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80–718 PDF 2013

S. HRG. 113–31 

NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN TO BE 

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FEBRUARY 7, 2013 

MARCH 5, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 
(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia, Vice Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

MARK WARNER, Virginia 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

DANIEL COATS, Indiana 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio 

JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio 

DAVID GRANNIS, Staff Director 

MARTHA SCOTT POINDEXTER, Minority Staff Director 

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk 
(III) 

CONTENTS 

FEBRUARY 7, 2013 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 1 

Chambliss, Hon. Saxby, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Georgia .............. 20 

Warner, Hon. Mark, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ............................................... 21 

WITNESS 

Brennan, John O., Nominee to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency . 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 28 

SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL 

Letter dated January 25, 2013, from James R. Clapper to Senator Dianne 

Feinstein and Senator Saxby Chambliss ........................................................... 3 

Letter dated January 8, 2013, from David S. Kris to the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence ................................................................................... 4 

Letter dated January 22, 2013, from Sarah Cleveland, Gregory Craig, William 

Dodge, Jeh Johnson, David Kris, David Martin, Daniel Meltzer and Trevor 

Morrison to Senator Dianne Feinstein ............................................................... 5 

Letter dated January 8, 2013, from Officers and Board Members of Victims 

of Pan Am 103, Inc. .............................................................................................. 7 

Letter dated January 31, 2013, from retired professional intelligence experts 

and interrogators .................................................................................................. 9 

Letter from representatives of various faith-based communities ........................ 13 

Letter dated January 8, 2013, from Act! for America to Senator Dianne 

Feinstein and Senator Saxby Chambliss ........................................................... 15 

Letter dated February 4, 2013, from various organizations to Senator Dianne 

Feinstein and Senator Saxby Chambliss ........................................................... 17 

Joint Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator Carl Levin, April 

27, 2012 ................................................................................................................. 85 

Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees .................................... 92 

Additional Prehearing Questions ........................................................................... 108 

Questions for the Record ......................................................................................... 136 

Letter dated February 4, 2013, from the Office of Government Ethics to 

Senator Dianne Feinstein .................................................................................... 166 

MARCH 5, 2013 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California .................. 88 

(1) 

NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN TO BE 

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 

AGENCY 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, 

Rockefeller, Burr, Wyden, Risch, Mikulski, Coats, Udall, Rubio, 

Warner, Collins, Heinrich, King, and Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We will begin this hearing. And let me say 

right up front that the process is that people are respectful; that 

they don’t cheer, they don’t hiss, they don’t show signs; that this 

is to listen. If that’s a problem for anybody, I ask you to leave the 

room now because what we will do is remove you from the room— 

let there be no doubt. 

So, if I may, I would like to begin. The Committee meets today 

in open session to consider the nomination of John Brennan to be 

the 21st director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the first 

director to have risen through the Agency’s ranks since Bob Gates. 

Mr. Brennan, congratulations on your nomination. I see Senator 

Warner has come in. Senator, I will make opening comments, the 

Vice Chairman will make opening comments, and then we will turn 

to you for your introduction, if that’s agreeable. 

Mr. Brennan, congratulations on your nomination. As you can 

see, it’s going to be lively. I’d like to welcome your family, as well, 

and hope you’ll introduce them so the Committee can give them its 

thanks. 

This is the first opportunity, also, to welcome our new Members—Senator Heinrich, who is on my right; Senator King, who is 

due any moment; Senator Collins, who is on my left; and Senator 

Coburn, who is not here at the moment, but will be, who is returning to the Committee. And we have a new Ex-Officio Member, Senator Inhofe. So, welcome to all of you. 

The director of the CIA is among the most critical national security positions in the United States Government, both because of the 

role the CIA plays in collecting and analyzing intelligence relevant 
2 

to every national security challenge we face, and because of the 

added importance of having steady leadership at an organization 

that conducts most of its business outside of the public arena. 

Intelligence is critical to the successful drawdown in Afghanistan; to the brutal war going on within Syria’s borders, across 

North Africa, where the attacks in Benghazi and the hostage situation in Algeria threaten to spread into the next front against alQa’ida and its affiliated groups; for counterterrorism operations 

around the world; in the efforts by the United States and others 

to prevent the gain and spread of weapons of mass destruction in 

Iran, North Korea, and other states; and in addressing emerging 

threats in space, cyberspace, and elsewhere around the globe. 

To confront these challenges, and to lead the CIA through a difficult budgetary period after a decade of major budget increases, 

President Obama nominated John Brennan, his closest advisor on 

intelligence and counterterrorism matters for the past four years. 

Mr. Brennan is, without a doubt, qualified for this position. He 

served at the CIA for 25 years in analytic, operational, and managerial capacities. He has seen the Agency from just about every 

angle—as a line analyst, as chief of station, as chief of staff to the 

director, and as the deputy executive director—among many others. 

People who have worked closely with him regularly cite his work 

ethic, his integrity, and his determination. In nominating John 

Brennan, President Obama spoke of his ‘‘commitment to the values 

that define us as Americans.’’ DNI Clapper, in a letter of support, 

noted his ‘‘impeccable integrity’’ and that ‘‘his dedication to country 

is second to none.’’ 

So, with that, with unanimous consent, I would like to insert into 

the record the letters the Committee has received in regard to Mr. 

Brennan’s nomination. 

[Letters received by the Committee regarding the nomination of 

Mr. Brennan follow:] 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. John Brennan, by all accounts, will be a 

strong leader, guided firmly by the law and his strong ethical code. 

He has assured the Committee, in his response to pre-hearing 

questions, that he will be independent from political influence; he 

will seek only to provide the President, the Congress, and other 

leaders with his best analysis and advice. 

His responses to the Committee’s questions are available on the 

Committee’s website, at www.intelligence.senate.gov. Of course, the 

Committee must conduct its due diligence on such an important 

nominee, so Members are going to have questions in a range of topics, including his plans for directing the Agency, major national security challenges we face, and positions and actions he has taken 

in his current and past jobs. 

Also of interest will be Mr. Brennan’s views on the use of targeted lethal force in counterterrorism operations. Mr. Brennan has 

been one of the few administration officials able to speak publicly 

about such issues; Members will certainly want to understand his 

views on this, to include the importance of Congress receiving all 

of the relevant legal analyses from the Office of Legal Counsel at 

the Department of Justice. 

While the disclosure earlier this week of a 16-page unclassified 

White Paper on the government’s legal analysis of the use of targeted force against a United States citizen, who was a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida—there is finally more information available to the public. 

I have been calling, and others have been calling—the Vice 

Chairman and I—for increased transparency on the use of targeted 

force for over a year, including the circumstances in which such 

force is directed against U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike. I have 

also been attempting to speak publicly about the very low number 

of civilian casualties that result from such strikes; I have been limited in my ability to do so. 

But for the past several years, this Committee has done significant oversight of the government’s conduct of targeted strikes and 

the figures we have obtained from the Executive Branch—which we 

have done our utmost to verify—confirm that the number of civilian casualties that have resulted from such strikes each year has 

typically been in the single digits. 

When I ask to give out the actual numbers, I’m told, ‘‘You can’t.’’ 

And I say, ‘‘Why not?’’ ‘‘Because it’s classified,’’ ‘‘It’s a covert program,’’ ‘‘For the public, it doesn’t exist.’’ Well, I think that rationale, Mr. Brennan, is long gone, and I’m going to talk to you in my 

questions a little bit about that, because I think it’s very important 

that we share this data with people. 

This Committee will continue to perform significant oversight of 

targeted strikes. We received, this morning, an Office of Legal 

Counsel opinion on the topic. Actually, we received a short one and 

a long one. And while I was there, I was delighted to see Senator 

Wyden reading, Senator King in the room, and Senator Udall came 

in the room. And I’m hopeful that every Member will avail of themselves of this opportunity to review those OLC opinions. 

I also intend to review proposals for legislation to ensure that 

drone strikes are carried out in a manner consistent with our val-
20 

ues, and the proposal to create an analogue of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review the conduct of such strikes. 

Finally, I will want to know how the nominee intends to lead an 

agency that’s had four directors since DCI Tenet resigned in July 

of ’04, now in a budget downturn, and what he sees as the major 

challenges before the CIA. 

For the information of Members, we will have rounds of questions of eight minutes each, and Members will be recognized by seniority, alternating between the sides. 

Members have requested the opportunity to ask Mr. Brennan 

questions that will require classified answers, as well, so we have 

the ability to move to a classified session following this hearing, if 

it is timely and we’re able to do so. So my suggestion is that we 

play that ear by ear, Mr. Vice Chairman, and see if it’s possible to 

do so. If it isn’t, we will have our closed session on Tuesday at our 

next hearing. 

Finally, before turning to the Vice Chairman, I’d like to conclude 

my remarks the same way I did at the confirmation for General 

Petraeus. Again this time, the transition between CIA directors has 

been managed by acting director Michael Morell. I’d like to thank 

Mr. Morell for keeping the Agency on firm footing and for his 

agreement to remain as deputy director after the confirmation 

process. He continues to be a top notch CIA officer, a friend of the 

Committee, and I’m sure he will be an excellent deputy, Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. Vice Chairman, please proceed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

And Mr. Brennan, I join the Chair in congratulating you on your 

nomination and welcoming you to the Committee today. And I don’t 

have to remind you—because you are a career individual—of the 

importance of your nomination to head the Central Intelligence 

Agency. I also want to welcome your family and thank them for 

their support of you during your years of commitment to our government. 

Also, I want to just say, as the Chairman did, how much we appreciate Mike Morell. And I’m very pleased to see in your prepared 

statement that you mention Mike and his contribution to the Central Intelligence Agency, and that you intend to keep Mike in place. 

He is a very valued public servant, and a guy who has stepped into 

a very difficult situation now twice and has led with great commitment and has provided the kind of leadership the Agency has needed. 

Mr. Brennan, if confirmed as the next director, it will be your responsibility to lead the CIA as our nation continues to face significant national security challenges. While we’ve heard a lot in recent 

months about al-Qa’ida being decimated and on the run, it is by 

no means destroyed, and the threat of terrorism from its affiliates, 

especially in Yemen and North Africa, remains very real. 

Just in the past few months, terrorist attacks in Algeria and 

Benghazi have claimed American lives, so it is clear that our vigilance must not waver. At the same time, our attention focused be-
21 

yond these threats posed by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations, from Iran to North Korea to Venezuela. From nuclear proliferation, to cyber intrusions, to counterintelligence, the challenges 

are constant and immense, and the CIA is at the point of the spear. 

As your predecessors faced similar challenges, they recognized 

the importance of working hand in hand with Congress, especially 

the Congressional intelligence committees. I appreciated your commitment to me to be open and transparent with this Committee, 

if you are in fact confirmed as the next director. 

I expect this commitment to actually be born out and practiced, 

regardless of political pressures, and not just become words spoken 

during the confirmation process. Far too often, the Committee is 

facing unnecessary and, frankly, legally-questionable obstacles, in 

receiving needed oversight information from the Intelligence Community. 

As we hear from you this afternoon, I also believe it is important 

for you to set the record straight on a few matters relating to detention policy and the CIA’s detention and interrogation program. 

We know that the 2009 Executive Order removed the CIA from the 

detention business. But the current framework is simply not working to get real-time access to intelligence from terrorist detainees. 

I reviewed elements of the 9/11 Commission report in preparation for this hearing, and I am concerned that the administration 

is making the same mistakes that were made before 9/11, when the 

CIA missed vital information on KSM, the mastermind of the attacks, and decided to forego a capture operation of Osama bin 

Laden. The Commission cited the administration’s focus on using 

the Article 3 court process as factors in both instances. 

You and I also discussed the Committee’s report on the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, which was approved in December by a slim majority. You told me that you had completed your 

review of the report’s Executive Summary, and the Findings and 

Conclusions, and you’ll have an opportunity to express your observations and the concerns that you expressed to me with the rest 

of the Committee today. 

Mr. Brennan, I thank you once again for your dedication and 

your service to our country, and we look forward to your testimony 

and to your response to questions submitted by the Committee. 

Thanks, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

And now we will turn to the distinguished senator from Virginia, 

Senator Mark Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MARK WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, and colleagues. It’s my honor to introduce John 

Brennan as the President’s nominee to be the next director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency. 

Like so many thousands of other professionals in the United 

States Intelligence Community, John now calls Virginia home. It 

has been my privilege, as a Member of this Committee for the last 

two years, to represent many of the thousands of men and women 

in our intelligence agencies who also call Virginia home. 
22 

I would also make mention of the fact, very briefly, since we 

don’t get this many opportunities in front of this kind of public audience, to recognize an action that Senator Mikulski and I took last 

Congress that many of you joined with us on that we will reintroduce this year—a joint resolution to mark U.S. Intelligence Professionals Day—to bring respectful attention to these quiet professionals who keep our nation safe every day. And I, again, look forward to working with all of you to make sure that we do this resolution again. 

These same qualities—dedication, selflessness, intelligence, and 

patriotism—are well represented in John Brennan, whom the men 

and women of the CIA will find a dedicated leader in public service, should he be confirmed. While I have not had the opportunity 

to work with Mr. Brennan as much as some of the other Members, 

I’ve enjoyed our meeting together. And as the Chairman has already indicated, John Brennan’s long career of public service and 

his record have prepared him to be director of the CIA. 

He served for 25 years at the Agency in the field and at Headquarters, including as deputy executive director in Saudi Arabia, 

and as briefer to two presidents since 9/11. He’s been on the front 

lines in the fight against al-Qa’ida, including standing up the National Counterterrorism Center. He has enormous appreciation for 

the men and women of the CIA and the work they do—often in the 

shadows—to keep our nation safe. 

One thing that I was also impressed in our meeting was that Mr. 

Brennan has been an advocate for greater transparency in our 

counterterrorism policy and for adherence to the rule of law. As a 

Member and a new Member of this oversight committee, I appreciate that. 

As the President said, the imperative to secure the nation must 

not come at the sacrifice of our laws or ideals. This needs never be 

an either/or choice. We can protect the nation and stay true to our 

principles. As has been raised by the Chair and the Vice Chair, I 

think it is also important—and these are questions that I’ll be asking, as well—to ensure that while we look at the programs of the 

CIA, that these programs’ effectiveness be measured objectively 

and not simply by those who are charged with implementing them. 

So, the Chairman has already gone through other parts of your 

background; I again want to congratulate you on this nomination, 

the service you’ve provided to our nation so far, and, in the aftermath of this hearing, hopefully the service that you’ll provide on 

a going-forward basis. 

With that, Madam Chairman, I’ll come back to the dais and look 

forward to my chance to ask the nominee questions, as well. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Mr. Brennan, please stand, raise your right hand, and I’ll administer the oath. 

‘‘I, John Brennan, do solemnly swear—’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN. I, John Brennan, do solemnly swear—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. ‘‘That I will give this Committee the truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

me God.’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN [continuing]. That I will give this Committee the 

truth, the full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God. 
23 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. And we look forward to hearing your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN O. BRENNAN, NOMINEE FOR DIRECTOR 

OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

Mr. BRENNAN. Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, 

Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you 

today as the President’s nominee—— 

[Disruption by a protestor in the audience.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Would you hold, please? 

I will ask the Capitol Police officers to please remove this 

woman. 

[Protest continues.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please remove—— 

[Protestor is removed from the Hearing Room.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I’m going to say, once again, that we welcome everyone here; that we expect no clapping, we expect no hissing, we expect no demonstration in this room. This is a very serious 

hearing. I will stop the hearing and I will ask the room to be 

cleared, so know that. 

Please continue, Mr. Brennan. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Chairman. I am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to lead the Central Intelligence Agency. I am deeply grateful to President Obama for the 

confidence he has placed in me by sending my name forward to the 

Senate for consideration. 

Senator Warner, thank you for your generous introduction, for 

your service to our nation, and for your strong support for those 

who defend it. This includes the extraordinary men and women of 

the CIA and the Intelligence Community, so many of whom, like 

me, call Virginia home, and call you our Senator. 

I would not be here today without the love and support of my 

wife, Kathy, who has been my life partner for 34 years, and who, 

like the spouses of many other public servants and intelligence professionals—— 

[Disruption by another protestor in the audience.] 

Mr. BRENNAN [continuing]. Has made numerous sacrifices over 

the years. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Would you—would you pause, Mr. Brennan? 

If you would remove that individual, please, as quickly as you 

can. Thank you. 

[Protestor is removed from the Hearing Room.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Brennan, please proceed. 

Mr. BRENNAN [continuing]. My wife, Kathy, who, like the spouses 

of many other public servants and intelligence professionals, has 

made numerous sacrifices over the years, bearing the brunt of family responsibilities because of my chosen profession. 

Similarly, I would like to pay tribute to my three children, who, 

like the children of many CIA officers and other national security 

professionals, have had to deal with the disappointments associated with an absentee parent far more often than they should. 

And I’m very pleased to be joined today by my wife, Kathy, and 

my brother, Tom. 
24 

[Disruption by another protestor in the audience.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right, we will stop again. 

Please remove that woman. 

[Protest continues.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you could please expedite the removal—— 

[Protest continues.] 

[Protestor is removed from the Hearing Room.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. Please proceed, Mr. Brennan. 

The next time, we’re going to clear the chamber and bring people 

back in one by one. This witness is entitled to be heard, ladies and 

gentlemen. So please give him that opportunity. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you. A heartfelt ‘‘thank you’’ also goes to 

my family in New Jersey, especially my 91-year-old mother, Dorothy, and my 92-year-old father, Owen, who emigrated from Ireland 

nearly 65 years ago—— 

[Disruption by another protestor in the audience.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right, I’m going to ask—we’re going to 

halt the hearing. I’m going to ask that the room be cleared and 

that the CODEPINK associates not be permitted to come back in. 

We’ve done this five times now, and five times are enough. So, we 

will recess for a few minutes. 

[Protest continues.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Ladies and gentlemen, if you would mind 

leaving, we will then have you come back in, but it’s the only way 

I think we’re going to stop this. We will recess for a few minutes. 

[Whereupon, the Committee recessed briefly.] 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay, we will reconvene the hearing. If the 

press would please take their places—— 

Mr. Brennan, please proceed. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. 

I was talking about my parents, my 91-year-old mother, Dorothy, 

and my 92-year-old father, Owen, who emigrated to this country 65 

years ago and who, together, raised my sister, my brother, and I 

to cherish the opportunity known as America. 

As I appear before you today, I would additionally like to extend 

a special salute to David Petraeus, a patriot who remains—as do 

all former directors—one of the staunchest advocates of the Agency’s mission and workforce. 

I want to express my admiration for my close friend and colleague, Michael Morell, who has twice guided the CIA as acting director, with a steady hand, integrity, and exceptional skill. If confirmed, it would be a distinct privilege for me to work side by side 

with Michael—my friend, and the epitome of an intelligence professional—in the months and years ahead. 

It also would be a tremendous privilege to serve with the Director of National Intelligence, Jim Clapper, who has mentored literally legions of intelligence professionals ever since his service in 

Vietnam. 

As the President’s principal intelligence advisor and the head of 

the Intelligence Community, Jim is a person of longstanding and 

deep experience and integrity. He and I share identical views on 

the role of intelligence and the importance of giving current and fu-
25 

ture generations of intelligence professionals the support they need 

and that they so richly deserve. 

It would be the greatest honor of my professional life to lead the 

women and men of the Central Intelligence Agency—the Agency 

where I started my career nearly 33 years ago and where I served 

for a quarter-century. A 24-year-old fresh out of graduate school, 

I arrived at Langley in August 1980 as a GS–9 career trainee, determined to do my part for national security as one of this nation’s 

intelligence officers. 

When I joined the CIA in August 1980, world events were unsettled. Our Embassy in Tehran had been overrun the year before, 

and 52 Americans were still being held hostage by a radical new 

government in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was less 

than a year old, and the next decade would witness the slow but 

steady crumbling of the Soviet Union. Nuclear proliferation and the 

spread of weapons of mass destruction were a constant concern. 

And U.S. officials were hard at work around the globe, trying to 

prevent regional tensions and animosities from turning into fullscale wars. 

And, ominously, the United States was about to face an upsurge 

in terrorist attacks that would claim hundreds of American lives in 

Lebanon, including a 49-year-old CIA officer named Bob Ames, who 

was killed during a brief visit to our Embassy in Beirut, and who, 

at the time, was my boss at CIA. 

During my 25-year career at CIA, I watched up close, and even 

participated, in history being made in far off corners of the world, 

as CIA fulfilled its critical intelligence roles—collecting intelligence, 

uncovering secrets, identifying threats, partnering with foreign intelligence and security services, analyzing opaque and complicated 

developments abroad, carrying out covert action, and attempting to 

forecast events yet to happen—all in an effort to protect our people 

and to strengthen America’s national security. 

And throughout my career, I had the great fortune to experience 

first-hand, as well as witness, what it means to be a CIA officer: 

such as an analyst, who has the daunting task and tremendous responsibility to take incomplete and frequently contradictory information and advise the senior-most policy-makers of our government about foreign political, military, and economic developments. 

Or an operations officer, whose job it is to find and obtain those 

elusive secrets that provide advanced warning of strategic surprise, 

political turbulence, terrorist plots, impending violence, cyber attacks, and persistent threats such as nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation. 

Or a technical expert, who seeks new and creative ways to find 

nuggets of intelligence in tremendous volumes of data, provides secure, and even stealthy, intelligence collection and communication 

systems, and counters the latest technological threats to our nation. 

Or a support officer or manager with the responsibility to ensure 

that the core missions of the Agency—collecting intelligence, providing all source analysis, and, when directed by the President, 

conducting covert action—are carried out with the requisite skill, 

speed, agility, and proficiency. 
26 

From the Middle East to the Central Caucasus; from Sub-Saharan Africa to Central and South America; from the vast expanses 

of Asia to the great cities of Europe, and all countries and regions 

in between, CIA officers were there—sometimes in force, and sometimes virtually standing alone. And for those 25 years, it was a 

great honor for me to be a CIA officer, as I knew that the Agency’s 

contributions to this country’s security were as invaluable as they 

were innumerable. 

Following my retirement from the CIA in 2005, I had the good 

fortune to experience other professional opportunities. For three 

years, I served as President and Chief Executive Officer of a private-sector company, where I learned, first-hand, some very important lessons about fiduciary responsibility and sound business practices. And for the past four years I’ve had the privilege to serve as 

the President’s principal policy advisor on Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism. 

In that role, I have had the opportunity to work daily with some 

of the finest Americans I have ever met from the intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement, and diplomatic communities, who have dedicated their lives to the safety and security of 

their fellow Americans. It is because of the work of those Americans—serving domestically, and especially, those serving in dangerous places abroad—that we are able to experience the freedom 

and security that are the hallmarks of our nation. 

I believe my CIA background and my other professional experiences have prepared me well for the challenge of leading the 

world’s premier intelligence agency at this moment in history, 

which is as dynamic and consequential as any in recent decades, 

and will continue to be in the years ahead. Simply stated, the need 

for accurate intelligence and prescient analysis from CIA has never 

been greater than it is in 2013 or than it will be in the coming 

years. 

Historic political, economic, and social transformations continue 

to sweep through the Middle East and North Africa, with major implications for our interests, Israel’s security, our Arab partners, and 

the prospects for peace and stability throughout the region. We remain at war with al-Qa’ida and its associated forces, which, despite 

the substantial progress we have made against them, still seek to 

carry out deadly strikes against our homeland and our citizens, 

and against our friends and allies. 

U.S. computer networks and databases are under daily cyber attack by nation states, international criminal organizations, sub-national groups, and individual hackers. And the regimes in Tehran 

and Pyongyang remain bent on pursuing nuclear weapons and 

intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems, rather than fulfilling their international obligations or even meeting the basic 

needs of their people. 

Yes, the CIA’s mission is as important to our nation’s security 

today as at any time in our nation’s history. In carrying out their 

mission, the men and women of the CIA are frequently asked to 

undertake challenging, perilous, and, yes, controversial actions, on 

behalf of the American people. The CIA is not immune from scrutiny of these efforts, and I welcome a discussion of CIA’s past and 

present activities. 
27 

If I am confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be the Committee’s lengthy report on the CIA’s former rendition, detention, 

and interrogation program that involved now-banned interrogation 

techniques. I have read the Findings and Executive Summary of 

the 6,000-page report, which raises a number of very serious 

issues. Given the gravity and importance of this subject, I would 

look forward to further dialogue with Members of the Committee 

on the report and its Findings, if I am confirmed. 

In addition, some of our government’s current counterterrorism 

policies and operations have sparked widespread debate—domestically, internationally, and in this room. I have publicly acknowledged that our fight against al-Qa’ida and associated forces have 

sometimes involved the use of lethal force outside the hot battlefield of Afghanistan. 

Accordingly, it is understandable that there is great interest in 

the legal basis, as well as the thresholds, criteria, processes, procedures, approvals, and reviews of such actions. I have strongly promoted such public discussions with the Congress and with the 

American people, as I believe that our system of government and 

our commitment to transparency demands nothing less. 

As the elected representatives of the American people and as 

Members of this Committee, you have the obligation to oversee the 

activities of the CIA and the other elements of the Intelligence 

Community to ensure that they are being carried out effectively, 

lawfully, successfully, and without regard to partisanship. If confirmed, I would endeavor to keep this Committee fully and currently informed, not only because it is required by law, but because 

you can neither perform your oversight function nor support the 

mission of the CIA if you are kept in the dark. 

And I know that irrespective of the fullness of that dialogue, 

there will be occasions when we disagree, just as you disagree 

among yourselves at times, on aspects of past, current, and future 

activities of the CIA. Such disagreement is healthy, and is a necessary part of our democratic process. But such disagreements 

should never prevent us from carrying out our national security 

and intelligence responsibilities, as a failure to do so could have 

devastating consequences for the safety and security of all Americans. 

During my courtesy calls with many of you, I also heard repeated 

references to a ‘‘trust deficit’’ that has, at times, existed between 

this Committee and the CIA. If I am confirmed, a trust deficit between the Committee and the CIA would be wholly unacceptable 

to me, and I would make it my goal on Day One of my tenure, and 

every day thereafter, to strengthen the trust between us. 

I have a reputation for speaking my mind, and, at times, doing 

so in a rather direct manner, which some attribute to my New Jersey roots. I like to think that my candor and bluntness will reassure you that you will get straight answers from me—maybe not 

always the ones you like, but you will get answers, and they will 

reflect my honest views. That’s the commitment I made to you. 

I would like to finish by saying a few words about the importance 

of taking care of the women and men who serve in the CIA. Because of the secrecy that intelligence work requires, few Americans 

will ever know the extraordinary sacrifices that these professionals 
28 

and their families make every day. Many of them risk their lives 

and, at times, have given their lives to keep us safe. 

If confirmed, I would make it my mission, in partnership with 

the Congress, to ensure that the men and women have the training, tradecraft, linguistic skills, technical tools, guidance, supervision, and leadership they need to do their jobs. They also need 

assurance that we will do all we can to protect our nation’s secrets 

and prevent leaks of classified information. These leaks damage 

our national security—sometimes gravely—putting these CIA employees at risk and making their missions much more difficult. 

The men and women of the CIA are a national treasure, and I 

will consider it one of my most important responsibilities to take 

care of them, just as others took care of me when I first arrived 

at Langley as a young trainee in 1980. 

Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee, as 

you well know, when you arrive at CIA Headquarters in Langley 

and enter the main lobby, you immediately see the marble Memorial Wall. On it are stars—each one representing a Member of the 

CIA family who gave his or her life in the service of this nation. 

Today, there are 103 stars on that wall. 

To me, and to everyone in the CIA, they are not simply stars, nor 

are they only visible remembrances of dearly departed colleagues 

and friends. The stars represent heroic and unsung patriots; Americans who lived their lives loving this country and who died protecting it. 

That Memorial Wall means something very special to me and to 

every other American who has proudly served at the Agency. I 

want all CIA employees always to be proud of the organization to 

which they belong, and to be proud of its activities. 

And if given the honor to serve as the 21st director of the CIA, 

I would take it as a sacred obligation to do everything in my ability 

to make sure the Central Intelligence Agency is the absolute best 

intelligence service it can be, and one that makes all Americans 

proud. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brennan follows:] 

STATEMENT OF JOHN O. BRENNAN, NOMINATION HEARING TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Chambliss, Members of the Committee—I am 

honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee to lead the Central 

Intelligence Agency. I am deeply grateful to President Obama for the confidence he 

has placed in me by sending my name forward to the Senate for consideration. 

Senator Warner, thank you for your generous introduction, for your service to our 

Nation, and for your strong support of those who defend it. This includes the extraordinary men and women of the CIA and our Intelligence Community, so many 

of whom, like me, call Virginia home and call you our Senator. 

I would not be here today without the love and support of my wife Kathy, who 

has been my life partner for more than 34 years and who, like the spouses of many 

other public servants and intelligence professionals, has made numerous sacrifices 

over the years, bearing the brunt of family responsibilities because of my chosen 

profession. Similarly, I would like to pay tribute to my three children, who, like the 

children of many CIA officers and other national security professionals, have had 

to deal with the disappointments associated with an absentee parent far more often 

than they should. 

A heartfelt ‘‘thank you’’ also goes to my family in New Jersey, especially my 91- 

year-old mother Dorothy and my 92-year-old father Owen—who emigrated from Ire-
29 

land nearly 65 years ago—and who, together, raised my sister, brother, and me to 

cherish the opportunity that is America. 

As I appear before you today, I would additionally like to extend a special salute 

to David Petraeus, a patriot who remains as do all former Directors—one of the 

staunchest advocates of the Agency’s mission and workforce. 

I want to express my admiration for my close friend and colleague, Michael 

Morell, who has twice guided the CIA as Acting Director with a steady hand, integrity, and exceptional skill. If confirmed, it would be a distinct privilege for me to 

work side-by-side with Michael in the months and years ahead. 

It also would be a tremendous privilege to serve with Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper, who has mentored literally legions of intelligence professionals 

ever since his service in Vietnam. As the President’s principal intelligence advisor 

and head of the Intelligence Community, Jim is a person of longstanding and deep 

experience and integrity. He and I share identical views on the role of intelligence 

and on the importance of giving current and future generations of intelligence professionals the support they need and so richly deserve. 

It would be the greatest honor of my professional life to lead the women and men 

of the Central Intelligence Agency—the Agency where I started my career nearly 

33 years ago and where I served for a quarter century. A 24-year-old fresh out of 

graduate school, I arrived at Langley in August 1980 as a GS-9 ‘‘career trainee,’’ 

determined to do my part for national security as one of this Nation’s intelligence 

officers. 

When I joined the CIA in August 1980, world events were unsettled. Our Embassy in Tehran had been overrun the year before, and 52 Americans were still 

being held hostage by a radical new government in Iran. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was less than a year old, and the next decade would witness the slow 

but steady crumbling of the Soviet Union. Nuclear proliferation and the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction were a constant concern, and U.S. officials were hard 

at work around the globe trying to prevent regional tensions and animosities from 

turning into full-scale wars. And, ominously, the United States was about to face 

an upsurge in terrorist attacks that would claim hundreds of American lives in Lebanon, including a 49-year-old CIA officer named Bob Ames, who was killed during 

a brief visit to our Embassy in Beirut and who, at the time, was my boss at CIA. 

During my 25-year career at CIA, I watched up close and even participated in history being made in far-off corners of the world, as CIA fulfilled its critical intelligence roles—collecting intelligence, uncovering secrets, identifying threats, 

partnering with foreign intelligence and security services, analyzing opaque and 

complicated developments abroad, carrying out covert action, and attempting to 

forecast events yet to happen—all in an effort to protect our people and strengthen 

America’s national security. 

And throughout my career, I had the great fortune to experience firsthand as well 

as to witness what it means to be a CIA officer. 

• Such as an analyst, who has the daunting task and tremendous responsibility 

to take incomplete and frequently contradictory information and advise the senior most policymakers of our government about foreign political, military, and 

economic developments. 

• Or an operations officer, whose job it is to find and obtain those elusive secrets 

that provide advance warning of strategic surprise; political turbulence; terrorist plots; impending violence; cyber attacks; and persistent threats such as 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation. 

• Or a technical expert, who seeks new and creative ways to find nuggets of intelligence in tremendous volumes of data, provide secure and even stealthy intelligence collection and communications systems, and counter the latest technological threats to our Nation. 

• Or a support officer or manager with the responsibility to ensure that the core 

missions of the Agency—collecting intelligence, providing all-source analysis, 

and, when directed by the President, conducting covert action—are carried out 

with the requisite skill, speed, agility, and proficiency. 

From the Middle East to the central Caucuses, from sub-Saharan Africa to Central and South America, from the vast expanses of Asia to the great cities of Europe, 

and all countries and regions in between, CIA officers were there . . . sometimes in 

force and sometimes virtually standing alone. 

And for those 25 years, it was a great honor for me to be an officer of the CIA, 

as I knew that the Agency’s contributions to this country’s security were as invaluable as they were innumerable. 

Following my retirement from CIA in 2005, I had the good fortune to experience 

other professional opportunities. For three years, I served as President and Chief 
30 

Executive Officer of a private sector company, where I learned firsthand some very 

important lessons about fiduciary responsibility and sound business practices. And 

for the past four years, I have had the privilege to serve as the President’s principal 

policy advisor on homeland security and counterterrorism. In that role, I have had 

the opportunity to work daily with some of the finest Americans I have ever met— 

from the intelligence, military, homeland security, law enforcement, and diplomatic 

communities—who have dedicated their lives to the safety and security of their fellow Americans. It is because of the work of those Americans—serving domestically 

and especially in dangerous places abroad—that we are able to experience the freedom and security that are the hallmarks of our Nation. 

I believe my CIA background and my other professional experiences have prepared me well for the challenge of leading the world’s premier intelligence agency 

at this moment in history, which is as dynamic and consequential as any in recent 

decades, and will continue to be in the years ahead. Simply stated, the need for accurate intelligence and prescient analysis from CIA has never been greater than it 

is in 2013—or than it will be in the coming years. 

• Historic political, economic, and social transformations continue to sweep 

through the Middle East and North Africa, with major implications for our interests, Israel’s security, our Arab partners, and the prospects for peace and stability throughout the region. • We remain at war with al-Qa’ida and its associated forces, which—despite the 

substantial progress we have made against them—still seek to carry out deadly 

strikes against our homeland and our citizens, as well as against our friends. • U.S. computer networks and databases are under daily cyber attack by nation 

states, international criminal organizations, subnational groups, and individual 

hackers. • And regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang remain bent on pursuing nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems rather than fulfilling 

their international obligations or even meeting the basic needs of their people. 

Yes, the CIA’s mission is as important to our Nation’s security today as at any 

time in our Nation’s history. 

In carrying out their mission, the men and women of the CIA are frequently 

asked to undertake challenging, perilous, and controversial actions on behalf of the 

American people. The CIA is not immune from scrutiny of these efforts, and I welcome a discussion of CIA’s past and current activities. If I am confirmed, one of my 

highest priorities would be the Committee’s lengthy report on the CIA’s former rendition, detention, and interrogation program that involved now-banned interrogation 

techniques. I have read the findings and executive summary of the 6,000 page report, which raise a number of very serious issues. Given the gravity and importance 

of the subject, I would look forward to further dialogue with Members of the Committee on the report and its findings, if I am confirmed. 

In addition, some of our government’s current counterterrorism policies and operations have sparked widespread debate, domestically and internationally. I have 

publicly acknowledged that our fight against al-Qa’ida and associated forces has 

sometimes involved the use of lethal force outside the ‘‘hot battlefield’’ of Afghanistan. Accordingly, it is understandable that there is great interest in the legal basis 

as well as the thresholds, criteria, processes, procedures, approvals, and reviews of 

such actions. I have strongly promoted such public discussion, with the Congress 

and with the American people, as I believe that our system of government and our 

commitment to transparency demand nothing less. 

As the elected representatives of the American people and as Members of the 

Committee, you have the obligation to oversee the activities of the CIA and other 

elements of the Intelligence Community to ensure that they are being carried out 

effectively, lawfully, successfully, and without regard to partisanship. 

If confirmed, I would endeavor to keep this Committee fully and currently informed, not only because it is required by law, but because you can neither perform 

your oversight function nor support the mission of CIA if you are kept in the dark. 

And I know that irrespective of the fullness of that dialogue, there will be occasions 

when we disagree, just as you disagree among yourselves at times on aspects of 

past, current, and future activities of the CIA. Such disagreement is healthy and 

is a necessary part of our democratic process. But such disagreement should never 

prevent us from carrying out our national security and intelligence responsibilities, 

as a failure to do so could have devastating consequences for the safety and security 

of all Americans. 

During my courtesy calls with many of you, I also heard repeated reference to a 

‘‘trust deficit’’ that has, at times, existed between this Committee and the CIA. If 

I am confirmed, a trust deficit between the Committee and the CIA would be wholly 
31 

unacceptable to me, and I would make it my goal on Day One of my tenure—and 

every day thereafter—to strengthen the trust between us. I have a reputation for 

speaking my mind and, at times, doing so in a rather direct manner, which some 

attribute to my New Jersey roots. I like to think that my candor and bluntness will 

reassure you that you will get straight answers from me—maybe not always the 

ones you like, but you will get answers, and they will reflect my honest views. 

That’s the commitment I make to you. 

I would like to finish by saying a few words about the importance of taking care 

of the women and men who serve in the CIA. Because of the secrecy that intelligence work requires, few Americans will ever know the extraordinary sacrifices 

that these professionals—and their families—make every day. Many of them risk 

their lives and, at times, have given their lives, to keep us safe. 

If confirmed, I would make it my mission—in partnership with the Congress—to 

ensure that the men and women of the CIA have the training, tradecraft, linguistic 

skills, technical tools, guidance, supervision, and leadership they need to do their 

jobs. They also need assurance that we will do all we can to protect our Nation’s 

secrets and prevent leaks of classified information. These leaks damage our national 

security, sometimes gravely, putting these CIA employees at risk and making their 

missions more difficult. The men and women of the CIA are a national treasure, 

and I will consider it one of my most important responsibilities to take care of them, 

just as others took care of me when I first arrived at Langley as a young trainee 

in 1980. 

Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Members of the Committee, as you well know, 

when you arrive at CIA Headquarters in Langley and enter the main lobby, you immediately see the marble Memorial Wall. On it are stars—each one representing a 

member of the CIA family who gave his or her life in service to our Nation. Today, 

there are 103 stars on that wall. To me, and everyone in the CIA, they are not simply stars, nor are they only visible remembrances of dearly departed colleagues and 

friends. The stars represent heroic and unsung patriots—Americans who lived their 

lives loving this country, and who died protecting it. 

That Memorial Wall means something very special to me and to every other 

American who has proudly served at the Agency. I want all CIA employees always 

to be proud of the organization to which they belong and to be proud of all of its 

activities. And if given the honor to serve as the 21st Director of the CIA, I would 

take it as a sacred obligation to do everything in my ability to make sure the Central Intelligence Agency is the absolute best intelligence service it can be and one 

that makes all Americans proud. 

Thank you very much, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brennan. 

I have five short questions that we traditionally ask; if you would 

just answer them yes or no. 

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other 

venues when invited? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the CIA 

and designated staff when invited? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any 

other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry 

out its oversight and legislative responsibilities? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; all documents that come under my authority 

as director of CIA, I absolutely would. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. We’ll talk to you more about that in a 

minute. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, Senator. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the CIA and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief, to 

the fullest extent possible, all Members of this Committee, of intel-
32 

ligence activities and covert actions, rather than only the Chairman 

and Vice Chairman? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I will endeavor to do that. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Now, let me—we are now 

going to go into eight-minute rounds. And we’ll do it by seniority, 

and alternate from side to side. 

I wanted to talk about, just for a moment, the provision of documents; Senator Wyden and others have had much to do about this. 

But our job is to provide oversight to try to see that the CIA and 

Intelligence communities operate legally. In order to do that, it is 

really necessary to understand what the official legal interpretation 

is, so the Office of Legal Counsel opinions become very important. 

We began during the Bush administration, with Mr. Bradbury, 

to ask for OLC opinions. Up until last night, when the President 

called the Vice Chairman, Senator Wyden, and myself, and said 

that they were providing the OLC opinions, we had not been able 

to get them. It makes our job—to interpret what is legal or not 

legal—much more difficult if we do not have those opinions. 

The staff has asked for eight additional opinions. What I want 

to know is will you become our advocate with the administration, 

so that we can obtain those opinions? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The National Security Act, as amended, requires 

that the heads of intelligence agencies provide the Committee with 

the appropriate legal documentation to support covert actions. I 

would certainly be an advocate of making sure that this Committee 

has the documentation it needs in order to perform its oversight 

functions. I have been an advocate of that position; I will continue 

to be. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I take that as a yes, and I’m counting on 

you to provide eight OLC opinions. 

Second question on this: when the opinion came over, our staff 

were banned from seeing it—this morning. We have lawyers. We 

have very good staff. This is upsetting to a number of Members. 

We depend on our staff, because you can’t take material home, you 

can’t take notes with you. So the staff becomes very important. 

Do you happen to know the reason why our staff are not permitted, when we are permitted, to see an OLC? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator—Chairman, I understand fully your interest in having your staff have access to this documentation; fully 

understandable. The reason for providing information just to Committee Members at times is to ensure that it is kept in a limited 

basis. 

It is rather exceptional, as I think you know, that the Office of 

Legal Counsel opinions, or advice, would be shared directly with 

you. And this, I think, was determined because of the rather exceptional nature of the issue and in a genuine effort to try to meet the 

Committee’s requirements. I understand your interest in having 

the staff access to it—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. If you would relay the request, officially—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN [continuing]. We’d appreciate it very much. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely; I will. 
33 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Second thing, when I spoke with you in my 

office, we talked about our report on detention and interrogation— 

the 6,000-page report you mentioned. I asked you if you would 

please read it; you said you would—you said you would, for sure, 

read the 300-page summary. Have you done so? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, Chairman, I have read the first volume, 

which is 300 pages. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Then, let me ask you this question: Were 

the EITs key to the takedown of Osama bin Laden? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Chairman, the report right now still remains classified. And the report has been provided to the Agency and Executive Branch for comments. 

There clearly were a number of things, many things, that I read 

in that report that were very concerning and disturbing to me, and 

ones that I would want to look into immediately, if I were to be 

confirmed as CIA director. 

It talked about mismanagement of the program, misrepresentations of the information, providing inaccurate information. And it 

was rather damning in a lot of its language, as far as the nature 

of these activities that were carried out. 

I am eager to see the Agency’s response to that report. I read 

those 300 pages; I look forward, if confirmed, to reading the entire 

6,000-page volume, because it is of such gravity and importance. 

But, Chairman, I do not yet—and nor has the CIA finished its 

review of this information. The Committee’s report was done, obviously, over an extended period of time; a tremendous amount of 

work that’s gone into it. Based on the review of the documentary 

information that was available—the documents, there were not 

interviews conducted with CIA officers. 

I very much look forward to hearing from the CIA on that and 

then coming back to this Committee and giving you my full and 

honest views. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, thank you. You will have that opportunity, I assure you. 

I’d like to ask you about the status of the administration’s efforts 

to institutionalize rules and procedures for the conduct of drone 

strikes; in particular, how you see your role as CIA director in that 

approval process. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Chairman, as this Committee knows—and I’m 

sure wants to continue to protect certain covert action activities— 

but let me talk, generally, about the counterterrorism program and 

the role of CIA, and this effort to try to institutionalize and to ensure we have as rigorous a process as possible, that we feel that 

we’re taking the appropriate actions at the appropriate time. 

The President has insisted that any actions we take will be legally grounded, will be thoroughly anchored in intelligence, will 

have the appropriate review process, approval process, before any 

action is contemplated, including those actions that might involve 

the use of lethal force. 

The different parts of the government that are involved in this 

process are involved in the interagency, and my role as the President’s counterterrorism advisor was to help to orchestrate this effort over the past four years to ensure, again, that any actions we 

take fully comport with our law and meet the standards that I 
34 

think this Committee and the American people expect of us, as far 

as taking actions we need to protect the American people, but at 

the same time ensuring that we do everything possible before we 

need to resort to lethal force. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks very much, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Brennan, the 9/11 Commission report describes a canceled 

1998 CIA operation to capture Osama bin Laden using tribal 

groups in Afghanistan. 

The former head of CIA’s bin Laden Unit told staff that you convinced Director Tenet to cancel that operation. He says that following a meeting you had in Riyadh with Director Tenet, the bin 

Laden Unit chief, and others, that you cabled National Security 

Advisor Sandy Berger, saying the operation should be canceled in 

favor of a different approach, described by the 9/11 Commission as 

‘‘an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel bin 

Laden.’’ 

Now, as we know, bin Laden was not expelled. Three months 

later, the bin Laden wrath was unleashed with the attack on our 

embassies. Did you advise Director Tenet and National Security 

Advisor Berger against this operation; and if so, why? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I had conversation with George Tenet at the time. 

But I must point out, Senator, that every single CIA manager— 

George Tenet, his deputy, the head of the Directorate of Operations 

at the time, and other individuals—the Chief of the Counterterrorism Center—argued against that operation, as well, because it 

was not well grounded in intelligence and its chances of success 

were minimal. And it was likely that other individuals were going 

to be killed. 

And so, when I was involved in those discussions, I provided the 

director and others my professional advice about whether or not I 

thought that that operation should go forward. I also was engaged 

in discussions with the Saudi government at the time and encouraged certain actions to be taken so that we could put pressure on 

the Taliban, as well as on bin Laden. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. So, I’m taking it that your answer to 

my question is you did advise against—in favor of the cancellation 

of that operation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Based on what I had known at the time, I didn’t 

think that it was a worthwhile operation and it didn’t have a 

chance of success. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. The 9/11 Commission reported that 

no capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of 

detail and preparation; do you have any second thoughts about 

your recommendation to the director to cancel that operation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I have no second thoughts whatsoever 

about my advice, which was to look carefully at this operation because the chances of success were minimal. I was not in the chain 

of command at that time. I was serving abroad as chief of station. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. As deputy executive director, you received the daily updates from the time of Abu Zubaydah’s capture 

throughout his interrogation, including the analysis of the lawfulness of the techniques, putting you in a position to express any con-
35 

cerns you had about the program before any of the most controversial techniques, including waterboarding, were ever used. 

Now, we found a minimum of 50 memos in the documents within 

the 6,000 pages, on which you were copied. What steps did you 

take to stop the CIA from moving to these techniques you now say 

you found objectionable at the time? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I did not take steps to stop the CIA’s use of those 

techniques. I was not in the chain of command of that program. I 

served as deputy executive director at the time. I had responsibility 

for overseeing the management of the Agency and all of its various 

functions. And I was aware of the program; I was cc’d on some of 

those documents, but I had no oversight of it. I wasn’t involved in 

its creation. 

I had expressed my personal objections and views to some Agency colleagues about certain of those IETs, such as waterboarding, 

nudity, and others, where I professed my personal objections to it, 

but I did not try to stop it, because it was, you know, something 

that was being done in a different part of the Agency under the authority of others, and it was something that was directed by the administration at the time. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Now, you say you expressed your objection to other colleagues; did you ever express any concern to Director Tenet, to John McLaughlin, Executive Director Krongard, or 

any other of the CIA leaders? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I had a number of conversations with my Agency 

colleagues on a broad range of issues during that period of time— 

not just on this program, but other ones. We would have personal 

conversations on that. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, my reason, particularly, for 

naming those individuals, Mr. Brennan, is that they were the ones 

directly above you. Mr. McLaughlin has been quoted in the press 

as saying he never heard from you; he doesn’t doubt that you did 

this, but he says he never heard from you. And we just have not 

seen anybody who has come forward and said they ever heard any 

objections from you with respect to these programs. 

Moving on—Mr. Krongard, your boss at the CIA, told the Wall 

Street Journal that you had a role in setting the parameters of the 

program, and I quote, ‘‘Helping to seek Justice Department approval for the techniques.’’ He went on to say that ‘‘John would 

have been part and parcel of that process.’’ How does that comport 

with your response to the Committee that you played no role in the 

program’s—and I quote again, your answer—its ‘‘creation, execution, or oversight’’? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I respectfully disagree with my former colleague, 

Buzzy Krongard. I was not involved in establishing the parameters 

of that program. I think in that same Wall Street Journal article, 

he goes on to say, in fact, that I was not involved in a lot of elements of that program. 

But I was not involved in the establishment of that program. 

Again, I had awareness that the Agency was being asked to do 

this; I had awareness that the Agency was going forward on it. I 

had some visibility into some of the activities there, but I was not 

part of any type of management structure or aware of most of the 

details. 
36 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. That being the case, why would you 

be the recipient of a minimum of 50 e-mails, Mr. Brennan, on the 

progress of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, including the techniques used in that interrogation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, that was probably a standard e-mail distribution. I was on thousands upon thousands of e-mail distributions, as deputy executive director. I think I was just cc’d on them; 

I wasn’t an action officer on it. I know of no action I took at the 

Agency that in any way authorized or reprogrammed funds, or anything along those lines. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Executive Director Krongard is said 

to have been an advocate of using SERE techniques. Did he discuss 

with you a proposal to move to SERE techniques with Abu 

Zubaydah; and if so, did you raise any objection? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t recall a conversation with Mr. Krongard 

about that particular issue. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. When you reviewed the intelligence 

that the CIA was getting on Abu Zubaydah after the use of EITs, 

did you think the information was valuable? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The reports that I was getting subsequent to that, 

and in the years after that, it was clearly my impression that there 

was valuable information that was coming out. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. In a November 2007 interview, you 

said that information from the interrogation techniques, quote, 

‘‘saved lives.’’ But you also say that CIA should be out of the detention business. 

The main benefit that I saw in CIA’s program was the ability to 

hold and question individuals about whom there was significant intelligence that they were terrorists, but not necessarily evidence 

that could be used in a court of law. 

Your view seems to be that even if we could save American lives 

by detaining more terrorists, using only traditional techniques, it 

would be better to kill them with a drone or let them go free rather 

than detain them. Can you explain the logic in that argument? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I respectfully disagree, Senator. I never believe 

it’s better to kill a terrorist than to detain him. We want to detain 

as many terrorists as possible so we can elicit the intelligence from 

them in the inappropriate manner so that we can disrupt followon terrorist attacks. So, I’m a strong proponent of doing everything 

possible short of killing terrorists, bringing them to justice, and 

getting that intelligence from them. 

I clearly had the impression, as you said, when I was quoted in 

2007, that there was valuable intelligence that came out from those 

interrogation sessions. That’s why I did say that they save lives. I 

must tell you, Senator, that reading this report from the Committee raises serious questions about the information that I was 

given at the time, and the impression I had at the time. 

Now I have to determine, based on that information, as well as 

what CIA says, what the truth is. And at this point, Senator, I do 

not know what the truth is. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. How many high value targets have 

been captured during your service with the administration? 

Mr. BRENNAN. There have been a number of individuals who 

have been captured, arrested, detained, interrogated, debriefed, 
37 

and put away by our partners overseas, which is—we have given 

them the capacity now, we have provided them the intelligence. 

And, unlike in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when a lot of these 

countries were both unwilling and unable to do it, we have given 

them that opportunity. And so, that’s where we’re working with our 

partners. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. How many high-value targets have 

been arrested and detained, and interrogated by the United States, 

during your four years with the administration? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I’ll be happy to get that information to you, in 

terms of those high-value targets that have been captured with 

U.S. intelligence support. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. I submit to you the answer to that 

is one. And it’s Warsame, who was put on a ship for 60 days and 

interrogated. 

Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

I want to point out that I’m going to try and enforce the eight 

minutes. If you hear a tapping, it is not personal. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Welcome, Mr. Brennan. And if confirmed, you’re going to lead an 

extraordinary agency with extraordinary people who perform extraordinary services, most of them totally unknown by the American people. Most people don’t think about that—what it is to do 

a life of public service and never have anything known. Those of 

us who sit up here do a life of public service and want everything 

that we do to be known. It’s how we get elected. It’s a very different ethic in the Central Intelligence Agency and all intelligence 

agencies, and I respect it very much. 

I want to go to the EITC—sorry; that’s Earned Income Tax Credit—to the enhanced interrogation techniques. Well, I’m for both. 

Well, I’m not for the second, but for the first. 

You talk about the 6,000 pages. What I want to say, and when 

the second round comes, I will, I’m going to pour out my frustration 

on dealing with the Central Intelligence Agency, and dealing with 

various administrations, about trying to get information. 

Why was it that they felt that we were so unworthy of being 

trusted? Why was it they were willing to talk to Pat Roberts and 

me, or Saxby Chambliss and Dianne Feinstein, but not anybody 

else, until we literally bludgeoned them—Kit Bond and I—into 

agreeing to include everybody? Like, Carl Levin’s not trustworthy? 

You know? I mean, it’s amazing. 

And I pursue Dianne Feinstein’s point about staff. When you go 

and you have, under the previous administration, a briefing with 

the President or the Vice President, or the head of the CIA, or others, you’re not allowed to—I can remember driving with Pat Roberts, when he was Chairman and I was Vice Chairman, and we 

weren’t allowed to talk to each other driving up or driving back. 

You weren’t allowed to do that. 

Staff were a part of nothing. You have to understand that you’re 

surrounded by people who work with you and fill you in—people 

who are experts. We are, too. But they’ve got to be part of this. 
38 

They’ve got to be part of—when the OLC comes, it should come to 

them, also. I strongly support the Chairwoman’s view on that. 

Now, in the enhanced interrogation techniques matter, a handful 

of former senior CIA officials who were personally invested—and 

are personally invested—in defending the CIA’s detention and interrogation program, largely because their professional reputations 

depend on it, depend on it. 

[Inaudible] to speak for the CIA and its workforce on this issue, 

and I think it does all a great disservice. In my office, you and I 

discussed the Committee’s landmark report on this program. You 

do understand that this took six years to write—not just 6,000 

pages, but six years to write, perhaps longer—23,000, 30,000 footnotes. Why did we do this? We did this because we heard nothing 

from the Intelligence Agency. We had no way of being briefed. They 

would not tell us what was going on. So we had to do our own investigation, and we’re pretty good at it. 

And when you read those first 350 pages, you told me that you 

were shocked at some of what you read. You did not know that. 

And that, to me, is shocking—but not to condemn anybody; simply 

says that has to be fixed, and changed forever. There never can be 

that kind of situation again, where we have to tell you what’s going 

wrong in your Agency, and thus demoralizing some of the people 

in your Agency who want to be relieved of the burden and the taint 

of bad techniques in interrogation. They suffer from that. 

And yet, nobody would talk with us about that. We had to get 

that information on our own. It’s a magnificent piece of work, and 

I think it’s a piece of history; it’ll go down in history because it will 

define the separation of powers as between the intelligence committees of the House and Senate, and the Agency and others that relate to it. 

I’m also very aware that this is all crucial to the President’s authority. Not just on the more modern question of the day about 

drones. But, you know, that determination is made by one person 

and one person alone. And if there is a breakdown in protocol, if 

there is a breakdown in line of command in reacting, therefore, into 

something which is not good, where there’s too much collateral 

damage, I think, for the most part, I would agree with the Chairwoman—I believe she said this—that the work of the drone had 

been fairly safe. However, any collateral damage is unacceptable. 

And that has to be the purpose of the Agency. 

And therefore, this detention and interrogation program, I’ve got 

to say, it was—the people who ran it were ignorant of the topic; 

executed by personnel without relevant experience, managed incompetently by senior officials who did not pay attention to crucial 

details, and corrupted by personnel with pecuniary conflicts of interest. It was sold to the policymakers and lawyers of the White 

House, the Department of Justice, and Congress with grossly-inflated claims of professionalism and effectiveness; so-called ‘‘lives 

saved.’’ 

It was a low point in our history. And this document, this book, 

should change that forever. I would hope very much that you 

would, if you are confirmed, which I hope you will be, that you will 

make parts of this at your discretion, required reading for your 
39 

senior personnel so they can go through the same experience that 

you went through. Are you willing to do that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, Senator. I am looking forward to taking advantage of whatever lessons come out of this chapter in our history 

and this Committee’s report. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. How do you cross-reference—and tell me 

when I’m out of time. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Eight seconds. No, a minute and eight seconds. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. A minute and eight seconds, yes. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right; a long time. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. The cross-referencing of the EIT disaster 

and the future of the drone, and the decisions that—only the President, of course, can authorize that—but the decision sometimes is 

passed down, and it has to be passed down in a very accurate manner. And there have to be a protocol, which is exact—more exact, 

even, than the interrogation techniques, because I think that’s 

probably been put to bed just a bit; it’s beginning to get straightened out. 

But the drones are going to grow. There’s going to be more and 

more of that warfare—not just by us, but by other countries, including, perhaps, by people from within our own country. So the 

protocol of that, insofar as it would refer to a particular agency, is 

going to have to be exact, and directed, and of particular excellence 

and exactitude. How will that happen? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, you make an excellent point, and that’s 

what I’m most interested in—is finding out what went wrong. If 

this report is, as stated, accurate, what went wrong in the system 

where there were systemic failures; where there was mismanagement or inaccurate information that was put forward? 

Because there are covert activities that are taking place, you 

know, today, under the direction and management of the CIA. And 

I would have the obligation to make sure I could say to this Committee that all of those covert action programs are being run effectively, they’re being well managed, they’re being overseen, and that 

the measures of effectiveness, the results of those programs, are an 

accurate and fair representation of what actually is happening. 

This report raises serious questions about whether or not there 

are serious systemic issues that are at play here. I would need to 

get my arms around that, and that would be one of my highest priorities, if I were to go to the Agency. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I thank you. Thank you, Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Chair. 

Mr. Brennan, welcome. Thank you for your long history of public 

service; and more importantly, to your family—thank you for your 

willingness to put up with his hobby. 

Most, if not all, of the intelligence that our Committee receives 

is the finished analysis that’s derived from source reports and other 

raw intelligence materials that we don’t see—and I might say, we 

don’t need to see—all of. 
40 

In order to ensure that we can perform our oversight duties of 

the Intelligence Committee, would you agree that the Committee 

should be able to review all analytical product, if requested? 

Mr. BRENNAN. On the face of that question, yes. My answer 

would be yes. However, I would have to take a look at the issues 

it involved in terms of, you know, what are we talking about, in 

terms of access to that analytic product—whether it’s all staff, all 

Committee Members, whatever. 

I just can’t make a commitment to that. But your intention, and 

what I think your objective is, I fully support, in terms of making 

sure this Committee has the breadth of analytic expertise available 

from the Agency. 

Senator BURR. As we go forward, there may be times that the 

Committee will need the raw intelligence to judge the accuracy of 

analytical product that we’re provided. If confirmed, will you provide the raw intelligence on those occasions when the Committee 

requests it? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I would give every request from this 

Committee for access to that information full consideration. That’s 

my commitment to you. 

Senator BURR. Do you agree that it’s a function of this Committee’s oversight that occasionally we would need to look at it? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would agree that it is probably a function of your 

oversight that you would have interest in doing that, and it would 

be my obligation, I think, as director of CIA, to try to be as accommodating as possible to that interest, while at the same time trying 

to respect whatever considerations need to be taken into account as 

we do that. 

Senator BURR. Mr. Brennan, as you know, the Committee is conducting a thorough inquiry into the attacks in Benghazi, Libya. In 

the course of this investigation, the CIA has repeatedly delayed, 

and in some cases, flatly refused, to provide documents to this 

Committee. If confirmed, will you assure this Committee that this 

refusal will never happen again? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I can commit to you, Senator, that I would do everything in my ability and my authority to be able to reach an accommodation with this Committee that requests documents, because an impasse between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch on issues of such importance is not in the interest of 

the United States Government. And so, it would be my objective to 

see if we could meet those interests. 

At the same time, our founding fathers did, sort of, separate the 

branches of government—Judicial, Legislative, and Executive. And 

so, I want to be mindful of that separation, but at the same time, 

meet your legitimate interests. 

Senator BURR. They also gave us the ‘‘power of the purse.’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN. They certainly did, Senator; I’m fully aware of 

that. 

Senator BURR. I would suggest that that’s the only tool, and it’s 

one we hate to use. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. 

Senator BURR. Do you think that there’s any situation where it’s 

legal to disclose to the media, or to the public, details of covert action programs? 
41 

Mr. BRENNAN. I do not think it is ever appropriate to improperly 

disclose classified information to anybody who does not have legitimate access to it and has the clearances for it. 

Senator BURR. Let me clarify. I didn’t ask for classified information. I specifically said ‘‘covert action programs.’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN. By definition, covert action programs are classified, Senator. 

Senator BURR. I realize that. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. So, I do not believe it is appropriate to improperly disclose any of those details related to covert action programs. 

Senator BURR. Let me point out that in the Committee pre-hearing questions, you didn’t really answer a question that dealt with 

specific instances where you were authorized to disclose classified 

information to a reporter. So, could you provide for the Committee 

any times that you were given the authority to release classified 

information? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I have never provided classified information to reporters. I engaged in discussions with reporters about classified 

issues that they might have had access to because of unfortunate 

leaks of classified information, and I frequently work with reporters, if not editors, of newspapers, to keep out of the public domain 

some of this country’s most important secrets. 

And so I engage with them on those issues. But after working 

in the intelligence profession for 30 years and being at the CIA for 

25 years, I know the importance of keeping those secrets secret. 

Senator BURR. Have any of your conversations with those reporters or media consultants about intelligence matters been recorded, 

or were there transcriptions of it? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe there have been. I’ve been on news network shows, and I have been, you know, engaged in conversations 

on the telephone and other things that I presume—and I know— 

that they have been recorded on occasion. 

Senator BURR. Have you specifically asked for them not to be recorded? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Whenever I talk to reporters, I do so at the request of the White House Press Office, and there are ground rules 

that are established there. And I’m not the one to establish those 

ground rules about whether or not they would be recorded or not. 

Senator BURR. You said in your responses to pre-hearing questions that in exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary to acknowledge classified information to a member of the media. 

Did you tell media commentators that the United States had, 

and I quote, ‘‘inside control’’ or ‘‘inside information’’ on the AQAP 

bomb plot in May of last year? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I think what you’re referring to, Senator, is when 

I had a teleconference with some individuals, former government 

officials from previous administrations, who were going to be out 

on talk shows on the night that an IED was intercepted. 

And so, I discussed with them that some of the aspects of that— 

because I was going on the news network shows the following 

day—I wanted to make sure they understood the nature of the 

threat, and what it was, and what it wasn’t. 
42 

And so, what I said at the time—because I said I couldn’t talk 

about any operational details, and this was shortly after the anniversary of the bin Laden takedown—I said there was never a 

threat to the American public as we had said so publicly, because 

we had inside control of the plot, and the device was never a threat 

to the American public. 

Senator BURR. Did you think that that comment actually exposed 

sources or methods? 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, Senator, I did not. And there is an ongoing 

investigation, I must say, right now about the unfortunate leak of 

information that was very, very damaging. And I voluntarily cooperated with the Department of Justice on that and have been 

interviewed on it. 

Senator BURR. Well, let me just say, as one that was overseas 

shortly after that, I certainly had, on numerous occasions, U.S. officials who expressed to me the challenges they’ve gone through to 

try to make apologies to our partners. And I personally sat down 

in London to have that apology conversation, and it was very disruptive. 

Very quickly—did you provide any classified or otherwise sensitive information to reporters or media consultants regarding the 

details of the Abbottabad raid? 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, I did not, Senator. 

Senator BURR. Then, do you know who disclosed information that 

prompted the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, to advise the 

White House to tell people to shut up? 

Mr. BRENNAN. You would have to ask Secretary Gates what he 

was referring to at that time, because I don’t know. 

Senator BURR. In conclusion, let me just go back to the initial 

questions that the Chair referred to. And in that, I think you might 

have taken her request on documents to be the documents that 

we’ve got outstanding right now; I think she was referring to the 

future. 

But let me just say I hope that you take the opportunity, if you 

haven’t already, to take back to the administration that it is absolutely essential that the documents this Committee has requested 

on Benghazi be supplied before the confirmation moves forward. I 

realize—I’m not saying that you were part of it, but it is absolutely 

essential that we get those documents before we begin a new administration at the CIA. And I hope you will deliver that message. 

I thank you. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Mr. Brennan, 

thank you for our discussions and for the joint meeting that you 

had with several of us on the Committee last week. 

As we discussed then, I believe the issues before us really have 

nothing to do with political party, and have everything to do with 

the checks and balances that make our system of government so 

special. 

Taking the fight to al-Qa’ida is something every Member of this 

Committee feels strongly about. It’s the idea of giving any president unfettered power to kill an American without checks and bal-
43 

ances that’s so troubling. Every American has the right to know 

when their government believes it’s allowed to kill them. 

And ensuring that the Congress has the documents and information it needs to conduct robust oversight is central to our democracy. In fact, the Committee was actually created, in large part, in 

response to lax oversight of programs that involved targeted 

killings. 

So it was encouraging last night when the President called and 

indicated that, effective immediately, he would release the documents necessary for Senators to understand the full legal analysis 

of the President’s authority to conduct the targeted killing of an 

American. What the President said is a good first step towards ensuring the openness and accountability that’s important, and you 

heard that reaffirmed in the Chair’s strong words right now. 

Since last night, however, I have become concerned that the Department of Justice is not following through with the President’s 

commitment just yet. Eleven United States Senators asked to see 

any and all legal opinions, but when I went to read the opinions 

this morning, it is not clear that that is what was provided. 

And moreover on this point, with respect to lawyers, I think the 

concern is that there’s a double standard. As the National Security 

Advisor—you volunteered, to your credit, you weren’t a lawyer— 

you ask your lawyers and your experts to help you. And we’re trying to figure out how to wade through all these documents, and one 

of the reasons why I’m concerned that it’s not yet clear that what 

the President committed to has actually been provided. 

And finally on this point, the Committee has been just 

stonewalled on several other requests, particularly with respect to 

secret law. And I’m going to leave this point simply by saying I 

hope you’ll go back to the White House and convey to them the 

message that the Justice Department is not yet following through 

on the President’s commitment. Will you convey that message? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I will, Senator. 

Senator WYDEN. Very good. 

Let me now move to the public side of oversight—making sure 

that the public’s right to know is respected. One part of oversight 

is Congressional oversight, and our doing our work here. The other 

is making sure that the American people are brought into these debates; just like James Madison said—this is what you need to preserve a republic. 

And I want to start with the drone issue. In a speech last year, 

the President instructed you to be more open with the public about 

the use of drones to conduct targeted killings of al-Qa’ida members. 

So, my question is what should be done next, to ensure public 

conversation about drones, so that the American people are 

brought into this debate and have a full understanding of what 

rules the government is going to observe when it conducts targeted 

killings? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I think this hearing is one of the things that 

can be done, because I think this type of discourse between the Executive and the Legislative Branch is critically important. 

I believe that there needs to be continued speeches that are going 

to be given by the Executive Branch to explain our counterterrorism programs. I think there is a misimpression on the part of 
44 

some of the American people who believe that we take strikes to 

punish terrorists for past transgressions—nothing could be further 

from the truth. We only take such actions as a last resort to save 

lives when there’s no other alternative to taking an action that’s 

going to mitigate that threat. 

So we will need to make sure that there is an understanding. 

And the people that were standing up here today, I think they really have a misunderstanding of what we do as a government, and 

the care that we take, and the agony that we go through to make 

sure that we do not have any collateral injuries or deaths. 

And as the Chairman said earlier, the need to be able to go out 

and say that publicly and openly, I think, is critically important, 

because people are reacting to a lot of falsehoods that are out 

there. And I do see it as part of my obligation, and I think it’s the 

obligation of this Committee, to make sure the truth is known to 

the American public and to the world. 

Senator WYDEN. Mr. Brennan, I’m also convinced there are parts 

of drone policy that can be declassified consistent with national security. And I hope that you will work with me on that if you are 

confirmed. 

Let me ask you several other questions with respect to the President’s authority to kill Americans. I’ve asked you how much evidence the President needs to decide that a particular American can 

be lawfully killed, and whether the administration believes that 

the President can use this authority inside the United States. In 

my judgment, both the Congress and the public needs to understand the answers to these kinds of fundamental questions. 

What do you think needs to be done to ensure that members of 

the public understand more about when the government thinks it’s 

allowed to kill them, particularly with respect to those two issues— 

the question of evidence, and the authority to use this power within the United States? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I have been a strong proponent of trying to be as 

open as possible with these programs as far as our explaining what 

we’re doing. What we need to do is optimize transparency on these 

issues, but at the same time, optimize secrecy and the protection 

of our national security. I don’t think that it’s one or the other; it’s 

trying to optimize both of them. 

And so, what we need to do is make sure we explain to the 

American people: what are the thresholds for action; what are the 

procedures, the practices, the processes, the approvals, the reviews. 

The Office of Legal Counsel advice establishes the legal boundaries within which we can operate. It doesn’t mean that we operate 

at those outer boundaries. And, in fact, I think the American people would be quite pleased to know that we’ve been very disciplined 

and very judicious, and we only use these authorities and these capabilities as a last resort. 

Senator WYDEN. One other point with respect to public oversight: 

if the Executive Branch makes a mistake and kills the wrong person or a group of the wrong people, how should the government acknowledge that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe we need to acknowledge it. I believe we 

need to it knowledge it to our foreign partners. We need to acknowledge it publicly. 
45 

There are certain circumstances where there are considerations 

to be taken into account, but as far as I’m concerned, if there is 

this type of action that takes place, in the interest of transparency, 

I believe the United States Government should acknowledge it. 

Senator WYDEN. And acknowledge it publicly? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That would be ideal, and that would be the objective of the program. 

Senator WYDEN. One last question if I might: in my letter to you 

three weeks ago, I noted that I’ve been asking for over a year to 

receive the names of any and all countries where the Intelligence 

Community has used its lethal authorities. 

If confirmed, would you provide the full list of countries to the 

Members of this Committee and our staff? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I know that this is an outstanding request on your 

part. During our courtesy call, we discussed it. If I were to be confirmed as director of CIA, I would get back to you, and it would 

be my intention to do everything possible to meet this Committee’s 

legitimate interests and requests. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, I’m going to wrap up just with one sentence on this point, Chair Feinstein. 

It’s a matter of public record, Mr. Brennan, that the raid that 

killed Osama bin Laden was carried out under the authority of CIA 

Director Leon Panetta. So that tells you right there that the Intelligence Community’s lethal authorities have been used in at least 

one country. 

I want to hear you say that if these authorities have been used 

in any other countries, that you’ll provide this Committee with the 

full list. Now, will you give us that assurance? 

Mr. BRENNAN. You’re talking about a historical list; are you not, 

Senator Wyden—as far as anytime, anywhere, that the CIA was involved in such a lethal provision? 

Senator WYDEN. Yes. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would have to go back and take a look at that 

request. Certainly, anything that—if I were to go to CIA, and the 

CIA was involved in any type of lethal activity, I would damn well 

make sure that this Committee had that information; absolutely. 

Senator WYDEN. That’s a good start. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden. 

Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, thank you for your service over the years. 

I want to follow up on a conversation you and I had in my office, 

and it touches on what Senator Burr asked you about a little bit, 

and that is the question of leaks. 

I was glad to hear you acknowledge in your opening statement 

how important it is that we avoid leaks of any kind, because they 

are dangerous, they endanger the lives of Americans, and they 

can’t be tolerated in the business that we’re in. And you agree with 

that, I gather? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely, Senator. 

Senator RISCH. Okay. Well, I want to talk to you about a person 

who I believe, and I think you acknowledge, is one of the most dangerous people on the planet, and that’s Ibrahim al-Asiri. And the 

conversation that you had with Senator Burr was referring to the 
46 

interview that you gave that talked about the plot that was uncovered that involved him. Do you recall that conversation with Senator Burr? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I do, Senator. 

Senator RISCH. Okay. And I have in front of me the Reuters article that’s dated May 18, 2012, describing your engagement with the 

media regarding Mr. Asiri and the plot; you’re familiar with that 

article, I would assume? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I have read many articles, so I presume I read 

that one. 

Senator RISCH. Well, this particular one is one that’s similar, I 

think, as far as the leak itself and how we got to where we are on 

this. 

I want to quote from the article. It says, ‘‘At about 5:45 p.m., 

Eastern Daylight Time, on Monday, May 7, just before the evening 

newscasts, John Brennan, President Barack Obama’s top White 

House advisor on counterterrorism, held a small, private teleconference to brief former counterterrorism advisors who have become 

frequent commentators on TV news shows.’’ 

Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That is an accurate statement, Senator. Yes. 

Senator RISCH. And can you tell me—who was involved in that 

conversation; who was involved in that interview? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe that the people who were on that phone 

included one of my predecessors, Fran Townsend; Roger Cressey; 

Juan Zarate; Richard Clarke. I think these are individuals who 

have served in the government and are counterterrorism professionals. 

Senator RISCH. Any others you can think of? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I do not remember the others. 

Senator RISCH. Do you have notes from that conversation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. There are notes, yes—that people took at that, 

yes. 

Senator RISCH. Have those been turned over to the Justice Department? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The Justice Department—as I said, I voluntarily 

and eagerly engaged in that investigation, and they have—— 

Senator RISCH. That wasn’t the question. Were those notes 

turned over? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Everything that was available on that has been 

turned over to the Department of Justice; absolutely, Senator. 

Senator RISCH. Did you turn those notes over? 

Mr. BRENNAN. My office turned over everything that was available about that, yes. 

Senator RISCH. Who took those notes? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I was not taking notes at the time. There 

were people, also, from the White House, who were on that conversation, as we do with all of these types of engagements. 

Senator RISCH. And who were the people that were involved in 

that conversation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Aside from the reporters? There was somebody 

from the White House Press Office and someone from the Counterterrorism directorate. 

Senator RISCH. You don’t know the peoples’ names? 
47 

Mr. BRENNAN. I do. They were Nick Rasmussen and Caitlin Hayden. 

Senator RISCH. Those are the two people from the White House 

that were involved; is that—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. That’s my recollection of who was involved in that 

conference call, yes. 

Senator RISCH. May 7th was the date that the incident occurred; 

is that correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The date of the conversation with those reports? 

Senator RISCH. Excuse me—the date of the underlying event that 

you were talking about involving Mr. Asiri. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Now you’re talking about Mr. Asiri—in terms of 

being the person who was responsible for putting together the IED? 

Senator RISCH. Correct. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe May 7th was about the right date, yes. 

Senator RISCH. And can you tell me why you felt compelled to 

release that information to these people on May 7, 2012? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, as I explained on the network news the following morning, and as we said publicly, that device was not a 

threat to the American public at the time of the bin Laden anniversary—— 

Senator RISCH. I don’t want to cut you off, but that’s not the 

question. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I thought it was, Senator. But go ahead. 

Senator RISCH. No. The question was why did you feel compelled 

to hold this press conference and divulge that information at that 

time on that day? 

Mr. BRENNAN. It wasn’t a press conference; it was a teleconference with these individuals. And I know they were going out on TV 

that evening and I wanted to make sure that these individuals 

with that background on counterterrorism were able to explain appropriately to the American people as we’ve been talking about— 

the importance of making sure the American people were aware of 

the threat environment and what we’re doing on the counterterrorism front. 

Senator RISCH. And they were going to go on TV that evening to 

discuss this event? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, because it had already broken. The news reports had broken that afternoon, Senator, and so there was a flurry 

of activity and press reporting that was going on. These individuals 

reached out to us, as they normally do. So this was just a routine 

engagement with the press, as we normally do when these things 

are made public. 

Senator RISCH. The next paragraph says, ‘‘According to five people familiar with the call, Brennan stressed that the plot was never 

a threat to the U.S. public or air safety because Washington had 

inside control over it.’’ 

Is that an accurate statement? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Inside control of the plot, yes, that’s exactly right. 

Senator RISCH. Okay. So, based on that, one would know that we 

had something inside; is that a fair statement? 

Mr. BRENNAN. From that statement, it is known that that IED, 

at the time, was not a threat to the traveling public, because we 
48 

had said publicly that there was no active plot at the time of the 

bin Laden anniversary. That’s correct. 

Senator RISCH. Would you agree with me that that disclosure resulted in the outing of an asset that shouldn’t have been outed? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely not, Senator. I do not agree with you, 

whatsoever. 

Senator RISCH. Well, how can you say that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. What I’m saying is that we were explaining to the 

American public why that IED was not, in fact, a threat at the 

time that it was in the control of individuals. When we say ‘‘positive control,’’ ‘‘inside control,’’ that means that we have, in fact, 

that operation, either environmentally or any number of ways. It 

did not in any way reveal any type of classified information. 

And I told those individuals—and there are transcripts that are 

available of that conversation—‘‘I cannot talk to you about the 

operational details of this, whatsoever.’’ 

Senator RISCH. Having used the words that you used of ‘‘inside 

control,’’ it isn’t much of a leap to determine that somehow you had 

a handle on it. 

Mr. BRENNAN. It’s not much of a leap to know that if in fact we 

said this IED was, in fact, obtained, and it was not a threat at the 

time, that there was some type of inside control. It is almost a truism. 

Senator RISCH. Well, having said that, it seems to me that the 

leak that the Justice Department is looking for is right here in 

front of us. And you disagree with that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I disagree with you vehemently, Senator. And I’ve 

talked to the Department of Justice. As I said, I conducted interviews with them. And, you know, I am a witness in that, as many 

other people are. And as you know, there’s witness and subject and 

target. I’m not a subject. I’m not a target. I am a witness. Because 

I want to make sure whoever leaked this information that got out 

to the press and that seriously did disrupt some very sensitive 

operational equities on the part of some of our international partners—that never should have happened. 

Senator RISCH. And you’re in agreement with that—that this was 

a serious flaw in what should have happened; is that correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. It’s a serious flaw that it got out to the press before that operation was, in fact, concluded; absolutely. And my discussion with those individuals that night, it already was out in the 

press. 

Senator RISCH. You would agree with me that on the day that 

we get Mr. Asiri, it’s going to be either a very, very good day, or, 

if he gets us first, it’s going to be a very, very bad day for the 

American people, and particularly for anyone who was involved in 

a leak concerning him. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I live this every day and night. 

Senator RISCH. I understand. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I go to bed at night worrying that I didn’t do 

enough that day to make sure I could protect the American people. 

So, when Mr. Asiri is brought to justice, one way or another, it will 

be because of the work that’s been done over the past number of 

years by some very brave Americans in CIA and other places. 
49 

So, believe me, I am focused as a laser on the issue of the IED 

threat, AQAP, and Mr. al-Asiri. 

Senator RISCH. I have more, but my time is up. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

Senator Mikulski. 

Before you start, Senator, a vote is due to start at four. It’s now 

five after four. Senator Chambliss went to vote; as soon as he returns, I will go. And we will just keep this going. So, Members, be 

guided by that. 

The vote just started. Please go ahead. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Mr. Brennan, first of all, welcome to the Committee. And in the short time I have—you mentioned your wife, 

Kathy; could you introduce us to her? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, this is my wonderful, beautiful wife, Kathy, 

who’s been my spouse for 34 years and my partner in my work. 

And my brother, Thomas, also is here, from New Jersey. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, we’d like to welcome you. And we know 

that not only will you serve, but your entire family has served, and 

will continue to serve. And I’m going to echo the remarks of my colleague, Senator Warner, thanking the people of the Central Intelligence Agency for what they do every day in every way, working 

often in a way that is not known, not recognized, and quite frankly, 

not always appreciated. 

So, let me get to my questions. I have been concerned for some 

time that there is a changing nature of the CIA, and that instead 

of it being America’s top human spy agency to make sure that we 

have no strategic surprises, that it has become, more and more, 

executing paramilitary operations. 

And I’ve discussed this with you in our conversation. How do you 

see this? I see this as mission-creep. I see this as overriding the 

original mission of the CIA, for which you’re so well versed, and 

more a function of the Special Operations Command. 

Could you share with me how you see the CIA and what you 

think about this militarization of the CIA that’s going on? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator, and thank you—— 

Senator MIKULSKI. You might disagree with me, and I welcome 

your disagreement is you so do so. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, the principal missions of the Agency is 

to collect intelligence, uncover those secrets, as you say, to prevent 

those strategic surprises, and to be the best analytic component 

within the U.S. Government, to do the all-source analysis that CIA 

has done so well for many, many years. 

At times, the President asks and directs the CIA to do covert action. That covert action can take any number of forms, to include 

paramilitary. And, as we’ve discussed here today on the counterterrorism front, there are things that the Agency has been involved 

in since 9/11 that, in fact, have been a bit of an aberration from 

its traditional role. 

One of the things that I would do if I would go back to the Agency is to take a look at that allocation of mission within CIA—the 

resources that are dedicated to this, and, as we had the discussion 

when I paid my courtesy call, I am concerned that looking at the 

world, which is a very big place, we need to make sure we have 
50 

the best intelligence collection capabilities possible and the best 

analytic capabilities possible. And the CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I appreciate that and look forward to 

working with you on this to really identify what’s up with the CIA, 

and to DoD, which then takes me to the issue of cyber threat. 

Both Secretary Panetta, General Dempsey, and so on—and we, 

in your current role at the White House—have talked about the 

cyber threat. You were a big help in trying to help us get the cyber 

legislation passed. 

Now, tell us what you think is the role of the CIA in dealing with 

the cyber threat in the area of human intelligence with the CIA? 

You have a unique insight into it. We know what NSA does; we 

know what Homeland Security is supposed to do; tell us where you 

see the CIA in this. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, first of all, the cyber threat that this country 

faces is one of the most insidious and one of the most consequential 

to our national security, and one that I think that our government 

as a whole and this body, the Congress, really needs to be focused 

on and do everything possible to prevent a devastating attack 

against this country because of our vulnerabilities on the cyber 

front. 

CIA’s traditional mission on the collection front is to try to determine the plans and intentions of foreign governments, foreign 

groups, sub-national groups, and others. 

Learning about those plans and intentions, and the development 

of capabilities in the cyber world, is something that CIA, I think, 

is best placed to do, so that we have an understanding of what foreign countries are doing, what organized criminal organizations are 

doing, what sub-national groups are doing, and the nature of the 

threat to us. 

Then, in addition, the analysts at CIA can take that information, 

working with the rest of the Community, to make sure that policymakers have a good sense of the nature of the threat and some potential mitigation strategies. And then, working with NSA, Department of Homeland Security, and others, put together that structure 

that’s going to make this country resistant and resilient to those 

attacks. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, Mr. Brennan, I really look forward to 

working with you on this, because this cuts across all the agencies—those that have responsibility for work outside of this country, inside this country, and yet, we all have to be doing—what 

we’re—to use the Marine Corp saying—the best that we’re best at 

and best that we’re most needed for. 

I consider this one of the greatest threats and one of the greatest 

vulnerabilities, because we failed to pass the legislation ourselves. 

We can’t stop what foreign predators want to do. I mean, we can 

divert; identify an attack. But we are making ourselves vulnerable. 

Now, I want to get to the job of the CIA director. I’m going to 

be blunt—and this will be no surprise to you, sir—but I’ve been on 

this Committee for more than 10 years, and with the exception of 

Mr. Panetta, I feel I’ve been jerked around by every CIA director. 

I’ve either been misled, misrepresented, had to pull information 

out—often at the most minimal kind of way; from Tenet, with his 
51 

little aluminum rods, to tell us that we had weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, to Porter Goss—not forthcoming. 

You know the problems we’ve had with torture. The Chair has 

spoken eloquently about it, all the way. And quite frankly, during 

those questions, they were evaded; they were distorted, et cetera. 

So, my question to you is: knowing your background, knowing 

your Jesuit education, knowing what I think your values are, can 

I have your word that you’re going to be very forthcoming with this 

Committee, to speak truth to power, to speak truth about power, 

even when it’s uncomfortable, or where we’re going to have to 

probe in a way that is not an easy way to go? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Honesty, truthfulness, was a value that was inculcated in me in my home in New Jersey, from my parents, Owen 

and Dorothy. It still is to this day. 

Honesty is the best policy. None of us are perfect beings. I’m far 

from perfect. But, Senator, I would commit that I would be honest 

with this Committee and do everything possible to meet your legitimate needs and requirements. As I think I’ve told you before, I 

know that you are a very proud senator of one of the jewels in the 

Intelligence Community, NSA, which resides in Maryland, but it 

would be my objective to make CIA your favorite intelligence agency and push Keith Alexander aside. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I think you’re pushing your luck now. 

Thank you very much. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Senator Levin. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Thank you for your willingness to serve here, Mr. Brennan. 

You’ve said publicly that you believe waterboarding is inconsistent with American values; it’s something that should be prohibited, and it goes beyond the bounds of what a civilized society 

should employ. 

My question is this: in your opinion, does waterboarding constitute torture? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The attorney general has referred to 

waterboarding as torture. Many people have referred to it as torture. The attorney general, premiere of law enforcement officer and 

lawyer of this country. And as you well know, and as we’ve had the 

discussion, Senator, the term ‘‘torture’’ has a lot of legal and political implications. It is something that should have been banned 

long ago. It never should have taken place in my view. And, therefore, if I were to go to CIA, it would never, in fact, be brought back. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you have a personal opinion as to whether 

waterboarding is torture? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I have a personal opinion that waterboarding is 

reprehensible, and it’s something that should not be done. And, 

again, I am not a lawyer, Senator, and I can’t address that question. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, you’ve read opinions as to whether or not 

waterboarding is torture. And I’m just—do you accept those opinions of the attorney general? That’s my question. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, you know, I’ve read a lot of legal opinions. I’ve read an Office of Legal Counsel opinion in the previous 

administration that said in fact waterboarding could be used. So, 
52 

from the standpoint of that, you know, I cannot point to a single 

legal document on this issue. 

But, as far as I’m concerned, waterboarding is something that 

never should have been employed, and, as far as I’m concerned, 

never will be, if I have anything to do with it. 

Senator LEVIN. Is waterboarding banned by the Geneva Conventions? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe the attorney general also has said that 

it’s contrary, in contravention, of the Geneva Convention. 

Again, I am not a lawyer, or a legal scholar, to make a determination about what is in violation of an international convention. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Rodriguez, the former CIA deputy director 

for operations, was asked about his personal moral or ethical perspective on these enhanced interrogation techniques, including 

waterboarding. 

He said that he knew of—and these are his words—‘‘I know that 

many of these procedures were applied to our own servicemen. 

Tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers had gone through this.’’ 

Now, as we investigated, at Senate Armed Services Committee, 

in our 2008 report, these so-called ‘‘Survival, Evasion, Resistance, 

and Escape’’—or ‘‘SERE’’—techniques referred to by Mr. Rodriguez 

were used to train members of our military. They were never intended to be used by U.S. interrogators. 

These techniques were based on Chinese Communist interrogation techniques used during the Korean War to elicit confessions, 

were developed to expose U.S.—and the use of or the training of 

U.S. personnel and exposing of them for a few moments to these 

techniques which helped to—was meant to help them survive in 

the event they were captured and the event they were subjected to 

these techniques. 

My question to you is this: is there any comparability between 

a friendly trainer in the United States exposing our troops to 

abuses—these SERE techniques, including waterboarding—for a 

few moments under close supervision; is there any possible comparability to that to using these techniques on an enemy in an effort to extract intelligence? 

Mr. BRENNAN. They are for completely different purposes and intentions. I do not see any comparability there. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, the Chairman and I issued a report, or 

made a statement, on April 27, 2012. This also began with a statement of Mr. Rodriguez. 

And here’s what he said: ‘‘Information provided by CIA detainees 

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Faraj al-Libbi about bin 

Laden’s courier being the lead information that eventually led to 

the location of bin Laden’s compound and the operation that led to 

his death.’’ 

That’s what Rodriguez said. We said that statement is wrong. 

The original lead information had no connection to CIA detainees. 

The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier that was collected from a variety of classified sources. While the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were used against KSM and alLibbi, the pair provided false and misleading information during 

their time in CIA custody. 
53 

Now, my question to you is: are you aware of any intelligence information that supports Mr. Rodriguez’s claim that the lead information on the courier came from KSM and al-Libbi? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I have not reviewed the intelligence thoroughly, 

but I am unaware of any. 

Senator LEVIN. Next, Michael Hayden, former CIA director, on 

May 3, 2011, said that ‘‘What we got, the original lead information, 

began with information from CIA detainees at black sites.’’ 

The Chairman and I issued, in the same statement, the following—that the statement of the former attorney general, Michael 

Mukasey, was wrong. Do you have any information to disagree 

with our statement? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I do not. 

Senator LEVIN. The third statement that we quoted in our report—out of Michael Hayden, former CIA director: ‘‘What we got, 

the original lead information, began with’’—excuse me; that was 

Mr. Hayden that I was asking you about, not Mr. Mukasey. Your 

answer is the same, I assume? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yeah, I do not know. I’m unaware. 

Senator LEVIN. You don’t have any information to the contrary? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator LEVIN. Now Michael Mukasey, former attorney general, 

Wall Street Journal: ‘‘Consider how the intelligence that led to bin 

Laden came to hand: it began with a disclosure from Khalid Sheikh 

Mohammed, who broke like a dam under pressure of harsh interrogation techniques that included waterboarding. He released a torrent of information, including eventually the name’’—the name – 

‘‘of a trusted courier of bin Laden.’’ 

Our statement—that of the Chairman and myself—is that that 

statement is wrong. Do you have any information to the contrary? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, my impression earlier on was that there 

was information that was provided that was useful and valuable, 

but, as I said, I’ve read now the first volume of your report, which 

raises questions about whether any of that information was accurate. 

Senator LEVIN. But I’m now referring not to the report, but to 

the statement that Chairman Feinstein and I issued on April 27, 

2012. We flat-out say that those statements are wrong. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you have any basis to disagree with us? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I do not. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you, when you become the CIA director, assuming you are confirmed, take the statement that we have issued 

and tell us whether or not you disagree with any of these statements that we have made about those statements of those three 

men; will you do that if you are confirmed? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I will look and consider that request, Senator. As 

I said, the report that this Committee has put together, I need to 

take a look at what CIA’s response is to it. And that report raises 

serious questions about whether any worthwhile intelligence came 

from these individuals. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you include, in your review, a review of our 

joint statement and tell us whether, after your review, you disagree 

with anything that we’ve said; will you do that? 
54 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would be happy to. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, there’s one final point, and that has to do 

with a very famous document. And that has to do with a cable that 

came in that relates to the so-called ‘‘Atta’’ matter. Are you familiar 

with that issue? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I am, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. The issue here is whether or not there ever was 

a meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, who is one of the 

people who attacked the Trade Center, and the Iraqi Intelligence. 

The cable that came in has been classified by the CIA, even 

though the report of—this is what the CIA did to the cable. (Holds 

up a piece of paper containing text that has mostly been redacted.) 

Now, will you check with the Czechs for the source of this cable 

and see if they have any objection to the release of this cable relative to the report of that meeting? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, Senator. And since our courtesy call, I have 

looked into this issue, and I know that you and Director Petraeus 

were involved in a discussion on this. And I would be happy to follow up on it. But there does seem to be some concerns about release of the cable. 

Senator LEVIN. The unclassified report of the Intelligence Committee—which was not classified; was not redacted by the CIA— 

made at least four references to the Czech Intelligence Service providing the CIA with reporting, based on a single source, about this 

alleged meeting, which never took place. We knew it never took 

place. And yet, repeatedly—particularly the Vice President—made 

reference that there was a report of a meeting between these two. 

Now, it’s very significant for the historical record here. We went 

to war based on allegations that there was a relationship between 

Iraq and the attackers—the 9/11 attackers. It’s very important that 

this cable be declassified. The only reason to keep it redacted and 

classified, frankly, is to protect an administration, not to protect 

sources and methods, because the sources and methods—if you will 

check with the Czechs, I’m sure they will tell you they have no objection to the release of that cable. 

My question to you is will you check with the Czechs, if you are 

confirmed, and determine whether they have any objection to the 

release of the cable, which makes reference to them? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely, Senator; I will. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, we acknowledge your experience, and I think that 

experience is important to have for the position that, if confirmed, 

you will occupy. I acknowledge your service to the country and your 

experience in this field. I think the President used that as one of 

the criteria, of course. 

You and I, when we talked earlier in a private talk, talked about 

the relationship that you want to have with this Committee—not 

just with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman, but with all the 

Committee Members. And I appreciate your answers on that, and 

you addressed it again today, in terms of a potential trust deficit 
55 

or—you said that that’s ‘‘wholly unacceptable’’ and that you would 

give straight answers and be blunt and candid. 

And you’ve been that today. It’s not a prerequisite to be Mr. Congeniality to occupy the position of director of CIA, so I don’t hold 

that as—in fact, it would be probably a red flag for me if somebody 

did have that award and wanted your position. 

The kind of issues that you have to deal with require straight 

talk, straight answers, and getting to the chase real quick. You 

said it’s the ‘‘New Jersey’’ way. I’ll accept that; it’s bipartisan. Governor Christie exhibits the same kind of responses and has a pretty 

high approval rating. 

So, we will go forward with taking you at your word that we’ll 

have the kind of relationship that we can have a blunt, straightforward, fully disclosed, working relationship. I think it’s critical to 

our ability to provide oversight, our ability to have the right kind 

of relationship with the Agency so we know where each other is 

and can move forward together in terms of what needs to be done 

to provide the intelligence necessary to protect the American people. 

So, I wanted to say that. I’d like to follow up a little bit more 

on the leaks question because I have a few more questions. I was 

going to delve into that in more detail, but it’s already been discussed by Senator Risch and others. But let me just ask a couple 

of other questions to clear some things up in my mind. 

My understanding is that the Associated Press had information 

relative to the intercept of a planned operation that perhaps had 

something to do with airlines and explosive devices; that apparently they had that for a few days and then either were about to 

or had gone ahead and released it. I’m assuming that your then 

calling the conference call was in response to what they had just 

released; is that correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. A number of news networks have put out information about this. Yes. 

Senator COATS. And you expressly arranged this teleconference 

for what exact purpose? 

Mr. BRENNAN. There were a number of people who were going 

to be going out on the news shows that night who were asking 

about the reports about this intercepted IED and wanted to get 

some context, as far as the nature of the threat, and also were asking questions about—‘‘Well, you said, and the U.S. Government 

said, that there was no threat during the anniversary of the bin 

Laden take-down, so how could there not have been a threat if, in 

fact, this IED was out there?’’ 

Senator COATS. The question I have is this—because based on 

what you said and what we have learned, you then, in that teleconference, talked about the fact that, in answering the question, 

‘‘How do we know this?’’—I think the quote that came across from 

Richard Clarke was, ‘‘never came close, because they had insider 

information, insider control.’’ And you had referenced that you had 

said that to the group. 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, what I said was inside control of the plot, and 

that the device was never a threat. 

Senator COATS. Okay, ‘‘insider control.’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, I said ‘‘inside control’’—not ‘‘insider.’’ 
56 

Senator COATS. Okay, ‘‘inside control.’’ The Associated Press 

never made any mention about inside control. Why was it necessary, then, to add that? Why couldn’t you have just simply said, 

‘‘We’ve intercepted a plot—it’s been a successful interception’’? Because once the word ‘‘inside control’’ got out, then all the speculation—and correct—was that that ‘‘inside control’’ was interpreted 

as meaning ‘‘we’ve got somebody inside.’’ 

And the result of that was the covert action operation had to be 

dissolved because the control agent, the inside person, was—well, 

essentially, the plot was exposed, and therefore, the whole operation had to be dissolved. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, Senator, I must caution that there are still 

elements of this event that remain classified and that we cannot 

talk about in public. There was a lot of information that came out 

immediately after AP broke that story. Unfortunately, there was a 

hemorrhaging of information and leaks. 

Again, what I said was that there was inside control, because 

what I needed to do, and what I said to the American public in 

open networks the following morning, is that during the anniversary period of the bin Laden take-down, when we said to the American public that there were no active plots, no threat to the American public, that we were aware of, that was specific and credible. 

Well, why was not this IED that we had intercepted—why wasn’t 

that a threat? Well, because we had inside control of the plot, 

which means any number of things—in terms of environmentally, 

working with partners, whatever else. It did not reveal any classified information. And as I said, we have to be careful here because 

there are still operational elements of this that remain classified. 

Senator COATS. And that’s appropriate, but, you know, it was 

just a couple weeks later when Reuters reported publicly, and I 

quote, ‘‘As a result of the news leaks, U.S. and allied officials told 

Reuters that they were forced to end an operation which they had 

hoped could have continued for weeks or longer.’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN. There were a lot of things that were reported by 

the press—accurate, inaccurate—a whole bunch of stuff, Senator. 

So I would not put stock in the types of things that you might be 

reading there. I know that I engaged for an extended period of time 

both before that leak and afterward to make sure we were able to 

mitigate any damage from that initial leak, and the subsequent 

leaks, of classified information. 

Senator COATS. So, you’re essentially saying that this Reuters report may or may not be accurate, but had no link to what was disclosed to Mr. Clarke and then what he said shortly thereafter on 

ABC News? 

Mr. BRENNAN. What I’m saying, Senator, is that I’m very comfortable with what I did and what I said at that time to make sure 

that we were able to deal with the unfortunate leak of classified 

information. 

Senator COATS. How frequently did you have to pull groups like 

this together in order to, in a sense, put out authorized, or at least 

what you think is appropriate, news for the correct purposes? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, frequently, if there is some type of event, 

or if there’s a disrupted terrorist attack, whether it’s some ‘‘underwear bomber’’ or a disrupted IED, or a printer bomb, or whatever 
57 

else, we will engage with the American public. We’ll engage with 

the press. We’ll engage with individuals who are experienced professional counterterrorism experts who will go out and talk to the 

American public. 

We want to make sure that there are not misrepresentations, in 

fact, of the facts, but at the same time, do it in a way that we’re 

able to maintain control over classified material. 

Senator COATS. Now, it does occur, I assume, or it is possible, to 

put out an authorized leak; is that correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. No. Those are oxymorons: ‘‘authorized leak.’’ It is 

something that would have to be declassified, disclosed, and done 

in a proper manner. 

Senator COATS. And this, in no way, fell into that category? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely not. I was asked to engage with these 

individuals by the White House Press Office. I talked with them 

about the interception. No, it was not. 

Senator COATS. There is a provision in last year’s Intelligence 

Authorization Bill that requires a report to this Committee of any 

authorized leak; so, you are aware of that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I’m aware of the provision, yes, that’s been put 

forward. 

Senator COATS. And no report has come forward, so I assume 

there haven’t been any authorized leaks in the past year? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I think, you know, what we want to do is to make 

sure if there’s going to be any disclosures of classified information, 

that this Committee is going to be informed about that. So we will 

adhere to the provision that was in that Intel Authorization Bill. 

Senator COATS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. 

Good afternoon, Mr. Brennan. I can’t help but—observing that 

Senator Coats talked about being governor of New Jersey, I think 

being governor of Jersey is a piece of cake compared to being the 

director of the CIA. 

I hope Governor Christie won’t take that in the wrong way, by 

the way, because I have great respect for him. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I have no plans to run against Governor Christie. 

[Laughter] 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for your service. Thank you for your 

willingness to continue serving as the head of the CIA. I have some 

comments I’d like to share with you, and then of course I’ll direct 

some questions your way. 

You’ve said that President Obama believes that, done carefully, 

deliberately, and responsibly, we can be more transparent and still 

ensure our nation’s security. I absolutely agree. The American people have the right to know what their government does on their behalf. 

Consistent with our national security, the presumption of transparency should be the rule, not the exception, and the government 

should make as much information available to the American public 

as possible. 

So when we, on the Committee, and we, as Members of Congress, 

push hard for access to the legal analysis justifying the authority 
58 

of the Executive Branch to lethally target Americans using drones, 

for instance, it erodes the government’s credibility of the American 

people. 

I want to tell you I’m grateful to the President for allowing Members of this Committee to briefly use some of the legal opinions on 

targeting American citizens. This is an important first step. But I 

want to tell you, I think there’s much more to be done in that regard. And you’ve heard that from my colleagues here today. 

I’ve long believed that our government also has an obligation to 

the American people to face its mistakes transparently, help the 

public understand the nature of those mistakes, and correct them. 

The next director of the CIA has an important task ahead in this 

regard. 

Mr. Brennan, I know you’re familiar with the mistakes that I’m 

referring to. We’ve already discussed those here today to some extent. They’re outlined in the Committee’s 6,000-page report on the 

CIA’s detention and interrogation program, based on a documentary view of over 6 million pages of CIA and other records, and including 35,000 footnotes. 

I believe that this program was severely flawed. It was mismanaged. The enhanced interrogation techniques were brutal, and, 

perhaps most importantly, it did not work. Nonetheless, it was portrayed to the White House, the Department of Justice, the Congress, and the media as a program that resulted in unique information that saved lives. 

And I appreciate the comments you made earlier about the misinformation that may have flowed from those who were in charge 

of this program to people like yourself. Acknowledging the flaws of 

this program is essential for the CIA’s long-term institutional integrity, as well as for the legitimacy of ongoing sensitive programs. 

The findings of this report directly relate to how other CIA programs are managed today. 

As you said in your opening remarks, and you so powerfully referenced the Memorial Wall, all CIA employees should be proud of 

where they work, and of all the CIA’s activities. I think the best 

way to ensure that they’re proud is for you to lead in correcting the 

false record, and instituting the necessary reforms that will restore 

the CIA’s reputation for integrity and analytical rigor. The CIA 

cannot be its best until the leadership faces the serious and grievous mistakes of this program. 

So, if I might, let me turn to my first question. Inaccurate information on the management operation effectiveness of the CIA’s detention and interrogation program was provided by the CIA to the 

White House, the DoJ, Congress, and the public. Some of this information is regularly and publicly repeated today by former CIA officials, either knowingly or unknowingly. 

And although we now know this information is incorrect, the accurate information remains classified, while inaccurate information 

has been declassified and regularly repeated. 

And the Committee will take up the matter of this report’s declassification separately. But there’s an important role I think the 

CIA can play in the interim: CIA has a responsibility to correct any 

inaccurate information that was provided to the previous White 
59 

House, Department of Justice, Congress, and the public, regarding 

the detention and interrogation program. 

So, here’s my question: do you agree that the CIA has this responsibility? And I’d appreciate a yes or no answer. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that. Again, yes or no—will you 

commit to working with the Committee to correct the public and 

internal record regarding the detention and interrogation program 

within the next 90 days? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I think it’s only fair of me to say that I 

am looking forward to CIA’s response to that report so that we’re 

assured that we have both the Committee’s report, as well as CIA’s 

comments on it. And I will be getting back to you, yes. 

Senator UDALL. I can understand you want to make sure you 

have accurate time. I understand, as well, that the CIA will finish 

their analysis by the middle of February. And so, I hope we can 

work within that time frame. 

And I know that in your answers to the Committee in preparing 

for this hearing, you wrote that ‘‘the CIA, in all instances, should 

convey accurate information to Congress. When an inaccurate 

statement is made and the CIA is aware of the inaccuracy, it must 

immediately correct the record. And certainly, I would do so, if I 

were director.’’ 

So, I take your answer in the spirit of the written testimony you 

provided to the Committee. Let me turn to the report and its eventual declassification, if I might. 

I don’t think it has to be difficult—that is, the declassification— 

for these reasons: the identities of the most important detainees 

have already been declassified; the interrogation techniques themselves have been declassified; the application of techniques to detainees has been declassified to some extent, with a partial declassification of the inspector general report; and the intelligence was 

declassified to a significant extent when the Bush administration 

described plots it claimed were thwarted as a result of the program. 

So long as the report does not identify any undercover officers, 

or perhaps the names of certain countries, can you think of any 

reason why the report could not be declassified with the appropriate number of redactions? Can you answer yes or no to that 

question? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would have to take that declassification request 

under serious consideration, obviously. That’s a very weighty decision, in terms of declassifying that report, and I would give it due 

consideration. But there are a lot of considerations that go into 

such decisions. 

Senator UDALL. I want to, again, underline that I think this 

would strengthen the CIA. It would strengthen our standing in the 

world. America is at its best, as we discussed earlier today, when 

it acknowledges its mistakes, and learns from those mistakes. 

And I want to quote Howard Baker, who I think we all admire 

in this room. He spoke about the Church Committee, which he, you 

know, was an important effort on the part of this Congress. And 

there was much broader criticism of the CIA in that Church Com-
60 

mittee process. And the CIA came out of that stronger and more 

poised to do what it’s supposed to do. 

So I want to quote Howard Baker. He wrote: ‘‘In all candor, however, one must recognize that an investigation such as this one’’— 

he’s referencing the Church Committee, but I think it could apply 

to what this Committee has done, as well—‘‘of necessity, will cause 

some short-term damage to our intelligence apparatus. A responsible inquiry, as this has been, will, in the long run, result in a 

stronger and more efficient Intelligence Community. 

‘‘Such short-term inquiry will be outweighed by the long-term 

benefits gained from the restructuring of the Intelligence Community with more efficient utilization of our intelligence resources.’’ 

So, again, Mr. Brennan, I look forward to working with you to 

complete these tasks that we’ve outlined here today. In the long 

run, I have faith in the CIA like you have faith in the CIA that 

it will come out of this study stronger and poised to meet the 21st 

Century intelligence challenges that are in front of us. Thank you 

again for your willingness to serve. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Brennan, for being 

here with us today, and congratulations on your nomination. 

I wanted to ask, in the 2007 CBS interview, you said that information obtained in interrogations have saved lives. In September 

of 2011, you said in a speech at Harvard, that whenever possible, 

the preference of the administration is to take custody of individuals so that we could obtain information which is, quote, ‘‘vital to 

the safety and security of the American people.’’ 

So, obviously, you believe that interrogations of terrorists can 

give us information that could prevent attacks in the future? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely agree. 

Senator RUBIO. But you don’t believe the CIA should be in the 

business of detention, correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I agree. 

Senator RUBIO. So, who should be? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, there are a number of options—U.S. military, which maintains an active interrogation program, detention 

program; the FBI, as part of its efforts on counterterrorism; and 

our international partners, and working with them. And that’s 

where, in fact, most of the interrogations are taking place of terrorists who have been taken off of the battlefields in many different 

countries. 

Senator RUBIO. So there are active interrogations occurring? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely, every day. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. About the foreign partners that you talk 

about, have you talked to folks in the CIA about their impressions 

of the quality of information we’re getting from our foreign partners? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, on a regular basis. 

Senator RUBIO. Would it surprise you to know that some of them 

have indicated to us repeatedly, over the last couple of years that 

I’ve been here, that the information we get directly is much better 
61 

than anything we get from our foreign partners on some of these 

issues? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. And that’s why we work with our foreign 

partners so that we can have direct access to these individuals that 

have been detained. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, I’ll tell you why I’m concerned. Ali Ani alHarzi—I think is how I pronounce his name—he’s a suspect in the 

Benghazi attack, and the Tunisians detained him, correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, he was taken into custody by the Tunisians. 

Senator RUBIO. Did we not ask for access to him, to be able to 

interrogate him and find out information? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. And the Tunisians did not have a basis in 

their law to hold him. 

Senator RUBIO. So they released him? 

Mr. BRENNAN. They did. 

Senator RUBIO. Where is he? We don’t know? 

Mr. BRENNAN. He’s still in Tunisia. 

Senator RUBIO. That doesn’t sound like a good system of working 

with our foreign partners. 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, it shows that the Tunisians are working with 

their rule of law, as well—just the way we do. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, we have someone who was a suspect in the 

potential in the attack on Benghazi. They didn’t give us access to 

him and we don’t have any information from him. 

Mr. BRENNAN. We work with our partners across the board, and 

when they are able to detain individuals, according to their laws, 

we work to see if we can have the ability to ask them questions— 

sometimes indirectly and sometimes directly. 

Senator RUBIO. So your point is that Tunisian law did not allow 

them to hold him, and therefore they let him go before we could 

get there to talk to him? 

Mr. BRENNAN. And we didn’t have anything on him, either, because if we did, then we would’ve made a point to the Tunisians 

to turn him over to us. We didn’t have that. 

Senator RUBIO. What role should the CIA play in interrogations? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The CIA should be able to lend its full expertise, 

as it does right now, in terms of—in support of military interrogations, FBI debriefings and interrogations, and our foreign partner 

debriefings. And they do that on a regular basis. 

Senator RUBIO. And so, what’s the best setting to do that in? For 

example, if a suspected terrorist is captured, and we think we can 

obtain information from them, where would they go? Where do you 

suggest that they be taken, for example; what’s the right setting 

for it? 

Mr. BRENNAN. There are many different options, as far as where 

they go. Sometimes it is with—foreign partners, they put the individuals in their jails and in their detention facilities according to 

their laws, and people can access that. 

We take people, as we’ve done in the past, and put them on 

naval vessels and interrogate them for an extended period of time. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. So you think that’s the best setting—the 

naval vessel? 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, I think—— 
62 

Senator RUBIO [continuing]. From our perspective, leaving aside 

the foreign partners for a second—for us. 

Mr. BRENNAN [continuing]. I think each case requires a very 

unique and tailored response. And that’s what we’ve done. 

Whether somebody is picked up by a foreign partner, whether 

somebody is picked up on the high seas, or anywhere else, what we 

need to do is see what the conditions are, what we have as far as 

the basis for that interrogation, what type of legal basis we have 

for that. So it’s very much tailored to the circumstances. 

Senator RUBIO. When we detain a suspected terrorist, the purpose of the interrogation—and I think you’d agree with this statement—the purpose of an interrogation is to develop information 

that could be used to disrupt terrorist activities and prevent attacks, correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Without a doubt. 

Senator RUBIO. It’s not to lay the case for a criminal conviction. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I think, you know, you want to take the person off the battlefield. You also want to get as much intelligence 

as possible. You don’t just want to get the information from somebody and then send them off. You need to be able to do something 

with them. And we’ve put people away for 99 years—for life—so 

that, in fact, they’re not able to hurt Americans ever again. 

So, what you want to do is get that intelligence, but also, at the 

same time, put them away so that justice can be done. 

Senator RUBIO. I understand. But the number one priority, initially, is not necessarily to protect the record for a criminal prosecution; it’s to obtain timely information—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely right. 

Senator RUBIO [continuing]. So we can act correctly—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely right. 

Senator RUBIO. Priority number two is to take them off the battlefield to ensure they can’t attack us in the future. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. It’s not an either-or, but I agree with you. 

Senator RUBIO. Why shouldn’t we have places where we interrogate people; for example, Guantanamo? Why shouldn’t we have a 

place to take people that we obtain? Because is it not an incentive 

to kill them rather than to capture them, if we don’t have a—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. No, it’s never an incentive to kill them. And any 

time that we have encountered somebody, we have come up with, 

in fact, the route for them to take in order to be interrogated, debriefed, as well as prosecuted. 

Senator RUBIO. So, where would we—but why is it a bad idea to 

have a place that we can take them to? 

Mr. BRENNAN. It’s not a bad idea. We need to have those places. 

And again, sometimes it might be overseas, sometimes it might 

be a naval vessel, a lot of times it’s back here in the States, where 

we bring someone back because we, in fact, have a complaint on 

them or an indictment on them, and then we bring them into an 

Article 3 process. And so we can elicit information from them and 

put them away behind bars. 

Senator RUBIO. Is the Article 3 process, in your mind, an ideal 

way to develop this kind of information, or aren’t there limitations 

in the Article 3 process? 
63 

Mr. BRENNAN. I’m very proud of our system of laws here and the 

Article 3 process. Our track record is exceptionally strong over the 

past dozen years, couple dozen years; that so many terrorists have 

been, in fact, successfully prosecuted and will not—— 

Senator RUBIO. No, I understand, but in terms of—our first priority is to develop information—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely; the FBI does a great job. 

Senator RUBIO. But an Article 3 setting is not the most conducive 

to that. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would disagree with that. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, they’re immediately advised about not cooperating and turning over information that would incriminate 

them. 

Mr. BRENNAN. No. Again, it’s tailored to the circumstances. 

Sometimes an individual will be Mirandized. Sometimes they will 

not be Mirandized right away. Mirandizing an individual means 

only that the information that they give before then cannot be used 

in Article 3 court. 

But, in fact, the FBI do a great job, as far as listing information 

after they’re Mirandizing them, and so they can get information as 

part of that type of negotiation with them, let them know they can 

in fact languish forever, or we can in fact have a dialogue about 

it intelligently. 

Senator RUBIO. Just one last point, and I’m not going to use all 

my—I only have a minute left. 

This Harzi case that I talked about—you’re fully comfortable 

with this notion that because the Tunisians concluded that they 

didn’t have a legal basis to hold him, we now lost the opportunity 

to interrogate someone that could’ve provided us some significant 

information on the attack in Benghazi? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, you know, this country of America really 

needs to make sure that we are setting a standard and an example 

for the world, as far as the basis that we’re going to, in fact, interrogate somebody, debrief somebody. We want to make sure we’re 

doing it in conjunction with our international partners. 

We also want to make sure that we have the basis to do it, so 

that we don’t have to face, in the future, challenges about how we, 

in fact, obtained the—— 

Senator RUBIO. What is that law? You keep on talking about the 

basis of our law; what law exactly are you talking about in terms 

of the basis of detaining someone? When you say that we want to 

make sure that we have a basis to—because you said that—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, that’s right. 

Senator RUBIO. Based on what? Which law are we talking about? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, it all depends on the circumstance. Are we 

talking about law of war detention authority, which the U.S. military has? Are you talking about Article 3 authority that the FBI 

has? 

Senator RUBIO. Right. 

Mr. BRENNAN. The CIA does not have, by statute, any type of detention authority. 

Senator RUBIO. The point I’m trying to get at is we don’t—the 

truth of the matter is we don’t know Harzi knew anything about 

the Benghazi attack. 
64 

We don’t know if he knew about future attacks that were being 

planned by the same people, because we never got to talk to him 

because Tunisia said their laws wouldn’t let them hold him, which 

is an excuse we’ve heard in other parts of the world, as well. 

And that doesn’t concern you, that we don’t—that we weren’t 

able to obtain this information? 

Mr. BRENNAN. We press our partners and foreign governments to 

hold individuals and to allow us access to it. Sometimes their laws 

do not allow that to happen. I think the United States government 

has to respect these governments’ right to, in fact, enforce their 

laws appropriately. 

What we don’t want to do is to have these individuals being held 

in some type of custody that’s extrajudicial. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay, thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you, 

again, Mr. Brennan, for your testimony today. 

One of the things that I think we’ve heard from a number of my 

colleagues, and we had this discussion when we discussed the Committee’s study on detention and interrogation, is, should you be 

confirmed, how do we ensure that the CIA director is always going 

to be well-informed? 

And particularly, to a—we’ve questioned you today about a number of key sensitive programs. The nature of the Agency’s work is 

that a lot of these programs are disparate, varied. And there needs 

to be some ability to measure objectively the success of these programs; not simply by those individuals that are implementing the 

programs. 

And while this is not the setting to talk about any individual of 

these programs, I guess what I’m interested in is pursuing the conversation we started about how you might set up systems so that, 

to the best extent possible, as the CIA director, you’re going to 

make sure what’s going on, get an accurate, objective review, and 

not simply have the information that simply bucks up through the 

system? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, that’s an excellent point, Senator—one that 

I’m very concerned about. In order to have objective measures of 

effectiveness, the metrics that you want to be able to evaluate the 

worth of a program, you cannot have the individuals who are responsible for carrying it out. As hard as they might try, they cannot help, I think, view the program and the results in a certain 

way. They become witting or unwitting advocates for it. 

So what we need to do is to set up some type of system where 

you can have confidence that those measures of effectiveness are 

being done in the most independent and objective way. And that’s 

one of the things that I want to make sure I take a look at, if I 

were to go to the Agency. 

Senator WARNER. Again, the nature of so many programs—all 

very sensitive in nature; you have to have almost, as we discussed, 

probably not an IG type vehicle, something that is more run out 

of the director’s office, but you’ve got to have some kind of red team 

that’s going to be able to check this information out to make sure 

you’ve—so that you hear colleagues here press on what you have 
65 

done, or could have done, or should have done, or if you had that 

oversight, you’ve got to have that objective information to start 

with. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely. I tend to have a reputation for being 

a detailed person. And having been an analyst in an intelligence 

office for many years, I need to see the data. I cannot rely just on 

some interpretation of it. So, I do very much look forward to finding a way that the director’s office can have this ability to independently evaluate these programs so that I can fairly and accurately represent them to you. I need to be able to have confidence, 

myself. 

Senator WARNER. As you know—and we all know—our country 

is grappling with enormous fiscal challenges. And that means, well, 

national security remains our most essential requirement for our 

national government. Everything’s going to have to able to be done 

in a fiscally constrained period. 

You know, how are you going to think about thinking through 

those challenges on where cuts, changes need to be made? And if 

you can specifically outline—one of the concerns that I have is, 

kind of, division of labor and appropriate roles between the CIA 

and the DoD SOCOM operations, fields where that kind of potential build-up in that capacity is—how do we get that done in these 

tight budget times? 

If you could address both of those, I’d appreciate it. 

Mr. BRENNAN. In a fiscally constrained environment, we have to 

make sure, more than ever, that every single dollar that’s dedicated to intelligence is going to be optimized. And in fact, if sequestration kicks in, what I wouldn’t want to do as CIA director is do 

the salami-slicing, which is, you know, five percent off the top of 

gross, all programs, because all the programs are not—— 

Senator WARNER. One of the reasons why we need to make sure 

sequestration—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. That’s absolutely right, because it’s going to have 

a devastating impact on the national security of this country. 

And so, I would want to make sure, even if it doesn’t happen in 

a fiscally constrained environment, that I look at the programs and 

prioritize. And we really have to take a look at what are those programs that we really need to resource appropriately. 

As we’re going to have—and we’ve had—some benefits from pulling folks out of Iraq, and with the continued draw down of forces 

in Afghanistan, there’s going to be some resource and assets that 

we’re going to have to reallocate there. So I’ll look carefully at that. 

So what I want to do is to make sure that if I go to CIA, I have 

an understanding about exactly how these monies are being spent. 

Then, as you point out, there is quite a bit of intelligence capability 

within the Defense Department, and I know there’s been recent 

press reports about the Clandestine HUMINT Service—Defense 

Clandestine Service—and its work with, in fact, CIA. 

I want to make sure these efforts are not redundant whatsoever. 

And I’ve had these conversations with Mike Morell, as well as with 

General Flynn over at DIA, to make sure that these efforts are 

going to truly be integrated and complementary, because we cannot 

have unnecessarily redundant capabilities in this government, par-
66 

ticularly in an environment that we have right now on the fiscal 

front. 

Senator WARNER. I think this is an area that’s going to need a 

lot of attention and a lot of oversight. I get concerned at times that 

the IC, on one hand, and the DoD on the other hand, think they’re 

coming from separate originators of funding, and ultimately, they 

still have to be within the greater budget constraints. 

Let me—I know my time is running down. Your background, and 

most of your expertise, has been on the CT side. Clearly, the challenge we’ve got is we see emerging threats in parts of the world 

that we’re not on the front line, as we see disruptions particularly 

through the Middle East, where, perhaps in retrospect, we didn’t 

have the right kind of coverage on social media and on to the 

streets. 

How do we make sure we’re going to get within the kind of fiscal 

constraints, that we don’t go complete CT; that we make sure we’ve 

got the coverage we need, the capabilities we need, and the worldwide coverage we need, with your approach, particularly with your 

background; if you could address that. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, clearly, counterterrorism is going to be a priority area for the Intelligence Community and for CIA for many 

years to come. Just like weapons proliferation is, as well. Those are 

enduring challenges. And since 9/11, the CIA has dedicated a lot 

of effort, and very successfully; they’ve done a tremendous job to 

mitigate that terrorist threat. 

At the same time, though, they do have this responsibility on 

global coverage. And so, what I need to take a look at is whether 

or not there has been too much of an emphasis of the CT front. As 

good as it is, we have to make sure we’re not going to be surprised 

on the strategic front and some of these other areas; to make sure 

we’re dedicating the collection capabilities, the operations officers, 

the all-source analysts, social media, as you said, the so-called 

‘‘Arab Spring’’ that swept through the Middle East. It didn’t lend 

itself to traditional types of intelligence collection. 

There were things that were happening in a populist way, that, 

you know, having somebody, you know, well positioned somewhere, 

who can provide us information, is not going to give us that insight, social media, other types of things. 

So I want to see if we can expand beyond the soda straw collection capabilities, which have served us very well, and see what else 

we need to do in order to take into account the changing nature 

of the global environment right now, the changing nature of the 

communication systems that exist worldwide. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you for that. I just would, again—back 

to my first point, and my time’s about out—I think, should you be 

confirmed, that trying to make sure you’ve got that objective oversight, the ability to make sure that you have the best knowledge 

and best metrics possible so that when future challenges arise, you 

can come to this Committee and others and make sure that the 

President and this Committee is informed with the best information possible. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 
67 

Mr. Brennan, so you can be advised, we are not going to do the 

classified hearing following this. We will do it Tuesday at 2:30. We 

will, however, do another round just with five minutes per senator, 

so people can wrap up whatever it is they want to ask. I hope that 

is okay with you. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Brennan, I want to follow up on an issue that several of my 

colleagues have raised on the issue of capturing a terrorist versus 

targeted killing of a terrorist. 

In a recent speech that you gave at the Wilson Center, you said: 

‘‘Our unqualified preference is to only undertake lethal force when 

we believe that capturing the individual is not feasible.’’ 

Yet, a study by The New American Foundation, as well as numerous press reports, indicates that in the first two years of President Obama’s administration, there were four times the number of 

targeted killings, than in eight years of President Bush’s administration. Is your testimony today that the huge increase in number 

of lethal strikes has no connection to the change in the Obama administration’s detention policy? 

Because obviously, if we’re capturing a terrorist, we have the opportunity to interrogate that individual and perhaps learn about 

ongoing plots; but if the strike is done, that opportunity is lost. Are 

you saying today that it is totally unconnected to the Obama administration’s shift in its detainee policy? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I can say unequivocally, Senator, that there’s 

never been occasion, that I’m aware of, where we had the opportunity to capture a terrorist and we didn’t, and we decided to take 

a lethal strike. So, certainly, there is no correlation there as far as 

any type of termination of the CIA’s detention and interrogation 

program and that increase in strikes. 

Now, I will say that if you look out over the last four years, what 

happened in a number of places, such as Yemen, and other areas, 

was that there was, in fact, a growth of al-Qa’ida, quite unfortunately. 

And so, what we were trying to do, in this administration, is to 

take every measure possible to protect the lives of American citizens, whether it be abroad or in the United States, as well as a 

maturation of capabilities and insight into those intelligence plots 

as a result of the investment that was made in the previous administration that allowed us, in this administration, to take appropriate actions. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, let’s talk further about the targeted 

killings. When the targeted killings began several years ago, the 

first-order effect of these operations was the elimination of the senior operational leadership of al-Qa’ida, many of the core leaders. 

Obviously, that is a critical priority. 

We have heard both former CIA Director Michael Hayden, in an 

interview on CNN, and General McChrystal say that it is now 

changed, and that the impact of those strikes is creating a backlash. 
68 

For example, General McChrystal said, ‘‘The resentment created 

by American use of unmanned strikes is much greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level, 

even by people who have never seen one or seen the effects of one.’’ 

He added that the targeted killings by remotely piloted aircraft 

add to the perception of American arrogance that says, ‘‘Well, we 

can fly where we want; we can shoot where we want, because we 

can.’’ 

And General Hayden has also expressed concerns, that now that 

the strikes are being used at the lower levels, arguably, that they 

are creating a backlash that is undermining the credibility of governments and creating new terrorists when a neighbor or family 

member is killed in the course of the operations. 

Do you agree with General McChrystal and Director Hayden 

about the potential backlash from the strikes, from the targeted 

killings, at this point? I’m not talking about the initial strikes. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I think that is something that we have to be very 

mindful of, in terms of what the reaction is to any type of U.S. 

counterterrorism activities that involve the dropping of ordnance 

anywhere in the world; absolutely. Whether it’s a remotely piloted 

aircraft or whether it’s a manned aircraft, I think we have to take 

that into account. 

But I would not agree with some of the statements that you had 

quoted there, because what we, in fact, have found in many areas 

is that the people are being held hostage to al-Qa’ida in these areas 

and have welcomed the work that the U.S. Government has done 

with their governments to rid them of the al-Qa’ida cancer that exists. 

Senator COLLINS. Finally, today, this Committee received the 

OLC memos describing the legal justifications that many of us, 

particularly those who have been on the Committee far longer than 

I, have been seeking for some time. And I, too, spent a large part 

of this morning reading them. 

Yet the Obama administration within months of taking office released several OLC memos describing the legal justification for the 

treatment of terrorist detainees that were held in U.S. custody. 

Do you think it was appropriate that a different standard was 

applied to the release of the memos from the Bush administration 

than those produced by the Obama administration? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, respectfully, Senator, I don’t think it was a 

different standard. Not being a—— 

Senator COLLINS. Well—— 

Mr. BRENNAN [continuing]. A lawyer—— 

Senator COLLINS. Well, one was released within four months—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator COLLINS [continuing]. Of the Obama administration taking office. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator COLLINS. The other had been requested for a very long— 

much longer time. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator COLLINS. And released only today. 
69 

Mr. BRENNAN. I’m not a lawyer. I’ve come to learn the term sui 

generis, which means that, you know, it has obviously unique circumstances surrounding it. 

The OLC memos that were released shortly after the President 

came into office—they were released because the program was terminated. It was no longer in existence. OLC—Office of Legal Counsel—opinions that deal with ongoing activities, ongoing programs— 

it’s a different animal. 

And, therefore, I think those decisions were looked at in a much, 

sort of, different way because of those sui generis circumstances. 

Senator COLLINS. Well, I would say to you that both are absolutely essential to the ability of Congress to carry out its oversight 

responsibilities. 

Finally, the Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004, with which you’re very familiar, and of which I was 

a co-author, requires the Director of National Intelligence to recommend who the CIA director should be to the President of the 

United States. 

I’m aware of General Clapper—the DNI’s letter endorsing your 

nomination, but that’s different from his actually recommending to 

the President that you be chosen. To your knowledge, did General 

Clapper recommend to the President that you be nominated for 

this position? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I know for certain that he made a recommendation to the President, but I would defer to General Clapper to tell 

you what that recommendation is. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Brennan, let me join my colleagues in thanking you for your 

service to your country and welcoming you to the Committee. And 

should you be confirmed, I’d like to start by just inviting you to 

visit New Mexico at some point, and in particular, Sandia and Los 

Alamos National Labs. Because, while you often don’t hear about 

the contributions that they make to our Intelligence Community, I 

can assure you that that support is vital to keeping our nation safe. 

I’ve got a few questions, and please forgive me if some of these 

return to some of the things you’ve heard from other senators. I 

want to start with your November 2007 interview with CBS News, 

where you said: ‘‘There has been a lot of information that has come 

out of these interrogation procedures that the Agency has, in fact, 

used, against the real hard-core terrorists. It has saved lives.’’ 

Other intelligence officials went a lot further than that in defending the use of so-called ‘‘enhanced interrogation techniques’’ at the 

time, and some still do. 

If your review of the Committee study convinces you that these 

techniques did not, in fact, save lives, I’d like to ask—will you be 

as public in condemning the program as you were in its defense; 

in other words, will you set the record straight? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I will do whatever possible to make sure that the 

record is straight and that I speak fully and honestly on it. 

Senator HEINRICH. I want to return to a question that Mr. Udall 

asked you. Would you object—and if so, why—to a public release 

of a truly declassified version of the Committee’s report? 
70 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I would give such a request for declassification every due consideration. There is a lot of information and 

material in those volumes with a lot of potential consequences, as 

far as its public release. And at the same time that we have a commitment to transparency, we also, though, have a tremendous commitment to making sure that we keep this country safe by protecting its secrets. 

There are a lot of equities as far as liaison partners, other types 

of things, operational activities, maybe source and method, so it 

has to be looked at very, very carefully. 

Senator HEINRICH. Well, I would just say I agree with you that 

sources and methods, and many of the operational details, absolutely should never be declassified, but there’s some basic principles, I think, in that report that I think it’s going to be very important for history to be able to judge. And I would urge you to look 

closely at that. 

Senator Levin asked about waterboarding. Let me follow up a little bit. In November 2007 interview with CBS News, you were 

asked if waterboarding was torture, and you said, ‘‘I think it is certainly subjecting an individual to severe pain and suffering, which 

is the classic definition of torture. And I believe, quite frankly, it’s 

inconsistent with American values and it’s something that should 

be prohibited.’’ Is that still your view? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, Senator, it is. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. Do you believe that all agencies 

of the United States Government should be held to the interrogation standards that are laid out in the Army Field Manual, as currently required by Executive Order 13491? And do you support efforts to codify those requirements into law? 

Mr. BRENNAN. The Army Field Manual certainly should govern 

the U.S. military’s detention and interrogation of individuals. 

The FBI has its own processes and procedures and laws that govern its activities. So, what I wanted to do is to make sure that, you 

know, appropriate sort of attention is paid to FBI as opposed to the 

military. 

Senator HEINRICH. I understand. Back in 2006, you were part of 

an online discussion with The Washington Post, and you suggested 

at that time that the director of the CIA should have a set fiveyear term, like the FBI director, to guarantee ‘‘the absolute need 

for independence, integrity, and objectivity in the senior ranks of 

our Intelligence Community.’’ 

Given that you will instead serve at the pleasure of the President, how do you maintain your independence? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Having grown up in the intelligence business for 

25 years, I truly understand the importance and value of maintaining independence, subjectivity, and integrity of the intelligence 

process. 

I know when I’ve sat in the White House Situation Room and 

when I’ve looked to the intelligence briefer, that if they were to advocate in any way a policy preference, it really calls into question 

the independence, subjectivity, and basis of that intelligence. I 

want them to give me the facts as it is, irrespective of what their 

policy leanings or preferences might be, because policymakers need 

to do that. 
71 

So, in order for me to maintain my integrity as an intelligence 

professional, as I would go to the President or the Secretaries of 

State or Defense, or into the National Security Council meetings, 

I would need to make sure I can say it straight, give it straight, 

and let the policymakers determine exactly the best course of action. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

One last question: I believe it was during that same online discussion with Washington Post, you said, quote, ‘‘I think that there 

is an effort underway to get the CIA to adapt to the new realities 

of the Intelligence Community. The CIA has resisted many of these 

changes, which has been a problem. It’s time to move forward.’’ 

What exactly did you mean, and has the CIA made progress in 

that direction? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, Senator, a credit to you and your staff for 

pulling up that Washington Post online interview because I had 

not, you know, read that or thought about that in a while. And I 

must say that having grown up in the Agency for 25 years, as I 

said in my testimony, I have tremendous respect for that organization. It is exceptionally capable; competent. 

But almost by dint of the nature of its work, it also at times is 

insular. And it has not interacted and interoperated the way it 

needs to with the rest of the Intelligence Community, the rest of 

the U.S. Government. At times, that is to protect source and methods and to protect the secrets that it has. 

But given the changes in the environment, given the changes in 

the nature of our government, the CIA needs to play a part in this 

larger role. And so, now, the head of the CIA does not sit on top 

of the Intelligence Community; it is part of a larger Intelligence 

Community that is led by the Director of National Intelligence. 

So, my objective would be to make sure CIA’s capabilities are 

truly going to be leveraged and empower the—the responsibilities, 

the missions of the rest of the government. The Department of 

Homeland Security is a new creation. They need intelligence just 

like others do as well. 

So, what I think I was conveying there is that, you know there 

was resistance at the time of the IRTPA, as we well know, that 

they didn’t want to sort of break some of the past practices. Well, 

I think a lot of that resistance is overcome and now I think CIA 

sees the benefits of having somebody that can sit on top of the 

Community, and not have to sit on top of the Agency, as well. 

Senator HEINRICH. That’s very helpful. Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Madam Chair. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator King. 

Senator KING. Thank you for your testimony and your stamina 

today. 

First, I should tell you that in an earlier hearing today, Secretary 

Panetta was testifying before the Armed Services Committee. And, 

in answer to a question, he strongly endorsed your nomination. 

And I think the record should show that—that Secretary Panetta 

was very complimentary of your capabilities and experience. 

Secondly—and this isn’t really a question—it’s incredibly important for the CIA to be totally open with this Committee. The reason 
72 

is that there’s no one else watching. Typically in our country, the 

public is involved. The press is involved. There are a lot of people 

that have access to information of what the Department of Commerce is doing, or the Department of State. 

This is a unique situation, where this Committee and a comparable committee in the House are the only places that are really 

paying attention, in terms of our separation of powers. So it’s not 

just nice to have that kind of openness; I think it’s critically important. And I hope you subscribe to that view. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely; I do, Senator. 

Senator KING. Just briefly, and I think Senator Warner touched 

on this—going forward, there needs to be some serious discussion 

with the Department of Defense about where the CIA ends and the 

Department of Defense starts, in terms of counterterrorism activities and operations. 

And I don’t need to pursue that, but I think Senator Warner 

raised an important point, because in this day and age, we just 

can’t be duplicating a whole set of capabilities and priorities and 

officers and procedures and everything else. 

I take it you subscribe to that? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I do agree, Senator, and I look forward, in a closed 

session, to talking to you about some specific areas where I really 

do believe that Defense-CIA relationship and integration of effort 

is critically important to the safety and security of this nation. 

So again, redundant—mindful of not having any type of redundant capabilities or waste resources, we need to make sure that we 

can leverage the capabilities that exist in both organizations for the 

good of this country. 

Senator KING. And the area I want to spend a little bit of time 

on is the drone policy, and particularly as it relates to American 

citizens. There’s a lot of law and history involved in our system of 

checks and balances. James Madison famously, in the 51st Federalist, said: ‘‘If people were angels, we wouldn’t need a government, and if the government was run by angels, we wouldn’t need 

checks and balances.’’ 

He concluded that angels were in as short supply then as they 

are today. And therefore, we need these kinds of checks and balances. 

The Fifth Amendment is pretty clear: no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. And we’re depriving 

American citizens of their life when we target them with a drone 

attack. Now, I understand that it’s under military circumstances; 

these are enemy combatants and all of those kinds of things. But 

I would like to suggest to you that you consider—and Madam 

Chairman, I’d like to suggest to the Committee that we consider— 

a FISA court-type process where an American citizen is going to be 

targeted for a lethal strike. 

And I understand you can’t have co-commanders in chief, but 

having the Executive being the prosecutor, the judge, the jury, and 

the executioner, all in one, is very contrary to the traditions and 

the laws of this country, and particularly in a situation where 

there’s time. If—a soldier on a battlefield doesn’t have time to go 

to court, but if you’re planning a strike over a matter of days, 

weeks or months, there is an opportunity to at least go to some-
73 

thing outside of the Executive Branch body, like the FISA court, in 

a confidential and top-secret way, make the case that this American citizen is an enemy combatant, and at least that would be— 

that would be some check on the activities of the Executive. 

I have great confidence in you. I have great confidence in President Obama. But all the lessons of history is it shouldn’t matter 

who’s in charge, because we should have procedures and processes 

in place that will protect us no matter who the people are that are 

in the particular positions. 

How do you react to this suggestion? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I think it’s certainly worthy of discussion. 

Our tradition—our judicial tradition is that a court of law is used 

to determine one’s guilt or innocence for past actions, which is very 

different from the decisions that are made on the battlefield, as 

well as actions that are taken against terrorists, because none of 

those actions are to determine past guilt for those actions that they 

took. 

The decisions that are made are to take action so that we prevent a future action, so we protect American lives. That is an inherently Executive Branch function to determine, and the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Executive has the responsibility to 

protect the welfare, well-being of American citizens. 

So the concept I understand and we have wrestled with this in 

terms of whether there can be a FISA-like court, whatever—a 

FISA-like court is to determine exactly whether or not there should 

be a warrant for, you know, certain types of activities. You 

know—— 

Senator KING. It’s analogous to going to a court for a warrant— 

probable cause—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right, exactly. But the actions that we take on the 

counterterrorism front, again, are to take actions against individuals where we believe that the intelligence base is so strong and 

the nature of the threat is so grave and serious, as well as imminent, that we have no recourse except to take this action that may 

involve a lethal strike. 

Senator KING. I completely agree with you, and I understand the 

dilemma. And I’m not trying to suggest anything that would limit 

our ability to take action on behalf of American citizens. I would 

just feel more comfortable if somebody other than a Member of the 

Executive said, ‘‘Yes, we agree that the evidence is so strong,’’ et 

cetera, as you stated it. 

In the Hamdi decision, Sandra Day O’Connor had a wonderful 

statement: ‘‘A state of war is not a blank check for the President 

when it comes to the rights of the nation’s citizens.’’ 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. And that’s why I do think it’s worthy of discussion. And the point particularly about due process really needs 

to be taken into account because there’s not a different standard 

as far as if a U.S. citizen joins al-Qa’ida, you know, in terms of the 

intelligence base or whatever. But American citizens by definition 

are due much greater due process than anybody else by dint of 

their citizenship. 

So I think this is a very worthwhile discussion. I look forward 

to talking to the Committee and others about it. What’s that appro-
74 

priate balance between Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branch 

responsibilities in this area? 

Senator KING. I appreciate your consideration and, again, appreciate your testimony today. And thank you for your service to the 

country. 

Madam Chairman, I yield back my time. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

We’ll do another quick round. I think one of the problems is now 

that the drone program is so public, and one American citizen is 

killed, people don’t know much about this one American citizen— 

so-called. They don’t know what he’s been doing. They don’t know 

what he’s connected to. They don’t know the incitement that he has 

stirred up. 

And I wonder if you could tell us a little bit about Mr. al-Awlaki 

and what he had been doing? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, Senator, I’m not going to talk about any particular operation or responsibility on the part of the U.S. Government for anything—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. See, that’s the problem. That’s the problem. I think when people hear ‘‘American citizen,’’ they think somebody who’s upstanding; this man was not upstanding, by a long 

shot. And now, maybe you cannot discuss it here, but I’ve read 

enough to know that he was a real problem. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I can talk about Mr. al-Awlaki. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And if you were in jeopardy; that’s right. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, and before he died he was intimately involved in activities that were designed to kill innocent men, 

women, and children, and mostly Americans. He was determined 

to do that. He was not just a propagandist. He was, in fact, part 

of the operational effort that is known as al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 

Peninsula and had key responsibilities in that regard. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Can I ask you some questions about him? 

Mr. BRENNAN. You’re the Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. You don’t have to answer. Did he have a 

connection to Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who attempted to explode a device on one of our planes over Detroit? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, he did. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Could you tell us what condition it was? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would prefer not to at this time, Senator. I’m not 

prepared to. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. Did he have a connection to the Fort 

Hood attack? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That is al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula has— 

a variety of means of communicating and inciting individuals, 

whether that be websites, or e-mails, or other types of things. And 

so there are a number of occasions where individuals, including Mr. 

al-Awlaki, have been in touch with individuals. And so, Senator, 

again, I’m not prepared to address the specifics of these, but suffice 

it to say—— 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I’ll just ask you a couple questions. Did 

Faisal Shahzad, who pled guilty to the 2010 Times Square car 

bombing attempt, tell interrogators in 2010 that he was inspired by 

al-Awlaki? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe that’s correct, yes. 
75 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Last October, al-Awlaki—did he have a direct role in supervising and directing AQAP’s failed attempt, well, 

to bring down two United States cargo aircraft by detonating explosives concealed inside two packages, as a matter of fact, inside a 

computer printer cartridge? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. al-Awlaki was involved in overseeing a number of these activities. Yes, there was a relationship there. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And was it true that they were so concealed that the first attempt to find and did not reveal them? It 

took an asset coming back with—to say, ‘‘Go again, look at this,’’ 

to find it? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes the concealment method that was used in that 

was one of the best we had ever encountered. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So, Mr. al-Awlaki is not, by far, an American citizen of whom anyone in America would be proud? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. al-Awlaki was part of al-Qa’ida, and we’re at 

war with al-Qa’ida, and it was his strong determination to kill 

Americans on behalf of al-Qa’ida. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Is it true that in the last four years, the FBI has arrested 100 

people, either planning, conspiring, or trying to commit a terrorist 

attack on this nation? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t know the exact number, Chairman, but 

yes—they have arrested a lot of people. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. It’s over 100, but they have arrested a lot 

of people, and that’s because of good, sound intelligence. 

I think—and this is just me—what people forget is that they will 

kill us if they can, and it’s extraordinarily difficult if you can’t get 

in to where they were hiding. Would it have been possible to have 

arrested Mr. al-Awlaki where he was, in Yemen? 

Mr. BRENNAN. It is—there are parts of Yemen that are 

ungoverned and beyond the reach of the Yemeni government security and intelligence services. And we work very closely with the 

Yemenis to see if we can arrest, detain, individuals. Whenever we 

can, we want to do that, because it’s very valuable for us. 

Any actions that are taken in concert with the Yemeni government are done—in terms of any type of strikes that we might engage there with them—are done only because we do not have the 

ability to bring those individuals into custody. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. My time is up. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

In 2002, what was your knowledge of interrogation videotapes 

about Abu Zubaydah, and did you seek any information about an 

Office of General Counsel review of them in 2002? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t have a recollection of that, Senator. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Of the tapes, or that request? 

Mr. BRENNAN. At the time, in 2002, I do not know what my involvement or knowledge was at the time of the tapes. I believe that 

they—I was aware of the Abu Zubaydah debriefings and interrogation sessions being taped. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Okay, it should be no surprise that 

many Members have been dissatisfied with the administration’s cooperation on the Benghazi inquiries. 
76 

For example, Senator Graham asked Director Clapper, in a hearing, if he was aware of the series of attacks in Benghazi, in the 

summer of 2012, and asked if he had informed the President about 

those attacks. Now, that seemed like a perfectly reasonable question, and the DNI said he would get us an answer. 

When we got answers back from the DNI’s office, there was a notation next to this particular question that Senator Graham asked, 

and here’s what it said, and I quote, ‘‘Per NSS’’—that’s the National Security Staff—‘‘No response required.’’ 

Mr. Brennan, that’s your shop; do you have any knowledge about 

why Senator Graham’s question was not to be answered? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I think there’s a longstanding tradition, 

understanding, of respecting the executive privilege that exists in 

the Office of the Presidency, and in terms of what information is 

provided to the President, or advice, counsel, to him. 

So it’s—I would suspect, then, that that question gets into this 

issue of the executive privilege, which I think, again, has been a 

longstanding tradition. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Now, are you sure that’s the answer, 

or you think that’s probably what it was? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t know, firsthand, because that would not 

been a request coming to me. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. And I understand that, so my direction to you—what I’ll ask of you—is that you go back and review 

that; we’ll get you notation if necessary, and if you could just give 

us a written response to that, if possible. 

Mr. BRENNAN. You deserve a response, certainly. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. This weekend, Secretary Panetta 

confirmed that information that led to bin Laden came from detainees and the CIA’s EIT program. His account comports with information we were provided immediately after the raid, and in 

months to follow, from the CIA analyst who actually tracked down 

bin Laden. These analysts told us it was detainee information that 

was key to them finding the courier and, ultimately, bin Laden. 

Now, were you briefed by any of the analysts who tracked down 

bin Laden? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Before the operation? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Yes. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Oh, absolutely; I was engaged with them. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Okay. And is that the information 

that was given to you—that it came from interrogation of detainees 

on whom EITs had been used? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t recall if I was given that information specifically. They talked about the chain of, sort of, collection that took 

place that was related to some of the information coming from the 

detainees. Yes, so, there was some there. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Do you agree with Secretary Panetta’s comments? 

Mr. BRENNAN. That there was some information that came out 

from there? 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Yes, that led to the courier. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I now, again, looking at this document 

from SSCI, this report, I don’t know what the facts are, or the 

truth is. So I really need to look at that carefully and see what 
77 

CIA’s response is because the SSCI report calls into question 

whether or not any of the information was unique and led to it. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Fair enough. Suffice it to say, Secretary Panetta’s comments are in direct conflict with the report 

that came out of this Committee recently. And you know I have serious concerns about that interrogation study that was voted out by 

Committee. 

Now, you told me a couple of days ago when we met that the 

study ‘‘was not objective,’’ and it was ‘‘a prosecutor’s brief, written 

with an eye toward finding problems.’’ And you went on to say that 

you’re withholding judgment on the merits and action until you 

read the response. 

And it’s my understanding, from what you’ve said, that that’s 

what you’re going to do. Suppose the CIA takes the position that 

the study’s findings and conclusions are wrong? I think I know 

John Brennan well enough to know that you’re going to stand up 

and say whatever’s on your mind, and whatever you conclude. And 

I’m not going to ask you for a response to that, but I know you’ll 

review it with an open mind and give us your thoughts and your 

opinions about the CIA’s response to it and how we move forward 

with this. 

Mr. BRENNAN. I assure you, Senator, I will do that. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Oh, excuse me—Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

I was just making a comment to the Chair, Mr. Brennan, that 

I’ve been through a whole lot of confirmation hearings in 28 years 

here—and including quite a few CIA directors—and I quite honestly do not recall anybody who was more forthright, more direct, 

more accommodating, without violating who you are, more open to 

the possibility of working with this Committee in a way that will 

do two things: one, that will give the folks at CIA, who probably 

constantly worry about what is the next awful thing that we’re 

going to say about them—but that’s not our intention, because 

we’re into the business of problem-solving, and if we have to write 

a 6,000-page thing, it isn’t fun for us; we’re trying to solve a problem. 

I have a feeling you understand that. I have a feeling that you 

feel that the CIA, if they felt that they were working in—you know, 

with some contention with the oversight committee in the Senate, 

but, nevertheless, that the Senate was involved, was informed, was 

interested; that this would be something that they would welcome; 

that there are a lot of people who’ve been at the CIA for quite a 

while who may be sort of stuck in that mid-rank crisis, et cetera, 

who are looking for an open, fresh, strong leader. 

I happen to think you are that leader. I’ve felt that since our conversation. I felt that from before our conversation. And we haven’t 

had our secret meeting yet, so I always—but I’m not going to—I’m 

sure I’m not going to change my mind. 

I just think you’ve done an extraordinary job of patience, of courtesy, of wisdom, of being able to—the only question that you 
78 

couldn’t answer that I’m aware of was who was it that took notes 

at some meeting that you had, teleconference that you had 20 

years ago. But I find it in my heart to forgive you for that. 

So, to me, I think you’re a terrific leader, and I’ll look forward 

to Tuesday. But I think you’re the guy for the job—and the only 

guy for the job. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator, for those very kind words. 

And I haven’t lived up to them yet. And if I were to go to CIA, as 

I think some people have said—some Senators have said, you want 

to hear not just words, but you want to actually see the actions. 

It’s a daunting task to go over to CIA. I want every Member of 

this Committee to be an ardent advocate, proponent, and defender 

of the men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. And I 

see it as my obligation to represent them to you on their behalf, 

so that when times get tough, and when people are going to be 

criticizing and complaining about the CIA, I have all of you to say 

you knew about what the CIA was doing, you supported it, and you 

will defend it. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Chairman. 

I’m going to try to be brief because I’ve noticed you’re on your 

fourth glass of water, and I don’t want to be accused of 

waterboarding you. 

[Laughter] 

Senator BURR. Mr. Brennan, with the exception of our request 

for the Presidential Daily Briefs around the time of Benghazi, for 

which there was executive privilege claimed, do you know of any 

other claim of executive privilege on any of the documents that this 

Committee’s waiting on right now? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I know that there are requests for some 

e-mails that might have taken place between the Intelligence Community and the White House, whatever, and so there are a number 

of, sort of, elements that I think people are looking at. So—— 

Senator BURR. But none that executive privilege have been 

claimed on. Correct? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, I am not in a position to say that, Senator, 

and I would defer to those individuals—the White House counsel 

and others—to make those determinations about what they want 

to—— 

Senator BURR. Well, let me say it from this end. They have not 

justified not producing those documents based upon executive privilege. So I assume if they’re going to claim it, then they need to 

claim it quick. 

On January 13th of this year, the President signed into law the 

2013 Intelligence Authorization Act, which requires congressional 

notification of any authorized disclosure of national intelligence. 

Now, we’ve not received any notifications of authorized disclosures. Have there been any authorized disclosures, to your knowledge? 

Mr. BRENNAN. I would like to say that since you haven’t received 

any notifications, there haven’t been. 

Senator BURR. Would you consider the information reported in 

the press about the counterterrorism playbook an authorized disclosure? 
79 

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t know which piece you’re talking about. 

There’s been a lot of discussion out there in the media and in the 

newspapers about this. 

And so I don’t know specifically about any classified information. 

The fact that the administration may be going through a process 

to try to institutionalize, codify, make as rigorous as possible our 

processes and procedures in and of itself is not a classified issue. 

So those details that are classified, I don’t know of any that came 

out in some of those reports. 

Senator BURR. Well, if there is classified information that’s out 

there, and it was not authorized, was there a crime report filed relative to the playbook? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Presumably there was, Senator. Those decisions, 

as far as initiating criminal investigations, are done by those departments and agencies that have stewardship of that classified information and in discussions with the Department of Justice to 

make a determination whether or not in light of the fact that 

maybe so many people have access to it, how they can proceed with 

some type of criminal investigations. 

Senator BURR. As we prepare for the closed hearing on Tuesday—this is not a question—I’ll ask you today that you be prepared 

to provide for the Committee any specific discussions that you had 

where you were authorized to reveal classified information or to 

talk about information on covert action. 

Again, not something I’d like to do today. The answer may be 

zero. If there are things, Tuesday would be an opportunity for you 

to provide. That was a pre-hearing question from the Committee 

that was unanswered. 

My last question is this: I’m still not clear on whether you think 

the information from CIA interrogations saved lives. Have you ever 

made a representation to a court, including the FISA court, about 

the type and importance of information learned from detainees, including detainees in the CIA detention and interrogation program? 

Mr. BRENNAN. First of all, on the first part of your question, that 

you’re not sure whether or not I believe that there has been misinformation, I don’t know—— 

Senator BURR. I said I wasn’t clear whether I understood, whether I was clear. 

Mr. BRENNAN. And I’m not clear at this time, either, because I’ve 

read a report that calls into question a lot of the information that 

I was provided earlier on my impressions. 

When I was in the government as the head of National Counterterrorism Center, I know that I had signed out a number of affirmations related to the continuation of certain programs based on 

the analysis and intelligence that was available to analysts. And I 

don’t know exactly what it was at the time, but we can look at 

that. 

Senator BURR. But the Committee can assume that you had 

faith—if you make that claim to a court, including the FISA 

court—you had faith in the documents and in the information that 

was supplied you to make that declaration? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Absolutely. At the time when, if I made any such 

affirmation, I would have had faith that the information I was provided was an accurate representation. 
80 

Senator BURR. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

We have talked for several hours now about the question of targeted killings of Americans, and you’ve heard it from a number of 

Senators. And I’d like to get your reaction on one point in particular. And that is this question, particularly in the context that 

you’ve given, that you’ve tried to focus in areas where the evidence 

is substantial, the threat is imminent, where there is a particularly 

persuasive case that the targeted killing of an American is warranted. 

In that kind of case, do you believe that the President should 

provide an individual American with the opportunity to surrender 

before killing them? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Senator, I haven’t spoken about any specific operations—— 

Senator WYDEN. I’m talking about the concept—— 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. 

Senator WYDEN [continuing]. Because you talk about the concept. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. Absolutely. 

Senator WYDEN. You said imminent threats, serious evidence, 

grave concern; certainly words that strike a chord with me. And 

that’s why I’d be interested in your thoughts on whether, in those 

kind of instances, the President ought to give—should give—an individual American the opportunity to surrender. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Right. I think in those instances, and right now, 

let’s use the example of al-Qa’ida, because if an American were to 

join al-Qa’ida, we have routinely said—openly, publicly, and repeatedly—that we’re at war with al-Qa’ida. We have repeatedly said 

that al-Qa’ida is in fact trying to kill Americans, and that we are 

going to do everything possible to protect the lives of American citizens from these murderous attacks from al-Qa’ida. 

We have signaled this worldwide. We have repeatedly said it 

openly and publicly. Any American who joins al-Qa’ida will know 

full well that they have joined an organization that is at war with 

the United States and that has killed thousands upon thousands 

of individuals, many, many of them who are Americans. 

So I think any American who did that should know well that 

they, in fact, are part of an enemy against us, and that the United 

States will do everything possible to destroy that enemy to save 

American lives. 

Senator WYDEN. And I certainly—and I said this at the very beginning—I certainly want to be part of that effort to fight al-Qa’ida 

on all of these key fronts. I just want to have some answers—and 

I’ll give you another chance—whether you think the President 

should give an individual American the opportunity to surrender. 

I think that Senator King, for example, talked about the idea of 

a new court, and there are going to be colleagues that are going 

to talk about a whole host of ideas. And I commend you for saying 

that you’re open to hearing about that. 

This is something that can be set in motion, I think, in a 

straightforward way, as a general principle. We’re not talking 

about any one individual. And I think you’ve answered the ques-
81 

tion, and I won’t go any further, unless you want to add anything 

to it. 

The only other point I’d say is we’ve covered a lot of ground 

today. And as far as I’m concerned, we’ve got a lot of ground still 

to cover. I’ve made it clear that we’ve got to see any and all of 

those legal opinions, the ones that the bipartisan group of senators 

asked for, before the vote. And to your credit, you said you’d take 

the message back to the White House. 

Because what it really goes to, Mr. Brennan, is this question of 

checks and balances—and we probably didn’t use that word enough 

this afternoon—because I think that’s really what this is all about. 

Our Constitution fortunately gives the President significant power 

to protect our country in dangerous times. 

But it is not unfettered power; it’s power that is balanced 

through this special system that ensures congressional oversight 

and public oversight. And so that’s why these questions that I and 

others have been trying to get at, in terms of congressional oversight, being able to get all of the opinions that are relevant to the 

legal analysis for targeting Americans, and then to learn more 

about how you’re going to bring the public into the discussion. 

And certainly you’ve been patient this afternoon, and I want you 

to know I think we’ve covered a lot of ground, but I think we’ve 

got a lot to go. And I’d be happy to give you the last word. I’ve got 

a little more time if you want it. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator. First of all, any member of 

al-Qa’ida, whether a U.S. citizen or non-U.S. citizen, needs to know 

that they have the ability to surrender, the right to surrender, anytime, anywhere throughout the world. And they can do so before 

the organization is destroyed. We will destroy that organization. 

And again, out there in al-Qa’ida, U.S. citizens and others, they 

can surrender anytime, turn themselves in. 

Senator WYDEN. Just on that point, I don’t take a backseat to 

anybody, in terms of fighting al-Qa’ida. That was why I came out 

with it right at the outset. But I asked you a different question, 

and on the question of what kind of evidence ought to be applied, 

whether there ought to be geographic limits, the question of whether an individual should be allowed to surrender. For—for example, 

there is I think also a question whether the obligation changes if, 

you know, a valid target has not been publicly reported. 

So there are issues, you know, here. And I think we’re going to 

have to continue those—those discussions. 

And Madam Chair, I thank you for this extra round. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. 

Senator Coats. 

Senator COATS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

John, I want to just say, and I’m not going to go into it here— 

I think it may be better held for further discussion next week in 

a classified room—but this whole idea of leaks—nothing upsets me 

more on this Committee, and we’ve had a raft of these in the last 

couple of years, than to see something that was discussed in classified area written up the next day in the newspapers or on the part 

of the media. It drives some of us crazy. It does me, anyway. 

And so, maybe I’m a little paranoid about all this, and so forth. 

I just can’t totally get my hands around this AQAP situation that 
82 

we discussed earlier. But I’m going to defer that until Tuesday so 

we can discuss it in more detail. 

Let me just ask you one question here. You said—I don’t have 

the date—‘‘The al-Qa’ida core has been decimated in the FATA.’’ 

And we’re aware of the significant efforts we’ve made and the 

progress we’ve made in that regard. But we see this thing metastasizing now across northern Africa and other parts. 

What’s your, you know, latest assessment of al-Qa’ida, in terms 

of its control and operation of these smaller efforts that are popping up like a whack-a-mole machine in different parts of the Middle East and North Africa? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, Senator, you used the exact right term when 

you said al-Qa’ida has been metastasizing in different parts of the 

world. We have the al-Qa’ida core that, in the past, I think exerted 

quite a bit of orchestration or order over a number of these franchises that have developed. 

Now, as a result of the decimation of the core, and our ability to 

interrupt a lot of the interaction and communication between them, 

a lot of these different elements, like al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and other elements, 

have grown up and developed as a result of the domestic and local 

sort of environment. 

And so they’re all sort of, you know, unique unto themselves. 

They have different features and characteristics. We need to make 

sure that we’re able to work with the governments and the intelligence and security services in the area so that we can put as 

much pressure on them as possible. 

A number of them have, you know, local agendas. Some of them 

have local agendas as well as international agendas. Al-Qa’ida in 

the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen has a very determined insurgency 

effort underway in side of Yemen to try to, you know, bring that 

government down. And the government has done a great job, you 

know, fighting back. 

There are other elements—al-Qa’ida in Islamic Maghreb. You 

know, they’re counter-narcotics—they’re narcotics smugglers. 

They’re human traffickers. They involve quite a bit in kidnapping 

and ransoms, and also involve in tourist attacks. 

So, what we need to do is to take into account what the environment is, who we can work with, and how we’re going to put pressure on them. But any element that is associated with al-Qa’ida 

has, as part of its agenda, death, and destruction. And so, I fully 

agree what we need to do is be mindful of the metastasization of 

the al-Qa’ida cancer. 

Senator COATS. But in relationship to some kind of centralized 

control over all these things, having said that, the core is decimated. 

Mr. BRENNAN. It really varies, you know. We do see al-Qa’ida 

core trying to exert some control over some of these elements. 

There’s a lot of independence of effort, you know, autonomous efforts that are underway. And I’d be happy to be able to talk in, you 

know, closed session about the particular relationships that exist 

between al-Qa’ida and some of these other elements. 

Senator COATS. Very good. Thank you. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 
83 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Collins. Last, but far from least. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Brennan, I want to follow up on the point that Senator Coats 

just raised with you, because if you looked at a map back in 2001, 

you would see that al-Qa’ida was mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And if you look at a map today, you would see al-Qa’ida in 

all sorts of countries. 

That’s not to say that there weren’t cells in other countries back 

in 2001, but it raises the question in my mind of whether, even 

though we’ve been successful in taking out some of the core of alQa’ida and some high-level leaders, whether our strategy is working. If the cancer of al-Qa’ida is metastasizing, do we need a new 

treatment? 

Mr. BRENNAN. What we’ve tried to do, Senator, over the past decade and longer, is to be able to treat this real cancer in a number 

of ways: sometimes it takes lethal force, sometimes it takes military might, sometimes it takes working with our partners in a variety of ways, sometimes it takes addressing some of the 

infrastructural, institutional, and other deficiencies that exist in 

these countries that al-Qa’ida takes advantage of. 

If you look at the geographic map, you know, in the area from 

South Asia over to the Middle East and North Africa, there has 

been tremendous political turbulence in that area over the past 

decade, and particularly in the last couple years. There are a lot 

of spaces—ungoverned spaces—that al-Qa’ida has taken advantage 

of. We’ve been able to make some significant progress in certain 

areas. 

Somalia is, in fact, a good example of a place where we have 

worked with neighboring countries, we’ve worked with the local 

government, and we’ve worked with AMISOM, a multilateral element within Africa, to try to suppress the efforts of Al Shabaab and 

al-Qa’ida in East Africa; good progress we made there. Because it 

has to be comprehensive; it’s not just a kinetic solution to this by 

any means. 

Now, as we look at the Sahel, and the area in Mali, and other 

areas, these are tremendous expanses of territory where al-Qa’ida 

can put down roots beyond the reach of local governments. And so 

they’ve been able to put down roots, and they’ve been—it’s been unattended because of the difficulties that these countries have even 

feeding their people, much less putting in place a system of laws 

and the intelligence and security capability. 

So, is it a different strategy; it has to be a comprehensive one. 

But al-Qa’ida and this—you know, the forces of Islamic extremists, 

that have really corrupted and perverted Islam, are making some 

progress in areas that give me real concern. That’s why I look at 

a place like Syria right now, and what is going on in that country; 

we cannot allow vast areas to be exploited by al-Qa’ida and these 

extremist forces, because it will be to our peril. 

Senator COLLINS. I certainly agree with you on that, and in our 

classified or closed hearing next week I’m going to be asking you 

about Syria, and also the Iranian threat. But I don’t think those 

are appropriate in open session. 
84 

Just two final questions: one has to do with priorities that you 

would set as director if you are confirmed. In recent years, paramilitary operations obviously had consumed a lot of resources, expertise, time, energy, and effort at the CIA; do you believe this has 

been at the expense of traditional CIA responsibilities—collection, 

analysis, all source? 

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, certainly, there have been opportunity costs 

because of the dedication of those resources. What I would need to 

do, if I were to go to CIA, is to inventory exactly how our resources 

are being dedicated against the wide variety of strategic priorities 

to protect our country. 

In terms of operational collection activities worldwide, in terms 

of the all source analysis being done, what are we doing in these 

other areas? Cyber, you know, weapons proliferation, political turbulence—there are so many different areas. Counterterrorism is an 

important one. There is also an intersection between counterterrorism and a lot of these other areas, counter-proliferation, international organized crime, other things. 

So we really want to optimize those resources so that we can, in 

fact, leverage the capabilities we have, in order to deal with these 

very challenging issues across a very large globe. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Brennan, you have devoted a great deal of 

your life to public service, for which I thank you. And you obviously 

understand the world of intelligence in a way that few people do. 

You’ve been an intelligence professional for much of your professional life. 

In the last four years, you have held a political position at the 

White House. And I have been talking to people at the CIA, whom 

I respect, and one intelligence official told me that a key question 

for the men and women of the CIA is which John Brennan are they 

going to get? Are they going to get John Brennan who’s been the 

right-hand advisor of President Obama in a political White 

House—and by the nature of the position—I don’t say that critically; that’s the position—or are they going to get John Brennan 

who was a career CIA officer, who worked his way up in the ranks? 

And the concern is that they want to hear that you are going to 

be the CIA’s representative to the White House, not the White 

House’s representative to the CIA. And I just want to give you the 

opportunity today to respond to that concern. 

I would note that I also heard very good comments from people 

with whom I talked, but I think it’s important, when someone’s 

coming from a political role, to make clear that you’re going to be 

the leader of the Agency and not the White House’s agent within 

the Agency. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Senator. I think if I were to be fortunate, privileged, and honored to go out to CIA, the CIA would get 

the John Brennan who is neither a Democrat nor Republican, nor 

has ever been; a John Brennan who has a deep appreciation and 

respect for the intelligence profession, one who has been fortunate 

to have lived it for 25 years; a John Brennan who has had the 

great fortune to be in the White House the past four years, watching and understanding how intelligence is used in support of our 

national security. CIA would get a John Brennan who has been 

working national security issues for my life. 
85 

They would get a John Brennan who really understands that the 

value of intelligence, the importance of intelligence, is not to tell 

the President what he wants to hear, not to tell this Committee 

what it wants to hear, but to tell the policymakers, the Congressional overseers, what they need to hear—what the Intelligence 

Community, with all its great capability and expertise, has been 

able to uncover and understand about world events that fundamentally affect the lives of not just this generation of Americans, but 

of future generations of Americans. 

And so, if I had the great privilege to lead the men and women 

of the CIA, it would be the biggest honor of my life, and I would 

understand just how important and weighty that would be. And if 

I ever dishonored that responsibility, I couldn’t look myself in the 

mirror. I couldn’t look my parents, my family in the mirror. I 

couldn’t look you in the face, and that is something that is very important to me. 

So, I guess the proof will be in the pudding, the tasting of the 

pudding, and if I do have that opportunity, it would be my intention to make sure I did everything possible to live up to the trust 

and confidence that this Congress, this Senate, and this President 

might place in me. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. 

If there are no further questions, John, I would like to associate 

myself with what Senator Rockefeller said. I’ve sat through a number of these hearings; I don’t think I’ve ever heard anyone more 

forthright or more honest or more direct. You really didn’t hedge. 

You said what you thought. And I want you to know that that’s 

very much appreciated. 

And I actually think you are going to be a fine and strong leader 

for the CIA, and, you know, I can’t help but say I am really fully 

supportive of this and will do everything I possibly can to see that 

our Committee works with you closely and honestly. 

We will have a classified hearing. I am specifically going to just 

warn you that I would like to have you respond in detail to what 

I perceive as a difficult, evolving situation in North Africa now, 

with Tunisia, with Libya, with all these countries, and certainly 

with Mali, and how you plan to direct the Agency to deal with this 

evolving momentum that’s taking place in Northern Africa. 

So that will be for Tuesday. And at the request of Senator Levin, 

I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a Joint Statement 

that he and I made on April 27, 2012. 

[The Joint Statement of Senators Feinstein and Levin, dated 

April 27, 2012, follows:] 

JOINT STATEMENT FROM SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN (D-CALIF.), CHAIRMAN, SENATE

INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, AND SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MICH.), CHAIRMAN, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

We are deeply troubled by the claims of the CIA’s former Deputy Director of Operations Jose Rodriguez regarding the effectiveness of the CIA’s coercive interrogation 

techniques. 

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will soon complete a comprehensive 

review of the CIA’s former Detention and Interrogation Program. Committee staff 

has reviewed more than 6 million pages of records and the Committee’s final report, 

which we expect to exceed 5000 pages, will provide a detailed, factual description 
86 

of how interrogation techniques were used, the conditions under which detainees 

were held, and the intelligence that was—or wasn’t—gained from the program. 

Statements made by Mr. Rodriguez and other former senior government officials 

about the role of the CIA interrogation program in locating Usama bin Laden (UBL) 

are inconsistent with CIA records. We are disappointed that Mr. Rodriguez and others, who left government positions prior to the UBL operation and are not privy to 

all of the intelligence that led to the raid, continue to insist that the CIA’s so-called 

‘‘enhanced interrogation techniques’’ used many years ago were a central component 

of our success. This view is misguided and misinformed. 

The roots of the UBL operation stretch back nearly a decade and involve hundreds, perhaps thousands, of intelligence professionals who worked non-stop to connect and analyze many fragments of information, eventually leading the United 

States to Usama bin Laden’s location in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The suggestion that 

the operation was carried out based on information gained through the harsh treatment of CIA detainees is not only inaccurate, it trivializes the work of individuals 

across multiple U.S. agencies that led to UBL and the eventual operation. 

We are also troubled by Mr. Rodriguez’s statements justifying the destruction of 

video tapes documenting the use of coercive interrogation techniques as ‘‘just getting 

rid of some ugly visuals.’’ His decision to order the destruction of the tapes was in 

violation of instructions from CIA and White House lawyers, illustrates a blatant 

disregard for the law, and unnecessarily caused damage to the CIA’s reputation. 

Further, it’s worth repeating, as discussed in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s 2008 report, the SERE techniques used in the CIA’s interrogation program 

were never intended to be used by U.S. interrogators. Rather, the techniques— 

which are based on Communist Chinese interrogation techniques used during the 

Korean War to elicit false confessions—were developed to expose U.S. soldiers to the 

abusive treatment they might be subjected to if captured by our enemies. An overwhelming number of experts agree, the SERE techniques are not an effective means 

to illicit accurate information. 

Misinformation Relating to the UBL Operation 

Statement of Jose Rodriguez, former CIA Deputy Director for Operations, Time 

Magazine, May 4, 2011: 

‘‘Information provided by [CIA detainees] KSM and Abu Faraj al-Libbi 

about bin Laden’s courier was the lead information that eventually led to 

the location of [bin Laden’s] compound and the operation that led to his 

death.’’ 

This statement is wrong. The original lead information had no connection to CIA 

detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier that was collected 

from a variety of classified sources. While the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques were used against KSM and al-Libbi, the pair provided false and misleading 

information during their time in CIA custody. This information will be detailed in 

the Intelligence Committee’s report. 

Statement of Michael Hayden, former CIA Director, Scott Hennen Show, May 3, 

2011: 

‘‘[W]hat we got, the original lead information—and frankly it was incomplete identity information on the couriers—began with information from 

CIA detainees at the black sites.’’ 

This statement is wrong. The original information had no connection to CIA detainees. The CIA had significant intelligence on the courier that was collected from 

a variety of classified sources. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence 

Committee’s report. 

Statement of Michael Mukasey, former Attorney General, Wall Street Journal, 

May 6, 2011: 

‘‘Consider how the intelligence that led to bin Laden came to hand. It began 

with a disclosure from Khalid Shiekh Mohammed (KSM) who broke like a 

dam under the pressure of harsh interrogation techniques—that included 

waterboarding. He loosed a torrent of information—including eventually the 

name of a trusted courier of bin Laden Another of those gathered up later 

in this harvest, Abu Faraj al-Libi, also was subjected to certain of these 

harsh techniques and disclosed further details about bin Laden’s couriers 

that helped last weekend’s achievement.’’ 

This statement is wrong. There is nothing in CIA intelligence records to corroborate this statement. 
87 

Other press reports have suggested that a third CIA detainee subjected to the 

CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques provided significant information on the 

courier and his relationship with al-Qa’ida. While this third detainee did provide 

relevant information, he did so the day before he was interrogated by the CIA using 

their coercive interrogation techniques. This information will be detailed in the Intelligence Committee’s report. 

The Facts: 

• CIA did not first learn about the existence of the UBL courier from detainees 

subjected to coercive interrogation techniques. Nor did the agency discover the 

courier’s identity from detainees subjected to coercive techniques. No detainee 

reported on the courier’s full name or specific whereabouts, and no detainee 

identified the compound in which UBL was hidden. Instead, the CIA learned 

of the existence of the courier, his true name and location through means unrelated to the CIA detention and interrogation program. 

• Information to support this operation was obtained from a wide variety of intelligence sources and methods. CIA officers and their colleagues throughout the 

Intelligence Community sifted through massive amounts of information, identified possible leads, tracked them down, and made considered judgments based 

on all of the available intelligence. 

• The CIA detainee who provided the most significant information about the courier provided the information prior to being subjected to coercive interrogation 

techniques. 

• The three detainees subjected to waterboarding provided no new information 

about the courier. In fact, the CIA detainees who were subjected to coercive 

techniques downplayed the courier’s significance, with some of those detainees 

denying they knew him at all, in the face of significant evidence to the contrary. 

• Detainees whom the CIA believed to have information on UBL’s location provided no locational information, even after significant use of the CIA’s coercive 

interrogation techniques. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And secondly, in order to have Mr. Brennan’s answers to questions for the record by the time he returns 

before us in closed session, I ask Members to the right questions 

for the record by 5 o’clock p.m. tomorrow—that’s Friday, February 

the 8th—so we have them for you as soon as possible so that you 

can respond to them Tuesday. 

I want to thank you and your family for being here, and I wish 

you well. 

Thank you, and the hearing is adjourned. 

Mr. BRENNAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

[Whereupon, at 6:00 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 
88 

COMMITTEE BUSINESS MEETING TO VOTE ON 

THE NOMINATION OF JOHN O. BRENNAN 

TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

TUESDAY, MARCH 5, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in Room 

SH–219, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Chambliss, 

Rockefeller, Burr, Wyden, Mikulski, Coats, Rubio, Heinrich, Collins, King, and Coburn. 

Committee Staff Members Present: David Grannis, Staff Director; Martha Scott Poindexter, Minority Staff Director; Kathleen 

McGhee, Chief Clerk; Jennifer Barrett, Randy Bookout, Michael 

Buchwald, James Catella, Christian Cook, John Dickas, Richard 

Girven, Lorenzo Goco, Tressa Guenov, Tom Hawkins (Minority 

Ldr’s Office), Neal Higgins, Clete Johnson, Ryan Kaldahl, Andrew 

Kerr, Jack Livingston, Eric Losick, Paul Matulic, Hayden Milberg, 

Brian Miller, Michael Pevzner, Tommy Ross (Majority Ldr’s Office), 

Jacqueline Russell, Kelly Shaw, Tyler Stephens, Chad Tanner, 

Ryan Tully, Brian Walsh, and James Wolfe. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will the Clerk please call the roll? 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Ms. Mikulski. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Udall. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Aye by proxy. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Warner. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Aye by proxy. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. King. 

Senator KING. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Burr. 

Senator Burr. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Risch. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. No by proxy. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Coats. 

Senator COATS. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Ms. Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Aye. 
89 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Coburn. 

Senator COBURN. No. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Chambliss. 

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. No. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Mrs. Feinstein. 

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Aye. 

Mrs. MCGHEE. Twelve ayes, three nays. 

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 

(91) 

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