provided over $20 million in the last 

5 years for wheat research by CGIAR, in partnership with U.S. universities and 

USDA’s Agricultural Research Service, to identify and rapidly deploy resistance 

genes. USAID also supported expanded efforts by USDA’s Cereal Disease Laboratory in St. Paul, as well as screening trials in disease hot-spots in East Africa, 

where global wheat varieties—including from the United States and Canada—were 

screened for both susceptibility and resistance. 

USAID is pleased to report that CGIAR wheat breeding efforts have succeeded. 

Using the latest molecular techniques and genetic information from international 

partnerships, new varieties of wheat that are resistant to the new strain have been 

developed, forming a first line of defense against a potential epidemic. Over the last 

2 years, USAID has deployed over $5 million in specially authorized ‘‘Famine 

Funds’’ to rapidly multiply and scale up production of resistant wheat seed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Egypt and Ethiopia. USAID also has a partnership with 

India, which brings its own considerable resources to the effort. In addition, the 

Agency works with global partners as part of a disease-surveillance effort to monitor 

movement of the disease, which has now moved as far as Iran. 

More work is needed—and will be supported through the Global Hunger and Food 

Security Initiative—to build back the ‘‘durable resistance’’ that Dr. Borlaug achieved 

in the Rockefeller Foundation’s wheat program in Mexico in the 1950s—the forerunner of CGIAR. More seed multiplication support will also be needed. We are 

working with our overseas missions to ensure that all partners—national organizations, international NGOs like Catholic Relief Services, CARE and others, work together to ensure farmers get access to resistant seed. All of the above efforts have 

been carried out in close partnership with USDA, U.S. universities and partners in 

Australia, India and elsewhere around the world. All of the resistant materials and 

genetic information about the disease and resistance to it are freely available from 
129 

the various partners, especially the CGIAR, which has an explicit focus on sharing 

its products and information. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE V. VOINOVICH

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Question. In September, world leaders will gather at the United Nations to assess 

the Millennium Development Goals and re-commit to achieving the MDGs by 2015. 

What are your plans in preparing the U.S. position at the U.N. session and any proposals President Obama might announce? 

Answer. As President Obama underscored in his address to the U.N. General Assembly last year, the United States fully embraces the Millennium Development 

Goals (MDGs). The MDGs are a core principle for USAID, and we are pleased to 

be playing a leading role in the interagency process to develop U.S. positions for the 

September MDG High Level Plenary (Summit). The interagency process has been 

working for the past few months to define U.S. strategies and approaches toward 

accelerating progress in achieving the MDGs. 

The 2010 Summit is an important opportunity to take stock of the progress made 

so far in achieving the MDGs. In fact, significant progress has been made in many 

MDG areas, although progress has varied dramatically across countries and regions. 

In developing its position for the U.N. process leading up to the September Summit, 

the United States will acknowledge and highlight this progress, while considering 

ways to replicate and scale up successes. At the same time, the challenges ahead 

in making further progress on the MDGs are formidable. In that regard, the United 

States will be considering the need for new approaches. 

Our preparations for the September MDG Summit provide an opportunity to build 

support for a more determined, strategically-minded and analytically-focused approach to the MDGs. We see four elements as critical for making more rapid 

progress in the next 5 years: first, the need to focus on development outcomes, not 

just development dollars; second, the need to enhance the principle and practice of 

national ownership and mutual accountability; third, the need to invest in making 

development gains sustainable; and fourth, the need to make more effective use of 

innovation and other force-multipliers to maximize the impact of our efforts. 

The interagency process is continuing to consider the best strategy and approaches to advance the MDGs. Recent Presidential initiatives, for example, including the Global Health Initiative (GHI) and Feed the Future (FTF), provide opportunities to accelerate and sustain progress in these important MDG areas. 

SCALE-BACK EFFORTS

Question. Dr. Shah, looking at the areas of growth in your budget—particularly 

for health, agriculture and USAID’s own capacity—it is evident what the Administration’s priorities are for development. Can you tell me where you think USAID 

could scale back, even eliminate or radically reform our current efforts? 

Answer. I have recently outlined a new approach to high-impact development 

which will lie at the center of restoring USAID’s effectiveness. The approach is premised on greater focus and selectivity, and includes four core areas. 

First, USAID is contributing to the U.S. commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), not simply by delivering services to those in need, but through 

building sustainable systems that will transform healthcare, education, food security 

and other MDG areas. Second, we are strengthening our ability to invest in countryowned models of inclusive growth and development success. Third, we are identifying new ways of leveraging science and technology to develop and deliver tools and 

innovations which we believe can be transformational. Finally, we will bring 

USAID’s expertise to bear on some of the most daunting national security challenges we face as a Nation—including stabilizing countries like Afghanistan. 

Focusing on these core areas will allow a concentration of USAID’s resources and 

its efforts rather than spreading our efforts and resources over the many other technical areas that relate to broad-based and sustainable development. Other areas of 

development engagement will be scaled-backed if they do not support the core objectives. 

On June 8, White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel and OMB Director Peter 

Orszag sent a letter to the heads of all executive departments and agencies asking 

them to identify those programs that have the lowest impact on each agency’s mission, and that constitute at least 5 percent of each agency’s discretionary budget. 

I fully support this effort, and USAID will meet or exceed the 5 percent target set 

by Chief of Staff Emanuel and Director Orszag. By identifying those areas where 
130 

we can scale back or eliminate projects and programs, this exercise will help USAID 

further focus our financial and human capital on the four core areas described 

above. 

PSD–7/QDDR

Question. Dr. Shah, could you give us an update on the multiple efforts going on 

right now on reforming and improving our aid processes, including the QDDR and 

PSD? How do initiatives such as the Global Health initiative and Food security initiative fit within the proposed reforms? 

Answer. I anticipate that the QDDR and PSD exercises, in which we are actively 

participating, will have a very positive impact on USAID and U.S. global development efforts, including the Global Health (GHI) and Feed the Future/Global Hunger 

and Food Security Initiative. Both exercises are looking at how the initiatives could 

be affected by possible reforms. For example, a joint USAID-State QDDR task force 

is examining how to increase our capabilities around the issue of aid effectiveness, 

and in doing so is explicitly looking at how the effectiveness principles (country ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability) 

should be applied to both initiatives. 

A focus on factors that improve aid effectiveness, such as promoting country ownership, learning, cost-effective and streamlined processes, a whole-of-government approach, and donor coordination are key principles of both the GHI and the Food security initiative. These same principles are the focus of work under both QDDR and 

PSD. 

For example, through the GHI we will help partner countries improve health outcomes through strengthened health systems. A core principle underlying the GHI 

business model in support of reaching these ambitious health goals is to encourage 

country ownership and invest in country-led plans. The GHI works closely with 

partner governments, as well as civil society organizations, to ensure that investments are aligned with national priorities, and to support partner government’s 

commitment and capacity so that investments are maintained in the future. Further, our efforts to strengthen country efforts will be coordinated across USG agencies and other partners to ensure efficient use of resources and effective results. 

CIVILIAN RESPONSE CORPS

Question. One of the concerns our military commanders have shared with us and 

others over the years is the lack of civilian follow up operations in places like Iraq 

and Afghanistan. As the USAID Administrator, how do you intend to build a cadre 

of dedicated staff at USAID that can move into post-conflict regions and begin longterm civilian stabilization and reconstruction (S&R)? 

Answer. USAID is dedicated to assisting in follow-up stabilization and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict regions. To accomplish this, we have built up a cadre of 

both immediate, rapid response networks and longer-term staff. 

To address immediate stabilization and reconstruction issues, USAID is responsible for a large contingent of Civilian Response Corps (CRC) personnel, managed 

by the Agency’s Office of Civilian Response. The CRC focuses on restoring rule of 

law and stabilizing war-torn societies as a precursor to sustained economic growth. 

The CRC currently has two components: the Active and the Standby. The Active 

Component (CRC–A) will ultimately be comprised of 250 U.S. Government (USG) 

members, 91 of which will be from USAID. CRC–A members are direct-hire employees who form a team of first responders available to deploy within 48 hours of callup for up to 12 months. CRC members within USAID are mostly senior-level, highly 

experienced personnel with S&R experience. They receive 3–4 months of training to 

prepare them for S&R operations. The Standby Component (CRC–S) interagency 

target is 2,000 members, with a USAID target of 744 members. CRC–S is comprised 

of current USG employees who sign up for and are accepted to the CRC. They receive 2–4 weeks of S&R training and can be deployed within 30–45 days. 

USAID CRC–A and CRC–S staff have already successfully deployed to Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Sri 

Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Nepal, Kazakhstan, and Haiti. In addition, they have 

participated in exercises with the Defense Department’s European Command 

(EUCOM) and Africa Command (AFRICOM). Deployments differ in length from a 

few months to a year. 

The Agency is also building its Foreign Service cadre through the Development 

Leadership Initiative (DLI). The initiative, introduced in 2008, is aimed at increasing USAID’s ability to meet its development and national security objectives 

through a strong workforce. The goal of DLI is to double the USAID Foreign Service 

workforce by hiring 1,200 junior and mid-level Foreign Service officers by 2012. To 
131 

date, 483 new officers have been sworn in and oriented under this initiative; 89 will 

specifically focus on Crisis, Stabilization and Governance issues. This cadre of new 

Foreign Service officers will strengthen the Agency’s capacity to provide leadership 

overseas to develop, carry out, and integrate programs that bring peace, prosperity, 

and security to the world. 

LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Question. Africa, as you know, remains a continent which suffers not just from 

extreme poverty, but from disease, lack of basic needs like clean water and food, 

and a dearth of educational and economic opportunities. Some nations in Africa 

even face the increasing influence of corrupt governments, terrorist organizations, 

drug traffickers and other destabilizing influences. One of the key ways these issues 

can be addressed is through strong, comprehensive and long-term development 

strategies that are designed to offer solutions to these destabilizing forces. What resources will USAID need to address these problems and how would you convince 

the American people that such expenditures would serve the national interests of 

the United States? 

Answer. Africa is vital to U.S. interests. Home to approximately 800 million people, Africa is increasingly linked to global markets, holds vast natural resources, 

and will soon provide 25 percent of U.S. oil imports. There has rarely been a more 

critical time to consolidate the progress and promise of Africa. Although wars in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Burundi, Uganda, and 

Sierra Leone, and the North-South conflict in Sudan have ended or dramatically 

abated, sub-Saharan Africa has recently experienced significant stagnation and 

challenges to its progress toward democracy and good governance. Most worrying 

have been the democratic setbacks in countries that have historically been considered ‘‘good performers,’’ but that are at risk of political instability. Regional bodies 

such as the African Union have a growing potential to provide leadership and share 

best practices, but the influence of poorly governed and autocratic states on these 

multilateral institutions complicates and stifles the evolution toward better governance in Africa. 

It is in the interest of the United States for Africa to be stable, well-governed, 

and economically self-sufficient with healthy and productive populations. Poor governance, conflict, and corruption contribute to the need for billions of dollars per 

year in food and non-food emergency assistance from the United States and other 

bilateral and multilateral donors that could be used to solve other global problems. 

Lacking any sustained political and economic improvements, and with Africa’s population expected to double by 2050 to 1.8 billion, the continent’s humanitarian needs 

will only escalate. The stakes are extremely high. However, strategic use of USG 

foreign assistance resources, combined with those from other bilateral and multilateral donors, can make a meaningful difference in Africa by creating tangible improvements in quality of life and building momentum toward political and economic 

progress. 

Our programs have already made significant contributions, including contributing 

to reducing mortality among children under five by 14 percent since 1990, and increasing the number of children enrolled in primary school by 36 percent since 1999. 

To sustain and consolidate these gains in the face of current projected population 

growth requires a multi-pronged approach that addresses the key issues for the continent and can produce visible impacts at the country and regional level. The Africa 

Bureau’s fiscal year 2011 foreign assistance request of $7.606 billion, which includes 

$3.728 billion of HIV/AIDS funding, directly advances key Administration policy priorities in the areas of democracy and governance, peace and security, economic 

growth and food security, health and education (including HIV/AIDS and malaria), 

and transnational challenges, including global climate change. 

When combined with the $3.9 billion currently committed to Africa through Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold programs and Compacts to date, 

and the annual average of $25.67 billion in other bilateral and multilateral donor 

assistance to Africa, the international community has the ability to effect real 

change. Within the United States, close coordination between the major U.S. agencies (MCC, State and USAID) has facilitated optimal use of funding. For example, 

USAID implements all the Threshold Programs for MCC in Africa, and is implementing some portions of the Compact in Burkina Faso. MCC Compact Teams coordinate closely with Ambassadors at post, and with USAID staff as appropriate. 

Another example is Senegal, where starting in July 2003 (even prior to the formal 

creation of the MCC), USAID provided $500,000 to enable the Government of Senegal to assess and strengthen its systems for managing development resources and 
132 

developed a methodology that could be used in future MCC-eligible countries to accelerate start-up of MCC programs. 

PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE

Question. We all recognize that corruption and weak governance are challenges 

in many of the poorest nations. What are some of the strategies USAID uses to promote good governance through our assistance programs? Is there legislation that 

could enhance these efforts? 

Answer. USAID’s overall objective in governance is to provide assistance and 

training to promote greater transparency, accountability, effectiveness and participation in governing institutions and public policy processes at all levels. 

Specific Anticorruption Initiatives promote accountable and transparent governing 

institutions, processes and policies across all development sectors. For example, 

USAID programs: 

—Promote corruption prevention and education while also supporting prosecution 

and enforcement through rule of law programming. 

—Focus on regulatory and procedural reform, increasing management capacity 

within the executive branch, and strengthening the oversight capacity of the judicial and legislative branches of government. 

—Strengthen public financial management, procurement reform, audit and internal controls, and transparency and accountability in budget processes. 

—Support anticorruption commissions, ombudsman offices, civil society, media 

oversight and advocacy capacity building. 

—Support host country multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to improve governance and public oversight in resource-rich countries. 

Executive offices, ministries, and independent governmental bodies are advised 

and trained on development and implementation of policies, procedures, and skill 

sets (including leadership, strategic management and communications). Assistance 

promotes linkages between different branches, levels and functions of government, 

including across development sectors such as health, education and economic 

growth, and enhances financial management and civil service reforms, public-private partnerships, and outreach to citizens. 

Security sector democratic governance programs focus on how component parts of 

the security system (e.g., policy, military, justice system, legislature, civil society) 

are linked and must all perform effectively and in a coordinated manner to achieve 

effective, legitimate security systems governed by law and accountable to the population. Program examples include reforming the justice system, the civil service and 

public management; enhancing strategic planning, policy and budget formulation; 

increasing civilian oversight of the security sector. As police are an important face 

of the government to citizens, USAID supports civilian police assistance programs. 

National and sub-national efforts support democratic decentralization of political, 

financial, and administrative authority, ensuring all levels are capable of effecting 

democratic and accountable local governance. Technical assistance and training 

strengthen development of budgets, local revenue raising, provision of public services, community planning, participation, and implementation of laws, regulations, 

policies and programs. 

Assistance to legislatures supports more democratic practices within legislative 

bodies, improves legislative processes, and increases the quality of legislation or constitutional reforms. Programs increase the legislature’s capacity to be responsive to 

constituents, engage in policy-making, hold itself and the executive accountable, and 

oversee the implementation of government programs, budgets, and laws. 

Media freedom and access to Information legislation are promoted to improve enabling environments for the existence and operations of NGOs and to increase transparency and accountability in the public sector while strengthening democratic practices and enabling civic engagement. 

The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) is reviewing all 

foreign assistance programs. As part of this process, legislative requirements to improve the effectiveness of governance assistance programs are being considered. We 

look forward to consulting with the Committee and others in Congress as we formulate recommendations and next steps on this critical issue. 

CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

Senator LEAHY. If there is nothing further, the subcommittee 

was stand in recess. 
133 

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., Tuesday, April 20, the hearings were 

concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] 

(i) 

LIST OF WITNESSES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND 

PREPARED STATEMENTS 

Page 

Bond Senator Christopher S., U.S. Senator From Missouri, Questions Submitted by ............................................................................................................... 58 

Brownback Senator Sam, U.S. Senator From Kansas, Questions Submitted 

by......................................................................................................................... 59, 122 

Clinton, the Honorable Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State, Department of 

State ...................................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 7 

Summary Statement of .................................................................................... 3 

Gregg, Senator Judd, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire, Statement of .......... 2 

Inouye Senator Daniel K., U.S. Senator From Hawaii, Questions Submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 44 

Johnson, Senator Tim, U.S. Senator From South Dakota, Question Submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 119 

Landrieu Senator Mary L., U.S. Senator From Louisiana, Questions Submitted by ............................................................................................................... 46 

Lautenberg Senator Frank R., U.S. Senator From New Jersey, Questions 

Submitted by...................................................................................................... 52, 119 

Leahy, Senator Patrick J., U.S. Senator From Vermont: 

Questions Submitted by ................................................................................... 32 

Statements of...................................................................................................... 1, 73 

McConnell Senator Mitch, U.S. Senator From Kentucky, Questions Submitted 

by ........................................................................................................................... 57 

Shah, Dr. Rajiv, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development ... 73 

Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 76 

Summary Statement of .................................................................................... 74 

Specter, Senator Arlen, U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania, Questions Submitted by ............................................................................................................... 121 

Voinovich, Senator George V., U.S. Senator From Ohio, Questions Submitted 

by......................................................................................................................... 68, 129 

(iii) 

SUBJECT INDEX 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

SECRETARY OF STATE

Page 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 32 

Afghanistan....................................................................................................... 19, 23, 24 

Afghanistan-Pakistan Civilian Surge .................................................................... 33 

Agriculture ............................................................................................................... 19 

Assistance: 

For Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia ............................................. 22, 24 

To Indonesia ...................................................................................................... 17 

Climate Change ....................................................................................................... 38 

Democratic Republic of the Congo .......................................................................... 31 

Economic Support Funds ........................................................................................ 11 

Effective Oversight of Contractors ......................................................................... 40 

Haiti .......................................................................................................................... 15 

India and Pakistan .................................................................................................. 12 

Internet Freedom ..................................................................................................... 30 

Iran...................................................................................................................... 9, 14, 27 

Jordan ....................................................................................................................... 11 

Microlending and Microenterprise ......................................................................... 28 

Middle East.............................................................................................................. 12, 32 

Millennium challenge Corporation ......................................................................... 29 

Orphans .................................................................................................................... 20 

Senate Confirmation Process .................................................................................. 26 

Sudan ........................................................................................................................ 31 

Syria ......................................................................................................................... 13, 25 

Travel to Cuba ......................................................................................................... 11 

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 103 

Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 91 

And Pakistan .................................................................................................... 105 

Africa ........................................................................................................................ 81 

Reboots .............................................................................................................. 95 

Agriculture............................................................................................................. 88, 128 

Assistance to Burmese Refugees ............................................................................ 127 

Banks Making Big Profits From Tiny Loans ........................................................ 109 

Civilian Response Corps .......................................................................................... 130 

Climate Change..................................................................................................... 98, 108 

Country Ownership ................................................................................................. 114 

Democratic Republic of the Congo ....................................................................... 89, 122 

Development Assistance .......................................................................................... 108 

Economic Support Fund for Sudan ........................................................................ 125 

Emergency Contraception ....................................................................................... 121 

Energy ...................................................................................................................... 100 

Enhancing Aid Effectiveness and Sustainability .................................................. 79 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget ......................................................................................... 83 

Food Security ........................................................................................................... 90 

Forest Protection Activities in South America ...................................................... 98 

Global: 

Engagement ...................................................................................................... 104 

Health ................................................................................................................ 115 
Page

iv 

Global—Continued 

Hunger and Food Security Initiative .............................................................. 107 

Guiding Principles and Overview ........................................................................... 77 

H1N1 ......................................................................................................................... 118 

Haiti .......................................................................................................................... 82 

Reconstruction .................................................................................................. 119 

Human Rights Conditions in Sudan ...................................................................... 127 

Influenza Pandemic Preparation ............................................................................ 121 

Interagency Coordination ........................................................................................ 93 

International Cooperative Administrative Services .............................................. 105 

Introduction/Haiti .................................................................................................... 76 

Justice Reform....................................................................................................... 97, 113 

Largest Funding Categories .................................................................................... 84 

Long-term: 

Development in Africa ...................................................................................... 131 

Plans to Combat Spread of Pandemics ........................................................... 121 

Lord’s Resistance Army ........................................................................................... 122 

Maternal and Child Health ..................................................................................... 116 

Meeting Urgent Global Challenges ........................................................................ 78 

Microcredit Loans .................................................................................................... 108 

Millennium Development Goals ............................................................................. 129 

NGO Transparency .................................................................................................. 106 

Neglected Tropical Diseases ................................................................................... 88, 90 

Orphans and Vulnerable Children ......................................................................... 86 

PSD–7/QDDR....................................................................................................... 104, 130 

Payroll Issues ........................................................................................................... 80 

Political Appointees ................................................................................................. 80 

Procurement ............................................................................................................. 90 

Promoting Good Governance ................................................................................... 132 

Scale-back Efforts .................................................................................................... 129 

Securing Critical Frontline States: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq ................. 77 

Selectivity ................................................................................................................. 115 

Sudan ..................................................................................................................... 87, 125 

Trafficking in Persons ............................................................................................. 128 

Transition Initiative Model ..................................................................................... 103 

2010 Funding Constraints for the USAID/India Greenhouse Gas Pollution 

Prevention Project ................................................................................................ 101 

UNICEF .................................................................................................................... 94 

USAID Effectiveness ............................................................................................... 103 

USAID’s Procurement System ................................................................................ 81 

Water ........................................................................................................................ 112 

Wheat Stem Resistance Wheat Variety ................................................................. 119 

Women and Girls ..................................................................................................... 113 

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