Dedicated to all Air Force Reservists

You simply do amazing things!
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force History and Museums Program, US Air Force, Air Force Reserve Command, the 

Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. SAF/PA cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

The contributions Air Force Reservists are making to the security of the United States and the world is a continuum of visionary concepts, ideas, and challenges undertaken at the beginning of the last century in the quest 

of human flight. Reserve members voluntarily partook of these endeavors and also gradually formed an effective organization. Moreover, the course toward the twenty-first century policy of maintaining a strategic air 

reserve that is well integrated with active duty forces and operationally engaged daily has been evolutionary 

and forged out of practicality and necessity. The result has been a responsive and efficient Air Force Reserve.

iii ii
TURNING POINT 9.11

Air Force Reserve in the 21st Century, 2001-2011

By

Betty R. Kennedy, Dr. Donald C. Boyd, Stephen P. Ove, Keith L. Barr, and noted contributors

HQ Air Force Reserve Command

Directorate of Historical Services

Robins AFB, Georgia

 September 2012

iii
ivv
v
12
2
ushering in airpower as a new third dimension 

and asset of warfare—air, land, and sea.

In August 1907, Brigadier General James Allen, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, established an Aeronautical Division under his office, responsible for "military ballooning, air 

machines, and all kindred subjects.”1 By the 

summer of 1908, the division counted three officers and ten enlisted men. Initially, captive 

balloons, proven in aiding military reconnaissance, observations, and artillery fire, garnered 

more interest than air machines in the Signal 

Corps. Legislation in July 1914 provided for 

an authorized strength of 60 aviation officers 

and student cadets and 260 enlisted men.2 

However, Chief Signal Officer Brigadier General George P. Scriven also realized a need for 

more trained personnel and, accordingly, recommended legislation to provide for an AviaCommissioned in the Signal Officers Reserve Corps, Lieutenant Charles D’Olive 

was posted to the 93rd Pursuit Squadron 

in France during World War I. Lieutenant D’Olive scored the squadron’s first 

victory on the morning of 12 September 

1918 when he shot down a Fokker D. VII. 

He later received the Distinguished Service Cross for extraordinary heroism and 

was declared an Ace with five kills.

LIEUTENANT CHARLES D’OLIVE

34
tion Reserve Corps. As the measure was being 

studied by congressional committees and with 

few military airplanes in existence, citizens 

via the Aero Clubs of America undertook subscriptions to raise money for airplanes to train 

aviators in this World War I era.3

Thus, the historical origins of an air reserve in 

the US military originated from the Preparedness Movement, Plattsburg Camp, and efforts 

of “air minded” citizens, military officials, and 

congressmen in eventually securing provisions in the National Defense Act of 1916 for 

an organized Signal Reserve Corps of nearly 

2,300 members under the then Aviation Section. Officers in the Signal Officers Reserve 

Corps received appointments for five years, 

but in wartime, they would continue to serve 

until six months after the war ended. Initially, 

enlisted reserve members voluntarily signed 

up for three years and had to possess military 

or technical experience.4 Interestingly, in light 

of the full-time/part-time military rebalancing discussions, the view then was that it was 

impractical to maintain sufficient numbers 

of technicians in the active peacetime Army. 

However, it was thought at the time that it was 

ideal to do so in the Signal Enlisted Reserve 

Corps, drawing upon their former military 

training and civilian work experiences.

INTERWAR

After WW I, reserve military aviators had 

to persevere in order to maintain their flying 

skills. They associated with the local aero 

Without presuming to assign any definite numbers of officers to these duties, I have estimated that the Air Corps would be unable to place more than 500 Regular officers in the 

air as pilots of combat planes. Without endorsing that number, General Westover says 

that it is approximately correct. So as we have 4 million square miles of territory and 

about 150 million people who will clamor for air defense in time of war, it is obvious that 

our devoted little band of 500 Regular officers is going to need help. Few of our citizens 

(and not many even in aviation) know that the actual fighting end of our Air Corps is so 

small. It cannot become any larger under present laws and under the amount of money 

available for the Air Arm. 

Of course wars are fought by civilians; the Regulars tell them how to fight. At the finish 

of the last war we had 11,000 flying officers and 9,000 semi-flying officers, and not much 

over a couple of thousand DHs. It is clear that we cannot maintain in peace times enough 

fighting pilots to wage war unassisted by some of the rest of us—preferably the young 

man just out of college, full of enthusiasm and the illusion that war is a lot of glorious 

adventure. The late William Jennings Bryan, I believe, said that if America is attacked, 

a million men would spring to arms that aren’t in existence, and that even if they existed 

you still must learn how to use them. At present there are not enough modern airplanes 

for even the 500 Regular officers of the Air Corps to leap into; and even if the planes for 

them existed, the civilians would require months of training before they could fly them 

and fight effectively. Meanwhile someone must do the fighting, or some of the fighting, if 

there’s anything to fight in, lest we use up all of our Regulars before they have trained the 

more simple-minded civilians. This is where the Air Corps Reserve comes in. 

Now, the Air Corps Reserves are sort of Lost Souls, wandering in a No Man’s Land that 

lies somewhere between Army life and civilian life—another group of Forgotten Men. 

About 15% of these Reserve officers get two weeks’ active duty with pay once a year (but 

not every year) and fly (on their own time and with no pay) during the year. If they are 

crashed and killed during a training flight they are a total loss to their families, for the 

War Department provides them no insurance. They are patriots and are supposed to fly, 

and if chance so directs, to die for nothing. They are admirable citizens, if anyone would 

pause long enough to admire them. But few do.

 Cy Caldwell, “Preserve Our Air Reserve,” Aero Digest, July 1936

on the eve of House Bill 12241 for Reservists flight pay, hospitalization, and death benefits

AIR CORPS RESERVE – LOST SOULS

4
tional Guard, and the Organized Reserve as 

mutually complementary, differing only by 

their commitments.5

Sustaining flying skills remained a challenge, 

cal community leaders promoted an Air Service and its reserve organizations. President 

Warren G. Harding, too, proved supportive 

when he upheld the 1920 legislation to include 

during peacetime the Regular Army, the Naclubs and military flying fields, obtaining a 

spare military plane now and then during their 

free time, mostly on the weekends. Reserve 

duty, at this time, was largely relegated to a 

weekend affair. Again, the aero clubs and lo-

“I believe we were put on this earth for a purpose—to make it, within our capabilities, a better place to live,” 

James Doolittle.

Jimmie Doolittle, test pilot and aeronautical engineer, began his military career in 1917, enlisting as a flying 

cadet in the Army Signal Corps Reserve. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1918 in the Signal 

Corps Reserve. In 1920, he was commissioned in the Regular Army. In 1922, he made the first cross-country 

flight, paving the way for long-distance military operations. He won the Schneider Cup (1925), Mackay 

(1926), Bendix (1931), and Thompson (1932) trophies for his air racing and speed records, advancing aviation. One of his more important contributions was the development of instrument flying. He served in the 

regular Army Air Corps until 1930 when he went to work for the Shell Oil Company as their manager of aviation. Subsequently, he was commissioned a major in the Officers Reserve Corps. Recalled to active duty in 

1940, he first worked to convert automobile plants for airplane parts manufacturing. 

Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle planned, trained, and led a daring bomber raid on 18 April 1942. With 16 B-25s, 

the “Doolittle Raiders” undertook the first aerial raid on the Japanese mainland and achieved a major morale 

victory for the United States. For this mission, President Franklin Roosevelt awarded Doolittle the Medal of 

Honor, and he received a promotion directly to brigadier general.

General Doolittle went on to command Twelfth Air Force in North Africa, Fifteenth Air Force in the Mediterranean Theater, and then Eighth Air Force in 

England where he encouraged fighters on escort missions to also conduct strafing operations on airfields, ensuring Allied air supremacy.

As the war wound down in Europe, General Hap Arnold had recommended General George C. Kenney and General Doolittle to head the air effort in the 

South Pacific. But as General Doolittle expressed: “MacArthur didn’t want me. He chose Major General George C. Kenney, one of the capable old hands, 

who had remained in the service through the rough formative years. It is probable that my public image as a so-called daredevil racing pilot got in the way. 

I was a reserve officer, and many of the old regulars didn’t believe reservists could handle the big jobs.” At heart, he remained a reservist.

After World War II, in 1946, Lieutenant General Doolittle reverted to reserve status in the Air Force Reserve until his retirement in 1959. He was the first 

president of the Air Force Association and was continually sought out for his counsel on aeronautical matters. President Ronald Reagan promoted him to 

four-star general status in recognition of his achievements. General Doolittle reached the age of 96 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. 

GENERAL JAMES H. DOOLITTLE

56
ing the ranks of the military for the war effort.

ESTABLISHMENT - AIR FORCE 

RESERVE 

The United States’ war policy was for the 

standing military force to rely on calling up 

the reserves and mobilizing for wars. However, the post-World War II world order was 

uncertain and required the initially reluctant 

United States to take a more leading role in 

international affairs, diplomatically and militarily. It, therefore, behooved the military 

to have a more organized and well-trained 

pool of reserves than just a mass subscription of its citizens in times of need. Changes 

in response times and the nature of warfare 

with its more sophisticated weaponry mandated such. Diplomatically, the military also 

demonstrated the good will of the United 

States by transporting and providing aid and 

responding to disasters around the world. 

While generally a consensus existed for a reserve, its specific structure and role remained 

debated for some years. 

General Henry “Hap” H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, 

had directed his staff to plan for the postwar 

air forces. In December 1945, the War Department considered, but returned, Arnold’s 

plan for an Army Air Forces’ strength of 1.5 

million organized into 131 groups: 400,000 

in the Regular Army Air Forces’s 70 groups, 

43,914 in the Air National Guard’s 27 groups, 

nel policies that provided limited extended active duty, advancements, 

and prospects of regular 

commissions.7 But, the 

emergence of commercial 

aviation, however, had resulted in great advances in 

the speed, range, endurance, and capabilities of 

air machines (airship and 

airplane), ensuring their 

larger role in military warfare beyond the “eyes and 

ears” of the artillery.

WW II 

In January 1939, increasingly concerned over Hitler’s aggression in Europe, President Franklin 

D. Roosevelt requested that Congress approve 

a major expansion of the Army Air Corps. 

Roosevelt had won over his General Staff on 

the matter.8 By September 1940, the Army Air 

Corps counted 4,022 reservists (3,001 rated 

pilots) on extended active duty along with 

the 2,270 regular officers in the corps. These 

numbers show the importance and necessity 

assigned to reserve forces. By 1941, as World 

War II began for America, the reserve of the 

newly established Army Air Forces swelled to 

19,427 (9,257 reserve pilots) called to active 

duty by the President’s declaration of an unlimited national emergency.9 A massive draft 

of millions of American citizens followed, fillhowever. Even with classifying or tiered ranking of reserve pilots according to experience, 

only 1,631 of the 6,000 rated pilots were authorized flying training—and then only about 

ten hours of flight annually by 1926.6 This 

scarcity of equipment and money was typical 

throughout the military in the interwar era but 

expressively felt in the reserve entities. The 

provisions of the 1926 Army Air Corps Act 

and the efforts of leaders such as Brigadier 

General Oscar M. Westover and Major General Benjamin "Benny" D. Foulois expanded 

and provided more training opportunities for 

the fledgling air reserve in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the Army Air Corps’ Organized Reserve Corps remained undermanned with low 

experience levels and hampered with personReserve Detachment Parent Base Command Jurisdiction

Buckley Field, CO Buckley Field, CO Air Training Command

Jackson AAB, MS Keesler Field, MS Air Training Command

Stout Field, IN Chanute Field, IL Air Training Command

Des Moines Mun., IA Sedalia AAB, MO Tactical Air Command

Portland AAB, OR McChord Field, WA Tactical Air Command

Marietta, AAF, GA Robins AAF, GA Air Materiel Command

Memphis Mun., TN Memphis Mun., TN Air Transport Command

Sioux City AAB, IA Sedalia AAB, MO Tactical Air Command

Romulus AAF, MI Selfridge Field, MI Strategic Air Command

Godman Field, KY Godman Field, KY Tactical Air Command

Implementation of the First Phase of the First Objective of the activation of the Air Reserve 

program with initiation of flying at each base as soon after 5 July as practicable.

Letter, HQ Air Defense Command, “Activation of the Air Reserve Program,” 3 June 1946

FIRST TEN BASES – FIRST PHASE

6
proved 70-group ceiling, as President Harry 

S. Truman sought to rebuild the economy and 

curb inflation over rearmament.11 

In the postwar environment, deliberations continued on the size, scope, and role of the military’s reserve programs. A more formal Air 

Force Reserve program emerged in 1946 when 

429,000 veterans accepted appointment or enlistment in the Army Air Forces Reserve—

without inducement of drill pay, retirement, 

or other benefits. In 1947, only approximately 

10,000 reservists (6,000 pilots and rated crewmembers) received active duty for training orders. While the military lagged in organizing 

the reserves, a number of veterans and reserve 

associations articulated the need for viable reserve forces—something more than a “flying 

club” for the Air Force.12 

President Harry Truman also stepped into the 

void. As a veteran, Truman had experienced 

the government’s neglect of the reserve programs during the 1920s. Up for reelection, 

he astutely calculated the veteran vote. Thus, 

on 14 April 1948, the Air Force Reserve was 

officially established as the “Air Force Reserve.”13 President Truman envisioned a 

unit-based program, similar to World War I's, 

whereby individuals remained available as 

replacements during wartime only. President 

Truman championed an extensive, volunteer 

reserve program that would reach into every 

community, affording a veteran or citizen a 

near-home program. Truman also knew firsthand the importance that comradeship, esprit 

and 1,056,086 in the Air 

Reserve’s 34 groups. Instead, only 87,500 (38,000 

rated officers and 45,000 

enlisted) would be in the 

Active Air Reserve (today’s 

Select Reserve status) while 

nearly a million fell to the 

Inactive Air Reserve (officers only) with no training 

provided. Units of the Air 

Reserve would organize 

under four classes, ranging from A-1 full strength, 

fully equipped and trained, 

and available for the Mobilization-Day force to Class 

C combat and service units 

with only a full strength of 

officers, bare essential individual and training equipment, and available from 

M-180 to M-365 days. As 

conceptualized, the Air 

Reserve would provide 

approximately a million 

personnel to round out the 

Regular Army Air Forces 

and the Air National Guard, 

the first-line reserve, to a 

total strength of 1.5 million. The War Department 

approved a modified plan in 

July 1946.10 In the ensuing 

years, the Air Force would 

struggle to build to an apSTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To recommend the most practicable organization of the Air Reserve 

and to recommend a plan for the continuation training and maintaining the 

proficiency of the personnel thereof so that it may be most efficiently prepared 

for war in time of peace and most efficiently employed in time of war.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

1. The Army Air Forces will include three components: The Regular Army Air 

Forces, the Air Units of the National Guard and the Air Reserve.

2. The overall forces for the post-war military establishment will be four and 

one-half million (4,500,000) men. The strength and composition of the three 

components of the Army Air Forces in peacetime will be such as to enable an 

expansion, within twelve months from declaration of a national emergency, to 

a balanced mobilized force of 1,500,000.

3. In general, no unit should be allotted to the Regular Army other than required for its peacetime mission, providing it can be equipped, trained, and 

made ready for its mobilization mission in time of peace, at less expense and 

more advantageously in the Air National Guard or the Air Reserve.

4. The strength of the Air Reserve will be those individuals and units sufficient 

in numbers and type which will, together with the Regular Army Air Forces 

and the Air Units of the National Guard, constitute an overall balanced Army 

Air Forces of 1,500,000.

5. Antiaircraft will not be an integral part of the Air Force.

6. Units of the Arms and Services within the Army Air Forces (ASWAAF) will 

be an integral part of the Army Air Forces.

7. One of the more important peacetime missions of the Regular Army Air 

Forces will be the training of the Air Reserve.

8. Air Reserve training will be unit and individual proficiency training under 

the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Air Defense Command.

9. No grade of flight officer will be included in the Air Reserve.

10. In order to minimize costs and avoid duplication, flying, schooling, and 

facilities necessary for administration of the Air Reserve will be located when 

feasible at Army Air Forces installations.

11. Implementation of this plan, particularly as regards [to] personnel requirements, will be within the limits of available appropriations.

Army Air Forces Plan for the Air Reserve, approved 12 July 1946

 ARMY AIR FORCES PLAN FOR 

 AIR FORCE RESERVE

78
the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve were functionally managed together. 

Primarily, the Air Force Reserve’s role was 

consigned as an “augmentation and replacement” force with less than first-rate assets 

and saddled with tiered levels of readiness. 

The Air Force Reserve was forced in budget 

cuts to give up its P-51 fighters to the Air National Guard, which then was designated as 

headquarters at Mitchel Air Force Base, New 

York, to run the reserve programs, Air Force 

Reserve and Air National Guard.17 The Air 

Force also established the Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve 

Forces at Headquarters Air Force and appointed Lieutenant General Elwood R. Quesada to 

advise the chief on all reserve matters and also 

coordinate policy and implementation of reserve programs.18 Thus, while not merged, 

de corps, and morale factored in a unit’s readiness. He believed much of the criticism of the 

reserve could be laid to the lack of established 

unit training programs and its organizational 

structure. Individuals versus units had personally ensured a reserve force for the last war.14

That October, President Truman issued Executive Order 10007, directing the secretary 

of defense and the military establishments “to 

establish vigorous and progressive programs 

of appropriate instruction and training for all 

elements of the reserve components, including 

the National Guard.”15 The Gray Committee, 

chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army 

Gordon Gray, recommended that each service 

have one reserve force. This resulted in an 

intense discussion on merging the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, both of 

which lagged behind the model Navy Reserve 

program. Although the Air Force was in favor, President Truman regarded the merger as 

politically too difficult as well as impeding on 

laws governing the conditions of service for 

state militias of the National Guard and federal military forces, which essentially served 

outside the United States. Strong opposition 

existed in the National Guard and the Reserve 

Officers Associations; Chairman Carl Vinson 

of the House Armed Services Committee brokered a compromise by passing language that 

confirmed the existence of both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.16 By the end 

of 1948, with drill pay and retirement benefits 

to attract and retain members, the Continental 

Air Command (CONAC) was established with 

More than 90 per cent of the Air Force personnel strength in wartime comes from the 

Air Force Reserve. Yet, in the Fiscal Year 1949 Budget only 1.7 per cent is allocated to 

Air Force Reserve activities.

The principal role of the Air Force Reserve should be training. It should be to train units 

and individuals so that they can become an effective military force in the shortest possible time after a national emergency has arisen. But the mission should not be limited 

to training. It should also include a tactical role and a service role.

Importance of the mission of the Air Force Reserve requires that the administration of 

that mission be elevated to a command level rather than on its present level of being 

subordinate to a command..

It is our conception that the role of the Air Force Reserve should be that as a part of one 

team composed of the Regular USAF, the Air Reserve, and the Air National Guard – 

with these three components of our Air Power being unified into one ‘ first team.’ There 

is too much distinction between the Regular and the Reserve in the administration of the 

mission and roles of the Reserve.

Colonel Robert J. Smith, National President, Air Reserve Association

 Appearance before the Gray Committee, 16 February 1948

GRAY COMMITTEE – AIR RESERVE 

ASSOCIATION

8
Korea

109
Korea

10
outfitted with C-46 and C-47 transports and 5 

light bombardment wings of B-26s. These Air 

Force Reserve wings differed only from the 

active duty in that they lacked air installations, 

food services, air police, and motor vehicles 

squadrons and only possessed 25 percent of 

their authorized personnel and equipment.20 

Between July 1950 and June 1953, the Air 

Force mobilized nearly 147,000 Air Force Reservists to active duty service from one to three 

years under various policies. Nearly 99,000 

individuals came from the non-unit programs, 

the Volunteer Air Reserve. Five Air Force Reserve units remained on active service while 

another 15 units were called up for their personnel, who replaced and filled out active organizations. The 375th Troop Carrier Wing 

converted to C-82 transports and remained 

stateside supporting airborne training at Fort 

Benning, Georgia, while the 433rd Troop Carrier Wing converted to C-119s and went to 

Rhein-Main Air Base in Germany. The 452nd 

HQ CONAC

Mitchel AFB, NY

121
while relocating in country. An example of 

the 452nd’s effectiveness was the 800 sorties 

flown in August 1951 that destroyed 1,237 and 

damaged 2,404 enemy vehicles; two months 

prior the unit had amassed 561 sorties for that 

month. While the obsolete B-26s had lacked 

much of what they needed, they still inflicted 

great damage upon the enemy.23 Arriving in theater in 1952, the 403rd Troop 

Carrier Wing’s 71 C-119s supported the 

ground efforts but were soon plagued 

with high out-of-commission rates after a 

few months of intense combat operations 

due to their older airframes and the lack 

of spare parts.24

On the whole, Air Force Reservists drew 

Bombardment Wing and the 403rd and 437th 

Troop Carrier Wings served extensively in Korea.21 

Thirty-six hours after first arriving at Japan’s 

Brady Field, three C-46s from the 437th departed on 10 November 1950 for the unit’s first 

cargo mission, flying over the sea of Japan 

to K-9 (Pusan), through central Korea to 

K-2 (Taegu) then north to K-13 (Suwon) to 

K-14 (Kimpo), and then to K-23 (Pyongyang), near the former North Korean capital. Each plane hauled five tons of priority aircraft fuel in drums. Interestingly, off 

loading and on loading took under 30 minutes; the drums were rolled out the cargo 

door bouncing on old tires or rolling down 

a ramp while passengers or medical evacuees were up loaded. Notably, the 437th 

would assist with the hasty withdrawal of 

United Nations’ forces in December 1950, 

performed paratroop drops at Munsan-ni in 

March 1951, and resupplied forces during 

the Spring Offensive.22

The 452nd Bombardment Wing, the other 

highly ready Air Force Reserve unit, underwent 

60 days of intense training, working through a 

host of recall issues to include an average aircraft in-commission rate of 44 percent for its 

49 B-26 bombers—well below the 80 percent 

Air Force standard. As the United Nations began the November 1950 offensive, the 452nd 

crews flew close air support missions and then 

added bombing, armed reconnaissance, and 

night interdiction to their repertories, all the 

Korea

12
ulations, and practices. It gave combat veterans some protection against being mobilized 

before others who had not served. It was the 

first legislation ever passed that pertained exclusively to the reserve forces. Significantly, 

the law established Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve categories. The Ready Reserve 

encompassed units or individual drilling members liable for active duty in time of war, in 

time of national emergency declared by Congress or proclaimed by the President, or when 

authorized by law. Section 205 authorized the 

Ready Reserve a strength increase to 1.5 million. The Standby Reserve ranked below the 

Ready Reserve and encompassed units or individuals liable for active duty only in time of 

war or a national emergency declared by Congress. The act further specified pay, allowancupon their WW II combat experiences and 

performed well. They did so despite older 

airframes, less than ideal readiness training, 

and inadequate administrative management 

processes—especially in the personnel and 

medical areas and for effecting mobilizations. 

Congress enacted legislation to correct these 

deficiencies. 

The Armed Forces Reserve Act 

of 1952 was comprehensive in 

addressing the issues facing the 

national reserve program. As 

general policy, it established: 

“the reserve components of the 

Armed Forces of the United 

States are maintained for the 

purpose of providing trained 

units and qualified individuals 

to be available for active duty in 

the Armed Forces of the United 

States in time of war or national emergency, and at such other 

times as the national security may 

require, . . ..”25 The 193,096 Air 

Force Reserve and Air National 

Guard personnel (146,683 and 

46,413, respectively) serving during Korea 

had provided the Air Force nearly a 20 percent 

increase in strength.26 It was readily apparent that the active forces could not go it alone 

and needed a more responsive and capable 

reserve—a “Ready Now” force.

The act, referred to as a “Magna Carta,” also 

formally codified the many existing laws, regCaptain Joseph McConnell, Jr—16 

MIGs Shot Down

Captain Manuel J. Fernandez, Jr—14.5 

(1 shared)

Captain Cecil G. Foster—9

Captain Richard S. Becker—5

Major Richard D. Creighton—5

Captain Robert H. Moore—5

Major William H. Wescott—5

AIR FORCE RESERVE KOREAN 

WAR ACES & CREDITS

134
debated among congressional, defense, and 

service officials. At this time, the services 

ensured readiness according to their levied 

requirements; various tiered readiness programs existed.

Portending the future as well as substantiating the need for a more ready reserve, Air 

Force Reserve troop carrier wings conducted Operation 16 Ton, flying 164 C-119 and 

C-46 missions (4,280 aircraft hours) to airlift 

425 tons of US Coast Guard LORAN equipment from New York 

to Caribbean locations between 

June and November 1956, utilizing reserve active duty training 

periods and special five-day tours 

of active duty. There had been 

only one aircraft that failed to arrive while Hurricane Betsy forced 

the cancellation of eight trips.33 

Overall, the operation proved successful and met its objectives: to 

assist the Coast Guard, provide 

reserve training, and “demonstrate 

to the Air Force and to the public 

the combat capability and peacetime use 

of the Air Force Reserve.”34 And, in November 1956, during monthly inactive duty 

training weekends, Air Force Reserve troop 

carrier units began airdropping airborne 

troops and equipment for the active Army 

on a regular basis after proving their capability in the joint exercise Operation Pine 

Cone. The Army had initially expressed reservations.35 Both operations demonstrated a 

could be “speedily mobilized to reinforce” the 

active and a lesser trained unorganized reserve 

in this period of “an uneasy peace.” as “Korea and Indo-China are bitter reminders of the 

everpresent threat of aggression.”30 As conceived in 1952, the Ready Reserve was to provide a trained reserve force for a Korea-like 

encounter, but the incentives provided had not 

fully realized this goal. The 1955 changes ensured a reserve force for the “early phases of a 

general mobilization.” It was the view of Congress that “For the foreseeable future, the 

Active Forces will continue to be made 

up in part of reservists on active duty.”31 

In the summer of 1955, a number of Air 

Force Reserve units began scheduling 

their two-week summer encampments 

away from home station, enhancing 

readiness by training at unfamiliar locations.32 Access to the reserves and 

their state of readiness remained much 

es, and benefits.27 Subsequently, on 3 September, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed 

the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954 

which provided a more uniform system for 

promotion, distribution, retention, and elimination of officers, ensuring greater consistency 

between the active and reserve systems.28 

President Eisenhower set the stage for the reserves to support the atomic age containment 

requirements when he moved away from a 

draft to citizen reserve forces capable 

of rapidly expanding the regular active 

duty from a peacetime to wartime footing. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 

strengthened training and tours while 

refining call-up procedures to include 

enabling the President to mobilize a 

portion of the Ready Reserve to active 

duty without advance congressional action.29 The President told Congress he 

needed one group of reserve forces that 

14
The military security of the United States requires armed forces, disposed and alerted for 

instant action, quickly reinforceable by units ready for mobilization, assured an adequate pool 

of trained manpower for necessary expansion. Three elements are necessary to this military 

posture—(1) active forces in the strength and effectiveness necessary to meet, to repel and to 

punish a first massive assault or to conduct a lesser operation that does not require mobilization; (2) reserves so organized and trained as units that they can be speedily mobilized to 

reinforce the active forces in combat or to man defense operations at home; (3) an unorganized reserve pool, adequate in training and numbers, to permit a quick general mobilization of all our military strength.

Never, in peacetime, have we achieved this proper military posture. The penalties of our unreadiness have been manifold—in treasure, in blood, in the heartbreak of a mighty nation 

buying time with the lives of men. Now, in an uneasy peace, we can and must move toward 

this proper posture—at tolerable cost, with due regard for tradition, without disruption of human plans or the material economy. 

Korea and Indo-China are bitter reminders of the everpresent threat of aggression. The 

masses of armed men and the vast array of war-making machines, maintained by the Soviets 

and their satellites along the frontiers of the free world, sharpen the reminders. 

The first purpose of our defense planning remains the maintenance of a just, secure peace. 

If, however, unwanted war should come, it should find us ready with every resource at our 

command to repel and defeat the enemy. And, at home, we must have forces trained for every 

emergency, should an aggressor be so criminally unwise as to attempt an atomic attack. 

In seeking to attain these goals, we must remember that the active military forces are only 

the cutting edge of our nation’s full strength. A vigorous economy, a strong mobilization 

base and trained citizens are the invincible elements in our military striking power. 

But we cannot possibly keep armed and in uniform the total forces that might ultimately be required in all-out war. The inescapable burdens would endanger the liberties and the economic 

system we are determined to defend. 

On the other hand, in case of a global war, the nation could not count on having time to marshal its strength while the enemy was engaged elsewhere. Unquestionably, the United States 

would be involved from the outset of such a conflict. We must be prepared. 

The Defense Establishment, through the past two years, has concentrated on effectiveness, 

economy and efficiency within the active military forces. The result is a formidable assurance 

to any aggressor that we would react to attack, instantly and powerfully. 

In the same period, exhaustive studies have been made on manpower—the key to a proper military 

posture. The recommendations herewith submitted, dealing with both the active and the reserve 

forces, are based on them. 

In summary, I recommend (1) that the present statutory provisions authorizing the induction of 

young men by the Selective Service System for 24 months of training and service, scheduled to 

expire July 1, 1955, be extended until July 1, 1959; (2) that the existing special statutory provisions 

authorizing the registration and induction of doctors and dentists, also scheduled to expire on 

July 1, 1955, be extended until July 1, 1957; and (3) that legislation be enacted by the Congress 

to permit the strengthening of the reserve forces to meet essential mobilization requirements. 

The extension of Selective Service is necessary because experience demonstrates that active 

Armed Forces of the size we must maintain cannot be raised by voluntary enlistments alone. The 

maximum number of volunteers will continue to be the recruiting goal of the services. But realistic estimates set the probable ceiling on voluntary forces, in the present economic situation, at a 

million and a half—more than 1,300,000 men short of the planned strength goal for the end of the 

Fiscal Year 1956. 

Active force strengths are continually under review in the light of changing missions and technological improvement of weapons. A major purpose is economy in the use of men. But I see no 

reasonable prospect that the world situation or technological advances, in the next four years, will 

render the draft unnecessary. I earnestly recommend, consequently, that the extension be for four 

years. In the case of doctors and dentists I recommend that the extension be for another period of 

two years only. By that time it is expected that the medical personnel requirements of the Armed 

Forces can be met adequately by other means. 

The term of service should be retained at the 24 month level established by the 82nd Congress after 

weighing the military efficiency and dollar-cost arguments involved. Those arguments, whose 

soundness was proved in the experience of the three past years, are now compellingly persuasive 

that shortening the term of service would seriously damage the combat readiness of our active 

forces. 

The present operation of selective service is recognized by the American people as an equitable 

and necessary solution to a national problem. The calm planning for a call, the unquestioning acceptance of it, the smooth adjustment to a new way of life, manifested by millions of our young men 

and their families, evidences the maturity of their attitude toward the problem of national security. 

Under the new National Reserve Plan, selective service and the reserve forces, in conjunction with 

our regular establishment, will fulfill our security needs with the least possible disruptive impact 

on the life of the individual citizen and the civilian economy. Flexibility is a primary characteristic 

of the Plan. Constant scrutiny and review of its operation by the Services will assure its increasing efficiency. 

The reserve program has been the subject of extensive study in the Congress, in various government agencies and in the military services themselves over long periods of time. As in our active 

forces, we will rely as heavily as possible on voluntary service. To further this purpose, recent 

surveys indicate that certain improvements can be accomplished within the Services, without legislation, and steps have been taken to remedy existing deficiencies. I shall follow this action personally with particular attention to training for combat missions. 

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE 

UNITED STATES

1516
In addition, however, there is need for certain changes in present laws relating to the reserves. 

There are five principal areas where affirmative legislation is needed to provide the basis for 

a strengthened reserve plan. 

First, present law divides reserve personnel into categories that do not lend themselves fully 

to strategic requirements. I recommend that this be altered so as to provide one group of 

reservists who can be organized into a force maintained in a high degree of readiness to 

meet immediate mobilization requirements, and a second non-organized group with prior 

service who would be called into military service by a selective process, if the need for their 

services should develop in a general mobilization. 

The first group should be kept ready through training, through the constant flow of new 

men into the group, and through the screening from the group of combat veterans and persons of essential civilian skills in excess of military requirements whenever possible. This 

makes provision for meeting the essential manpower needs of defense supporting activities 

as well as those of the Armed Forces. Both these needs must be met if we are to realize our 

maximum national strength in time of emergency. 

Second, present legislation does not make adequate provision for bringing young men directly 

into the reserve forces without either adversely affecting the readiness of the active forces or 

reducing the capability of the active forces to recruit long-term volunteers. 

At present, the reserves are composed of older men who have completed their terms of active service. For example, less than 17 percent of the men now in the Army Reserves are under 

24 years of age. I recommend that legislation be adopted by which physically fit young men 

between the ages of 17 and 19 may volunteer for six months’ basic training, to be followed by 

active reserve participation for a period of nine and one-half years. 

During the six-month period of training, these young men would receive pay at the reduced 

rate of $30 a month. The total numbers accepted in the basic-type training should be subject 

to quotas, fixed by the President, to avoid bringing the manpower pool down to an undesirably 

low level; on the other hand, if an adequate number do not volunteer for this program, authority should be given to induct the needed young men through the Selective Service System. Men 

so selected would be between the ages of 18.5 and 19. 

The six-months training program should be authorized for a term of four years, covering the 

same period as the requested extension of the draft. In connection with this program, the 

National Security Training Commission should serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary 

of Defense and to the President as Commander-in-Chief. 

Third, under present legislation, there is no assurance that the National Guard, which by law 

is in the first line of defense and dependent on voluntary enlistments, receives an adequate 

supply of young men with appropriate basic training. Young men who enlist in the National 

Guard receive no concentrated initial training of the type provided by the active services. I 

recommend that legislation be enacted by which the men enlisting in the National Guard 

receive basic training in the active services. There must be further assurance that the National Guard contain a hard core of men who have been schooled in leadership and technical 

military skills through longer periods of active training and service. 

Primary emphasis on voluntary recruitment of personnel for the National Guard should continue. However, subject to constitutional limitations, the legislation should provide that in the 

event of failure to recruit the necessary numbers and quality of volunteer personnel, and at the request or approval of the Governor of a State, personnel completing training or service in the Active 

Forces may be assigned to the National Guard for their obligated period of reserve participation.

Fourth, I recommend that legislation be adopted to induce participation in reserve training by 

providing that men who have served less than two years may be recalled to active duty in order 

to maintain or restore proficiencies. 

It is also contemplated that reservists who fail or refuse to participate in the reserve training that 

may be required of them and choose not to restore lost proficiencies, will be given other than an 

honorable discharge at the end of their period of military obligation. Such action, which will be 

taken in accordance with existing statutory authority and procedures, is based upon the concept 

that honorable military service includes complete fulfillment of all service obligations, reserve 

as well as active. I ask that the Congress reaffirm this concept which is already contained in the 

law. 

Fifth, existing law does not permit states to maintain troops in addition to the National Guard. In 

view of the fact that the potential enemy possesses weapons of mass destruction and means for their 

delivery, it is a matter of urgent importance that there be no break between the time that National 

Guard units might be called into Federal service and the time that the states could raise additional 

forces to replace them. I therefore recommend that the Congress enact legislation which would 

permit the states to raise and maintain in time of peace organized militia forces which would 

take over the National Guard’s domestic missions and support civil defense activities upon its 

withdrawal. 

These five remedies are suggested as amendments to our existing legislative pattern, which is an 

essentially sound one. Through these amendments, certain broad objectives can be attained. To 

begin with, we will give each young man the maximum possible right of self-determination by offering him a choice of methods of meeting his military obligation. At the threshold of his career, he 

will understand his obligations, so that he can make definite plans for his future. 

In addition, a more equitable sharing of the military obligations will be accomplished. The program will go far toward assuring combat veterans that they will not be called in an emergency 

until younger men who have not had combat duty are called, thus alleviating an inequity made 

apparent during the Korean conflict. 

In sum, the program will constitute a substantial improvement in our present defense arrangements. It will make our determination evident to every would-be aggressor. 

I believe that, under today’s conditions, steps generally as outlined above represent the best available approach to the problem of military security. I earnestly urge that Congress promptly initiate 

its studies of the detailed measures necessary and that legislation incorporating the principles of 

the program be enacted.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 13, 1955

16
real airlift capability to the Defense Depart

-

ment as a by-product of meeting training re-

quirements. More programs followed. 

 Operation Swift Lift, proposed by the Con-

tinental Air Command, drew upon the Air 

Force Reserve airlift crews to move high-pri-

ority cargo for the Air Force. Although each 

Swift Lift mission was a training mission, it 

provided considerable savings to the Air Force 

in transportation costs. As worked out under 

the “let’s see” attitude, each of the 45 Air Force 

Reserve transport squadrons committed one 

aircraft around-the-clock on a standby basis. 

By 31 October 1958, within 18 months of in-

ception, the Air Force Reserve had contributed 

29,000 aircraft flying hours.36 In the summer 

of 1958, under Operation Ready Swap, the Air 

Force Reserve troop carrier units began airlift-

ing engines and equipment for the Air Materiel 

Command, further contributing to peacetime 

operations. Within the first year, units record-

ed 243 missions, flying over 3 million pounds 

of equipment.37 

Besides peacetime airlift support, the Air 

Force Reserve’s 319th Fighter-Bomber Wing’s 

crews had also begun sitting F-84 fighter run-

way alerts in July 1956. Under the operational 

control of the 20th Air Division, Air Force 

Reserve along with Air National Guard crews 

supported the Air Defense Command, provid-

ing direct assistance to the Air Force.38 In 

1956, the Air Force Reserve also initiated 

peacetime search and rescue operations, work-

ing at times jointly with the Army, Navy, and 

178
SAC B-47 DISPERSAL – CUBAN MISSILE

Traditionally, the reserve forces of the United States have comprised a pool of military manpower and units available to expand our forces rapidly toward required wartime strength. In every war in which the United States has been involved, these ‘citizen soldiers’ have been a most important factor in 

achieving our national security objectives.

Nevertheless, in recent years it has become apparent to the Air Force that something more than a pool type of reserve force would be required in the event 

of future wars. To be truly effective in the modern era of ballistic missiles, supersonic aircraft, and nuclear weapons, our air reserve forces must be an 

‘in-being’ part of Air Force combat and support capabilities—comparable in effectiveness and readiness to our first-line active units.

Today, our air reserve forces do comprise a significant portion of this nation’s over-all aerospace capability. An idea of the current importance of our 

air reserve forces in terms of total force can be gained from the fact that two-thirds of the tactical reconnaissance units, nearly half of the tactical fighter 

units, and more than three-fourths of the troop carrier units available to the Tactical Air Command in an emergency are contained in the Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve. In addition, a considerable portion of our interceptor fighter defense capability is in the Air National Guard.

Despite these substantial contributions, it has become apparent, through comprehensive study of the possible uses of the air reserve forces, that there is 

additional potential in these forces—a potential which if efficiently managed would result in better utilization of our total Air Force resources—both in 

wartime and in peacetime. Consequently, the Air Force approved a new plan for the management of the air reserve forces—a plan generated in response 

to several factors. These included: The necessary and vital role that the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve play in our present-day over-all 

aerospace power; their proven capability to perform wartime missions; the desire to find more useful missions that the reserve forces could effectively 

and economically accomplish; and the requirement to gear the combat and support units to a much higher degree of operational readiness.

The high cost of maintaining aerospace power and the comparatively lower cost of using reserve forces to perform some of the necessary functions of the 

Air Force mission clearly indicate the desirability of assigning to the air reserve forces greater responsibility in certain areas. In many cases these forces 

already have demonstrated their capability to assume such responsibilities.

Fine as the record of the air reserve forces has been, the Air Force and members of the air reserve forces must jointly continue to exert every effort toward 

improving the value and usefulness of the reserves. In this respect, the new management plan for the air reserve forces provides for a closer integration 

of the reserves into the active establishment than ever before. It accomplishes this by placing the responsibility for peacetime supervision of training and 

for the measurement of training progress and capability of the reserve force units in the hands of the Air Force commands which would have operational 

control over these units in an emergency.

The new plan also puts the vast and virtually untapped reservoir of planning and management ability in the reserve forces to work by providing for much 

of the management of the Air Force Reserve program to be done by reservists themselves—in region headquarters as well as in local units.

The plan also provides—in addition to the specific new missions—for the assignment of additional missions to the reserve forces whenever such missions 

will improve the Air Force’s over-all capabilities. I am confident that the implementation of this plan will result in greater contributions by the air reserve 

forces to the over-all Air Force mission and will permit more effective and economical utilization of our total Air Force resources. This, in turn, will enable the Air Force to perform its share of the total national defense task more efficiently.

 

 General Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Force Magazine, July 1960

NEW ACCENT ON THE AIR RESERVE FORCES

18
1920
branch, had taken the 12 October call from 

the Tactical Air Command and later recorded 

his conclusions. “Troop Carrier Wings will 

respond immediately to a call for assistance 

even when given scant information that the 

mission is important.”57 Despite difficulty 

flying and exceeding crew rest, all crews 

safely returned due to commanders controlling the missions. Such short-notice missions disrupted maintenance and resulted in 

substantial workloads for reserve units. Notably of the 80 aircraft initially responding 

to the Cuban Crisis, only three went out of 

commission en route. And still a relevant issue when drawing upon the reserves, “Missions such as this require the expenditure of 

mandays that have not been put into the program.”58 The 32 dispersal units supporting 

Strategic Air Command assets had required 

in excess of 6,300 mandays alone. There 

were also issues surrounding mobilizing 

Air Force Reserve forces which were another major command’s gained resources.59 

Lieutenant Colonel Charles Rawls, 2494th 

Air Force Reserve Sector Commander, expressed: “I was extremely worried about the 

status of the 96 to 100 Reservists who were 

out on the ramp at Columbus [Ohio], refueling airplanes, driving trucks, keeping unauthorized personnel out of the area, and all 

these other things, while they had no official 

status.”60 Initially, those Air Force Reserve 

personnel who had volunteered continually 

faced new tour days and resulting employer issues, as predictability and tour lengths 

were on an ad hoc location basis.61 

need for filling out units 

with specialized experience (flight engineers, 

aircraft mechanics, communications, and aeromedical technicians) and 

required, in some cases, 

recalling recently retired 

active duty members who 

had Ready Reserve obligations.53 Additionally, 

even after a year, Air Force 

Reserve C-124 units still 

had an “extreme shortage” 

in aircrews. Moreover, 

the reserve C-124s had 

been relegated to the “less glamorous jobs.”54 

There was a general feeling of being treated 

as “stepchildren.”55 Besides highlighting the 

need to increase unit manning percentages for 

a more “flexible response” capability, Berlin 

also showed the need to revise unit equipment 

policies. Interestingly in this nuclear warfare 

era, recalled fighter and reconnaissance aircraft 

were ready for action in just under thirty days 

versus the hours required today.56 Although 

the Berlin recall roundly proved the post-Korea “Ready Now” concept and deserved every 

bit of praise, it still required much maturing. 

Importantly, the Ready Now concept laid the 

foundation for the later integration of active 

and reserve component operations under the 

Total Force policy. 

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Major Wesley Brashear, chief of the exercise and airborne 

Both crises provided lessons. Air Force Reserve support for the Berlin Crisis can be cited 

as perhaps the first instance of mobilizing reserve forces to deter a conflict instead of for 

a war. Some reserve members had officially 

questioned the non-war call up. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric astutely 

expressed that individuals had simply not “oriented” themselves to this view yet.51 Presidential recognition of the rapid augmentation “as a 

powerful factor in preserving the peace” set in 

place the future expectations of the commander-in-chief.52 The restriction on manning the 

reserves to 80 percent had left units needing 

individual “fillers” from the Air Reserve Records Center to round out their units—2,666 

individuals with approximately half volunteering for recall with the alerted units. The 

lower reserve aircrew ratios and transition to 

KC-97 and C-124 aircraft had also created a 

20
212
22
sions into the Vietnam theater as part of their 

inactive duty, annual two-week training, and 

an additional 36 days of inactive duty training 

days until US involvement ended in 1973, at a 

savings of $265K per C-124 unit for 30 days. 

The Air Force Reserve’s 935th Troop Carrier 

Group performed the first missions. In all, the 

C-124 crews recorded 1,252 missions, utilizing just twenty aircraft. Moreover, in 1968, as 

the Air Force received the new C-141 jet transports, Air Force Reservists (flight and medical 

crews) also flew the C-141 into Southeast Asia 

on missions that lasted from six to thirteen 

days. Air Force Reserve intelligence, maintainers, lawyers, and chaplains made up an entire range of support.63 How the Air Force Reserve airlift and active forces worked together 

in the Vietnam era established the model for 

the future. In the ensuing years, the Air Force 

Reserve continued augmenting the day-to-day 

needs of the Air Force via its crews and personnel primarily volunteering for duty. 

TOTAL FORCE 

As the Air Force and Air Force Reserve leadership assessed a future of reduced funding 

and constrained resources, active and reserve 

forces training to the same standards and utilizing the same modern equipment and weapon systems offered greater efficiencies. The 

latter was a lesson learned, as the Air Force 

Reserve's C-124s had broken down en route to 

Vietnam. There were also issues with the logistics system being unable to support the higher 

flying hour rates required of recalled aircraft 

ments. On inactive duty status, Air Force Reserve C-119 transport crews also performed 

the near offshore missions from the United 

States for the active duty. A second mobilization in May 1968 called up personnel from 

the 82nd, 86th, and 88th Aerial Port Squadrons, 34th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 

52nd Medical Service Squadron, and the 71st 

Special Operations Squadron, which had just 

transitioned to the AC-119 gunship. The 71st 

performed a six-month tour in Vietnam, flying more than 6,000 hours. Medical personnel 

from the 34th flew aeromedical evacuations 

missions from Vietnam to the United States 

while the 52nd remained stateside at Scott Air 

Force Base, assisting with the monthly influx 

of 2,000 patients. The three aerial port squadrons stayed at their home stations and folded 

in, except for the 88th which deployed to Korea for six months.62 

Needing more strategic airlift into Vietnam, the 

commander of the Military Air Transport Service sought additional reserve assistance in 1965. For the past two 

years when needed, the five C-124 

groups had transported cargo as far 

as Hawaii and Japan, flying some 

100 missions. Setting precedence 

that is still relevant today, the Air 

Force Reserve senior leadership 

recommended against an expensive recall and instead offered a 

more orderly volunteer system of 

direct support. Air Force Reservists volunteered to fly C-124 misThus, national security requirements and the 

Air Force’s resource constraints drove an ever-evolving role for the Air Force Reserve beyond mobilizations only per war plans. Now, 

also relied upon as an augmentation force for 

the active duty, the Air Force Reserve, through 

volunteerism and mobilizations, built upon 

its reputation as the United States entered 

the Vietnam Conflict to contain the spread of 

state-sponsored communism.

 

VIETNAM

During the Vietnam Conflict, Air Force Reservists provided both direct and indirect support. An example of indirect support was the 

partial unit activations in January 1968 of 

the 305th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery 

Squadron, which performed rescues overseas 

in Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean, and 

of five C-124 military airlift groups, which 

integrated into the worldwide airlift systems, 

freeing up the active duty for Vietnam require234
used in structuring the total force to meet nat

-

ural security objectives in the future.”65 The 

study, which provided quantitative analysis 

versus recommending the “preferred” Total 

Force, found wide acceptance in the Depart-

ment of Defense. The challenge then was 

to find the right mix of regular and reserve 

forces based upon cost and mission effec-

tiveness. Still germane, the study alluded to 

the dichotomy between budgeting and oper-

ational planning, the issues surrounding the 

management of the reserve forces, and the 

legal and institutional rules and regulations 

pertaining to the reserve forces.66 Secretary 

of Defense Melvin R. Laird adopted the Total 

Force concept in August 1970 with Secretary 

of Defense James R. Schlesinger declaring it 

policy in August 1973. While reducing de-

fense expenditures drove President Richard 

M. Nixon, his defense secretaries recognized 

that a Total Force concept meant “that in 

many instances the lower peacetime sustain-

ing costs of reserve force units, compared to 

similar active units, can result in a larger to-

tal force for a given budget or the same size 

force for a lesser budget.”68 Additionally, 

Guard and Reserve forces could “perform 

peacetime missions as a by-product or ad-

junct of training with significant manpower 

and monetary savings.”69 All recognized 

that a Total Force required higher reserve 

readiness levels. Nevertheless, Secretary 

of Defense Schlesinger forcefully moved 

implementation: “It must be clearly under-

stood that implicit in the Total Force Policy, 

as emphasized by Presidential and National 

and the nature of aging assets. Moreover, Ma-

jor General Tom E. Marchbanks, Jr., Chief of 

the Air Force Reserve, had been limited in rec-

ommending which units for recall based upon 

the Defense Department’s “Beef Broth” tiered 

readiness categories. The no-notice mobiliza-

tion of January 1968 had also shown the need 

to plan for sufficient notifications to the unit 

and individual member preceding any mobili-

zation, ensuring a ready access to reserve forc-

es. Additionally, desiring more augmentation 

from the Air Force Reserve and yet unable to 

procure enough new C-141 transport aircraft, 

the Air Force had initiated in 1968 the asso-

ciate concept whereby Air Force Reserve per-

sonnel would associate with an active duty unit 

equipped with new C-141s or C-9As, flying 

and performing maintenance alongside active 

duty personnel with no need to mobilize.64 In 

the ensuing decades, these associations would 

result in closer working relationships between 

the active and the reserve and were bolstered 

by a new policy.

In 1966, Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force General John P. Mc-

Connell had asked the Rand 

Corporation to look at the air 

reserve forces’ roles and mis-

sions. Rand’s Air Reserve Forc-

es Study completed in 1967 de-

clared “the concepts of a regular 

force and a reserve force should 

be viewed as essentially com-

plementary (rather than com-

petitive) systems which may be 

24
 

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments Aug 21, 1970

 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

 Director, Defense Research and Engineering

 Assistant Secretaries of Defense

 Department of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Support for Guard and Reserve Forces

The President has requested reduced expenditures during Fiscal Year 1970 and extension of these economics into future budgets. Within the Department of Defense, 

these economies will require reductions in overall strengths and capabilities of the active forces, and increased reliance on the combat and combat support units of 

the Guard and Reserves. I am concerned with the readiness of Guard and Reserve units to respond to contingency requirements, and with the lack of resources that 

have been made available to Guard and Reserve commanders to improve Guard and Reserve readiness.

Public Law 90-1 68, an outgrowth of similar Congressional concern, places responsibility with the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments for recruiting, 

organizing, equipping, and training of Guard Reserve Forces. I desire that the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide, in the FY 1972 and future budgets, 

the necessary resources to permit the appropriate balance in the development of Active, Guard and Reserve Forces.

Emphasis will be given to concurrent consideration of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national strategy and 

meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces. Application of the concept will be geared to recognition that in many instances the lower peacetime sustaining costs of reserve force units, compared to similar active 

units, can result in a larger total force for a given budget or the same size force for a lesser budget. In addition, attention will be given to the fact that Guard and 

Reserve Forces can perform peacetime missions as a by-product or adjunct of training with significant manpower and monetary savings.

Guard and Reserve units and individuals of the Selected Reserves will be prepared to be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any 

future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces. Toward this end, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is responsible for coordinating and monitoring actions to achieve the following objectives:

-Increase the readiness, reliability and timely responsiveness of the combat and combat support units of the Guard and Reserve and individuals of the Reserve.

-Support and maintain minimum average trained strengths of the Selected Reserve as mandated by Congress.

-Provide and maintain combat standard equipment for Guard and Reserve units in the necessary quantities; and provide the necessary controls to identify resources 

committed for Guard and Reserve logistic support through the planning, programming, budgeting, procurement and distribution cycle.

-Implement the approved ten-year construction programs for the Guard and Reserves, subject to their accommodation within the currently approved TOA, with priority to facilities that will provide the greatest improvement in readiness levels.

-Provide adequate support of individual and unit reserve training programs.

-Provide manning levels for technicians and training and administration reserve support personnel (TARS) equal to full authorization levels.

-Program adequate resources and establish necessary priorities to achieve readiness levels required by appropriate guidance documents as rapidly as possible.

MELVIN R. LAIRD

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, D.C. 20301

2625
 Aug 23, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments

 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

 Director, Defense Research and Engineering

 Assistant Secretaries of Defense

 Director, Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation

 Directors of Defense Agencies

SUBJECT: Readiness of the Selected Reserve

An integral part of the central purpose of this Department—to build and maintain 

the necessary forces to deter war and to defend our country—is the Total Force 

Policy as it pertains to the Guard and Reserve. It must be clearly understood that 

implicit in the Total Force Policy, as emphasized by Presidential and National 

Security Council documents, the Congress and Secretary of Defense policy, is the 

fact that the Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary augmentation of the Active forces. 

Total Force is no longer a “concept.” It is now the Total Force Policy which integrates the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole. 

As a result of this policy, the Selected Reserve has moved towards timely responsiveness and combat capability. Application of this policy has improved equipping, 

funding, facilities, construction, programming and some training areas. 

I recognize and appreciate the great amount of effort that has been made to develop the Guard and Reserve. Progress has been made. However, gross readiness 

measurements (which should be improved) indicate that we have not yet reached a 

level consistent with the objective response times. It is clear that we should move 

as much post-mobilization administration as possible to the pre-mobilization period and streamline all remaining post-mobilization administrative and training 

activities. 

We must assure that the readiness gains in the Selected Reserves are maintained 

and that we move vigorously ahead to reach required readiness and deployment 

response times in areas still deficient. I want each Service Secretary to approach 

affirmatively the goals of producing Selected Reserve units which will meet readiness standards required for wartime contingencies. Each Secretary will provide 

the manning, equipping, training, facilities, construction and maintenance necessary to assure that the Selected Reserve units meet deployment times and readiness required by contingency plans. You will have my support and personal interest in overcoming any obstacles in these areas. 

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs is charged by 

statute and by Defense policy and Directives with the responsibility for all matters 

concerning Reserve Affairs. It is my desire that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Manpower and Reserve Affairs, as a matter of priority, take such actions as are necessary to bring the Selected Reserve to readiness goals. In this respect, the Services, 

the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of 

Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation and other Defense Agencies will provide 

support on a priority basis. Particular emphasis will be placed on assistance in manning, equipping and training. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve 

Affairs) will continue to function in accord with current statutes and directives.

To emphasize and to strengthen Selected Reserve management, I suggest a civilian 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs in the office of each of the Assistant 

Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. This 

Deputy should be supported by an adequate staff and be assigned responsibilities 

and functions similar to those assigned the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs. 

At the military level, the Navy has been given specific guidelines for developing the 

new office of Chief of Naval Reserve. The Air Force and Marine Corps management 

structure has produced combat readiness and that is the vital test. I expect that the 

Army’s reorganization, with strong command emphasis and good selection of leaders will produce demonstrably visible improvement and I shall follow the results with 

interest. 

The Chiefs of the National Guard and Reserve components will be the staff level 

managers of the Guard and Reserve programs, budgets, policy, funds, force structure, plans, etc. They will be provided the authority, responsibility and means with 

which to accomplish their functions effectively. The overall management responsibility of the Chiefs of the Selected Reserve, under the Service Chiefs, will be supported 

by all other appropriate staff agencies. 

In addition to the foregoing emphasis on Reserve Force policy and management, I 

am asking my Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs, with your support, to 

manage a study covering the issues of availability, force mix, limitations and potential of Guard and Reserve Forces. 

In summary, strong management with achievement of readiness levels in the Selected 

Reserve is among our highest priorities—we must and will accomplish this objective 

as soon as possible. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, D.C. 20301

26
To meet gunship requirements in the Southeast Asia Conflict, the Air Force decided in early 1968 to take C-119G tactical airlift aircraft and personnel from the Air 

Force Reserve. The C-119s had been out of the active inventory since 1956 but were deemed more suitable for outfitting with heavier armament and system updates. 

On 13 May 1968, members from the 930th Tactical Airlift Group of the 434th Tactical Airlift Wing, a C-119 Reserve unit located at Bakalar Air Force Base, Indiana, 

were recalled to active duty. The 930th’s 71st Tactical Airlift Squadron was subsequently redesignated the 71st Special Operations Squadron and reassigned from the 

Continental Air Command to the Tactical Air Command. More than 300 of the 383 personnel were mobilized, and in early June, aircraft and personnel moved from 

Bakalar to Lockbourne Air Force Base, Columbus, Ohio, for AC-119G training, augmented with active duty personnel. Debate at the Air Force level over gunship 

requirements delayed the unit’s departure. The 71st was selected because of its experience in the C-119 weapon system. The accomplishments of the 71st Special 

Operations Squadron with the call sign and nickname of “Shadow” were impressive. Arriving in January 1969, the 71st operated at three locations in Vietnam: Nha 

Trang, Phan Rang, and Tan Son Nhut Air Bases. According to the official wing history, the three flights performed 1,516 combat sorties (6,251 combat flying hours), 

expending 14,555,150 rounds and dropping 10,281 flares. Seventh Air Force confirmed 682 enemy killed, with an additional 1,104 presumed so. With its nighttime 

flying tactics and equipment, the 71st also destroyed at least 43 enemy vehicles laden with needed supplies from the Communist. No Shadow aircraft were lost although six took rounds.

 

Assigned all gunship missions except forward air control, the Shadow gunships participated in a number of Army and Marine ground operations: Purple Mountain, 

Dewey Canyon, Green Basket, Putnam Panther, Toan Thang, Speedy Express, and Whiskey Box. Members of the 71st departed for home in early June 1969, turning 

over the mission to the active duty 17th Special Operations Squadron, which subsequently relinquished it to the Royal Vietnamese Air Force in 1971.

For its Vietnam service, the 71st Special Operations Squadron was awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Citation with individuals receiving 751 Air Medals, 143 

Distinguished Flying Crosses, 18 Bronze Star Medals, two Purple Hearts, and 47 Air Force Commendation Medals. Lieutenant Colonel Earl Scott, Shadow 62 commander, displayed initiative on the night of 9-10 May 1969 in averting a friendly-on-friendly incident. Lieutenant Colonel Scott was in contact with an Army of the 

Republic of Vietnam ground force when he was advised by the sector command post to evacuate the area for a scheduled Arc Light B-52 bombing mission. Advising 

of friendly in the area, he was again ordered out of the area, as the sector did not show any friendly in that area. Lieutenant Colonel Scott refused to leave, forcing the 

Arc Light mission to divert. “When placed in a unique situation, Lieutenant Colonel Scott and his crew did not respond routinely. They instead, properly analyzed the 

danger to friendly ground forces and make the fact known. At the risk of censure, they persisted until corrective action was taken. The validity of their judgment has 

since been established, and there can be little doubt that a potentially tragic situation was averted,” expressed 

the letter from General George Brown, Seventh Air Force Commander and Colonel William Bush, Commander 14th Special Operations Wing.

On another mission, a Shadow gunship circled an unlighted compound for thirty minutes illuminating the 

area so a doctor could operate. And in mid-May, with forces pinned down and fire coming from all sides 

three hours after sunset, Army Captain Clinton Stokes called in for fire support. Active and reserve gunships 

exhausted their ordnance, rotating in and out throughout the night until dawn broke. Captain Stokes personally delivered his “thank you” for “arriving in the nick of time” to the Shadow and AC-47 Spooky crews. 

“The support was some of the best I’ve seen and even better than the artillery.”

The 71st Special Operations Squadron had arrived in Vietnam with their active counterparts expressing misgivings. However, this sentiment soon dissipated. Colonel 

Bush would articulate high regard for the Shadow unit: “I am proud to have the 71st SOS as a part of this Wing. This former reserve unit has done an outstanding 

job and is performing a vital mission here in Vietnam.” The 71st and her Shadow crews never lost an outpost they were defending and saved many patrols needing 

assistance.

SHADOW – 71ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

278
With the Communists taking over South Vietnam, President Gerald 

R. Ford ordered an evacuation of Vietnamese orphans from Saigon 

to the United States as he spoke during a press conference on 3 April 

1975. I have directed . . . that C-5A aircraft and other aircraft especially equipped to care for these orphans during the flight be sent to 

Saigon. I expect these flights to begin within the next 36 to 48 hours. 

These orphans will be flown to Travis Air Force Base in California, 

and other bases on the West Coast, and cared for in those locations.

Thus, what became known as Operation Babylift drew upon the active and Air Force Reserve resources to respond to this emerging 

emergency. The work was begun by a C-5 Galaxy but soon saw the 

more medically equipped C-141 Starlifter and C-9 Nightingale aircraft carrying their precious cargo stateside. The Starlifters would 

lift 949 of the approximately 3,300 children rescued.

Remembering Bablylift, Major General Hanferd Moen recalled: 

When I got to McChord as a second lieutenant copilot, I ended up 

flying out of Clark Air Base and Saigon doing Operation Babylift 

and the evacuation of Saigon. Flying with Bob Beckman, we were 

one of the last C-141s in there because it quickly turned into a C-130 

and helo operation. But, I’ve got a picture at home looking back 

from the front of the airplane through the back with the tail doors 

open. We had to haul approximately 250 infants and small children 

and 27 escorts out in one load. Everybody couldn’t wait to get engines going and the air pressurized and moving because of all the 

dirty diapers. The kids that were old enough would sit in the sidewall seats. We put a tie down strap around every ten or so of them 

and then tied it off. We tied the smaller ones down in cardboard 

boxes. We put blankets and pillows on the floor to keep them from 

rolling around. It was a pretty interesting time. Most of my time was 

spent shuttling refugees out of Saigon back to the states in what was 

called Operation New Life. Bob and I just happened to called for 

one of the last Babylift missions, too.

 

Major General Hanferd J. Moen, Jr., End of Tour Interview, 2009

management with achievement of readiness levels 

in the Selected Reserve is 

among our highest priorities—we must and will accomplish this objective as 

soon as possible.”70 

Security Council documents, the Congress and 

Secretary of Defense policy, is the fact that the 

Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the 

initial and primary augmentation of the Active 

forces. Total Force is no longer a ‘concept.’ It 

is now the Total Force Policy which integrates 

the Active, Guard and Reserve forces into a 

homogenous whole. . . . In summary, strong 

On a night mission from Okinawa in April 1969, a 305th Aerospace Rescue and 

Recovery Squadron crew served as the communications controller and flare dropper looking for a Navy EC-121 shot down by the North Koreans. When a flare 

came back into the aircraft and landed near a stack of flares, Sergeant William 

C. Smolinski, pararescueman, hurled the burning flare from the HC-97 and then 

wrapped his glove around the smoldering magnesium that remained, discarding it 

out the airplane as well. Sergeant Smolinski was credited with saving the HC-97 

and those aboard. 

PARARESCUEMAN SAVES HC-97

 AND CREW

BABYLIFT

Homecoming

28
2930
30
 

Ms Kennedy: After graduating from undergraduate pilot training in March 1973, you spent the next five and a half years flying C-130As with the 440th Tactical Airlift 

Squadron, 440th Tactical Airlift Wing, which was then based at General Mitchell International Airport, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. If you would, describe these years—as 

a tactical airlift pilot and a Reservist in the post-Vietnam era.

Brig Gen Severson: I mentioned earlier that I kind of referred to it as flag pole flying because in the A models, we really didn’t have the legs to go a long way. If we 

were to go to Europe, we had to hop to Canada, then to Iceland, and work our way over. And, we didn’t always have the maintenance support or parts over there. 

So, there really wasn’t the opportunity. It wasn’t like they were looking for additional support, too. We had a plan, if the balloon ever did go up, to forward deploy. 

We had what we called the collocated operating base, COB, and ours happened to be in Chievres, Belgium. So, you would exercise that plan maybe every five years 

and get a chance to go over there, spending two weeks flying around. That old connotation of one weekend a month and two weeks of summer camp was really the 

way it was. Obviously for the flyers, you had the training going on during the week, so I would try and fly one night a week. It would be right after school or after 

coaching. You’d fly either an early or a late mission (a two-hour flight).

 Basically, you were keeping your proficiency up, and then you would fly cross country. We might do that once a month. So, you’d usually have a couple of weekends 

tied up, and then in the summer, our summer camp was usually right there in Wisconsin. It might be up at Volk Field. It was usually a family affair. We used to haul 

the families up in campers and stay at a local camp ground. We would concentrate on training then, and a lot of times, it would be in conjunction with an inspection. 

We might have a week where we would fly mass formations and get as many aircraft airborne as possible. If you had eight assigned, you’d hopefully get up six, seven, 

or maybe eight, perhaps. And then the following week, the inspection team would roll in for an ORI [operational readiness inspection] or a practice inspection. That 

might be your annual tour, and it would be in the summer because you had folks that were students or teachers. You didn’t have the number of airline pilots that you 

have today, so it was a different mix of folks. That was pretty much the way it was—pretty routine. Now, there were contingencies, but nothing that critical that would 

cause you to go overseas. There might be a drought in the South, and you’d be hauling hay. As we got into the late ‘70s, we picked up the mission in Panama [Oak], 

which was very interesting, and I think one of the best things that could have happened to the Reserve C-130 units, preparing them for what would come in Desert 

Shield/Desert Storm. So, Panama was a mission that every other year, you would get a chance to go down and do your two weeks there, perhaps.

Ms Kennedy: How did Panama come about? 

Brig Gen Severson: This was with the drawdown after Vietnam. This had been a mission of SOUTHCOM [US Southern Command] and MAC [Military Airlift Command] had supported it. So, they had asked the Guard and Reserve to take on this mission. Earlier on, there was active duty as well. So, it was shared. You go 

back to the mid-to-late ‘70s, really; Total Force was coming into play. Eventually, it scaled down to where the active duty was the primary support cadre of intel and 

admin support. Then, the Guard and Reserve crews would roll in, and every weekend, there were crews swapping out. Usually, you would perform your two weeks, 

and you would have that overlap on the weekend with people coming in, of course. Basically, what we were doing was supporting SOUTHCOM. There was a lot of 

embassy support and just moving cargo around Central and South America as well as training the Army down there at the training centers in Panama and dropping 

Army personnel. It could also be humanitarian such as with hurricanes and earthquakes, whatever was really needed. We would have a capability 24/7 to support 

operations throughout Central and South America.

Ms Kennedy: And this was 365 days of the year; the Reserve and Guard were able to do this with C-130s?

Brig Gen Severson: Right. And we would prorate that with the Guard. But, it was all Guard and Reserve 130 units involved in it.

Ms Kennedy: When you were doing your stateside two weeks of training a year, were you also dropping Army troops?

JUST CALL AND WE’LL BE THERE

312
Brig Gen Severson: Oh yes. It might be units there in Wisconsin or down in Illinois. We might come down here [Georgia]. I forget the name of the operation but that 

was one of the ways you could accomplish mass formations. We still trained to support an Army brigade, so we would come down and form up with other C-130 units. 

We couldn’t get the whole gang out on any particular weekend, but you might be able to get three crews and three aircraft to come down here. So if you had three or 

four other units that could do the same (and they could support us here at Robins [AFB], which they did), we’d fly in here and then fly down to Lawson [Army Airfield, 

GA] or Ft. Benning [GA] and pick up the troops and drop them. I don’t know that they called them anything back then—JA/ATT [joint airborne/air transportability 

training] missions, but that’s what they essentially were. So, we were doing Army support. That’s why we existed to support the Army. Anytime we could get the live 

drops and especially the mass formations, that’s really what it was all about.

Ms Kennedy: During the 1970s and mid-1980s, you saw firsthand the implementation of the new Total Force policy. What did you know then about the program with 

the lash up to the active force and how that would shape or change the Reserve? Were commander’s talking to you about Total Force?

Brig Gen Severson: Not really. By just being involved down there in Central and South America, we felt like we (talking for the Guard here) were part of the active in 

working a key mission. I didn’t think of it so much then. Being on the unit-equipped side and not in a classic associate, like the strat [strategic airlift], I really wasn’t 

familiar with how it was set up. There wasn’t a whole lot of talk. I think we all realized that (for lack of a better term, we had all grown up with that “raggedy assed 

militia” kind of connotation, RAM), but I think we realized now (as we had the newer aircraft and were deploying around the world) that we were expected to be just 

as involved as the active duty and maybe even more so, having the newer equipment. But in those early days, as I recall, there wasn’t a whole lot of talk about Total 

Force changes. It was: we’ll do what we need to do. Just call and we’ll be there.

We talk now about a strategic or operational reserve; I would contend that in the 130 world we were operational since the mid-1970s when we started Oak.

The new aircraft, making that conversion, forced everybody to really get focused. We knew that we would really have a capability to go worldwide and do more things. 

So, I took advantage of getting the guys out and especially in getting that last forward operating location deployment and in establishing more relations with the 322nd 

[Airlift Division] at Ramstein. I told them that I would like to send aircrews over on a quarterly basis for a week to two weeks. Humanitarian missions, we got involved 

with. The Denton Amendment had just come into play, so we took advantage of that in terms of getting them into remote areas such as places like Colombia, St. Lucia, 

Grenada, and the Caribbean. It pushed the guys to think on their feet. Sometimes there wasn’t outside radio contact, so that really forced the crews to sometimes get 

creative, solve some problems, and work together in accomplishing the mission. It was an exciting time for me as a technician in that role as the scheduler. 

Then, in May-June 1990, I had just become the ops officer, and things were heating up in Southwest Asia. In August of 1990 with less than 48-hours notice, we were on 

our way. There were five C-130 units at that time. With the Hs, fortunately, we had the brand-new aircraft, so they were able to deal with what was one of the hottest 

periods where we deployed. It was interesting flying. All of a sudden, it all came to roost; this is what we’ve trained for! We hadn’t really taken the SERE [air force 

escape and evasion] piece and CBRNE, the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear explosive warfare, that seriously really, leading up to that time.

We were seeing some real interesting terrain and moving a lot of cargo forward. Then after thirty days, we did a swap out. Soon after that, General Norman Schwarzkopf decided he didn’t want any more swap outs. They just wanted to mobilize and have people in place for the long haul. So, that’s what happened.

Ms. Kennedy: So initially you were not mobilized?

Brig Gen Severson: We were all volunteers, initially.

Brigadier General Richard R. Severson, End of Tour Interview, July 2008

32
1973 when some 650 C-5 

and C-141 Air Force Reserve crewmembers from 

the six associate wings 

volunteered for Middle 

East missions to include 

flying into Tel Avi while 

another 1,495 Reservists 

performed airlifts worldwide, freeing up more 

active duty crews for this 

massive airlift over extensive distances.71

In 1977, the Air 

Force Reserve began flying rotational 

C-130 support missions for US Southern Command in 

the Panama Canal 

Zone. Air Force 

Reserve airlift as a 

by-product of performing training 

requirements accounted for over 

4,000 missions, 

nearly 39,000 flying 

hours, transporting 

over 74,500 passengers and nearly 

5,500 tons of cargo 

while also airdropping over 41,000 

troops in calendar 

year 1978. Today, 

With the implementation of the Total Force 

Policy, the Air Force Reserve became a multimission force, flying the same modern aircraft 

as the active Air Force, and adhering to the 

same readiness levels and standards. Special 

operations, air refueling, weather reconnaissance, and once again fighters became the new 

missions added to the airlift, medical, and rescue roles already performed by Air Force Reservists. The associate concept was then expanded to include the C-5 airlift aircraft. Air 

Force Reserve participation in Air Force exercises and deployments substantially increased 

its readiness state. One of the first demonstrations occurred during the Israeli Airlift of 

Personnel

1,760 personnel in country

4,760 personnel stateside

Airlift 

C-5 146 Sorties 541.1 Hours 2,200 Pax 2,591.2 Cargo Tons

C-141 267 Sorties 908.5 Hours 3,730 Pax 1,084.6 Cargo Tons

C-130 189 Sorties 185.3 Hours 2,479 Pax 669.9 Cargo Tons

Air Refueling

KC-10 13 Msn 127.0 Hours 1,1169.0M Pounds Offloaded

Special Operations (combat)

AC-130 23 Sorties 221 40MM 2,000 20MM Ordnance

Aeromedical

225 Litter 42 Ambulatory Patients

Awards

Presidential Unit Citation: 919th Special Operations Group

AFR JUST CAUSE SUMMARY

December 1989-January 1990

Korea

Israeli Airlift

334
Air Force Reserve operationally partnered 

with the active duty, returning American 

students from Grenada in 1983, responding 

to the Marine headquarters bombing in Beirut, performing air refuelings for the F-111 

bombers during the El Dorado Canyon raid 

on Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 1986, and 

participating fully in the invasion of Panama to oust Manuel Noriega in 1989-1990.73

Moreover, the Air Force Reserve had performed these operations without mobilizing; it had simply been tapped into. The Air 

Force Reserve demonstrated a high state of 

readiness that was soon called upon beyond 

any crisis or operational plans envisioned. 

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 2, 1926, takes pleasure 

in presenting the Distinguished Flying Cross to Major Clay T. McCutchan, United States Air Force, for extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight as an AC-130A crewmember near Howard Air 

Force Base, Republic of Panama on 20 December 1989. On that date, while exposed to extreme danger from 

hostile anti-aircraft artillery fire, Major McCutchan’s 

professionalism and attention to detail directly impacted 

on the success of air operations during Operation JUST 

CAUSE and in the saving of over 40 American lives. The 

professional competence, aerial skill, and devotion to 

duty displayed by Major McCutchan reflect great credit 

upon himself and the United States Air Force.

CLAY T. MCCUTCHAN

El Dorado Canyon

34
Force Reservists had already performed duty 

in support of what became Operations Desert 

Shield and Storm. When ground operations 

began, Air Force Reserve A-10s operated near 

the front lines along with Air Force Reserve 

special operations and rescue forces. By midApril 1991, when Air Force Reserve participation ended, airlift assets had flown nearly 

239,000 hours (associate and unit-equipped), 

moving some 310,000 passengers and over 

560,000 tons of cargo while tanker aircraft 

delivered almost 10 million gallons of fuel. 

STRATEGIC RESERVE –

 OPERATIONAL DAILY

The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War represented 

a monumental change for the Air Force and 

the Air Force Reserve and their evolving and 

complementary roles, responsibilities, and relationships. The Air Force Reserve’s performance in this war was a true testimony to the 

Total Force policy. Air Force Reserve airlift 

and tanker crews were flying within days, 

and by 20 August 1990, more than 15,000 Air 

3536
Flying an A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support mission over Iraq on 6 February 1991, my wingman First Lieutenant Mark White and I were working a kill-box 

in Kuwait, just west of Ali Al Salem airfield. It was afternoon, and we were on our third mission of a twelve-hour day in the cockpit. We had just put six MK-82s 

(500-pound freefall bombs), on buildings the Iraqi Army were using as a command post. The anti-aircraft artillery fire had intensified; we were a bit tired but we 

each still had two maverick missiles and a full load of 30MM . Coming out of that bombing run, there was a single tank moving on a road; the Iraqis knew not to 

move in convoys at this point in the war. So, you would see individual vehicles moving as fast as they could between areas as they repositioned. Backtracking, we 

located two more tanks and then another four tanks waiting for their signal to move. I targeted the western tanks and Lieutenant White selected the eastern tanks. 

We took turns firing and covering each other destroying four tanks. During the shooter-cover attacks, I noticed two black dots running across the desert that looked 

really different than anything I had seen before. They were moving too fast to be more tanks or trucks and they were not kicking up the dust we normally observed 

when vehicles traveled in the desert.

I called Captain Jon Engle in the OV-10 spotter plane, reporting, ‘Hey, I think I’ve got a helicopter.’ Jon confirmed that they were indeed helicopters and put a marking rocket in their vicinity so we would not lose sight. I then contacted AWAC’s controllers in our kill-box and asked if the helicopters were transmitting friendly 

emissions or any other friendly aircraft were in our area. AWAC’s confirmed no known friendlies in the area, but I decided to perform a visual identification on the 

helicopters before I would attack them. I descended from our attack altitude and approached the lead helicopter from behind and allowed them to see me and see what 

their reactions would be. The two Iraqi helicopters saw me, split up, and one went to the area that we had previously bombed. With no known friendlies in the area, 

not squawking appropriate codes, and performing defensive maneuvers, I told my wingman to take a shot and that they were bad guys. Lieutenant White attempted 

a long-range gunshot but missed short. I traded my airspeed for altitude and went vertical over the lead helicopter arming both my AIM-9 air-to-air missile and my 

30MM cannon. I could not get my AIM-9L heat-seeking missile to lock onto the helicopter flying 50 feet above the desert, so I went to my seven-barrel, 30 millimeter 

cannon that I had fortunately armed. I started firing about a mile away. Shooting a defensive maneuvering target for the first time was more difficult than I thought 

it was going to be even with the short time of flight of the bullet. Some of the bullets on the first pass ran through him; but the helicopter was not stopped completely. 

So, I pirouetted over him for another pass. I made a steep dive, putting another 300 rounds into it. The Iraqi helicopter exploded, breaking apart. A-10, tail number 

77-0205, and I became known as the Chopper Popper. 

 

In Desert Storm, we had jacked up our altitudes worried about the triple A threat. But, you can’t think about that on a pass, otherwise you’ll mess up. Your wingman 

will only be able to tell you about twenty to forty percent of it. The flying was different than what we had trained for—the Warsaw Pact threat. By the end of day, 

you had to be helped out of the cockpit. I learned a lot about myself during Desert Storm. You have to discipline yourself and also think about other things on the 

return to base. I enjoyed the sunsets. 

 Colonel Robert R. Swain, Jr., June 2012

Downing the helicopter, then Captain Bob Swain in aircraft 77-0205, 706th Tactical Fighter Squadron, made history as the first A-10 to shoot down an enemy aircraft 

in air-to-air combat. With its heavy armor and slow speed, the A-10 “Warthog” normally did not engage in air combat operations. 

During the Gulf War of 1991, A-10s mainly provided close air support for ground forces by attacking tanks, armored vehicles, and other ground targets to include 

SCUD missile launchers. The A-10 played a critical role in destroying over 900 Iraqi tanks, 2,000 vehicles, and 1,200 artillery pieces. 

AF artwork credit: William Lacy

FIRST A-10 AIR-TO-AIR KILL 

36
Major Generals Clay T. McCutchan and Michael N. Wilson and Brigadier General George F. Williams (first ship), Major General Richard S. Haddad 

and Colonel Randal L. Bright (second ship,) and Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Muench (third ship) performed the famed three gunship raid during 

Desert Storm on 26 February 1991 along the road from Kuwait to Basrah.

Maj Gen Wilson: We were sent up to the border area and were flying over all the oil fires. It was pretty impressive how much damage had been done 

to those oil fields. On the A model gunship we were fuel limited to about five hours of flying since we could not air refuel. At over three hours into the 

mission, Clay asked the controller once again if he had anything for us. It must have been some sort of shift change at this point because the controller 

said of course, contact another guy and see what you can do for him. Up until now it had been pretty boring. When Clay checked in, they came up 

with a target that was over an hour away, and we could not get there and back to base. The next target was a kill box which turned out to be about 20 

minutes from us on the road from Kuwait City to Basrah. It would not give us much time in the target area, but it was doable. I checked with the crew 

to see how it looked to them threat wise, and we agreed that it should be okay. No reports of missile activity and no electronic indications. When we 

got to the kill box, it turned out to be a lot of vehicles on a long stretch of road—no moving targets. We couldn’t make out any people. After verifying 

that no friendlies were in the area, we opened fire with the 40mm. We got some secondary’s on a few trucks. Since we didn’t have a lot of time, we were 

able to fire everything in the airplane in about 5 orbits which was a little over 15 minutes. That was about 400 rounds of 40mm and 3,000 rounds of 

20mm. Low on gas, we called up the second ship and made a beeline back to base, hoping to rearm and go out again. When we landed we were met 

by the squadron commander who was none too pleased with our having crossed the border. Apparently we were supposed to call back and ask. We 

didn’t think that was the case. They not only would not let us rearm but talked of disciplinary action. In the end, we got a DFC instead. Our crew had 

the youngest (19) and oldest (60) crewmembers, and three of us went on to the rank of major general. Not bad for a bunch of Florida Panhandle boys.

Maj Gen Haddad: They realized what an opportunity this was and called me up and said, ‘Hurry up! Get up here!’ Our aircraft was the next one in the 

queue. Alley Cat gave us the same clearance as the lead aircraft. I had a full load of fuel and a full load of bullets. We got up there, and my autopilot 

didn’t work. This was critical to the gunship in maintaining its platform and shooting geometry (on airspeed and at the correct altitude). So essentially, 

Randy my copilot, who was the airspeed officer, was controlling the throttles as well as the yoke to maintain our geometry. I was controlling the ailerons 

trying to shoot. We were there for a considerable amount of time. We shot up the place like there was no tomorrow. Finally, my engineer said it was 

bingo fuel. We rolled out, and he was able to look at the wings’ level and the fuel gauges. The crew was so into this that he said, ‘Hey, we’ve got more 

fuel. You can continue on station.’ We continued a little while longer. It was everything that you would think war to be. The intensity, the adrenaline, 

shooting things on the ground was a thrill for the crew. Finally, we were employing our many years of training and experience!

The next airplane was Larry Muench. They only got one or two orbits, and the hornets’ nest got them. They had to return to station.

Interviews and Recollections, Maj Gens Clay T. McCutchan, Michael N. Wilson, Richard S. Haddad, and Brig Gen George F. Williams, 2011 and 2012

THE THREE-SHIP RAID

378
38
1990’s, Congress sought to clarify the organizational placement of the reserves. The Fiscal 

Year 1997 National Defense Authorization Act 

directed each of the military services to establish “reserve commands.” Title XII, Reserve 

Forces Revitalization, Section 10174 further 

instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to 

establish an “Air Force Reserve Command.” 

Accordingly, in February 1997, the Air Force 

Reserve officially became the Air Force Reserve Command, the Air Force’s ninth major 

command.76

 

 The Air Force Reserve Command remained 

engaged worldwide, and between March and 

September 1999, Air Force Reservists volunteered and were mobilized for Allied Force 

operations over Serbia and Kosovo, providing 

aeromedical, airlift, tanker, rescue, AWACs, 

and fighters along with support personnel. Recalled unit-assigned Air Force Reservists alone 

accounted for over 81,000 mandays while over 

150,800 mandays in all were recorded for mobilized and volunteer members (unit and individual mobilization augmentee). And, Air 

Force Reserve personnel on a Watch rotation 

rolled into support the Kosovo effort. Staff 

Sergeant Eric Giacchino, pararescueman from 

the 939th Rescue Wing, would serve as the 

team leader aboard the HH-60 that rescued the 

F-117 pilot downed over Serbia on 27 March. 

He was awarded the Bronze Star for his efforts. Air Force Reserve Command associate and unit-equipped aircrews flew some 265 

missions, delivering nearly 22 million pounds 

of cargo while air refueling assets recorded 

nearly 1,400 sorties, transporting .5 million 

fighter, tanker, and rescue assets deployed to 

Turkey and began the Northern Watch no-fly 

zone rotations.75 In hindsight, it is clear the 

Air Force Reserve had begun a new era as a 

strategic reserve whose resources would be 

continually drawn upon for operations around 

the world. The Air Force Reserve’s organizational structure, however, had not kept pace 

and was out of sync.

As the Defense Department increasingly relied on its reserve components during the 

Tactical air A-10 assets flew more than 3,300 

hours, recording more than 1,400 sorties while 

special operations flew 265 hours on over 100 

missions. At the peak effort, approximately 

23,600 Air Force Reservists were mobilized 

with another 15,000 serving in a volunteer capacity.74

After the Gulf War, the Air Force Reserve 

did not stand down as in decades past during 

the Cold War era. Instead, it remained heavily involved in humanitarian relief missions 

to include six years of sustained support to 

Operation Provide Comfort, which assisted 

uprooted Iraqi Kurds by providing relief supplies. Between 1992 and 1993, Air Force Reserve airlift units supported Air Force efforts 

to provide food and medical supplies to millions starving in Somalia. In August 1992, 

Air Force Reserve fighter, tanker, air rescue, 

and support units began performing Operation Southern Watch rotations, enforcing the 

no-fly zone over Iraqi territory, a decade long 

endeavor. Between 1993 and 1995 when tensions mounted in Bosnia, Air Force Reserve 

tanker and fighter crews along with the Air 

National Guard and coalition forces participated in enforcing the no-fly zone while airlift units ensured logistical resupply. In 1994, 

Air Force Reserve airlift and air refueling 

crews flew humanitarian relief missions to 

aid Rwandan refugees in Operation Support 

Hope. Then, the full range of Air Force Reserve resources supported the Uphold Democracy peacekeeping mission in Haiti for six 

months. By January 1997, Air Force Reserve 

3940
First Gulf War were continuing. Thus, 

on the eve of 11 September 2001, the 

Air Force Reserve Command was at a 

high state of readiness, fully integrated 

and capable of performing every type 

of Air Force tasking.

pounds of cargo and offloading nearly 59 million pounds of fuel to nearly 4,800 receivers.77

The command once again demonstrated itself 

as a capable force ready to perform the range 

of Air Force operations needed on a daily basis. Allied Force efforts confirmed that the integrated active and reserve operations of the 

Korea, 1950-1953 (146,600)

Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962 (5,613)

Cuban Crisis, 1962 (14,188)

Korea, 1968-1969 (4,851)

Southeast Asia, 1968-1969 (755)

Postal Strike, 1970 (208)

Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991 (23,500)

Desert Thunder, 1998 (3)

Allied Force/Northern Watch, 1999 (1,278)

AIR FORCE RESERVE MOBILIZATION

CALL-UPS, 1950-1999

40
412
42
ki detected the flicker of overhead 

lights. Another noted only a brilliant 

blue flash before the explosion.4

Air Force Reservist Technical Sergeant Tyree Bacon also heard the 

alarming commotion outside of his 

office at the New York State Supreme 

Courthouse in lower Manhattan. The 

event had not taken Bacon off guard. 

Even as the airliner approached the 

city, he and other employees of the 

New York State Supreme Court had rushed to 

windows, trying to make sense of the sound. 

All of a sudden, the rumbling ceased, overtaken by an enormous boom and compression 

wave that rocked the building. Perceiving a 

“big, gaping hole of fire in one of the World 

Trade Center towers,” Bacon prepared for action.5

At 8:46 a.m. (EST), flying out of Boston’s Logan International Airport, hijacked American 

Airlines Flight 11 had crashed into Tower One 

of the World Trade Center.6 Downtown office 

workers, that had a glimpse of the plane coming at more than 400 miles-per-hour toward 

the building, attempted to seek safety; others 

sought cover as the debris rained down in the 

aftermath. Initially believing that a private jet 

had collided with the tower, most eyewitnesses perceived the event as a local accident.7 

 

Bacon and his coworkers commandeered a 

state jury bus and made their way ten blocks 

to what would become known as Ground 

sual flight rules. By 8:45 a.m., between 16,400 

and 18,800 people were at work in the World 

Trade Center complex with its renowned twin 

towers and five other structures, comprising 

16 acres. Few tourists had arrived, and workers would not open the observation deck until 

9:30 a.m.3

 

Most residents were still on street level, or 

away from a window, so they had little idea 

what the sound was that approached them. The 

rumbling of jet noise from American Airlines 

Flight 11 as it approached Manhattan attracted 

an occasional glance, but most residents of the 

“city that never sleeps” thought little of it and 

remained focused on their daily activities. 

In nearby Seven World Trade Center Tower, 

Staff Sergeant Lonnie Wells of the Air Force 

Communications Agency prepared equipment 

for the upcoming United Nations conference. 

He heard aircraft engines power down and 

throttle up randomly, thinking only “Man, this 

thing is flying low.” Deeper within the tower, 

coworker Staff Sergeant Craig WalentowsMan, this is going to be a nice day! No clouds 

whatsoever, no wind, and not even a hint of 

haze. The sky is extremely clear and crisp; 

a rarity on the East Coast. The sun is up 

enough now to cast a faint orange glow on 

our massive gray KC-10 as well as the others on the near deserted flight line. The sky is 

looking even clearer. Man, did I mention this 

is going to be a great day?

With the frantic, hectic pre-departure preparations behind us and all our checklists completed, we line up on the runway precisely on 

time for our 6:30 a.m. takeoff. The thrill of 

blasting down the runway has never grown old 

to me . . .. In practically no time we’re airborne and I start looking around. Man, what a 

nice day! As we takeoff toward the northeast, 

the Manhattan skyline is dead ahead. Normally obscured by haze and smog, today it’s 

clear as can be. The sun is just coming above 

the horizon and the signature of Manhattan, 

the twin towers of the World Trade Center, are 

positively glowing blood red. I interrupt the 

activities of the crew for a moment to point it 

out for their enjoyment.2

WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK

In the streets of New York City, it was a beautiful fall morning. People walked and drove 

to work in downtown Manhattan, pleased that 

the previous evening’s thunderstorms had given way to a pleasant Tuesday morning. The air 

was cool, and the skies were blue, ideal flying 

conditions that pilots refer to as “VFR,” or vi434
44
4546
46
478
48
Zero. Meanwhile, scores of civilians rushed 

away from them, trying desperately to flee. 

No sooner had the bus begun plying the streets 

of lower Manhattan when they heard a second explosion as loud as the first.8 At 9:03 

a.m. (EST), a second hijacked airliner, United 

Airlines Flight 175, had crashed and exploded 

into Tower Two of the World Trade Center.9

Emerging from their vehicle, the team stared 

up in horror. Both towers were already in 

flames, and the air was thick with smoke and 

debris. Fire soared upward into the clear, blue 

sky while occupants and office equipment fell 

into the street below. The scene, as Bacon 

recalled it, was “Just utter chaos. 

Airplane wreckage in the street . . . 

people jumping from the towers.”10

Bacon and his co-workers looked 

for an emergency medical station, 

but there was none. They grabbed 

medical bags stashed on the bus and 

headed out to look for the injured. 

Bacon and his crew began evacuating those they could along with 

emergency responders and civilians that had raced to the scene as 

well.11

 

AT HEADQUARTERS AFRC

While preparing an intelligence 

briefing for an upcoming mission 

to Colombia, Lieutenant Colonel 

Eugene Ziemba caught a television 

news report of an aircraft colliding 

into the World Trade Center. The event immediately reminded him of a B-25 Mitchell 

bomber that had struck the Empire State Building on 28 July 1945 during extremely low visibility. There was some discussion among his 

coworkers on the difficulties of fighting such 

a high-rise fire. Perplexed by the fair-weather 

collision, but then unaware of the gravity of 

the unfolding situation, Ziemba returned to his 

task.12 “While continuing to monitor the situation, I called AMC [Air Mobility Command] 

on the secure phone and started to speak with 

the Latin American analyst, who was one of 

our reservists from California. I was watching 

the monitor, when a second aircraft appeared 

on the screen and struck the second tower. Not 

believing my eyes, I asked others in the room 

for confirmation. When we all agreed on what 

we saw, I called the Command Center and told 

them what I saw, and that it was in all probability a terrorist attack.”13

Lieutenant Colonel Ziemba immediately departed to notify the senior staff. Entering the 

command conference room, he interrupted the 

weekly staff meeting and spoke directly to 

the vice commander of the Air Force Reserve 

Command (AFRC), Major General David R. 

Smith. The simplicity of his statement emphasized its impact: “We are under attack.”14

4950
Jersey to California, Flight 93’s radio emitted spasms of noise; Dahl and First Officer 

LeRoy Homer were engaged in a fight for 

their lives and control 

of the plane. The activity became clear to 

Ballinger; the aircrew 

cried “Mayday! Mayday!” amidst a melee 

in the cockpit. The 

struggle continued 

for at least another 35 

seconds with a clear 

transmission of “Hey, 

get out of here—

get out of here—get 

out of here,” as they 

fought the terrorists 

to retain control of the 

aircraft.20 Within four 

minutes, at 9:32 a.m., 

the battle was over; the intercom announced: 

“Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the captain, 

please sit down keep remaining sitting. We 

have a bomb on board. So, sit.”21 However, 

their captor’s deception would not last long. 

These terrorists then reset the plane’s course 

to the east. Although trapped in their seats 

with four suicidal terrorists in command, the 

flight crew and 33 passengers received word 

of the World Trade Center attacks via the 

cabin and their cell phones. Within minutes, 

they began plotting their response and decided: rush the terrorists and retake the aircraft 

by force. The battle cry forged in their struggle, “Let’s Roll,”22 memorialized their fight 

operational and manned for 24/7 within a few 

hours.17

TERRORISTS ON UNITED FLIGHT 93

At 9:24 a.m. (EST), Ed Ballinger, a United 

Airlines controller at the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s Cleveland Air Route Traffic 

Control Center, cryptically typed a message to 

all American Airlines aircraft in the vicinity, 

warning of the air disaster in New York City: 

“Beware any cockpit intrusion—Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.”18 Two minutes 

later, United Airlines Flight 93 commanded by 

Captain Jason Dahl responded, “Ed, confirm 

latest mssg plz—Jason.”19 And within another 

two minutes, horrific sounds unfolded before 

Ballinger over the radio. En route from New 

Over the next hours, the nature of the attack 

continued to unfold.

Assistant Vice Commander Brigadier General 

Robert E. Lytle related the command found itself at a generally “inopportune time” to begin 

a decade-long war.15 While Robins Air Force 

Base went to FPCON (force protection condition) DELTA, Headquarters AFRC’s senior 

leaders undertook decisions regarding base 

access, providing enhanced security, staffing, 

relocating personnel, activating the crisis action team (CAT), and rescheduling planned 

missions. As Ziemba described it, “During the 

balance of the day, a heroic effort by a cross 

section of computer savvy HQ types brought 

the CAT to life with furniture, cable, telephone, NIPR and SIPR [unclassified and classified communications network access].”16 

Throughout 2001, Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command was undergoing a renovation 

of its facilities. The building was in “shambles,” wires dangled down, and headquarters 

personnel were scattered in temporary quarters 

both on and off base. Since June, renovation 

work had completely disassembled the crisis 

action team war room. The plans conference 

room had been designated as the temporary 

CAT, consisting of a table, some chairs, and 

one phone. Additionally, only a handful had 

retained currency as CAT directors and functional experts from the last major mobilization—the Persian Gulf War. Thanks to extreme effort in a difficult time, the Air Force 

Reserve Command crisis action team became 

I left at 1930 that evening. When I arrived 12 hours earlier, everything was normal. Now, I was the acting Chief of Intel, I had a 24/7 

intel watch, and we were probably at war (but I still wasn’t sure with 

who). Robins was eerily silent and maze-like. In the 12 hours I was in 

the HQ, it seemed like every ‘ jersey barrier’ on the planet had been 

moved into position around the HQ, and the base. As I left the base, 

I drove south on Hwy 247, while listening on the radio to members of 

Congress singing ‘God Bless America’ from the Capitol steps. I got a 

little misty.

Lieutenant Colonel Eugene V. Ziemba, Jr., 1 May 2009

AT WAR

50
Major LeRoy Wilton Homer, Jr., born on 27 August 1965 in Plainview, New York, will be forever known 

as the first officer of United Airlines Flight 93 that crashed in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, on 11 September 

2001. However, to the United States Air Force Reserve Command, he is known as a hero and the first Reservist to lose his life due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Major Homer’s fascination for aviation developed as a 

child, watching airplanes taking off and landing at the local airport. This interest led him to assemble model 

airplanes, collect aviation memorabilia, and read aircraft books. Partnering up with a friend as a teenager, 

he cleaned medical buildings to earn money for flying lessons. Major Homer’s passion for soaring in the air 

became a reality at the age of 15 when he started flight instruction on a Cessna 152. Unlike most teenagers, 

he was passing through the clouds before he learned to drive on a highway. Completing his first solo trip, 

he obtained his private pilot certification as he reached his 16th birthday. 

Major Homer put his pilot’s credential to use when he was accepted into the Air Force Academy in the fall of 1983 as a member of Cadet 

Squadron 31. During his time at the academy, Major Homer displayed leadership skills, as well as compassion. Lieutenant Colonel Fred 

Armstrong, a classmate, reminisced how Major Homer had an “infectious ability to see through to the positive effect of each challenge that 

lay before you... [and he] pushed and supported his classmates” at the academy. 

Major Homer graduated from the Air Force Academy in 1987 and received orders to the 18th Military Airlift Squadron at McGuire Air Force 

Base, New Jersey. At his home base, he flew C-141B Starlifters from 1988 to 1995 with the “Mighty Blue Diamonds.” While on active duty, 

he served in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm as well as operations in Somalia. As a flight instructor, he helped the students to 

become better by giving entertaining briefings and making aerial lectures fun and interesting. He asked thought-provoking questions and 

gave detailed answers, pushing his students to become excellent aviators. Major Homer received an award as the Twenty-First Air Force 

aircrew instructor of the year in 1993. Not only was he a great instructor, but he was also trusted to fly important missions, such as flying 

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney’s envoy to Tbilisi, Georgia. Major Homer received many commendations, awards, and medals during 

his active military career.

After separating honorably from the active duty Air Force in 1995, United Airlines hired Major Homer as a second officer, operating the 

Boeing B-727. Within a year, working at the company allowed him to achieve a goal of flying commercial airliners such as 757s and 767s. 

In that same year, he quickly achieved first officer status.

Simultaneously in 1995, when he left active duty, Major Homer decided to continue his military career as an Air Force Reservist at the 

356th Airlift Squadron, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, as a C-141 instructor pilot. As a Reservist, he was able to achieve the rank 

of major. When he reassigned to Wright-Patterson, Major Homer performed duties as a flight examiner. By October 1999, he had become 

an additional-duty academy admission liaison officer, giving up flying duties. By 2000, Major Homer continued in the Air Force Reserve 

Command as an Individual Ready Reservist, while becoming a primary-duty admission liaison officer for the Air Force Academy. His 

REMEMBRANCE MAJOR LEROY HOMER - AFRC HERO

512
job consisted of interviewing, advising, and assisting future candidates with the admission process. In addition, he guided young men and 

women who were potentially qualified and interested in the military by presenting the option of pursuing a profession in the armed services. 

On that dreadful day of 11 September 2001, Major Homer flew as Captain Jason Dahl’s first officer on United Airlines Flight 93. “Based 

on information from several sources that day, Major Homer and Captain Dahl both were the first to fight against the terrorist threat to the 

airplane.” Air Force Chief of Staff, General John Jumper, stated that “we know there was a struggle aboard that aircraft... [and I’d] like to 

think that the people in uniform tried to retake control of that aircraft and save many more lives on the ground.”

Several organizations awarded Major Homer posthumously for his courage to fight against the terrorists’ threat on Flight 93. Major Homer 

received recognition as an honorary member of the Tuskegee Airmen for his heroic actions and also their Congressional Gold Medal in 2007. 

Other awards included the Congress of Racial Equality’s Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Award, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s 

Drum Major for Justice Award, and the Westchester County Trailblazer Award. A few more distinguishing honors Major Homer received 

were the Fallen Hero Tribute presented by the Congressional Black Caucus, the Air Force Achievement Award, the Meritorious Service 

Medal given by the direction of the President, the American Legion’s Jack and Jill Foundation of America, and he was awarded an honorary 

Doctor of Science degree from the College of Aeronautics. The 445th Airlift Wing honored Major Homer’s life and service by dedicating 

their new operations building to him in 2008.

Major Homer left behind two important ladies in his life, his wife and daughter. His wife, Melodie Homer, created a foundation for people 

to not only remember what he had accomplished during his career but also to help inspire future aviators by providing financial assistance 

to become certificated as a private pilot. The scholarship helps to maintain the major’s love of flying and honors him by supporting others 

learning to fly. In an article published by Checkpoints magazine, distributed by the Air Force Academy Association of Graduates, Marc 

Ranger left a message for everyone to remember Major LeRoy Wilton Homer, Jr. by ensuring young people are aware of the major’s journey:

LeRoy’s legacy deserves recognition. He paid his dues. His life and spirit is in the essence of the flag that most Americans have recently 

become proud to bear. His life should also be a constant reminder to all of us of the importance of pursuing our dreams instead of settling 

and becoming a slave to them. 

Brother Homer your service, your struggle, and your death were not in vain. You found freedom and joy in flight and now you’ve flown on 

to the Kingdom. I’ll see you at the crossroads, but in the meantime your memory lives on in me.

Everyone should take time to remember Major Homer’s courage as well as the many others that lost their lives during the 11 September 2001 

terrorist attacks. 

By Staff Sergeant Sa’Maad I. Bynum, 916th Air Refueling Wing Historian

52
er had ended the session and expressed, “We 

better get back to our offices because it may 

get pretty busy here.”27 He was right. Within minutes, General Jumper activated the Air 

Force’s crisis action team.28

 

Brigadier General Duignan and Major Lukas 

were just sitting down with their senior visitors to apprise them of the situation in New 

York City when “there was a sudden loud 

boom, and the building shook. It sounded 

like a bomb. Instantly we knew we had just 

become part of the World Trade Center debacle. I turned my head toward the window 

and saw a white plume of smoke rising from 

the Pentagon. This was an important piece of 

information because, without the smoke, we 

wouldn’t have known what part of the building we should move away from,” Major Lukas recalled.29 General Duignan had gone out 

into the hallway and then quickly came back 

telling all to evacuate. “My mind immediately 

began to go through the ways out of the building, quickly discarding one path after another 

as being too vulnerable or too crowded.”30

Nearby, Chief Master Sergeant Troy McIntosh, superintendant of policy integration, 

Office of the Air Force Reserve, also recalled 

hearing the news in a staff meeting and turning 

on the television for the coverage of the attack 

in New York City. He and others were “horrified” at the television images of the World 

Trade Center ablaze and were wondering what 

next. Chief McIntosh returned to his desk and 

thought “we’re sitting ducks” with one of the 

meeting. From the massive sea of cars, Sepulveda watched in awe as an airliner, American 

Flight 77, sliced low through the sky overhead. 

Diving and increasing speed, the aircraft ricocheted off light poles, pitched at a 45-degree 

angle, and drove into the Pentagon. The explosion sent shrapnel in every direction. The 

back draft blasted Sepulveda into a light pole, 

halfway across the parking lot.26

Inside the Pentagon, the deputy to the Chief 

of the Air Force Reserve, Brigadier General 

Robert Duignan, and Major Susan Lukas, a 

reserve advisor for legislative matters, were 

hosting several visiting senior leaders who had 

appointments on Capitol Hill. General Duignan had returned from the staff meeting where 

the new Air Force Chief of Staff, General John 

Jumper, was laying out his philosophy and 

direction when images of the burning World 

Trade Center were put up on the big screens. 

Then, the second plane hit. Everyone grasped 

the significance and thought in terms of an attack. Duignan later related that General Jumpfor freedom aboard their aircraft. At 9:57 a.m., 

they began their assault on the cockpit. “With 

the sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty field 

in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per 

hour, about twenty minutes’ flying time from 

Washington, D.C.” with a target of either the 

White House or the Capitol.23

Passengers had reported that two bodies, presumably those of Captain Dahl and First Officer Homer, lay slumped outside the cockpit.24

Unknowingly, as the terrorists had subdued the 

first officer, they had taken the life of a United 

States military service member in the Global 

War on Terrorism, Air Force Reservist Major 

Leroy Homer.25

PENTAGON ATTACK

At 9:43 a.m. (EST), Air Force Reservist Master Sergeant Noel Sepulveda, reserve medical 

inspector at the Air Force Inspection Agency, 

walked across the Pentagon parking lot pondering why they had cancelled his midmorning 

Within a year, Air Force Reserve Command aircraft

carried the mantra aloft, emblazoned on their sides, 

demonstrating the solidarity of the American fighting 

spirit and their own fight for freedom half a world away.

“LET’S ROLL”

534
54
had happened upon a discussion between two 

Pentagon civilians, trying to understand the disaster. Sidetracked by a phone call, Colonel 

Kuchar excused himself to return to his office 

on the south side. Just as he walked through 

his doorway, a powerful shockwave rattled 

“the hallways; you could feel it.” The spot 

where he stood only a few minutes before was 

now ablaze. The civilians were dead. “I ran 

back out to the E-Ring and looked down the 

hallway that goes down to the end. When I 

walked back down there, the smoke was just 

billowing, like big rolls of cotton rolling down 

the hallway. Fuel had spilled and splashed 

into the building. There was just a black cloud 

it happened.” Then, like others, he heard “the 

screams; people were screaming and running. 

It was just chaos.” Chief McIntosh witnessed 

two women dragging a badly burned man, “his 

flesh just falling off,” and a woman walking 

“without eyelids,” so burned was her face.31

Much like Chief McIntosh, Colonel Victor Kuchar, another Air Force Reservist who 

was assigned as an individual mobilization 

augmentee to the Air Force Combat Support 

Office, remembered briefly exchanging rumors over what had occurred in New York 

City. Leaving a morning meeting, Kuchar had 

walked down the west side of the building and 

approaches to Reagan National Airport nearly 

right over the Pentagon. But, others had immediately discounted such a scenario, saying 

“they would never hit the Pentagon.” Then, 

came the explosion. After feeling the impact, 

McIntosh’s gaze fell towards the inner courtyard to the other side of the Pentagon. “Initially, all I could see was reams and reams of 

paper flying up and over the building. I remember thinking, ‘What?’ All of this happened in 

seconds, but it seemed like everything was in 

slow motion. Then all of the sudden, I saw 

the fireball. All of the flying paper ignited in 

mid-air. The big red and black fireball came 

over the building. That’s when I realized that 

MSgt Noel Sepulveda

5556
AIR FORCE RESERVISTS ASSIST

Master Sergeant Noel Sepulveda, a twenty six-year veteran medical technician of the Air Force and Air Force Reserve rushed across the asphalt and toward the calls for 

help within the Pentagon. Darting through flames and wreckage, he lifted six people to safety through a window.

Chief Master Sergeant Troy McIntosh distinguished himself similarly to Master Sergeant Sepulveda for his own heroic actions at the Pentagon on 9/11. McIntosh, later the 

command chief of the Air Force Reserve Command, reentered the building on three occasions over forty minutes to retrieve the injured. “My focus was on getting people 

out.” Faced with horrifyingly graphic death and suffering, Chief McIntosh voluntarily risked life and limb to rescue the dead and dying. “No one granted me permission 

to stay, and I wasn’t asking,” recalled McIntosh, who did not join the twenty thousand others evacuating the structure. 

Once Chief McIntosh and others had succeeded in freeing victims from the wreckage, the fight of their lives had only just begun. The impact disrupted the passive fire 

suppression system. Without sprinklers, the jet fuel expanded the inferno much as it had at the World Trade Center complex until the upper floors in the Pentagon’s E-Ring 

collapsed. 

Air Force Reserve Master Sergeant Noel Sepulveda also set up a triage area outside the building. A medic, he put his fifteen years of Air Force training for wartime scenarios into immediate use during the disaster as he prepared victims for treatment. These heroic actions earned him the praise of the Air Force Surgeon General, the Airman’s Medal, and the Purple Heart. During his commendation, Surgeon General Lieutenant General Paul Carlton said that Sepulveda “did exactly what he needed to do 

at exactly the right moment--he created order out of chaos. He behaved as all airmen are trained to behave – as a leader – making all of us proud,” as Chief of Staff of the 

Air Force General John Jumper pinned on his decorations. 

Sepulveda’s sacrifice was only the most visible contribution of other emergency assistance rendered by individual Air Force Reservists on the scene at the Pentagon. Air 

Force Reserve Captain Bernetta Lane, a nurse working in the Pentagon’s DiLorenzo TRICARE Health Clinic at the time of the 9/11 attacks, also drew upon her expertise. 

As she arrived at the clinic that day, emergency managers issued an evacuation order for the entire building. As Captain Lane merged into the mass of people pooling towards exits, she remembered she “was startled by a loud boom,” probably the partial collapse of the E-Ring at 10:10 a.m. Looking back toward the impact site, she “saw 

huge, dark clouds of smoke from the other side of the Pentagon.” Seeing this and the suffering gathering around her, her training as a nurse kicked in, and she immediately 

reentered the devastated building to gather medical supplies and equipment from the TRICARE clinic. Returning to her rally point in the Pentagon’s north parking area, 

she helped orchestrate the growing triage area there. Captain Lane worked unflinchingly for twelve hours, executing as if she was in combat. Holding it together until her 

work was done, she was suddenly overcome with “shock and disbelief” and reacted “very emotional.” 

Captain Lane’s effort was joined by Chief McIntosh in the south parking area triage, once he was able to evacuate his last of three victims from the now blazing inferno. 

Working in the interior rings was Colonel Craig Seeber, General James Sherrard’s executive officer, showing Air Force Reserve rescue activity across the entire Pentagon 

campus. From enlisted medics to the commander’s own executive, Air Force Reserve airmen exuded heroism from the bottom to the top of the chain of command. Captain 

Katherine Pallozzi, an Air Force Reserve public affairs officer, who like both Seeber and McIntosh was not a medical professional, took up the reins of assistance with others on the scene equipped only with their basic emergency management training. Pallozzi and Seeber busied themselves in the triage and the temporary morgue unfolding 

in the Pentagon’s center courtyard. All of the military and civilians participating in the recovery integrated seamlessly in that time of need.

In the aftermath of the disaster, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche and Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper noted the efforts of all who assisted at the Pentagon that day, saying that, “These heroes, in the midst of an unfolding crisis, disregarded their personal safety to provide cohesive emergency care to injured servicemembers. 

They did us all proud.”

56
ones. Major Lukas finally decided on the least 

crowded and vulnerable route out and also 

emerged from the south side with her visitors 

in tow.36 

While the Pentagon blazed, many stood in a 

cluster in the parking lot. “Everybody was 

shouting the same thing, the same attack—or 

attackers—that had hit New York were striking us,” recalled Colonel Victor Kuchar. They 

watched in the space of a few minutes “as 

Pentagon police, local fire departments and 

ambulances,” filled the area. “There were ambulances everywhere,” said Kuchar, lauding 

“an incredible job of securing the area,” and 

getting patients out.37 “I remember seeing 

Rumsfeld out there helping people who were 

air. Everybody had soot all over their faces and 

their clothes.”33 “Like a river of people moving out of the building, very quickly, shoulder 

to shoulder, trying to get out,” Kuchar recalled 

the scene. When he went around the building, 

he was amazed at what he saw. The airplane 

tail was still intact then but burned up by the 

time news media released televised images of 

it to the public.34

Many others made for the exits in a daze, carrying only what papers they had in their hands. 

However, the evacuees soon discarded even 

these, creating a “virtual path” leading toward 

the exits.35 “It was just a constant flow of 

people going out,” trying to understand what 

was happening and making calls to loved 

moving right through the hallway. There were 

people screaming and crying down there, but 

there wasn’t anything that I could do right 

there.”32 

It was as if “somebody had dropped a bomb 

on the building,” Colonel Kuchar expressed. 

“I thought to go down a flight of stairs and go 

over closer, and maybe we’d be able to help 

somebody on the third floor or the fourth floor. 

By the time I descended to the second floor, 

there were people running out like crazy from 

that particular part of the building. That’s 

when I went with the rest of the people out to 

the south entrance and looked around to the 

gaping hole side of the building. The smoke 

was just everywhere, and the soot was in the 

“Overwhelming” was the word Father Mark Rowan, an Air Force Reserve Command chaplain, used to describe the three weeks he served on active duty at Dover Air 

Force Base, Delaware, along with the 514th’s, 512th’s, 315th’s, 349th’s 940th’s, and the other Port Mortuary Teams. Father Rowan was one of 17 Air Force Reserve 

chaplains and initially 200 Reservists providing support to the Dover Port Mortuary, working 12-hour shifts to identify and prepare those killed at the Pentagon. “We 

had several families in the parish who were missing a family member from the World Trade Center. It was difficult to leave the parish then, but everyone was very 

supportive.”

“Counseling was done everywhere as more ‘Walk up’ counseling than ‘Walk in’ counseling in an office setting. Most walk-in counselees are dealing with marriage 

and personal issues. I was able to do informal counseling with a number of dependants after worship services and with Airman in work areas especially at the Mortuary facility. We also made sure to visit the Terminal to visit with those waiting to ship out and deploy to the war zone. Basically anywhere a Chaplain was present – on 

or off duty – became a place and an opportunity for counseling sessions. We were open to this and our expertise was taken full advantage of.” 

“I heard and the other chaplains heard so many times the workers saying: ‘We’re so glad that you’re here.’ I also heard that from the FBI agents, who were there as 

part of their investigation.” 

“We were walking this journey with them.”

 Father Mark Rowan, October 2001

OVERWHELMING

578
58
situation was grave. News reports and air traffic controllers received dozens of other threats 

within the first hours, including United Flight 

93 bearing down on Washington DC from the 

west. The Air Force continued to respond.42

We saw airmen roar into the skies as the nation activated an ironclad air defense network. 

There were cheers heard on the lawns of the 

Pentagon as fully loaded Air Force fighters 

roared overhead within minutes of the attack, 

Secretary James Roche and General John 

Jumper expressed.43

AIR TRAFFIC SUSPENDED - SCATANA

9:01-9:02—Manager New York FAA Center 

to Command Center in Herndon:

We have several situations going on here. It’s 

escalating big, big time. We need to get the 

military involved with us . . . . We’re, we’re 

involved with something else, we have other 

aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here.44

A minute later, United Flight 175 had plowed 

into the South Tower. The Federal Aviation 

Administration, which had halted all take offs 

in the New York City area at 09:06 EST, just 

minutes after the attack on the second tower, 

had issued a “national ground stop,” banning 

takeoffs of all civilian aircraft across the United States at 09:25 EST. The national plan, 

SCATANA—the security control of air traffic 

and navigational aids during emergencies—

Major Lukas remembered 

“Look[ing out] on the thousands of people in the parking lot, [and] knew we had 

to continue moving. If a 

second plane saw everyone 

rushing from the building, 

the pilot might decide to 

plow through the parking lot 

to take out as many people 

as possible.”40 Mired in 

a group and “scrunched up 

in one section of the parking lot,” sensing a danger in 

numbers, the police forced 

the crowd to disperse. “No, 

no, you guys break up,” they 

said as they directed the 

group to scatter.41 

Thousands of Pentagon 

workers watched in awe as three Air National 

Guard F-16s, just scrambled from Langley 

Air Force Base, screamed over the Pentagon 

with supersonic speed and fully armed. The 

secret service had requested the armed jet coverage over Washington DC. North American 

Aerospace Defense Command’s northeast 

air defense sector had declared “AFIO” (authorization for interceptor operations) for the 

Washington airspace, providing the military 

to direct operations over the FAA. F-16 Captain Craig “Borgy” Borgstrom received the 

“Squawk quad-sevens” for AFIO and passed 

it on to the other ships, Quit 25 and 26. Never 

had they received such an order before. The 

coughing, had burns, and everything else.”38

If they could pull their eyes away from the 

horrifying devastation playing out on the south 

wall of the Pentagon, they would have noticed the crowd of some twenty-five thousand 

Pentagon employees gathering around them. 

Even those that had made it to their cars found 

themselves mired in a traffic jam as they tried 

to leave. Cell phones proved useless. About 

then, “one of the policemen got up on the top 

of a vehicle with a megaphone and told everybody to ‘move back,’ to ‘move back.’ As a 

result of this, “police and Pentagon officials 

got everybody pushed into the south parking area, in one place,” recollected Kuchar.39

2,602 Killed World Trade Center (initial)

 87 Killed American Flight 11 World Trade Center

 60 Killed United Flight 175 World Trade Center

 125 Killed Pentagon

 59 Killed American Flight 77, Pentagon

 40 Killed United Flight 93, Shanksville, Pennsylvania

2,973 TOTAL*

*Non-terrorists

CASUALTIES 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

5960
stances.”48 However, Eberhart related that 

within 24-hours, over 400 aircraft were airborne or sitting ground-based alerts to thwart 

any additional attacks. Within 48-hours, the 

number of combat air patrol bases went from 

the Cold War drawdown of seven to some 48 

bases, ready to provide air defense. Initially, a Total Force effort of active Air Force, 

Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve 

Command fighters and E-3s along with attending air refueling aircraft protected the 

skies, 24/7.49 

 

Since the military had essentially designed 

the US radar system to scan outward for foreign threats, this necessitated the Air Force’s 

E-3 airborne warning aircraft becoming 

active to protect threats now within the interior of the United States. The Air Force 

E-3s provided a critical capability to help 

the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command quickly re-posture itself to also 

monitor airspace within the interior of North 

America.50

E-3 CREW ESCORTS – PRESIDENT

Utilizing the Air Force’s unique capability to provide an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) for aircraft operating 

across vast swaths of the nation’s airspace, 

the Air Force’s first challenges were to gain 

control of the skies, assess the terrorist situation, and assure the continuity of government. The United States’ Continuity of Operations Plan, first designed to minimize the 

clear the US’s airspace of commercial aircraft 

was made to gain control and respond to other 

hijackings and potential threats.45 

When at 11:06 the Air Traffic Control System Command Center issued a directive for 

all aircraft airborne in US airspace to land, 

more than 700 aircraft did so within four minutes aided by air traffic controllers. And by 

12:16 with another 2,800 aircraft landing, 

the Federal Aviation Administration declared 

US airspace clear of all commercial and private flights. This was an amazing feat. Now, 

within the space of hours of the first hijacked 

aircraft crashing into the World Trade Center, 

only military, law enforcement, rescue, and 

medical evacuation flights were airborne.46

The events of 11 September laid bare the defense of the US homeland and North America, 

which had traditionally been postured for incoming external Cold War threats. Now, the 

US needed to be prepared for threats originating within US airspace. No longer would 

NORAD consider domestic flights as “friendly 

by origin.”47 On the day of 11 September, 

the NORAD battle management staff was 

conducting a two-week exercise, Vigilant 

Guardian, as well as its normal operations. 

NORAD’s staff quickly transitioned to what 

was unfolding, telling each air defense sector 

to get as many fighters in the air as possible 

and ensuring airspace control measures. General Eberhart later testified that “Unfortunately, due to the constraints of time and distance, 

we were unable to influence the tragic circumwas underway. Co-located at the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s Herndon Command 

Center was the National Air Traffic Services 

Cell, which served as the liaison function between the civilian and military on air traffic issues and was manned by a small staff of Air 

Force Reservists, part-time. On the morning 

of 11 September, Colonel John Czabaranek, 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael-Anne Cherry, 

and Major Kevin Bridges happened to be on 

duty and immediately began coordinating efforts. Colonel Czabaranek called the National 

Military Command Center (NMCC), which 

was already working the fighter request, and 

the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), informing that their cell was 

up, about the ground stop, and that airborne 

aircraft would continue to their destinations 

if outside of the New York area while arriving international flights were being diverted to 

Canada. Initially, Czabaranek also took calls 

from the White House regarding escorts for 

Air Force One and fighter combat air patrols 

(CAPs) for Washington, DC as well as worked 

getting fighter escorts for Attorney General 

John Ashcroft, who was returning from a Midwest trip and the arrival of Secretary of State 

Colin Powell from Peru. Throughout the day, 

the cell’s back office computer continued to 

provide the NMCC, NORAD, and the Air 

Force Operations Center information. Confusion existed over SCATANA implementation. 

Colonel Czabaranek spoke with NORAD 

Commander General Ralph Eberhart, confirming that just a limited SCATANA was being 

implemented. The unprecedented decision to 

60
nel informed him.53 

Major Lomheim and his crew entered 

an orbit over western Louisiana. Lomheim inquired about his responsibilities, 

fighter aircraft at his disposal, airliners 

suspected of hijacking, and the destination of Air Force One. “Am I looking 

inside the US or outside the US? I told 

them I needed some toys to play with if I 

was going to do a mission to protect the 

President.”54 Sanitizing the area and 

providing the “toys” were two Texas Air 

National Guard F-16s piloted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Crogg and Major 

Scott Brotherton, from the 111th Fighter 

Squadron, the President’s former squadron. As the news reported, President 

Bush then went to Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska to a secure facility. Again, Lomheim’s 

E-3 orbited overhead, refueled from a tanker 

aircraft, and waited. A short time later, Air 

Force One launched skyward, and Lomheim’s 

E-3 chartered a course eastward, continuing 

to escort the President. Another AWACS Sentry over Chicago picked up the President and 

covered him into DC along with the Texan F16s. The AWACS Total Force community had 

commenced 24-hour operations, protecting 

the President and US cities. Lomheim’s crew 

made it back home around midnight. The 

fighters returned the next day.55 What was 

to have been his monthly volunteering for a 

training sortie underscored the high readiness 

state of the Air Force Reserve Command’s resources. 

the World Trade Center. Lomheim related, 

“Our first thought was, ‘Wow! In the age of 

GPS [global positioning system], how can an 

airplane fly into a big building? There must 

be terrible weather, or the pilot screwed up, or 

equipment, or whatever.’ Shortly thereafter, 

another maintainer walked in and said, ‘The 

second WTC tower was struck. They think 

it is a terrorist event, and you guys are now 

going to be re-roled to go and do something.’ 

We called a bus over for our students and sent 

them back to the training squadron. We gathered the NORAD material and the NORAD 

battle technician.”52 Lomheim and Miller 

took off about midday, checked in with the 

Southeast Air Defense Sector, and were told 

to go to Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, 

where President Bush was. “We want you to 

escort him wherever he goes,” sector personpossibility of the decapitation of senior US 

leadership by a preemptive nuclear strike by 

the Soviet Union during the Cold War era, 

remained in force on 9/11. The continuity 

plan required that certain members of the 

national command authority within the US 

Constitution’s Presidential Line of Succession remain remotely located from one another in the event of an attack. On 9/11, senior military and government leaders feared 

that terrorists targeting the National Capitol 

Region were undertaking similar attempts 

to target the President of the United States, 

who had traveled to Florida to read and talk 

education to a class at the Emma E. Booker 

Elementary School. A realization that there 

was no way to really know what was taking 

place across the country fueled the engines 

that sent Air Force One and President George 

W. Bush barreling down the runway and into a 

full power launch from Sarasota, Florida, to a 

reported undisclosed location. Vice President 

Dick Cheney remained at the White House 

and went to the underground tunnel, keeping 

in contact with the President.51

 An Air Force E-3 Sentry aircraft crewed by 

Air Force Reservists from the 970th Airborne 

Air Control Squadron at Tinker Air Force 

Base, Oklahoma, scrambled to assist the President. That morning, Air Force Reservists Major Doug Lomheim and Captain Greg Miller 

were preparing for a student training sortie on 

the E-3 but had incurred a maintenance delay when an engine would not start. During 

their wait, they heard an airplane had struck 

612
lifted him and the woman off the ground, 

tossing them almost 100 feet away. The air 

grew thick with dust and debris, enveloping 

him and filling his eyes and mouth. It was 

impossible to see. He believed he was going 

to die.58 Yet with his patient hysterical, he 

told her “I’m going to get you out of this, I 

promise.”59 But, he himself did not believe 

it, so serious were the conditions. His desire 

to save her made him press forward through 

the cloud, feeling his way out and eventually 

delivering the woman to the triage at Fulton 

Force Base, New Jersey, used their military 

training as firefighters, security forces, and 

medical personnel to support the rescue and 

recovery efforts. These airmen incorporated 

the Air Force’s mentality of “service before 

self,” sacrificing their safety to help distressed 

civilians.57

Once more, Tyree Bacon emerged with a victim in critical condition. He and team members 

had entered 5 World Trade Center for a third 

time, where some of the injured had gone. He 

found a young woman with severe burns 

and rigged a chair stretcher to take her out 

of the building. Bacon had progressed 

about 150 feet when a shockwave from 

the collapsing Tower Two (9:59 a.m.) 

WTC COLLAPSES – 

CITIZEN AIRMEN RESPOND

Fires raged within the World Trade Center 

towers doused with more than 20,000 gallons 

of jet fuel. Spilling down elevator shafts, the 

fuel ignited and exploded into the West lobby, 

lower floors, and the 77th and 22nd floors in 

World Trade Center Tower One. Feeding on 

the combustible elements of 110 acres of office space, the fires trapped inhabitants below 

and above the impact zone, the 93rd through 

99th floors. While occupants climbed to the 

roof to escape the overwhelming flames, heat, 

and smoke, New York City firefighters rushed 

from street level to stem the growing inferno. 

With no possibility of rescue, occupants leapt 

to their death while others burned alive inside. 

A similar scenario unfolded in Tower Two. 

As the fires overpowered occupants, they also 

consumed the structural columns not severed 

by the 440 to 540-mile-per-hour impacts of 

the jets, slowly weakening the building from 

within.56

Among the thousands of rescue and recovery 

workers were Air Force Reservists wearing 

police and firefighter uniforms. Air Force Reservists arrived in a variety of capacities even 

before the attacks had ended. These trained 

and ready Air Force Reservists eased the effects of the expanding crisis in New York City 

by sharing both their combat training and 

specialized knowledge as civilian emergency 

responders. Citizen airmen, principally with 

the 514th Air Mobility Wing at McGuire Air 

Air Force Reserve Special Agent Dan McNally received the New York Police Department’s Medal of Valor from Mayor Michael Bloomberg on 17 January 2003 for his heroic actions on 11 September 2001. Off duty that day, McNally, a NYPD bomb squad detective, rushed to the World 

Trade Center, arriving as the first tower collapsed and the second tower was in flames. He met up 

with other bomb squad members and began looking for survivors. Reflecting later on the events, 

he expressed: “What you do? Leave your comrades up there to carry the load? No, you just get 

in there, and you help any way you can. You throw yourself in there.” The honor bestowed is in 

his words “bittersweet” for those lost and those also deserving such a medal.

“We were playing the odds, and we knew it. I was in the company of very good men that day. I 

was lucky. There were others who weren’t.”

Called to active duty in January 2002 and serving with the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, McNally knew he was again getting in there and helping. “The war on terrorism is not 

over.”

DAN MCNALLY – NYPD MEDAL OF VALORR

62
ered.62 McNally expressed that the two Air 

National Guard F-15s from Otis flying overhead assured them, as “we were all bracing for 

the next [attack].”63 

Also downtown that day was Albert Lefave, 

who was attending a two-day meeting for his 

civilian pharmaceutical company. Lefave, an 

Air Force Reserve medical technician with the 

439th Airlift Wing in Massachusetts, watched 

in horror and responded. “With all that going on, you can’t be that close and not go to 

were playing with the odds. Looming 110 

stories over their heads, World Trade Center 

Tower One imploded at 10:28 a.m., shaking 

the ground and spraying rubble to the north 

of its foundation, right on top of them. The 

collapsing tower pancaked most of the building, entombing three of McNally’s eight-man 

party. McNally and four others were plunged 

into darkness amidst a maze of shattered corridors. “Everything went black, totally black. 

I thought I had gone blind.” They grouped 

their way along the wall in the direction they 

had come only to have the wall and floor end 

fifteen feet from where they had been. They 

reversed direction and extracted themselves 

from the rubble. Exhausted Dan McNally 

stayed on and directed fresh rescue teams in. 

“I was praying they would have better luck 

than I had.”61 McNally’s efforts came at a 

high cost. His partner, Detective Claude Richards, and the others were dead. It would be 

the following spring before they were recovand Broadway. In the end, this gravely injured 

woman who had made it down from the 78th 

floor of the first tower with burns over 48 percent of her body saved Bacon’s life. In the 

ordeal, Bacon lost a third of his team—William Harry Thompson, Mitchel Wallace, and 

Thomas Jurgens. Soon thereafter, Tower One 

collapsed.60

 

Dan McNally, a New York City Police Department bomb squad detective and Air Force Reservist, also rushed to the scene from his Manhattan home. It was his day off. He teamed 

up with his partner, Claude Richards, and six 

others. Battling through the cloud of ash, he 

and his team entered the wreckage surrounding World Trade Center Tower One. They directed survivors out of the World Trade Center plaza as they made a path to nearby World 

Trade Center Building Six, hoping to find 

those trapped inside. Once they began making a sweep of the hallways, they knew they 

People call me a hero, but that woman who somehow made it down 78 flights of stairs is a 

hero to me. If she wasn’t there, I wouldn’t have made it. And those three guys who gave their 

lives—along with the 343 New York City firefighters, 37 Port Authority police officers, 23 New 

York City police officers and eight EMS (Emergency Management System) workers who died 

that day—they are the real heroes. Winning the DOD and Air Force Heroism Awards is a great 

honor, but I really don’t think of myself as a hero. I’m just honored to have the ability to serve. 

Freedom isn’t free. We were attacked because of the freedoms we cherish. This is an ongoing 

fight that is far from over, and I consider it an honor to serve.

 Staff Sergeant Tyree Bacon, firefighter, 514th CES, October 2002

TYREE BACON – NY STATE COURT MEDAL OF VALOR 

& DOD/AF HEROISM AWARDS

634
servists Technical Sergeant Charles Boyette, 

Master Sergeant Doris Rosado, and Staff 

Sergeant Robert Taverna, three New York 

police officers, arrived to save as many lives 

as possible. Boyette responded on his day 

off and initially worked searching for people, clearing buildings, performing security 

patrols, and then helping in the morgues until he was activated on 22 October with his 

civil engineer squadron.66 Taverna served 

in every imaginable capacity from response 

to relief, including rescue, recovery, cleanup, and participation in a bucket brigade.67

Rosado accomplished more of the same—

with one difference; it was her second time 

responding to a terrorist attack at the World 

Trade Center. On 26 February 1993, she had 

rushed into the chaos when al Qaeda struck 

tribute knowledge and combat training to the 

recovery effort. Blunnie joined a human chain 

hauling medical supplies to a hastily organized 

triage at a church several blocks from the former World Trade Center site. When asked 

why he heroically risked his life without being 

told to do so, Blunnie replied, “We’re not heroes, we’re just Americans trying to help other 

Americans. Until everyone is accounted for, 

we’re going to work night and day to find our 

countrymen.”65

Air Force Reservists serving double-duty as 

civilian police officers joined the rescue attempts at Ground Zero and created a security 

perimeter, protecting the public, maintaining 

the peace, and assuring the integrity of the 

world’s largest crime scene. Air Force Rehelp,” he would later state. Lefave and a fellow colleague, who was also an Army lieutenant, pushed forward to Ground Zero. While 

still twenty blocks away, they witnessed the 

second 110-story office tower collapsing. According to Lefave, “The news coverage depicts how horrendous the events were, but it 

doesn’t capture the ‘largeness’ of these huge 

buildings crashing to the ground.” Arriving 

downtown, he discovered that four to five layers of rubble buried the initial World Trade 

Center plaza triage section. The crisis within 

the greater disaster caused much confusion to 

other responders that arrived to help. Unrelenting, Lefave located a police checkpoint, 

showed his military identification card and 

emergency medical technician certification, 

and found his way to the second triage site at 

a Manhattan courthouse. Once there, Lefave 

rendered aid, “using water bottles to rinse ash 

out of eyes and to clear throats.” Lefave also 

“helped people with breathing difficulties from 

the scene.” Additionally, he also found himself in the thick of early rescue and recovery 

efforts for New York firefighters. At one point, 

Lefave and other volunteers boarded an ambulance and searched for firefighters amidst the 

thick smoke blanketing the area. He described 

it as “one huge black-and-white photo.” The 

images and sounds of the day would stay with 

him along with the greatest admiration for 

New York’s finest.64

Typical of many Reservists, Senior Airman 

Edward Blunnie, 514th Air Mobility Wing, 

simply went to Ground Zero, anxious to conIn one aspect, the 514 AMW was most fortunate; while a formal census was not accomplished, 

an informal estimate was that upwards of 200 men and women assigned to the 514 AMW lived, 

worked or had reason to be in lower Manhattan on any given workday. No 514 AMW member 

was killed in the attacks despite the numerous personnel who worked for various law enforcement and emergency response units throughout New York City, especially lower Manhattan. 

So far as is known, only one wing member lost immediate family. Having said that, almost no 

one was untouched as the hours lengthened into days and the breadth of the tragedy became 

clearer. It seemed almost everyone knew someone killed; present and past co-workers, neighbors, fellow parishioners, etc. The wing’s Catholic chaplains reported losing members of 

their parish, and wing personnel who work for FDNY, NYPD, and New York-New Jersey Port 

Authority, among others, personally knew many of the victims. Numerous wing members volunteered their efforts at Ground Zero and other locations in the hours and days that followed.

By Master Sergeant Gerald White, 514th Air Mobility Wing Historian

514 AMW – MOST FORTUNATE

64
NEW YORK, 13 September 2001 – They don’t stand out, but many National Guard and Reserve members are here at ‘Ground Zero.’ They wear the uniforms of 

firefighters, city and state police officers, and other public services. Sparsely scattered among hundreds of volunteers are also those in battle dress uniforms. They 

are publicly distinguished from each other only by the words above their pockets – ‘US Marines,’ ‘US Army,’ ‘US Air Force,’ ‘US Navy.’ 

Most of those in uniform are individual guardsmen and reservists on the volunteer ‘chain hauls,’ the human chains that remove rubble or bring in supplies. Some are 

active-duty military members from local recruiting stations or civilian school assignments. one airman took leave, drove 12 hours from his duty station in Missouri 

and, by early morning the day after the 11 September attack on the World Trade Center here, was just another shadowed worker on a hill of rubble.

Sergeant First Class Earl Peeples of the Army Reserve had been looking forward to some sleep the morning of 11 September. He was leaving his night job as an 

operations analyst at Citibank in the Wall Street area when the first hijacked airliner slammed into the nearby trade center’s north tower. A communications expert 

with the 112th Field Artillery in Toms River, New Jersey, Peeples immediately drove the 86 miles home to retrieve his uniform, gloves, web harness, and other useful 

gear. By Tuesday evening, Peeples was assisting New York City police officers in setting up a security perimeter around the disaster area.

He then joined the chain hauls in the 16-acre area of devastation, passing buckets of debris throughout the night and much of the following day before exhaustion 

set in. ‘I found a nice, quiet spot in Battery Park where I could lay my head,’ Peeples said. He was up again a few hours later, conducting a search of the damaged 

American Express Building before again joining the ‘guys’ atop the rubble. ‘I think everyone was a little afraid at first,’ said Captain Brent Unger, an instructor with 

the 440th Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps Detachment in Columbia, Missouri. ‘We started out slow, but once we got together out on the pile and started 

working, we got momentum.’

‘The camaraderie I felt; it was like we were all in the military,’ said New York native Navy Petty Officer First Class Shannon Smith. ‘People constantly bringing water 

to drink or pour over your neck, or sandwiches.’ Smith recalled his high school summers working in the World Trade Center. Now an active-duty administrator at 

the Undersea Warfare Unit in Brooklyn, he and fellow sailors joined a debris chain haul near the tall, silver-frame remains of the south tower.

Navy Lieutenant Commander Andre Alston walked the perimeter of Ground Zero. A reserve chaplain with the Marine Air Wing Group 49 in Willow Grove, Pennsylvania, he stopped rescue workers who seemed in need of comfort and encouragement. ‘If they want to talk, we talk,’ said Alston, an eighth- grade teacher and 

former New Yorker. ‘If they want to pray, we pray, right in the middle of the street. A firefighter just cried, and I held him.’ Alston said the most common question 

he received was, ‘Why?’ He said he doesn’t have an answer, but he did have a response. ‘Out of tragedy there’s always a purpose,’ Alston said. ‘I hope the tragedy 

of the loss of all these lives will unify our nation and break down the barriers that divide us.’ 

After seven days, 50,000 tons of debris had been removed from Ground Zero. The volunteers were at work then, they are today, and they will be tomorrow and likely 

many more tomorrows to come—individual soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, some are putting their military training to use while others simply provide physical 

and moral strength.

‘We’re not heroes, we’re just Americans trying to help other Americans,’ said Brooklyn resident Air Force Senior Airman Edward Blunnie, a reservist and full-time 

US Postal Service employee. ‘Until everyone is accounted for, we’re going to work night and day to find our countrymen.’ 

 

 By Major Michael J. Paoli, Air Force Public Affairs, New York Office Special to American Forces Press Service

US TROOPS RESPOND TO TRAGEDY

656
quests to Ground Zero. Two others, Colonel 

Stephanie Brotherton and Lieutenant Colonel Bill Nugent, assisted with civil air patrol 

missions.74 

 RESERVE KC-10 CREW 

PROVIDES FUEL 

As day wore into afternoon and then 

into evening, there was little opportunity to reflect on the attack; crews 

remained in response mode.75 Major Carlos Vilella’s KC-10 (Team 

23, tail number 60028) siphoned 

fuel from its sister ship to utilize 

his more versatile docking capability. When a thirsty four-ship fighter formation arrived to tank up, Major Vilella decided 

to terminate the operation early and get the 

aircraft back to the fight. Over the next few 

hours, Vilella’s boom operators, Technical 

Sergeant Jimmie Rush and Staff Sergeant 

Joseph Jones, refueled two more F-15s before preparing for the return of Air Force 

One and its escorts later that evening. President George Bush’s air fleet included a pair 

of escort F-16s from the Texas Air National 

Guard and an E-3 Sentry. Combined with 

the refueling of an additional two-ship combat air patrol of Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets out of Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia, Vilella’s crew cumulative offload was 

271,000 pounds of fuel over the course of 

two sorties lasting 12.6 hours on a 18-hour 

duty day. Team 23 arrived back at McGuire 

at 00:02L, 12 September. They had perDominick Roselli, who also worked in the 

same capacity in civilian life at the Lakehurst Naval Air Engineering Station. Roselli responded to the attack and would work a week 

and a half searching for the dead and dying at 

Ground Zero.73

Nine Air Force Reservists serving as emergency preparedness liaison officers were also 

among the many who responded to assist in 

New York City, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania crash site. As individual mobilization augmentees, they brought their unique 

talents to bear quickly. Colonel Laura Talbot 

and Lieutenant Colonels Brian Dubie, James 

Maskowitz, and Abbott Taylor were later recognized for ensuring the coordination and support to the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency search and rescue teams in New York 

City and to the Air Force crisis action team 

while Colonels Sylvia Coleman, Leo Lawrenson, and Robert Tilton planned and coordinated over 50 Defense Department support rethe complex. Back then, the terrorist group 

detonated a 1,500-pound bomb in a rental 

truck beneath the twin towers but only succeeded in killing six persons. Unimaginably, 

eight years later, on 11 September 2001, Rosado again found herself evacuating people 

from both the World Trade Center site and 

adjoining New York subways.68

In the aftermath of the next days, other Air 

Force Reservists like Nick Marchisello, a 

firefighter with the Clifton Fire Department 

in New Jersey, went to New York City with 

his department to assist. He described the 

scene as horrible “like walking into hell.”69

Marchisello and his fellow firefighters relied 

on search and rescue dogs from the Bergen 

County Sheriff’s Department to travel ahead 

of them in the search for survivors. With fires 

still burning and the rubble unstable, their work 

was dangerous. The acrid smell remained intense. “Seeing this destruction is unbelievable. 

I can only hope that we can still bring people 

out alive,” Marchisello expressed.70 “The 

[Air Force] fire program expects and encourages you to constantly upgrade and continue 

your education about the firefighting profession. What I learned I can use in my job with 

the Reserves and vice versa.”71 Also on site 

during the first days were sixty-three civilians 

skilled in search and rescue, who had traveled 

from California on board a 439th Airlift Wing 

C-5 diverted from a Pacific mission.72 Another local 514th Air Mobility Wing Air Force 

Reserve firefighter and EMT, on the scene with 

Bacon and Marchisello, was Staff Sergeant 

I urge everyone to show their support for our reservists and their families throughout this national challenge. It will take all of us working together to succeed. Our men and women are trained and ready. I 

have total confidence in their skills and dedication 

and what they bring to the Total Air Force.

Lieutenant General James E. Sherrard III, AFRC 

Commander & Chief Air Force Reserve, September 

2001

66
I was at home that day. I wasn’t on airline or military duty. I remember a friend called and said, ‘Hey, turn on the TV and watch the news.’ 

I turned the TV on about nine in the morning and saw it. I knew immediately that this was going to be serious. Airplanes don’t fly into the 

World Trade Center. There was some confusion initially. But, those of us that know a little about this recognized right away that this was 

some type of provocation, unknown exactly what it was. It was going to require some serious military action at some point. I continued 

to watch; I picked up the phone and called the Air Combat Command command section, where I was assigned, and let them know that depending upon what was going on if they needed some assistance, I was available to come in. I would rework my schedule and come in for 

whatever they needed. At this point, no one really knew exactly what was going on.

Very quickly, they needed me. They went into mission planning for an Afghanistan scenario, so I took a leave from the airlines. The Air 

Combat Command asked me to come in and assist there. Coincidently, the Commander of Air Combat Command, General John Jumper, 

had just gone to the Pentagon to be the new chief of staff of the Air Force. They had not confirmed a new commander for the Air Combat 

Command. The existing Vice Commander, General Don Cook, moved up to be the acting commander, and they brought me on to be the 

acting vice commander during this whole Enduring Freedom planning while we were waiting for the new commander to come in. It was 

an exciting time. We were really, really busy. I ended up being focused on ACC’s business at large and did not get into the specifics on the 

Air Force Reserve although I was aware. As the acting vice commander, I took on that duty like the active. I was aware of active, Guard, 

and Air Force Reserve issues and did the coordination necessary. But, the specifics were done like normal with the Air Force Reserve. We 

have reserve advisors in the active commands, and that is their job to do more of the specifics. They defaulted to me to be the acting vice 

commander; I worked with the ACC staff to start supporting all of the requirements. We had a lot of issues on sourcing and basing.

That’s the beauty of working as an IMA. You are a Reservist with the background and experience, and you are assigned to the active force. 

I stayed on active duty for several months. I was on mandays.

We had F-16s already positioned at Base X. We did not get into discussions whether they were Guard or whatever. The Air Force Reserve 

Command knew about that, but from my vantage point at ACC, we talked about what capabilities we had. We were aware where the forces 

were, where they were postured, and what we had for forces.

We really got into the basing business at ACC, providing forward basing and how to build up the basing, the infrastructure, and all the things 

it takes. We opened up like 19 bases in a very short amount of time to support air refueling, tac airlift, strat airlift, combat search and rescue, 

special operations, A-10s, F-16s, and F-15s; all in order to get access to that part of the world. So, this was a herculean effort that the Air 

Combat Command put together. I was fortunate to be part of it. At the headquarters, we asked the active, Guard, and Air Force Reserve to 

do pieces of it. For example, if I had an operational piece with aircraft, we might have gone to AMC to ask for expertise on bedding down 

ACC’s IMA MOBILIZATION ASSISTANT READY TO STEP IN

678
aeromedical, staging, logistics, or for aerial port. Air Combat Command pretty well took on the responsibility for all of the basing and 

the access over there. We did not really plan it out. It was whoever you could get. Who could do the job where we would access, be it the 

Guard, Reserve, or active duty.

There were actually a lot of discussions on the access to the Reserve forces and how you get them on status, take care of them, pay them, 

provide them orders, get them mobilized or on volunteer status, and get them over there. There was a lot of dialogue between the Air Combat 

Command and the Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command. There were just many issues.

We stood up the crisis action team, the CAT, at ACC to deal with all of this, and the different functionals were working this every day. We 

brought a lot of Reservists in to work with the operations, plans, installations, and communications staffs, and we had a mobilization cell 

there. We also had many Reservists, officer and enlisted, working in the cell on all of the issues. There was a constant dialogue between 

the Air Combat Command and the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Command. I was monitoring this, but there was a whole 

staff communicating and working issues to include equipment issues.

We had a reserve advisor whose name was Colonel Bob Nunnally; Nunndog was his call sign. He is retired now who worked Reserve issues. 

He was active duty for a long time and joined the Air Force Reserve as a reserve advisor on an AGR tour. He spent a lot of time in the CAT, 

coordinating all of the different processes we had to work through, particularly in terms of mobilizations, readiness, getting forces on status, 

and then deployed to the AOR.

In terms of being at ACC, it was just a really busy time. All I can say is that everybody responded whether they were active, Guard, or Air 

Force Reserve. Everybody played a role and did the Air Force justifiably proud. The investment that the Air Force made in the Air Reserve 

Component, that they could have access to them that quickly—both the people and the equipment—ready, trained airmen ready to do whatever job they were tasked to do without additional readiness, equipment, or resourcing, it really came together very, very effectively and 

timely in terms of where you needed them. It was all of a sudden; there they are. They responded; they were there! The Air Force Reservists 

were there in spades. The Guardsmen of the Reserve Component were there.

Major General Allan R. Poulin, End of Tour Interview, April 2009

68
11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 

persons.” More broadly, the law enabled the 

President to “prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States 

by such nations, organizations or persons.”80

The so-called Bush Doctrine, later incorporated into the 2002 National Security Strategy, 

effectively sanctioned the escalation of US 

antiterrorism efforts from covert influence to 

covert operations and direct military action.81

AL QAEDA’S DECLARATION OF WAR

It is important not to divorce President George 

Bush’s executive decision to invade Afghanistan from its historical context. In the wake of 

the 1998 Kenya and Tanzania embassy bombings, Osama bin Laden had already issued a 

fatwa, or Islamic religious edict, effectively 

“declaring war” on the people of the United 

States of America. Although neither bin Laden nor his chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, had the authority to speak on behalf of Islamic law, they clarified al Qaeda’s stance with 

the American people three months later. “It is 

far better for anyone to kill a single American 

soldier than to squander his efforts on other 

activities. . . . We do not have to differentiate 

between military or civilian. As far as we are 

concerned, they are all targets.”82

President Bush’s hopes of outing Osama bin 

Laden was also not unique among the highest 

level of US policy makers. President George 

W. Bush’s predecessors Bill Clinton and 

George Herbert Walker Bush indicated their 

tion between terrorists who committed these 

acts and those who harbor them.”79 With a 

flurry of domestic support and the world in its 

favor, the 107th Congress passed on 18 September 2001 a Joint Resolution to “authorize 

the use of the United States Armed Forces 

against those responsible for the recent attacks 

launched against the United States.” Public Law 107-40 gave complete authority to 

the President to use force against “those nations, organizations or persons he determines 

planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 

terrorist attacks that occurred on September 

formed 10 refuelings (6 F-16s, 2 F-15s, and 2 

E-3s).76 Team 24, the second Air Force Reserve Command KC-10 crew, was Major William Sherrod’s crew. The boom operator was 

Master Sergeant Dan Ciambrone. After taking 

off at 09:05L for scheduled training, they had 

instead clocked a five-hour real-world mission, 

offloading 101,100 pounds in 13 refuelings (7 

F-16s and 6 F-15s), landing at 14:05L.77 At 

16:00L, two more McGuire Air Force Reserve 

Command crews, Fueler 30 and 31, received 

alert notifications and took to the air at 20:50L 

to support the fighter CAPs throughout the 

night of 11 September and early morning of 

12 September.

PRESIDENT BUSH – “WAR AGAINST 

TERRORISM”

Within hours of the 9/11 attacks, Taliban regime spokesperson Mullah Omar from the 

Middle Eastern nation of Afghanistan organized a press conference disclaiming responsibility for the attacks. Bush administration 

officials followed their initial suspicions to 

the 1993 World Trade Center terrorist attack 

mastermind—Osama bin Laden. Promising 

to bring Osama bin Laden to justice, President 

George Bush set in motion a revolutionary 

change in US foreign policy in his address to 

the nation on 11 September 2001. It would 

take the US to the brink of war with the proterrorist Taliban government of Afghanistan.78

 

On the evening of 9/11, President Bush announced that the US would “make no distinc6970
defeating the Soviet superpower in Afghanistan and his hopes to defeat America. He 

also saw the 1993 insurrection against US 

peacekeepers in Somalia as a victory for al 

Qaeda and predictive of battles to come, as 

spective US involvement in Afghanistan was 

part of an elaborate al Qaeda trap designed 

to kill Americans; they were certainly aware 

of it. Bin Laden himself drew a correlation 

with the success of the Mujahedeen underdogs 

inability to bring bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to justice during their administrations their 

greatest regrets respectively.83 In the wake of 

the 9/11 attacks, President Bush’s senior military advisors may have advised him that proI remember getting the phone call. Commander Mark Landers, USN, Chief of Imagery Collection Management at HQ USCENTCOM found me at work in 

El Paso three days after the attacks of 9/11. As an intelligence analyst for the Drug Enforcement Administration, I was working late catching up on some 

drug-related reports because word was those of us at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) would be soon helping the FBI put together comprehensive 

packages on 300+ potential terrorists living in the US. After it became clear that it was Middle Eastern terrorists who were responsible for the attacks, 

I was expecting the phone call from USCENTCOM. I was happy to do my part in this new war that had been thrust upon us. 

As an Air Force IMA intelligence officer assigned to USCENTCOM’s imagery collection management division, I was mobilized in early October 2001 

for one year (which was quickly extended to two years) right off the bat. My being there enabled the division to have an O-4 operations officer on duty 

around the clock. I worked from 1800 to 0600, so that my active duty counterpart, a Navy O-4, could work just from 0600 to 1800. There was so much 

work that it was actually about 14-16 hours per day each. Days off were a luxury that we didn’t often have, sometimes for over a month, especially as officers. Doing our jobs right meant getting the needed imagery, saving lives and giving the troops on the ground and crews in the air more keys to success 

in this war effort. During the two invasions (Afghanistan in late 2001-2002 and Iraq in spring 2003), it was my goal to get five hours of sleep per day. 

Each invasion meant three or more 125-hour workweeks strung together (7 x 17-18 hrs) for all of us in the function of imagery collection management. 

Some of our more experienced enlisted, highly technically-skilled personnel were also Air Force Reserve Command IMAs. Once mobilized, we melded 

into one team very well. In this long war, nearly all of the command’s intelligence capability either volunteered or was mobilized.

Colonel Brian C. Guthrie, career intelligence officer, August 2012

INTEL IMAs

We’ve broken a lot of paradigms. The first paradigm to break was intel. Intel was used to being deployed. They had no problem with that in the blue suit 

world. But, hands off on the joint side; you can’t touch these people. They belong to us. We broke that paradigm with Air Staff A2’s assistance. That 

leveled the playing field and got folks to realize this is everybody’s war. We are here to help.

Colonel Nancy C. Zbyszinski, RMG Commander, End Of Tour Interview, November 2010

70
` 

Office of the Press Secretary September 14, 2001 

President Orders Ready Reserves of Armed Forces to Active Duty 

Executive Order 

Ordering the Ready Reserve of the Armed Forces to Active Duty And

Delegating Certain Authorities to the Secretary of Defense And the Secretary of Transportation

 By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) and 

section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in furtherance of the proclamation of September 14, 2001, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, 

which declared a national emergency by reason of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, New York, New York, and the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of 

further attacks on the United States, I hereby order as follows: 

 Section 1. To provide additional authority to the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation to respond to the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks 

on the United States, the authority under title 10, United States Code, to order any unit, and any member of the Ready Reserve not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in 

the Ready Reserve to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months, is invoked and made available, according to its terms, to the Secretary concerned, subject in the case of 

the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, to the direction of the Secretary of Defense. The term “Secretary concerned” is defined in section 101(a)(9) of title 10, United States 

Code, to mean the Secretary of the Army with respect to the Army; the Secretary of the Navy with respect to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard when it is operating 

as a service in the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force with respect to the Air Force; and the Secretary of Transportation with respect to the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a 

service in the Navy. 

 Sec. 2. To allow for the orderly administration of personnel within the armed forces, the following authorities vested in the President are hereby invoked to the full extent provided 

by the terms thereof: section 527 of title 10, United States Code, to suspend the operation of sections 523, 525, and 526 of that title, regarding officer and warrant officer strength and 

distribution; and sections 123, 123a, and 12006 of title 10, United States Code, to suspend certain laws relating to promotion, involuntary retirement, and separation of commissioned 

officers; end strength limitations; and Reserve component officer strength limitations. 

 Sec. 3. To allow for the orderly administration of personnel within the armed forces, the authorities vested in the President by sections 331, 359, and 367 of title 14, United States 

Code, relating to the authority to order to active duty certain officers and enlisted members of the Coast Guard and to detain enlisted members, are invoked to the full extent provided 

by the terms thereof. 

 Sec. 4. The Secretary of Defense is hereby designated and empowered, without the approval, ratification, or other action by the President, to exercise the authority vested in the 

President by sections 123, 123a, 527, and 12006 of title 10, United States Code, as invoked by sections 2 and 3 of this order. 

 Sec. 5. The Secretary of Transportation is hereby designated and empowered, without the approval, ratification, or other action by the President, to exercise the authority vested in 

sections 331, 359, and 367 of title 14, United States Code, when the Coast Guard is not serving as part of the Navy, as invoked by section 2 of this order, to recall any regular officer or 

enlisted member on the retired list to active duty and to detain any enlisted member beyond the term of his or her enlistment. 

 Sec. 6. The authority delegated by this order to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation may be redelegated and further subdelegated to civilian subordinates 

who are appointed to their offices by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

 Sec. 7. Based upon my determination under 10 U.S.C. 2201(c) that it is necessary to increase (subject to limits imposed by law) the number of members of the armed forces on active duty beyond the number for which funds are provided in appropriation Acts for the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense may provide for the cost of such additional 

members as an excepted expense under section 11(a) of title 41, United States Code. 

 Sec. 8. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. 

 Sec. 9. This order is effective immediately and shall be promptly transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register. GEORGE W. BUSH 

 

712
training camps, so we can make sure they 

are no longer operating. 

These demands are not open to negotiation 

or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act 

immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. 

I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your 

faith. It’s practiced freely by many millions 

of Americans, and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its 

teachings are good and peaceful, and those 

who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah. . . .86

BATTLE PLAN – OEF -- AFGHANISTAN IS BORN

US planners developed a strategy to bring al 

Qaeda terrorists to justice, close their training camps, and wrest control of Afghanistan 

from the Taliban regime. Prior to the introduction of the regular military personnel, the 

attacks, namely Osama bin Laden. Rejecting the US ultimatum to hand over bin Laden 

and close terrorist training camps, effectively 

made the Taliban a state sponsor of al Qaeda 

terrorism. President Bush, again in his 20 September speech to Congress and the American 

people explicitly addressed this, saying, 

The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence 

in Afghanistan and support the Taliban regime 

in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda’s vision for the world. 

The United States respects the people of Afghanistan—after all, we are currently its 

largest source of humanitarian aid—but we 

condemn the Taliban regime. It is not only 

repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and 

sheltering and supplying terrorists. By 

aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban 

regime is committing murder. 

And tonight, the United States of America 

makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide 

in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned. Protect foreign journalists, 

diplomats and aid workers in your country. 

Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand 

over every terrorist, and every person in their 

support structure, to appropriate authorities. 

Give the United States full access to terrorist 

“the United States rushed out in shame and 

disgrace.”84

“BY AIDING AND ABETTING

 MURDER”

Although Bush implicated the role of radical 

extremism for its destabilization across the 

world, there was one place above all others 

that the President singled out as a dangerous 

state sponsor of terror. Fulfilling his 11 September assertion that the United States will 

make “no distinction” between terrorists and 

the nations that harbor them, President Bush 

and his national security advisors decided on 

swift action and directed the CIA to initially 

lead undercover operatives against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Bush administration 

planned to leverage the upwelling of international support into a plan to retaliate against 

the al Qaeda terrorist network; its mastermind, 

Osama bin Laden; its sponsor, the Taliban 

regime; and its base of operations, Afghanistan.85

As early as 11 September 2001, the Taliban 

government of Afghanistan denied responsibility for the attacks of 9/11. The Taliban 

government further refused to support efforts 

to extradite the international terrorist immediately suspected of masterminding the 9/11 

Don’t Tread on US

The message is for everybody who 

wears the uniform: get ready. The 

United States will do what it takes to 

win this war.

President George W. Bush, Camp David,

15 September 2001

72
General Czekanski is the one that needed me at Fourth. I needed to go to Fourth. I wasn’t really sure what he wanted me to do because I had never been a Fourth 

Air Force person before. I just knew that General Ryder said, ‘Faylene, you need to go to Fourth,’ and I said, ‘Yes sir, I’m going.’

I was TDY here at AFRC for a Logistics Executive Group meeting. The moment it happened, we were on break. General Ryder was still the A4 at the time. He came 

and got us all. We went in his office where the TV was on. You could have heard a pin drop. It was like everybody had gotten punched in the stomach. We were all 

in shock. We couldn’t believe it happened. Then, of course, that conference was disbanded and we were all—the command was never the same, life was never the 

same—trying to get back to our home units because we were needed. 

I, personally, was in Lackland where I was a group commander at the 433rd and had a new assignment at Fourth Air Force. I had just been picked up, and I was TDY 

en route. My dog was in the slammer; my household goods were gone. I’m in Georgia, and the slammer is in Texas. My car was at the airport in Texas, and I had to 

go to Atlanta. No planes were flying, of course.

I was numb. I had no home in Texas. I had no home in California. I had closed on a house, but there was no furniture or anything waiting there. To be honest, when 

I left here, I didn’t really know what I was going to do in Atlanta. I knew there were no planes flying. My mom and dad lived 45 minutes up the road. I thought I could 

go up there, but that’s not going to get me to California. How am I going to get to California? I drove clear to Dobbins because I felt safe at an Air Force base. I didn’t 

know who I was going to talk to. The gate guards inspected under the car—they just about took the car apart. I talked to the gate guard and asked him what I could 

do to get to California. He said, ‘Well, ma’am, I don’t know, but you can probably go to the Greyhound station.’ I knew where the Greyhound station in Marietta was. 

I went there and bought a one-way ticket to San Antonio. The next step was to turn in the rental car. I tried to keep the rental car and drive it to San Antonio. Oh, 

no, no one would let me do that. When I got to the rental car place, there was no one around for miles. The rental car place had one guy there. I went in. I told him 

I hated to turn in this car. He said, ‘I know, ma’am, but we need the car.’ I said, ‘Okay. You take the car, but I’ve got to get to the Greyhound station downtown. Can 

you at least take me to the Metro place?’ He closed up the shop and drove me to the Metro place. He stayed with me until the train came, and he made sure I got on 

the train. I got on the train and was headed straight downtown to Atlanta. I didn’t even know where I was going. I guess, personally, I had trouble putting everything 

together. I knew that I needed to get to California, but I sure took a circuitous route about getting there. Well, I got off the Metro place and guess who was at the 

bottom of the escalator? One of Atlanta’s finest was standing there in his uniform, and I said, ‘Oh, God bless you.’ He asked if I was okay. I said, ‘Oh, yes. I’m okay 

now because you’re here.’ I asked how to get to the Greyhound station, and he said, ‘Ma’am, I’ve been helping people all day. Let me get you going.’ He got me to 

the Greyhound station, and then, I was around compadres from the airport.

I rode a Greyhound bus from Atlanta, Georgia, to San Antonio, Texas. I met some wonderful folks—people I’m still in touch with today—on the bus trip. They were 

stranded passengers, too. One of their husbands took me to the airport in San Antonio and stayed with me until I got the car out of the parking lot because there was 

no one there. It was very creepy, very scary. I picked up the dog that afternoon and headed west. I drove until I couldn’t stand up. I called General Czekanski. I 

said, ‘I’m coming. I’ll be there.’ He said, ‘Take care of yourself—get here when you can. We need you.’ I hit the crisis action team (CAT) at Fourth a couple of days 

later. I gave my dog to my new neighbors. They didn’t even know me. I had a lot of good, healthy American folks that pitched in and helped me. They were people 

that didn’t know me from Adam. But, anyway, that’s what happens with the American public.

I was brand new to Fourth and a NAF person. I knew there was no one there doing the job. I was needed there to help get an assessment of the capabilities of the 

logistics side for the NAF commander because when you talk about someone attacking us on our soil, that’s all about readiness. We had to provide what was ready in 

the A4 arena. That means logistics, supply, transportation, and maintenance. Keep in mind that I’d never been a NAF person before. I’d been a group commander 

many, many years. I’d moved around many times. I was stepping off into a new job, and other than that, I wasn’t really sure what else he needed. I knew he stood up 

a crisis action team to interface with the command’s CAT. I was going to do my fair share of helping provide oversight to the Fourth Air Force units.

Colonel C. Faylene Wright, Interview, August 2009

RECOLLECTIONS

734
I was a TR working for Twenty-Second Air Force. I had a full-time job working for the airlines. When 9/11 happened, I was not on a trip, so I was at home. Basically, 

I was doing two things militarily. I was a TR supporting Twenty-Second Air Force as well as doing man-days supporting SOCOM. When 9-11 happened, like Colonel Wright said, it affected everybody. I was affected both from the patriotic standpoint in that we kind of felt like we got punched in the stomach but also from the 

financial security standpoint. For myself, knowing that I was working for an airline, I knew it was going to be a devastating blow for my employer and that perhaps 

I would lose my job. So, from that standpoint, it was a little more, and I hate to use the word, personal. Not only was I seeing the dramatic scenes of the towers going 

down, but a day afterwards, I realized this was going to have long-lasting effects on my civilian career. What was really neat to see was that it was almost like a tugof-war. SOCOM wanted me to do mandays and so did Twenty-Second Air Force: both wanted me to work their CATs. My fear of not being employed was certainly 

short lived. I got kind of torn between those two. I eventually did lose my job with US Airways in January.

My kids were younger—five and one year old. My wife was in England doing an annual trip with her friends. Because I worked for US Airways, she was flying space 

available to England. It went from shock and awe to “Okay, what do I need to do to take care of the kids?” When I found out that my next trip was still scheduled, 

I had to find people to take care of my kids. I think, it was Thursday when they started back flying. It was three or four days afterwards, whenever that day was, I 

had a trip scheduled.

It was survival mode, basically. I called my wife everyday to see how she was doing, to see if she could buy a ticket. But, when they started flying again, there were 

no tickets to be found, and she ended up spending two weeks over there. Then, I was trying to make sure my kids were going to be okay. I still had a job to do, both 

on the military side and civilian side. It just so happened that when I got back from my trip, a hurricane—it wasn’t a big one—but a category one hurricane hit the 

west coast of Florida. I was dealing with 9-11, dealing with the kids, dealing with my wife not being there, and dealing with the hurricane. I’d never ridden out a 

hurricane or anything like that before. They said it was going to be 80 mile-per-hour winds. That gets your attention. The power went out for a couple of days.

Basically, I went from being shocked to survival mode and trying to do the things to take care of my family. Along with the multiple jobs that I had to do, I had to 

help get my wife back from England. 

Colonel John A. Hickok, Interview, August 2009 

RECOLLECTIONS

74
stan, and Tajikistan (and later Kyrgyzstan) was 

required to ensure adequate military responses, staging, and logistical resupply efforts. 

In order to gain Pakistani, Uzbek, and Tajjik 

support, war planners had to make abundantly 

clear that the United States military would arrive to free an oppressed people and support 

a popular liberation movement but not to occupy the region. US efforts also included allaying Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 

concerns.90 To mitigate the risks of our allies 

to indigenous movements in their own countries, “it was important that American forces 

be viewed as assisting in the national liberation than invading a nation.”91

ANSWERING THE CALL

As most Americans dealt with the shock of 

the events on 9/11, a number of Air Force Reserve Command Reservists from McGuire Air 

Force Base answered the call for volunteers 

and left for Europe less than a week after the 

9/11 attacks to operate a major air bridge to 

the Middle East from Moron Air Base, Spain, 

facilitating the airlift movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Besides the 

tanker aircrews were planners, logisticians, 

and maintenance personnel supporting the Air 

Force’s air mobility global reach.92 Equally 

engaged, the logistics support, maintenance, 

and aircraft generation personnel of the 439th 

at Westover Air Force Base activated and supported operations at four locations: Westover; 

Moron, Spain; Ramstein Air Base, Germany; 

and Kuwait. In October 2001, the 439th Airback in the United States. The Taliban had 

long pursued these indigenous factions, collectively known as the Northern Alliance. As 

their name suggested, the Taliban’s brutal tactics had largely relegated the rebel’s sphere of 

influence to the most remote northern mountain ranges of the country. Utilizing Army rotor aircraft, CIA planning and financing, Air 

Force fixed-wing airplanes, and a joint contingent of special force operators, well-equipped 

and supplied Northern Alliance fighters would 

launch assaults on Taliban strongholds across 

Afghanistan in October 2001. The first major phase of US operations in Afghanistan was 

scheduled to begin on “Hit Night,” 07 October 

2001. Northern Alliance warlord commanders, 

principally Generals Abdul Rashid Dostum, 

Daoud Khan, Mohammed Ismail Khan, Gul 

Agha Sharzai, and Hamid Karzai, would then 

launch concurrent campaigns against Taliban 

strongholds in the areas of Konduz, Mazar-eSharif, Kabul, and Kandahar. President Bush 

approved the concept on 21 September.89 

Staging in Afghanistan required the consent of 

partner nations in the Gulf region. A number 

of these countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi 

Arabia, had permitted the presence of coalition forces to protect the integrity of their borders from Saddam Hussein’s previous aggression. However, these nations, hosting forces 

for Operations Northern and Southern Watch 

ever since the 1991 Gulf War, were wary of an 

outright invasion of other Muslim states, such 

as Afghanistan. Additionally, the support of 

neighboring nations such as Pakistan, UzbekiCIA and US special forces would enter Afghanistan and do whatever was necessary to 

cause the anti-Taliban resistance movement to 

topple the Taliban. US Air Force air support 

would play a prominent role conducting surgical strikes called in by combat air controllers 

embedded with the freedom fighters. The CIA 

would primarily use cash, arms, and battlefield 

expertise to assist the principal domestic resistance groups, collectively known as the Northern Alliance.87

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld agreed 

with CIA Director George Tenet to pursue a 

limited regular military response, supporting 

agile operatives in country. This compromise, 

calling for a “light, agile force” to swiftly 

overtake Taliban defenses using local resistance, was referred to as the “Rumsfeld Doctrine.” The revolutionary approach of pairing 

clandestine and special forces operatives with 

local fighters and US airpower carried risks. 

However, the pros were numerous: benefiting 

US policymakers by limiting local visibility 

over US military participation, giving regular 

US forces an opportunity to mobilize, and allowing local leaders to initiate the process of 

nation-building.88

The focus was on a quick and decisive retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, enabling the Northern 

Alliance to cast off the restrictive Taliban rule 

and killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and 

his senior lieutenants. The plan essentially 

tapped into an existing conflict while more sizable regular military ground forces mobilized 

7576
civil engineer and security forces augmented 

base needs as was typical during this time. 

349th logistics support personnel pumped 

over 8 million gallons of fuel within the first 

twenty days of Enduring Freedom. This 

pace became the new norm in “ops tempo.” 

Equally, within these first weeks, 349th Reservists from many career fields individually 

deployed to Spain, Germany, Diego Garcia, 

and into theater locations to provide additional support. The 349th security forces’ 

Ravens deployed for Watch and Enduring 

Freedom.96

Stateside, the 507th Air Refueling Wing’s 

personnel deployed on 16 September to support airlift operations from Rota, Spain, and 

Sigonella, Italy.94 Lieutenant Colonel Donald 

Sloan, their operations group commander provided, “since day one we have had continuous 

aircrews either on alert or flying.”95

The 349th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air 

Force Base, California, continued to have its 

C-5 and KC-10 crews support Enduring Freedom missions, generally flying west. Its aerial 

porters folded into its active-duty associate 

operations, working 507 aircraft, over 2,600 

passengers, and over 3,000 tons of cargo utilizing annual tour days in November; 349th 

lift Wing’s C-5s flew nearly 850 hours moving 

personnel, supplies, equipment, and munitions. 

Going west, the C-5 crews would haul munitions from Utah to Diego Garcia. Going east, 

the C-5s went from stateside locations to Moron, to Ramstein, and into Kuwait. In November, the Westover C-5’s work effort exceeded 

900 flying hours and now included missions 

into Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia.93

At Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, the 514th 

Airlift Wing’s C-5 aircrews flew nearly 380 

hours transporting nearly 1,400 passengers and 

almost 4,175 tons of cargo with 125 members 

volunteering for active duty during the month 

of September alone. Of these, 36 logistics 

It [the post 9/11 activity] was interesting in this respect, almost all previous mobilizations have been mobilizations of the flying packages—either the C-5s or the 

KC-10s, or sometimes both. But since it was an attack on America, we mobilized kind of a different set of skills of AFSCs. The one notable exception was SF. We 

mobilized every security forces troop that we had because all of a sudden there was a threat against the base.. . .

To prosecute that campaign [Enduring Freedom], we opened up a ton of bases that we had never been into, in countries that we had never been into. Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, in addition to some of the old standbys, Diego Garcia and we operated out of some other bases in Southwest Asia. Anyway, what that drove 

was an incredible requirement for base operating support. So we mobilized a bunch of our civil engineers.

Not only did we mobilize SF. Not only did we mobilize CE. The vast majority of our mobilization, over 300 folks, was maintenance. The maintenance here at Travis 

is the poster child for how the associate program is supposed to work. We produce roughly 30 percent of the production that goes on the flight line at Travis AFB on 

any given day. It’s pretty obvious that, even prior to mobilization, we are a vital, integrated part of Team Travis maintenance. So, when you mobilize reservists, you 

bring even more than 30 percent. It is a relationship, a capability that the 60th, the active duty knows, understands, and appreciates. And when they mobilize us, 

we don’t bring a bunch of 3 levels. We bring 5 levels and over half our force came home with 7 levels. That’s an incredibly experienced, capable force that came on.

 Colonel James T. Rubeor, 349th Air Mobility Wing Commander, 

 Interview with TSgt Robert Wade, Historian, 24 February 2003

MORE THAN 30 PERCENT

76
ploying four days after September 11th. This 

deployment was planned for months in advance. We knew for a year that we were going 

to deploy on 15 September 2001. So, we had 

trained to be ready for this deployment. The 

first unit that rotated over was from Homestead 

Air Force Base, the 93rd Fighter Squadron—

the Makos. We’ve been doing Northern and 

Southern Watch missions for four-five years as 

well as deployments for Bosnia and Kosovo. 

following 9/11. The command was also fully engaged in executing scheduled Operation 

Southern and Northern Watch rotations to the 

Middle East. 

 “On 15 September 2001, we deployed a fighter squadron to Kuwait to fly Operation Southern Watch in Iraq to protect the Kurdish population. We didn’t deploy over there because of 

September 11th. It just happened we were deKC-135s flew 65 sorties, offloading 2.4 million pounds of fuel during the month of September.97 Likewise the 940th Air Refueling 

Wing immediately commenced support to the 

CAPs defending the homeland.98 Tanker 

crews often performed double duty flying air 

refueling orbits for the CAP flights and then 

the orbits for the air bridges. The above accounts merely highlight some of the Air Force 

Reserve Command’s responses in the weeks 

Lt Col Riley: When did the first RAVENs go out?

SMSgt Sobieski: The first active duty RAVENs went out the day following the attacks—12 September. My first mission was on the 14th of September. It was strictly 

voluntary. We were not mobilized until the 23rd of September. The active-duty side of the house was literally screaming for bodies; they did not have enough RAVENs. 

A message came out from Air Mobility Command saying that every single aircraft launching from the United States had to have a RAVEN team on it. That strained 

the program. Every squadron with RAVENs has a RAVEN Manager. The RAVEN Manager for the 305th Security Forces Squadron [active duty] walked down to 

my office. I was the reserve program manager as well as the unit ART. He told me that his unit was hurting for RAVENs and asked what we could do. I picked up 

the telephone and got a hold of two RAVEN team members who responded to the unit within two hours. The two RAVENs from the 514th (SSgt Eamon Lawlor and 

SrA Richard Mustachio) and I volunteered to take an active duty mission for them. I think we did it in reserve appropriation (RPA) status. Don’t quote me. Although 

RPA status is only supposed to be used for reserve stuff, this was a different situation. We didn’t care where the money came from; we just wanted to be on some sort 

of orders. 

Basically the base went into Force Protection condition Delta, and there was not enough manning from the active-duty side to cover the posts. At the same time, there 

were many Air Force reserve personnel who were so angry that the attacks had happened; they wanted to do something. Instead of sitting at home waiting for a phone 

call, these people kissed their families good-by, left their jobs, travelled to the base and said, ‘Put me to work; we’ll figure out the pay later—put me to work.’ Chief 

Jeffrey Cain was the Twenty-Second Air Force RAVEN Coordinator. I got the authorization from him to send the RAVEN teams out prior to general mobilization.

 

Lt Col Riley: Where did you go on the 14th of September?

 

SMSgt Sobieski: We ended up doing a KC-10 mission to Saudi Arabia. It was a 10-day mission; we flew through Moron, Spain. We were escorting F-16s that were 

going to Saudi Arabia. After landing at Moron, we were glued to the news and television sets. After we landed, we were released for the day, and we went into the 

town of Seville. People were walking up to us and were shaking our hands, patting us on the back, and saying how sorry they were that this happened to us. It was 

a comforting feeling. 

 

 Senior Master Sergeant Anthony J. Sobieski Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Teresa M. Riley, 2008

AFRC RAVENS RESPOND

778
September, the first formations began to disappear over the horizon en route to Naval 

Support Facility Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory, to prepare for strikes 

against air defense and terrorist training 

facilities in Afghanistan.101 Also, at this 

time, upon receiving a call for assistance, 

the 507th Air Refueling Wing assembled a 

group of volunteers and KC-135s to support 

the air bridge across the Pacific Ocean for 

five weeks.102

Air Force after the 1991 

Gulf War, the 

93rd Bomb 

S q u a d r o n , 

917th Wing, 

B a r k s d a l e 

Air Force 

Base, had 

just entered a 

deployment 

vulnerability, “AEF bucket,” making them 

available for unexpected emergency contingency operations 

around the world.100 Following the grounding of the aircraft 

during the Force Protection Delta 

conditions, the 917th Wing reinstated flying training operations 

on 19 September in preparation 

for their impending deployment. 

The unit received activation orders for over 370 personnel and 

nine of the unit’s B-52s. On 24 

So, this was not new to us,” remarked Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, who was then the 

Tenth Air Force Commander.99 In so doing, 

Bradley observed that the Air Force Reserve 

Command had been involved in Iraq just as 

long as the active units, five years, controlling 

Saddam Hussein’s airspace as an enduring 

“steady-state” force provider. It was the Total 

Force nature of the operation—and a little bit 

of luck—that resulted in the command’s fighter units being among the first participants in 

Operation Enduring Freedom.

Likewise, as part of the Aerospace Expeditionary Force—AEF—concept adopted by the 

Flat on his belly and thirty minutes into the KC-135 mission, 

Airman First Class Chris Norris waited for the C-5 to show in 

his window. Within minutes, he had the C-5 in view; the aircraft was now just thirty feet off the tail of the KC-135 ready 

for Norris to work his magic as the boom operator, guiding 

the boom to the C-5’s fuel receptacle. “I visualize what I’m 

doing while my hands are doing it. I just don’t miss,” remarked Norris. Some thirty minutes later, the C-5 backed 

away ready to continue its mission with 120,000 pounds of 

fuel. Well satisfied, Norris expressed: “The job I do—air 

refueling—is just awesome.” 

Norris and the rest of the aircrews and maintainers from the 

931st Air Refueling Group and the 507th Air Refueling Wing 

were volunteering to be part of the action while allowing 

other units time to activate. Returning home in late October, 

they had supported the Pacific Tanker Air Bridge for more 

than five weeks in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

TANKER AIR BRIDGE ACROSS 

THE PACIFIC – 2001

78
sions relating to Operation Enduring Freedom 

and later Operation Iraqi Freedom.106 

 

The presidential authorization for Reserve and 

2001 and headed east.104 

Regular Air Force C-17 aircraft with Air 

Force Reserve crewm e m b e r s 

from the 

315th Air 

M o b i l -

ity Wing, 

Charleston 

Air Force 

Base, South 

C a r o l i n a , 

deployed to 

Germany in 

advance of 

O p e r a t i o n 

E n d u r i n g 

Freedom as 

well. C-17 crews also continued to support 

channel operations across the Atlantic.105

As plans unfolded, the demand for AWACS 

resources intensified so much so that NATO 

AWACS assets provided for US homeland 

defense requirements under Operation Eagle 

Assist. This allowed the activated 513th Air 

Control Group E-3 crews to report to Incirlik 

Air Base, Turkey to backfill the AEF rotation 

in Operation Northern and Southern Watch. 

This enduring commitment by the United 

States to protect the predominantly Kurdish 

populations of northern Iraq from Saddam 

Hussein resulted in the 513th Air Control 

Group’s crews availability for critical misSimilarly, Air Force Reserve special operators 

responded. We were “tasked to activate . . . all 

aircrew positions assigned to the Combat Talons,” Captain Steven L. English, 919th Mission Support Flight, clarified.103 Approximately 500 members from the 919th Special 

Operations Wing along with their specialized 

MC-130 aircraft were activated in September 

ONE

 Missions Flying Hours

C-5 12 24.5

C-17 12 61.3

C-130 57 270.1

C-141 38 240.0

KC-135 316 1522.5

KC-10 32 219.2

Total 467 2337.6

OEF

 Missions Flying Hours

C-5 396 3340.9

C-17 339 3939.2

C-130 10 25.8

C-141 49 462.5

KC-135 284 1069.3

KC-10 10 105.7

Total 1088 8943.4

AFRC SUMMARY

25 NOVEMBER 2001

NATO evoked the collective defense clause of Article 5 in its 1949 North Atlantic 

Treaty for the first time following the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States, 

showing support for the United States and condemning the attack. Subsequently, the 

United States requested NATO airborne early warning and control force assistance. 

From 9 October 2001 until 16 May 2002, five NATO E-3As, crews, and support 

personnel from 13 nations deployed to Tinker Air Force Base and flew 447 sorties 

and 4,719 flying hours under Operation Eagle Assist. They guarded American cities, nuclear power plants, bridges, and major sporting events. As Major General Johann G. Dora, NATO AEW&CF Commander, expressed the NATO members were 

pleased to be “able to return some of the overwhelming support provided by the 

United States of America to Europe after World War II.”

NATO AWACS – OPERATION EAGLE ASSIST

7980
And by November 2001, Air Force Reservists’ Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom 

combined work effort exceeded 1,500 missions and 11,000 flying hours.109

By the end of September 2001, the Air Force 

Reserve Command had launched 275 missions 

totaling 1,447.8 hours. Air Force Reserve aircrews had already moved 149 passengers and 

4,682,091 tons of cargo to support a war that 

would not begin for another seven days.108

National Guard mobilizations on 20 September 2001 included 5,131 members divided 

among 29 air reserve component units (Air 

Force Reserve and Air National Guard).107

With thousands already volunteering and serving, this mobilization call up illuminated the 

active military’s immediate reliance on reserve 

forces in the national security environment of 

the twenty-first century. It also portended the 

near future. 

AFRC UNITS SUPPORTING ONE

NORAD QRF/RRF

513 ACG 94 AW

434 AW 302 AW

452 AMW 440 AW

507 ARW 908 AW

916 ARW 910 AW

927 ARW 911 AW

931 ARW 914 AW

 934 AW

AFRC UNITS SUPPORTING OEF

Mobilized Volunteer

433 AW 315 AW

439 AW 349 AMW

434 ARW 445 AW

507 ARW 446 AW

513 ACG 452 AMW

916 ARW 459 AW

917 WG 512 AW

919 SOW 514 AMW

920 RQG

AFRC SUPPORT 

NOVEMBER 2001

September 11, 2001 changed life in the United States forever, and its impact on Air Force Reserve operations will also be felt for a long time to come. Perhaps more so than any other potential scenario for 

military operations, it highlighted the huge importance and unique missions of the Air Force Reserve.

Air Force Reserve aeromedical evacuation (AE) aircrews were among the first to respond and provided 

almost half of the immediate AE response that was provided. Tragically, we found there was little need for 

their service. The larger need was in mortuary affairs support, of which the Air Force Reserve provides 

more than 75 percent of our Air Force’s capability. One hundred eighty-six trained Reservists immediately stepped forward, in volunteer status, for this demanding mission. Reserve airlift crews were among 

the first to bring in critical supplies, equipment and personnel, including emergency response teams from 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), fire trucks, search dogs, and earth moving equipment. F-16 fighters and KC-135 air refueling tankers immediately began pulling airborne and ground 

alert to provide combat air patrol support over major US cities. They were quickly joined by our AWACS 

aircrews and our C-130 aircrews under the direction of NORAD in support of Operation Noble Eagle.

The response of our Reservists in this time of crisis has been simply overwhelming. Over 11,000 Air Force 

Reservists have been mobilized, and thousands more continue to provide daily support as volunteers. 

Three thousand of those mobilized are Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), providing critical 

support to the Unified Commands, MAJCOMs, and various defense agencies supporting Homeland Security efforts. Required support functions span the entire breadth of Reserve capabilities... security forces, 

civil engineering, rescue, special operations, strategic and tactical airlift, air refueling, fighters, bombers, AWACs, command and control, communications, satellite operations, logistics, intelligence, aerial 

port, services, and medical. Never have I been so proud to be part of the outstanding group of patriots 

who make up the Air Force Reserve Command. 

Equally important to the Air Force Reserve Command’s ability to meet the requirements being levied on 

us is family and employer support. Their sacrifices and support make it possible for our members to carry 

out their duties in such a spectacular manner.

Congressional Statement Lieutenant General James E. Sherrard III, AFRC Commander & Chief Air 

Force Reserve, February, 2002 

AIR FORCE RESERVE CHANGED FOREVER

80
812
82
 

 7 October 2001

Mr. President:

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following armed attacks that were 

carried out against the United States on September 11, 2001.

On September 11, 2001, the United States was the victim of massive and brutal attacks in the states of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. These attacks 

were specifically designed to maximize the loss of life; they resulted in the death of more than five thousand persons, including nationals of 81 countries, 

as well as the destruction of four civilian aircraft, the World Trade Center towers and a section of the Pentagon. Since September 11, my Government has 

obtained clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in 

the attacks. There is still much we do not know. Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may find that our self-defense requires further actions with respect 

to other organizations and other States.

The attacks on September 11, 2001, and the ongoing threat to the United States and its nationals posed by the Al-Qaeda organization have been made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by this organization as a base of operation. Despite 

every effort by the United States and the international community, the Taliban regime has refused to change its policy. From the territory of Afghanistan, 

the Al-Qaeda organization continues to train and support agents of terror who attack innocent people throughout the world and target United States nationals and interests in the United States and abroad.

In response to these attacks, and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, United States armed forces have initiated 

actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. These actions include measures against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and 

military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In carrying out these actions, the United States will continue its humanitarian efforts to alleviate the suffering of the people of Afghanistan. We are providing them with food, medicine and supplies.

I ask that you circulate the text of the present letter as a document of the Security Council. 

Sincerely,

John D. Negroponte

Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations

NEGROPONTE LETTER TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT

834
Force/Air Force 

Reserve Command KC-135 

Stratotanker and 

KC-10 Extender 

aircraft were 

critical to the 

success, as the 

fighters alone 

required two inflight refuelings each way to travel the hundreds of miles in land. Intelligence, special 

operations, rescue, and E-3 AWACS crews and 

aircraft lent their vital support as well. Opening night targets included the Taliban’s national headquarters; Kandahar airport’s radar; 

a Taliban tank concentration; the headquarters 

of two Taliban divisions near the northern city 

of Mazar-e-Sharif engaged against Northern Alliance General Abdul Rashid Dostum’s 

forces; Taliban positions around Bagram Air 

Base north of Kabul, the capital; a bin Laden 

training camp south of Jalalabad; and Taliban 

Scud missile launchers, which the administration believed might be used against Pakistan 

for granting staging and over flight access.2

under both of its massive wings. The ground 

crew knew the significance of this mission. 

More than fifty airmen gathered, some clambering atop the fire truck, to snap pictures, 

wave American flags, yell, and wish the crew 

well; all were quietly hoping for a successful 

mission and retaliation for the terrorist attacks 

on America less than a month before.1

After nightfall, the B-52 from AFRC’s 93rd 

Bomb Squadron, 917th Wing, along with other Air Force forward-deployed B-52s at Diego 

Garcia crossed into enemy airspace, beginning 

a carefully orchestrated process of target acquisitions and precision ordinance releases on 

targets across Afghanistan. The mission comprised President George W. Bush’s initial response to Mullah Omar’s refusal to apprehend 

Osama bin Laden and surrender him for trial. 

Additionally, the crew’s mission was to disrupt 

al Qaeda terrorist training activities and neutralize Taliban air defense capabilities in Afghanistan, ensuring uncontested air supremacy. In all, 5 Air Force B-1 and 10 Air Force/

Air Force Reserve Command B-52 bombers, 

2 Air Force B-2 stealth bombers, and 25 Navy 

F-14 and F/A-18 fighters from the USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson in the North Arabian Sea carried out the massive air attack. 

Moreover, 50 Tomahawk land-attack missiles 

rained down on high-priority targets from 

three destroyers (USS McFaul, USS John Paul 

Jones, and USS O’Brien), one cruiser (USS 

Philippine Sea), and two nuclear attack submarines (US and UK). Air refueling support 

from British RAF TriStar and VC-10 and Air 

These, the first bombs to fall on Afghanistan, 

were the inaugural step in an initial successful operation. However, the 7 October 

strikes achieved more limited results—similar to President Bill Clinton’s cruise missile 

response in the wake of the 1998 embassy 

bombings of Kenya and Tanzania. Only 

through sustained air assaults and a decisive ground offensive would the ascendancy 

of the Northern Alliance forces be assured. 

The military needed to do well against not 

only fixed and coordinated forces but also 

very mobile and individual targets in remote 

and mountainous terrain.

With Afghanistan a landlocked country, the movement of forces into the 

country hinged on airlift 

and tanker resources. Diplomatic efforts eventually 

secured the use of airfields 

in neighboring countries. 

Pakistan offered Shahbaz 

Air Base near Jacobabad 

and other fields, but the 

84
 

 

 

 

News Release

 IMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 491-01 October 07, 2001

 

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld released today the following statement: 

Good afternoon. We have said since September 11 that the campaign against terrorism will be broad, sustained, and that we will use every 

element of American influence.

Today, the president has turned to direct, overt military force to complement the economic, humanitarian, financial, and diplomatic activity 

already well underway.

The effect we hope to achieve through the raids, which, together with our coalition partners, we have initiated today, is to create conditions 

for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations in Afghanistan. That requires that, among other things, we first remove the 

threat from air defenses and from Taliban aircraft. 

We also seek to raise the cost of doing business for foreign terrorists who have chosen Afghanistan from which to organize their activities, 

and for the oppressive Taliban regime that continues to tolerate the terrorist presence in those portions of Afghanistan they control. 

The current military operations are focused on achieving several outcomes. To: 

Make it clear to the Taliban leaders and their supporters that harboring terrorists is unacceptable and carries a price.

Acquire intelligence to facilitate future operations against Al Qaida and the Taliban regimes who harbor the terrorists. 

Develop relationships with groups in Afghanistan that oppose the Taliban regime and the foreign terrorists they support. 

Make it increasingly difficult for the terrorists to use Afghanistan freely as a base of operations. 

Alter the military balance over time, by denying to the Taliban its offensive systems that hamper the progress of the various opposition forces. 

Provide humanitarian relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive living conditions. 

US Department of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

8586
I want to reiterate a point President Bush has made often and that he made again today. The United States has organized armed coalitions 

on several occasions since the Cold War for the purpose of denying hostile regimes the opportunity to oppress their own or other people. 

In Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the United States took action on behalf of Muslim populations against outside 

invaders or oppressive regimes. The same is true today. We stand with those Afghans who are being repressed by a regime that abuses the 

very people it purports to lead and harbors terrorists who have attacked and killed thousands of innocent people around the world-of all 

religions, races and nationalities. 

While our raids today focus on the Taliban and the foreign terrorists in Afghanistan, our aim remains much broader. Our objective is to 

defeat those who use terrorism, and those that house or support them. 

The world stands united in this effort. It is not about a religion, an individual terrorist, or a country. Our partners in this effort represent 

nations and peoples of all cultures, religions, and races. 

We share the belief that terrorism is a cancer on the human condition, and we intend to oppose it wherever it is. 

The operation today involved a variety of weapons systems, and it originated from a number of separate locations. We used land and sea 

based aircraft, surface ships and submarines, and employed a variety of weapons to achieve our objectives. 

As President Bush mentioned in his statement, dozens of countries contributed in specific ways to this mission, including transit and landing rights, basing opportunities, and intelligence support. In this mission, we are particularly grateful for the direct military involvement 

of forces from Great Britain. 

To achieve the outcomes we seek, it is important to go after air defense and Taliban aircraft. We need freedom to operate on the ground 

and in the air, and the targets selected, if successfully destroyed, should permit an increasing degree of freedom over time. 

We have also targeted command facilities for those forces we know support terrorist elements within Afghanistan, and critical terrorist 

sites. 

As President Bush has repeatedly emphasized, we will hold accountable any who help terrorists, as well as the terrorists themselves. 

86
the country with 

millions living in 

neighboring countries. The harsh 

conditions had limited life expectancy 

to a mere 43 years.5

These airdrops vividly underscored 

the distinction the 

Bush Administration was making 

between the hostile Taliban and al Qaeda and the people of 

Afghanistan. Beginning on 7 October 2001, 

C-17 Globemaster III crews transported 

roughly 37,500 MRE’s on two aircraft missions.6 These two missions were the C-17’s 

first combat missions, first combat airdrops, 

and first humanitarian missions for Enduring 

Freedom.7 On 9 October, two GlobemasReserve aircrews from the 437th, 315th, 62nd, 

and 446th Airlift Wings at Charleston and McChord Air Force Bases, respectively, initiated 

airdrops of humanitarian goods from Ramstein 

Air Base, Germany, to displaced persons in 

eastern and northern Afghanistan. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed, 

these efforts were to “provide humanitarian 

relief to Afghans suffering truly oppressive 

living conditions.”4 Decades of war, a poor 

economy, and the worst drought in thirty years 

had displaced at least 900,000 Afghans within 

distances from bases in Europe were still too 

great to serve as a logistical hub. The former 

Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan expressed interest, and US and Uzbekistan negotiations 

reached an agreeable conclusion on 5 October 

over the use of Karshi-Khanabad (K-2). With 

the campaign about to commence, transport 

planes immediately began arriving every two 

hours. With runways too short for the C-5 Galaxy, the C-5 transports offloaded their cargo at 

Ramstein Air Base in Germany or at locations 

in Spain, Italy, and Turkey for the C-17 Globemasters and C-130 Hercules to haul forward 

into K-2. K-2 would serve as an initial staging 

point and logistical resupply as well as a launch 

point for combat search and rescue (CSAR) efforts, if needed. Critical to the fight was the 

arrival of the Army’s 5th Special Forces Group 

along with Air Force and Air Force Reserve 

special operations resources, and the aviation, 

signal, and infantry elements that were part of 

the famed 10th Mountain Division. Eventually, US diplomatic efforts reached accords with 

Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan over 

support. Kyrgyzstan offered three air bases 

and, then in December 2001, allowed use of 

the Manas Airport near the capital of Bishkek. 

Manas would become a major trans-shipment 

point and logistical hub for the war effort in 

Afghanistan.3 The air mobility supply lifeline 

was being laid in. 

C-17 HUMANITARIAN AID AIRDROPS

Concurrent with the bombing campaign, C-17 

Globemaster IIIs with Air Force and Air Force 

During loadmaster Senior Master Sergeant Ken’s humanitarian missions over Afghanistan, he 

described the magnitude of the operation, explaining that each modern C-17 airdrop was the 

equivalent to 14 cargo aircraft used in the Berlin Airlift after World War II. Ken described 

that “There were just rows and rows of pallets getting ready to go every day. It was one mass 

assembly line. The scale of this operation is very impressive.” All told, Ken expressed his 

satisfaction with his first five operational missions to assist the poverty-stricken areas of the 

country suffering with warfare and temperatures 40 below zero. “I’m very proud to have been 

able to help in any way in this.”

JUST ROWS AND ROWS

878
“The mission was different because we 

were operating several thousand feet above 

what we normally operate—about 10 to 15 

thousand feet higher,” Colonel Allardice 

expressed. “Physiologically we don’t normally fly that high due to the dangers to an 

individual. If someone had come unplugged 

[from their oxygen source] and was exposed, 

they would have been unconscious in 30 seconds and dead in five minutes.”10 Physiological technicians were on board to oversee 

the safety of the aircrews. These missions 

continued through the end of 2001 with 

2.4 million rations dropped. On one of the 

last missions, Air Force Reserve Command 

crews performed the 2,000,000th humanitarian daily ration delivered to the people of 

Afghanistan.11 It was not a task to be taken 

lightly. Attempting to earn the “hearts and 

minds” of the Afghani people, who had suffered under the yoke of oppression for over 

two decades, required airlift diplomacy.12

There were also lessons. The higher than 

normal altitudes did rupture the packages, 

spoiling the food. The bright yellow packages were the same color as bombs. Not all 

packages reached those intended, as local 

warlords collected and sold the packages for 

profit.13 Relief agencies generally regarded 

such airdrops best only in dire circumstances and to isolated refugees due to a host of 

issues that ranged from failure to reach the 

neediest to triggering migrations to the drop 

locations and thereby worsening conditions. 

Nonetheless, agencies expressed that Afghan 

back ramp, the slipstream then burst opened 

the boxes, and rations rained down. Each ration package contained two 2,200 calorie-rich 

vegetarian meals, enough for two days. These 

missions were the first of the $320 million in 

aid for the people of Afghanistan that the President had pledged.8

Once there, the mission was far from over. 

Colonel Bob Allardice, the Air Force mission 

commander of the Total Force effort, described 

the airdrops over unusually high terrain and at 

high altitudes in an active combat theater as, 

“very dangerous,” citing the need to depressurize the planes to open the cargo doors and 

pitch the aircraft to jettison the supplies of 

food rations, blankets, wheat, and leaflets.9

ters delivered another 35,000 rations during 

a 22-hour and 6,500-mile roundtrip circuit 

from Ramstein to Afghanistan. Coalition, Air 

Force, and Air Force Reserve Command tankers provided the multiple air refuelings needed. In the night sky, flashes of fire alerted the 

crew to the danger. To ensure the safety of the 

operation and to create a wide dispersing pattern to minimize injury to those on the ground, 

the C-17 delivery method was at high altitudes 

and used the novel tri-wall aerial delivery systems, TRIADS, a first. As the loadmasters orchestrated the oversized cardboard boxes affixed on static lines over the rollers and out the 

88
8990
90
Col Bowers: HRO, humanitarian ration operations, had never been done with large airplanes under these conditions. We utilized what was called TRIADS, which was basically a large refrigerator box. We had not been trained on this at that time. It was at altitudes that I had never dropped at; it was in 

excess of 24,000 feet. It was done in two, three, and four-ship formations, and there was no technical data that you would utilize to determine your release 

point for these items. Also, it was the first time in a non-training environment that I had the chance to really look at an air tasking order. And, it was not 

very different from what Colonel Greg Vitalis and I had flown for CENTRAZBAT in 1997 when we flew nonstop to Kazakhstan.

Col Vitalis: That mission won the David Shilling Award. Three of those eight airplanes had Air Force Reservists in them.

Col Bowers: There was little or no margin of error on some of this stuff. There was a refueling that occurred, and some fairly long days that were part 

of this HRO.

At that point, we were rendezvousing with tankers, I believe, out of Incirlik. Then, as we transitioned from an aerial delivery to an airland method, we 

still used the same tracks, but the tankers then transitioned to more of an international flavor. In fact, there were perhaps Italian if not Turkish tankers. 

Later, there were NATO tankers. But what strikes me during the initial October-November time frame was a lot of the stuff was very specialized, highlyskilled, requirements.

These HDRs would blow up like big balloons, and then they would disgorge them out of the back of the airplane in these big refrigerator boxes. After the 

first week, they figured out that the Afghanis were a little concerned. The Afghanis did not know what these were; so then, we started dropping the leaflets 

out. The interesting thing from a Westerner is that you read this right-to-left as you go through the pictorial of this. So, we were dropping the leaflets out 

along with these HDRs.

Col Vitalis: Being at HQ AFRC, I did not fly that much; I got a chance to fly maybe once a quarter. I actually went on long trips and would tend to fly 

with folks I had flown with. But going to Bagram, you are talking about going out there. You go get the briefing, and the day starts. It is going to be a 

long day, so bring plenty of food.

For this, you alert 4 hours and 15 minutes prior to departure. You decide whether you are going to eat before or stop and eat on the way out, and to be 

sure you had enough supplies for that long a day. Twenty-six was not the longest day; twenty-six was typical. I flew everything from 23 to 30 hours. So, 

you would have plenty of stuff with you.

Colonel Bowers was talking about how Ramstein kept their quiet hours. Frankfurt still got mad about noise complaints. You could imagine, as we were 

there at maximum gross weight headed out. So, you needed to stay away from the noise sensors, or you were going to get complaints. For guys like me 

who were not flying at home much, I always reviewed carefully those procedures. Then, you finished preflighting and had to be sure that we made our 

appropriate departure time. There was a lot that happened in those four hours in the push to get off the ground. Because the airplanes staged through 

there, there was always ongoing maintenance work and all those kinds of things. Obviously, the loadmasters had to be sure you had the right guys and the 

right load on the airplane. But really, you knew that it was interesting and significant from having flown years earlier—just flying over Eastern Europe, 

places you would have avoided and had never been close to. Now, you are flying over the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine and talking 

to all these folks. Until probably my very last flight in a C-141 (I went to Baku, Azerbaijan, into St. Petersburg, Russia) but even when we were doing that 

C-17 AIRLIFTERS

912
flight, there was still a buffer zone. We still had to go over the Baltic. And in this effort, there was really no change. It just depended on the accent, 

whether somebody would converse with us a lot in English. We would get a tanker over the Black Sea, and then again, you would see trackless areas 

and no roads. There is nothing in central Asia, if you are flying out there. 

The first time we flew into Bagram, and as you get closer, there is nothing. Then, you go get your gas, which was always important when you really 

need it. You build up your anticipation because now we are going to talk to the AWACs (airborne warning and control system) to be sure we understand 

who is where and that we are in the right place at the right time. Again, separation is pretty much by you being at the right altitude at the right place, 

listening for other folks, trying to be sure there is nothing big happening as you are going into Bagram. 

I thought it was kind of funny—they told me half the runway was closed, but it took me a minute or two to figure out they did not mean front or back 

half, but left half. So, that was another thing I had never, ever seen before. I had landed on narrow runways. The runway width was okay. But, it is 

very different landing on a narrow runway, which had finished and grass sides, to landing on half of a runway that has six- and eight-foot deep holes in 

the left hand side as you are going past in your airplane. To me, that was unusual. Half the runway was closed. So, we went there. As Colonel Bowers 

was saying, even during daytime, the turn with an airplane that size, taking your time and doing all that, was very interesting. We spent our time there. 

Then coming back out, you would find that you got the gas to go direct or refuel in what was Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. If you stopped there, it was 

like going back to the old communist Soviet empire with all the procedures on what you needed to do. Our ALCE, airlift control, folks were there; it 

always took three or four hours because that was just the way it was, with big pictures of the leaders and all that stuff everywhere. Huge airport! It 

was the same when we did CENTRAZBAT. And, it was like the graveyard of Aeroflots, just pieces of airplanes everywhere. It had two huge runways. 

And then, you would arrive back in the dark. Winter in Central Europe is pretty low weather, so you would be listening to the weather. Do you have 

the gas? Really, by the time you were done, big deep breath, as Colonel Bowers said. If you do two, three, or four of those in a row, it was tough.

Col Bowers: Chronic fatigue is probably as big a threat for any large airplane individual that is out there. Chronic fatigue can have the same consequences as the bad guys being lucky with a missile shot.

Col Vitalis: As we got into 2002, we set up procedures. There was a lot of work with the Air Mobility Command on all the different OPORDS, all the 

different rules of flying, all the coordination on that, keeping track of where all our folks were going, and being sure that we knew what was available 

to give that information to the leadership. Really, we had resources going across the board—everything from airlift, to refueling, to B-52s there in 

Diego Garcia. Our C-141s did a great job. Additionally, there was a lot of our regular work still going on. We were supporting the Forge exercise in 

Europe, and we were doing Oak missions in South America. We had the Deep Freeze resupply effort to Antarctica, too. We had all the other normal 

things going on, too, that still needed doing such as flying the weather missions and fire fighting responses.

While there was a lot going on in Afghanistan, it was tying up in terms of what was happening on the ground and looking pretty good. We were all 

wondering about what was going to happen with Iraq. If it was this much effort for relatively a small ground force in Afghanistan, what is it going to 

be like in Iraq?

Colonel Bruce A. Bowers, AFRC A3 deputy director, and Colonel Gregory L. Vitalis, AFRC A5/8 program manager organizational/force structure, 

Interview, April 2010

 

92
934
94
We had been in Kuwait since 8 October 2001 supporting Operation Southern Watch, when the war in Afghanistan kicked off. The A-10 

Thunderbolts, located in theater, were originally tasked to forward deploy to a classified base. Although they never did deploy, they ended 

up standing down for the preparation. My unit of F-16 Fighting Falcons picked up the A-10’s close air support tasking. I was the lead CAS 

pilot and ended up on 24-hour alert status for almost a week. On the morning of the 22nd, the squadron commander knocked on my door 

at 4 a.m., told me that the unit was flying four aircraft into Afghanistan, and I was chosen as the flight leader. We prepared for an 11 a.m. 

briefing.

The four pilots included Lieutenant Colonels Gary Batinich, Mike Poggi, Tom Carpenter, and me. We ended up with less than 45 minutes 

to review our flight profile, threats and target area tactics. The mission route had us flying down the Persian Gulf, around Iran, and then 

entering the area of responsibility through Pakistan. The total flight time was approximately three hours, but it required joining up with 

two different aerial tankers, and transiting through eight different countries airspace.

The flight departed on time, but we soon began encountering difficulties. The assigned air-to-air refueling [AAR] tanker apparently had 

to abort the flight and was not at the pre-designated rendezvous location. I slowed the flight down to maximize our fuel consumption 

rate, to increase our range, and used my wingmen to coordinate with higher headquarters for additional AAR assets. A scrambled tanker 

miraculously reached our flight with minutes to spare. Any longer, and we would have had to divert our aircraft to an alternate airfield 

of questionable status.

We had been tasked to strike an Army barracks just north of Herat with laser guided 500-pound bombs. Unfortunately, an errant bomb 

from an F-18 Hornet had blown out the windows of a nearby hospital just hours before our time-on-target. The media was all over the 

area covering that, so my flight was sent to an area right on the northern border where the forces of the Northern Alliance were engaged 

with Afghan forces. When I checked in on the designated radio frequency I was given an American voice that simply said, ‘The good guys 

are on horses and the bad guys have vehicles – if you see a vehicle kill it!’

Then, the target area was covered with an abundance of low clouds, making it almost impossible to find any vehicles. At one point, I had a 

World War-II style half-tracked truck locked up but could not get the clearance to drop a bomb before the clouds closed in again. Luckily, 

all the jet noise put the fear of death into the bad guys, and they disengaged from their fight with the friendly forces.

Up until that time, in both combat and training missions, the pilots were given an ingress and egress route with specific target locations 

that included photos. Sometimes, we had alternate targets, but these were usually close to the primary objective. In Operation Enduring 

Freedom, the entire country was the target area.

At this point, the airborne warning and control [AWAC] system broke in over the radio and directed us to a KC-10 Extender to obtain gas 

for a priority tasking. An RQ-1B Predator had located a high-value target in the city of Kandahar, which was at the opposite end of the 

FIRST F-16 MISSION

9596
country from where we were. We were given a set of coordinates but had no imagery or even a map of the city. All we were told is that 

it was an ‘L’ shaped building one mile south of the airport. After discussing it with my wingman, we decided that neither one of us was 

confident enough to confirm the precise target location and told the mission director that we weren’t going to drop. As it turned out, after 

landing and seeing the imagery we would have dropped on the wrong house.

We had been in the air for almost 7 hours and were exhausted and out of gas, We topped off our fuel tanks from another KC-10 and headed 

back home with all our bombs still on board – probably one of the hardest things I’ve ever had to do in the jet.

I had been flying fighters for over 20 years and thought that I had been exposed to just about everything that anyone could throw at me, 

but nothing I had ever done, seen, or heard of, even approached the fluidity and chaos of that 10-hour mission.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Brill, 419th Fighter Wing

96
The operation we started was called Pony Express. There were not a lot of maps and charts, imagery, and stuff like that over Afghanistan. The people 

that build that—the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA], then the National Imagery and Mapping Agency—were scattered in several 

places around the country. At the speed of light, they were building new maps, charts, satellite pictures, terrain data, all the things that you need to 

go and do operations anywhere in the world. When Lieutenant Colonel Paul Hastert and I left and went forward, we took the few things that we had. 

These were paper maps and things like that. 

When we actually got forward, working initially out of Jacobabad, Pakistan, there was very little data available in the form of high resolution maps. 

What we did have was something that might be comparable to a map of the eastern United States. 

So, if you take a look at those maps, those are the ones that we had that were in a digital format and were available. We loaded those into our computers and CDs at that time. That was well before we had these big massive hard drives that we use today. We went forward. We were supporting the 

special operations guys that were working out of Pakistan at the time. So, we brought the best available military maps.

As they continued to make new maps, charts, and terrain data, they were cranking it out and putting it on CDs. You’ve got to remember, in 2001, we 

didn’t have the cell-phone capacity that we have today. Some of the units that were forward had these ‘Bat phones’ that the special ops guys had access to. They would make phone calls back, talking about the areas that they were going to support, the data that they needed, and so forth. 

We were on the ground in theater, when Operation Enduring Freedom kicked off. A lot of the requests came from there. We didn’t know until probably 

a couple of weeks later that the pipeline was clogged. That’s when we started flying back and forth. Lieutenant Colonel Hastert and I would come 

back and forth, load up our data, and carry it over. We took the rotator over.

Our little phrase that we used in those days was ‘Face First.’ When took our data forward, we would go and give it to Colonel ‘Face’ Nichols first, 

to make sure that our F-16 and F-15 fliers had the latest data available on the planet to do their mission. You talk about some real heroes of the day. 

These guys were flying single-seat F-16s ten to twelve hours round-trip with six to seven refuelings. Then, we would set up our replication process 

there. In the process, we also hooked up with the Navy.

When we got back to Jacobabad Air Base, Pakistan, we would immediately give the CD to the Predator guys. They were providing a lot of eyes to 

the operations that were going on. We also wanted to make sure that the Air Force special operations gunships and all those guys had all that they 

needed. We would go around from place to place delivering these CDs. Colonel Hastert is much more technically-inclined than I. He would typically 

sit at the keyboard, download these CDs, and give the updated FalconView software to the people that we would come across. Our little Pony Express 

was extremely important. There was no way those CDs were getting forward by any other means at that time. Very soon, then Captain Mike Miller 

came on active duty, deployed, and came forward. Captain Miller and I ran all over the place. We supported many operational locations, many of 

which are still in operation today. I’m going back over to do the 43rd trip. 

PONY EXPRESS

978
By 2003, we had a well-established pipeline and standard operating procedures in place. We would try to find folks that had needs and had no way of 

getting stuff. We would always have a bag full of stuff with us. We would go and try to find folks that needed the data, software, and, in many cases, 

hardware as well. I think that the numbers that are recorded indicated that we provided the support to fifty-eight operational locations and fourteen 

countries. 

When we went into Iraq, the same story unfolded all over again. Our purpose in life was to get up into Tallil Air Base, as it was called at the time, 

and establish a ground operation. We wanted to pump our data in to support mission planning for what was coming in, which was mostly the A-10s. 

Eventually, when we got to Baghdad, we moved our operation up there. As soon as they got the Al-Faw Palace secured, we were there. The reason 

for that is that everybody needs to have a map depot. It’s not something that people think of a lot of times, especially in the bigger, broader sense. 

We’re thinking of dropping bombs, and tanks, and mortars, and snipers, and all that stuff. Well, who thinks about maps, and charts, and terrain data? 

To execute the war, we had to get that stuff forward.

In our case, as you mentioned earlier, we provide support to the fighters, the bombers, the special ops, the CSAR, the HH-60s. In conjunction with 

all of that, we are also supporting all of the coalition forces across Afghanistan at this time. We still have the operations going in other parts of the 

AOR. In Afghanistan, we’re supporting the coalition forces: thirty-eight countries, twenty-seven are NATO that we have provided in addition to Pony 

Express. We have a sister activity. We call it the Eagle Express, which is basically the same thing. It’s providing hardware, software, data, training, 

and updates to the data as it becomes available. That five-pack is what we provide today. That’s what I’ll be doing next week when I go back again.

Everybody tells me, ‘You’ve done enough. It’s time for you to hang up your spurs.’ When you see those young troops—you look into their eyes—I 

think it’s the thing that has to be done. If we can provide them anything that will help their mission be more successful and help them to do their job 

a little bit easier . . ..

Colonel Victor Kuchar, IMA, Interview, 31 October 2008

(FalconView was initially designed by and for members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command for flight planning.)

98
needed advantage to effect the fight.18 Precedence had been set during the Balkans when 

the CIA and the special forces had worked 

closely together. 

Within three days of the beginning of Operation Jawbreaker (by the luck of the rotational 

draw), Air Force Reserve Command F-16 pilots assigned to the 301st, 419th, 482nd, and 

944th Fighter Wings, which had deployed 

to Kuwait for a planned Operation Southern 

Watch rotation, began their support of forces 

in Afghanistan. Flight leader Lieutenant Colonel Michael Brill, from the 419th, led four 

AFRC F-16s into enemy territory on 22 October for their first Enduring Freedom mission 

some red tape and delays.16

US special forces components also infiltrated 

Afghanistan proper and embedded with Northern Alliance combat units in the valley. These 

frontline units, composed of 18 12-man special forces operational detachment A (ODA) 

teams, first penetrated Afghanistan beginning 

on 19 October. Air Force Reserve Command 

MC-130 Combat Talons would provide fixedwing support.17 These initial special forces 

were joined by four larger company-level 

operational detachment B (ODB) teams and 

three battalion-level operational detachment C 

(ODC) teams. In all, some 300 special forces 

had come, dramatically changing the situation. 

Blending in and accompanying the Northern 

Alliance fighters on foot, in vehicles, and fourfooted animals, the special forces teams using 

advanced state-of-the-art technologies called 

in target after target to the B-1 and B-52 bombers, fighters, A-10s, AC/MC-130s, and the 

Hellfire-armed Predator drones, gaining the 

refugee populations in neighboring countries 

had to be part of any long-term reconstruction 

for post-war Afghanistan.14

JAWBREAKER INSERTED

On 26 September, just weeks following the 11 

September attack, a CIA team joined up with 

the Northern Alliance at a landing field in the 

Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. 

By 1800 that evening, a message en route to 

Washington DC indicated that Operation Jawbreaker was underway, laying the groundwork, 

establishing and building relations.15 The 

seven-member Jawbreaker team had made 

their way to Afghanistan, taking a scheduled 

military C-5 channel mission from Dover Air 

Force Base, Delaware, to Ramstein Air Base, 

Germany, on the evening of 19 September. A 

512th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve Command crew flew the first mission with an active 

duty crew from the 436th following two hours 

later on a second mission. On board were two 

pallets of cargo, including 

three million 

dollars in cash. 

T h e r e u p o n , 

the Jawbreaker 

team proceeded via an L-100 

aircraft to Uzbekistan for a 

final helicopter 

ride in—after 

o v e r c o m i n g 

100 99
ed target of a military helicopter at Kabul 

Airport and hit a residential area. A Defense 

Department news release regretted the loss 

of civilian life and reiterated its intention of 

only striking military and terrorist targets.24

Despite sophisticated precision weapons and 

a concerted effort to avoid collateral damage, this war would prove no different than 

previous in its unintended civilian casualties 

despite the military’s best efforts to the contrary.

Although the firepower was tremendous, it 

was not the only tool available to coalition 

commanders. The campaign included dropping leaflets in psychological operations that 

informed Afghan citizens on how to tune in 

to local anti-Taliban radio stations, provided 

information on the rations, or warned about 

the danger of unexploded ordnance. First 

performed on 15 October by B-52s (where a 

single MK-129 pod held 80,000 leaflets), F16s, F-18s, A-6s, and MC-130s would subsequently perform leaflet missions.25 

Initially, the campaign to destroy the Taliban 

regime had three main phases. In the first, 

Northern Alliance Generals Bismullah Khan 

and Abdul Rashid Dostum launched offensives in mid-October from the mountains 

above Kabul in the east and Mazar-e-Sharif 

in the north. Phase two called for an assault 

by General Daoud Khan on Konduz, shoring 

up the northeastern portion of the country in 

the latter half of November. The third phase 

of the offensive called for an attack in the 

tantly their LITENING 

precision-targeting pods 

made “them the most 

capable F-16s at the 

JFACC’s hands.”21 

JOINT AIRSTRIKES 

CONTINUE

Over the next days and 

weeks, 15 long range 

Air Force/Air Force Reserve Command bombers joined with 25 Navy 

F-14 Tomcats and F/A18 Super Hornets as well 

as 10 F-16 Fighting Falcons from the Air Force 

Reserve Command and 

delivered a devastating 

amount of ordinance on 

Taliban and al Qaeda 

targets throughout Afghanistan. The objective of the airstrikes was 

to decapitate Taliban 

forces (estimated as high 

as 50,000) before they 

could respond.22 On 9 

October, for example, 

bombers and naval aircraft struck airfields, air 

defense sites, al Qaeda infrastructure as well 

as the garrison again near Marzar-e-Sharif.23 

 On 12 October, a Navy F-18 missed its intendagainst Taliban and al Qaeda forces.19 These, 

the first coalition F-16 aircraft to serve in the 

Afghanistan war, represented the first of 216 

AFRC F-16 combat sorties in Afghanistan for 

2001.20 Their availability and more imporDaily, air tasking orders were issued, detailing the missions and the 

targets. Usually, our F-16s departed their base in a four-ship formation at dusk, arriving over the target area some four to five hours 

later. Controlling agencies may redirect them upon arriving in the 

combat area. Special operations would generally give targeting 

coordinates. The pilots also received descriptive information, such 

as on the terrain, buildings, and vehicles. This information would 

come from ground and airborne forward air controllers, AWACs 

operators, and unmanned Predator aircraft. Bombs dropped were 

laser-guided bombs with most 500-pound GBU-12s. Our F-16 pilots would fly two or three Enduring Freedom combat missions per 

week during their two- or three-week tour in the theater. Our pilots 

also continued to fly Southern Watch missions and perform alerts.

This was how it was initially.

I must tell you that the ten F-16s rotated back to the United States 

in code one condition. They went over only going to fly two- to 

three-hour Southern Watch missions but ended up flying eight- to 

ten-hour, and even twelve-hour, intense combat missions.

I was very proud of how our aircraft and people performed. By 

sending aircraft from three units, we spread the workload and ensured our ability to maintain our readiness and availability levels.

Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, CAFR & AFRC Commander, 

End of Tour Interview, April and May 2008

WHAT WAS A TYPICAL ENDURING 

FREEDOM MISSION FOR OUR F-16s?

100
In May of 2001, we were tasked with a Southern Watch deployment. We were in that active association where we owned the airplanes, but we had the 

active duty squadron up there at Duke Field with us. So, we shared in a Southern Watch deployment. I think it was a 90-day deployment, and we took 

half of it or 45 days. We were stationed at El Jabir in Kuwait. During that 45-day period, we were able to rotate the crews, so that I ended up with five 

crews that experienced the Southern Watch operation. We all had the desert camies, desert flight suits, the desert boots, and desert jackets. They all 

had the experience to fly in Kuwait to see what the conditions were like. It was May, so it was hot. They got to see what the climatic conditions were 

going to be and what those were like. 

So, when we were mobilized after 9/11, I already had five crews that had been over there. We were well prepared to mobilize for that contingency. When 

it happened, I was home from an airline trip. I was out in the garage doing something when my wife called in and said, ‘You might want to come in and 

look at the TV.’ I walked in. At first I was a little confused, but when the second airplane hit, there was no question that this was not right. There was 

something wrong. It was an attack of some sort. So, I ran and put my flight suit on and went up to the unit. Essentially, I was on active duty for the 

next two years.

We mobilized and took five airplanes and eight crews. Actually, the active duty went out the door first with one airplane and a crew. They went to 

Jacobabad, and they were part of the personnel recovery, PRC, type operation. They weren’t even there to do the Talon penetrating tanker mission. 

They were doing rescue recovery. 

As the active went out the door and did that mission, we were part of the task force, and we went out with a five-ship and eight crews. I was in charge, 

and that was the big dog. We went to the island of Masirah and were part of Task Force Sword, the main special ops invasion that went in. If you remember RHINO and GECKO, we were a part of that.

 

We were the refueling platforms for the missions on hit night [19 October]. We used all the airplanes that night, including the airplane at Jacobabad. 

Our missions lasted about fourteen or fifteen hours that evening. It was just very draining because we were going back to the tanker and refueling, then 

going back and refueling helicopters. That went on all night long.

As a result of hit night, we developed a good relationship with the Army that lasted the duration of the war. It was good because they knew that when 

they called and needed us to get somewhere at a certain time and a certain place, we would always be there. We did some amazing things that night, 

as we had done in previous contingencies. These great reservists just meld together and develop great team work. They know what it’s like to work 

together for a common cause. We all came home safely, thank God. The rest of the war, we were continually engaged in other missions related to OIF.

I was going to make a point about our flight suits. We went over there as this huge package of gunships, Talons, and the whole ball of wax. We were led 

by the wing commander from Hurlburt. Our first stop on that mission was Rota, Spain. After we landed, we all parked in this one long line of 130s. We 

were on the bus with the wing commander, and he was watching all these guys get off their planes. All of my guys got off their planes in uniform. They 

had on the desert uniform, and they looked sharp and were ready to go. His guys were coming off airplanes with green flight suits, beige boots, beige 

flight suits, black boots, green jackets, just a whole mishmash of stuff. His comment to me was essentially, ‘You guys are pretty sharp.’

711th SOS – AMAZING GUYS

1012
He learned to appreciate what we brought to the table because he saw the closeness. We were all together in this camp. All the Air Force Reservists 

were in these tents that were pretty close to each other. They had built a common area between them that was the envy of the compound. They had 

an outdoor movie theater that they had set up with some audio visual equipment. There was one area they put a net around and made a little barber 

shop. One of our radio operators became the barber and was also giving our wing commander haircuts. We were just a close-knit group. They had 

a rack of MREs. It was organized based on types of MREs, and all the extra stuff that came out of them was categorized. I mean, these guys were just 

amazing. That same esprit de corps lasted throughout OIF and OEF. As I said, we developed a relationship with the Army, and they knew that we would 

be there when needed. Our active duty guys that participated with us had three crews out of the eight. I think they found it enjoyable to be a part of 

the kind of team effort that was going on.

We took in all sorts of different folks into different locations around Afghanistan, especially our special operations folks. We dropped them off and 

picked them up later on. We were refueling, restocking their supplies, or dropping stuff to them in canyons. The terrain was very challenging there. 

The crews had to make these challenging approaches to do their high-speed drops, and they were successful in getting the beans and the bullets to the 

guys on the ground. And, there was the fact that they developed these great relationships with our joint partners. The special forces group up in Uzbekistan was a bunch of Guard guys, and the relationships were absolutely marvelous. They knew that we were there to support them, and they knew 

that they were going to get what they needed.

We managed the whole force to ensure that we were utilizing the tanker fleet to maximize refueling our airplanes and maximize the requirements that 

the Army had with their helicopters to ensure that we were meeting the time line. We developed that relationship, that trust, and confidence. Because 

when they called us, we were there.

I had already developed a relationship with the mission commanders. It just got better and better as the war went on. Every time I went on a flight 

(they called me ‘Beef’), they would say, ‘Hey Beef, we need you to come here at this time.’ I knew who the guy was on the other end by voice recognition. If they knew Beef and his guys were up, they knew they were in good hands, and that they would be getting the fuel they needed to take them out 

of harm’s way. 

The crews were amazing. There’s no question that we had some of the most qualified crews that were participating in those efforts from a special ops 

perspective. They did it very professionally, and they did outstanding things. We were the most highly decorated Air Force Reserve unit – Air Force 

unit for that matter, during those contingency operations. These guys were doing great things. There is one story after another.

Major General Richard S. Haddad, Interview, 14 December 2011

102
lines and knocking people off their feet a mile 

away. And in one eighteen-hour period, airstrikes enabled the destruction of over 20 armored and 20 support vehicles. In the Alma 

Tak Mountain range, air power took out over 

65 vehicles, 12 command bunkers, and a large 

ammunition storage bunker by 7 November. 

The battle also entailed cavalry charges and 

close combat conditions. Near a critical pass 

south of Mazar-e-Sharif, Dostum and the special forces came under very effective multiple 

rocket launcher fire on 9 November. With the 

special forces calling upon B-52s to engage, 

the bombers forced the Taliban to retreat to the 

city and then move beyond. On 10 November, General Dostum secured Mazar-e-Sharif 

and received a warm welcome by the citizens. 

This marked the first major victory and provided a strategic base and airfield in northern 

Afghanistan.28 

 Meanwhile to the east of Mazar-e-Sharif, 

General Daoud Kahn had established defensive positions around Taloqan-Konduz 

by 11 November and requested the special forces teams to call in close air support assets. Taloqan fell that night while 

heavy resistance was encountered on 13 

November. Over the next ten days, bombs 

rained down, weakening the Taliban at 

Khanabad and Konduz, destroying 12 tanks, 

51 cargo trucks, 44 bunker complexes, many 

vehicles, and supply areas as well as killing or wounding around 2,000 enemy forces. 

Moving east toward Konduz, Daoud captured 

Khanabad as it fell. General Bismullah Khan 

and financial support, Afghan fighters under 

the steely Northern Alliance commander Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum pressed the 

front lines of their decade-long stalemate. In 

this remote rebellious region of northern Afghanistan, a coalition of US special forces and 

local fighters opposing Taliban rule accelerated their tactical campaign. Under cover of 

darkness and under very dangerous flying conditions, CH-47 helicopters began inserting the 

first special forces teams on 19 October high 

up in the mountains south of the city of Mazar-e-Sharif to support Dostum. The teams set 

about calling in close air support (CAS) from 

B-1, B-52 bombers; F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 

fighters, as well as Predator and AC/MC-130s 

aircraft. The overwhelming close air support 

brought to bear had a devastating effect on the 

Taliban fighters while boosting the morale of 

General Dostum’s forces. These were the days 

of the famed special forces traveling on horseback and directing digitally CAS fire to bear 

from above. In the opening phase, MC-130 

aircraft dropped two 15,000-pound BLU082 

“Daisy Cutter” bombs, walloping the Taliban 

south on the heart of the Taliban movement—

Kandahar—by Generals Hamid Karzai and 

Gul Agha Sharzai, which took place from midNovember to the middle of December 2001.26

In a 1 November press release, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld informed the American 

people of the progress to date as smoke still 

rose from the ruins of the World Trade Center. He related that within less than a month of 

the attack on the United States, military operations had commenced on 7 October. And since 

then, in three week’s time, coalition forces had 

flown 2,000 sorties and had delivered over a 

million humanitarian rations. Addressing the 

press’ questions on the “speed of progress,” he 

expressed: “There is no doubt in my mind but 

that the American people know that it’s going 

to take more than 24 days. . . . In the end, war 

is not about statistics, deadlines, short attention spans, or 24-hour news cycles. It is about 

will – the projection of will, the clear, unambiguous determination of the President and the 

American people to see this through to certain 

victory. In other American wars, enemy commanders have come to doubt the wisdom of 

taking on the strength and power of this nation 

and the resolve of her people. I expect that 

somewhere, in a cave in Afghanistan, there is 

a terrorist leader who is, at this moment, considering precisely the same thing.”27 

BATTLE IN THE NORTH: MAZAR-ESHARIF AND KONDUZ

Armed with increasing US military expertise 

1034
104
105 106
106
US rules of engagement prohibited firing upon 

the evacuees, as the exodus likely included 

civilians. In the interests of limited collateral 

damage, care was taken by intelligence professionals to identify specific targets of the many 

that likely contained high-value terrorists. On 

17 November, such an air strike likely yielded 

a senior bin Laden deputy named Mohammed 

Atef. The death of Atef, the chief of al Qaeda’s military arm, was an extremely significant event in the Global War on Terrorism.31

Secretary Rumsfeld made the announcement 

to the press. 

Civil engineers also accompanied US special 

forces teams arriving at the Bagram Airfield, 

thirty miles to the north of the Kabul. The 

US Air Force immediately took actions to 

develop the area as a forward staging area, 

providing relief from the logistically and dipBATTLE IN THE EAST: FROM BAGRAM 

TO KABUL

Almost concurrently with General Dostum’s assault on Mazar-e-Sharif, on 19 

October, Northern Alliance forces under Tajik Generals Fahim Khan and 

Bismullah Khan began a march south 

toward the Bagram Airfield en route to 

the Afghani capital of Kabul. The infiltration into the Panjshir Valley of US 

forces comprising the ODA-555 “Triple 

Nickel” team and later ODA 594 was 

significant for this battle as well. The 

Northern Alliance controlled Bagram 

Airfield, and from the tower Triple 

Nickel established an observation post 

and began to systematically direct airstrikes over the next three weeks, preparing the battlefield. Obviously aware of the 

strategic value, thousands of Taliban fighters 

had turned out. Expecting stiffer resistance, 

the Army also made plans to airdrop paratroopers. The Northern Alliance attack began 

on 13 November. Less than ten miles from 

Bagram, in the Shomali Plains in between the 

airfield and Kabul, the special forces team and 

Khan’s forces met the Taliban front line—rife 

with guns, anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, and 

tanks. However, the weeks of airstrikes had 

virtually eliminated any real resistance. On 

14 November after some five years of Taliban 

rule, General Fahim Khan liberated Kabul. 

The remaining Taliban and al Qaeda fighters 

fled toward Kandahar and into the Tora Bora 

Mountains to the east of Jalalabad.30

approached from the north while General Dostum pressed from the west. With the surrounding local populations joining in, the Northern 

Alliance forces swelled to some 30,000. Thus, 

by 23 November, the remaining Taliban, some 

3,500, had agreed to surrender Konduz and 

be held at the Qala-i Jangi fortress. Unfortunately, these prisoners were not searched for 

hidden weapons, resulting in the battle at the 

fortress from 25-29 November and the killing 

of Agent Mike Spann.29

1078
US forces did their part. On the night of 19-

20 October, under the name of Operation 

Rhino, B-2s dropped 2,000-pound bombs 

while AC-130 gunships fired on buildings 

and guard towers. Four Air Force Reserve 

Command MC-130 aircraft followed dropping from 800 feet under zero illumination 

199 Army rangers from the 75th Ranger 

Regiment along with sniper support onto an 

austere landing zone southwest of Kandahar. 

One MC-130 and the helicopters then landed 

with the MC-130 refueling the helicopters 

and extracting the rangers. The forces conducted raids, eliminated resistance, and destroyed weapons caches in the almost fiveand-a-half hour mission. The Rhino raiders 

demonstrated the US’s ability to insert and 

strike at its own choosing with no areas safe. 

They left a calling card of PSYOP leaflets 

Hit Night, Karzai returned from exile in Pakistan to raise a rebellion in Kandahar.33 Yet, it 

was here that the Taliban had a strong hold on 

the region; the city of Kandahar was the spiritual and political seat of the movement.

Remarkably, after assuring local support and 

realizing the need for more resources to force 

the Taliban out, Hamid Karzai had reached out 

for US assistance via his satellite phone, initially contacting the US Embassy in Rome and 

the US Consulate in Islamabad. Inserted near 

Tarin Kowt, special forces team ODA 574 arrived along with aid, food, supplies, and weapons. Tarin Kowt was the heart of the Taliban 

movement and home to Mullah Mohammed 

Omar. The 12-man ODA team and some 150 

Afghanis comprised Karzai’s force. By the 

end of November, Karzi’s force would grow 

to 800.34 

lomatically taxing trips from 

Karshi-Khanabad Airfield (K2) 

in Kyrgyzstan and Jacobabad 

Airfield in Pakistan. The reestablishment of the airfield 

allowed C-130 as well as the 

larger C-17 aircraft to land in 

the vicinity of Kabul. Now, 

capable of frontline resupply, a 

massive buildup of ordinance, 

personnel, and war material 

was possible with each passing day.32 Although the fall of 

Mazar-e-Sharif preceded that of 

Kabul by five days, the size of 

the Taliban garrison indicated 

that Kabul was to have been the 

site of a major standoff. Kabul was extremely 

significant for the morale of the Northern Alliance and the first step in the formation of a 

new Afghanistan. 

BATTLE IN THE SOUTH: SYMBOLIC 

VICTORY AT KANDAHAR

Following the Taliban assassination of Northern Alliance founder Ahmad Shah Massoud in 

the hours before the 9/11 attacks, the next best 

hope for a unifying leader of a free and stable 

Afghanistan was Hamid Karzai. Karzai, a Pashtun and a son and grandson of senior parliamentarians of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, 

was a noted opponent of the Soviet and Taliban occupations in his own right. Traditionally, the Pashtuns held the southern regions of 

Afghanistan. At the outbreak of the 7 October 

108
taken matters into 

their hands and initiated an uprising 

against the Taliban 

on their own. With 

a small force, Hamid Karzai faced a 

dilemma but chose 

to assist the town, 

relying on the ODA 

574 and its link to 

air power. Informants came forth 

and warned of a 

convoy of more 

than 500 Taliban 

defenders moving 

north from Kandahar toward Tarin Kowt. What 

followed, known as the Battle of Tarin Kowt, 

proved again the effectiveness of US-coalition 

firepower directed at a force of superior size 

and armor. Following repeated precision airstrikes, the remaining Taliban forces fled. But, 

Karzai’s fighters had panicked at one point and 

had to be redirected. The building of Karzai’s 

force continued. Karzai’s charisma and ability 

to rally the Pashtun Afghans ensured the push 

to take Kandahar.38

Desiring to keep the momentum, coalition 

planners sought out other Pashtun leaders for 

support. On 18 November, members from 

ODA 583 helicoptered in to the Shin Naray 

Valley south of Kandahar and established contact with Gul Agha Sherzai, who joined the 

fight with between 650 to 800 men and a promligence, and returned 

to Rhino for their MC130 pickup.36 

 

These activities would 

result in America’s 

first killed in action. 

As Rhino and Gecko 

unfolded, four MH-60 

helicopters inserted 

another force to set 

up a contingency support site. One of the 

Blackhawk helicopters 

crashed during landing in brown-out conditions, resulting in the deaths of two Army 

rangers on 19 October.37

In November, the citizens of Tarin Kowt had 

behind. Subsequently, arriving on 25 November, 

the US Marines would use 

the area for Camp Rhino.35

Concurrently on the night 

of Operation Rhino, Operation Gecko was launched. 

AC-130s and MH-60s 

provided pre-assault fire 

for four MH-47s to infiltrated 91 special forces 

personnel for a high-value 

target mission. Their objective was the compound 

of Taliban leader Mullah 

Mohammed Omar and his take out. However, 

Omar was not there. Within an hour, the forces had cleared the compound, collected intelOn December 7, 2001, Major Bruce R. Taylor and his crew from the 711th Special Operations 

Squadron responded to a battlefield emergency of four MH-53 Pave Low helicopters deep inside 

enemy territory, running extremely low on fuel. “With fuel as low as they had, the helicopters 

had one chance to come up, and get on the tanker,” Major Taylor said. First, the MC-130 Talon 

assisted the two most fuel-starved helicopters and led them out of harm’s way. They then headed 

back for the remaining two Pave Lows. By the time that the four helicopters were refueled and 

safe, Major Taylor’s aircraft did not have enough fuel to return to their own base and ended up 

diverting to Pakistan. “We did what we were trained to do,” said Major Chris Snider, electronic 

warfare officer. Their diligence and skill over the rapidly evolving 17-hour mission earned the 

711th SOS crew the Air Force Reserve’s highest honor in 2002, the Major General Thomas E. 

Marchbanks Jr. Memorial Award for most distinguished flight crew of the year.

WE DID WHAT WE ARE TRAINED TO DO

10910
ise to recruit another 500. On 21 November, 

Sherzai’s forces and the special forces team 

pushed northward with an objective of the 

Kandahar airport, leaving Hamid Karzi’s 

forces to take the city, as the two Pashtun 

leaders were rivals.39

Sherzai’s forces of 800 strong in a collection 

of 100 vehicles met resistance at the town of 

Tahk-te-pol. Once again, airstrikes enabled 

the taking of the town and cutting off the 

Taliban supply line from Pakistan. The next 

strategic point, the bridge across the Arghastan Wadi, was taken. However, they met 

fierce fighting as they neared Kandahar airport, forcing them back over the bridge. And 

for the next week, with Sherzai’s advance 

halted, the ODA 583 called in airstrikes day 

and night around the bridge and the airport 

area against the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Enemy casualties were high due to the 

importance of the airport and Kandahar.40

Meanwhile, positioned north of Kandahar, 

Hamid Karzai’s forces continued with their 

success as they advanced on Kandahar. As 

needed, the special forces arranged for resupply in weapons, ammunition, food, and 

clothing. They met their first substantial 

resistance at the town of Shawali Kowt. A 

dry riverbed and a bridge near the village of 

Sayd Alim Kalay became a pivotal battle in 

the march south on the way to Kandahar in 

early December. Aided by airstrikes, Karzi’s 

forces were able to take the village and the 

eastern end of the bridge but not the wellAn intense mission transpired on the night of 4 March 2002, when an MC-130E Combat Talon 

landed with lights out on what was expected to be a hard-packed dirt airstrip. It actually turned 

out to be mud, and the MC-130E was unable to fly out after delivering needed medical support. 

A helicopter came and removed the crew and delivered a security contingent to guard the aircraft overnight.

The following day, a recovery team was transported to the scene by a British CH-47 helicopter 

in the hopes of flying the aircraft out, and if not destroying it in place. While the digging and 

excavation work progressed, mortar rounds began exploding and getting closer to the recovery 

team. Major Joseph K. Nicholson, aircraft commander commented, “As the rounds kept getting 

closer, I was feeling like I was up against an enemy imposed time line. We had to remove the 

plane or leave before the mortars got any closer.” Master Sergeant Bobby Barton, 711th Special 

Operations Squadron loadmaster, said the mortar fire was not what he was concerned about at 

the time. “I was more concerned with getting the plane out of there,” he said. “Phillips, Fister, 

and I were working on digging out the nose gear. Dirt was packed so tightly between the nose 

wheel tires that we had to break it loose with a crash axe. We were digging the extra debris out 

with shovels.” 

After some time, the aircrew attempted to start the engines and see if the aircraft could be 

moved from its present predicament. “With engines overheating, we had to stop about every 

thousand feet to let the engines cool down until we got to the end of the runway backwards. By 

then, there were about 100 or more Afghan locals at the site. We didn’t know if they were friend 

or foe, so we readied our weapons,” Major Nicholson provided.

As they prepared to take off, “The aircraft accelerated very slowly. I was wondering if we were 

going to make it because the end of the runway was coming up and flying speed had not been 

reached,” stated Major Nicholson. He continued, “We flew about 200-250 feet above the ground 

for about five miles until we could turn around. After turning, we flew back over the airstrip, 

and then they headed home.”

Colonel George Williams, the mission commander, summed it up: “With just a few hours to 

prepare, the team flawlessly performed their mission at great personal risk under extremely 

hazardous combat conditions and recovered an irreplaceable special operations asset. It was an 

amazing feat of sheer determination and superb airmanship.”

MC-130 RECOVERY EARNS 2002 MARCHBANKS AWARD

110
“Hit Night” – 19 October 2001

On that date, a 4-ship formation of MC-130E Combat Talon aircraft became the first fixed wing aircraft to penetrate Afghani airspace. This mission 

was operationally referred to as “HIT NIGHT” because it was the first combat strike against enemy forces after 9-11 to put US forces on the ground. 

This extremely complex joint special operations package and incredibly difficult assigned mission was the “Doolittle Tokyo Raid” of OEF due to its 

high strategic-level impact and significant national importance. The objective of the mission was to provide mission essential helicopter air refueling 500 

miles inside Afghani airspace [of the force] that was infiltrating and providing close air support for special operations forces conducting a direct action 

raid on Usama Bin Laden’s primary training and command and control facilities. This day marked the initiation of ground combat operations for the 

Global War on Terrorism. An amazing 15-hour mission, in which 919 OG aircrews flew as low as 200 feet above the desert floor and into the heart of 

the world’s largest cache of Stinger missiles, was flawlessly and heroically executed. 919 OG aircrews remained vigilant for hours near the objective area 

to ensure the rotary wing assault packages were able to quickly refuel and repeatedly reengage the enemy. This was a massive endeavor which culminated in the successful insertion of “first boots on the ground in Afghanistan” which dealt a devastating and demoralizing blow to the heart of al Qaeda 

leadership ensuring the future success of OEF. The 4-ship MC-130E Combat Talon I formation flew an amazing 69.4 combat hours and transferred an 

incredible 112,500 pounds of fuel to special operations helicopters, which successfully established the initial force on the ground in Afghanistan. These 

raids resulted in the killing and capture of hundreds of al Qaeda operatives and Taliban as well as the collection of vital enemy documents detailing the 

worldwide terrorist network.

14 Distinguished Flying Crosses (DFC), (five for heroism), and 15 Air Medals (AM) awarded

Exfiltration – 4 November 2001

The safe extraction was key to the establishment of a post Taliban representative government. This combined special operations mission would test the 

skill and bravery of all involved. A formation of three Combat Talon I aircraft executed this mission of vital nation importance, with one of the aircraft 

tasked to fly a daylight low-level threat penetration in order to recon the helicopter aerial refueling track and to draw out any possible Taliban response. 

This heroic, low-level, daylight threat recon, flown at times less than 100 feet above the ground, would be a first in the history of MC-130E special 

operations. Hours later under the cover of darkness the three-ship Talon I formation penetrated 500 miles inside hostile airspace and provided in-flight 

refueling to 7 MH-60’s who would covertly exfil from a landing zone deep inside Afghanistan. [The individual] had recently survived two assassination attempts and his life was considered to be in grave danger. Having provided the special operations helicopters with their mission essential fuel, 

one MC-130E would conduct reconnaissance of the desert-landing zone where [the individual] would be transferred to an awaiting aircraft and provide 

on scene command and control during transloading of the personnel. By the time this heroic, politically sensitive mission was completed, the Combat 

Talon I formation had flown over 3,000 miles logging an incredible 50 hours of combat time.

Four DFCs and 5 AMs awarded

AFRC SPECIAL OPERATIONS – AWARD CITATION - PART I

1121
Personnel and Re-supply Drop - 13 November 2001

An MC-130E, call sign STEAK 11, executed this high visibility mission with barely 3 hours to mission plan and prepare. The crew was given a shortnotice tasking to airdrop a Jump Clearing Team of Rangers and Special Tactics Team personnel into a remote desert airstrip to prepare a landing zone 

for follow-on combat operations by Special Forces. This critical mission was combined with another equally critical airdrop of supplies essential to 

sustain combat operations to a geographically separated TF team. The Commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was understandably 

concerned that the crew did not have adequate time to prepare for this complex and demanding mission involving a high risk, low-altitude penetration 

of hostile airspace culminating in multiple, dissimilar airdrops. However, after briefing with the crew and understanding the national urgency of this 

mission, the JSOC/CC gave clearance for execution of this vital mission despite the high risk involved. After crossing into enemy territory, the aircraft 

descended to 250 feet above ground level over the featureless terrain while on night vision goggles. The paratroopers exited the aircraft two seconds 

prior to the Time-Over-Target (TOT) and landed precisely at the briefed location despite stronger than forecast winds and suspended dust that reduced 

visibility to less than 2 miles over the drop zone. When the jumpers were safely clear, the crew executed a descending escape towards the desert floor. 

The aircraft’s loadmasters worked feverishly in the cargo compartment to retrieve the paratroopers’ static lines, ensuring evidence of the airdrop did 

not fall into enemy hands and enabling the MC-130E to accelerate back to combat cruise airspeeds. The crew did not have a chance to pause—the next 

airdrop was only 17 minutes away. The crew rapidly transitioned to prepare the aircraft for a resupply drop to [the] TF. Flying at 400 feet above the 

ground and at a speed of 140 knots, the crew of Steak 11 executed a precise airdrop of 5,000 pounds of food, water and ammunition to [the] TF. As this 

airdrop was being conducted, simultaneously a massive armada of special operations aircraft began landing at the remote desert strip where STEAK 

11 had just moments earlier airdropped the US Army Rangers.

Infiltration - 14 November 2001

On 14 November 2001, a two-ship formation of MC-130E aircraft executed a high-risk, extremely hazardous joint mission with elite special operations 

forces, conducting a blitzkrieg attack against al Qaeda and Taliban troop concentrations west of Kandahar. This mission would involve one MC-130E 

infilling two [units/teams] from the XXXth SOAR with the second aircraft infilling a 75th Ranger Regiment security team into a dry lake bed. The 

[forces] with their onboard sniper teams conducted armed reconnaissance and interdiction along a major highway west of Kandahar, Afghanistan, 

leading into Iran. The security team of Ranger’s provided security for the two MC-130E’s while they awaited the completion of the mission. Once 

the mission was complete, the two MC-130E’s would extract the entire force and return to base. The flight into this austere, contested objective area 

involved a maximum effort NVG landing to a dry lake bed whose usable landing area was only 3,500 feet long and a mere 60 feet wide during a 

period of 0 percent illumination and in close proximity to enemy troop concentrations. The dry lake bed had only been surveyed hours before by an 

AF Special Tactics Team. The two Combat Talons performed the harrowing exfiltration from the remote dirt strip with incredible precision and skill. 

Despite the intensity and close proximity to active enemy small arms fire, mortars, and RPG’s, the courage and bravery of these Talon I aircrew was 

unwavering. Post mission debriefing of this mission reported that the [forces] and their onboard sniper teams killed 32 enemy personnel, destroyed 

6 x military trucks, 1 x artillery gun, and 1 x 14.5 machine gun. The brazen display of heroism and valor by these crewmembers while supporting 

operational forces to engage the enemy was critical to the defeat of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.

112
The 39-year-old traditional Air Force Reservist found himself in Afghanistan. By day, he scrutinized barren landscapes from the open door of a Blackhawk helicopter flying nap-of-the-earth with Apache escorts. At night, he hugged his rifle with his pistol packed in his clothing while sleeping in a tent. 

Like many reservists, Major Tim Donnelly’s deployment was the result of 9/11. On a weekday morning like any other, the Massachusetts state trooper 

was on the job in Boston where he was assigned to the state attorney general’s office. Unlike many others, on hearing that a plane had flown into the 

World Trade Center, Donnelly didn’t think it was a small plane gone astray. ‘I immediately did think it was a terrorist,’ he said.

By 10 a.m., he and his fellow investigators were speeding toward Logan Airport. Donnelly was assigned to pair up with an FBI agent, and together they 

followed leads for the agency’s Twin Towers Task Force. ‘The level of work we did was incredible,’ Donnelly said. ‘It was amazing to see the things 

uncovered that first week. It shows what can happen when everyone works together.’

Because of the importance of his civilian work, Donnelly was excused from his October unit training assembly by his Air Force Reserve Command unit, 

the 439th Airlift Wing’s security forces squadron. He was at home on a rare day off, carrying out the trash, when his squadron called with orders to 

report for the mobility line November 5. Even then, he expected to stay at Westover, where security cops were working 12-hour shifts in force protection.

‘I expected it to be like my activation during Desert Storm,’ he said.

But the Air Force had other ideas. On January 6, he flew on a commercial plane to US Central Command’s Joint Security Directorate (Forward) in 

the Middle East. He became a team chief assessing the vulnerability of embassies, American schools, and Department of Defense institutions around 

Africa, Central, and Southwest Asia. His teams, tailored to each situation, might include Navy SEALs, surface warfare officers, Army Rangers, military 

police, Green Berets, explosive ordnance and biochemical experts, or Air Force security forces members like himself.

‘I would pack a suit and tie for embassy work, jeans and T-shirt for other sites,’ he said. ‘In some places, I kept my weapons close.’

Donnelly was scheduled to travel throughout CENTCOM, an area comprising 25 economically and culturally diverse countries. His travelogue included Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Djibouti. Turkmenistan proved one of the most interesting.

‘It’s called the Las Vegas of central Asia,’ he said. ‘Because it’s a dictatorship, it was the only country where one entered at the invitation of the Turkmenistan president.’

His tour of the command was cut short when in late April he was sent into Afghanistan on a rotation of a vulnerability assessment team. He flew into 

Kabul International Airport, where he met his partner, a Green Beret. Together they traveled the country, but within a week their objective changed.

After staying a few days at a special ops compound, Donnelly and his partner were asked to put together quick reaction force packages at fire bases 

around Afghanistan. These packages, used by special ops combat teams, required dangerous reconnaissance work. That’s when the Blackhawk rides 

began.

WAR TAKES RESERVIST TO AFGHANISTAN

1134
We’d be screaming along at low altitude with the door open, the wind so strong my cheeks sucked in,’ Donnelly said. ‘The Apache helicopters would 

be flying cover alongside us as we flew over caves and antiaircraft emplacements. It was like the movie Apocalypse Now. The danger was exciting.’

Donnelly draws many parallels between his civilian police work and his experience with special ops forces. He says that the general public may 

perceive both groups as tough and macho, when in fact, if they were only that, they wouldn’t stay alive. Indeed, Special Operations Command 

Central touts its troops as being culturally sensitive, a key characteristic for their mission of building trust and influence within a region.

‘I believe only about three percent of people cause problems,’ he said. ‘Most people just want safety and to be able to feed their kids. It’s true in 

Massachusetts, and it’s true in Afghanistan.’

Over the course of his two months in the country, Donnelly noticed changes. ‘I went into Kabul quite a lot,’ he said. ‘It was good seeing how much 

freer people were becoming, boys playing soccer, kids doing the things kids do.’

But there always seemed to be the sobering, underlying threat of the Taliban coming back. During this time, they attacked and killed one girl and 

maimed another for removing their burqas in public. Other visual memories: torture rooms, unexploded minefields off the sides of public roads, 

and the level of poverty. 

“What we consider trash was tresure to them,’ he explained. ‘They would pick through our garbage, take it, and do things with it.’‘It made me 

embarrassed to think what we waste,’ Donnelly said.

His Afghan tour ended in late June when he flew back to his headquarters element, then headed for Boston.

 

 

 

 Major Tim Donnelly

114
madan, with its strict observance of no eating 

or drinking until sundown, affected the battle 

as well. Special forces Team ODA 572 called 

in airstrike after airstrike from 6-18 December. What the battle did do was oust al Qaeda 

and Taliban fighters from Afghanistan. Osama 

bin Laden and the senior leadership escaped 

and faded into Pakistan’s equally concealing 

sanctuaries. At this time, the coalition did not 

have enough airlift assets and conventional 

forces on the ground in Afghanistan to close 

off the exits. Nevertheless, indigenous antiTaliban/al Qaeda forces did regain control of 

their country with the assistance of coalition 

air assets.43 

forces in the remote Afghan 

hinterlands proved immensely challenging without the presence of regular 

ground forces. All across 

the country, retreating Taliban and al Qaeda defenders headed to the south 

and east to the secluded 

and rugged mountains between Kabul and the border with Pakistan. There, 

they found sanctuary in 

two primary concentrations 

the Shahi Kowt Valley and 

the Tora Bora Valley of the 

Spin Ghar Mountains. Military engagements would 

ultimately force many to 

evacuate to Pakistan. At 

Tora Bora, Taliban and al 

Qaeda fighters attempted 

to gain a tactical advantage by exploiting the 

dramatic topography and high altitudes (10-

15,000 feet). For years, the area had been a 

haven for al Qaeda. It was well fortified, well 

stocked, and contained hundreds of caves. Intelligence indicated that Osama bin Laden was 

at Tora Bora as well. The stage was set for the 

battle of Tora Bora; operations commenced on 

6 December.42 

The battle of Tora Bora could be characterized 

as the taking, retreating (for rest and dinner), 

and the retaking of ground by the Eastern Alliance of anti-Taliban forces. The month of Radefended bridge. Two days of close air support missions followed, but the Taliban still 

remained in control. On 4 December, loading 

up in pickup trucks and brandishing machine 

guns, AK-47s, and RPGs, Karzai’s force drove 

towards the bridge, as close air support covered them. The Taliban attempted to cross 

three times but could not prevail in the face 

of the fire from Karzai’s fighters and that of 

coalition air power. The battle was marred on 

5 December by a friendly fire incident when a 

2,000-pound bomb landed in a special forces 

position, killing nearly 30 (3 Americans) and 

wounding 50-60. Hamid Karzai sustained a 

minor facial wound, but the person next to 

him was killed. Pave Low helicopters, with 

pararescuemen or PJs aboard, swiftly brought 

in a new team and cared for and evacuated the 

wounded to the dirt runway of Camp Rhino 

where an HC-130 was waiting with a surgery 

team. On that dreadful day, Karzai’s negotiations produced a Taliban surrender of the 

bridge as well as the city of Kandahar. During the battle for Kandahar, Hamid Karzai had 

learned the interim Afghanistan government 

had chosen him as their leader.41

TORA BORA

As the major Taliban-controlled areas—Mazar-e-Sharif, Konduz, Kabul, Tarin Kowt, and 

Kandahar—gave way and with the Taliban 

government effectively in exile, the focus of 

the coalition and US efforts now narrowed on 

neutralizing senior al Qaeda leaders. Restricting the movement of Taliban and al Qaeda 

On 12 December 2001, during a refueling mission in support of 

Enduring Freedom, a 79th Air Refueling Squadron crew commanded by Major Brandon K. Nugent heard an emergency locator transmitter beeping intermittently from a downed B-1 Lancer bomber. The aircrew soon saw a visual signal, aborted their 

original mission, and initiated a search.

The crew saw strobe lights in the water and immediately transformed its mission into an emergency rescue crew. Due to his 

extensive search and rescue operations experience, Captain Michael D. Dali took command and began the coordination and rescue operation with the Navy, resulting in the successful recovery 

of all four B-1 crewmembers. For their efforts, the crew received 

the General James H. Doolittle Trophy for the Air Force Reserve 

Command’s Outstanding Aircrew for 2002.

B-1 RESCUE

115 116
We are not just the back-up team.

Lieutenant General James E. Sherrard III, AFRC Commander and CAFR, March 2002

cer, one loadmaster, and one logistics officer 

serving on a three-year exchange program.45

With an AC-130 gunship surveying the air 

assault landing zone, Operation Anaconda 

commenced. Airstrikes by F-15s and B-52s 

followed. Again, the powerful JDAMS and 

thermobaric bombs were used against the 

caves. E-3 aircraft worked to deconflict the 

airspace and provide command and control. 

The lines between friendly and enemy forces 

were so close that the opening stages were 

marred by another accidental friendly fire incident, killing two and wounding five others. 

Resistance was intense. AH-4 Apache helicopters came under fire from mortars, RPGs, 

machine guns, and small-arms fire as they 

air assaulted the force in. Close air support 

strikes continued for some 24 hours straight 

with the gunships, replacing the fighter and 

bomber aircraft as night fell. By the end 

of the first day, Task Force Mountain knew 

the fight would prove more difficult and that 

they faced some 400 al Qaeda, Taliban, and 

foreign fighters. For example, the enemy 

had cemented mortar base plates and had 

also registered the mortars on key terrain features. The need for more airpower was clear, 

despite the delivery of 177 precision-guided 

bombs by the joint air component that first 

day. F-18s, F-16s, A-10s, Predators, B-1s, 

MC-130s, and HC-130s joined the fight.46 

Additionally, reinserting special forces into 

the OP (observation point) near the Takur 

Gar mountaintop would command the entire 

terrorists presented a unique military opportunity. With limited time until spring to capitalize on their target of opportunity, US military 

leaders rushed to gather more intelligence on 

the enemy’s true strength as well as positioned 

cargo and troops for the battle. The US Air 

Force airlifted the combined Joint Task Force 

Mountain including the 10th Mountain and 

101st Airborne Divisions to the rebuilt Bagram 

Airfield, the forward staging base. Forces also 

included US Navy SEALs and Australian special forces. The sudden influx of these forces 

required additional airlift support operations. 

Air Force and Air Force Reserve Command 

C-17 and C-130 crews stepped in to address 

the supply and fuel shortfalls as US Army 

and coalition forces began massing near the 

Takur Ghar Mountain on 20 February 2002. 

Air refueling from a tanker aircraft stationed 

over the base, Globemaster IIIs, then landed 

and “wet winged” onboard fuel directly into 

underground tanks and bladders at Bagram. 

Task Force Mountain was quite dependent on 

airlift and tankers to ensure the arrival of between 700 to 1,000 forces from Kandahar to 

Bagram; the delivery of ammunition, supplies 

and equipment; and the evacuation of casualties. Interestingly, among the C-17 force were 

two Canadians pilots, one maintenance offiANACONDA - MARCH 2002

After Tora Bora, intelligence indicated a group 

of Taliban and al Qaeda had taken up sanctuary in the Shahi Kowt Valley (5 km by 10 km) 

in Paktia province. The plan then was for the 

Afghani militia working with a special forces 

team to conduct engage and destroy missions 

against the remnants in the area. Further intelligence disclosed a more sizable enemy 

presence, upwards of a thousand, necessitating a larger operation. Operation Anaconda 

unfolded. The operation followed previous 

plans with extra measures taken to ensure the 

blocking of passes as escape routes, the lesson learned from Tora Bora. The Afghani 

forces with their special forces teams and 10th 

Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions soldiers would enter the valley by its two main 

approaches with coalition combat air support 

setting the conditions ahead as well as during the 18-day operation, 2-19 March. The 

combined task force headquarters moved to 

Bagram Airfield. Commanders and tacticians 

were mindful of the recent Soviet experiences 

in these very same mountains, where the mujahideen had prevailed.44 

Finding refuge in the Shahi Kowt Valley, these 

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Tora Bora; credit: US SOCOM History, 1987-2007, p 96

118
Tora Bora Attack – 8 December 2001

Without regard for known enemy troop concentrations, an MC-130E Combat Talon crew operated at their maximum performance while heroically executing a daring and extremely dangerous daylight airdrop of a 15,000-pound BLU-82 bomb. The objective for this mission was the Tora Bora Mountain region of Afghanistan where intelligence reported 

Usama bin Laden and other members of the al Qaeda terrorist network, along with retreating Taliban forces, were located. At 2000 hours local time on 8 December 2001, STEAK 71 

received orders to immediately plan and execute a tactically risky and daring daylight attack in conjunction with a B-52 strike. This mission was unlike the previous two BLU-82 drops 

during OEF due to the fact it would be employed to strike a tactical target. The crew masterfully conducted the air strike and exited hostile airspace in broad daylight, resulting in a 

precise, on-time delivery, demolishing the entry point of the Tora Bora “Mountainous Cave Complex.” The tactical skill and unfailing courage culminated with the flawless release of 

the weapon that destroyed the infrastructure of the caves and shattered the spirits of the enemy, but inspiring US and Coalition Forces on the ground.

Ten DFCs for heroism awarded

DITKA 02 Rescue – 13 February 2002

An MC-130P Combat Shadow crew’s exemplary knowledge and extraordinary airmanship, displayed under extremely hazardous conditions in the aftermath of the nighttime crash of 

DITKA 02 on a snowy mountain side in Afghanistan, culminated in the safe recovery of all eight downed crewmembers, three MH-47 helicopters, their crews, and the Special Forces 

teams involved in an OEF direct action mission. The Combat Shadow’s role in a routine alert mission—suddenly called upon for a JCS direct action mission and then into combat 

rescue operations in hostile territory—demanded the highest level of daring and navigation ability through forbidding, mountainous terrain during abysmal weather conditions at night. 

These courageous aviator’s unhesitating and decisive actions throughout the crisis, directly resulted in the timely and safe recovery of numerous US troops and several precious US 

military assets.

Two DFCs and six AMs awarded

SF and Foreign Journalist Rescue – 4 March 2002

On that date, while engaged in combat operations against enemy forces, a Combat Talon I crew performed heroically while executing a daring, extremely high-priority medical evacuation mission. The Talon crew was alerted to deliver a medical surgical team close to the field of battle to perform an exfiltration of badly wound US soldiers during the height of 

Operation Anaconda. Although the aircraft bogged down on the landing zone surface, the crew was able to provide opportune critical lifesaving medical care to a Canadian citizen 

and newspaper reporter with the Toronto Star, who was severely injured by a grenade blast in Gardez and was near death when brought by Special Forces to the aircraft. Their heroism 

and steadfast devotion to duty in support of this important mission, under extremely hazardous and austere conditions, proved essential to the survival of the aircraft, medical team, 

security team, and wounded personnel. Their colossal efforts contributed significantly to the success of the nation’s war on terrorism and received international media attention for 

their role in saving the life of a Canadian national.

Nine AMs for heroism awarded

MC-130E Recovery – 5 March 2002: Operation Anaconda

AFRC SPECIAL OPERATIONS – AWARD CITATION - PART II

12019
On this date, a Combat Talon I crew operated at the highest level of performance while heroically executing a daring, extremely dangerous daylight recovery mission of an MC-130E 

aircraft from an austere, high altitude, abandoned landing zone close to the field of battle during the height of Operation Anaconda. The TF Joint Operations Center considered this 

mission as a “last ditch effort” to recover the 80 million dollar aircraft which became deeply imbedded in mud near the edge of the landing zone the previous night. If the Talon crew 

was unsuccessful in the rescue operation, the aircraft would have been subject to a greatly increased threat of enemy attack due to the instability of the area. Under mortar attack, the 

crew worked feverously to loosen the compacted earth with picks digging sloping trenches in front of the nose and left main landing gear. With a Special Forces security team reporting 

unidentified personnel approaching the area, aircraft engines were started and maximum power was applied to rock the aircraft back and forth to free it from the muddy entrenchment. 

Unable to turn, the crew had to reverse taxi the aircraft over a mile stopping three times to let the engines cool, losing valuable minutes as the enemy continued to calibrate their mortar 

fire. Refusing to leave any personnel behind, take-off performance was considered at best marginal due to the high density altitude and the addition of 70 Special Forces and maintenance personnel. The aircraft lumbered down the makeshift landing zone and as the end of the hard-packed desert floor rapidly approached two unidentified personnel ran in front of 

the aircraft with indistinguishable object in their hands. Rotating early and barely clearing the rapidly approaching personnel, the crew gingerly coaxed the aircraft in low energy state 

through hostile and treacherous terrain and safely returned the aircraft and personnel to the forward operating base.

Ten Bronze Stars for heroism awarded

2002 Maj Gen Thomas E. Marchbanks, Jr. Award presented by the Reserve Officer’s Association for the most outstanding mission of the year

TF Emergency Re-supply – 6 March 2002: Operation Anaconda

The superb airmanship and courage exhibited by a Combat Talon crew in the successful accomplishment of two urgent, high-priority airdrop missions in enemy held territory resulted 

in the successful re-supply of critical food and water to TF Special Forces teams performing enemy blocking operations. Without their immediate resupply, the Special Forces teams 

would have been forced to abandon these key blocking positions which would have given the enemy the opportunity to escape towards safety near the Pakistan border. The crew flew 

a daring, high-speed, low-altitude, terrain-following profile in pitch-black darkness in rugged mountainous terrain to minimize exposure to known enemy positions along the 

planned route. Despite encountering numerous enemy AAA engagements in the vicinity of both drop locations and communications difficulties with ground parties, the crew executed 

two perfect, point-of-impact drops. The crew’s heroism in the face of intense enemy resistance, under extremely hazardous and demanding conditions, proved essential to the survival 

of the aircraft, crew, and teams on the ground, which ensured the success of Operation Anaconda and the crushing defeat of al Qaeda and Taliban enemy forces.

Four DFCs for heroism and five AMs awarded

Quick Reaction Air Refueling - 17 March 2002: Operation Anaconda

On 17 March 2002, while engaged in combat operations against an opposing armed force, a Combat Shadow aircrew was tasked on very short notice to fly a high priority, hazardous, 

daylight, special operations aerial refueling mission in support of a quick reaction, strike interdiction operation against high value Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan. This 

strike interdiction mission received worldwide news coverage and was of the highest national importance, and its overwhelming success brought about the triumphant conclusion of 

Operation Anaconda, the largest US-led offensive in OEF. The crews were tasked to provide immediate daytime aerial refueling for TF helicopters inserting strike teams and extraditing terrorist detainees. With no time to lose, they were alerted and assisted in the planning sequence for an immediate takeoff. Minutes later the crew was airborne and headed for 

the fight, already in progress. The explosions from the conflict between the US SOF forces and the al Qaeda ground forces were in plain sight. Escaping the conflict with their strike 

teams and new detainees, the fuel starved helicopters radioed the Shadow, requesting an immediate rendezvous. Within moments, the helicopters were on the hose getting their gas, 

but the formation made for an easy, low-and-slow target as it crawled slowly across eastern Afghanistan in the middle of the day. This was an extremely successful, high-visibility 

mission by any standard (televised on CNN and Fox News), and it was only through the incredible airmanship displayed by the crew that this mission was successfully executed. Their 

outstanding proficiency and unwavering courage in support of OEF, under these extremely hazardous and demanding conditions, proved essential to the safety of the aircraft, crew, 

and the entire Task Force-11 operation.

120
Anaconda, Bagram Airfield, March 2002

1212
122
And, the USS Bonhomme Richard returned 

to the area, bringing in Marine aviation AH-1 

Cobra and CH-53 Sea Stallions assets. More 

Afghani forces also arrived (to include mechanized forces) under the leadership of Pashtun 

Generals Zia Lodin, Zakim Khan, and Kamel 

Kahn and Tajik General Gul Haidar. Airlift 

provided a steady flow of troops and supplies 

from Kandahar to Bagram. Operations Glock, 

Harpoon, and Polar Harpoon followed. Close 

air support by F-18s, A-10s, B-52s, and AC 

and MC-130s devastated the area, especially 

so were the MK-82 airbursts on uncovered al 

Qaeda troops in the open. The valley became 

the Valley of Death as air power prevailed. 

For Anaconda, US airstrikes averaged 60 sorties and 235 bombs dropped per day.49

Anaconda would be the major combat operation of the coalition forces in Afghanistan. As 

With an E-3 vectoring and 

ground controllers spotting, a torrent of bullets and 

bombs by F-15, B-52, F-16, 

AC-130, and F-18 aircraft 

kept the enemy from closing in on those left at Roberts Ridge for the next fifteen hours. By noon, Army 

rangers, climbing from 

3,000 feet below, joined up 

with those remaining and 

took out the al Qaeda position at the crash site, killing some 40-50 of them. 

That evening, assisted by 

nightfall and firepower of 

the gunship, two MH-47s returned the group 

of now 38 safely to base. This special reconnaissance mission had quickly taken a turn. 

Among the lessons was the need for better 

intelligence on the enemy. Additionally, joint 

and integrated operations had 

saved the day, confirming this 

course.48 

After these events and with a 

clear understanding of the enemy’s resolve to make a stand, 

the Combined Joint Task Force 

Mountain quickly threw in more 

resources to the fight. Accordingly, C-17s flew directly from 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to 

Kandahar, delivering additional AH-64 Apache helicopters. 

valley below. Both forces knew the significance of the OP to the outcome of the battle. 

In the early morning of 4 March, as two Army 

MH-47s reinserted the team, one of the helicopters sustained three RPG hits, severely 

damaging its hydraulic systems. The MH-47s 

had offloaded into a barrage of gunfire. Ready 

to exit the aircraft, Navy SEAL Petty Officer 

First Class Neil C. Roberts, fell off the back 

ramp as the crippled MH-47 abruptly departed. 

Returning fire, Roberts was soon killed by the 

al Qaeda fighters. Two helicopters returned 

for his rescue, carrying an Army ranger quick 

reaction force along with two Air Force pararescuemen. Another RPG would take down 

one of the MH-47s, and the first three exiting 

the down helicopter were killed. In all, seven 

US service members perished at Takur Ghar 

Mountain attempting to capture a prominence 

called Objective Ginger. This objective became known as “Robert’s Ridge,” spurring on 

those who fought in Operation Anaconda.47

1234
coalition partners. With Osama bin Laden at 

large, the capture or killing of Taliban and 

al Qaeda remained a focus, and the collation 

launched Operations Mountain Lion, Mountain Sweep, Champion Strike, and Village 

Search during the remainder of 2002. At the 

same time, President George Bush renewed 

his commitment to the people of Afghanistan and their economic viability.50 

END OF MAJOR COMBAT - 

AFGHANISTAN

As the mass of enemy forces succumbed or 

fled from the mountains in Operation Anaconda, the Northern Alliance and coalition 

leadership expressed satisfaction over the 

campaign to displace the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Its initial goal of liberating Taliban Afghanistan was successful. The 

combination of tactics in the fight against 

the Taliban in Afghanistan liberated the nation. US diplomatic interaction had also 

yielded the capture of al Qaeda No. 2, Abu 

Zubaydah, by Pakistan’s security forces.51

And by April 2002, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

referred to al Qaeda efforts against US forces in Afghanistan and around the world as 

“pockets” of resistance—a far cry from the 

terrorist-infested autocracy coalition forces 

faced on Hit Night, exactly six months earlier.52 However, the appearance of success 

soon gave way to a much more sobering reality—the architecture of the post-Taliban 

transitional government under Hamid Karzai 

2002 ended, Taliban and 

al Qaeda were in sufficient disarray with their 

more hard core fighters 

killed or injured and their 

sanctuary and training 

base in the mountainous 

valley disrupted. The 

evanescence and movement of Taliban and al 

Qaeda fighters into the 

Afghan countryside and 

neighboring Pakistan required a new measure 

of stealth, surveillance, 

and restraint to develop 

the community partnership needed to root out 

future insurgents. Such 

efforts were aided by the 

employment of more unmanned aerial vehicles 

for reconnaissance. The 

coalition forces would 

continue to mount sweep 

operations to ensure stability and flush out remaining resistance. Following Anaconda, the 

British and Canadians 

increased their presence in Afghanistan and 

performed intelligence, 

cordon and search, and 

humanitarian assistance 

operations alongside their 

Throughout Operation Anaconda, from 2 though 18 March 2002, 

combat controller Technical Sergeant Jim “Hots” Hotaling directed 

air attacks on al Qaeda and Taliban positions in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan. An Air Force Reserve individual mobilization augmentee, his voluntary deployment took him from his job as 

a Washington state trooper to a mountaintop, directing fire support. 

For fourteen days, Hotaling stayed entrenched on that mountain, 

whispering coordinates to airborne control aircraft while pressed 

to the earth. He provided coordinates for airstrikes against Taliban 

and al Qaeda forces, assaulting US Army forces entrapped along 

Objective Ginger, the only one of seven Takur Ghar mountain observation posts that US forces did not control.

Hots watched the scene unfold from his covert observation position 

three kilometers away. He kept his cool as he saw the rocket strike 

the helicopter and then watched Neil Roberts fall off the ramp. His 

training paid off. In the seconds after the crash, the JTAC embedded with the unit, Regular Air Force Staff Sergeant Gabe Brown, 

didn’t need anyone stepping on his frequency, he needed Hots position on the high ground to keep line of sight communication signal 

with the aircrew’s overhead. However, the situation degraded as 

the enemy began swarming uphill and capturing Roberts, who kept 

up his fire while wounded. Sergeant Brown frantically called in 

A-10 strafing run after A-10 strafing run “danger close” between 

200 and 800 feet of his position, while Sergeant Hotaling coordinated with Brown to direct 2,000 pound bombs in airstrikes outside 

the 800 foot radius of the downed helicopter.

Fifteen American service members, including Roberts were killed 

or wounded that day. However, thanks to steadfast efforts of combat 

controllers like Sergeants Brown and Hotaling, even in the darkest 

hours of Operation Anaconda, coalition forces never lost air superiority, and they never lost ground. Hots and Brown’s airstrikes 

“turned the tide” in favor of US forces on Takur Ghar yielding hundreds of al Qaeda and Taliban casualties, and buying time for reinforcements to arrive and evacuate or recover US casualties.

COMBAT CONTROLLER

124
cation and coordination among coalition forces. Senior al Qaeda terrorists and their Taliban 

allies escaped justice. The Taliban performed 

a tactical withdrawal; they vacated most of 

Afghanistan proper while the majority of their 

regular forces, senior leadership and traditional support apparatus regrouped in the tribal regions of Pakistan. The Pakistani government 

was in no position to counter the evolving developments. As riots and demonstrations to 

the US presence in Jacobabad mounted, so too 

did tensions with its nuclear neighbor to the 

east, India.53 Given their tenuous security, 

foreign policy, and domestic public opinion 

situation in the fall of 2001, Pakistani officials 

could neither stem the flow of Taliban and al 

Qaeda forces east nor actively confront them 

in a concerted effort.

US HOME FRONT

Patrolling for additional attacks while instilling a sense of security in commercial air traffic, the first year of Operation Noble Eagle was 

the most active for fighter and tanker aircraft of 

the Air Force Reserve Command. In October 

2001, the Secretary of Defense began referring 

to the military’s mission to defeat international 

terrorism at home as Operation Noble Eagle. 

By February 2002, when the United States 

Northern Command became established, 

the Air Force Reserve Command’s air mobility and air combat air crews had amassed 

765 Noble Eagle sorties, accumulating over 

3,830 flying hours; many thousand more hours 

were spent standing alpha, bravo, and charlie 

al Qaeda leaders, were dismayed to learn that 

many had hastily struck deals with Northern 

Alliance forces and disappeared across the 

border with Pakistan. The coalition had been 

plagued by the treacherous terrain, underestimation of enemy strength, and poor communirequired diligence.

The US was also unprepared for how quickly 

their Northern Alliance partners reconciled 

with the Taliban. US commanders, anxious 

to capture and interrogate Taliban and senior 

The countries blended together with every fuel stop, but the anticipation of the final landing caused my 

heart to race.

Faces filled the aircraft windows, straining to find loved ones in the waiting crowd. I sat back down to wait 

my turn, unable to get a peek out the window for myself.

As reservists from the 93rd Bomb Squadron returned in late January from a forward operating area in 

support of Operation Enduring Freedom, family and friends anxiously waited on the ramp for their personal ‘hero’ to step from the plane.

One hundred and twenty-two days had passed since leaving here and everything I love. Who could forget 

the ‘I can’t believe this is happening’ look on everyone’s face as we boarded the C-5 bound for war? It was 

much like the look we all had when we walked into our tents hours later to find nothing but a cot waiting 

for us.

Being there was like being a kid back at summer camp for the first time, realizing you didn’t like it but 

knowing you couldn’t call mom to come get you.

We were given 30 minutes to pack that September morning, so many of us had forgotten to take pictures 

and personal items of loved ones left behind.

After spending so much time together, sometimes we were friends and sometimes we were enemies but 

often we were each other’s closest confidants. Few people are allowed the experience to accomplish what 

we did and make history at the same time. 

My time may be short before returning to the zone, but whatever the future holds for my buddies and me, 

we will prevail. Our futures depend on it.

 B-52 Weapons Loader, 93rd Bomb Squadron, February 2002

WE WILL PREVAIL

125 126
2002 WINTER OLYMPICS

Park City, Utah, had submitted the winning bid as the host city for the 2002 Winter 

Olympic Games. Following the terrorist attacks, the Salt Lake Organizing Committee 

called for Defense Department assistance to 

ensure the security of the games. Although 

the Posse Comitatus Act prohibited the military from directly working in traditional law 

enforcement and public safety roles within 

the United States, the President took action. 

Faced with the threat of terrorism, an executive order altered that traditional arrangement by declaring the Olympics a national 

special security event. This permitted the 

utilization of a variety of Air Force Reserve 

Command resources.59 

Instead of giving terrorist organizations a single target or opportunity to attack, the Olympic Games involved dozens of venues spread 

out over an entire region of the United States 

for weeks throughout February 2002. Air 

Force Reservists, especially from Utah and 

Oregon, joined the National Guard in a team 

of approximately 4,500 service members out 

of 30,000 volunteers and worked in a variety of roles including staging and processing troops to support the event, providing 

airlift and surveillance capabilities for local 

and federal agencies, escorting athletes and 

distinguished visitors, security coordination, 

ground transportation, event preparation and 

maintenance, and assisting with administrative needs from early January until the end 

(QRF or RRF), enabling immediate responses 

to any emergency. By 2002, almost all C-130 

units stood alerts to deploy Army and Marine 

battalions at a moment’s notice.56

IMAs BACKFILL ACTIVE DUTY

POSITIONS

Of the 11,000 Air Force Reservists mobilized 

for Operations Noble Eagle and Enduring 

Freedom by March 2002, more than 3,000 

were individual mobilization augmentees. 

IMAs comprised more than a quarter of the 

command’s surge capability in the critical 

first six months of the Global War on Terrorism. Although many more provided support to warfighting organizations both before 

and after the initial Presidential call-up, these 

3,000 IMAs represented a capable force called 

to active service both without the necessity of 

additional training or reactivating the draft.57

As Lieutenant General James Sherrard III, 

AFRC Commander, described them, they also 

spanned the vast variety of air force specialties; they “provide critical support to the Unified Commands, MAJCOMS, and various defense agencies supporting Homeland Security 

efforts. Required support functions span the 

entire breadth of Reserve capabilities, security 

forces, civil engineering, rescue, special operations, strategic and tactical airlift, air refueling, fighters, bombers, AWACs, command and 

control, communications, satellite operations, 

logistics, intelligence, aerial port, services, and 

medical.”58

alerts for unexpected national defense contingencies.54 The command’s 513th Air Control Group would record their 100th airborne 

warning and control system mission in support 

of the homeland on 6 March 2002.55 

Additionally, in and around their home stations, Air Force Reservists increased their protection of US air space, and with it, the freedom of movement though the nation’s skies 

synonymous with the American way of life. 

Air Force Reserve Command participation in 

Operation Noble Eagle guaranteed the support of hundreds of state-of-the-art aircraft and 

thousands of airmen to ensure that a 9/11-like 

attack would not occur again within the United States. All Air Force Reservists shouldered 

the responsibilities of Operation Noble Eagle 

but none more than reserve fighter, tanker, air 

control, airlift crews, maintainers, and support 

personnel along with security forces and intelligence personnel.

The continuation of Operation Noble Eagle 

taskings combined with the demands for air 

and tanker bridges for contingency operations 

in Afghanistan required nothing less than herculean effort on the part of many air mobility personnel. The 514th Air Mobility Wing, 

for example, had performed 42,147 mandays 

through the end of May 2002. Just 271 activated reserve members had achieved an equivalency of 92 full-time officers and 300 enlisted 

billets. Air Force Reserve Command units 

engaged in Operation Noble Eagle supported 

quick reaction force or ready reaction forces 

126
and Syria for their nefarious activities.66 By 

June 2002, the Bush administration pursued 

allegations that Iraq sponsored terrorism and 

possessed weapons of mass destruction. On 

11 October 2002, the 107th Congress passed 

Public Law 107-243 authorizing the President 

to use military force “to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations,” relating to periodic inspections of its weapons 

programs.67 In the wake of the bill’s passage, 

Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki 

noted that “from today forward, the main effort of the US Army must be to prepare for war 

with Iraq.”68

On 8 November 2002, the US delegation to 

the United Nations succeeded in ratifying a 

non-binding United Nations disarmament and 

weapons inspection resolution.69 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 notified Iraq that it would “face serious consequences” if it chose to ignore the terms of the 

1991 Gulf War cease-fire.70 Both the US Public Law and United Nations Security Council 

Resolution invoked the authority of the original UN Security Council resolutions calling 

for Iraq’s disarmament in 1990.71 Secretary 

of State Colin Powell made the case for weapons of mass destruction.

MASTER PLAN - OPERATION IRAQI 

FREEDOM

As planning progressed, the chief objective of 

coalition forces was the liberation of Iraq from 

Saddam Hussein and the senior echelons of the 

However, Iraqi propaganda put forth that 9/11 

allowed America to “reap the fruits of [its] 

crimes against humanity” while following 

with sympathetic comments toward bin Laden 

after the first US airstrikes in Afghanistan. In 

addition to the proven links with the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the 

Palestine Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal 

terrorist organizations, US intelligence sources 

considered a relationship between the regime 

President Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.63

Following 9/11, President Bush requested 

a new intelligence analysis on Iraq, the only 

Arab-Muslim country not to condemn the 9/11 

attacks on the United States.64 New reports 

speculated on al Qaeda activity within Iraqi 

territory. President Saddam Hussein’s continued hostility toward United Nations disarmament mandates raised the specter of al Qaeda 

terrorists using a nuclear device. “Making no 

distinction between the terrorists . . . and those 

who harbor them,” President George Bush 

aligned Iraq under the “Axis of Evil” in his 

January 2002 State of the Union Address.65

In March 2002, with Taliban and al Qaeda forces on the run in Afghanistan, the White House 

could afford to take an extremely hard look at 

Iraq’s recent activities. In a speech on April 

2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 

echoed President Bush’s earlier alignment of 

Iraq within the Axis of Evil. Out of a list of 

seven official state sponsors of terrorism subject to sanctions by the government of the 

United States, Rumsfeld singled out Iraq, Iran, 

of March.60

On New Year’s Day 2002, 80 Air Force Reserve aircrew members and maintainers mobilized with four HH-60G Pave Hawk helicopters and one HC-130 King assigned to the 939th 

Rescue Wing, Portland International Airport, 

Oregon. Six aircrews and their support personnel arrived early to the Olympic village to 

provide training and operational use of their 

forward-looking-infrared-radar system aboard 

their helos to civil and federal agencies, monitoring Olympic venues during the games.61

“Our job was to be ready to respond to any 

contingency—day or night,” said Lieutenant 

Colonel Brian Calkins, 304th Rescue Squadron operations officer and helicopter pilot. He 

further related that “The FLIR capability of 

our HH-60s provided local law enforcement 

with around-the-clock capability to monitor 

activity at the various venues.” “The crewmembers were responsible for the aircraft, and 

we were responsible for directing law enforcement assets based on the situation,” said Gil 

Garcia, a law enforcement officer assigned to 

the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command’s 

aviation unit. “We responded to a few incidents—snowmobilers in suspicious locations, 

abandoned vehicles, and other cases where we 

viewed the circumstances to be unusual.”62

IRAQ – AXIS OF EVIL

In the run-up to war in Afghanistan, even Iran 

made minor accommodations in the wake of 

the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. 

1278
Freedom and the AFRC airmen who support 

it face-to-face with al Qaeda’s area of operations stretching from Africa to Oceana. 

At the outbreak of operations in Afghanistan on Hit Night, 7 October 2001, Secretary 

Rumsfeld echoed President Bush in even 

stronger language, “While our raids today 

focus on the Taliban and the foreign terrorists in Afghanistan, our aim remains much 

broader. Our objective is to defeat those 

who use terrorism, and those that house or 

support them. . . . Our partners in this effort 

represent nations and peoples of all cultures, 

religions, and races. We share the belief that 

terrorism is a cancer on the human condition, 

and we intend to oppose it wherever it is.”74

The bi-partisan 9/11 Commission report reiterated this. With international terrorism, 

“beyond a doubt the top national security 

priority for the United States [requiring the 

most “rapid surge in national security spending since the Korean War,” the commission 

defined threats in the post 9/11 world as “defined more by the gaunt lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between 

them.”75 

OEF - PHILLIPPINES

Elsewhere around the world, the United 

States completed its deployment of 1,200 

members of US armed forces to the southern Philippines for a combination security 

cooperation exercise and counterterrorism 

training called Balikatan 2002-1 on 10 Janube gained there without excessive collateral 

damage to Iraqi infrastructure or the civilian 

population. However, urban warfare in the 

sprawling metropolis of Baghdad remained a 

persistent concern by US military commanders. The Bush Administration seemed to have 

reached a consensus that the people of Iraq 

would be welcoming and that this would be a 

short war once Saddam Hussein was removed 

from power.

EXPANDING THE GLOBAL WAR ON 

TERRORISM

The war was not about Afghanistan or Iraq, at 

least not at first. Even President Bush’s speech 

before a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001 acknowledged that international 

terrorist networks extended beyond Afghanistan. The unlimited scope of terrorist operations required the US to wage both war and 

influence operations to defeat “thousands of 

[al Qaeda] terrorists in more than 60 countries.” He intended to “direct every resource 

at [America’s] command—every means of 

diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every 

instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon 

of war—to disrupt and defeat the global terror network.” Specifically President Bush directed those involved in the fight, “from FBI 

agents to intelligence operatives to the reservists we have called to active duty,” to be alert, 

make ready, and “make America proud.”73

Inevitably, the scope of a confrontation with 

global terrorism brought Operation Enduring 

Ba’ath regime leadership. The military strategy would integrate a ground offensive with 

a spectacular initial aerial bombardment and, 

later, close air support to coalition forces. The 

ground advance included coalition forces from 

20 member countries. As revised, the thrust 

of the ground offensive would come through 

Kuwait; the 3rd Infantry Division would track 

northwest through the southern desert towards 

Baghdad. Meanwhile, the offensive’s vanguard and support elements, spearheaded by 

the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, would 

take a direct approach through anticipated hotspots in the dense cities abutting the Euphrates 

River. These units would capture high-value 

targets such as the former Tallil air base but 

avoid vast swaths of the cities, returning to 

“mop up” once national Ba’ath command and 

control was disabled.72 

The aerial bombardment would originate from 

forces based in the Pacific, United Kingdom, 

Kuwait, and naval forces afloat in the Persian 

Gulf. The size and scale of the bombardment 

itself was envisioned to decapitate senior 

Ba’ath party leadership and terrify field combatants into mass surrenders similar to those 

seen during 1991 in the Persian Gulf War. By 

sweeping through Iraq’s north and south, the 

coalition planned to isolate Iraqi minority populations from reprisal by Saddam’s regime. 

The final objective of coalition kinetic operations in Iraq remained the liberation of the nation’s capital, Baghdad. By severing the regime from its control over the institutions and 

armed forces of Iraq, larger objectives could 

128
In September 2001, this was where I was: getting our guys to make sure we were going to work through this contractor to do our ORI. Another issue was being an 

aerial port of embarkation and what was expected from the gaining major commands in the Air Force as to the utilization of the base. As a result of the closing of 

the active duty bases, I considered Westover as a strategic entity because we were the farthest northeast base that you could run any major airlift operation. The 

Air National Guard was at Pease, but they were very limited with what they could do with the port up there at Bangor. Ultimately, you could stop one or two flights 

through there, but you couldn’t run anything major at Bangor. We were the place. If you didn’t have us, you’d have to go down to McGuire in New Jersey, or Dover, 

Delaware.

As we approached 9/11, we were pretty much just preparing for the ORI. In my mind before the exercise, I had to resolve the expectations of the utilization of 

Westover Air Reserve Base, despite the fact that history counter-indicated it. Westover had proven that nine years earlier during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. 

That was kind of where we were at this particular point. We were performing standard Air Force Reserve business, mostly training. However, this also included 

participation in the AEF. This entailed sending small numbers of participants to do that and performing our regular line channel mission that we had when 9/11 hit.

The answer we got back was, ‘No, you guys are no APOE. There is nothing written in any plan that acknowledges you like the Operations Desert Shield/Storm role 

you played.’

Well, we ended up mobilized for a year. If I remember correctly, we demobilized sometime around October-November 2002. There were still a lot of things going 

on. At that particular point, I think we had some crews that demobilized, but stayed. We put them on MPA because they still needed access to missions being flown 

out there. We did that with some of the maintainers as well. We thought it was coming to an end. That this is all going to wind down.

About the middle of January 2003, I get a call from General Wallace Whaley, who was the Command DO at the time and who ran the CAT. He said, ‘Hey, we’re 

going to need you guys to go 24 hours. You need to start preparing for that.’ I said, ‘No problem. When do I get the mob?’ He replied, ‘Oh, there’s no mob.’ I said, 

‘Well, how do you expect me to go 24 hours with no mobilization?’ He responded, ‘Well, you’ve got to work that out. We’ll get you some help somehow.’ I said, ‘Okay.’

We started looking at it. I got with my LG at the time. The concept we were briefed on was about the way they wanted to use Westover, and that this was going to be 

before OIF. Westover would get six empty C-5s a day coming from the theater. Our job was to turn the airplanes, do whatever maintenance was required, and send 

them down to Dover. At that point, Dover would load them up, and they’d go back out. That was the concept. However, the Command wanted us 24 hours in order 

to have airplanes dropping in whenever they came back. 

I got together with my maintenance commander at the time, and we looked at it. Theoretically, we had help coming. We knew they were looking at Kelly and Lackland to send us some help. We got with the union steward right away and said, ‘We want to go to four 10s, plus two hours of directed overtime every day.’ Whatever 

we have as maintenance, we’re going to split up with the full-time side. We asked how many guys wanted to volunteer, but it still wasn’t going to be enough. We took 

our core civilian maintainers, split them up half each day and worked them. Each person did four, 12-hour days. We then gave them time off and cycled them back 

in again. That’s how we spread out our maintenance. I remember sitting down with the union steward and him asking, ‘Wow, what about childcare for our folks?’ 

I said, ‘I don’t give you childcare today; I can’t.’ We finally worked through these kinds of things, and he agreed. We said, ‘We’re just being open with you. This is 

what we think we’ve got to do. This is our tasking. We just wanted to tell you. We looked at ever way, and this is how we do it.’ He agreed. That’s what we initially 

set up to do, starting at the end of January 2003.

 Major General Martin M. Mazick, AFRC Vice Commander, End of Tour Interview, 2010

WESTOVER - APOE

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US into South America. The elimination of 

Howard Air Force Base, Panama, in 1999 

lengthened the logistical process, requiring a 

greater role by Air Force Reserve Command 

air mobility airmen. By the advent of 9/11, 

the logistical challenges and ever-increasing 

investment of resources required an equivalent of nine C-141 to relocate members of 

the Army’s 204th Military Intelligence Battalion from Fort Bliss, Texas, to the Andean 

region. The level of involvement by the Air 

Force Reserve resulted in Twelfth Air Force 

delegating operational control of the annual 

mission, with Major General Wallace Whaley, AFRC Director of Operations, proposed 

as commander of Air Forces.84

As airlift requirements for contingency operations in Afghanistan increased, so too did 

strain from ever-increasing requirements for 

Air Force Reserve Command airlift to support Palmetto Ghost. Although just prior to 

9/11, the Palmetto Ghost had required the 

use of all strategic airlifters in the Air Force 

Reserve Command inventory and the participation of seven separate units, including 

the 94th, 315th, 433rd, 445th, 452nd, 459th, 

and 512th wings.85 In 2002, this expanded 

to tactical airlifters, principally the C-130. 

Intense planning and rebalancing requirements resulted in the Air Force Reserve 

Command utilizing all airlifters at its disposal—C-130s, C-141s, C-17s, and C-5s—to 

meet mission requirements. As requested, in 

Palmetto Ghost 2002 and 2003, AFRC C-5s 

from the 433rd Airlift Wing, Lackland AFB, 

for Reserves called to active duty because of 

the Global War on Terrorism.” 

OEF EXPANDS TO COLOMBIA

For years, Air Force Reservists supported Colombian counterdrug operations to exploit the 

local terrorist group’s greatest weakness, funding. Particularly at the turn of the 20th century, 

a number of congressional committees and 

social scientists established a conclusive link 

between drug money entering the black market through the Andean trade and the impetus 

of rebellious organizations to conduct terrorist 

operations globally.81 Accordingly, US military counternarcotics assistance to Colombia 

expanded and became included as a theater of 

the Global War on Terrorism. Coupled with 

the 9/11 attacks, US approaches to the mission 

changed from counternarcotics support to active counterinsurgency training in 2002.82 “It 

is clear,” stated US Senator Jon Kyl before a 

Senate subcommittee meeting on narcoterrorism in 2002, “that the FARC’s dependence on 

drug sales to finance its operations is not likely 

diminishing.” He continued, “In the South 

American region—in Colombia—I believe we 

must take a hard look at what is truly needed 

to effectively eliminate the narcoterrorst terror 

that has taken hold there.”83

In support of Palmetto Ghost, the Air Force 

Reserve Command flew missions to forward 

deploy US intelligence and counterterrorism 

specialists and their equipment from US Army 

and Marine Corps bases across the southern 

ary 2002.76 During the resupply of forces 

in late January 2002, one of the eight Operation Enduring Freedom missions flown by the 

Air Force Reserve Command’s 312th Airlift 

Squadron through Kadena AB, Japan, supported OEF—PHILIPPINES.77 The mission, 

typical of Air Force Reserve global mobility 

support to this exercise, transported passengers and cargo on a leg from Guam to Okinawa aboard a C-5 on 24 January 2002.78 The 

mission helped lay the groundwork for further 

progress in later Balikatan 2002-2. 

Baliakatan 2002-2, as part of the largest confrontation in the Philippine Army’s 30 year 

history with Abu Sayyaf, came three months 

after the first regularly scheduled security cooperation exercise Balikatan 2002-1. The Philippine Army, supported by US forces, was determined to make a stand against Abu Sayyaf 

and the larger Jemaah Islamiyah encroachment 

in the Philippines. The importance of airlift’s 

role was highlighted in the renovation of a 

local airport to ensure C-130 throughput.79

Once again, Air Force Reserve Command strategic airlift crews from the 349th Air Mobility Wing in California and 433rd Airlift Wing 

in Texas also flew 12 missions in support of 

the exercise, delivering passengers and cargo 

through the international airport in Manila.80

These activities showed the range of Air Force 

Reserve support to meet national security objectives around the world. Public Affairs officer Captain David Englin noted “the military 

activity going on in Afghanistan and the Philippines . . . seem like the most logical mission 

130
cargo and warriors bound for staging areas 

in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia. Faced 

with overcrowded ramps at regular Air Force 

APOEs, aerial port of embarkations, such as 

Travis AFB, California; Pope AFB, South Carolina; and McGuire Air Force, New Jersey, the 

Air Mobility Command tapped the Air Force 

Reserve Command to alleviate the congestion. 

On the east coast, Westover Air Reserve Base, 

Massachusetts, (hosted by the Air Force Reserve’s 439th Airlift Wing) sprang into action. 

Equipped to operate its squadrons of C-5 Galaxy aircraft, the base was ideally suited to handle the overflow of C-5s transiting to Europe 

and the Middle East. Maintenance crews composed of traditional reservists, air reserve technicians, and civil service employees worked 

overtime to handle maintenance issues and 

1990 Gulf War. A huge amount of war material throughput was destined to locations in 

the Middle East. In the continental 

United States, this meant a surge in 

activity at air bases on the eastern 

and western seaboard. Called aerial 

ports of embarkation, these were the 

last stops for massive movements of 

Texas, and the 439th Airlift Wing, Westover 

AFB, Massachusetts, gathered Marines and 

soldiers for transfer to South America. Thereupon, the C-130s from the 914th Airlift Wing, 

Niagara Falls ARS, New York, 911th Airlift 

Wing, Pittsburg IAP, Pennsylvania, and 908th 

Airlift Wing, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, delivered them down country.86

RESERVISTS STEP UP

For the most part, air mobility preparation for 

Operation Iraqi Freedom mirrored that of the 

I have to admit when they mobilize their folks and they know they are their folks those MAJCOMs 

bend over backwards to get them trained, equipped and everything. You bring in somebody else 

that isn’t theirs, they are less accommodating. You have that problem when somebody will volunteer to take that tasking and they do it on MPA days. That’s when we run into the horror stories 

of not being able to get a weapon, can’t get a MOB bag, can’t get a gas mask, no one will process 

you. That’s where the horror stories are. It was probably less than 20 percent of what we were 

doing, but it was enough to make a difference. It’s not just the IMAs; it is the AGRs, too.

Colonel Nancy C. Zbyszinski, RMG Commander, End Of Tour Interview, November 2010

An Air Force Reserve Command 315th Airlift Wing C-17 crew assigned to the 17th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron at Rhein-Main Air Base flew a 26-hour mission from Germany to Pakistan 

and back, achieving an Operation Enduring Freedom milestone—the 1,000th C-17 mission for 

the squadron on 12 June 2002. Air Force Reservists from the 446th Airlift Wing as well as the 

regular Air Force were also part of the effort in Germany. Pilot Major Jeff Meyers and crew 

began their record-setting mission in Frankfurt on 11 June. They stopped in Pakistan to pick 

up 95 soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division, home based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and 

refueled in Uzbekistan before returning to Germany. Activated in January 2002, the Total 

Force 17th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron had transported over 25,000 tons of cargo and 

approximately 10,000 passengers since inception with a reliability rate of 90 percent—an 

amazing achievement!

17TH EAS – 1,000TH MISSION

1312
routine airfield operations arising from 1,100 

transiting C-5s.87 The value of their effort 

cannot be over-estimated; maintenance crews 

serviced more aircraft than any other C-5 base 

in the run-up to war while achieving the highest logistics reliability rate of any C-5 operation.88 On the west coast, March Air Reserve 

Base, California, (hosted by AFRC’s 452nd 

Air Mobility Wing) exploded into activity. 

Base operations personnel, already ramped up 

to handle its own Air Force Reservists mobilizing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, expanded 

their services to handle the sudden influx of 

transient warriors such as the Marines from 

Camp Pendleton.89

Air Force Reserve Command KC-135 operators from the 349th Air Mobility Wing, Travis 

Air Force Base, California, forward deployed 

to provide theater support to coalition forces 

preparing for the invasion of Iraq out of an air 

base in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Air Force 

Reservists from the 514th Air Mobility Wing 

deployed to the southeast European nation 

of Bulgaria to stage KC-10 Extender aerial 

refueling aircraft to handle the throughput to 

northern Iraq. The size of this deployment 

required a number of Air Force Reservists to 

fill senior leadership positions. United States 

Air Forces in Europe also tapped the experience of Air Force Reserve commanders from 

the 434th and 507th Air Refueling Wings to 

fill critical senior leadership positions for the 

tanker hub at Moron Air Base, Spain.90 

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1334
134
My fellow citizens, events in Iraq have now reached the final days of decision. For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pursued 

patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. That regime pledged to reveal and destroy all its weapons of mass destruction as 

a condition for ending the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Since then, the world has engaged in 12 years of diplomacy. We have passed more than a dozen resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. We 

have sent hundreds of weapons inspectors to oversee the disarmament of Iraq. Our good faith has not been returned.

The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful 

efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again–because we are not dealing with peaceful men.

Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal 

weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s people.

The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda.

The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.

The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat. But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward 

tragedy, we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is too late to act, this danger will be removed.

The United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security. That duty falls to me, as Commander-inChief, by the oath I have sworn, by the oath I will keep.

Recognizing the threat to our country, the United States Congress voted overwhelmingly last year to support the use of force against Iraq. America 

tried to work with the United Nations to address this threat because we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. We believe in the mission of the United 

Nations. One reason the U.N. was founded after the second world war was to confront aggressive dictators, actively and early, before they can attack 

the innocent and destroy the peace.

In the case of Iraq, the Security Council did act, in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687–both still in effect–the United States and our allies 

are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a question of authority, it is a question of will.

Last September, I went to the U.N. General Assembly and urged the nations of the world to unite and bring an end to this danger. On November 8th, the 

 ADDRESS TO THE NATION – ULTIMATUM TO SADDAM HUSSEIN

135 136
Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, finding Iraq in material breach of its obligations, and vowing serious consequences if Iraq did 

not fully and immediately disarm.

Today, no nation can possibly claim that Iraq has disarmed. And it will not disarm so long as Saddam Hussein holds power. For the last four-and-a-half 

months, the United States and our allies have worked within the Security Council to enforce that Council’s long-standing demands. Yet, some permanent members of the Security Council have publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels the disarmament of Iraq. These governments 

share our assessment of the danger, but not our resolve to meet it. Many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat 

to peace, and a broad coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world. The United Nations Security Council has not lived up to its 

responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.

In recent days, some governments in the Middle East have been doing their part. They have delivered public and private messages urging the dictator to 

leave Iraq, so that disarmament can proceed peacefully. He has thus far refused. All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. 

For their own safety, all foreign nationals–including journalists and inspectors–should leave Iraq immediately.

Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast, and I have a message for them. If we must begin a military campaign, it will be directed 

against the lawless men who rule your country and not against you. As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you 

need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror, and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no 

more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. 

The tyrant will soon be gone. The day of your liberation is near.

It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power. It is not too late for the Iraqi military to act with honor and protect your country by permitting 

the peaceful entry of coalition forces to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Our forces will give Iraqi military units clear instructions on actions 

they can take to avoid being attacked and destroyed. I urge every member of the Iraqi military and intelligence services, if war comes, do not fight for 

a dying regime that is not worth your own life.

And all Iraqi military and civilian personnel should listen carefully to this warning. In any conflict, your fate will depend on your action. Do not destroy 

oil wells, a source of wealth that belongs to the Iraqi people. Do not obey any command to use weapons of mass destruction against anyone, including 

the Iraqi people. War crimes will be prosecuted. War criminals will be punished. And it will be no defense to say, ‘I was just following orders.’

Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure 

will be taken to win it. Americans understand the costs of conflict because we have paid them in the past. War has no certainty, except the certainty of 

sacrifice.

Yet, the only way to reduce the harm and duration of war is to apply the full force and might of our military, and we are prepared to do so. If Saddam 

Hussein attempts to cling to power, he will remain a deadly foe until the end. In desperation, he and terrorists groups might try to conduct terrorist 

operations against the American people and our friends. These attacks are not inevitable. They are, however, possible. And this very fact underscores 

the reason we cannot live under the threat of blackmail. The terrorist threat to America and the world will be diminished the moment that Saddam Hussein is disarmed.

Our government is on heightened watch against these dangers. Just as we are preparing to ensure victory in Iraq, we are taking further actions to 

136
protect our homeland. In recent days, American authorities have expelled from the country certain individuals with ties to Iraqi intelligence services. 

Among other measures, I have directed additional security of our airports, and increased Coast Guard patrols of major seaports. The Department of 

Homeland Security is working closely with the nation’s governors to increase armed security at critical facilities across America.

Should enemies strike our country, they would be attempting to shift our attention with panic and weaken our morale with fear. In this, they would fail. 

No act of theirs can alter the course or shake the resolve of this country. We are a peaceful people–yet we’re not a fragile people, and we will not be 

intimidated by thugs and killers. If our enemies dare to strike us, they and all who have aided them, will face fearful consequences.

We are now acting because the risks of inaction would be far greater. In one year, or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations 

would be multiplied many times over. With these capabilities, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies could choose the moment of deadly conflict when 

they are strongest. We choose to meet that threat now, where it arises, before it can appear suddenly in our skies and cities.

The cause of peace requires all free nations to recognize new and undeniable realities. In the 20th century, some chose to appease murderous dictators, 

whose threats were allowed to grow into genocide and global war. In this century, when evil men plot chemical, biological and nuclear terror, a policy 

of appeasement could bring destruction of a kind never before seen on this earth.

Terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations–and responding to such enemies only after they have 

struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide. The security of the world requires disarming Saddam Hussein now.

As we enforce the just demands of the world, we will also honor the deepest commitments of our country. Unlike Saddam Hussein, we believe the Iraqi 

people are deserving and capable of human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and 

peaceful and self-governing nation.

The United States, with other countries, will work to advance liberty and peace in that region. Our goal will not be achieved overnight, but it can come 

over time. The power and appeal of human liberty is felt in every life and every land. And the greatest power of freedom is to overcome hatred and 

violence, and turn the creative gifts of men and women to the pursuits of peace.

That is the future we choose. Free nations have a duty to defend our people by uniting against the violent. And tonight, as we have done before, America 

and our allies accept that responsibility.

Good night, and may God continue to bless America.

 

 President George W. Bush, 17 March 2003

1378
A long anticipated message from Air Mobility Command came on the first weekend of February. The surge of aircraft was starting, the wing was told. 

Within hours, the first C-5s landed here, and Westover began moving troops and equipment to back up the national will in the Persian Gulf area of 

responsibility. They were followed by C-130s within the first week.

Twenty-four hour operations to accommodate troops and service aircraft started with teams of volunteers. At the tip of the spear was the 42nd Aerial 

Port Squadron, augmented by the 58th APS aerial porters. Westover’s maintainers worked around-the-clock in 12-hour shifts with the help of 433rd 

Airlift Wing volunteers from Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Services volunteers were on duty at all hours to feed passengers and prepare flight meals. 

“An air bridge operation is a tremendous job for everyone involved. To be a success, everyone has to pitch in together. That’s what is happening here. 

People know that what they are doing is important. Everyone is coming together,” said Brigadier General Martin M. Mazick, 439th Airlift Wing Commander.

AMC planners at the command’s headquarters at Scott Air Force Base, Ill, are channeling the armada of aircraft through Westover. AMC also coordinates aerial refueling over the Atlantic . . ..

By MSgt Tom Allocco, 439th AW, Public Affairs, 2003

AIR BRIDGE

Since the 439th Airlift Wing began providing a 24-hour air bridge to Southwest 

Asia on 2 February 2003, the base has accommodated 375 planes, pumping 

more than 3.3 million gallons of JP-8 fuel. During the same period, base aerial 

porters cared for 2,571 passengers and more than 8.5 million pounds of cargo.

AFRC Public Affairs, March 2003

 NORTHEAST CHILL FAILS TO STEM AIR BRIDGE

138
101st Airborne Division. Equally, the Iraqi 

military was breaking a pattern by the daytime 

launch. The USS Higgins detected the launch 

and provided the warning. Troops took cover 

in their MOPP 4 condition protective chemical warfare gear while a US Army Patriot 

missile, located at Camp Victory, intercepted 

the in-bound Iraqi missile 15 kilometers from 

Camp New York. At 1330, the Iraqi military 

unleashed a second missile, aimed at Camp 

Doha and the Headquarters of the Combined 

Force Land Component Command. Another 

Patriot missile performed the intercept three 

miles from the camp. Through the remainder of the first day, the Iraqi military launched 

three more missiles without great success. A 

Patriot missile intercepted one while the other 

two fell harmlessly short.5 Supporting the efforts to locate Scuds as well as the capturing of 

the western airfields were six F-16s from the 

Air Force Reserve Command.6

the actionable intelligence on Saddam Hussein 

and a plan by Iraqi forces to sabotage the Al 

Rumaila oil fields in Al Faw forced the USled coalition to move a day earlier. US and 

coalition ground forces (numbering in excess of 200,000) began moving into Iraq on 

the night of 20 March. Initially, they faced a 

five-kilometer span of land that contained an 

18-meter high berm, tank ditch, razor wire and 

electric wire encased in chain link fencing, followed by another berm and another tank ditch. 

Their route took them past lightly defended 

Iraqi border observation posts some 10 kilometers away. Ten thousand vehicles would 

cross the berm, using eight lanes over the next 

two days, bumper to bumper. The sand of the 

desert was unforgiving, even the heavy equipment transporter, which cleared the passages, 

had to be recovered numerous times. In less 

than three hours, at 2100, the first artillery fire was directed at Iraqi observation posts. And some 38 minutes later, 

Alpha Company would report seven 

Iraqi soldiers killed at posts 18 and 19, 

the first combat blood. Starting the 

ground campaign ahead of the air attack achieved tactical and operational 

surprise because it was in contrast to 

what the Iraqi military had experienced in the First Gulf War.4

Saddam’s military responded. At 

1224, the first of 17 Iraqi Scud missile 

attacks on coalition forces commenced. The 

first target was 4,000 soldiers and 100 helicopters in the Thunder assembly area of the 

ground offensive. Departing from a classified 

base near Iraq, three AFRC MC-130s refueled six Air Force MH-53Ms inserting Army 

special forces and other infiltrating teams 

into multiple strategic locations within Iraq. 

The MC-130s offloaded an incredible 91,000 

pounds of fuel during this mission.2

Intelligence had also provided that Saddam 

Hussein and his two sons were at Dora Farms 

near Baghdad. There were hopes of taking 

out Saddam and his key advisors. Two F-117 

Nighthawks dropped four 2,000-pound GBU27 laser-guided, bunker-busting bombs on the 

compound while the US Navy unleashed Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Red Sea and 

the Persian Gulf. However, as later confirmed, 

Saddam was not there.3 

CROSSING THE BERM

Coalition leaders from 35 countries had 

planned “D-Day” to coincide with “crossing 

the berm” from Kuwait into Iraq. However, 

13940
On average, coalition aircraft would generate 1,500 to 2,000 sorties per day.8 While 

the B-52 crews could deliver from far away, 

their missions averaged 16 to 18 hours and 

their days ran close to 20 to 21 hours with 

the mission planning. Regular Air Force and 

Air Force Reserve Command bomber crews, 

maintenance, munitions, and support personnel blended seamlessly.9

Overhead, the coalition’s AWACs orchestrated and controlled the air space. Mobilized Air Force Reservists from the 513th Air 

Control Group were there as well. “Everything, we did was joint,” Lieutenant Colonel 

Patrick Rupel stated recalling the time and 

further offered: “In OIF, for example, the 

standard thing was to relieve an E-2 with one 

of our airplanes. They were based from the 

aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt and another 

carrier in the Mediterranean. We would either relieve an E-2 or an E-2 would relieve 

us.”10 “It’s hard to remember that Iraq had 

one of the most competent air forces in that 

region at the beginning of OIF. They had 

MiG-25s and MiG-29s. Our primary focus 

was looking for aircraft that were taking off 

from the existing Iraqi bases. Also, we continuously scanned for any radars that indimissiles and bombs hit with pin-point accuracy the thousand of strategic command and 

control, military, and governmental targets, 

dramatically lighting up Baghdad. Miraculously, the city still kept its electricity. It was 

twenty-first century warfare. It was a massive display of airpower. The Iraqi military 

responded with some triple A and surface-toair missile fire but had largely ceded control of 

the air space. The Iraqi people knew the main 

presidential palace was in flames and in ruins. 

Over 1,700 air sorties comprised the effort that 

night. Over the next days, the coalition forces 

released 600 missiles and bombs. From five 

ships, US and United Kingdom naval forces 

sent 500 missiles airborne while United Kingdom, Air Force, and Air Force Reserve Command attack aircraft, fighter, and bombers generated the remainder, flying from their Pacific, 

United Kingdom, and Southwest Asia areas. 

The main force—3rd Infantry Division, 1st 

Marine Expeditionary Force, and the UK’s 7th 

Armoured Division—began moving across 

the berm into Iraq from Kuwait for the 300-

mile plus run (500-600 km) to capture Baghdad, the seat of power. The 3rd Infantry took 

the west side of the Euphrates River on the 

road to Baghdad, covering 200 miles to Al Najaf with little resistance in twenty-four hours. 

The Marines reached and easily secured the 

Al Rumaila oil fields after a brief firefight and 

then pushed north. Embedded with the Marines were Air Force Reserve medical members from the 433rd Aeromedical Evacuation 

Squadron, serving as an aeromedical liaison 

team. Besides regulating casualties and arranging for evacuations, they would use their 

combat training to return fire and repulse the 

enemy during a three-hour firefight. The UK 

forces captured 750 Iraqi forces right at the 

border by Umm Qsar and, thereafter, began to 

prepare the port city to receive supplies. To 

the west, special forces had already ended any 

Iraqi efforts to launch missiles into Israel and 

on coalition forces. In the northern part of 

Iraq, special forces had also initiated a second 

front, working with the Kurds there.7 

 SHOCK AND AWE 

At 1800Z on 21 March, A-Hour, the coalition air forces began the “Shock and Awe” 

campaign. Highly televised and videoed, the 

evening bombing of Baghdad with its “giant 

explosions” provided the world an air show 

of immense intensity. Precision weaponry of 

Reserve Special Ops and Rescue crews were crucial to the speed and forcefulness of the coalition’s ‘Shock & Awe’ blitz through Iraq, providing key air-refueling to elite special operations 

forces as well as extracting injured or downed coalition members.

Major General Martin M. Mazick, General Officer Steering Group, 21 October 2003 

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CSI: On Point: OIF, p 144

1421
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along with another 50 to 80,000 hardcore Republican Guard and over 2,400 tanks, 2,400 

armored personnel carriers, and 4,000 artillery 

pieces. Additionally, many irregular forces—

Fedayeen Saddam, Al Quds, Ba’ath Party militias, and the Lions of Youth—posed serious 

threats to the coalition forces.14

Beginning on the night of 22-23 March 2003, 

with the berm crossed and coalition forces 

moving in country, coalition airpower shifted 

its focus from strategic bombing of Iraqi air 

defense assets and strategic targets to close 

air support of penetrating ground forces. The 

shock and awe option of airpower would remain.15 

WADI AL KIR INFILTRATION

Requests for Air Force support remained continuous. One more notable mission was the 

Wadi al Kir infiltration. On 22 March, an 

AFRC four-ship of MC-130s loaded with 100 

special forces personnel from the 5th Special 

Forces Group and some 119,000 pounds of 

equipment performed an important mission 

under extreme circumstances. The MC-130 

crews inserted the force in Southern Iraq at the 

heavily damaged Wadi al Kir airfield, establishing a critical forward operating base (FOB) 

on the outskirts of Najaf. Avoiding radar, three 

manned border posts, and 57mm antiaircraft 

artillery sites, the MC-130s stealthy delivered 

the special forces by landing under blackout 

conditions which also included a bomb crater at the touchdown point and another craswered the call to serve. He had flown on the 

evening of 12 September 2001, sat alerts, and 

then departed for Southwest Asia the end of 

September.12

Terrifying the rank and file of the Iraqi military and elite Republican Guard into immediate surrender en masse had been the hope of 

the explosive air assault. US planners and 

administration officials had inferred from the 

mass surrenders of the 1991 Gulf War that 

many Iraqi military members were not prepared to die supporting Saddam Hussein’s 

regime. However, within hours of the strike, 

US forces were aware they did not have the 

desired result. Mostly because the Iraqi forces 

had not yet been “worn down,” they continued 

to fight.13

Although greatly reduced from its Gulf War 

heyday, Saddam’s military still numbered 

between 280,000 to 350,000 in 17 divisions 

cated that they were trying to set up an IS network. The only air defense they threw up was 

primarily unguided artillery,” Colonel John 

Trnka added.11 

Also in the sky that first night of the war was 

First Lieutenant Kevin Dombay, an Air Force 

Reserve Command KC-10 pilot with already 

more than thirty combat tanker missions flown 

in Afghanistan as Enduring Freedom commenced in 2001. Now as Iraqi Freedom unfolded, Dombay and his crew would perform 

an 11-hour air refueling mission, providing jet 

fuel to Navy EA-6 Prowlers that were jamming Iraqi radars to ensure safe passage for the 

follow-on bombers. Over the next days, they 

refueled the B-52 Stratofortress bombers and 

RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance planes. 

The fuel-hungry aircraft penetrating the skies 

over Iraq on long missions required night 

and day access to air refueling, so six KC-10 

Extenders crews and support personnel deployed from the active and reserve 305th and 

514th Air Mobility Wings (the 409th Air Expeditionary Operations Group) to assist from 

March through June 2003. From their base at 

Camp Sarafovo, Burgas Airport, Bulgaria, in 

southeastern Europe, the largest aerial refueling aircraft in the US inventory, flew their 

assigned tracks, silently downloading their 

170,000 pounds of fuel to coalition aircraft. 

First Lieutenant Dombay, a computer technician in civilian life who was in the midst of 

planning his June wedding, was typical of the 

many Air Force Reservists who had put their 

personal lives on hold, once again, and had an1434
and food for sizable numbers of enemy prisoners.18 The city of some 500,000 inhabitants contained pro-Iraqi forces—Fedayeen 

Saddam militiamen, Baath Party loyalists, 

and Iraqi Army—that would prove fateful to 

members of an US Army maintenance company and the Marines.

On 23 March, 64 members and some 33 vehicles of the 507th Maintenance Company, 

became isolated. This portion of the 507th 

was last in a march column of 600 vehicles 

departing Kuwait. The soft sand and the 

resulting breakdowns and recovery had put 

them farther behind. With little rest over a 

70-hour period, tragedy occurred. The enemy exploited the situation when an element 

of the 507th missed a traffic control point 

turn at An Nasiriyah, the major southern 

crossing of the Euphrates River. Eleven of 

the 33 soldiers were killed by small arms and 

RPGs in the ensuing attacks that lasted some 

60-90 minutes. Seven others were captured, 

including Private Jessica Lynch.19

After pushing 85 miles into Iraq, Charlie 

Company of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine 

Regiment and of Task Force Tarawa had arrived in the An Nasiriyah area and received 

the mission to take the second bridge on 23 

March while another Marine element had already secured the other bridge crossing the 

Euphrates River and leading into An Nasiriyah. Controlling both spans was crucial to 

the drive north to Baghdad. Up front should 

have been the M1-A1 Abrams tanks from 

tech air defenders on approaching coalition 

aircraft by flickering the city lights. Adapting 

to this environment and being fully aided by 

artillery, attack helicopters, and the combat air 

support of Army, Air Force, and Navy pilots 

along with AWACS, the 101st Aviation Brigade launched a second deep-attack operation 

against the 14th Brigade of the Medina Division on 28 March as the sandstorm abated. Although weakened, the Medina forces still remained a significant threat. Securing Karbala 

would mean an open approach to the outlaying 

areas of Baghdad.17 This event highlighted 

the nature of the unfolding war—one employing the most sophisticated and advanced weapons in existence as well as one drawing upon 

the home-made, improvised, and unsophisticated (but deadly) equipment and methods. 

Joint and coalition forces were up to the fight.

BATTLE OF AN NASIRIYAH - POWS

In the drive north, the 3rd Infantry Division 

had pressed 140 kilometers into Iraq, securing 

the area around Tallil Air Base, near the Euphrates city of An Nasiriyah but not the city itself. Tallil would serve as a key logistical supply point. Air Force Reserve Command A-10, 

C-130, rescue, and medical resources soon 

forward deployed to Tallil, reducing flying 

times and increasing responsiveness. On 23 

March, after securing the bridge northwest of 

An Nasiriyah, the Army turned the area over to 

a 1st MEF task force and continued the march 

north to As Samawah. In securing Tallil, the 

3rd also had to contend with and provide care 

ter located just 3,200 feet down the taxiway. 

Combat offloading under blacked-out, night 

vision goggle conditions pushed the operation 

to the extreme end and was even more so by 

the eight-minute spacing between the aircraft 

landing and departing. Besides the insertion, 

the mission also provided needed reinforcement and resupply of the teams inserted on 19 

March. From Wadi al Kir, the special forces 

teams would conduct raids and psychological 

operations against the remaining Iraqi forces 

in the area. Subsequently, Air Force special 

forces aviation assets inserted more special 

forces teams and provided surveillance of 

Iraqi troop movements.16 

MEDINA - KARBALA

On the night of 23-24 March, Army AH-64 

Apache helicopters from the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment launched a deep-attack operation against Saddam’s famed Medina Division, positioned near the city of Karbala and 

on the doorstep of Baghdad. The plan entailed 

the Apaches destroying the artillery and armor 

of the Medina Division, enabling the 3rd Infantry to maneuver through the Karbala Gap. 

Planning estimates had allotted two nights for 

the attacks. These plans became upended. On 

the first night, 31 of the 32 Apaches returned 

damaged with the other helicopter downed 

and two pilots captured. The event called into 

review deep-attack helicopter operations and 

provided a new understanding of this enemy 

and its use of irregular forces and small-arms 

fire for hitting-and-running, alerting its low 

144
One night in a hole in the ground is all it takes to know that the real face of war is still about boots in the dirt. Thirteen Westover security 

forces specialists dug fighting positions in the desert and laid in them night after night in body armor. They kept their M-16s, M-203 grenade launchers, squad automatic weapons, and grenades close at hand as they watched a barren landscape for enemy movement. Hearing 

firefights nearby, they learned early that the road to Baghdad was a rough one.

The reservists returned home in early June 2003. For them, Operation Iraqi Freedom was long nights, sandstorms, short rations, unexploded ordnance all over the ground, and eyes red from fatigue and uncertainty. It was the tension of setting up a firebase in the desert with 

enemy soldiers close enough that at night they could hear them hit US Army checkpoints and listen to the situation report on the radio. It 

was close enough to the front that they helped move injured on the airstrip.

The members of Air Force Reserve Command’s 439th Airlift Wing experienced a combat situation unique for Air Force security forces specialists since the Vietnam War. They were fully loaded with combat gear and dug in at a bare base in hostile territory. They rode the first 

C-130 Hercules into Bushmaster Landing Zone, a dirt airstrip that had just been passed by the 3rd Infantry Division on its long push north 

through Iraq. Bushmaster LZ was nothing more than a temporary dirt airstrip near Karbala, scene of hard fighting by the “Rock of the 

Marne” division. The fighting had moved north toward Baghdad when Westover and Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, security forces specialists arrived on the first C-130. Until Baghdad fell, this airstrip served as a supply point for the front and a waypoint for those returning.

Stepping off the plane, they set up their M-60s in fighting positions as the inner ring of defense. Further out were Army checkpoints, which 

were hit by Iraqis. The soldiers were veterans of the battle to take Karbala, a fight so tough it left widespread destruction. ‘The soldiers 

talked about that place,’ said Technical Sergeant Shane Stabile, who led the Westover contingent, ‘That had a big impact on them, the hardest impact.’

For five days, the security forces specialists mostly lived in holes. With two up and two down at night, a few hours sleep were all they got. 

During the day, temperatures rose above 100 degrees, but at night the reservists had to wrap themselves in sleeping bags to get warm. When 

not on the perimeter, they helped on the flightline, carrying injured and supplies. Supplies, including Meals Ready to Eat and water, were 

always short and had to be carefully conserved. The only contact they had with Iraqis was shooing away nomads with goat herds. The 

Iraqis were friendly, knowing enough English to offer ‘down with Saddam’ and seeking to barter cigarettes or dinars, the national currency.

‘It definitely made you appreciate the American way of life,’ Stabile said, ‘Kids were running around with bare feet in the middle of the 

desert.’ One day they were told to pack up, Baghdad had been liberated and Saddam International Airport was open. The word, however, 

came one day too late to avoid a four-day sandstorm that knocked down tents and kept them in sleeping bags, poncho liners, and goggles. 

By the time they re-deployed to a built-up base near Iraq, one member needed antibiotics to counter the sand in his lungs.

The team was hand-picked—based on their performance and experience at Bushmaster LZ—to provide security at the renamed Baghdad 

 WESTOVER SECURITY FORCES ON ROAD TO BAGHDAD

145 146
International Airport. After two days of cleaning and repacking gear, they were on a C-130. When they de-planed in Baghdad, there 

were still firefights. They stayed in a building nicknamed the “crack house” for its filthy condition. At night from the roof, they could 

hear firefights. They saw the red tracers of the 3rd Infantry Division crisscross with the green tracers of the Iraqis. The airfield was 

mortared once.

‘The wild, wild west,’ is how Stabile describes those early weeks after the liberation. ‘Probably for the first two weeks there were continuous firefights. ...It was lawless,’ Stabile said. ‘The runways were the only things actually cleared. There were RPGs (rocket-propelled 

grenades) and weapons laying everywhere. There were rocket launchers. The Iraqi soldiers just left their fighting positions. There was 

so much [that] EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] couldn’t get it all. We were constantly picking up AK-47s. Piles 10 feet high were 

spilling over.’

The reservists’ job was to guard the side of the airport allocated to civilian and humanitarian aircraft. They teamed up with the Army, but 

to a large extent the Westover security forces were an autonomous unit. They also worked with Australian security forces and patrolled 

in a Mercedes, which was given to them by 3rd Infantry Division soldiers. Several times the reservists apprehended Iraqis, who most 

likely intruded to loot.

As at Bushmaster, Meals Ready to Eat were in short supply. The 3rd Infantry Division soldiers were eager to trade for tobacco. It was 

a real treat when an aircrew brought in some frozen chicken from Germany. People lost weight because they got tired of eating MREs. 

Gradually, conditions improved. The shooting tapered off, although there were still pinpoint attacks taking place when they left. The 

quality of life improved with tents and hot meals. The Westover security forces specialists visited with the 11-member 439th Airlift Control 

Flight and two intelligence specialists at the Baghdad International Airport. They even got enough time off to tour one of Saddam’s palaces, furnished in marble, complete with moat. A washing machine pulled from a bombed out building added to the quality of life. They 

set up their own electricity. Life was almost becoming comfortable, with an air conditioner and refrigerator, when they got orders to go 

home. 

By MSgt Tom Allocco, 439th AW Public Affairs, June 2003

146
Samawah on 29 March. Lieutenant General 

William S. Wallace, V Corps Commander and 

leader of the offensive out of Kuwait, considered that An Najaf would also be a hot spot as 

were As Samawah and An Nasiriyah. Additionally, An Najaf contained the Tomb of Ali, 

a major holy site for Shiite Muslims. Meeting 

resistance from paramilitary and regular Iraqi 

military, he sought to contain An Najaf and 

was successful by the end of March. The battle of An Najaf was waged despite continuous 

dust and sandstorms (25-27 March) which affected all operations across the drive north.24

NORTHERN FRONT - AIRBORNE 

DRAGON

Turkey’s last-minute decision to refuse overland passage for the 4th Infantry Division required a massive change in plans. To open the 

ground war in northern Iraq and provide the 

pressure of a second front, 1,000 members of 

the 173rd Airborne Brigade would airdrop to 

a remote airfield in Iraq on 26 March. To facilitate the mission, called Operation Northern 

Delay, a special forces unit would airdrop in 

and ensure the regular forces had a safe point 

of ingress. Italy’s Berlusconi government supported the basing required to execute what became a historic airdrop. C-17s, assigned stateside to Charleston and McChord Air Force 

Bases, executed the airdrop portion of the 

mission, Operation Airborne Dragon, flying 

from Aviano Air Base in Italy. Despite sizable 

civilian protests, Italian President Silvio Berlusconi assured the safe conduct of US forces 

events put before all the full aspects of warfare 

to include the fog of war.

On 1 April, with intelligence in hand, special 

forces supported by Marines extracted Private 

Jessica Lynch from a hospital. The Marines 

located and rescued the other 507th survivors 

along with the two Apache helicopter pilots on 

13 April, some 75 miles north of Baghdad.21

Joint teams of Air Force and Air Force Reserve 

medical and aeromedical personnel flew these 

soldiers home.22 Once recovered, Air Force 

Reservists from the 439th Aeromedical Staging Squadron stabilized Private Lynch aboard 

a C-141 and evacuated her to Germany. Subsequently, Air Force Reservists from the 445th 

Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron assured a 

safe flight aboard a transoceanic C-17. From 

a dire situation, members of the Air Force Reserve Command rose to the challenge helping 

to liberate Lynch and her six fellow POWs, the 

first such recoveries of American prisoners of 

war since the end of the Vietnam War.23

AS SAMAWAH - AN NAJAF

The next objective after Talill and An Nasiriyah 

was As Samawah, some 240 kilometers southsoutheast of Baghdad. Paramilitary forces 

mounted fierce and fanatical attacks but failed 

to fight competently. A combined service effort would isolate As Samawah and prevent 

the interdiction of the lines of communications 

in the drive north. Flying between Kuwait 

and Tallil, two C-130s brought the last units 

of the brigade forward where they reached An 

Bravo Company, but they had gotten stuck in 

the marshland and then needed refueling after 

assisting the 507th. Taking the bridge in the 

dark as well as losing the momentum drove 

the decision to send the 200 Marines of Charlie Company forward in their lightly skinned 

and armed amphibious assault vehicles. The 

tracks’ direct route to the Saddam Canal 

Bridge was via a two to three-mile stretch of 

road lined with buildings on both sides, “Ambush Alley.” They made their way single file 

and soon entered a “hornet’s nest.” Uniformed 

and non-uniformed Iraqis (and women) fired 

at them from rooftops, doorways, and around 

the corners with small arms, machine guns, 

and RPGs. Within minutes, Charlie Company 

had crossed the bridge and set about to hold 

it. One track had taken an RPG hit and then 

took another shell, setting off its ammunition. 

The Marines responded with their .50-caliber 

machine guns, grenade launchers, and mortars 

but continued to take heavy fire. The Iraqis 

outnumbered them and were increasingly 

landing their shells closer and closer to the exposed Marines. A decision to retrace the route 

to evacuate the wounded resulted in half of the 

losses. After sustaining four-hours of intense 

fire (to include misguided friendly fire), the 

Abrams had caught up with Charlie Company 

and put their firepower in action. It was the 

fourth day of the war; 18 Marines died. Fifteen others were wounded. It was the deadliest battle to date for US losses. The battle 

over An Nasiriyah continued until 31 March 

when elements of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force gained control of the city.20 These 

1478
drop as one of his early missions. On board 

was an Army colonel as well.30 

The last stage of the operation required 45 

more C-17 airland sorties at the new UScontrolled airfield at Bashur. Air Force 

and Air Force Reserve C-17 crews landed 

an additional 1,200 soldiers, equipment, 

and vehicles at the pace of 12 landings per 

night. All together, the entire operation took 

scarcely 96 hours to complete; 62 C-17 sorties delivered a complete brigade—2,160 

soldiers and 381 pieces of equipment (3,060 

short tons). Notably, this was the first C-17 

combat personnel airdrop, the largest C-17 

formation ever, and the largest nighttime 

single-pass drop since D-Day of World War 

II. Moreover, these C-17s and their Total 

Force crews achieved a 100 percent reliability rate.31

BAGHDAD–THUNDER RUNS 

 

The need to safeguard the lines of communications along with some bad weather 

delayed the drive to Baghdad. Coalition 

forces required resupply over a 500-kilometer road network, initiated at Kuwait. Provisions required in fuel, ammunition, and 

daily subsistence were simply staggering 

and exceeded WW II rates. Defeating the 

paramilitary forces around the cities of An 

Najaf, As Samawah, and Karbala was critical. The enemy showed more resistance 

than expected. This required V Corps Commander Lieutenant General Wallace to comairspace, the C-17s cruised at 30,000 feet but 

quickly went into a tactical descent, literally 

diving down to reduce exposure to Iraqi air 

defenses. Reaching 1,000 feet, the first 5 of 

17 C-17s dropped 10 heavy drop platforms 

of vehicles and equipment at 2000. At 2010, 

Colonel William Mayville, 173rd Airborne 

Brigade Commander exited the aircraft as the 

first jumper. 963 paratroopers followed him in 

58 seconds. Thirty-two jumpers did not leave 

the aircraft. On this jump, there could be no 

jumps after the red light due to the C-17s powering up for a combat exit. The permissive airdrop had made the most sense due to the small 

ramp capacity of the Bashur airfield. However, despite a tight formation package, the jump 

was long, and it took some hours to form the 

brigade again. Nevertheless, the active Air 

Force and the three Air Force Reserve C-17 

crews and support personnel could be proud 

of their effort. Equally proud was Canadian 

exchange officer Major Jeremy Reynolds who 

piloted the ninth C-17 for the drop.28

Maintaining a silent and watchful sentry overhead was an Air Force Reserve Command E-3 

airborne air controller crew from the 513th Air 

Control Group. These Air Force Reservists assisted the coordination of the fleet of coalition 

aircraft supporting the airdrop. “We flew out 

of Cyprus through Turkey. They allowed us to 

transit through their airspace. We then orbited 

in northern Iraq, controlling the air support 

and interdiction for special operators and airborne forces operating out of northern Iraq.”29

Major Louis Fournier remembered the 173rd 

preparing for battle there.25

Executing Airborne Dragon, an Army longrange surveillance (LRS) detachment and an 

Air Force tactical air controller departed Constanta, Romania, aboard an MC-130 and arrived at Bashur 24 hours prior to the airdrop of 

the first elements. This team would get things 

ready, hook up with the special forces already 

on the ground, and provide the “go-no go” 

call back to Aviano. The drop zone was set 

among rolling hills with a single runway down 

the middle; intermittent streams were at each 

end, which were now quite full.26 “The jump 

was scheduled for 2000 and we had to have 

the TACSAT set up by 1800 to make a call 

to the inbound aircraft. We got to the airfield 

with little time to spare, and the LRS members 

performed superbly, moving the communications equipment and then setting it up in time 

to make our calls. The weather was not looking good. The winds were light but the ceiling 

was less than 1,000 feet, and we would need 

a minimum of 2,500 feet to call the drop. . . 

. Fortunately, the weather lifted to an unlimited ceiling and we waited with the Peshmerga 

on the edge of the drop zone,” recalled Major 

Phillip Chambers.27

Despite iffy weather, the long line of C-17s 

received their take off clearances and soon 

disappeared, heading eastward on the late afternoon of 26 March for the four-and-a-halfhour flight to Bashur. Colonel Bob Allardice, 

Commander 62nd Airlift Wing, served as the 

airborne mission commander. Entering Iraqi 

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showed the giant statue of 

Saddam Hussein at Al-Firdos Square with Iraqis celebrating and trying to bring 

down the statue. US Marines stepped forward and 

facilitated with a recovery 

vehicle and chain; ingloriously Saddam slowly bent 

over. The crowd quickly 

took over, hitting the statue 

with their shoes and breaking it apart.34 The scene 

signified the end of Saddam’s regime and a new era 

for the Iraqi people. 

BAGHDAD IAP

On Sunday evening 6 April 

2003, a C-130 tactical airlifter was the first fixed-wing 

coalition aircraft to land at 

the recently liberated Saddam (now Baghdad) International Airport. Due to three 

mit forces from the 101st Airborne Division 

and 82nd Airborne Division to provide security along the route northward. On 1 April, 3rd 

Infantry Division elements advanced through 

the Karbala Gap choke point, defeated Iraqi 

military forces, and then secured the crossings 

over the Euphrates River. Meanwhile, the 1st 

Marine Expeditionary Force pressed Baghdad 

from the right. The 3rd Infantry continued 

advancing and encountered Iraqi Republican 

Guard units in a battle over capturing and 

securing Saddam International Airport on 4 

April, some twelve miles to the southwest of 

the city center.32

Pressing the advantage to weaken Baghdad’s 

defenses, the 3rd undertook “Thunder Runs” 

or raids into the heart of Baghdad via tanks 

and Bradley Fighting Vehicles. The first of 

these bold raids commenced on 5 April. With 

nearly 100 tracked vehicles and several hundred men, Lieutenant Colonel Rick Schwartz’s 

Rogues from Fort Stewart, Georgia, drove up 

Highway 8 into the central part of Baghdad 

and then looped southwest to the international 

airport, showing force and meeting no sizable 

resistance. However, the enemy had devised a 

kill zone, believing the Rogues would retrace 

their route. On 7 April, a second Thunder Run 

of a full brigade, the Spartans, ended in downtown Baghdad, breaking Saddam’s hold and 

providing a visible presence to all.33

By 9 April, the coalition’s plan of capturing 

Baghdad had succeeded; organized resistance 

had largely dissipated. International news 

The 327th Airlift Squadron (327 AS) was part of AFRC’s 913th 

Airlift Wing based at Air Reserve Station, Willow Grove, 

Pennsylvania. It operated C-130 Hercules aircraft supporting 

the United States Air Force global reach mission worldwide. 

Some 200 Air Force reservists from the 913th were mobilized 

and deployed to Southwest Asia in July 2003. On 5 September, a 327th AS C-130 and crew were given the honor of transporting Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from Balad Air 

Base to Baghdad in Iraq.

The flight occurred at the end of his first full day during Rumsfeld’s second journey to the Iraq AOR. The day started out with 

a trip in an Army helicopter to Tikrit where Saddam Hussein 

was suspected to be hiding at the time. In Tikrit he spoke to the 

soldiers of the 4th Infantry Division under command of Major 

General Ray Odierno. Next, came a flyover of Mosul and a low 

pass over the site where Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay, were 

killed on 22 July. On the ground in Mosul he visited the 101st 

Airborne Division, spent some time with the troops and fielded 

their questions. “You’ve helped to free some 23 million people,” 

he told the troops. “That’s an enormous accomplishment I don’t 

think you’ll ever forget.”

After landing at Baghdad International Airport in the 327th 

C-130, the secretary gave an interview to Dan Rather of CBS 

News. He had another interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation before participating in a media roundtable at Camp Victory, where Secretary Rumsfeld had this to say: “Ambassador 

Bremer and I just returned from a trip north and 

as is always the case, visiting the young men 

and women of the armed forces is a thrilling 

experience. They are so dedicated and so courageous and doing such a wonderful job for the 

Iraqi people that it’s truly an inspiration.”

SECDEF -AFRC C-130

1512
The F-15s and F-16s were good. The A-10s were absolutely fantastic. 

It is my favorite airplane. If I had enough coins, I’d send one to every 

A-10 driver in the Air Force just to tell them how much I appreciate 

them because when those guys come down and they start those strafing 

runs, it is flat awesome. It is just flat awesome.

You can move, and when that A-10 starts his strafing run, you can do 

anything you want to do as a task force commander because the bad 

guy’s head is not coming off the hard deck. His head is not coming 

out of the ground. If he is in a hole, he is hugging Mother Earth and 

praying to whatever God he can to that he lives through this. You can 

maneuver anywhere you want to maneuver as long as that cannon is 

firing. As long as that A-10 is flying above you and turning and moving, you can do anything you want to do.

You could hear the roar of screams of joy when [the air liaison officer] 

would come over the radio and say, ‘I’ve got A-10s.’ When the A-10s 

came in, first of all you could see them, second of all the control, the 

positive control, over what we were shooting with was absolutely phenomenal.

Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Sanderson, Commander, TF 2-69 AR, 12 May 

2003 from US Army Combat Studies Institute book On Point.

I’VE GOT A-10s

More than 300 Air Force Reservists and 12 A-10 Thunderbolt II combat attack aircraft assigned to the 442nd Fighter Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base, 

Missouri, were mobilized and deployed. Arriving in Kuwait just as coalition 

forces were battling their way through southern Iraq, the wing’s pilots engaged 

in the Battle of Baghdad on their first day’s sorties. A few days later, the 

442nd members received orders to forward deploy to an Iraqi airfield, Tallil, 

that had been effectively destroyed in the first Persian Gulf War. “We arrived 

at night,” related Chief Master Sergeant Greg Wetzel, 442nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron weapons section chief, speaking of the wing’s arrival at Tallil 

Air Base south of Baghdad and near the ancient Sumerian City of Ur, in April 

2003. “The base was under blackout conditions, so there were no lights on the 

aircraft, vehicles or anything else.”

“We had no vehicles, no tents, essentially nothing,” Lieutenant Colonel Dave 

Graham, 303rd Fighter Squadron Commander. “There were still firefights 

going on around the base, which is not normal for Air Force personnel.”

In Iraq, wind and dust combined to make living conditions almost intolerable 

and flying operations practically impossible. “It really was a dump there,” 

Chief Wetzel said of the conditions at Tallil. “You breathed dirt, you lived in 

dirt, and you worked in dirt. They say its sand. It’s not sand. It’s dirt.”

The reservists spent less than a month at this initial location before redeploying to Kirkuk Air Base, in northern Iraq. “Kirkuk was better than the first 

base that we opened.” Chief Master Sergeant Don Shoop provided. “We had a 

couple vehicles and a tent to sleep in the first night, which was a vast improvement over what we had before.” Despite the improved conditions, Kirkuk was 

far from being ready for flight operations. The airfield was closed due to 

extensive amounts of debris. Chief Shoop added, “The flight line was covered 

with steel, rocks, and equipment.” This had to be cleared prior to the A-10’s 

arrival on 29 April.

During the eight-month deployment, the wing achieved an unprecedented 100 

percent sortie generation rate, executed 1,164 combat sorties for a total of 3,360 

flying hours, and incurred no combat casualties nor no aircraft damages or 

losses.

By Technical Sergeant Scott J. Gaitley, 931st ARG Historian

A-10 – 442ND FIGHTER WING – 

IRAQ 2003

152
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154
We originally went to marshal up at Ramstein, and then we went from there to Aviano. Lieutenant General Bob Allardice, who was then a colonel and 

the active duty wing commander at McChord, was the airborne mission commander. Shane Hershman was the squadron commander, and then Colonel, 

now Brigadier General Lyn Sherlock was the ground mission commander. They moved us to Aviano and basically started marshalling the airplanes at 

that location with the intent being that it was either an 11 or 13-ship that was going to go drop at Bashur. I ended up being the back-up on the airdrop, 

but then the very next day, Pat Cannon and I actually flew the two-ship airland that were the first two airplanes to land at Bashur. At that point, we had 

gone back to a two-ship BDS, bundle delivery, construct, which was one of our initial planning cells. Pat Cannon and I landed as a two-ship down at 

Bashur, really not knowing what the location was and what fields were available. This was the first time I ever did a combat offload, because there were 

no real facilities there. We practiced the combat offloads all the time. But, there was no real ground support equipment, so we did combat offloads. I 

think the length was 1,100 feet, and that was the minimum length. There were concerns that the Army folks had already started marshalling around the 

area. There were just a lot of unknowns associated with landing there, and it was mountainous terrain.

One preeminent concern, either in the initial phases or in follow-on phases, is time. Timing becomes a critical factor, whether it is sequencing with other 

aircraft, whether it is meeting other aircraft, or whether it is rendezvousing with other aircraft. Timing becomes a critical factor. When you are dealing 

with timing in terms of an hour, you can kind of judge when you need to take off, but when you start looking at flying phases that are eight, nine, and ten 

hours in length, there are significant things that can occur that can dramatically impact your ability to rendezvous or being sequenced in the right format. 

So, that becomes a critical factor.

Then, there is a certain sense of realism the first time that you put all your gear on, get the weapons out, and put the seat armor in. While the adrenaline 

keeps you going for a certain part, eventually the fatigue sets in. Fatigue ends up being something that I remember a lot. Maybe just because I am old, 

fatigue ends up being something that is a struggle—something that you are fighting with the whole time and also understanding the impact of fatigue.

There were some significant mountains and threats in that area. This was kind of a recurring theme, again, which kind of changed our tactics. One of 

the things that we did, when Colonel Greg Vitalis and I used to spend a lot of time in Fayetteville and Pope, the way that we flew the airplane was we flew 

it at one thousand, two thousand, three hundred feet, and then we would go across the drop zone 

in a large formation. In this particular case, there was a three to four-month training cycle as 

they started gearing up that changed the way that we do the airdrops. We were coming in from 

high altitudes with a penetration-type profile, a leveling off with a large formation in relatively 

short confines of the drop zone. Then, immediately as you departed the drop zone, you would go 

into a max effort climb to mitigate the risk associated with ground fire. So again, that, much like 

our HUMRO drops, was something that we had not done before. That was something that had 

never been practiced before and was relatively new in a wartime scenario, to mitigate what was 

the threat at that time. It was not an integrated defense concern or threat; it was ground fire. It 

was the ability for surface-to-air, hand-held weapons. That was our main threat. It changed the 

way we trained, it changed the tactics, and frankly, it went back to the idea that we do not always 

train the way that we are going to fight.

 Colonel Bruce A. Bowers, AFRC A3 deputy director, 2010 

C-17 DROP AT BASHUR

155 156
Highlights – 26 Saves

The 301/304 Rescue units rolled into Tallil. The bare bones operation was required until the superior facilities at Kirkuk could be secured 

for airfield operations. The rescue deployment was truly a Total Force initiative, with regular Air Force units providing support from Jor- dan, Reserve units providing support from Kuwait, and Air Guard units providing support from Turkey.

On 23 March HH-60’s, A-10’s, and an HC-130 responded to an emergency near Baghdad. The incident required the recovery of critically 

wounded Army special operators by flying the HC-130 below cloud level to ensure an adequate delivery of fuel to the starving rescue 

helicopters. The scenario replayed itself two weeks later, on 7 April elsewhere in Iraq.

On 24 March (Operation Broadsword 23) picked up a seven-man Marine reconnaissance team.

On 24 March helicopter aircrews from the 301 RQS searched for the Lieutenant Nathan White from F-18, callsign Dogwood 02. The aircraft, launched earlier that day from the USS Kitty Hawk, crashed southwest of Baghdad.

On 7 April (Operation Soapy 83) picked up two wounded Army special forces.

On 8 April (Operation Facing 43) an Iraqi SAM hit Major Jim Ewald’s A-10, callsign 43. The Air Guard pilot declared an inflight emergency and attempted to divert to Tallil airfield but was forced to eject. His wingman initiated CSAR procedures. The exploding jet complicated rescue attempts by ground forces who eventually located the downed pilot and transported him to the nearest field hospital. The 

301 RQS evacuated him back to Kuwait, where he returned to flying duty two days later.

On 13 May convoy attack on the 728th ACS resulted in one wounded in action and one killed in action pick up in the Baghdad area.

On 12 June Operation Dude 47 picked up one F-16 pilot who ejected some 70 miles southwest of Baghdad.

On 19 August UN terrorist bombing picked up three wounded who were on Sergio Vieria de Mello’s staff.

IRAQ 920th RESCUE WING - 2003

156
65 days at Baghdad International Airport assured aircraft were in place to repatriate POWs 

and conducted some 2,000 high-priority missions, moving nearly 25,000 personnel and 10 

million pounds of cargo transiting the terminal. The 439th had aircraft in the right place 

at the right time to meet theater commander 

requirements.40

IN THE NORTH

As the military engaged for control of Baghdad, coalition operations in the northern part 

of Iraq centered on assisting the armed Kurdish fighters, the Peshmerga, in attacking Iraqi 

forces, some 150,000, around Mosul and 

Kirkuk as well as the Ansar al-Islam terrorist 

group and the growing al Qaeda forces that 

operated from the mountainous region in the 

northeast along the Iraq-Iran border. There 

were estimates of a thousand terrorists along 

the border; taking them out had political considerations as well. On 27 March, Viking 

Hammer operations commenced against the 

terrorists along the border areas. The Peshmerga called in targets for close air support 

from Navy fighters and Air Force gunships. 

These airstrikes took out bunker after bunker, 

completely devastating the main camp in the 

Sargat Valley.41

To bolster the Kurdish forces, 23 C-17 sorties 

delivered Task Force 1-63 Armor of the 1st Infantry Division, bringing in Abrams tanks and 

Bradleys to Bashur. By the end of March, the 

173rd and Task Force 1-63 Armor were ready 

of darkness, a Charleston C-17 landed on the 

airport’s ramp due to the obstructions to bring 

in and establish a mobile command post.37 

On 14 May, active and reserve C-141 crews 

inaugurated a daily C-141 resupply mission—

“Baghdad Express”—staged from Ramstein 

Air Base in Germany to Baghdad International 

Airport, bringing forward the personnel and 

cargo brought in by the C-5 and C-17 transports.38 More C-141, C-17, and C-5 strategic airlift missions would follow over 2003 

and early 2004, but threat conditions for small 

arms and surface-to-air missiles remained 

high until late 2004 when commercial operations got underway. From May 

through November 2003, there 

were 19 surface-to-air attacks 

on aircraft near Baghdad International Airport, confirming the 

value of the large aircraft infrared countermeasures (LAIRCM) 

program.39

Also arriving at the airport in 

April was a tanker airlift control element (TALCE) from the 

Air Force Reserve Command’s 

439th Airlift Wing, Westover Air Reserve Base, 

Massachusetts. Under hostile and bare-base 

conditions, the 439th TALCE organized the 

military airflow in and out of the airport. Air 

Force Reservists, that had handled one of the 

largest C-5 aerial port operations in the lead up 

to Afghanistan and Iraq, were now orchestrating the flights in the heart of Saddam’s empire. 

Members of the 439th forward-deployed for 

craters on the runway, the C-130 came in on 

the taxiway, testing its condition as well. On 

8 April, an AFRC MC-130 Combat Talon I 

(STEEL 71) followed, performing a special 

operations forces mission. STEEL 71 would 

takeoff executing a daring three-engine takeoff. Triple A and SAM threats remained. That 

same day, an Iraqi surface-to-air missile shot 

down an A-10 Warthog (tail number 78-0691) 

performing close air support in the vicinity of 

the airport. Coalition forces worked to set up 

a military base to house thousands at the airport, a key strategic facility for logistical operations. Military engineers were fast at work 

repairing damage and getting the runway and 

taxiway into condition.35

Air transports of the Total Force would deliver 

the first of many troops and supplies to follow 

over the next eleven years. Initially, AFRC 

members of the 914th Airlift Wing were there 

as well providing C-130 combat delivery airlift support.36 On 10 April, under the cover 

1578
 And by the beginning of April, persuaded by 

the joint airstrikes, Iraqi Regular and Republican Guard forces had largely lost the will to 

fight. On 1 April, coalition forces liberated 

Irbil. One of the last Iraqi coordinated efforts occurred on 6 April when one T-55 tank 

platoon, two platoons of mechanized infantry, and one motorized infantry force engaged US special forces. With close air support, .50 caliber machine guns, and 60mm 

mortars, the smaller force of special forces 

prevailed. The 173rd faced its most intense 

action when it took Kirkuk on 10 April. On 

11 April, the 5th Corps of the Iraqi Army was 

ready to surrender Mosul. Subsequently, the 

US 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and the 

101st Airborne Division gained control of 

the Mosul area.43

Just south of Kirkuk by Tikrit an area known 

as the “Sunni triangle” that extended to 

Baghdad was mostly inhabited by Sunni 

Muslims that had a strong allegiance to Saddam Hussein. Saddam and his family were 

from the region with Saddam born just outside of Tikrit. Most of the senior Iraqi officials and the Iraq Republican Guard were 

from Saddam’s tribe, the Al Bu Nasir. Thus, 

the area around Tikrit received intense interest with Saddam Hussein and his senior 

leadership still at large.44 The Sunni triangle area would remain particularly troublesome in the years ahead.

Believing Saddam had fled to the area, Tikrit 

became subjected to an intense operation the 

their assistance to include undertaking 

dangerous probing operations and targeting the Mukhabarat and Feydayeen. The 

Peshmerga received high praise and much 

respect from coalition forces and operatives. In the lead up to and first days of the 

war, the Kurds were especially concerned 

about Iraqi forces unleashing chemical warfare on the Kurdish people as they had done 

in the 1980s. The war also gave hope to an 

independent Kurdish existence.42

to engage beyond the airhead. They would 

proceed to Kirkuk and the oil field and production areas, significant strategic assets in northern Iraq that would be critical to the country’s 

future recovery. The Peshmerga continued 

Litening II: It gave us a quantum leap of real-time information. The targeting pod allowed our A-10 squadron to more accurately employ weapons and survey the target area. It allowed us to stay a very long time in 

the target area and provide excellent photos to the headquarters targeting element. It increased our usefulness to the ground commander.

It was interesting going from the April regular war, to more of a static mission acting as a safety net for the 

Army, and then back to the employment and mobility stages. That’s the ebb and flow of how war works. 

People back home don’t understand that this is not a static environment, but rather a fluid one. Things 

change over here. You don’t go from ending a war to peace over night. Even though it’s been a fairly safe 

environment for the Air Force, this is still a combat area and is very hazardous.

Our daily training back in Missouri directly related to our combat operations over here in Iraq. Our clean 

record validates our daily training programs and the professionalism of our pilots and every Reservist who 

works in the 303rd Fighter Squadron.

The missions got done on-time, no matter what else was going on. The maintainers did an incredible job in 

solving problems and kept us flying. As a result, we never missed a sortie.

Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Thomas, A-10 pilot, Kirkuk, November 2003

OIF Tally, March-November 2003: 

1,164 combat sorties, 3,360 flying hours

A-10s 303 FS – TALLIL, KIRKUK

158
From Tallil, A-10 Thunderbolts and rescue 

forward deployed to Kirkuk Air Base the 

end of April and became part of the Total 

Force’s 506th Air Expeditionary Group 

there. At this time, A-10s from the 303rd 

Fighter Squadron, 442nd Fighter Wing were 

on a tour while the reserve rescue assets 

were from the 301st (HH-60), 39th (HC130s), and 304th Rescue Squadrons (PJs) of 

the 920th Rescue Wing. On 30 April, Air 

Force Reservists Lieutenant Colonel Shannon Wiley and Major Robert Duncan became 

the first and second A-10 pilots, respectively, 

summed up during the Pentagon briefing of 14 

April.47

 

beginning of April. On 11 April, an important 

mission fell to an AFRC B-52 newly equipped 

with the LITENING II advanced airborne targeting and navigation system. The Air Force 

Reserve 93rd Bomb Squadron crew along 

with its Total Force partners from the 23rd 

Bomb Squadron successfully dropped two 

500-pound, laser-guided GBU-12 bombs on a 

radar complex and a command center at the Al 

Sahra air field northwest of Tikrit. The results 

were spectacular. Proving the technology for 

the B-52 while implementing it against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the crew neutralized 

the Iraqi Air Force complex and assessed the 

bombing damage all at the same time.45 On 

an attack and destroy mission moving northward from Baghdad, several thousand Marines 

in some 300 armored vehicles descended on 

the town of Tikrit on 13 April but met no real 

resistance. Days earlier coalition airstrikes 

had set the stage.46 “Tikrit was the last area 

where we anticipated seeing major combat 

formations, if in fact they were there. There 

were some sharp fights, but not a coherent 

defense,” Major General Stanley McChrystal 

On 19 May 2003, crewmembers from the 711th Special Operations Squadron encountered a coolant gas-fed fire erupting with blowtorch-like intensity on their 

MC-130E after a re-supply mission near Erbil, Iraq. Smoke, flames, and toxic 

fumes quickly entered the cargo compartment and flight deck. With complete 

disregard for his life, Senior Master Sergeant Dale Berryhill retrieved a fire extinguisher to attack the fire which was moving towards the oxygen converter. As 

they prepared to touch down, the crew and aircraft were not out of danger. The 

plane came under two small arms and rocket-propelled grenade attacks. While 

battling physical fatigue and limited sight, Berryhill relayed MAYDAY calls and 

accurately plotted the coordinates of the enemy fire for coalition forces. In 2004, 

then Chief Master Sergeamt Berryhill received the Air Force Sergeants Association’s Pitsenbarger Award for heroic acts. “It took all of us doing something right 

to survive and get us all back safely.”

IT TOOK ALL OF US DOING 

SOMETHING RIGHT

159 160
The 5th Communication Flight was a team assembled in July 2003 to provide and maintain communication services supporting the deployment and 

redeployment of US and coalition forces for Operation Iraqi Freedom. It was a true Total Force unit mostly made up of members of the Air Force 

Reserve Command and the Air National Guard. During its first rotation in 2003, the 5th Communications Flight consisted of airmen that were primarily from Air Force Reserve Command’s 514th Communications Squadron, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey and the 914th Communications 

Squadron, Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station. The remaining service members were from the Air Force Reserve’s 452nd Communications Squadron, 

March Air Reserve Base, California; the Air National Guard’s 108th Communications Flight, McGuire Air Force Base; and the active force’s 1st 

Combat Communications Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany. In addition to the military, over 100 contract personnel were also employed to 

handle airfield operations.

The flight was a part of the largest expeditionary air mobility squadron during this period, the 5th Expeditionary Air Mobility Squadron located at 

an air base in Southwest Asia. The 5th Expeditionary Air Mobility Squadron was the busiest Air Mobility Command passenger operation moving 

almost a million passengers and a quarter million tons of cargo per year.

“The foundation of the communications infrastructure is the theater deployed communications package that has been augmented with a commercial 

satellite earth terminal,” said Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Weimar, the 5th Communications Flight’s commander. “This is the first time that many 

of these folks have been deployed to support such an extensive and vital mission.”

“Preparation for the mission was critical,” he said. “Through a combination of annual and special tour training, most folks had access to theater deployed communications equipment through an extensive training curriculum provided by the 514th Communication Squadron at both McGuire and 

Niagara Falls. In addition, training at local host communication facilities provided reservists and guardsmen with the necessary skills to handle the 

robust and detailed infrastructure and services.”

The team was comprised of network managers, information system specialists, help desk technicians, technical controllers, supply specialists, and 

ground radio, satellite, telephone and computer maintainers. They provided base operating support, such as Internet access and telephone and computer support as well as “giant voice,” land mobile radio, air-to-ground radio, and UHF satellite communications support. The communicators facilitated service to 2,500 users from more than 30 units in two different camps and the airport in Southwest Asia where they were stationed. 

Master Sergeant Ruth Verbanic with the 5th Communication Flight was an Air Force Reservist from Niagara Falls. What was significant for Master 

Sergeant Verbanic was the chance to serve in a unit responsible for moving the war fighters to and from the front. Besides her fellow airmen she said, 

“Every soldier and Marine who goes north or returns back to their units comes through here. It has been quite an experience. One I will never forget.” 

AFRC PROVIDED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE AOR

160
porting oil. Rebuilding would entail laying 

in the foundation for a competitive, private 

business sector. From 2003 through 2006, 

the US Agency for International Development 

was a major contributor to the US’s aid efforts 

in Iraq.51 The US military supported these 

efforts. Already by mid April 2003, a C-17 

Globemaster uploaded humanitarian cargo at 

Camp Sarafovo, Bulgaria, for delivery to the 

Iraqi people.52

 

SUMMARY

Air Force Reserve Command resources supported the major combat phase of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom in full measure. The capability and level of readiness this part time force 

in reserve brought to the Air Force and the 

fight cannot be overstated—a tremendous valHUMANITARIAN 

AID

As the fighting subsided, humanitarian assistance followed. The 

World Food Program 

had developed a $1.2 

billion plan to provide 

for the food substance 

needs of 

27 million 

Iraqis from 

M a r c h 

t h r o u g h 

S e p t e m -

ber 2003. 

The United 

States and 

other countries provided medicine 

and water. The focus was on restoring essential services—water, 

electricity, health, and education. 

The US Agency for International 

Development estimated that it 

would provide some $596.5 million in assistance in fiscal year 

2003 with some $2.5 billion over 

a two-year period. More than a third of Iraq’s 

population was under the age of fifteen; portions of the population had also become displaced. The good will came with concerns 

over oversight and thoughts of Iraq providing 

oil in exchange for food and assistance in rebuilding. However, the war had also disrupted 

Iraq’s economy which largely rested on exto land at the forward location of Kirkuk.48

Once established, “We provided ‘armed overwatch’ of the many small military units scattered throughout from mid to northern Iraq, 

using our sensors to search for insurgents,” 

Lieutenant Colonel John P. Marks related.49

According to Lieutenant Colonel Dave Graham, squadron commander, they assisted in 

dozens of operations against high-valued targets, for example, the raid that killed Uday and 

Qusay Hussein on 22 July. “We’re the weapon 

of choice for the Army. This has been a Hawg 

war, as the A-10s are the ones who work with 

the Army and handle the most targets. Also, 

we’ve been in the area of operations longer 

than anyone else.”50 Members of the 442nd 

Fighter Wing redeployed from Iraq in November 2003. 

Mobilization process is in need of repair – current process is not flexible and coordinated enough to handle the various requested scenarios

Base operating support (BOS) packages were not activated early 

enough in the mobilization process – many functional areas that were 

needed in the packages were not included

Combatant commanders desired training of activated reservists differed from actual training required by training regulations; last minute requirements of dirt landing/NVG in AOR specific.

Wide range of equipment issues surfaced, for example lack of sufficient communication equipment (STU IIIs), BDU issue, aircraft 

equipment, weapons, etc... Desert BDU’s are not allowed to be acquired from GMAJCOM until mobilized or the unit has to pay the 

bill. Forces last minute ordering, name tags, stripes etc...

EARLY LESSONS

1612
in supporting the ground forces in securing 

the Haditha Dam. Altogether, they dropped 

hundreds of precision guided munitions. B52s racked up 42 percent of all B-52 Iraqi 

Freedom combat missions with just 25 percent of the crew force. A-10s assets mobilized from the 442nd Fighter Wing went to 

Iraq as the airfields opened up, providing 

close air support to the ground forces. That 

AFRC had LITENING II equipped combat 

air forces aircraft proved invaluable.54 The 

war showed the evolution of air power. In 

World War II, 1,000 sorties covered a target 

with the Vietnam War reducing this to 100 

sorties; Desert Storm had realized 1 sortie 

for 1 target with Iraqi Freedom now achieving 1 aircraft sortie hitting up to 15 targets.55

The command’s MC-130 crews provided 

a sizeable contribution to the Air Force—

representing 62 percent of the Air Force’s 

crews. Likewise, Air Force Reserve rescue forces provided 33 percent of both the 

HH-60 and HC-130s crews to the Air Force. 

Once again, rescue assets performed difficult 

the designated theater area. Additionally, Air 

Force Reservists relieved the active duty from 

or co-shared non Iraqi or Enduring Freedom 

missions, such as security support packages 

and humanitarian missions to other parts of 

the world like Liberia and Algeria, Presidential or DV airlift, theater airlift support 

to US Southern Command’s area, Antarctica 

resupply, and joint readiness training and exercises, which included ensuring proficiency 

for personnel about to deploy.53 

The Air Force Reserve Command’s combat air forces were heavily involved in the 

successful liberation of Iraq in 2003. Six F16s and crews from the command’s 419th, 

482nd, and 301st Fighter Wings flew airstrikes into Iraq at the beginning of the 

conflict and were also employed in a Scud 

hunting role. F-16 pilots supported many 

classified undertakings and were instrumental 

ue. Between March and May 2003, AFRC’s 

GWOT contribution peaked at 14,741 mobilized and volunteer (645) personnel (Cumulatively, almost 24,000 Air Force Reservists had 

been activated since 9/11.). Overall, AFRC 

aircraft and crews flew 161,926 hours 

and deployed 70 unit-equipped aircraft 

(12 A-10, 6 F-16, 22 KC-135, 6 C-130, 

6 B-52, 6 MC-130P, 4 HC-130, and 6 

HH-60) in theater for the initial combat 

phase. Many other Air Force Reservists, especially the C-5, C-17, and KC10 units, crewed active duty aircraft in 

associate organizational relationships. 

Moreover, thousand upon thousand of 

hours were logged by those supporting 

at US locations or those crewing and 

maintaining aircraft on “channel” missions across the Atlantic and Pacific 

oceans but who never officially entered 

Percentage of Scheduled Hours Flown

 C-5 - 244% E-3 - 220% 

 

 C-17 - 200% B-52 - 116% 

 C-141 - 180% A-10 - 112%

 C-9 - 130% F-16 - 110%

Total contingency hours executed: 150,749

AFRC FY03 FLYING HOUR

SUMMARY 

162
On 13 January 2003, while flying over the skies of Afghanistan, KC-135R Stratotanker pilots Majors Michael Moeding and Marc Moor had finally 

come to the end of their six-and-one-half hour aerial refueling mission, when the unthinkable ensued. Their aircraft suffered a major technical 

malfunction that included all six multi-functional and all three control display units. This incident negatively affected other vital systems: heading, 

navigation, attitude, transponder, autopilot, ground control communications, airborne warning and control, and flight management systems were simultaneously inoperable. Circumstances outside the crew’s control now made it unattainable to communicate with the ground or through the airborne 

warning and control system aircraft. “There is no airborne solution for the problem,” says Major Moeding. Given that this particular situation had 

never occurred in the history of the aircraft, technical orders and flight manuals were worthless to the crew. The pilots had to implement an immediate and innovative course of action for their own safety. 

“We elected to depart the combat area of responsibility for the relative safety of the open ocean,” claims Major Moeding. “We didn’t have the fuel to 

loiter over Afghanistan waiting for help; we had to resolve our problem alone.” Using only a magnetic compass, they headed south towards the Arabian Sea nearly 45 minutes flight time away. “We guessed at our position and started timing the airspeed and climbed 500 feet to help avoid coalition 

aircraft,” Major Moeding recalls. Fortuitously, the distressed crew heard the radio chatter from another KC-135R piloted by Captain Shelby Basler 

and requested immediate assistance. Captain Basler said, “We were in the right place at the right time.” The 

two Stratotankers then rendezvoused visually. Captain Basler explains, “We declared an emergency for them 

and coordinated with air traffic control to modify both flight plans for the most direct routing to their recovery base.” The crippled aircraft then followed the assisting KC-135R to its own originating base in Southwest 

Asia. Both aircraft landed safely and without any further complications. “The assisting tanker crew did a 

great job considering it was their first flight in the theater,” said Major Moeding.

Majors Moeding and Moor received the Distinguished Flying Cross for their extraordinary 

achievement and distinguished actions during this hazardous flight, while assigned to the 

913th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, 384th Air Expeditionary Wing, and deployed to 

a classified location in Southwest Asia in direct support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The 

two pilots are home stationed at the 18th Air Refueling Squadron, 931st Air Refueling Group, 

McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas. 

On-board the troubled aircraft was active duty Staff Sergeant Christopher home stationed at 

the 22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell AFB, KS. He was awarded an Air Medal for his 

actions on the flight.

DFC – MAJORS MOEDING & MOOR 

1634
The 440th Airlift Wing from General Mitchell International Airport Air Reserve Station, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, initiated a recall for mobilization on 26 November 

2003, the day before Thanksgiving. Many of our members were traveling for the holiday, making contact challenging, and when contacted, they were directed to report on Friday morning, 28 November, for a one-year mobilization in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Within a few days, the first group 

deployed, and the rest followed within weeks. Instantaneously, they put their civilian lives, careers, and families on hold. I was working as the Chief of 440th Operations Group Standardization/Evaluation, and flew several flight evaluations before I left on 8 December in order to ensure members’ flying currency certifications 

did not expire while deployed. We had no return date, and we guessed, based on our 1991 Desert Storm experience, it would be six months before we would return 

home from Southwest Asia. As it turned out, some started rotating back stateside after a couple of months. My group came back after about four months, so that we 

could stagger the rotations for the remainder of the mobilization. To celebrate our stay for that duration, we had patches made commemorating “100 consecutive 

days in the sand.” Thereafter, I deployed for about half the time, catching up on our training and work at home in between rotations. We were not able to train in 

theater, so flight evaluations, low level training, assaults, and other training requirements had to be accomplished during our limited time at home. One rotation I 

was on was shortened slightly, so I could come home to participate in an operational readiness inspection, ironically demonstrating our units’ readiness to deploy to 

a contingency. Naturally, we all hoped the Air Force would eliminate these inspections during a war. 

Just a few weeks before our mobilization orders ran out, we were extended for another year of mobilization and continued to deploy on a roughly 1:1 deploy to dwell 

basis for the remainder of our two-year mobilization. We integrated operations and maintenance with the many Air Force Reserve Command C-130 units, who were 

also mobilized, and eventually integrated some with our Air National Guard and regular Air Force partners as well partnered with allies at our AOR base from 

several coalition air forces. Our forward location changed in the second year of our mobilization, and we relocated to another Southwest location, the 379th Air 

Expeditionary Wing. On my last rotation, I served in a staff role, as the chief of tactics for the 379th Expeditionary Operations Support Squadron. We did well, and 

AFRC Commander Lieutenant General John Bradley “coined” me while he was on an AOR visit after my active Air Force boss had presented me with an award. It 

was an interesting time to be the chief of tactics, as we were implementing Combat Track II and initiating combat airdrop operations from our base during my rotation. Half of my staff was regular Air Force, and the remainder was comprised of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command personnel. We also planned 

and executed the first ever C-130J combat airdrop mission, which required my staff and I to learn the unique mission planning characteristics for the C-130J. One 

might think that this was an easy mission, due to it being the first of its kind and knowing the attention it would get, but I can attest that it was not one of our easier 

missions. It involved two separate airdrops in different parts of Afghanistan, the second of which was very challenging indeed due to small drop zone size, remote 

location amidst very rugged and high terrain which dictated a very short maneuvering run-in, and the concentration of people in the vicinity of the drop zone. The 

Air National Guard crew had to rely on us for the mission planning due to crew rest and timing constraints, and though it was a challenging mission, the mission was 

100 percent successful. 

The pace was brisk and the days were long for our C-130 crews (often over 16 hours, requiring crew day waivers), but they were glad to see airdrop missions appear 

on the schedule and embraced the challenges which broke up the routine of the much more common airland missions. During my fifth and final rotation of this mobilization with the 440th, the BRAC announced that our base would be closing, along with several others that were home to our comrades over there with us, so we 

returned home to find a different set of challenges as our home bases went through the anguish of closure.

All together, these last twenty years, I have deployed eight times to five different locations in Southwest Asia—the First Gulf War and Southern Watch in C-130s, and 

Enduring and Iraqi Freedom in C-130s, and now in KC-10s. 

 Lieutenant Colonel Anthony G. Polashek, 514th Operations Group Deputy Commander , May 2012

C-130 SERVICE

164
In late 2002, preparations were being made for an Iraqi invasion while operations were still ongoing in Afghanistan. As diplomatic efforts continued 

during this period, the Reserve forces were being told to prepare for activation. It was also during this time that 914th AW members were participating 

in Noble Eagle operations as part of GWOT. Niagara was one of four wings selected by the Air Force Reserve Command for activation.

Early in 2003, the warning order to deploy came. In March, we were out the door for the AOR. It was to turn into two years of citizen airmen activation 

with operations out of five separate Middle East countries, combined operations as part of multiple expeditionary airlift squadrons, and combat airlift 

missions into three separate AORs

The 914th AW was part of a last-minute desert aviation package deployed to an air base in Southwest Asia from March to May 2003. The bed down/

buildup included 46 Hercules C-130 H2/H3 aircraft from seven different Air Reserve Component units (one AFRC/six ANG) as well as active duty F-15 

fighters from Langley and Seymour Johnson AFB. This airlift package constituted the largest deployed bed down of Guard and Reserve C-130s in US 

Air Force history.

The base was slated to support in excess of 4,000 military personnel for the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Upon our arrival, we were immediately prepared to start flying operations. Unfortunately, when we arrived, we found only a handful of CE folks deployed and very little ancillary 

support to help prepare for the rest of the incoming personnel, aircraft, and associated equipment.

It was a desolate desert location, essentially a bare base. We hit the ground running. Without a full CE contingent to erect tents and facilities, we utilized the skill sets borne out of our civilian experiences as master plumbers, carpenters, heavy equipment operators, and other specialties to provide 

innovative engineering and manpower expertise to build an Emerald City, well perhaps a Beige City is more appropriate. 

That’s right; operations and maintenance personnel built roads, created sewage systems, stood up shower and lavatory facilities, constructed an Operations City for day-to-day operations, and erected tents for the other 3,500 incoming troops. Some titles the unit garnered as a result of its efforts were 

‘The Niagara Building Association’ and the ‘328th Civil Engineering Airlift Squadron.’

After several days of combat operations at another location, we were sent back to Niagara Falls to reconstitute our unit. Our return home was brief, and 

the community treated us to a parade and a hero’s welcome. In early August 2003, after about 25 days back at home, we were tapped on the shoulder 

and deployed back to the AOR—this time we became part of the 332nd AEW.

We arrived back into the AOR and merged operations with the 179th AW ANG unit out of Mansfield, Ohio. Once again we were able to provide seamless 

continuity of operations and a consistent high-level of sustained performance with mission capability rates in excess of 92 percent.

Prior to our departure in August 2003, we were told that we would need to prepare for a possible move forward into Iraq 30 days after our arrival. The 

DIRMOBFOR indicated that we would need to prepare for another bare base operation possibly at a base in southern Iraq.

After 30 days, the 133rd AW from Minnesota and two of our aircraft from Niagara were directed to return to the CONUS. Our base in the AOR was 

STORY OF THE 914th AIRLIFT WING IN OEF/OIF

1656
slated for closure and the US presence would cease 30 days later. We forward deployed an ADVON Team a week prior to our departure to establish 

our squadron operations, tactics, and Intel functionality as well as our maintenance. We moved two aircraft, four crews, and associated command 

and support personnel up to Tallil AB, Iraq (now called Alli AB).

At Tallil AB, we were charged with leading the first-ever C-130 operation in enemy territory—a first of its kind, C-130 tactical airlift operation based 

in Iraq. Georgia, Oklahoma, and Nevada Air National Guard units joined us as part of the 328th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron. Our mission capable 

rate exceeded 97 percent. We flew over 2,100 hours of combat time, airlifting over 23,500 pax, delivering over 2,566 tons of cargo in just over 1,650 

sorties.

In late December 03, we were requested to RTB (return to base) to Niagara Falls for reconstitution. This concluded our first year of activation. But, 

we continued on a fast pace with reconstitution and training in all the latest certifications.

One of several significant operations we were involved in occurred during the month of September 05. The DIRMOBFOR directed a reorganization 

and bed down of C-130s in SWA. As part of that bed down, Colonel (2004 Brigadier General) Charles Reed (DM4) ordered us to provide an aircraft 

and two crews, along with six MX specialists, and two Intel specialists to Bagram, Afghanistan.

This aircraft was tasked to fly as many as four lines per day, utilizing both crews. We supported ground combat and special ops troops in Afghanistan 

to include Operation Vigilant Sentinel. Numerous critical combat airdrops were made to resupply Army, Marine, and special ops personnel on the 

ground. 

From a MX perspective, these surge operations were conducted with no set working schedules or job taskings. In other words, everyone shared the 

burden of getting the aircraft ready despite their job specialty. Every MX member performed tasks, from refueling, to brake changes, to taping up 

antennas for dirt LZs. From the lowest senior airman to the lieutenant colonel (Aircraft CC), everyone contributed by doing whatever had to be done 

to get munitions, vehicles, or troops to the fight. The goal was to seamlessly launch and recover the airplane repeatedly. Aircraft preparation, maintenance and parts swap out were all based upon field fixes and innovation.

Today, in 2006, we’re teamed up with the 302nd AW (Colorado Springs) and 913th AW (Willow Grove) as part of an Air Force Reserve “Super Wing” 

now deployed to Southwest Asia. The formation of our three units combined with ANG C-130J models from Rhode Island, Maryland, and Channel 

Islands comprise a single unit now known as the 746th EAS, which is one of several flying squadrons under the 379th AEW. From our location we are 

able to reach out and touch all three AORs--OIF/OEF/HOA.

 

Lieutenant Colonel David Re, 328th Airlift Squadron, 2006

166
base.58

 

Rounding out the strategic airlift capability 

of the US Air Force, 40 C-141 aircraft and 

crews from the Air Force Reserve Command 

fielded 90 percent of the total capability of that 

weapon system. Aeromedical evacuation and 

resupply were the soon-to-be-retired C-141’s 

main focus. For service members critically injured in the conflict, 17 mobilized AFRC aeromedical evacuation units assured capability 

roughly equivalent with that of the regular Air 

Force. Air Force Reserve Command medical 

and aeromedical efforts included providing 

personnel for crews, mobile staging facilities, 

control elements, and contingency hospitals. 

C-130 combat delivery aircraft would airlift 

the injured to the staging locations and the 

C-141, C-17, and later the KC-135 would then 

provide the transportation out of the theater to 

Ramstein. Thereafter, C-17s would primarily 

bring the injured to stateside facilities. Notable, the modification of AFRC KC-135s for 

the aeromedical mission enabled the reserve to 

shoulder the workload of the Pacific aeromedical evacuation missions while also still contributing to contingency operations.59

Air Force Reserve Command C-130 assets initially mobilized from three units with the other 

units following, such as the 914th Airlift Wing, 

whose members received their two-year mobilization call up and left for Southwest Asia 

early in 2003. The 914th was part of the group 

that forward deployed into Tallil Air Base. At 

Tallil, the mixture from one Air Force Reserve 

two years of continuous service until September 2003.57

Thanks to decades of Total Force integration and the sharing of modern weapon systems among Air Force and Air Force Reserve 

members in associate unit relationships, both 

Air Force Reserve Command C-17 associate 

wings participated in Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and had personnel mobilized. Providing 

45 percent of the Air Force’s crews, the C-17 

missions were nearly evenly split between the 

active and Air Force Reserve Command. The 

same held true for the C-5 Total Force partnership where Air Force Reservists mobilized 

from the two C-5 wings (the other two wings 

had already mobilized for OEF), providing 50 

percent of the Air Force’s crew. Additionally, 

the 439th Airlift Wing at Westover Air Reserve 

Base and 452nd Air Mobility Wing at March 

Air Reserve Base served as aerial port of embarkations during the time-phased movement 

of service personnel, cargo, and equipment 

to the fight in Iraq. The 439th launched over 

1,100 C-5 missions, more than any other C-5 

extractions of injured or downed coalition pilots. The command’s special operations and 

rescue resources had been tapped into early 

on; these forces had been mobilized since 

September 2001.56 Similarly, the Air 

Force Reserve Command’s one E-3 unit, 

the 513th Air Control Group, was heavily 

relied upon. Its members remained mobilized and deployed overseas, providing 

1678
 Air Force Reserve Command space assets 

aided the accuracy of munitions, supported 

weather forecasting, provided battlefield 

situational awareness, and ensured combat 

communications to out-maneuver the enemy and protect coalition forces from attack. 

Hundreds of intelligence personnel augmented the active duty.62

 

BUSH - MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

Initially, the role of the US military in Operation Iraqi Freedom remained the military 

defeat of Saddam Hussein and his Ba’athist 

regime. On 1 May 2003, from aboard the 

USS Abraham Lincoln, President George 

W. Bush declared an end of major combat 

operations in Iraq and the beginning of efforts to create a republic. He related: “We 

have difficult work to do in Iraq. We’re 

bringing order to parts of that country that 

remain dangerous. We’re pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime, who will be 

major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Roughly one of four KC-10 and KC-135 

crews were Air Force Reservists supporting 

coalition assets moving around the world for 

the war effort. Besides the theater air refueling highlighted by the KC-10 crews from the 

514th Air Mobility Wing at Burgas Airfield, 

Bulgaria, Air Force Reserve crews were critical for air refueling duty on the Pacific and Atlantic air bridges across the oceans to the Middle East. Deployed to Moron Air Base, Spain, 

members from the 434th and 507th Air Refueling Wing initially operated a critical location. Air Force Reservists from the 507th KC135 unit, for example, alone flew 150 combat 

sorties racking up 900 hours of air refueling 

support to download 5 million pounds of fuel 

to coalition aircraft. On the Pacific air bridge 

were Air Force Reservists from the 931st Air 

Refueling Group while air refueling personnel 

from the 349th Air Mobility Wing forward deployed to Saudi Arabia. Theater air refuelings 

were truly force enablers.61

and three Air National Guard units became the 

328th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, together airlifting over 23,500 passengers and 2,566 

tons of cargo on 1,650 sorties and maintaining 

a mission capable rate exceeding 97 percent. 

And by fall 2003, the 440th Airlift Wing had 

received their two-year mobilization call up 

and left for Southwest Asia, becoming part of 

the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing. These Air 

Force Reservists provided the Air Force 15 

percent of the crew force capability. They also 

offered night vision goggle experience, critical to successful operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. By 2006, 914th members would 

team up with two other AFRC units, (302nd 

and 913th Airlift Wings) and would combine 

with Air National Guard C-130 units flying 

once again under the 379th Air Expeditionary 

Wing banner, supporting Afghanistan, Iraq, 

and the Horn of Africa.60

US Central Command planners heavily depended on the aerial refueling capability in the 

In a surprise Thanksgiving visit to the US air base at Baghdad International Airport, Bush noted that ‘terrorists’ were testing America’s 

resolve:

Those who attack our coalition forces and kill innocent Iraqis are testing our will. They hope we will run. We did not charge hundreds of 

miles into the heart of Iraq, pay a bitter cost in casualties, defeat a brutal dictator and liberate 25 million people only to retreat before a 

band of thugs and assassins.

 President George W. Bush, 1 December 2003

TESTING OUR WILL

168
organized, deconstruction of the existing power structure (De-Baathification), and dissolution of the Iraqi Army. Envisioned to improve 

the chances at long-term democratization of 

Iraq, these moves, in hindsight, also appear to 

have had a great destabilizing effect on Iraq 

as a whole. Many feared that the insurgency 

would grow stronger as former military members lost their income, and Iraq lost its most 

stable and respected institutions. De-Baathification also eliminated the bureaucracy that 

kept just basic things working within the country. Buy-in was jeopardized by the inability of 

Iraqis to quickly form representative government due to the ancient and tribal power structures. Meanwhile, the De-Baathification policy jeopardized the support and contribution of 

the Iraqi intelligentsia, permitting non-secular 

power structures to form in the vacuum, in 

particular under a cleric named Muqtada al 

Sadr.67

SECURING BAGHDAD - THE SUNNI 

TRIANGLE

Prior to the war with the United States, President Saddam Hussein had ordered a series of 

acts to stymie coalition forces and also limit 

their ability to control a post-Saddam Iraq. US 

administrator Paul Bremer noted how actions 

such as the release in October 2002 of 100,000 

criminals by the Ba’ath regime reduced the 

ability of coalition forces to assure the security of newly-liberated Iraq. In his view, it was 

time to put such people back in jail.68 On 9 

May 2003, only eight days after the announcethe US military focused on hunting down senior regime leadership, reinforcing the green 

zone established in Baghdad, and locating 

weapons of mass destruction. Although these 

objectives did little to enhance the Iraqi security environment at the local level, they were essential to the pressing need to secure US forces 

and regional stability. Restoring basic services 

such as water, electricity, and fuel to the Iraqi 

people was a prime concern. The task was not 

easy and hampered by sabotage and looters.66

 

COALITION PROVISIONAL 

AUTHORITY - RECONSTRUCTION

On 21 April 2003, the Coalition Provisional 

Authority was designated by the Bush Administration to oversee civil affairs in Iraq until a 

domestic government could be formed. Established from 

the Office for 

Reconstruction 

and Humanitarian Assistance which 

preceded it, 

President Bush 

appointed L. 

Paul Bremer, a 

career US diplomat, to oversee its operation. The organization was best 

known for instituting three key new policies 

with the first promulgated on 16 May 2003: 

withholding the formation of organic power 

structures until democratic elections could be 

held to account for their crimes. We’ve begun 

the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons and already know of hundreds of 

sites that will be investigated. We’re helping 

to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces 

for himself, instead of hospitals and schools. 

And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq 

as they establish a government of, by, and for 

the Iraqi people.”63 The Bush Administration 

envisioned that regime change would achieve 

elements of all three presidential objectives in 

the Global War on Terrorism. These objectives were to make the region less conducive 

to terrorist activity, disrupt the proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and collaborate with the Iraqi people to build a representational government as a beacon for the rest 

of the Middle East. Although the US could not 

locate the sought-after Iraqi WMD stockpiles, 

the effort to build a democratically-elected republic in Iraq 

continued as a primary objective.64

Within a month of crossing the 

berm, coalition forces had established control of Baghdad, 

Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and 

Tikrit. US Central Command 

Commander General Tommy 

Franks had directed the rapid 

advance by-passing urban centers generally 

and focusing on Iraqi resistance. The oil fields 

and port facilities had been secured, ensuring a 

flow of cash and goods for the Iraqi people for 

the rebuilding effort.65 In the ensuing weeks, 

169 170
When asked what it was like serving as a senior military leader in Saudi Arabia, Major General Larry L. Twitchell recalled that in addition to being 

a military general, “Senior military leaders have to be diplomats as well as anything else.” It also helps to understand other cultures and their regard 

for families.

Coincidentally, Major General Twitchell shared his surname with the man who was responsible for bringing American interests to develop the oil 

fields of Saudi Arabia. At the height of the Great Depression, Karl S. Twitchell, an American geologist, arranged for the first ever oil concession in 

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s history. The final negotiations between the Saudi government and the Standard Oil Company were concluded in May 

1933.

Seventy years later, Air Force Reservist Major General Larry Twitchell, who was about to retire and had bought his “dream” car, was asked by higher 

ups to serve as Chief, US Military Training Mission (USMTM), US Central Command, Saudi Arabia, and as the US Defense Representative to Saudi 

Arabia.

After serving many years as the mobilization assistant to the commander of Ninth Air Force and US Central Command Air Forces with numerous trips 

to the AOR and the Combined Air Operations Center, Major General Twitchell believed that “After major combat ops terminated in 2003, I thought I 

would retire when asked by General John Jumper to take the position at USMTM for a two-year tour. After that tour was coming to fruition, Prince 

Khalid bin Sultan, the Minister of Defense and Aviation, asked me to stay on for another two years. Ambassador Jim Oberwetter, General John Abizaid, and I agreed to remain for one additional year.” 

In 2003, Major General Twitchell arrived in Riyadh at a critical juncture. Insurgents had detonated several bombs; the US government had ordered all 

dependents and non-essential personnel to leave Saudi Arabia. He and the military then stepped into the void, working directly with the Saudi Arabian 

Royal Family. In his dual role, the former pilot and vice president of flight operations for a commercial airline managed all foreign military sales to 

include the training and the support. As the US Defense representative, he coordinated administrative and security matters for all Defense Department 

noncombatant command elements in Saudi Arabia. He credits his Middle East diplomatic success to his teenage years in Michigan—“you 

can learn a lot by keeping your mouth shut 

and listen and learn from those around you.” 

Major General Twitchell finally got to retire 

in January 2007. Although he became familiar with the Karl Twitchell story, he had 

not yet traced the genealogy.

AFRC MAJOR GENERAL ENSURES RELATIONS - SAUDI ARABIA

170
1712
172
1734
174
The 919th Operations Group (OG), 919th Special Operations Wing (SOW), Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, distinguished itself through exceptional courage against an armed enemy of the United States from 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003. The unit was awarded the Gallant Unit Citation for heroic actions during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The 350 airmen of the 919th Operations Group supported two unique special-equipped 

aircraft, the MC-130E and MC-130P, operating from five austere locations across two continents while the 919th conducted vital extraordinary missions. 

The 919th Operations Group displayed combat expertise and were responsible for establishing communication between joint operations centers, and for 

commanding several air components functions during the two campaigns. This notable award was given to the wing for effectively coordinating and 

conducting split combat operations between the Asian and African areas of responsibility. The group compiled an incredible combat record during the 

largest, longest, most complex and most successful campaign ever conducted by United States special operation forces. Having achieved so many accomplishments during their time in theater, the group received over 850 awards. 

The 919th Operations Group exposed themselves to enemy missiles, rockets, mortars, small arms fire, and anti-aircraft artillery. These brave men and 

women successfully executed perilous and challenging missions with strategic proficiency and unwavering fortitude. Exceptional heroism, professionalism, and selfless devotion to duty were continuously exhibited by the 919th Operations Group. These characteristics were major factors in the 

successful accomplishment of US military objectives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. The conspicuous courage, aerial skill, and tenacity 

exhibited by each and every member, regardless of rank, resulted in the swift defeat of our nation’s enemies and ensured the liberation of Afghanistan 

and Iraq from totalitarian regimes, which threatened the United States’ national security. A description below give details to the individual decorations 

awarded to the recipients.

By Staff Sergeant Sa’Maad I. Bynum, 916th Air Refueling Wing Historian

Decoration Quantity

Silver Star 2

Distinguished Flying Cross 66 (44 for Heroism)

Bronze Star 33 (10 for Heroism)

Air Medal 566 (31 for Heroism)

Aerial Achievement Medal 86

EXTRAORDINARY GALLANTRY AGAINST AN ARMED ENEMY

175 176
970th Airborne Air Control Squadron, 513th Air Control Group

Operation Iraqi Freedom Tally: 526.5 flying hours, 49 sorties

HIGHLIGHTS

-Flew 14 sorties amassing 173 hours in support of Operation Special Envoy, providing 24-hour coverage for a State Department delegation meeting 

with Kurdish leaders in Northern Iraq. “With history as a guide, what we did was not possible.” 

 -Directed and controlled the successful airdrop of the 173rd Airborne Brigade paratroopers.

-Played an integral role in coordinating the rescue of seven American POWs in Northern Iraq while also tactically managing assets to protect capitulating Iraqi forces from aggressive Iranian troops.

-Recognized by Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem, Commander Fleet Air Mediterranean of the USS Theodore Roosevelt and USS Harry S. Truman 

Battle groups, for saving the lives of 12 American SOF teams. 

-Personally assisted 16 lightly-armed CSAR forces from having their position overrun by local Iraqi militant group and directed the immediate return 

of supporting helicopters to pick them up.

-Managed ten tanker tracks with more than 150 tankers that offloaded a total of 10 million pounds of jet fuel. 

-Close controlled a F-14 Tomcat with IFF, navigation and altitude indication problems safely through the AOR corridor traffic, successfully handing 

him off to the E-2 for safe return to an aircraft carrier and similarly did so for a P-3 Orion aircraft.

-“Iron Triad”—AWACS, JSTARS, and Rivet Joint—provided complete coverage of the land, sea, air and intelligence for maximum mission effectiveness.

-Maintained the longest airborne air control AEF unit rotation ever, more than 17 months.

The Reserve mindset was, ‘Get it done, come hell or high water.’ A lot of people reached into the fire and made the mission happen, Lieutenant Colonel 

Dale Andrews, 513th ACG Chief of Maintenance

970TH AIRBORNE AIR CONTROL 

176
Reservists, this person could be saved; they 

would air transport three wounded for more 

advanced care, handing them off to the mobile 

aeromedical staging facility for aeromedical 

evacuation out of Iraq. In all, Air Force Reservists rescued seven wounded UN workers, 

Baghdad International 

Airport, running up the 

engines on two HH60 helicopters. Moments later they were 

airborne. Arriving at 

the devastated UN 

complex, Guardsmen 

Chief Master Sergeant 

Ian Nesbit reported on 

the scene: “The Army 

had already secured the 

building when we got 

there, but it was crumbling. Windows were 

blown out. Hot electrical wires were exposed. 

Water was leaking everywhere.” Their first 

victim required many 

of the trauma care 

techniques pararescue 

jumpers train for in 

combat. The Air Force 

Reservists had to crawl, 

poke through wreckage, and use ropes to 

access him. “This guy 

was in bad shape,” 

said another pararescue 

specialist. “He’s been 

pinned upside down for more than two hours. 

Both legs were crushed, his right hand was 

pretty much destroyed, and he’d lost about 40 

percent of his blood as well.”71 Thanks to the 

speed, skill, and experience of the Air Force 

ment of the end of major combat operations 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the first significant non-regime attack on coalition soldiers 

occurred in the outskirts of Baghdad. Fortunately, between 15 and 16 May, coalition forces had rounded up more than 300 criminals in 

sweeps to locate the top 55 most-wanted leaders of the former Iraqi government.69

In late May, signaling the full participation of 

the world community in the post-liberation 

phase of Iraq, United Nations envoy Sergio 

Vieira de Mello arrived in Baghdad. Iraqi citizens waiting in long lines around the country 

were now free and appeared anxious for the 

opportunity to finally have their voices heard. 

However, as the recently arrived United Nations team worked to support Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Government, the young 

Iraqi insurgency executed the most disastrous 

attack to date. During a press conference on 

19 August 2003, a massive truck bomb detonated under de Mello’s office window in the 

safe zone around the UN compound. Instantly, 

16 people were killed and at least 100 more 

were wounded. With Sergio de Mello among 

the dead and dying, chaos ensued while survivors looked for help.70 This event foretold 

a sobering reality facing the UN and coalition 

partners as they worked with the Iraqis on 

forming a new government.

Within minutes of the attack, pararescue jumpers, pilots, and flight engineers from the Air 

Force Reserve Command’s 301st Expeditionary Rescue Squadron were on the tarmac at 

Right now, we’re still in the surge because we’ve got three more wings 

mobilized. We’ve [also] got a lot of volunteers out there, and the volunteer tempo is huge. But, no; you can’t keep it going forever. We’ve 

had most of our major aviation units mobilized for two years, and 

the only ones that haven’t are the three [currently mobilized C-130 

wings]. That will be coming to an end here probably in October of 

this year.

. . .

When you look at all the C-130 units, they’ve all done just an incredible job. A lot of the load of the war kind of fell to them after the 

initial thrust of the war was over. The maintenance of the troops 

and the maintenance of the country required a lot of airlift, and the 

C-130s are the airplane that we fly.

. . .

All the C-130 units did just an incredible job, and they have saved a 

lot of lives as far as I’m concerned—by their evacuation of wounded folks and by the fact that when they’re carrying passengers and 

equipment, it doesn’t have to be carried by convoy. They’re not subject to the IEDs. I think they’ve done a lot of incredibly important 

work over there.

The KC-10s did not mobilize, but they kept a level of activity that 

rivaled mobilization throughout the whole time. They’re doing just 

a super job, and they’re participating in the overall Air Force effort 

on air refueling regardless of whether they’re mobilized or not. It’s 

the same with our strat units; they maintain the same high level of 

participation whether they’re mobilized or not.

Interview, Major General James D. Bankers, Twenty-Second Air Force 

Commander, with SMSgt Robin Rosenberger, 31 January 2006

INCREDIBLE JOB 

1778
ity, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez 

had taken steps to make sure his unit commanders formed Iraqi civil defense corps 

the ambush and grisly 

execution of four US 

contractors in the streets 

of Fallujah. The mutilation and delight exhibited by Iraqi civilians 

appalled most US audiences, especially since 

Americans were joyously seen as liberators the 

previous year.74 Once 

more, the televised mutilations highlighted a 

true domestic security 

problem for all to see 

but did not reveal the 

years of insurgency that 

would follow. US leaders had remained fixated 

on mopping up criminal 

elements and did not 

organize a long-term 

anti-insurgency strategy 

to counter the growing 

threat until 2005 with 

the new Clear, Hold, 

Build strategy. Based 

on the perception that 

major ground combat 

was completed and that 

Iraqis would be anxious to form their own 

government, short-term 

and transitional thinking 

initially prevailed. Not 

waiting on the Coalition Provisional Authoradding to their 21 other saves since Iraq’s liberation the previous month.72

The hopeful mood in the country was becoming supplanted as shown in the UN compound 

attack in the green zone. Most of the necessary US security action in and around Baghdad 

did not ingratiate the local populace. Essential 

efforts to fortify and secure Iraq’s interior required searches, seizures, and other unpopular 

aspects of martial law. Worst of all, each day 

made it more apparent to Iraqis that their security could not be assured. Disenchanted by a 

series of policies stripping the preference away 

from the once-ruling Sunni population, many 

people in Iraq’s central region considered the 

perceived offense too great to bear. Religion 

was another facet that fueled insurgency, as 

the US became regarded as against Islam. In 

an area roughly encompassing the land area 

between Baqubah, Baghdad, Ramadi, and Tikrit, which included the cities of Samarra and 

Fallujah, the majority Sunni residents created 

the first true uprising against US and coalition 

occupation forces. This area, known as the 

Sunni triangle, was filled with soldiers, government workers, and members of the former 

ruling party who were recently restricted from 

reconstituting their political representation and 

denied gainful employment. For those that did 

not have political and employment privileges 

under the Ba’ath regime, they now had a front 

row seat to De-Baathification.73

 By 31 March 2004, the growing “insurgency” 

within Iraq had attained global attention with 

The Air Force Reserve Command explosive ordinance disposal 

(EOD) technicians played a significant role in the efforts to counter improvised explosive devices (IED) during both Iraqi Freedom 

and Enduring Freedom. Media reports suggested that, as early 

as 2003, Iraq was one of the most heavily mined nations in the 

world with an estimated 10 million mines already in the ground. 

Iraq was both a producer and exporter of anti-personnel and antitank mines. Additionally, the Pentagon reported that more than 

250,000 tons of Iraqi ordnance were looted, providing a nearly 

limitless supply of ammunition by the insurgents. From the onset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces encountered large 

numbers of booby traps and IEDs. By late 2003, 60 percent of all 

attacks in Iraq began with an IED, and their use as a means to attack convoys and troops created an immediate demand for counter 

measures.

Insurgency IED attacks were utilized at constantly increasing rates 

against coalition forces after 2003 and represented the preferred 

method of attacking coalition troops. By July 2006, IED attacks 

had risen to their highest levels of the year. In addition to more sophisticated bomb making material, the insurgents employed better 

technology to include infrared beam devices designed to defeat 

coalition efforts at jamming radio signals. Rapid changes in enemy tactics entailed the disguising of IEDs as rubbish or dead 

animals, the elevated placement of IEDs on bridges and underpasses, and the shifting of IED attacks to civilian targets. All of 

this forced changes in the counter-IED mission. Adaptation to 

the increased numbers of IEDs was compounded by these new 

tactics that required retraining of EOD personnel. EOD technicians, including those stationed at Tallil Air Base, were spending 

an increasing amount of time in the classroom and on ranges.

AFRC - EOD

178
In Iraq during 2004, a surge in enemy attacks on motor convoys caused some civilian contractors to postpone operations, a luxury unavailable to the 

US military. Until that time, the Army had primary responsibility for providing convoy security escort in Iraq, but when the demand for its services exceeded capability, the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) responded to the call for help. Members of the AFRC performed convoy 

security missions in Army gun trucks for two years, from the spring of 2004 through January 2006. Providing combat support specialties “in lieu of” 

(ILO) soldiers who would have normally filled these positions initially became known as ILO deployments.

The combat-convoy airmen were assigned to detachments of the 732nd Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron (ELRS), part of the 732nd Expeditionary Mission Support Group at Balad Air Force Base. Initially, the Air Force and Air Force Reserve Command supplied the equivalent of three-anda-half light-medium truck companies. But they were not designated by the Air Force as “companies.” When the detachments were assembled, they actually took over the jobs of Army National Guard gun truck companies that had been serving in country since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Colonel Gary Schick, commander of the 732nd Expeditionary Mission Support Group explained at the time that officially the Air Expeditionary Force 

units were 732 ELRS Detachment 1, 2, etc. and these designations were used by Air Force higher commands throughout the AOR. 

“However,” wrote Colonel Schick, “as day to day, common use, vernacular goes the Army designations stuck and are used for unit tracking. This includes casualty reports. Unfortunately, none of us in operations instantly think in terms of DET designations – hard to track and harder to converse with 

the Army and hard to say. When there is a casualty the last thing on our minds is the designation question. When the SIR (Serious Incident Report) 

comes in it is with an Army designation and the rush for more data under the inevitable “fog of war” doesn’t allow for much time to contemplate this 

particular piece of heraldry.”

He went on to say that the airmen were comfortable, if not a little proud of Army designations as their unit identity, as well as the authorization to wear 

an Army divisional combat patch on the right shoulder of their battle dress uniforms.

After the initial basic convoy training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, airmen assembled in Camp Virginia, Kuwait, for six additional weeks of preparation. It was here that individuals were assigned to the gun truck companies. They had come from 14 bases throughout the United States with no more 

than six airmen deployed from the same unit. One of these companies put together in Kuwait was the 1058th Air Expeditionary Force Transportation 

Company.

Although officially designated 732 ELRS Detachment 3, members of what would be called the 1058th Air Expeditionary Force Truck Company 

(AEFTC) formed for the first time at Camp Virginia on 21 February 2004. The unit was commanded by Air Force Reserve Captain Annette D. Bonaro. 

The outfit was comprised of 148 individuals from 25 states, the District of Columbia, Japan, Puerto Rico and the United Kingdom. Air Force reservists 

represented 30 percent of the unit’s personnel. The company was validated as mission-ready on 25 March and forward deployed to Forward Operating 

Base (FOB) Speicher, Iraq, on 1 April. There, they replaced the Army National Guard’s 1058th Transportation Company from Hingham, Massachusetts. 

The AEFTC’s primary mission was convoy escort and route security for military units; third country nationals; and Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) 

contracted personnel and vehicles. They transported all classes of supply throughout the Iraqi theater of operations as far north as the Turkish border 

and as far south as Arifjan, Kuwait. Other tasks included providing armored passenger carriers to transport personnel, potable water delivery, and post 

COMBAT CONVOY AIRMEN IN IRAQ 2004 - 2006

17980
shuttle services.

Five airmen in the 1058th were from the 934th Logistics Readiness Squadron, 934th Airlift Wing based at the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport Air Reserve Station. The Air Force Reservists of the 934th faced dangerous days on what were some of the deadliest roads in the world at the 

time. Their convoys were subject to small arms fire, indirect and direct fire, rocket propelled grenades, land mines, mortars, and improvised explosive 

devices. These service members were still in AFRC but were living and working like the Army.

Master Sergeant Doug James, newly married only two months before the February deployment, drew strength from thoughts of home, “I thought of the 

people waiting for us back home and that they’re looking forward to seeing us.”

In a 2010 interview, Technical Sergeant Marcus Erickson of the 934th had this to say: “I think that we kind of stepped up to the plate and showed that 

the Air Force could do the same job the Army can. There were a lot of people impressed with us by the time we left. Everyone talks about how the Air 

Force has it great, but we lived just like the Army, and it was actually pretty good. The Army unit we worked with, the Illinois National Guard, they 

treated us really well, and it was a good experience. It was tough living, but it was a good experience.”

At least three 934th airmen were decorated for their service. The Air Force awarded the Bronze Star to Master Sergeant Brian Iverson for meritorious 

service during his tour with the 934th. Technical Sergeant Colleen Kramp was wounded in Iraq, and received the Purple Heart. Technical Sergeant 

Michael Humenny was wounded when an IED exploded near his convoy. Sergeant Humenny also received the Purple Heart. Despite the dangers, 

Sergeant Humenny said he would return to Iraq if given the chance. While conducting motor convoys from April to August 2004, their unit endured 25 

attacks on the road and 18 while on post. Between 2004 and 2006, the 1058th and the other companies in the 732nd Expeditionary Logistics Readiness 

Squadron executed more than 5,000 convoy escort missions totaling four million miles.

Besides the 1058th AEFTC at FOB Speicher, there was the 494th AEFTC (732 ELRS Detachment 1) based at FOB Diamondback near Mosul, the 1087th 

AEFTC and one half strength company, the 2632nd AEFTC at Logistics Support Area Anaconda. The 2632nd was a blend of active duty, Air National 

Guard and Air Force Reserve personnel. The 494th and the 1087th were strictly active duty. When the 1087th and the 2632nd were combined into one 

super-sized company, the 2632nd AEFTC (732 ELRS Detachment 2), only the 494th remained as an active duty only unit.

During the 2004-2006 time frame, eleven other AFRC logistics readiness squadrons also sent airmen to the AEF transportation companies. These were 

the 917th from Barksdale, the 442nd from Whiteman, the 916th from Seymour Johnson, the 908th from Maxwell, the 302nd from Peterson, the 434th 

from Grissom, the 914th from Niagara Falls, the 919th from Duke Field, the 927th from MacDill, the 445th from Wright Paterson, and the 940th from 

Beale. Vehicle operators from the Air Force Reserve Command were still sent to Iraq after early 2006, but they were assigned to logistics readiness 

units carrying out normal USAF taskings.

At least five other AFRC airmen received recognition from the Army for their service during this same period. They were all from the 434th Logistics 

Readiness Squadron, Grissom Air Reserve Base, Indiana. As members of the 2632nd AEFTC, Master Sergeant Nathan Moore received the Bronze 

Star; Master Sergeants Mike Mooney, David Marks, and Technical Sergeant Christopher Mills along with Senior Airman Joshua Stewart, each received 

the Army Commendation Medal. 

Just like the 1058th, the 2632nd experienced some harrowing times. According to Sergeant Marks, they were rocketed and mortared on average about 

four times during daylight hours and a couple more times at night. Nevertheless, the company escorted some 4,000 vehicles, delivered 50,000 tons of 

supplies and traveled 250,000 miles during their deployment.

180
A C-130H Hercules aircraft ascends into the bright clear sky after departing the northern Iraqi airfield at Mosul, carrying its aircrew and 57 Army 

soldiers on what appeared to be another routine flight to Kuwait. It was 26 October 2004, and the C-130H (call sign “Crome 32”) was only a few hundred feet above the city when it unexpectedly shuddered. It had just begun its first big turn for departure out of the Mosul airspace. Major Rolf Breen 

stated, “I suddenly had a fire-warning light staring me in the face.” As the aircraft commander, he heard the audible alarm tones and visually observed 

the cockpit fire indicator and engine nacelle overheat lights simultaneously flashing out their warnings. Loadmaster Master Sergeant James Grigsby 

witnessed something he would never forget, “I saw a fireball on the number one engine . . . I wasn’t sure what had happened, but the number one engine 

had exploded.” He immediately notified the other crew members of the situation. Obviously, the aircraft was in dire straits.

The Army personnel were members of the 2nd Infantry Division and had just spent 14 grueling months in Iraq. Needless to say, they were anxiously 

looking forward to returning to Fort Lewis, Washington. Shortly, the soldiers were scheduled to depart Kuwait on the “Freedom Bird” back to the 

United States. 

The Chrome 32 aircrew arrived in Kuwait on 13 October 2004, consisting of the following personnel: navigator - Lieutenant Colonel John Loranger; 

pilot – Major Rolf Breen; co-pilot – Major Jason Schroeder; loadmaster – Master Sergeant James Grigsby; loadmaster – Technical Sergeant Robert 

Sczesny; and flight engineer – Staff Sergeant Dan Hayes. Everyone, except for Hayes, had already deployed three times. They were all from the 440th 

Airlift Wing, home stationed at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and temporarily assigned to the 386th Air Expeditionary Wing. This crew had only flown seven 

missions together; however, this would be one that they would never forget.

Upon notification of the blazing fire, the pilots shut down the number one engine. “We’re at a few hundred feet . . . and I hear Major Breen say that the 

remaining engines were acting up,” said Sergeant Grigsby. Immediately, the crew automatically took action. “We didn’t really think about it, we just 

implemented emergency procedures,” said Staff Sergeant Hayes, a newly trained flight engineer. Major Breen recalled, “I saw that the engine instruments were going crazy, but the co-pilot and flight engineer said it was just an indication problem. Sergeant Hayes flipped some switches and the engines 

stopped acting crazy, but we still had a problem.” Meanwhile the backend crew ensured that their passengers were safe, uninjured, and briefed on the 

preparations for an emergency landing.

It was quite apparent; the crew must get the aircraft on the ground forthwith. “As soon as we were hit and we’d finished the emergency procedures and 

I knew the aircraft was under control, I made contact to let people know what happened and alert other aircraft,” said Captain Schroeder. He sent out a 

radio transmission notifying the Mosul tower of the hazardous Hercules situation, and that the aircraft had possibly been hit my enemy fire. Crome 32 

then reported that they were departing the area in search of a safe place to land. “In the meantime, we had to figure out where to go,” remarked Captain 

Schroeder. Major Breen added: “Our mindset was to get away from the threat, so I asked the navigator for a distance and heading to a divert field, 

which he gave me almost instantaneously.” Lieutenant Colonel Loranger stated, “I made the recommendations to go to an alternate airfield, instead of 

returning to the departure airfield. We didn’t have any navigation info on the field . . . but luckily, we’d been there just a few days prior so we knew it 

could safely handle us.” Unfortunately, this location could only provide minimal facilities and the runway was undergoing reconstruction.

“The fire didn’t go out for most of the flight,” Sergeant Hayes continued, “Once we completed the initial emergency procedures we used a second fire 

bottle and continued going through the procedures.” “Because the fire was still going, we continued to keep an eye out for places to set the aircraft down 

CROME 32 - 440 AW

1812
if needed,” remarked Colonel Loranger, who further provided, “It seemed like an eternity before they reached the divert field. It only took us about 10 

minutes from start to finish, but it seemed like 45.” Seven minutes into the fiery flight and still eight miles away from the emergency airfield, the fire 

miraculously snuffed itself out. However, Crome 32 was not out of danger. They still needed to get the crippled aircraft on the ground. 

“We couldn’t take the plane in too fast, in case there were problems with the wing,” said Sergeant Hayes. With nearly two miles separating them from 

the airfield, the pilots decelerated the airspeed and implemented controllability checks ensuring the operation of each piece of equipment required for 

landing the Hercules safely. Major Breen recalled, “I’ll never forget the sight of the people working on one end of the runway waving at us as we passed 

overhead.” Upon the final approach, the pilots noticed construction crews encompassing half of the runway, so they decided to overfly the workers and 

land on the remaining 6,000 feet of tarmac. Captain Schroeder added, “Not only did he have to land with an engine shut down and an unknown fire 

status, but land over the runway repair equipment onto the open half of the runway and he did it perfectly.” The landing proved uneventful. “When we 

landed it was like a weight coming off my shoulders,” said Sergeant Sczesny, “I was thankful we were on the ground, but now we had to get the passengers off the plane quickly and safely. The briefing, and unloading the 57 soldiers, took about a minute.” Sergeant Grigsby remembered, “The soldiers 

had lined up in formation and were applauding us as we came off the aircraft.” 

Explosive ordnance disposal personnel inspected the aircraft for any explosive dangers, and once they deemed the aircraft safe to approach, the aircrew 

viewed the extensive damage of Crome 32. There was a six inch hole in the bottom portion of the number one engine where a projectile had penetrated. 

On the left side of the nacelle, there was a substantial amount of shrapnel damage, which had apparently exited the structure of the aircraft in such a 

manner that it shredded oil and fuel lines feeding the T56-A-15 turboprop engine. It was now quite obvious to the aircrew why the fire extinguishing 

agent proved ineffective. 

Major Breen hitched a ride, “Once we got to the command post, and they got over their shock of 

seeing us there, they went out of their way to help us. They made calls, let people know we were 

safe and found our passengers and crew a place to rest. We spent about four hours on the ground 

before another aircraft was able to pick up all of the soldiers, cargo, and crew,” continued Major 

Breen. “We came back home and those soldiers all made their flights back to the states.” According to Major Breen, credit goes out to the entire crew for the success of the mission. “It wasn’t 

the work of any one individual but the 

collective efforts of the group, the way 

we worked together, that allowed us to 

safely land the plane.” “Everyone did 

what they were supposed to do, added 

Sergeant Grigsby. 

 

By Captain Aaron Burgstein, 386th AEW 

Public Affairs, 2004

182
wal-Jihad, grew under the command of Jordanian terrorist leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi 

after his arrival in 2002. However, it was not 

until his union with al Qaeda in 2004 that its 

followers focused attention on repelling US 

and coalition forces ahead of the Shia and its 

other localized enemies. He was responsible 

for the deaths and beheadings of thousands and 

was involved in the bombing of the UN headquarters in Iraq. Targeted by the coalition and 

with a $25 million dollar bounty on his head, 

Zarqawi was killed while in a “safe house” 

in June 2006 by two precision-guided bombs 

dropped from two F-16 LITENING-equipped 

aircraft. No one except al Qaeda grieved the 

loss. Subsequently, the Egyptian-born Abu 

Hamzah al-Muhajir (al-Masri) replaced him 

and became the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq. 

Where the new al Qaeda of Iraq gained its 

greatest traction and influence, however, was 

in the atmosphere of chaos leading up to the 

brink of civil war in 2006.81

MAHDI ARMY UPRISING TESTS THE 

GOVERNMENT

Certainly, the perceived and real incapacity 

of the Coalition Provisional Authority to address utility, security, and economic concerns 

eroded the coalition’s authority. Regardless 

of the specifics, the Iraqi people struggled 

to achieve a measure of representation, subsistence, and security in their lives. Accordingly, some Iraqis drifted towards alternative 

forms of governance and security at the religious, sectarian, tribal, local, and gang levels. 

 Already by October 2003, the Air Force Reserve Command began providing EOD personnel for the extensive munitions clearing 

operations. Twelve Air Force Reservists of the 

332nd Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron 

operated a 24-hours a day EOD mission at Tallil Air Base, Iraq. With too few technicians 

to split into shifts, the 12-man crew stayed on 

24-hour alert. They responded to an average 

of 25-30 calls each week clearing areas of the 

base and disposing of munitions at the range.79

 

 RISE OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS - 

IRAQ

Though not a major player in Iraqi security 

prior to its liberation in 2003, foreign terrorist organizations were growing in significance 

through the environment of chaos and vacuum 

of power that ensued in Iraq. The coalition 

succeeded in disrupting the formation of home 

grown terrorist organizations by eliminating 

key members of al Qaeda in Iraq. However, 

it would not be a clean break; as is generally 

the case with terrorism, the exception was the 

rule. Terrorist organizations were not confined 

to al Qaeda, their attacks were not limited to 

traditional targets, and their activities were not 

only in Iraq.80 A plethora of other terrorist 

and insurgent organizations intersected the activities of one another across the world, aided 

by the age of the internet and mobile communications. 

In Iraq, the foreign jihadist organization of 

most interest to coalition planners, al-Tawhid 

battalions for local and regional security assistance.75

CLEARING “ARSENAL OF TERROR”

Saddam Hussein’s “Arsenal of Terror” was a 

focus of interest by the US military following 

the 2003 liberation of Iraq. Working with the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Army’s 

sensitive-site exploitation teams largely took 

on this task. Although the hunt for WMD ultimately came up negative in the process of their 

search, they located numerous weapons caches, denying insurgents more firepower and reducing the risk of injury by Iraqi civilians and 

US/coalition service members alike.76

The size and scale of Iraq’s weapons hoarding 

and dispersal initially overwhelmed the ability of coalition forces to control it. “The Iraqi 

regime had ordnance stashed in nearly every 

crevice, school, hospital, and military installation in Iraq. Cleaning up this ammunition 

became a daunting task after major combat operations ceased.”77 The inescapable reality of 

widespread lawlessness and the availability of 

offensive weaponry by Iraqi sectarians set the 

stage for insurgency. “Literally hundreds of 

Iraqi ammunition depots were scattered across 

Iraq. Because these sites were a hazard to the 

Iraqi people and potential sources of weapons 

and ammunition for any insurgents, coalition 

forces attempted to secure or destroy them.”78

Air Force Reservists would distinguish themselves, risking life and limb to participate in 

the joint effort. 

1834
“General, is he inside the country at the moment? Can you tell us where Saddam is?” asked the reporter on 16 December 2003. Lieutenant General 

Ricardo Sanchez, Joint Task Force Commander, indicated that Saddam was at an undisclosed location at that point. The reporter then asked, “General 

Myers, are you going to meet with him? General Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, replied, “No. We have the right people meeting 

with him.”

At that moment, Saddam Hussein was in fact at a secret special operations forces battlefield interrogation facility (BIF). He was being questioned by 

the commander of the interrogation team, an officer in the Air Force Reserve Command with over twenty-five years of military experience.

When the Special Operations Forces Task Force found Saddam Hussein hiding in the “spider hole” he had been there only a short time. The Iraqi 

dictator did not actually live in the hole but only got in it when he heard someone coming. That is exactly what Saddam did when the First Brigade 

Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) and the Special Operations Task Force approached the farm outside Tikrit where he was hiding. 

They found him in a small underground chamber on the grounds of the property. An Iraqi-American interpreter contractor working for the BIF commander was the individual who actually jumped in the hole and pulled Saddam out by the scruff of his neck.

Saddam was flown in a special operations forces MH-6 Little Bird helicopter to his former palace in nearby Tikrit, then headquarters of Major General Raymond T. Odierno, 4th ID commander. Next, Saddam was taken to the secure Task Force interrogation facility near Baghdad. The C-130 

aircraft he traveled in at this time was flown by an AFRC crew.

The BIF commander remembered it was dark in the facility. He wore a stripped down uniform with no rank or insignia. Saddam could not see his 

face. “Who are you?” the commander asked.

“I am Saddam Hussein the President of the Republic of Iraq,” he answered. 

The commander said, “I asked you what your name was. I did not ask you what 

your job was.” 

Then Saddam asked “Who are you? What is your rank?”

“Here you are a prisoner,” the commander answered. “I ask the questions and you 

don’t ask.”

AFRC AND THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

184
It was Wednesday, 1 September 2004 in Beslan, North Ossetia, an autonomous republic in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. Children were attending the first day of the new school year. This “Day of Knowledge” was usually a happy time for the students who brought balloons and flowers for their teachers 

and attended ceremonies hosted by the school. Because the pupils were accompanied by family members attending the festivities, more people were present than on 

a normal school day. They were just lining up when a large group of heavily armed terrorists entered the town, surrounded the school, and took some 1,200 people 

hostage. They locked up the hostages in the school gym with no food or water for three days. The terrorists executed most of the young men right away and set up 

explosive devices throughout the school. On the third day, an explosion occurred in the gym. Parents, relatives, volunteers, and Russian special forces rushed in. 

When the dust had settled, 330 people were dead, 156 of them children. More than 700 of the surviving hostages were wounded.

On the evening of the first day of the hostage crisis, President George W. Bush offered US support in any form to the Russian government. The President described 

the events as “another grim reminder” of terrorism. “We stand with the people of Russia,” he said, “We send them our thoughts and prayers in this terrible situation.” 

He also sent two C-130s and their crews from the 302nd Airlift Wing, an AFRC unit deployed to Ramstein Air Base, Germany with the 38th Airlift Squadron. 

The planes dropped off about 36,000 pounds of medical and humanitarian supplies for use in treating the victims in Beslan. The supplies included sheets, blankets, 

medicine, burn kits, bandages, and dressings as well as specialized medical equipment.

The aircraft and crews landed on an airfield on the outskirts of Beslan. They were met by a ‘reception committee’ comprised of individuals from various Russian 

agencies, such as their equivalent of our Federal Emergency Management Agency, members of the Russian military, and airport personnel.

“I spoke to the Russian interpreter, and he was very thankful that we made the journey over here,” stated Air Force Reservist Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Galante, 

serving as the 38th Airlift Squadron commander. “I could see some of the other Russian officials were really teary-eyed and really appreciated the support that we 

brought in these medical supplies and other equipment that they need so badly.”

An additional two C-130 Hercules aircraft, assigned to the 731st Airlift Squadron, an Air Force Reserve unit deployed from the 302nd Airlift Wing at Peterson Air 

Force Base, Colorado, also answered the call to deliver medical and humanitarian supplies. The 731st crews were already deployed in Europe supporting another 

mission when they were redirected to Beslan. “The mission just fell into our lap,” said Lieutenant Colonel John Richey, the 731st flight commander. Technical 

Sergeant Graham Thorne, 731st flight engineer, expressed, “I think they were still in shock at what was going on, and why two American planes were on Russian 

soil even though they knew we were coming.”

Senior Master Sergeant Pete LaBarre, a 731st loadmaster agreed. Providing humanitarian aid airlift on a rainy day in Russia touched the crews emotionally. This 

mission shattered Sergeant LaBarre’s preconceived notions and images of robotic, militaristic Russians.

“They said it was nice that our countries were in such community with one another, and that we were living like brothers in the midst of tragedy,” related active 

Air Force Staff Sergeant Clayton E. Bronnee, a Russian linguist. “They said they felt very bad for us when 9/11 happened, and they appreciate our help and support 

now that this tragedy has befallen them.”

“We felt we did something that mattered and counted,” Lieutenant Colonel Richey recalled. “To bring those people something they needed was really a unique 

experience. It was refreshing to be able to help those people with a timely response. For us to have active duty (military) put trust in us to perform a mission like 

this really meant something. It shows all of our training has really paid off.”

AFRC AIDS BESLAN SCHOOL VICTIMS 

185 186
Sadr came unglued in October 2003 when 

his forces ambushed and set upon a unit 

from the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment 

in Sadr City, killing two American soldiers and wounding several. The Coalition Provisional Authority had had enough 

and decided to take direct action against 

al Sadr in March-April 2004. Al Sadr 

reacted by telling his militias to engage, 

and violence occurred in Sadr City and the 

Shia cities of An Najaf, Kufa, Al Kut, and 

Karbala. The situation really escalated on 

4 April when al Sadr’s militia attacked an 

American convoy in Sadr City, killing this 

time 7 and wounding 52 soldiers. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander Combined Joint Task Force-7, 

then took decisive action and put in motion Resolute Sword and Iron Sabre. Once 

again, the coalition forces drew upon attack helicopter and Air Force gunships to counter the Mahdi Army’s 

hit and run tactics. Al Sadr and the 

Mahdi Army went up against US, 

Spanish, Ukrainian, and Salvadoran 

troops at Karbala, and they faced 

British forces in May 2004 in Basra. 

But, al Sadr’s army was spent, and 

many regarded him and his men as 

too violent and aggressive. In June, al Sadr 

announced a cease-fire with the US as the 

Marines engaged in Fallujah and as the new 

interim Iraqi government began to assume 

sovereignty. It appeared al Sadr desired 

to transform his following into a political 

movement and make a bid for power. Polls 

to a few thousand 

armed fighters by 

April 2004. Mostly poor Shias, 

his supporters renamed the slums 

of Baghdad from “Saddam City” to “Sadr 

City” in his honor. Ferociously anti-sectarian 

and opposed to foreign occupation, he used 

weekly prayers to advocate rebellion and assassinations, such as the April 2003 murder 

of the pro-American and well-regarded cleric 

Abd Al-Majid al-Koei, hacked to death on the 

orders of al Sadr. The fragile truce with al 

No challenger to coalition authority was 

more visible than Muqtada al Sadr, a son 

of the notable Iraqi Shia, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al Sadr.82

The rise of Muqtada al Sadr, a radical anti-American cleric, also boded poorly for 

the formation of the national government 

in Iraq. Besides overt vocal attacks on 

the new government, he also countered 

the authority of the national government 

by forming militias, called the “Mahdi 

Army,” across the country.83 The US 

Army’s Counterinsurgency Field Manual noted that “In some areas of Iraq . . . 

militias established themselves as extragovernmental arbiters of the populace’s 

physical security—in some case, after 

first undermining that security.”84 Although al Sadr, and other ethnic, religious 

and political elements had a considerable 

role in subverting the national authority, 

sizeable numbers also chose the alternative governance he offered. It reasonably followed that when “government weakens and 

violence increases, people look for ways to 

protect themselves. If a government cannot 

provide protection, people may organize into 

armed militias to provide that essential service [as with] militias of various ethnic and 

political groups formed in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.”85

A previously unknown figure outside of Iraq, 

al Sadr called on supporters to form a movement amongst the Shia militias which grew 

On 20 November 2004, under the auspices of the Denton Amendment provisions, loadmasters from the 

349th Air Mobility Wing, Travis Air Force Base, California, loaded nearly two tons worth of text books from 

the University of California at Los Angeles and California State University Los Angeles on their aircraft 

bound for Iraq. Five days later, the 349th offloaded 

a pallet worth of educational supplies to colleges and 

high schools in Balad which supported the nascent 

civic education and Iraqi democratization. This effort 

constituted only two of at least 22 such missions performed by Air Force Reservists, delivering donated 

educational materials to theaters of the Global War on 

Terrorism through 2010.

DENTON ASSISTANCE - 

IRAQ

186
Additionally, the Air Force Reserve Command 

played a significant role by backfilling many 

continental United States active duty missions, 

allowing other elements of the Total Force to 

forward deploy. 

Air Force Reserve Command involvement in 

the Global War on Terrorism theaters of conflict ranged from flying attack missions to delivering humanitarian supplies. In the case of 

OEF-Trans Sahara, the thrust of the US mission was to defeat terrorism by building partner nation capacity and the capability to stem 

the illicit flow of arms, goods, and people. 

A logical fit for the Air Force Reserve Command were mission focus areas in airlift logistical support and aviation training as well as 

military information sharing; communications 

systems interoperability; joint, combined, and 

multinational exercise cooperation; countering 

extremist ideology; sustaining regional operations; and building upon mutual military professionalism and accountability.

Inevitably, marrying partner country military 

training, exercises, and operations with diplomatic objectives served the US national security’s interests in championing freedom around 

the world. Exercises that offered both a humanitarian purpose and training that improved 

local security conditions across the combatant 

commands served an equally important purpose in the Global War on Terrorism. To improve local security conditions, the Air Force 

Reserve Command participated in training and 

exercises to restrict terrorist groups and elimivilians.88 Touching remote locales the world 

over, the Global War on Terrorism was truly 

global in nature, and it was the United States’ 

foremost military endeavor of the new century. President Bush’s plan called for tripartite action—influence operations, security development, and warfare—to achieve tripartite 

results—develop democratic ideology, participate in democratic state building, and attack 

insurgency.89 Along with defending the US 

homeland (Noble Eagle), every post-9/11 Air 

Force Reserve Command contingency mission 

inevitably supported President Bush’s three 

national objectives: create a more peaceful, 

more democratic, and safer world.

As its name implied, the Global War on Terrorism was much larger in scope. Indeed, United 

States Central Command remained the largest theater of GWOT operations, and Iraq and 

Afghanistan garnered the most international 

attention for the US confrontation with terrorism. While Air Force Reservists engaged in 

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, they also supported anti-terrorist forces 

from Africa to Micronesia.90

The Global War on Terrorism comprised the 

thrust of the Air Force Reserve Command’s 

operational activity in the first decade of the 

21st century, Air Force Reservists continued to 

support military assistance training, exercises, 

and operational activity in every Air Force 

mission area in every theater of operations 

across the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, 

the Caribbean, North America, and elsewhere. 

had shown al Sadr as the second most popular 

political leader. In August, the Iraqi Government made an agreement with al Sadr to end 

the standoff with coalition forces in An Najaf. For the time being, Sadr worked to grow 

his following within Iraqi politics, principally 

within in a number of deputies and ministers 

he supported in the May 2005 Iraqi national 

elections. Paul Bremer would conclude that 

the al Sadr uprising showed the coalition 

forces were too few for the presence required 

and requested two more divisions (25,000 to 

45,000). It also confirmed the course to train 

up a new Iraqi military and police force for ensuring stability and security within Iraq.86

GLOBAL ANTITERRORISM

On 20 September 2001, President George W. 

Bush remarked: “There are thousands of these 

terrorists in more than 60 countries. They are 

recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics 

of terror. They are sent back to their homes or 

sent to hide in countries around the world to 

plot evil and destruction.”87

In the wake of 9/11, the Global War on Terrorism was a full-scale offensive designed by 

President George W. Bush to combat international terrorism. Cold War policy gave way 

to the 2002 National Security Strategy, which 

called for preemptive engagement of “failed” 

rogue states, terrorists, and their use of weapons of mass destruction to attack American ci1878
averted at least five terrorist attacks and resulted in the capture of dozens of suspected 

terrorists.97

The Air Force Reserve Command resources 

assisted as needed in the volatile region. At 

one point in 2006, on a weekly basis, as many 

as three different reserve units supported intertheater airlift requirements. The 913th 

Airlift Wing at Willow Grove, for example, 

provided C-130s to shuttle resources desperately needed across the rugged region due to 

the less developed infrastructure. Additionally, the military capabilities of the C-130 

also permitted the delivery of equipment to 

begin special humanitarian projects, such as 

water purification and advanced transportation technology. First Lieutenant Justin 

Botts, of the 913th, related his understanding 

of the task, “It’s all about planting the seeds 

of goodwill. Our missions are much more 

than carrying food and water. Humanitarian 

assistance operations deepen trust and cooperation between coalition forces and citizens 

in the region.” Captain Pat Stafy, another 

Air Force Reserve pilot, echoed Lieutenant 

Botts: “There’s no doubt we’re making a 

difference. We’re touching the lives of our 

own service members and thousands of Africans every day.”98

Meanwhile, US Naval forces began random 

checks on shipping through the Persian Gulf 

and supported increasing US operations in 

Iraq. In January 2007, the US Air Force 

launched airstrikes against al Qaida targets, 

Originally called the Pan Sahel Initiative in 

2001 and the Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership in 2005, Operation Enduring 

Freedom—Trans Sahara was a component of 

Operation Enduring Freedom—Horn of Africa. Operations sought to supplement the weak 

regional authorities and mitigate the dire circumstances that bred terrorism and instability 

within African nations. After the 9/11 attacks, 

these included Mali, Mauritania, Chad, and 

Niger, but by 2005, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Nigeria were also added. US intelligence revealed that terrorist activities in these 

countries were directly linked to al Qaeda.94

 

Essentially, these nations received US advisors and resources to equip six infantry regiments each in Mali, Mauritania, Chad, and 

Niger to beef up their domestic capability to 

discourage terrorist activity. In June 2005, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan explained prior 

to the launch of the introductory “Flintlock” 

exercise that the Trans Saharan initiative was 

“a little bit of Band-Aid approach” to the area 

where war, poverty, disease, corruption, and 

lack of education allow extremist views to permeate society. By developing civilian infrastructure including schools and hospitals, the 

US improved relations and living standards for 

allies in the region.95 However, she called the 

initiative “a step in the right direction,” especially given the “physical impossibility” of an 

overt US confrontation to terrorism all over the 

globe.96 Militarily, headway was still made. 

Intelligence garnered during operations there 

nate conditions conducive to their goals.

OEF-HORN OF AFRICA

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the United States negotiated with East African nations to establish 

a foothold in the vicinity of Somalia. Lacking a non-functional government since the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, Somalia had 

grown into a seedbed for terrorist and piratical 

activity.91 Supporting highly-visible attacks 

on US troops in Aden and Somalia in that 

time period, al Qaeda also maintained interests across the region, including a terrorist cell 

in Nairobi, Kenya, and bin Laden’s residence 

(1991-1996) in Khartoum, Sudan.92 With the 

US stated goal of “detecting, disrupting and defeating terrorists who pose an imminent threat 

to coalition partners in the region,” the mission 

of ensuring the safe passage of coalition forces 

into Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated direct 

confrontation of terrorist and insurgent activity in Africa. To meet this and other national 

objectives, the US established Combined Joint 

Task Force Horn of Africa in October 2002. 

Based at the former British base at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, the sphere of operations was 

extensive. Activity largely involved irregular 

US forces, including more than 2,000 coalition personnel, a 150-ship coalition naval task 

force, and use of an airfield in Djibouti.93 The 

efforts of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance specialists, military advisors, and 

others comprised the main effort through 2006 

with no open conflict between US forces and 

an apparent al Qaeda enemy.

188
“AFRC supports the president’s policy in 

the counter drug arena. The missions offer 

challenging flying, training and real world 

participation to the continued global war on 

terrorism.”103 Regarded as a success story, 

Colombia enjoyed a much improved security 

environment for its increased efforts to include 

mitigation of violence from narcoterrorism. As 

Colombian Ambassador to the United States, 

Gabriel Silva, related it was a matter of Colombia deciding to push back—on organized 

crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.104

AFGHANISTAN GOVERNANCE 

CHANGES

On 11 August 2003, North Atlantic Treaty Organization member nations officially took control of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. Functionally, this allowed a majority of 

Afghanistan’s provinces to fall under the direct 

military authority of other European nations.

Both the Bonn Agreement and the Afghan 

Constitution planned for free and fair elections as part of the rebuilding efforts. Originally, the presidential election was scheduled 

for summer 2004 with parliamentary elections 

to follow, but this slipped. In its first elections 

in over 40 years, Afghans voted on 9 October 

2004. However, it was not until 3 November 

that Hamid Karzai, a leading Pashtun statesman from the pre-Taliban Mujahadeen era, was 

officially declared President of the Republic of 

Afghanistan. He won with 55.4 percent of the 

vote facing a field of 17 candidates. Concern 

terests of minimizing the influence of radical 

Islamists on both nations. Traditionally, the US 

has offered subsidies and military assistance to 

Pakistan. More than simply a base of operations, by 9/11, Pakistan and its military intelligence service had provided much assistance. 

Their efforts to restrict the movement of terrorists transiting the Afghanistan/Pakistan border also proved critical to the initial successes 

of Operation Enduring Freedom. The ongoing 

humanitarian and logistical support of the US 

military services to include the Air Force Reserve Command helped to cultivate this essential relationship for winning the Global War on 

Terrorism in this region of the world.

COLOMBIA 

 

The Air Force Reserve Command also supported the Colombian counternarcotics and counterterrorism effort as US military presence increased in this region to assist the Colombian 

government. Training 600 members of a Colombian commando anti-insurgency response 

battalion and three anti-narcotics brigades paid 

dividends with a 60 percent increase in combat-ready counterinsurgency forces. Both the 

number of insurgent fighters and the attacks on 

the critical Canon-Limon oil pipeline (40 percent decrease through 2003) were consequently decreased. Congress approved additional 

support over the next years.102 

In 2005, Colonel Robert Swain, assistant director of operations at Headquarters AFRC, 

lauded the Air Force Reservists’ work there: 

followed by anti-piracy activities in June and 

October of that year. Airstrikes resumed in 

earnest by March 2008, and anti-piracy operations had commenced in force by the fall of 

2008.99

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, President 

Pervez Musharraf of the Islamic Republic of 

Pakistan was one of the first Middle Eastern 

leaders to come out vehemently opposed to 

the attacks in a show of solidarity against terrorism. He did so facing substantial popular 

dissent for his desire to upend the Taliban government of Afghanistan. Musharraf permitted 

American forces to both overfly and base support operations against al Qaeda in Operation 

Enduring Freedom from airports in his country.100 In the US, both Presidents Bush and 

Obama continued to walk a thin line between 

supporting the central authority of Pakistan 

and battling al Qaeda within it. At the height 

of Afghani Surge operations in March 2009, 

President Obama rebuffed concerns of détente 

emerging towards al Qaeda, “What is our purpose in Afghanistan? After so many years, 

why do our men and women still fight and 

die there?” His reply was simple: “We have a 

clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, 

and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”101

The United States had a long history of working the government of Pakistan in mutual in18990
On 8 October 2005, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck the northern Pakistan near the Kashmir, killing 73,338 people and rendering homeless almost a million more. The United States’ response was massive. By 17 October, Air Force C-17s, KC-10s, and C-130s had delivered 

more than 630,000 pounds of humanitarian relief, in the form of food, tents, cots, medical supplies, emergency medical workers, clothing, water, rations, building materials, construction equipment, vehicles, and cargo loading equipment. The Air Force-Air Force Reserve 

Command effort was tremendous—10 million pounds of relief supplies on 58 C-130s, 45 C-17s, and a number of other aircraft, including 

C-5s. 

Captain Christina Fiore, an Air Force Reserve C-5 pilot with the 326th Airlift Squadron at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, assured the 

delivery of military hardware to support the relief efforts by transporting two US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The helicopters travelled halfway around the world from Robert Gray Army Air Field, Texas. The helicopters held the capability to transport sizable amounts 

of people and equipment in emergency situations, including 24 litters for aeromedical evacuation missions. “Being a Reservist,” said 

Captain Fiore, one of five Air Force Reservists on the mixed crew, “We’re always ready to answer the call. It’s a real privilege to be part 

of something bigger.” 

Captain Andy Schwaderer, commander of a C-17 that including members of the Air Force Reserve Command’s 446th Airlift Wing from 

McChord Air Force Base, Washington, discussed the significance of his mission to send 50 tons of relief supplies to the disaster-stricken 

area. With members of his crew just reporting into US Central Command that month to begin an AEF Enduring Freedom rotation, some 

crew members had just seen action serving the victims of Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi and Louisiana. “It feels pretty gratifying. We 

know that what we’re doing here today is really going to benefit those in need.” Major James Jamir, an Air Force Reserve instructor pilot 

with the unit echoed the significance of the mission to strengthening US-Pakistani relations. “What we are doing here in Pakistan is just 

another example of how great the United States is. We’re building strong relationships and making history, but most importantly we’re 

saving lives.”

EARTHQUAKE RELIEF – PAKISTAN 2005

190
About an hour and forty minutes after the goatherds disappeared, the SEALs had taken up a 

defensive position on a mountain wall some 

forty yards from the summit. Suddenly, Lieutenant Murphy gave the alert signal and was 

looking straight up the slope. Corpsman Luttrell looked in the same direction and observed 

on the summit a force of between 80 and 100 

Taliban warriors armed with AK-47s, some 

with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).111

The ensuing firefight lasted about an hour and 

a half with the SEALs in a tumbling withdrawal down the mountain, landing in a number of 

defensive positions. Near the end of the action, with Dietz killed and Axelson suffering 

from a severe head wound, “Lieutenant Murphy repeatedly attempted to call for assistance 

for his beleaguered teammates. Realizing the 

impossibility of communicating in the extreme 

terrain, and in the face of almost certain death, 

he fought his way into open terrain to gain a 

better position to transmit a call. This deliberate, heroic act deprived him of cover, exposing him to direct enemy fire. Finally achieving 

contact with his headquarters, Lieutenant Murphy maintained his exposed position while he 

provided his location and requested immediate 

support for his team.”112 A few minutes later 

the lieutenant was shot once more in the back 

and died of his wounds.113

 Meanwhile, the dying Axelson and Luttrell 

had taken cover in a hollow in the mountain 

wall when one of the Taliban fired an RPG into 

their position. Axelson was probably killed by 

them in order to replace them with a government and military of their own. They had 

successfully executed a number of bombings, 

killing and injuring US Marines.107 After 

months of trying to pin down his location and 

two false starts, by 27 June 2005, the mission 

to move on Ahmad Shah was “a go.”108

By early morning 28 June, a four-man US 

Navy special reconnaissance SEAL team, 

composed of Navy Lieutenant Michael Murphy (commanding officer), Gunner’s Mate 

Second Class Danny Dietz (sniper), Sonar 

Technician Second Class Matthew Axelson 

(sniper), and Hospital Corpsman Second Class 

Marcus Luttrell (medic), was deep behind enemy lines east of Asadabad, Afghanistan. Operation Red Wings was in progress.109

A couple hours after daylight, the team got 

themselves into a perfect position for scoping 

the village where intelligence had indicated 

Amad Shah was hiding. Corpsman Luttrell 

had taken a position under a felled tree and 

was observing the village through binoculars 

when he heard the sound of soft footsteps. Unexpectedly, a man wearing a turban and carrying an ax jumped off the log and right over 

Luttrell. The SEALs jumped to their feet and 

trained their rifles on him. He turned out to 

be one of three local goatherds with about 100 

goats. The goats all had tiny bells around their 

necks, potentially compromising Red Wings’ 

security. After some discussion, Lieutenant 

Murphy determined to let the prisoners and 

goats go free.110

for election-day violence by Taliban and al Qaeda forces did not deter a high turnout, some 

75 percent of eligible voters. The 100,000 

Afghan and coalition forces surged to provide 

security at polling centers across Afghanistan. 

That President Karzai had won was generally 

viewed as boding well for Afghanistan and its 

stabilization. And on 18 September 2005, Afghanistan held parliamentary and provincial 

council elections. Security had improved to 

the point that 1 in 2 citizens of Afghanistan 

turned out to cast their ballots. Signaling a 

striking success against the paternalistic ideology of the Taliban, a large proportion of the 

electorate were women, and they accordingly 

won 28 percent of the 249 parliamentary seats. 

Inauguration of the Afghan National Assembly occurred on 19 December 2005.105

OPERATION RED WINGS

In Afghanistan, during the early months of 

2005, Taliban and al Qaeda warriors were 

planning a comeback in the western end of 

the mountain range known as the Hindu Kush. 

This was the same area where Osama bin Laden’s fanatical followers trained and planned 

the events of 11 September 2001. One such 

bin Laden ally was Ahmad Shah, also known 

as Mullah Ismail. He was a key leader of militants in the region.106 Commanding possibly 140 to 150 armed fighters, Shah was well 

educated, trained in military tactics, and could 

speak five languages. He and his forces were 

bent on destroying the elected government of 

Afghanistan and the US forces that supported 

1921
pickup, utilizing their HH-60 Pave Hawk

rescue helicopters. As the mission commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey “Skinny” McCrander piloted the lead helicopter 

with Major John Phalon his copilot. Major Jeff “Spanky” Peterson was the pilot 

of the number two bird with Lieutenant 

Dave J. Gonzales as the copilot. Jason 

Burger and Mike Cusick were the 

flight engineers; Josh Donnelly and 

Ben Peterson performed as aerial 

gunners. The PJs were John Davis, 

Brett Konczal, Josh Apel, and Chris 

Pierchicci.117

The rescue operation was set for 3 

July. From Jalalabad, the two HH60s flew in the dark of night carefully navigating the canyons as they 

made their way up the mountains. 

All the radio chatter gave way to a 

last-minute re-direction; forward 

controllers relayed updated coordinates for the landing zone, changing 

it nearly two kilometers within three 

minutes of touchdown. The supporting Army helicopters and Air Force 

AC-130 and A-10s laid down fire as 

a diversion to cover the rotor noise from 

the rescue helicopter’s approach. On the 

ground were Army special forces. The display of American air power was spectacular; bomb blasts, gunfire, and prop wash 

cracked walls and sent thatch roofs flying. 

The extreme altitude caused the helicopters to ditch fuel to remain airborne. Low 

dition of hospitality and protection known as 

Lokhay. With Taliban forces scouring Sarawa’s village, Marcus Luttrell relayed a message carried by the village elder to a Marine 

firebase. The note said in part, that the man 

had given Luttrell food and protection and 

should be helped.116

Members from the 305th Rescue Squadron, 

Air Force Reserve Command, had been deployed to Afghanistan on a rotation from 

April to July with its sister squadron, the 301st 

Rescue Squadron, just rotating in for a tour. 

When the village elder’s message was confirmed, special operations personnel turned to 

these Air Force Reservists for the challenging 

the blast, and Luttrell was blown out of the 

hollow and down a ravine where he landed 

upside down in a hole. His legs were riddled 

with shrapnel and his nose was broken; he further assessed that his shoulder and back might 

be broken as well from the retrograde action. 

Miraculously, Luttrell had not been wounded 

by any of the bullets fired at him that day.114

Receiving Lieutenant Murphy’s call, Lieutenant Commander Eric Kristensen, acting 

commander of the SEALs in 

Asadabad, ordered an MH-47 

helicopter and quick reaction 

force—QRF—into action. The 

force consisted of Kristensen, 

seven other SEALs, and eight 

soldiers from the Army’s 160th 

Special Operations Aviation 

Regiment, the fabled Night 

Stalkers. The helicopter arrived at the designated position 

that the rescue team planned 

to rope down to. As the stern 

ramp lowered, Taliban fighters 

launched an RPG which, by 

chance, exploded inside, destroying the helicopter and killing all 16 service members aboard. It was the largest single 

loss for the US SEALs/Navy Special Warfare 

since World War II.115

Staggering, wounded, and hunted, Luttrell 

evaded capture until a man named Sarawa located Marcus and protected him under a tra

192
learned he had landed less than two feet from 

the cliff. Army special forces greeted them. 

PJs Master Sergeant Joshua Appel and Staff 

Sergeant Chris Piercecchi assisted Luttrell and 

the man that had protected him into the helicopter. With the SEAL safely on board, the 

Air Force Reserve Command combat search 

and rescue team returned to Asadabad, where a 

C-130 transport flew US Navy SEAL Marcus 

Luttrell on to the hospital at Bagram Air Base. 

Mission accomplished!118

 

Planning had already begun on the recovery 

of the bodies of the remaining SEALs. The 

mission fell to the AFRC HH-60s due to the 

rugged recovery conditions, requiring a hover 

procedure. The crews made the helicopters 

light to facilitate the operation. On 4 July, two 

of the SEALs were recovered with the operation completed on 10 July.119 This was a call 

to service of the extraordinary that combat 

search and rescue personnel perform expertly. 

By every measure, the forces of Ahmad Shah 

prevailed in the summer of 2005, but Shah’s 

success would not last long. The Marines 

and nascent Afghanistan forces—Task Force 

KOA—launched Operation Whalers in August 2005 as part of the larger Operation Red 

Wings II to take on anti-coalition militias within the Kumar province prior to the upcoming 

elections. In rugged mountainous terrain at 

some 8,000 feet, they fought Shah’s forces in 

a fight that lasted over 72 hours. Their ammo 

resupply came by C-130 containerized drops. 

In the end, the Shah’s forces had suffered a 

fire. Following Macrander in, Major Peterson landed his HH-60 on a terrace cut into the 

steep mountain in total darkness. The growing 

dust cloud obscured visibility, causing a brown 

out. Peterson’s gunner and engineer called out 

his position, providing guidance. Peterson 

cloud cover obscured the landing zone, while 

high cloud cover obscured the ambient starlight. A break in the clouds allowed the A-10 

to shine on the landing. Lieutenant Colonel 

Macrander marked the landing zone, a shelf 

abutting a cliff, and was prepared for enemy 

In October 2004, the 706th Fighter Squadron deployed to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan with 

the active-duty 81st Fighter Squadron, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spandgdahlem Air Base, Germany. 

“The reservist and active-duty mix here has well exceeded my expectations,” said a Lieutenant 

Colonel John, 81st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, commander deployed from Spangdahlem. 

“Once we all got here, we went straight to work. Here we support a lot of customers at the table, 

working mostly with the Army, escorting convoys and providing Afghan presidential escort, and 

defending the troops as needed.” “I am extremely impressed with the way the two squadrons 

have melded in both operations and maintenance,” said Colonel Ozzie, 81st Expeditionary Fighter 

Squadron, deputy operations officer and from New Orleans-based Air Force Reserve Command 

unit, 706th. “It is impossible to tell which unit a person is from unless you ask them. 

 The 303rd Fighter Squadron from the 442nd Fighter Wing returned to Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan during the months of May through September 2006, in another joint effort with the 

active-duty’s 81st Fighter Squadron. As a single team, they would support Operations Mountain 

Lion, Mountain Thrust, and Medusa, protecting US, NATO, and Afghan forces on the ground in 

the fight against extremists in Afghanistan. This rotation, Colonel Keith McBride, commanded 

the 81st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron and also the 81st at home station. He remarked: “I 

relied heavily on the Reservists’ experience to help my younger pilots gain combat experience.” 

Melding into one team, the units put their two numbers together and began to wear a 384th EFS 

patch. “It doesn’t really matter if you’re an active-duty guy or a Reserve guy,” said Colonel Tony 

Johnson, the 455th Expeditionary Operations Group commander at Bagram and an Air Force 

Reservist from the 442nd. “An A-10 pilot is an A-10 pilot no matter where you go.” It’s the level 

of training that gets the job done. “It’s amazing how the training we do back home has been 

validated by the execution of the mission here,” remarked Captain Rick Mitchell, a pilot from the 

442nd. “Our training back home is so intense that it really serves us well here.” Colonel Johnson 

added: “There have been numerous occasions where our troops have been taking heavy fire and 

we show up and either our presence ends the engagement or we employ against enemy positions 

and end the engagement.”

AFRC A-10’s RETURN – TOTAL TEAM 

AFGHANISTAN

1934
expenditure – the Canadians were sweeping a several square mile area near Kandahar City and ran into a lot more resistance 

than they expected. All of these locations 

were 300+ miles from Bagram and made for 

some long sorties, and this contributed to 

tain Lion, 

Mountain 

Thrust, and 

M e d u s a 

would coll e c t i v e l y 

b e c o m e 

known as 

the largest 

c o a l i t i o n 

offensive 

since the 

n a t i o n ’ s 

liberation 

in 2001. 

The massive force 

relied on 

airpower, 

and AFRC 

C - 1 3 0 s 

and A-10s 

were there 

to assist as 

well.122

 

Air Force 

R e s e r v e 

A-10 pilot 

John Marks 

was flying 

combat missions during this time and recalled 

supporting the British in the towns of Sangin, 

Kajaki, Musa Qalaeh, and Nowzad. He was 

part of “A very intense week of activity near 

Kandahar which resulted in a lot of weapons 

substantial loss of 44 killed.120 And in April 

2008, Pakistani security forces reported that 

they had killed an insurgent, Ahmad Shad, attempting to run the Khyber Pass border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Shah 

died in a shoot out trying to cross the Afghan 

border with a kidnapped trader. Considered a 

“full-scale blow” to the Taliban insurgency, 

morale amongst his Kunar province fighters 

fell with the man Osama bin Laden himself 

had revered.121

MOUNTAIN LION - MOUNTAIN 

THRUST - MEDUSA

In 2006, the security environment in Afghanistan continued its downward slide from its high 

during the liberation of November 2001. One 

observer calculated that suicide attacks alone 

increased 4,000 percent during the fall of 2005, 

indicating yet another deadly change in Taliban tactics. Such attacks had an effect on reconstruction. In the south and east, Afghan Finance Minister Anwarul-Haq Ahady indicated 

that reconstruction had deadlocked in the rugged southern and eastern provinces—a school, 

a clinic or a bridge were no more than built and 

the Taliban would come and burn and tear them 

down. To counter this trend, ten thousand coalition forces under the command of Canadian, 

British, and American (mainly 10th Mountain 

Division and 3rd Marine Regiment) forces and 

their Afghan military allies made a stand in the 

country’s south and east, a vast area surrounding Kandahar and stretching all the way to the 

border region of Pakistan. Operations MounMOUNTAIN LION (11 April – May 2006) Afghan National Army [ANA] and 

coalition forces initiated mission into the Korengal and Pech River Valley’s of 

the Kunar Province in northeastern Afghanistan to rid safe havens from the 

terrorists. 

MOUNTAIN THRUST (15 June – 31 July 2006) Approximately, 11,000 coalition troops commenced. It was the largest offensive operation against the 

Taliban, since 2001 and had an objective to weaken the Taliban insurgency in 

the southern portion of the country. US, British, Canadian, and Afghan troops 

concentrated operations against southern Uruzgan and northern Helmand provinces. Besides destroying the Taliban insurgents, Mountain Thrust assisted the 

Afghan government forces, government institutions, and humanitarian organizations in beginning to function in these provinces. The al Qaeda-backed 

Taliban forces suffered over 1,000 killed and nearly 4,000 captured. As in the 

past, the insurgents withdrew to fight again.

MEDUSA (2 – 17 September 2006) A Canadian-led offensive into the Kandahar Province involved North Atlantic Treaty Organization and International 

Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) that would eliminate Taliban tunnel systems, 

arms caches, and bomb making equipment. Operations began on 2 September 

with Harrier jets, US Air Force and Royal Netherlands F-16 Falcons, and US 

Air Force B-1 bombers providing air power as the ground forces engaged. US 

Navy F-18 Super Hornets supported Medusa from the USS Abraham Lincoln. 

While initially NATO officials believed Medusa met its objective of assisting 

the government to gain control over rural areas of Kandahar Province and enabling the reconstruction of roadways and infrastructure, the Taliban insurgents 

had returned to the Kandahar Province by late October, renewing the fighting.

LION – THRUST - MEDUSA 

194
Initially, during GWOT, as the Air War College MA, mobilization assistant, I worked those duties and then volunteered to run the HQ Air Force Special 

Operations Command’s crisis action team, CAT, on weekends and holidays. I was in the seat the night of the initial raids into Afghanistan. 

Before the onset of the Iraq invasion, the actives put out a call for reservists and ANG types to serve on high-level staffs. I ended up at Ninth Air Force, 

Shaw AFB, South Carolina, and over a five-month period served initially as special assistant to Ninth Air Force Commander Lieutenant General T. 

Michael Moseley, then as vice commander Ninth Air Force (Provisional), and lastly as commander of Ninth Air Force (Provisional). We kept the HQ 

Ninth Air Force staff working and all the stateside units supporting the war in the AOR. Serving in these positions was probably the highest amount 

of responsibility I ever held in my entire military career. Brigadier General Allen Peck, the new Ninth Air Force vice commander who replaced Major 

General Robert Elder asked me to stay longer as the provisional vice commander. This was one of the greatest compliments of my military experience.

On my return home, and as the Air Force Special Operations Command began to suffer combat and accident losses in the AOR, it needed SOF experienced GOs to serve as Class A accident/safety board presidents. Brigadier General Michael Wilson, then the Twenty-Third Air Force MA, and I attended the safety course at Kirtland and were soon put to work. Mike did a number of MH-53 Pave Low and MC-130 Shadow/Talon crashes in the AOR 

since he had more availability as a civilian airline pilot. He and I worked separate boards on the 2005 MC-130H Talon II crash in Albania. 

After I briefed Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper on the Albania MC-130H crash, the Air Force Special Operations Command leadership 

asked me (based on my light plane experience) to serve as president of the accident investigation on the Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7 SL crash in Iraq. 

It was not a ‘real’ USAF investigation since it was not a USAF plane. But, it was set up as an advisory effort to show the Iraqi Air Force how to do 

a proper investigation. We had Iraqi Air Force members on the team, and we showed them how to do the job. Subsequently, I was asked to teach the 

Safety/Accident Board President’s course on how to conduct an investigation.

After briefing General Moseley on the Comp Air crash, the Central Command Air Forces commander asked me, via Brigadier General Frank Padilla, to 

put together a team of experts at Hurlburt Field, Florida, to do an Iraqi Air Force comparative aircraft study of aircraft that would be useful in counter 

insurgency (COIN). We sequestered a team of active/reserve/ANG/civilians at the Hurlburt base operations and researched and wrote the “Comparative Aircraft Study for the Iraq Air Force Counter Insurgency Air Operations,” 10 December 2005. It covered ISR, battlefield mobility, light strike, 

medical evac, airlift, air resupply, sensor systems, etc, and gave the Iraqis an idea of the systems available and their cost logistics, training needs, and 

so forth. A team of two actives and two reservists took the report to Iraq, briefed the CENTAF/CC, and then briefed the senior leaders of the Iraqi Air 

Force. Later, the Iraqis bought many of the platforms we suggested—Cessna Caravan, and the Mi-17.

I could have not done any of the above without the total support of family and civilian supervisors.

Major General Clay T. McCutchan, Mobilization Assistant, May 2011 

HONORED TO SERVE

195 196
In the spring of 2004, insurgents frequently fired on the Kirkuk Air Base, Iraq; their weapons of choice were the 107mm, 120mm, and 122mm rockets. “We had gotten somewhat 

complacent about the rocket attacks because there were so many of them, and they were largely ineffective. The insurgents could hit the base but were lucky to cause any real damage,” 

explained Major James “Mike” M. Larkin, a traditional reserve member of the Air Force Reserve Command’s 482nd Security Force Squadron at Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, 

who was deployed as the Defense Force Commander for the 506th Expeditionary Security Forces Group from March 2004 through July 2004. Explosive ordinance personnel on 

Kirkuk Air Base were stretched thin, as the base was the northern storage site for recovered Iraqi munitions awaiting destruction. There was no lack of unexploded Iraqi ordinance 

scattered around northern Iraq. Larkin related: “There were all kinds of munitions piled on a number of cement pads--estimates ranged from between 1.5 to 2.5 million pounds net 

explosive weight munitions were stored in the bomb dump in early July. Putting those numbers into perspective, a 500-pound bomb contains only about 192 pounds of net explosive.”

When the 107 mm rocket landed inside the base perimeter on 2 July 2004, a routine base-wide “Alarm Red” was initiated. But, the rocket started a grass fire in the bomb-dump close 

to the munitions laden storage pads. “We didn’t think much of it until we saw the fire. The grass was about four feet tall and bone dry; the winds were blowing at about twenty knots 

towards the pads. I knew what was going to happen when the fire reached the munitions.” Major Larkin’s perspective was more than just common sense; he had 13 years of munitions, 

armament, and bomb dump experience as an enlisted member of the Navy and the Air Force.

 

The fire spread quickly. The fire department responded but chose not to directly attack the fire, due to the danger created by the unstable munitions. Instead, they began a controlled 

burn to protect the petroleum, oil, and lubricant storage area. Larkin contacted the command post to suggest an evacuation of the affected portions of the base and learned that the base 

commander and the group commander were stuck off base in the throng of Iraqis that had gathered to watch the fire. 

Concerned about the safety of approximately 5,000 military and civilian personnel, Major Larkin ordered an evacuation of all affected areas except the Base Defense Operations Center 

(BDOC). Although the center was adjacent to the bomb dump, and well within the explosive danger area, Larkin determined that they would stay put. “I thought about evacuating, but 

we were the only ones who had the capability of keeping eyes on the fire and the perimeter through the thermal-imaging camera. Even though we were in a hardened bunker, I made 

sure that all of the doors were propped open so that we would not be trapped if the explosions weakened the bunker or if toxic smoke from the fire engulfed us.” 

With the first explosions, off-duty security forces started reporting to the BDOC for assignment. “They showed up in whatever they happened to be wearing when the Alarm Red 

was sounded: civilian clothes, flak jackets and helmets; some guys even showed up in T-shirts, shorts and tennis shoes. We issued weapons and ammo and sent everyone out as fast 

as they came in. I knew that the explosions were going to be bigger than any I had ever seen. We still could not be sure that the fire was not being used to penetrate the perimeter and 

gain access to the base.” 

The base defensive line was moved outside the wire to about 1,500 feet away from the bomb dump. The base was rocked by a series of massive explosions that began about one hour 

after the onset of the fire. Thinking that the base was under attack, some of the evacuees froze in place and had to be carried to safety by security forces personnel. 

Army soldiers augmented the security forces personnel who were defending the air base perimeter. The explosions eventually slowed but continued throughout the night and into the 

next morning. The fire burned for another twenty-four hours and did not extinguish itself until it reached the fire department’s containment area. The next morning, bowling-ball sized 

debris were found 1,500 meters away from the bomb-dump.

“I was so proud of the security forces at Kirkuk Air Base. Given everything that was going on, they performed flawlessly, and no one got hurt. They executed the evacuations under 

extremely dangerous conditions while at the same time ensuring that the base was defended. Everyone pitched in; even non-security forces personnel helped with the evacuation. With 

so much at stake, those men definitely saved lives that night,” Lieutenant Colonel Larkin recalled some years later.

Interview, Lieutenant Colonel James M. Larkin with Lieutenant Colonel Teresa M. Riley, 2009

RESERVE COMMANDER AVERTS DISASTER

196
to the Air Force Reserve Command. The third 

aircraft had been assigned to the Air National 

Guard. The arrival of the three aircraft was the 

beginning of the Iraqi Air Force airlift mission and the establishment of Iraqi Squadron 

23.128 The initial mission of Squadron 23 was 

transporting Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. After 

assuming authority, Allawi traveled frequently 

in his effort to unify the government and garner support for the upcoming elections. Due 

to the insurgent threat, Allawi was forced to 

travel by air, and the Iraqi Air Force did not 

possess passenger aircraft. Traveling in US 

marked aircraft was problematic for the prime 

minister and stood in marked contrast to his 

proclamations of an independent Iraq. With 

national elections less than 90 days away, the 

task of preparing crews to fly C-130Es became 

a priority for the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).

Training of the C-130E crews was implemented by a fifty-man team of operators and maintainers lead by Air Force Reserve Command’s 

Colonel Abel Barrientes. Colonel Barrientes, appointed as a senior US advisor in Iraq, 

shouldered the responsibility of the C-130E 

training mission while having to overcome insurgent threats, severe language barriers, cultural gaps, and political realities. In addition 

to these challenges, Colonel Barrientes led in 

breaking down old ways of thinking about airlift, maintenance, and base management. “To 

have them run a base without a whole lot of 

guidance from above is a big deal,” said Colonel Barrientes. “They’ve had to think outside 

TRAINING IRAQI AIR FORCE

On 23 May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) issued Authority Order 

Number 2, which disbanded Iraqi military organizations and infrastructure.126 The CPA 

handed sovereignty to the new Iraqi Interim 

Government on 29 June 2004. By October 

2004, the Iraqi Interim Government and the 

US Central Command had identified a set of 

significant primary goals and mission requirements that focused on the need for a new Iraqi 

Air Force. Plans for a strong and independent 

Iraq required the Iraqi Air Force to effectively 

support a broad spectrum of air operations that 

could address military requirements for meeting the challenges of the insurgency. An additional consideration for the immediate development of the Iraqi Air Force was the need to 

support the Iraqi Army, which had already taken significant steps toward full operational capability.127 With national and provincial elections only a few months away, Prime Minister 

Iyad Allawi frequently traveled throughout the 

country convincing provincial leaders and the 

public to support the upcoming elections. The 

desire for the prime minister to be seen utilizing an Iraqi marked aircraft was viewed as an 

important part of projecting a legitimate government. 

In January 2005, the United States government provided three C-130Es to the Iraqi Air 

Force through the excess defense articles program. Two of the three airplanes, tail numbers 

62-1826 and 62-1839, had formerly belonged 

the A-10’s being eventually moved in 2009 to 

Kandahar, where they would be closer to most 

of the fighting.”123

SECOND BATTLE OF FALLUJAH

Meanwhile in Iraq, in November 2004, the 

coalition signaled a fundamental shift in domestic security strategy for Iraq and launched 

an all-out attack on insurgents in the Second 

Battle of Fallujah. The same Sunni uprising 

that resulted in the lynching of the four Blackwater security contractors in Al Anbar Province in March 2004 now spread across the city 

of Fallujah.124 The US Air Force responded with devastating firepower, including 15 

GBU-12 500-pound guided bombs and four 

2,000 pound JDAM penetrator bombs, and 

an AC-130 Spectre gunship. Although results 

were mixed, it evidenced a departure from a 

previous limited scope of operations. The US 

declared tactical victory on 17 September, but 

years of insurgency would follow.125

In the midst of this escalation, on 25 January 

2005, the Iraqi National Assembly elections 

were held for the first time. US leaders hailed 

the event as a new era in Iraqi history and a 

major step towards domestic governance. The 

National Assembly selected Iyad Allawi as 

interim Prime Minister to head up the task of 

drafting a permanent constitution. However, 

as the insurgency soon revealed, Iraq’s sovereignty would be impracticable without security to accompany it. 

1978
Force Reserve Command casualties due to 

their Air Force Academy commission status. 

All five crewmembers were interred in Arlington National Cemetery as a demonstration of the commitment to the partnership 

and the determination to rebuild the Iraqi Air 

Force.133 This tragedy served to strengthen 

the resolve of those involved with establishing a viable Iraqi Air Force. 

On 20 July 2005, the US Central Command 

Air Forces issued the Iraqi Air Force Capability and Requirement Plan. The defense 

tasks contained in the plan formed the basis 

for Iraqi aircraft requirements and missions. 

The plan placed an emphasis on the ability to provide 

b a t t l e f i e l d 

and tactical mobility 

for ground 

troops. The 

Coalition Air 

Force Transition Team 

(CAFTT) was 

formally established in 

November of 

2005 as part 

of a reorganization of MNSTC-I. The establishment of the CAFTT was, in part, due to 

the outcomes outlined in the Capability and 

Requirement Plan. The status of the Iraqi 

Air Force posed a unique set of challenges 

for the CAFTT. The 40 aircraft in the Iraq 

tering threats to national security.131 

As a strategy for internal defense, the Iraqi 

Air Force training program was designed to 

develop and sustain the air power of the Iraqi 

government by building partnerships with outside military organizations.132

That partnership was challenged in May 

2005 when four 

US Air Force 

airmen and one 

member of the 

Iraqi Air Force 

were killed during a 

training mission when 

an Iraqi Air Force 

Comp Air 7SL aircraft crashed in Northern Iraq. Air Force 

Reservist Brigadier 

General Clay T. McCutchan was asked to 

serve as president of the accident investigation 

as an advisory effort to instruct Iraqi officials 

on how to conduct a proper accident investigation. Among the fatalities in the crash were 

Captains Jeremy J. Fresques and Derek M. 

Argel. Both were officially recorded as Air 

the box, which is something they’ve never 

had to do. Their thinking was always done for 

them.”129

The MNSTC-I implemented the Iraqi flight 

training program on 14 January 2005. The initial Advisor Support Team (AST) consisted of 

35 operations and maintenance instructors.130

These personnel worked alongside Iraqi Air 

Force personnel in flying squadrons at Basra, 

Kirkuk, and Baghdad. The first group of service pilots flew CH-2000 Seeker aircraft from 

Basra on security and pipeline reconnaissance 

missions. However, other required missions 

included VIP transport, reconnaissance on the 

electricity infrastructure, major communication routes and nodes, land borders, offshore 

platforms, search and rescue, and patrolling 

Iraq territorial waters. Additional requirements for troop transport, freight, and equipment airlift were considered essential to coun

198
posed to minimal levels of English provided 

exclusively by trainers and instructors.137

The CAFTT overcame these challenges, and 

the training program was handed over to the 

Iraqi Air Force. 

On 7 March 2006, The New Al Muthana Air 

Base, Baghdad, opened as the first Iraqi Air 

Force stand-alone facility. Air Force Reserve 

Command’s Colonel Richard S. Haddad led a 

team of advisors in creating the new air force 

base from the ground up. Sustainment funding was initially provided by MNSTC-I and 

included donated aircraft from the US, former 

Soviet, and commercial sources.138 However, the leadership of Colonel Haddad resulted 

in close coordination of Iraqi officials and 

getting other bases involved such as nearby 

Sather Air Base, which represented a new and 

important relationship between the MNSTC-I, 

US Air Force, and the IAF. This relationship 

to meet Iraq’s strategic needs in a dynamic 

austere environment. The Air Force Reserve 

Command played a significant role in developing the programs, facilities, and leadership 

necessary for meeting those strategic needs. 

 

The training of maintainers posed another set 

of challenges for the CAFTT. The US Air 

Force maintenance practice of reading and following steps in a technical order (TO) meant 

that Iraqi trainees had to read English-only 

TOs. This was a sharp departure from the previous practice of memorizing various steps for 

maintenance procedures without referencing 

aircraft manuals. Literacy skills necessary for 

referencing TOs were very different from the 

education received by most Iraqi maintainers. Maintenance trainees normally received 

a primary education that stressed rote memorization that was part of Arab culture. Because 

training occurred in Iraq, trainees were exinventory consisted of six different air frames 

including the three C-130Es. Several aircraft 

were grounded due to safety concerns or maintenance issues, and flying hours were restricted 

due to lack of pilot training. This set of challenges was typical of those faced by CAFTT 

senior advisors.134

The establishment of the CAFTT occurred 

after the decision was made to accomplish a 

complete De-Baathification of the Iraqi government and to disband the Iraqi military. 

According to Air Force Reserve Command’s 

Brigadier General Frank J. Padilla, who served 

as the first CAFTT commanding general, DeBaathification and the focus on re-establishing 

Iraqi ground units had placed the Iraqi Air 

Force about one-and-a-half years behind the 

Iraqi Army in terms of organizational development. The remaining pilots of the disbanded 

Iraqi Air Force had not flown since 1991. This 

made the operations to build and train a new 

air force capable of battlefield mobility a complex undertaking.135 

On 10 December 2005, a comparative aircraft 

study organized by Air Force Reserve Brigadier General Clay T. McCutchan outlined specific goals and capabilities for the new Iraqi 

Air Force. Also serving on the study team was 

Air Force Reservist Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert 

Williams.136 Using the comparative aircraft 

study as a foundation, US Air Force leaders, 

advisors, and trainers worked toward building an efficient and effective Iraqi Air Force 

with a versatility and responsiveness designed 

The last C-141 Operation Iraqi Freedom mission occurred on 26 September 2005. Members from 

the 89th Airlift Squadron, 445th Airlift Wing at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, loaded 

eight pallets of sustainment war materiel and a jet engine at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. 

The crew of C-141C Starlifter then performed a channel delivery of the supplies from Dover to 

Ramstein on the second leg of the mission. At Ramstein, the Starlifter with the tail number of 66-

0132 picked up four aeromedical and critical care air transport teams and delivered them to Balad 

Air Base in Iraq. On the return flight, the Starlifter carried 22 patients to Ramstein and another 18 

patients went on to Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland. On 1 October, the aircraft arrived home 

to Wright-Patterson. The C-141 Starlifter would fly its last missions in 2006. It had begun its 

service life during the Vietnam War and ended it with war service to the Global War on Terrorism.

LAST C-141 OIF MISSION

199 200
During the summer of 2005, Air Force Reserve Command resources were stretched thin because of ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan on the other side of the 

world. Nevertheless, between 23 August and 4 November 2005, the Air Force Reserve Command responded to one of the most devastating natural disasters in United States history.

Initially, the 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, 403rd Wing began to chart the course and tenacity of the Hurricanes Katrina, Ophelia, Rita, and Wilma. The squadron’s WC130J Hercules aircraft flew 59 sorties into the eye of the storms to gather important meteorological data on their course and severity. The 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron 

“Hurricane Hunters” were stationed at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi.

Within 24 hours after Katrina made landfall, the Air Force Reserve Command had 18 crews and 23 aircraft available for hurricane relief. The 920th Rescue Wing, Patrick AFB, 

Florida, was ready to fly rescue missions as soon as the winds died down and had rescued 654 people by 1 September.

By 2 September, according to Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, Commander Air Force Reserve Command, the command’s aeromedical units were flying more than 60 percent 

of the medical evacuation missions, saving lives in the United States just as they had been doing around the world. Moreover, many had just returned from tours in the AOR. These 

were the same men and women who had not lost one life in flight since the beginning of hostilities in Iraq. By the end of the first week of September, they had moved more than 

2,600 patients. Air Force Reserve Command mobility airlift forces were also a major contributor.

During the course of the 2005 season, over 1,468 Air Force Reservists deployed in response to the four hurricanes, assisting in humanitarian rescue and recovery efforts. Air Force 

Reservists flew a total of 89 sorties, resulting in 1,044 lives saved. Cargo planes and tankers flew 457 sorties, ferrying 5,414 passengers to safety, and transporting over 3,321.5 tons 

of supplies. In Louisiana and Texas, to control disease aerial spray aircraft dispensed 14,313 gallons of the insecticide Dibrom, covering over 2.8 million acres. Lieutenant General 

Bradley expressed his pride in the Air Force Reserve Command’s performance, and singled out rescue, airlift, and aeromedical accomplishments as particularly noteworthy. He 

urged the Command to “help as much as we can for as long as we can.”

In an October 2005 Citizen Airman article addressed to Air Force Reserve Command personnel, General Bradley summed up their response to the disasters: “Upon entering the 

military, we all took an oath. That oath includes a statement about supporting and defending the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Nature quickly became a 

domestic enemy. So when you stepped forward and raised your hand, you assumed this awesome responsibility and joined the ranks of citizens who are asked to protect the lives 

of thousands of people. I am exceedingly proud to tell our national leaders about your significant accomplishments and that you are well and faithfully discharging your duties 

beyond the call.”

The 908th Airlift Wing, Maxwell Air Force Base was one of the units that sent Air Force Reservists fresh from Operation Iraqi Freedom directly to hurricane ravaged areas. Some 

had even sent emails ahead expressing their readiness to help in the hurricane-support missions. “Something you see particularly in the Guard and Reserve is that they should 

have a chapter of ‘overachievers anonymous,’” said Major Jerry W. Lobb, Chief, 908th Public Affairs officer. “They’re very active across the gamut of what they do for the Guard, 

Reserve and their communities. You wonder when they have time to do the normal things in life.”

After the 2005 hurricane season ended, Department of Defense officials told a joint hearing of House of Representatives subcommittees that response to Hurricane Katrina was the 

largest, fastest deployment of military forces for a civil-support mission in US history. The officials went on to say that this response was unprecedented in size and scope not only 

here, but also in the world. Paul McHale, assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense, testified that the devastating impact of Hurricane Katrina resembled in many 

ways the foreseeable effects of a terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, and therefore, the lessons learned must be applied to protect American citizens in the future.

 AFRC RESPONDS TO 2005 HURRICANES 

200
however, proved more tenuous than they had 

believed. The persistent counterinsurgency required the continuous presence of US ground 

forces in theater as well as those forces which 

supported them.

In November 2005, US forces in Iraq still included one airborne corps, one airborne division, three infantry brigades, two armored 

brigades, two armored cavalry regiments, one 

brigade combat team, and one field artillery 

brigade from the US Army. US Marines attached to two expeditionary forces and one 

expeditionary unit, filled out the remaining 

ground forces. US Navy forces included one 

carrier strike group and one expeditionary 

strike group supported by six cutters and port 

security elements from the US Coast Guard. 

The US Air Force continued its US Central 

Command commitments by forming 10 expeditionary wings to serve the combat air, mobility air, special operations, and agile combat support air power requirements of some 

250,000 US personnel engaged in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom.141 

The Air Force continued a massive effort resupplying those forces both through channel 

airlift missions from the United States and 

other forward locations into the theater of operations. All Air Force Reserve Command air 

mobility units kept a sustained level of support 

to theater commanders in the 2003 through 

2006 time frame.142

Air Force Reserve Command aircrews flew 

personnel were among those leading in the development and eventual success of the Iraq Air Force 

training program. 

The broad scope of the Iraqi Air 

Force training program that included ground support and English language training allowed the 

CAFTT advisors to eventually 

train Iraqi instructors how to conduct basic pilot training, evaluations, scheduling, tracking, and 

provide command and control 

functions themselves, which represented important steps toward 

self-sufficient national security. 

Moreover, the training mission 

served as an effective “hearts and 

minds” operation by showing off 

the Iraqi flag on aircraft during humanitarian and airlift missions and facilitating 

the continuing growth of an emerging national 

identity. 

AIR MOBILITY - OIF

Throughout the first two years of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, US efforts supporting the military and civil objectives of the young Iraqi 

government continued in earnest. Commanders had planned a sizable withdrawal of forces 

in the wake of the liberation phase in the summer 2003 and had hoped to turn the mass of 

domestic security responsibility over to Iraqi 

forces the following summer. The handoff, 

eventually led to quick and efficient responses 

to the needs and emerging missions of the Iraq 

Air Force. 

On 1 October 2007, the Iraqi Air Force began 

its own flying training school at Kirkuk Air 

Base. The initial class consisted of 10 students and two Cessna-172 aircraft.139 Additional successes were realized when the Iraqi 

Air Force Academy graduated its third officer class in March 2008. On 9 July 2008, US 

forces transferred eight Cessna 172s and three 

Cessna Caravan 308s to be part of the Iraqi 

training program. By the end of 2009, the 

Iraqi Air Force had grown to 6,000 airmen and 

133 aircraft.140 Air Force Reserve Command 

Percentages of Scheduled Flying Hour Program 

Exceeded and Air Mobility Effort

(6 months)

 C-5 170% (31% of AMC Total)

 C-141 190% (40% of AMC Total) 

 C-17 200% (35% of AMC Total)

 C-9 130% (65% of AMC Total)

Total AFRC Unit Equipped airlift contingency flying 

hours executed: 12,245.7

Total AFRC airlift contingency flying hours (UE and 

AFRC Associate): 36,517.6 

AFRC AIRLIFT WORK EFFORT – 

FLYING TIME, 

OCTOBER 2002 – MARCH 2003

2012
202
tribal, factional, and sectarian differences that 

impacted one another and occasionally spilled 

over to the coalition forces securing Iraq. 

More specifically, the “insurgency” represented three distinct elements, Kurd separatists, 

disenfranchised Ba’athist Sunnis, and pro-Iran 

Shia populations. The assessment of the US 

Department of State Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor in 2005 was bleak: 

“The ongoing insurgency, coupled with sectarian and criminal violence, seriously affected 

the government’s human rights performance; 

elements of the security forces, particularly 

sectarian militias, frequently acted independently of governmental authority.”147

Each group fought for security by dominating 

the other groups as they had for generations 

in the heterogeneous nation. While a degree 

of anti-Americanism perpetuated this among 

the Iraqi population, the US Army’s 2006 

Counterinsurgency Manual also portrayed the 

frustration over the drawn-out occupation, 

the civilian casualties, and disruption accompanying the once-celebrated liberators. The 

best hope for the coalition was to prevent any 

group from hijacking the democratic process 

or crushing their opposition.148 

As conditions deteriorated into something 

akin to “civil war,” the people aligned to the 

elements with the greatest influence over their 

local security.149 Without a refined national 

consciousness, the inability of citizens of the 

young republic to broker compromise only 

worsened the national security situation. The 

mand F-16 crews participated in Operation 

Steel Curtain, a joint operation to reduce the 

flow of foreign al Qaeda insurgents and weapons crossing into Iraqi from the towns bordering Syria as well as restoring control of these 

border towns and cities. The operation was the 

first large-scale deployment of the new Iraqi 

Army, assisted by US Marines and Army. In 

the air, Army helicopters and active duty F-15 

and Air Force Reserve F-16 crews flew strike 

missions against the foreign insurgents. The 

3,500 ground forces cleared the towns of Husaybah and Karabilah, house by house. Reserve F-16Cs equipped with LITENING II 

targeting pods provided the ability to precisely 

deliver bombs to the targets, day and night or 

in adverse weather.145

Elsewhere in Iraq, Air Force Reserve Command F-16 crews remained busy as operations 

intensified dramatically over fall 2005 through 

2006. Pilots from the 301st Fighter Wing 

flew 686.2 hours in the month of November 

2005 alone, followed by the 419th and 482nd 

Fighter Wings’ crews accomplished 471 and 

277 hours, respectively. The increase in hours 

and sorties continued for the duration of their 

deployment. By February 2006, Air Force 

Reserve F-16 pilots had flown approximately 

5,192 hours and 1,143 sorties in just over four 

months.146

TOWARD CIVIL WAR

Inside Iraq, the insurgency against the coalition, in reality, was a fluid environment of 

tactical airlift missions between air bases, airfields, and forward operating bases inside the 

Operation Iraqi Freedom theater of operations. 

Roughly from the liberation of Iraq through 

the end of 2005, Air Force Reserve C-130 

aircrews amassed 33,624.5 flying hours and 

15,223 sorties just in support of Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. This was more than twice the 

tactical airlift support required in Operations 

Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle for the 

same period of time. The Iraqi missions, which 

were 60 percent shorter than those flown by 

their Afghan counterparts, belied their distinction as exceptionally tactical in nature. This included many short hops between Iraqi airstrips 

and airdrops of supplies to forward commanders.143

From roughly the liberation of Iraq until the 

end of 2005, Air Force Reserve KC-135 and 

KC-10 tanker crews flew 2,500 hours of support to coalition aircraft operating in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom. Strategic airlift crews flying the 

C-141 Starlifter and the C-17 Globemaster III 

accumulated the most hours, averaging 10,000 

a year on each. Additionally, AFRC C-5 Galaxy crews from the unit-equipped 433rd Wing 

in Texas and the associate 349th Air Mobility 

Wing in California, racked up an average of an 

additional 5,000 hours per year in support of 

heavy and outsize cargo delivery in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom.144

F-16 – IRAQ COUNTERINSURGENCY

In November 2005, Air Force Reserve Com2034
December 2006: “Security efforts will fail 

unless the Iraqis have both the capability to 

hold areas that have been cleared and the 

will to clear neighborhoods that are home 

to Shiite militias. US forces can ‘clear’ any 

neighborhood, but there are neither enough 

US troops present nor enough support from 

Iraqi security forces to ‘hold’ neighborhoods 

so cleared. The same holds true for the rest 

of Iraq. Because none of the operations conducted by US and Iraqi military forces are 

fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the sectarian violence, US forces 

seem to be caught in a mission that has no 

foreseeable end.”153 It was a public call 

to action for the Bush Administration, and 

within two weeks, President Bush himself 

would announce a surge of forces in Iraq. 

With Iraq now in a state of unrest, President Bush’s “coalition of the willing,” which 

sought to stabilize and rebuild Iraq, saw a 

shift in its support base. Close allies of the 

US remained committed, however.154

Growing concerns that US forces were now 

engaged in a full-fledged civil war in Iraq encouraged some in Congress to argue for an immediate withdrawal from the burgeoning chaos. The high death rate for US ground forces 

complicated the argument as IED attacks and 

terrorist bombings became a daily occurrence. 

In the early December 2006 national elections, 

Sunnis acceded to representative government, 

bringing their voter participation level up to 80 

percent. Although a sign of progress in nationbuilding, it, like many elections, was a cue for 

extremist violence against the coalescing body 

politic.150

Then, in February 2006, the bombing of the 

Al-Askari shrine, a site of great significance 

to Shia Muslims, fundamentally changed the 

US approach to Iraq. Both Shia and Sunni 

elements in Iraq took this as a call to action, 

elevating their activity to new heights. The 

radical Shia cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr cancelled 

a planned trip to Lebanon to show his opposition.151

The increased sectarian violence 

made US commanders assess that they 

could not win the war within existing 

strategy, even by the most optimistic 

measure. The levels of insurgency 

prevented the establishment of a free 

Iraqi state in an acceptable amount of 

time or cost for the Iraqi government, 

US forces, or its coalition partners.152

Commissioned by Congress, the Iraq 

Study Group released a report on 6 

efforts of US forces to create institutions and 

operate from nodes of control remote from the 

at-risk population aggravated this situation, 

and the conflict escalated into counterinsurgency, a war without front lines or major engagements. 

 

By 19 October 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice noted the growing crisis. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, she stressed the apparent failure of 

the existing “Clear—Hold” counterinsurgency 

strategy. She expressed a desire to see broader 

implementation of a holistic political-military 

strategy called “Clear—Hold—Build.” The 

policy equally focused on community relationship building—partner security capacity 

building along with direct combat.

As the security situation deteriorated, sectarians in Iraq fought amongst each other for control of the future. Benefiting from the discord 

and exacerbating it with additional attacks, 

foreign fighters flooded into Iraq through 2006. 

204
205 206
206
on Iraq in 2007, the scope of the global endeavor broadened, as its name implied. At the 

time of the President’s speech in Charleston, 

the United States Central Command remained 

the largest theater of GWOT operations. Since 

2001, Iraq and Afghanistan had garnered the 

most attention from 

policymakers for confronting international 

terrorism. However, 

AFRC’s participation 

had expanded beyond 

Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi 

Freedom by supporting the military’s 

anti-terrorist efforts 

in the Horn of Africa, the Caribbean, 

Southeast Asia, and 

elsewhere. The Air 

Force Reserve Command maintained 

continuous support 

for these efforts and 

also shouldered a significant role in daily 

operations within the 

United States, enabling other elements of the Total Force to 

deploy. In this period, the military responded 

to an increase in insurgent activity in Iraq and 

Afghanistan.6 The 2007 surge of forces was 

the first of a series of operations supported by 

the Air Force Reserve Command forces that 

eventually led to the early withdrawal of US 

confronting what President Bush described as 

“this mortal threat to our country.”4 By 2011, 

managing personnel and weapons systems to 

provide the best support to the warfighter required strict adherence to AFRC Commander 

Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner’s vision 

of “leveraging the strategic reserve to provide 

an operational mission ready force,” engaged 

both at home and half a world away in continual support of the Global War on Terrorism 

and other national security interests.5 

Although President Bush maintained a focus 

Second, al Qaeda, more than any other group, 

was behind most high-casualty incidents. 

Third, al Qaeda had stated ambitions to make 

Iraq a base for attacks outside of the country. 

President Bush quipped that the best way to 

protect America is to “go on the offense.”2

The Bush Doctrine remained a reality for Air 

Force Reserve Command 

airmen six years after 

9/11.

By the summer of 2007, 

the Air Force Reserve 

Command had mobilized 

34,472 members, which 

represented nearly 48 

percent of the command’s 

personnel. This compared to 43.4 percent for 

the Air National Guard 

and 46.5 percent for all 

reserve components (although the Marine Corps 

Reserve had mobilized 

54.9 percent).3 The operational stresses—ensuring the necessary 

equipment and weapon 

systems; maintaining readiness levels; training, recruiting, and retaining personnel; and 

taking care of personnel which extended to 

their families and employers—were applicable to the Air Force Reserve Command for 

nearly two decades now as a Total Force partner. Nevertheless, the command was intent on 

2078
the President, was security in and around 

Baghdad. Citing that 80 percent of the 

violence in Iraq occurred within 30 miles 

of the capital, President Bush said, “Our 

past efforts to secure Baghdad failed.” Responding accordingly to this assessment, 

President Bush announced an increase in 

American force levels of more than 20,000 

additional troops. Their mission was well 

defined: to help Iraqis clear and secure 

neighborhoods, to assist with the protection of the population, and to ensure the 

Iraqi forces were capable of providing for 

the security of Baghdad.10 

The premise of the new strategy stemmed 

from the administration’s Clear—Hold—

Build policy that was doctrinally established with the publication of Field Manual 3-24 and endorsed by Secretary of State 

Condoleezza Rice in 2005.11 By definition, this tactic involved clearing an area 

by destroying, capturing, or forcing the 

withdrawal of insurgent combatants; holding the area with security forces to effectively reestablish a government presence 

at the local level; and building support for 

the government by protecting the populace 

and improving economic, cultural, social, 

and medical care.12 Rooted in the “Clear 

and Hold” communist counterinsurgency 

plan of the Vietnam era, US ground forces 

assimilated the civil assistance mission in 

an approach used by regional commander 

Colonel H.R. McMaster’s experience in 

Tal Afar, Iraq, in 2005.13 

Force Reserve airmen, in the air and on the 

ground, supporting Global War on Terrorism 

operations.9 

SURGE – IRAQ

The violence in Iraq that stemmed from the 

rising insurgency was a tipping point for coalition forces and the new Iraqi government. 

Air Force Reserve Command airmen were 

not immune from the risks of serving amidst 

this wave of persistent unrest. These sacrifices pointed to one important development in 

both Iraq and Afghanistan: Air Force Reserve 

Command airmen served in increasingly austere combat environments on both sides of the 

wire.

On 10 January 2007, President Bush announced a new strategy to thwart the violence 

that was splitting Baghdad into sectarian enclaves and shaking the confidence of the Iraqi 

people. The most urgent priority, according to 

forces in Iraq in December 2011. 

Continuous support of the Global War on Terrorism was a military reality for the Air Force 

Reserve Command. Since the beginning of the 

war, the command had amassed some 500,000 

contingency flying hours alone and, additionally, was still flying missions under the transportation working capital fund in excess of the 

programmed flying hours in 2007, for example, by 171 percent (exceeding 62,400 flying 

hours) with many of these hours also related 

to the war effort or for other operations, which 

provided relief to the active airlift community. By June 2007, the number of Air Force 

Reserve Command members (volunteers and 

mobilized) daily engaged around the world 

stood at over 5,000 personnel.7 The realities 

of the war and the national security environment created an unprecedented impetus for organizational and process changes that moved 

the Air Force Reserve Command toward full 

operational capability (FOC) in every respect 

as a major command as part of its Air Force 

Reserve FOC 2012 initiative. Coequal status 

with the other major commands was another 

emerging reality. Resetting the relationships 

and ensuring the requests for forces processes 

with the joint commands and combatant commands was an operational necessity addressed 

by Lieutenant General Stenner through the 

establishment of the AFRC Force Generation 

Center and a restructuring of the headquarters 

staffs and numbered air forces.8 Such were 

the organizational conditions that served as a 

backdrop for the contributions made by Air 

208
20910
210
The “Eyes of the Eagle” is the motto of the 4th Combat Camera Squadron (4 CTCS), March Air Reserve Base, California. In 2009-2010, Staff Sergeant 

Christine Jones was a member of a team of four CTCS photographers and videographers who traveled to Afghanistan as part of the unit’s first mission 

to that country. The 4 CTCS is the only Air Force Reserve Command squadron capable of deploying visual information assets to an area of combat. 

“Seconds can feel like hours,” wrote Sergeant Jones, “pulse racing, heart pounding, hands shaking uncontrollably, as all around lives are changed forever 

in the blink of an eye. But in that blink, time doesn’t stop. Life is still happening in that moment. Even after an explosion” But, recording images 

during such experiences is the job of a combat camera airman.

Jones and eight other 4 CTCS members were attached to the Army’s 5th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, known as 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team 

from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. A team made up of a photographer and a videographer accompanied the Army Brigade infantry and 

cavalry units on both mounted and dismounted patrols during their six-month deployment. With the very first mission it became clear to the imagery 

specialists that every time out could be a matter of life or death.

“The first mission was a real wake-up call,” recalled Master Sergeant Juan Valdes, a 4 CTCS videographer attached to the Stryker Brigade. “As I looked 

at my teammate, I emphasized words I learned at Combat Skills Training: ‘Watch where you step and keep your situational awareness up.’ As moments 

grew closer to gunfire, I realized this wasn’t a movie, this was real life, people were dying and it was my job to document.”

Staff Sergeant Dayton Mitchell, a 4 CTCS photographer, was also on the ground with the infantry recording what they did on a daily basis. Mitchell was 

asked if he had some good advice for future combat camera teams. “Take your combats skills training very seriously,” he replied. 

But, it wasn’t all about combat, according to Sergeant Jones. The cameramen recorded joint patrols with Afghan National Army and Police; meetings 

with village elders; documented controlled detonations of improvised explosive devices (IED), and humanitarian missions. Technical Sergeant Fransciso Govea, also serving with the brigade, said that what his camera recorded helped to make things real for US citizens back home. “If there is not a 

photo of a humanitarian mission,” Sergeant Govea said, “then it didn’t happen. The photos are proof for the Americans that the humanitarian missions 

take place.”

Even though documenting the humanitarian mission was important, combat coverage was a frequently unavoidable part of the job. Technical Sergeant 

Rudy Castro and Technical Sergeant Efren Lopez, 4 CTCS, were with the Stryker Brigade when they got into firefights. Sergeant Lopez remembered 

one patrol in particular. “We went over a wall and went into a ditch, bullets were flying overhead. I took cover and I took pictures of the Army as they 

were engaging the enemy,” Sergeant Lopez said. “To document combat was both exciting and a little bit scary...It goes through your mind when you 

are in a combat environment that you might get shot or an IED could go off next to you.” Before long Sergeant Lopez had to put down his camera and 

pick up a weapon to help the soldiers suppress enemy fire.

In summing up the experience of the 4 CTCS, Sergeant Lopez may have said it best, “The feeling of getting to be part of the first 4th Combat Camera 

team to go into Afghanistan is a great feeling. I wanted to earn the name Combat Cameraman, and I think we all did. This was an eye-opening and 

life-changing experience for me.”

4TH COMBAT CAMERA - AFGHANISTAN

2121
On 5 July 2007, members of a provincial reconstruction team embedded with the Army’s First Infantry Battalion Brigade Combat Team prepared for 

a routine civil affairs mission outside of forward operating base Falcon in the Rasheed District, south of Baghdad. They were traveling in a threeHUMVEE convoy to a point about thirty minutes south of the base. Each HUMVEE contained the usual members, the driver, the team chief, the 

interpreter, the gunner, and a passenger. The passenger in the lead vehicle was Major Jose L. Rivera, an active duty engineer assigned to the Air Force 

Reserve Command. He had been in country less than thirty days but had already made this same trip three times. The convoy cleared the Falcon gate 

and turned left towards the destination. The Iraqi guard at the checkpoint waived and shouted a greeting to the passing convoy of American military 

men. Minutes later, an explosively formed projectile penetrated the front passenger window of the HUMVEE, killing the team chief and the driver 

instantly. “There was no big explosion,” explained Major Rivera. “Suddenly everything just slowed down. I did not know what was going on.” 

With the driver no longer in control, the HUMVEE inched forward. Almost immediately, a second explosively formed projectile entered the HUMVEE through the door next to Major Rivera. “I did not see the second one hit. One minute we were driving, and the next minute . . . I was trying 

to understand what was happening.” Major Rivera realized that he was injured. His right hand appeared to be missing and a bone was protruding 

through his right thigh. His femoral artery was severed, and blood was everywhere. “I tried to move. I looked at the driver and the team chief who 

were slumped in the front seat. The gunner had fallen in with them. I could hear the interpreter screaming.” As hard as he tried, Major Rivera could 

not make sense of his situation. He knew he was badly injured and attempted to retrieve the tourniquet from the lower pocket of his uniform, but his 

battered body would not cooperate. He heard the men from the other HUMVEES shouting; he realized the HUMVEE was on fire. This was the last 

thing that Major Rivera remembered before he lost consciousness. 

“I came-to as they were pulling me out of the HUMVEE.” I was in a lot of pain, and I was very thirsty—it was very hot that day. Thank God that we 

were traveling with a US Army combat medic who knew what he was doing—he saved my life.” The medic kept him conscious on the thirty minute 

drive to the hospital. “It was just like the movies . . . I kept wondering if I was going to see my wife and daughter again, and I thought about my unborn son. I kept telling them, “Save my leg. Save my leg.” Not knowing whether Major Rivera was going to make it to the hospital, one of the other 

men asked Major Rivera if he wanted to telephone his wife. They dialed her number on a cell phone. The only words Major Rivera got a chance to 

say were, “I’m sorry, I’ve been hit; I’m sorry,” before the line went dead. “Looking back, that may not have been the best decision,” explained Major 

Rivera. “Understandably, my wife became very upset. It was two in the morning when she got the call. She was seven months pregnant—she is the 

hero in this whole thing.” It wasn’t until the next day that Mrs. Rivera learned her husband was in stable condition. 

Major Rivera’s recovery from those life threatening injuries has been nothing short of phenomenal. He credits his recovery to expert medical care and 

the love of his family. “All together I had thirteen surgeries, but they saved my leg. I spent thirty days in the Walter Reed Medical Center and then 

another thirty days at Fisher House.” His family stayed by his side the whole time. “I didn’t like my daughter to see me all hooked up to wires and 

everything while I was in the hospital, but she made a game of it. Every day, she took my temperature and checked my heartbeat with her toy doctor’s 

kit. Now she takes care of me by putting Band-Aids where my thumb used to be. ”Major Rivera believes that he was given a second chance. “One 

more second or two and I would have been killed. There was somebody watching out for me. Now, I appreciate my family even more. I let them 

know how much I appreciate them being there for me.” Major Rivera and his family are preparing for his new assignment to Command and General 

Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. When asked about his plans for the future, Major Rivera said, “My wife and I have decided to stay in the 

Air Force. I want to make a difference and do my job. That’s why I wear this uniform.” 

 By Lieutenant Colonel Teresa M. Riley

JUST MINUTES OUTSIDE THE GATE

212
One day in the spring of 2007, Senior Airman Diane Lopes was at home when an unexpected phone call came in. It was her squad leader, Technical 

Sergeant Robert Shaffner. He told her, “Make sure your bank accounts are in order, and your personal affairs are handled because you are going to the 

desert.” The initial six-month deployment lasted over 16 months. In her words, she was “volun-told.”

The most difficult part of preparing to go to war was telling her mom and dad. Her mother cried for days and was afraid she would not come back. 

Diane’s father reassured her mother that she would be fine. Her mother remembered the day she left, “When her deployment day came, she called me 

before leaving to say, ‘Don’t worry, I WILL be back!’”

On the 30th day of her deployment, her world changed forever. Senior Airman Lopes had turned in her weapons at the end of her shift and was walking 

from the armory when she was hit by a mortar. She recalls, “I did not hear it [mortar] coming and when I turned to check for traffic as I crossed the 

road, I heard the boom and felt the compression wave go over me. Initially, I thought I was on fire and thought I might have to put myself out. When I 

came to, still on the ground, then I tasted blood in my mouth.”

Diane’s mother recalls: “I’ll never forget that phone call from Lieutenant Colonel Seymour on a Friday evening at 5:30 pm on September 21, 2007. It was 

probably the hardest call that Lieutenant Colonel Seymour had to make. Her dad and I were sitting at a local pizza shop and my cell phone rang. I really 

didn’t think much of the call when Lieutenant Colonel Seymour identified himself as he had called me in the past as a supportive follow-up. However, 

when he asked if Mr. Lopes was with me . . . that’s when I started to panic. He informed me Diane had been injured but didn’t know the full extent of 

the injuries. He added that she is alive and being treated and that more information would be forthcoming as soon as they receive it. I felt the adrenalin 

rushing through my body and the tears were pouring out. I don’t remember too much of the days and sleepless nights that followed except consistent 

contacts with Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Seymour and Senior Master Sergeant Debra Levy giving me updates as to her condition and making arrangements for dad and I to meet her upon her arrival at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.” 

Senior Airman Diane Lopes’ injuries were very serious. The shrapnel snapped her tibia and shattered part of the fibula in her left leg, slashed through 80 

percent of the tendons in her right wrist, collapsed a lung, burned the backs of her legs and perforated her right eardrum along with shrapnel throughout 

her body. Airman Lopes recalls saying to herself, “Hell no, I’m not dying here today. No way.” 

Lopes was taken to Balad Air Base, Iraq, then to Landstuhl, Germany, before being transported to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, 

DC, remaining there about three weeks. Then, she stayed in an outpatient facility for about eleven and a half months of physical therapy. The therapy 

was hard, but what was harder was the mental strength it took to get up every day and do it. She said she did not feel like she was progressing or getting 

anywhere, but then she would see people who had not seen her for a while, and they could not believe how far she had progressed. This propelled her to 

keep going. Lopes, protective by nature, would encourage those around her who were also going through their own challenges of recovery.

Walter Reed Army Medical Center had many creative programs to help injured airmen recover. One of them was working with dogs at the Washington 

Humane Society. The program provided basic obedience training for dogs at the shelter to make them more adoptable. Another program that helped 

Lopes’ recovery was “Project Healing Waters.” The organization founded by retired Navy Captain Ed Nicholson taught fly fishing to injured veterans. 

SENIOR AIRMAN LOPES – SECURITY FORCES

2134
Because Lopes was in a wheel chair at the time, she was hesitant to get involved. The project manager, Captain Eivind Forseth, saw her as she wheeled 

herself to a window to observe the vets at practice. “I watched them casting for a while and was getting ready to bail when I heard this booming voice 

behind me: ‘Air Force, glad you finally joined us!’” Forseth took her out to the lawn. “I put a rod in her hand, and the rest is history,” he says. She 

started to cast left-handed because her right arm was in a brace. “It was really too cold, but it was so nice to be out on the lake,” she said of her first 

trip with the group. “I used my walker to stand by the water’s edge. It was exactly where I wanted to be.”

Several situations saved Senior Airman Lopes’ life. For instance, if she had remembered her soft cap that day and was not wearing her helmet, she 

probably would not have survived. Another reason was she was mentally prepared before the attack. She said she was always aware of her surroundings and would imagine different scenarios and what she would do if she were attacked. She was also hyper-aware of her body after she was attacked, 

repeating her blood type over and over as the medics tended to her after the attack. As a police officer in her civilian job, she was on the scene of 

many car accidents and witnessed firsthand how easy it is to slip away. The self aide buddy care training she received in the military taught her how 

important being aware of one’s blood pressure and controlling one’s breathing was key in her surviving.

 When she felt like giving up, she depended on her deep beliefs and prayers. Going through the ordeal, she learned a lot about her inner strength and 

used this to handle much more than she thought possible. Another thing that got Diane through the painful process physically, mentally, and emotionally was her great sense of humor. According to her mother Betty Lopes, Diane was the “clown” of the family, a trait she inherited from her father 

Roger. Lopes admitted that you have to have a sense of humor, or you would never get out of the war alive. She had t-shirts custom made that would 

have popular sayings on them like “Got Shrapnel,” much like the popular advertising slogan, “Got Milk.” Another one said, “I went to Iraq, and all 

I got was blowed up!”

Lopes’ commander, Colonel Steven W. Kirkpatrick, had a saying that she said helped her survive many times and this was, “I know this situation 

sucks, but we must embrace the suck!” This she would say to others during their hardest times, and they could not help but laugh!

One of the scariest events is when an injured soldier has to return to the real world. There are the physical challenges due to the injuries. Before Airman Lopes deployed, she had recently completed police officer field training and was ready to start work for the Tampa Police Department. Now, 

there was uncertainty. There are also emotional challenges when people would call her “Celebrity Lopes,” which was due to the numerous special 

appearances, articles, and special attention she received such as being one of the guests of First Lady Laura Bush at the state of the union address. 

The story of Senior Airman Diane Lopes’ will to live, determination to recover, and her consideration of others can be summed up in a cut line from 

the wing’s newspaper about the 920th’s Annual Military Ball event: 

“However, the moment of the night came when Senior Airman Diane Lopes, a wing security forces journeyman, made her first appearance with the 

unit since being severely wounded in Iraq last September. Airman Lopes spoke of her time in rehabilitation and her gratitude for the support she 

received from her 920th family. Barely a dry eye could be found as Airman Lopes finished her speech with an order for security forces to lock the 

ballroom doors, then glanced at Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Seymour, her mission support squadron commander, and announced, “I’m going to collect 

that dance Colonel Seymour promised me when I could walk again.”

 By Staff Sergeant Maria L. Eames, 920th Rescue Wing Historian

214
tion of Clear—Hold—Build, the United States 

was planning the complete withdrawal of military forces from Iraq.

Hold—Build was the avoidance of large-scale 

offensive operations such as in Fallujah in 

November 2004 and in Tal Afar in September 

2005.15 Within 36 months of the implementaOne of the first “Build” tasks under this strategy was the reconstruction of the most sacred 

al-Askari Mosque that had been destroyed in a 

bombing by insurgents in February 2006. The 

reconstruction was completed under the supervision of the United Nations Educational, 

Scientific, and 

Cultural Organization (UNESCO).14 This 

new approach 

to counterinsurgency was a 

more dynamic 

and thought-out 

version of the 

administration’s 

offensive counterinsurgency (COIN) operations that involved smaller unit “cordon and 

search” tactics common in Baghdad from 

2003-2006. An additional benefit to Clear—

That he was in a war zone was never lost on Colonel Lindsey Graham, Air Force Reserve Command staff judge advocate and US Senator. In August 2007, he took time 

from his congressional duties and went to Afghanistan as a reserve lawyer. His mission: 

train Afghan judges, lawyers, and prosecutors of the Afghan military on US military 

law.

An American Forces Press Service article reported Graham said he was honored at the 

opportunity to help Afghans continue to form the country they want and have taken 

great strides to live in.

“They have a chance to start over again as a country, and they want to take advantage of 

this opportunity, he related. “I was in a room with a bunch of people who are the first in 

their field. These men are the first military prosecutors to operate outside the Soviet system. 

They are the first group of judges that will be judging on the rule of law, not the rule of gun. 

I was in a room of George Washingtons, Thomas Jeffersons, John Marshalls and John Jays.”

US SENATOR – AFRC JAG

On 2 May 2008, while flying combat missions in Iraq for the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Brill set his fourth 

world record in total number of hours flown in an F-16 Fighting Falcon. He acquired a total of 6,000 hours, of which, 95 combat hours were flown in 

support of Iraqi Freedom tours and one Enduring Freedom tour. While deployed to Afghanistan in 

2001, he served as the 466th Fighter Squadron Operations Officer and assisted in mission planning, 

tasking, coordination, and monitoring of F-16 air operations. In addition, on 22 October 2001, he led 

the first F-16 strike into Afghanistan.

 

Lieutenant Colonel Brill began flying Fighting Falcons in 1980, when he first attended F-16 flight 

training at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. After ten years of active duty service, he joined the air reserve 

technician program in 1990, where he was assigned to the 419th Fighter Wing, serving since January 

2007 as the chief of safety and leading by example with 6,000 hours without a safety incident. 

WORLD RECORD – LT COL BRILL

215 216
in their town. The demand had essentially 

fallen on deaf ears, and al Qaeda stood their 

ground. The Sons of Iraq commenced enforcing their intentions with armed resistance and engaged al Qaeda in a prolonged 

street battle. Twenty-four hours later, and 

with the help of US forces, the battle ended 

with four enemy dead and thirty suspected al 

Qaeda detained. The townspeople suffered 

one dead and four wounded. Nonetheless, 

the Sons of Iraq succeeded; with al Qaeda 

gone, the town eased into recovery. Local citizens peacefully patrolled streets that 

once belonged to the insurgents. More than 

70 percent of the population had returned to 

their homes, and local commerce was on the 

upswing. By November 2007, a tentative 

normalcy had returned to the small community.17

On 22 November, the al Qaeda insurgents 

returned to the streets of Hawr Rajab determined to re-establish control of the town. 

The insurgents killed several citizen perimeter guards and entered the city intent on 

regaining lost ground. This time, the Sons 

of Iraq and the Iraqi Army, aided by US airpower, killed, captured, or repelled the attackers but not before the death toll had risen 

to fourteen.18 On describing how al Qaeda 

had ravaged the town, one local sheik stated, 

“Hawr Rajab was devastated by al Qaeda in 

Iraq. They burned houses, stole goods, and 

used many structures for storing weapons and 

building bombs. Now that the violence has 

subsided in the area, its residents can move 

Hawr Rajab, the “Concerned Local Citizens,” 

led by a local imam and later referred to as the 

“Sons of Iraq,” banded together and issued al 

Qaeda a demand to “move to the mosque” in 

exchange for amnesty.16 The Sons of Iraq 

rejected al Qaeda’s tactics of violence and intimidation and were intent on regaining peace 

CLEAR – HOLD – BUILD 

During the 2007 surge in Iraq, the Air Force 

Reserve Command played a role in one of the 

most successful examples of the newly implemented Clear–Hold-Build policy. From 6-7 

September, a group of Iraqi men in the town of 

In the fall of 2007, the Iraqi judicial system lay in a state of chaotic defeat—the end result of 

nearly a quarter century of a dictatorial justice system rife with the absence of the rule of law and 

an abundance of violations against a modern concept of human rights. The legal structure that 

followed during the years immediately after the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein had scarcely 

improved, as this period was marked with lawlessness characterized by rampant looting, kidnappings for ransom, and the extrajudicial killings that were hallmarks of the sectarian violence 

which threatened to tear the country apart from within. This was the dire situation that Air Force 

Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Craig Simper of the 419th Fighter Wing, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, 

encountered and was charged with changing.

For six months, Lieutenant Colonel Simper served in Baghdad on the Law and Order Task Force 

as the assistant director for a multi-national team responsible for investigating terror and corruption within elements of the Iraqi government. This organization—made up of American and Iraqi 

law enforcement officers, investigators, attorneys, and interpreters—strove to rebuild the Iraqi 

judicial system into one based on the rule of law, due process, and dedicated to the protection and 

service of the citizens of Iraq. Accordingly, they investigated high profile murder, extortion, and 

kidnapping cases. His teams also taught Iraqis how to build legal cases using evidence based 

on forensic science and technology rather than their former confession-based system, which was 

built on intimidation and violence. This work required the task force to venture outside the relatively secure perimeters of their base into often hostile surroundings, where they frequently faced 

small arms fire, mortars, rockets, and any combination of these assaults. Undeterred by enemy 

attacks, Lieutenant Colonel Simper continued to perform his duties and thus received a Bronze 

Star for his actions in leading aggressive investigations in the pursuit of justice. Establishing law 

and order was a vital component of both counterinsurgency and post-conflict reconstruction. 

Lieutenant Colonel Simper’s work served to build a new and functional Iraqi justice system.

 By Master Sergeant Angela M. Vazquez, 403rd Wing Historian

LAW AND ORDER - IRAQ

216
TSgt Snowman: Were most of your missions close air support type missions? 

Col Mortensen: Yes, I think you could categorize them as close air support missions. There was one instance I will tell you about. It probably stands out more than 

others. While we were there, there were three Army soldiers that were kidnapped near Baghdad, and they didn’t find them for a couple days. Maybe two or three 

days after that, one of our pilots was on a mission at night north of Baghdad. Some Army personnel had cornered insurgents in a grove of palm trees, and they called 

in air, which was one of our guys. They delivered ordinance on them which put an end to this skirmish they had going on down there. When they went in to exploit 

the scene, they found two of the Army guys’ identification cards and some computers and things. So, they were able to gather intel and determine that these bad guys 

were involved with the kidnapping of our soldiers. That was a good feeling to know that at least those guys paid for that. The low points you asked about—I would 

say that one of the squadrons there lost an F-16 and the pilot. That was the low point while we were over there. There was rough period of eight months where the 

US Air Force lost three F-16s and two pilots, and one of them was while we were there. That would be the low point for me.

TSgt Snowman: Sir, the operators were there to fly, fight, and win. Everyone else that deployed was there to support you in doing that. What did you come away 

with when it came to the work that your support team provided?

Col Mortensen: Ok, that’s a good question, John. It’s one that’s very evident to me but may not get advertised or talked about a lot. As far as the support goes, it 

was absolutely outstanding performance both here, stateside in the 301 FW, and those that went along with us. This is really a monumental undertaking to take that 

many people and airplanes that far and into that type of environment to operate. The planning for that starts about a year out. There is assigning project officers 

for the deployment both on the operations and maintenance side of the house as well as other areas. During this organizational phase you’ve got logistics, medical, 

admin, and MPF (or personnel) that play huge roles in helping us to get out of town by making sure we have all the right equipment and all the squares filled. They 

ensure things are in order to get us over to the AOR and then return. Maintenance has to work a lot of issues—the aircraft, phased maintenance, and getting them in 

line to go over there, choosing the correct aircraft and making sure that when we deploy not only are the aircraft in tip-top shape for the maintenance items but also 

the phased inspections are done. If we can get fresh aircraft over there (i.e. aircraft that will not require major maintenance while there), then that makes the whole 

process run smoother once we arrive. It takes a lot of organizing and planning to do that. In any flying operation, you always have the inevitable issues that arise 

unexpectedly, so then they have to react to those as well to fulfill this plan. 

As we get closer to the deployment date, the fighter squadron will start their spin up program of tailoring their training plan specifically to do the types of missions we 

will be doing when we get over there. The objective there is to get every pilot that is going to deploy not only trained in the skill sets that are going to be required but 

also proficient in those as well. What this enables us to do is hit the ground running over there. So, you get in place, and the first day we are responsible to execute 

the ATO. The guys are ready to go for their first sortie. There are a lot of times when there is not much going on over there when you’re airborne, and then there are 

some times when it is very, very busy. You have to be ready to perform that very busy sortie on your first sortie because it could very easily happen. So, that’s how 

we get ready to go. 

As your question alluded to, especially in a combat zone, the emphasis is on the operators, the guys that execute the mission, commonly referred to as the tip of the 

spear. In our case, being a fighter wing, a lot of the focus goes towards the pilots and maintenance turning the airplanes, but what isn’t so obvious are the support 

assets and the endless hours of work they put into getting this huge package, this huge organization, 6,000 miles around the world to employ in this environment that 

we’re talking about. As I mentioned earlier, a lot of those assets are here, stateside, on base, but we also deploy with a lot. So, when we are over there executing the 

ATO, pilots can worry about pilot stuff; the maintainers can worry about fixing, turning, and loading the planes with fuel and munitions. Then for all the other stuff, 

we have personnel there in place to take care of it, so you can concentrate on your job. That’s what pilots like to do; that’s what maintainers like to do to project the 

force as required. If those support assets were not there to do that, we couldn’t be as successful as we are over there or here for that matter. In fact, we probably 

BALAD F-16 FIGHTER DEPLOYMENT, MAY 2007 – JULY 2008

2178
wouldn’t even be able to get to the fight. We are fortunate here at the 301 FW that we have the professionals on the support side of the house that we do. There is a 

lot of experience, and they do an outstanding job, prepping us to get out the door and supporting us while we are there. On the maintenance side of the house, I have 

been working with these maintenance guys for a long time. The faces have changed out there but not the product. They are absolutely the best in the CAF, the combat 

air forces. This last time over there, we flew, I think, 437 sorties during our portion there, that doesn’t include the 482nd Fighter Wing, who we partnered with over 

there. So for the first 40 days of the ATO, we flew over 1,850 hours, and we didn’t lose one sortie due to a maintenance problem. That is pretty remarkable. These 

guys performed their jobs. I’ve been there in the summer when it’s 120 degrees, and I’ve been there in the winter. When it gets cold, it rains—crummy weather and 

a lot of mud. The mud creates a lot of problems in the winter, and the maintenance guys plow through all that. They are simply the best.

TSgt Snowman: Deploying for weeks and months takes a significant toll on military families. Many airmen have deployed multiple times, and many, like you, deployed in harm’s way. Can you talk a little about how you and your family coped with you being away for so long? Any personal experiences you would care to 

share? 

Col Mortensen: Ok. Every family is different and at different stages in their lives. My kids are fairly young, so they don’t comprehend a lot of things that might 

bother older kids. This is the thing I would say about families. Obviously when somebody is deployed, it adds a lot of stress to the family. How do you counter that? 

One thing is preparation for the deployment, and that’s getting your affairs in order. That is legal and financial affairs. You should do that early, a year prior to the 

deployment. That will avoid the rush at the end trying to get out the door when everybody else is doing it and the stresses that it induces. So, get those legal affairs 

taken care of—have a will and powers of attorney just like the Air Force preaches to you. Get your financial affairs in order. Brief the spouse that is left behind on 

all those affairs, so they are comfortable with it. Prepare a checklist, and I know that Family Services provides these. So if something goes wrong either at this end 

or that end, they know where everything is and how to reach the appropriate people. I think if you have this plan in place prior to deployment and you’ve talked about 

it with the person staying behind, they feel more comfortable when you’re deployed. It will alleviate a lot of stress. Then, keep your family informed of when you’re 

going to deploy and for how long. You have to stay within force protection and classification issues, but you can let them know when you’re going to be gone. A lot 

has to be done before the deployment because it is very difficult to coordinate things from there to here with the time change, phone issues, and email issues. It’s a lot 

better if this is all done before. Second is communication. From the AOR, you have email and telephones most of the time, so it’s a lot easier to communicate back 

home. You need to take advantage of that every week, or whenever you can talk to your spouse and kids. I would talk about their lives not yours. Family Services is 

a great organization to tap into for the family left here at home station. There are other support assets that the military provides, so make sure your family is aware 

of Family Services and how to contact them. Don’t hesitate to contact them if you have problems. There are a lot of people here to help in the member’s absence. 

Then, make a family return to base plan. When you get back and you’re off duty for a while on R & R, take advantage of that time and spend it with your family. 

As you approach the end of your deployment and you have communicated with them from the AOR, talk that up, so you have something positive to look forward to.

TSgt Snowman: Is there anything else you would like to add, sir? 

Col Mortensen: I would say when you asked me questions about the AEF, it gets you thinking about the past. Deploying to the AOR, that was a very rewarding 

time and maybe a highlight. These deployments are really what we do for a living and why we’re here. Like you said earlier go fly, fight, and win when our nation 

calls. When I look back, like I mentioned I’ve been here 22 years, the thing that stands out are the people I’ve worked with in all aspects of the wing—maintenance, 

MPF, all the support side, and obviously the operations side, which I have been closely involved with. That’s what really stands out. You have a good quality of 

people that work here in the Air Force Reserve in general and the 301 FW in particular. I really appreciate that. When you start talking about deployments, all this 

is done with volunteerism. When you look back and see that many people going over there for that length of time and it’s all done through volunteerism, that’s pretty 

impressive. That says a lot of the individuals that make up this wing. I’m very honored to serve with these people, and I really appreciate them.

Interview, Colonel Robert Mortensen, 301st Fighter Wing Vice Commander and 332nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron Commander, by Technical Sergeant John 

Snowman, 301st Historian, 2008

218
peddled kabobs and falafel to people passing 

by. Security patrols reported that the most immediate threats encountered were stray dogs 

and children begging for candy. Overall, the 

village was bustling with activity.21 The success of the mission was an important verification of the Clear—Hold—Build strategy at a 

time when the Iraqi people were at a crucial 

point in rebuilding their nation. Moreover, it 

shed light on the potential success of the surge 

mission called for by President Bush earlier in 

the year. 

CIVIL ENGINEERS

Sixteen Air Force Reserve Command combat engineer squadrons from across the command contributed to surge operations. As part 

of the Iraq effort, during the summer of 2007, 

Air Force Reserve civil engineering units 

provided Prime Beef support with more than 

40 personnel deploying. Over 110 Air Force 

Reserve Red Horse personnel deployed from 

May to August 2007 to Iraq and a location 

in Southwest Asia. Explosive ordinance and 

demolition technicians provided a year-round 

themselves 

by teaching the local residents 

trades that 

they could 

use to rebuild 

their town. 

In Hawr Rajab, members 

of the 557th 

E x p e d i t i o n a r y 

Red Horse Squadron, including Air 

Force Reservists, 

participated in the 

program, which ultimately taught 181 

men skills such as 

plumbing, electrical, masonry, carpentry, and welldrilling. Before 

the classes began, 

the civil engineers 

built their own living quarters and 

classrooms at the small Army patrol base near 

the village. Air Force Reservists provided the 

curriculum and taught the courses.20 

Within weeks of the program start-up, the village was relatively safe. Shops and markets 

reopened, children played soccer, and along 

the main road were painted pro-American 

graffiti. Restaurants were open and the venders 

on. The first thing we need to do is rebuild our 

homes.”19 Having established a secure hold 

on the town, the rebuilding effort began to take 

shape. Although there were enough people 

in the town to assist, there were few with the 

skills to do so. To remedy the lack of expertise, an experimental program, the “Village of 

Hope,” was initiated to give residents the opportunity to learn a trade. The concept behind 

the program was simple: help people to help 

We at the CASF level are helping the Iraqis to load both fixed wing and 

rotary aircraft with Iraqi patients. They are in the infancy of learning 

their entire AE system. We have had Iraqi doctors stay here as our guests, 

observing what we do, and how the whole AE system works. Of course, 

this is not just a CASF effort, the Joint Theater Hospital at Joint Base 

Balad is driving it, and we are just playing our role in supporting it.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Hedglin, CASF Flight Commander, Joint 

Base Balad, Iraq, 2008

One interesting point about this rotation; you actually get to shake hands 

with an Iraqi pilot or Iraqi flight nurse. That is a wonderful part of this 

war. To actually see how we are finally handing things over to the Iraqis, 

and how they are at the point of letting us help, allowing us to help resolve 

any issues collectively with them, and enabling them to ultimately take 

over. We did not have that interaction during my 2004 deployment. Last 

time, there was minimal interaction typically, consisting of a smile, small 

talk, and then you move on. Sometimes you did not even talk to them because of their culture aspects with women.

Master Sergeant Jenny K. Carney, NCOIC CASF, Joint Base Balad, Iraq, 

2008

IRAQI AERO-EVACUATION

21920
not only set records but also verified the resiliency and capabilities of the Air Force Reserve Command for sustained operations. In 

2007, the command’s tanker units contributed over 5,500 flying hours for both Iraq and 

Afghanistan air refueling requirements but 

would provide over 13,200 and 12,400 flying hours for 2010 and 2011, respectively.24

Also supporting the troop surge activities 

in Iraq during the summer of 2007 were 

Air Force Reserve Command aircrews and 

maintainers from the 301st Fighter Wing, 

Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas, and 

the 482nd Fighter Wing, Homestead Air 

Reserve Base, Florida. Over a four-month 

period, May-August, the “Spads” and the 

“Makos” F-16 pilots logged nearly 3,900 

hours, performing 901 sorties from Balad 

Air Base.25 Thereafter, the 419th Fighter 

Wing, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, began 

its rotation in August through September 

TANKER, AIRLIFT, FIGHTER 

SUPPORT

The Air Force Reserve Command 

responded to the broad range of 

surge requirements during the summer months of 2007. This included 

substantial air refueling support. 

Seven AFRC tanker units teamed 

and rotated personnel to provide refueling missions to coalition forces 

from May through August. Operating from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, were the 434th Air Refueling 

Wing, Grissom Air Reserve Base, 

Indiana; 931st Air Refueling Group, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; 459th 

Air Refueling Wing, Andrews Air 

Force Base, Maryland; 452nd Air 

Mobility Wing, March Air Reserve 

Base, California, and the 916th Air 

Refueling Wing, Seymour-Johnson 

Air Force Base, North Carolina. In 

May, the 434th and 931st paired 

with the former unit designated the 

lead; in June, the 931st took over 

the lead status. For July, the 459th 

led while paired with the 916th, and 

the 452nd provided air refuelings 

during August. Flying tanker missions, maintaining aircraft, and providing mission support throughout 

the four-month period kept the tempo high for 

all of the tasked units.23 As the focus moved 

from Iraq to Afghanistan, air refueling units 

were called to participate in operations that 

presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan. These 

deployments ranged from 120 to 179 days 

with the vast majority of the Air Force Reservists volunteering.22

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tion in exposure to insurgent attacks.30 By 

October 2010, the theater direct delivery operation noted its millionth ton delivered upon 

arrival at Bagram Airfield.31

THREE BASES PLAN 

In September 2007, the Air Force Reserve 

Command developed a way ahead that restructured how Air Force Reservists deployed. 

The AFRC AEF cell staff, Carl Vogt and Dan 

Powell, had noted much turmoil, as “nearly 

every major organization in AFRC is supporting AEF practically every pair. This means 

the deployment machine is running constantly 

in every unit across the command while the 

organization has lost predictability for future 

planning activities; this is exactly the opposite of a major tenet of the AEF construct.”32

The average number of Air Force Reservists 

volunteering each AEF pair exceeded 2,000 

from some 57 major organizations and 165 

squadrons. Moreover, in a typical laydown 

of forces to the AOR area, Air Force ReservGermany, as the 779th Expeditionary Airlift 

Flight. Members of the 779th EAF provided 

airlift support to the US European Command 

and flew throughout Europe, Africa, and also 

into the AOR, augmenting the air mobility 

fleet. On 25 January 2008, Air Force Reserve 

Command airmen flew the first C-17 rotational 

airlift operation from Ramstein in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom’s NATO Training 

Mission in Iraq.29

Originally initiated in 2005, this dedicated airlift effort evolved into what became termed 

“theater direct delivery” with detachments 

located more forward throughout Southwest 

Asia AOR locations from the main squadron. 

The innovation improved aircrew utilization 

and management as well as the delivery of 

troops and cargo with now predictive forecasting. Each rotation’s teaming and deployment 

of their own administrative support meant the 

senior leadership knew the crews capabilities, 

enhancing operations further. This became 

a two expeditionary airlift squadron concept 

with its outlying units operating in direct support of US Central Command and fulfilling 

airlift and airdrop requests identified by their 

air and space operations center. Metrics demonstrated the success of the theater direct delivery concept. Utilization of the C-17 reduced 

C-130 requirements from 64 to 34 airframes. 

Sorties flown increased from 4,000 to some 

19,000 by 2008 with 765,500 tons delivered 

and 2.0 million passengers transported since 

inception during the summer of 2005. Fewer 

trucks and bus movements equated to a reduc2008.26 The 301st Fighter Wing saw action in 

and around Baghdad, including operations that 

supported a successful rescue of three Army 

soldiers. Colonel Robert “Mort” Mortensen, 

301st Fighter Wing Vice Commander, characterized the fighter deployment missions as 

mainly “close air support.” Training for these 

kinds of missions began prior to deployment. 

Skill sets needed for the specific missions that 

would be encountered in an ever-changing environment required spin-up training programs 

that prepared pilots and maintainers to “hit the 

ground running.” Maintainers were responsible for many aircraft issues in the preparation 

stage that included phased maintenance and 

inspections, deployment planning, and ground 

operations.27

Air Force Reserve Command forces supported the airlift movement requirements for 

the five US Army brigades required for the 

redefined mission in Iraq. Sorties and flying 

hours for the C-5 and C-17 transports totaled 

nearly 4,950 and over 26,000, respectively, for 

Iraq alone in 2007. C-130s assets contributed 

some 710 sorties, flying 1,640 hours for the 

surge, likewise underscoring the magnitude of 

the effort.28 In January 2008, the Air Force 

Reserve Command also provided dedicated 

strategic airlift C-17 aircrews from the 514th 

Air Mobility Wing, McGuire Air Force Base, 

New Jersey; the 315th Airlift Wing, Joint Base 

Charleston, South Carolina; and the 446th Airlift Wing from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 

Washington, who voluntarily teamed up to 

fill an AEF rotation at Ramstein Air Base, 

2234
port forces predominately at three deployed 

locations: Balad, Bagram, and Kirkuk Air 

Bases. Re-linking the flying—the iron—

with the expeditionary combat support and 

increasing voluntary deployers from within 

the AEF vulnerable “buckets” moved the 

command towards increased efficiencies and 

predictability with the attending stability for 

its members and their civilian employers and 

families all the while meeting the demands 

of the Total Force Integration associate organizational changes and the 2005 Base 

Realignment and Closure actions,36 which 

affected the command the most of any Air 

Force command. 

The predictability of the three bases policy 

provided other important benefits. Aviation 

and expeditionary combat support personnel 

could then expect to deploy every 20 months 

and to the same location as a possibility. The 

plan optimized the ability of Air Force Reservists to deploy as a team with their leadership and enabled utilizing single-ticket 

dedicated airlift for better efficiency and 

cost savings. Most importantly, the three 

bases plan supported volunteerism, which 

remained as the command’s first method of 

choice for supporting GWOT. Other administrative issues tempered by implementing 

the three bases plan included de-conflicting 

unit inspection cycles and major unit training events.37 While the command adopted 

the three bases policy, Air Force Reservists 

continued to serve throughout the AOR and 

globally. 

ity from diverse unit type code (UTC) packages.33 The AFRC AEF cell staff found, “As 

we have robbed Peter to pay Paul in rainbowing UTCs, we create ever more broken UTCs 

and muddle the process up further. This has 

become ever more apparent 

when it comes to identifying 

units for mobilization authority.”34

Thus, Lieutenant General John 

A. Bradley, the Air Force Reserve Command Commander, 

approved the “three bases” 

concept to align with the Air 

Force leadership’s goal and out 

of a desire to increase predictability and stability, refocus 

the command’s units on the 

AEF pairs, and provide more 

opportunities to deploy in 

larger elements or teams along 

with assuming more leadership roles. General Bradley 

believed that “It’s important 

and helpful for people to serve 

where they know people. . . ., 

and we do that by buying hundreds of positions at a place 

instead of spreading them out 

all over the place.”35 Subsequently, beginning in January 

2008, the Air Force Reserve 

Command consolidated some 

of its flying and especially its 

expeditionary combat supists were “spread all over the map” in a fragmented fashion. The Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force, General T. Michael Moseley, had also 

promoted more teaming and unit deployment 

than trying to mold a cohesive combat capabil

224
Ms Kennedy: You spoke of a three component Air Force.

Lt Gen Stenner: Three components. This to me is imperative. If you don’t look at it as a three-piece whole and you only look at how you deal with the 

active force and define yourself by how many active duty members you have, then you don’t get the synergy with the associations. And if you only look 

at what you keep in the Guard and Reserve, then you only regard us, perhaps, for just surge. There has always been hesitancy by the planners because 

they didn’t have assured access daily. You do if you have mobilizations. But, they don’t believe they have assured access otherwise. While mobilization 

is a piece, we have our record on volunteerism these past twenty years.

When you look at the one piece that is unique to the Air Force, which has defined us for decades now, it is that we train and maintain the same standards. 

And, that’s where you come to the reality of a three component Air Force. We are a three component Air Force, seamlessly integrated. We are able to 

integrate seamlessly because we do train and maintain the same standards. If you don’t, you become an active duty, a Reserve, and a Guard.

Ms Kennedy: And when you define it as active duty, Guard and Reserve, those walls are very steep as it was decades ago. What you’re describing with 

these three components, I can go back twenty-five, thirty years ago and find ‘Well, we can’t count on you.’ And they still used the phrase of ‘Oh, you’re 

a weekend warrior.’ So, your thinking is based on these last couple of decades when we were there.

Lt Gen Stenner: Yes. We have been there. We did corporately fund the CAF and MAF missions to maintain and sustain those SORTs, tier one ready 

levels, and the expeditionary combat support has come right along with it. We can seamlessly integrate, and we do. And, it’s important. That’s how we 

define ourselves as a service—as an Air Force, three components. If we don’t, we’ll never define ourselves as an airman. We’ll always define ourselves 

by the iron. When you ask the Navy, it is: I’m a naval aviator.’ When you ask us, it is: ‘I’m an A-10 guy.’ ‘Well, you’re not an Air Force aviator?’ Or 

pick any airplane; you define yourself by that airplane, and the unit does, too. Then, you get farther away from that three component Air Force. If you 

define yourself as a three component Air Force, everyone can find themselves in there one way or the other. Nuances.

Ms Kennedy: You are also telling me that the Air Force Reservists and Guardsmen of today are thinking and serving differently than those in the early 

‘80s. They serve concurrently with a civilian career and reserve service when in the past they were waiting for the big one [war] to be called up. It’s 

an entirely different kind of thinking, and the system has not totally accommodated this reserve person and his or her contribution.

Lt Gen Stenner: It has not, and this is a big piece of working through the nuances of what’s in the dwell. When you have Air Force Reservists on duty 

to the military for 200 days a year and they are still trying to do their civilian jobs, there is not a whole lot of time left for family. So, there‘s the needed 

balance. When you’ve got triggers that start mobilizations for us and when you have mobilization triggers that don’t mean anything or have not been 

counted appropriately, we are stressing the wrong force. We don’t count the stress on the Guard and Reserve. The trigger is on the active that says they 

are stressed. So, we trigger the mobilization. Well, we have been using mobilizations fairly liberally in some cases, especially when daily operations 

are the preponderance of the effort such as in the air mobility fleet. You can’t count it the same way. So, we are working through the how do you count 

it. And how do you ensure you are not just labeling one piece of the force as the one that you are concerned about being stressed. You have got to be 

concerned about all three components and the stress on all of them. There has got to be a balance there, too. So, we haven’t quite cracked the code on 

what is dwell, what is deploy, and how, when you have three parts to your life, you factor that in. That’s the civilian, family, and reserve pieces. The 

MOBILIZATION - ACCESS

\

225 226
We’ve made huge adjustments, such as deciding we are going to primarily buy AEF positions at Balad, Bagram, and Kirkuk in large numbers, so we 

can send more people together from a unit to a location. It’s important and helpful for people to serve where they know people. So, we want to send 

people from the same unit if we can, and we do that by buying hundreds of positions at a place instead of spreading them out all over the place. That’s 

paid great dividends for us. It improves morale. It makes our units more effective over there, I think. People want to serve together. We found we 

were all over the board and fractured. We needed to instill some policies that enabled us to do this for the long term. Really, only 15 percent of our 

force is available for longer tours unless we mobilize them. General Rusty Moen and his staff did some analysis that showed we should concentrate 

our efforts at Balad and Kirkurk in Iraq and at Bagram in Afghanistan. Our security forces have ‘bought,’ so to speak, the base at Kirkuk, signed up 

to provide the security. We’ve been rotating them in, their UTCs [unit type codes], on six-month tours since the end of 2007.

In December 2007 when I visited Kirkuk, we had around 275 security forces and around 100 civil engineers from several units. They were on sixmonth tours. The security forces commander was one of our own female officers, Lieutenant Colonel Mary Lutz, and we are proud of her. We had 

to mobilize security forces to do this. I wish we could do it all with volunteers.

The feedback I get is that it is working very well. I’ve went to these three locations, and I’ve talked to people about how it’s going. They’re glad that 

they get to go with their buddies. Before we made this decision to do it, I had been at a CENTCOM base outside of Iraq and Afghanistan. I was talking to a firefighter, I believe in Kuwait, and he stated there were twenty airmen from fifteen different units there. And he said to me, ‘Sir, if you would 

put more of us from our unit in one place, we’d volunteer to stay longer. Stop spreading us out so much. We’d volunteer more often, and we’d stay 

longer.’ Now that we’ve done this for a year, it has had an impact. While we have mobilized security forces and civil engineers, and so forth, they are 

glad that they are there with their buddies. They’ve trained together, and they know each other and know how they will react. They are like family. 

People want to go with people they know instead of being there with strangers. It works better for morale. So, the feedback I got on my last trip in 

December was really positive with what we’ve done.

 

Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, CAFR & AFRC Commander, End of Tour Interview, April and May 2008

family piece is almost a wash for all three components. But, the civilian job with its employer piece is not. We still have a lot of work to do, I think.

We all recoginze the need for a next construct and the need for predictability. The ARC was looked at being a ‘plug and play’ with their associate unit 

organizations. The active did not understand the predictability for all, the issues of requesting reserve assistance, our need for the ‘white space,’ nor 

the employer piece. The dwell has got to be factored in. We need to meet SECDEF approved requirements and the requirements of the Combatant 

Commands. Everything else is operational support. So, AMC is operational support unless USTRANSCOM has a COCOM requirement. In the past, 

AMC has been pretty loose in triggering us or indicating a need on ‘emerging’ requirements.

Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr., CAFR & Commander AFRC, End Of Tour Interview, July 2012

HUGE DIVIDENDS

226
Ms Kennedy: In partnering, how well has this worked and why?

Lt Gen Bradley: We partner with the Guard and the active duty very well. One of the reasons why it works is because this Total Force Policy has allowed us to all train to the same standard or forced us to all train to the same standards, have the same kinds of inspections, and have the same kinds 

of readiness requirements. We do things the same way. Our tactics, techniques, and procedures are the same. So, it’s easy to put things together. We 

put rainbow units in many places with the Guard and the active Air Force. But, it’s easy because we all train the same way. We all have the same 

standards. It was not difficult at all. 

Ms Kennedy: Where there any issues?

Lt Gen Bradley: Not about working together, no.

Ms Kennedy: In going full force initially—nobody ever expected this to go on for years and years. So, how do we make this judgment call on using the 

Air Force Reserve?

Lt Gen Bradley: Well, what I tell people I don’t think the Air Force Reserve is being over-used, over-stressed too much. There are people who think we 

are. I don’t see indications that we are. I worry about it a lot. But, what we try to do is keep the tours at a reasonable length and not mobilize people. 

There are benefits to being mobilized. There are also cons to it, too. But, there are benefits to using volunteers, and that’s what has made it successful for us. We’ve not had a shortage of volunteers for our AEF requirements. We are having units that have deployed the fourth and fifth time in six 

years, and they’re still volunteering. We keep their tour lengths, generally, at a reasonable level, and the Air Force lets us do this. They let us manage 

our people, which is good, healthy, and works. If we were to mobilize everybody, we’d have more problems. But, our recruiting and retention are very 

strong, so I don’t see indications that we’re asking people to do too much. We are asking them to do a lot, but we go around and tell them: ‘We’re going 

to ask you to do some more—stay with us, we need you.’

Ms Kennedy: This has been another evolutionary progression for the Air Force Reserve, and you have been a very strong advocate of volunteering. 

Previously, we had Desert Shield/Storm, where we had volunteering and mobilization in sizeable numbers, and in Kosovo we still had volunteering and 

mobilizations. What basically is driving you to volunteering as the first preference?

Lt Gen Bradley: I think mobilizations should be a last resort. You can always mobilize every single person, if you get permission. I don’t want to use 

up that capability too early because there are rules about mobilization that limit you using them indefinitely. So, why not do it where the tours are 

reasonable? You get people home quicker, ask them to volunteer again, and not use up that mobilization capability. I really think it is smart to not 

mobilize because we need people, and we are going to need them for a long haul. Let’s just save up the mobilization for when we just can’t do it any 

other way. To me, it just makes great sense and is logical. We can use them over, and over, and over again in a volunteerism status. We can’t do that 

with a mobilization.

Ms Kennedy: When did this become apparent to you?

VOLUNTEERISM – MOBILIZATION

2278
Lt Gen Bradley: Well, pretty quickly after I got in this job. In fact, before I even got in it, I had a briefing about our C-130s and the mobilization that 

we did. I thought it was done improperly with a lot of flaws. AMC wanted us to do it; they didn’t think the war would last long—‘So, let’s not make a 

mistake. Let’s make sure we’ve got everything we need. Let’s mobilize.’ And we tried to talk them out of this. We had a different idea of using volunteers 

and being able to sustain an operation for a long, long time. We knew if we mobilized, we were limited. Sure enough, it turned out to be true. So, I 

saw it right away and said next time, ‘Let’s do it with volunteers.’ Don’t go through another mobilization where we misused people. We had our C-130 

people mobilized too long. We sent them over, brought them home, and left them mobilized. They still flew some missions in the states, but we really 

had twice as many people mobilized for the requirement for CENTCOM. Thus, we used up the capability way too fast. It became apparent to me before 

we had even finished that we made a mistake with this. We—Air Force Reserve—tried not to; AMC insisted on it.

So, now what we are doing is using volunteers. We are putting C-130s in an AEF construct just like our A-10s and F-16s, and expeditionary combat 

support people, and we’re not mobilizing them.

Ms Kennedy: AMC’s position at that point in time could you account for their thinking on this as being old thinking?

Lt Gen Bradley: I think so. Let me say short-range thinking. They weren’t taking the long view. The AMC staff said ‘This is not going to last long.’ 

Really, what I am talking about is when we went into Iraq. They didn’t have the long view on it. They didn’t plan on it lasting long. It will be short and 

quick is what they thought. ‘We’re just going to mobilize for a short time to make sure we have the capability we need, and then we’re going to be done.’ 

Well, it wasn’t short. It’s long, and it’s going to be longer. They made a mistake. It was bad judgment on their part. We tried to convince them that we 

had a way to give them the capability they wanted and that we could keep that capability going for a long time. They thought they were smarter than 

we were. How’s that for candor. I have quotes. We have people who said, ‘We know better than you. We’re going to make sure we don’t mess this up. 

It’s not going to last long. We’re going to do it this way.’ The attitude was we don’t want to mess it up on our watch. We’re going to be gone in a couple 

of years on the AMC staff. I’m not going to worry about it [the long view]. We’re going to make sure we’re not going to mess it up—a very short view 

of things, I think.

Ms Kennedy: Even though we had Total Force, the view was you call up the Reserves and you utilize them. AMC didn’t have to think about employer 

issues and everything else.

Lt Gen Bradley: Oh, no. They don’t see things through the eyes of a Reservist. They cannot do that. They don’t understand. I think it was a big mistake. 

I tell you we used the C-130 capability twice as fast as we had to. We ran out a year and a half ago. We had to stop, and we had a year of reconstitution. 

We’re back in with 130s now, but we are doing it with volunteers. I talked to the chief and said, ‘I want to do these like A-10s and F-16s. How much different is a C-130? You pick up something at point A and carry it to point B whether you’re in an A-10 or C-130, and I think we can do it with volunteers 

in an AEF construct instead of mobilizing people.’ He said, ‘Good. I like it, John. Let’s do that.’ He was very supportive. So, I talked about it a lot, 

and this is the way we decided to do it.

 Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, CAFR & AFRC Commander, End of Tour Interview, April and May 2008

228
Air Force Reserve Staff Sergeant Francisco “Paco” T. Martinez, was 44 years old. He was a member of the 610th Security Forces Squadron (SFS), Naval Air Station 

Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth, Texas, when deployed to Iraq in July 2008. It was a little over four years since his son, US Army Specialist Francisco “Paquito” G. 

Martinez, age 20, was sent to the same area of responsibility.Paquito Martinez was a forward observer from the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery attached to a scout 

platoon in Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment. He was killed in action 20 March 2005 by an enemy sniper in the Tamin area of Ramadi, Iraq. Only 

four days earlier, Paquito told Army Times reporter, Gina Cavallaro, that he preferred patrolling with the scouts outside the wire rather than sitting guard on a gate 

somewhere.

Paquito’s father supported his son’s decision to join the Army. At the time, the young man was only 17, just out of high school, and in a down job market. So, he chose 

to enlist for the educational and financial benefits as well as to help out with the economics of his family’s household. He and his father began a physical training 

program together. Paquito was a skateboarder but was never into sports or physical fitness. His dad was overweight and, as he himself admitted, completely out of 

shape. But in the summer of 2002, they worked out together to the point of being able to pass an Army fitness test. Twenty years earlier, the senior Martinez had also 

enlisted in the Army as a young man. Two years later, he transferred to the regular Air Force in security forces. It was during this time that his only son Paquito was 

born. After over nine year’s service, Paco left the Air Force in 1991 and pursued a career in information technology.

Shortly after his son was killed, the father seriously considered the prospect of returning to the military. But, he realized it would have been too soon. He wanted to 

make sure he was doing it for the right reasons. Also, he did not want to neglect his wife and daughter at that time. About a year later, he had something of a revelation and decided that he must go to Iraq.

“Of course revenge crept into my mind,” he said. “My son was killed there. But revenge is God’s job. I was blessed with a wonderful son who served his country and 

is now in Heaven. My job was not to hurt those who took him away . . .. My job was different. I needed to do what other parents (in similar circumstances) couldn’t 

do. I needed to go over there and, by doing my job, make sure everyone else’s sons and daughters come home safely.”

Paco also felt that as an “old timer” the younger troops might benefit from his guidance and experience. And so, in the summer of 2006, he enlisted in the 610th SFS 

and subsequently attended the US Air Force Security Police Academy. In early 2008, he volunteered for a six- month tour in Iraq and arrived at Kirkuk Air Base on 

17 July.

In Kirkuk, the father thought about his son many times and after a few weeks began to feel his presence. He imagined his son as a young boy on a skateboard or as 

a soldier previously stationed in Korea. “But, while I was in Iraq,” Staff Sergeant Martinez told a reporter, “I could feel so in touch with the Paquito who patrolled 

there. He manifested himself in the people who were with me. We often worked with people from the Army who were doing the exact same patrols done by him.”

During his time there, the base experienced dozens of attacks from rockets and mortar fire. There were many tense moments as Paco rode in an uparmored Humvee, 

stood watch in a guard tower, performed searches, or patrolled the many miles of perimeter fence that surrounded the base. But, he felt like he was doing what he was 

meant to do. He was protecting airmen and soldiers. He kept them safe, so they could return home to their families.

The stresses of hardships endured overseas faded and were replaced by euphoria and happiness when Staff Sergeant Martinez safely returned home in January 2009. 

“I dedicate this homecoming experience to my son,” Paco wrote in his blog, “and to every son and daughter that did not make it back. Thank you America for your 

love and support.”

IN HIS SON’S FOOTSTEPS

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In the fall of 2008, Afghan President Hamid Karzai made an official visit 

to the United States. The trip began when President Karzai visited the 

United Nations in New York on 24 September where he thanked the members of the General Assembly for their assistance in fighting the war on 

terror. Afterwards he met with several Americans and foreign leaders 

and addressed the Asia Society in Manhattan.

The next morning, President Karzai was in Washington DC for a meeting 

with the leadership of the Senate and expressed his deep gratitude for US 

support in fighting terror and in rebuilding his country. That afternoon 

he joined members of the House of Representatives for a similar discussion. Karzai also met separately with Vice President Cheney, Senators 

John Kerry, and Hilary Clinton. He spoke to Senator Joseph Lieberman 

over the phone.

On 26 September, Karzai addressed the Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars about overcoming security problems in Afghanistan. 

In the afternoon, he visited the White House and participated in a teleconference with President George W. Bush, US Defense Secretary Robert 

Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, governors of Afghan provinces, and others.

Later, in a private conference with President Bush, Karzai thanked the 

American people through him for all they had done for Afghanistan. “I 

would like you to remember, as you leave office, Karzai added, “that Afghanistan will remember you tremendously nicely, with affection.” He 

also invited Bush to visit his country again before leaving office.

His whirlwind trip at an end, President Karzai was ready to be taken home 

by members of the Air Force Reserve Command. According to Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel L. Ward, 514th Air Mobility Wing, McGuire Air 

Force Base, New Jersey, the final leg of his journey was from Andrews 

Air Force Base to Afghanistan. The Air Force Reserve crew that flew the 

C-17 dropped off the Afghan President on 27 September 2008.

AFRC C-17 - AFGHAN PRESIDENT

235 236
Vice President Joe Biden made his third visit to Iraq as VP in September 2009. On the way he stopped at RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom 

on Air Force Two. After a short hop to an airbase in Europe, he transferred to a C-17 cargo plane for the flight to Baghdad. This flight’s mission 

commander was Air Force Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Nathaniel L. Ward Jr., 514th Air Mobility Wing, McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey.

A White House statement informed that Vice President Biden would convey a strong US commitment to Iraq’s future. Early in his administration, 

President Obama had asked the VP to provide sustained, high-level focus from the White House on Iraq, and this trip was part of that mission. Biden 

had also visited Iraq in January and July, 2009.

In an effort to disturb the visit, insurgents launched four mortar shells into the Green Zone on 15 September. This was as Biden’s first day was ending at the American embassy. The Green Zone is the unofficial name for the International Zone, the walled off area in the heart of Baghdad that was 

home to government offices, the US and British embassies, and parliament. This attack was responsible for at least two deaths and several injuries.

Another attack occurred the next day. Terrorists fired two rockets that landed near the American embassy compound and a second near the Babylon 

Hotel in the city. It happened just after Biden’s formal meeting with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. At 

least one death and several more wounded resulted from this attack. Neither Mr. Biden nor Mr. Maliki 

mentioned either attack during brief public remarks before sitting down to a traditional dinner to break 

the Ramadan fast.

On 17 September, the Vice President met with Iraqi President Jalal Talanai and the president of the semiautonomous Kurdish region, Massoud Barzani. After a flight back to Europe on the C-17 that took him 

to Iraq, the Vice President returned to Wilmington, Delaware, early on the morning of 18 September.

Looking back on the trip, Lieutenant Colonel Ward wrote that Vice President Biden “would delay everything to make sure he personally shook everyone’s hand and took all the pictures they wanted (much to 

the annoyance of the Secret Service and timekeepers). He came into the flight deck and shot the breeze 

with us for quite a while on subjects like college football and raising kids.” Colonel Ward also remembered the Vice President as very laid back and easy to converse with.

AFRC C-17 CREW – VICE PRESIDENT

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network and the chain of events leading to 

IEDs in an area.41 By the end of 2007, Iraqi 

insurgents were deploying six IEDs to inflict 

one coalition casualty.42 

Although technological advancements made 

the EOD technician’s work safer and more 

efficient, the risks of direct fighting situations remained. These risks 

became evident for the Air 

Force Reserve Command 

in Operation Dark Rest in 

February 2010. While serving on a six-month tour 

with the 755th Bravo EOD 

Flight at Kandahar Airfield, 

Afghanistan, Technical Sergeant Stephen J. Kaufman, 

an Air Force Reservist from 

the 512th Airlift Wing, Dover AFB, Delaware, was 

supporting an elite British 

unit of the Royal Marines. 

The mission was to kill or 

capture Taliban in Central 

Helmand. During a patrol 

mission on 26 February, 

Sergeant Kaufman and his 

EOD team encountered an 

IED attack when one member of the British 

unit was killed instantly after stepping on a 

pressure plate. The unit came under smallarms fire and engaged in a lengthy firefight for 

some hours. Sergeant Kaufman’s actions were 

notable that day.43 By the conclusion of his 

tour in March 2010, Technical Sergeant Steand training both Iraqi and coalition personnel. Working in teams, these skilled service 

members handled upwards of 6,000 IEDs in a 

ten-month period.39 The Air Force Reserve 

Command continued to support a significant 

portion of this effort.40 Although IED casualties in Iraq were high in the first half of 2007, 

those numbers dropped dramatically by the 

end of the year. However, the opposite trend 

was observed in Afghanistan. There were 

three major factors for the turnaround in Iraq: 

local factions decided to support coalition efforts, the sustained presence of coalition forces 

in the Baghdad area, and successful military 

operations that proved disruptive to the IED 

COUNTERING IED

One important development during the wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan was the increasing frequency whereby Air Force Reservists could 

be found working beyond the confines and 

safety of the air base. Operations occurring 

“outside the wire” placed these personnel at 

risk and resulted in combat injuries and fatalities. This could not 

have been more evident than in 

the Air Force Reserve explosive 

ordinance and demolition community. The improvised explosive 

device (IED) had emerged as the 

key combat strategy of both the 

Iraq and Afghanistan insurgencies. 

The emphasis placed on improvised explosive device operations 

in Afghanistan resulted in a host of 

new technological developments 

for the explosive ordinance and demolition technicians who served in 

austere and hostile environments, 

countering the deadly improvised 

explosive device threat.

May 2007 was the deadliest month 

of the war in Iraq to date. Accordingly during that month, 89 of the 131 coalition combat fatalities were the result of an 

IED attack representing 68 percent of total fatalities.38 By the end of 2007, more than 500 

EOD technicians were deployed to Iraq with 

the mission of dismantling the IED production network, clearing IEDs, assessing attacks, 

2378
“HE WOULDN’T HAVE CHANGED A THING”

His friends called him “Tony.” Chris Terrell, a fellow service member and Tony’s best friend from back home in Florence, Kentucky, described him 

as a person who needed more out of life. The Air Force Reserve filled that need. In a letter written to mourners after his death, his wife expressed, 

EOD was “a passion for Tony far above what he ever imagined; he wouldn’t have changed a thing.” On 15 December 2009, Technical Sergeant Anthony C. Campbell, Jr., EOD technician from the 932nd Civil Engineering Squadron, gave his life during a mission in support of Operation Enduring 

Freedom in the battle against improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in southern Afghanistan. 

The mission on that day was not ordinary. Technical Sergeant Campbell’s team was supporting Joint Task Force Paladin at its new regional southern 

headquarters in Kandahar during a counter-IED surge. These new counter-IED teams, specializing in forensics and evidence collection, deployed 

with the goal of targeting networks of bomb makers and builders. The role of counter-IED teams significantly increased when IED events in Afghanistan tripled in 2009. “We have to be perfect; we have to find every IED. But the insurgents just have to be lucky and put one out there that we miss,” 

said Colonel Mark Lee, counter-IED coordinator for Paladin South. 

On 15 December, Campbell and his team were supporting British special forces tasked with a cordon and search mission located in the vicinity of 

Heydarabad, Central Helmand Province, where a suspected Taliban operative was hiding. It was likely that the area was mined or booby-trapped, 

so they scanned the ground for command wires and buried explosives. Moving slowly, the explosive ordinance disposal team led the way into the 

village. They split into two pairs, and Campbell was tasked with clearing a safe route for follow-on forces. Campbell encountered an IED in his 

team’s path. As he selflessly took his team out of danger, the device detonated. The explosion killed Technical Sergeant Campbell; his team leader 

was seriously injured. 

Technical Sergeant Campbell and the members of his bomb disposal team were operating on 

the cutting edge of the US military’s effort to end the predominance of the IED as a method 

used to cripple the troop surge and break the supply lines of coalition forces. Since IEDs caused 

more than sixty percent of US war casualties in Afghanistan, Campbell’s work as an Air Force 

Reserve Command EOD technician was a critical contribution in staying ahead of the enemy. 

Campbell had originally been slated to deploy to the United Arab Emirates, but he volunteered 

to spend his tour in the more dangerous Afghanistan. He had been with the Air Force Reserve 

since 2005 and had begun serving as a Cincinnati police officer just weeks before his deployment. During his 2009 deployment to Afghanistan, Campbell had assisted in the recovery and 

destruction of more than 280 bombs and bulk explosive charges and had also disposed of more 

than 2,500 pounds of explosives. He was one of 275 service members killed by IEDs in 2009. 

Technical Sergeant Anthony Campbell left behind a wife and three children. For his act of heroism, the Air Force posthumously awarded the Air Force Reservist the Bronze Star with Valor, 

the Purple Heart, and the Air Force Combat Action Medal. He also received the Army Commendation Medal and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.

TECHNICAL SERGEANT ANTHONY C. CAMPBELL, JR 

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The Air Force Reserve Command presented the Bronze Star Medal to Technical Sergeants Stephen J. Kaufmann, Steven W. Hager, and Timothy Haffner 

for their actions while serving as EOD technicians in Afghanistan. Their service is emblematic of the Air Force Reserve Command’s EOD effort in the 

Global War on Terrorism. The Bronze Star Medal, the fourth-highest US Armed Forces combat award, is awarded to warfighters for acts of bravery or 

meritorious service.

During his deployment from September 2009 to March 2010, Technical Sergeant Steven J. Kaufmann, a 512th EOD Flight team leader, provided explosive ordinance support to several coalition organizations. On 26 February 2010, Technical Sergeant Kaufmann and his EOD team supported Operation 

Dark Rest. The mission of this 100-man reconnaissance force was to capture or kill a group of Taliban near the town of Marjah in central Helmand. 

During the patrol, a detonated IED device killed one man and injured three others. Ensuring that his EOD team was free of any injuries, Technical Sergeant Kaufmann searched the area for other mines and cleared a helicopter landing zone. After the medical evacuation, the patrol came under fire. The 

EOD team took cover, suppressed enemy fire, and covered the flanks of the unit. After four hours of gunfire, the patrol overcame the enemy and killed 

one Taliban commander. That night, they observed four Taliban replacing the removed IEDs and took the fight to the Taliban’s compound. Technical 

Sergeant Kaufmann and his team accompanied the task force as they assaulted the compound, killing six members of the Taliban cell responsible for 

laying the deadly IED. While returning from the mission, Technical Sergeant Kaufmann and his crew cleared two more IEDs placed by the insurgents. 

On 5 March 2011, a Bronze Star Medal was presented to Technical Sergeant Steven W. Hager of the 944th Civil Engineer Squadron EOD Flight. During 

his deployment to Afghanistan, Technical Sergeant Hager participated in 93 counter-improvised explosive device missions. On one of those missions, 

Hager assisted in the extraction of three seriously wounded soldiers from a vehicle that had been involved with an IED detonation. In another mission, 

Technical Sergeant Hager’s EOD team engaged enemy forces in an ambush. While being fired upon, Technical Sergeant Hager and his team continued 

to sweep the area for IEDs. Additionally, his follow-up actions made a significant contribution to future counter-IED missions.

Technical Sergeant Timothy C. Haffner, an EOD technician serving with the 482nd Civil engineering Squadron, received the Bronze Star Medal for 

his actions in Iraq on 24 March 2007. This was the first Bronze Star Medal awarded to a member of the 482nd Fighter Wing, Homestead Air Reserve 

Base, Florida. According to the citation for the award, Technical Sergeant Haffner’s team came under fire while on a patrol near Sather Air Base, Iraq. 

Haffner directed his team to take immediate cover. After returning fire, Technical Sergeant Haffner moved his team toward a targeted safe house and 

assisted in clearing the objective. From there, his team provided security for members of an approaching US Army scout platoon. Technical Sergeant 

Haffner’s EOD team continued the mission of clearing enemy ordnance caches in the area.

Although many other Air Force Reserve Command members received the Bronze Star Medal and other awards for valor and meritorious service during 

the Global War on Terrorism timeframe, Technical Sergeants Kaufmann, Hager, and Haffner are emblematic of the significant contributions made by 

Air Force Reservists. These airmen and their wingmen consistently demonstrated their dedication to duty while contributing to the overall mission. 

EOD – BRONZE STARS

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casualties from the battlefield combat zone 

to Category Three theater hospitals primarily 

at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, 

and Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. From there, 

the coalition and Air Force 

Total Forc medical staffs 

performed life-saving procedures. Thereafter, aeromedical staging personnel 

prepared stabilized patients 

for evacuation by active 

and reserve component 

C-130 and C-17 aircrews 

and medical personnel. 

The aeromedical evacuation system transferred 

wounded personnel to 

higher level care facilities 

such as Landsthul Regional 

Medical Center, Ramstein 

Air Base, Germany, running two to seven missions 

a week. From Germany, 

scheduled usually three 

times a week, KC-135 and 

C-17 crews flew channel 

missions across the Atlantic Ocean transporting patients identified for follow-on surgeries 

as well as long-term care to medical facilities 

in the United States. This system, which averaged up to 1,300 patients per month, was highly effective at increasing the survivability of 

battlefield casualties. Overall, the expeditious 

patient care, deliveries, and follow-on movements had resulted in a decrease in deaths over 

patients since October 2001 for Operations 

Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, achieving fewer 

than 10 percent dying from battlefield wounds 

and the aeromedical transport survival rate exceeding 98 percent for those reaching a theater level hospital, historically the highest rate 

ever.46 

In this period, C-130 tactical airlift crews and 

HH-60 combat search and rescue crews typically supported the evacuation of coalition 

phen J. Kaufman contributed to the destruction of 54,000 pounds of munitions items, 108 

unexploded ordnance items, 

71 named operations, and the 

clearance of 6,871 miles of danger-filled roadways throughout 

the Kandahar, Helmand, and 

Zabul provinces, supporting the 

United Kingdom, Danish, and 

Estonian forces in clearing insurgent cells.44 

TAKING CARE

Air Force Reserve Command 

operations in Iraq represented 

a wide array of specialty skills 

and mission sets, and this was 

no more evident than in the 

medical support for the US 

warfighter. Air Force Reservists made a significant contribution to the aeromedical 

missions, representing over 60 

percent of the total aeromedical 

capability with the Air National 

Guard providing 28 percent and 

the active duty 12 percent, respectively. Significantly, since 2007, Air Force Reserve Command mobilization requirements were being 

met by members volunteering. In 2008, over 

500 AFRC nurses and medical technicians deployed stateside and globally and were serving with their active and Air National Guard 

components.45 Together, by May 2011, this 

Total Force team had transported some 86,000 

2412
cal technicians shouldered the workload that 

was normally done by a much larger medical team of three doctors and seven technicians. Despite this shortage, he expressed 

that great things could be accomplished if 

a person had the right attitude and a service 

mentality in such circumstances. He instilled this in his team. Doctor Becton credited his father, who had twenty-two years 

with the Army special forces, as his inspiration to serve the military.49 Likewise, 

flight nurse Captain Susan McCormick from 

Westover’s 439th Aeromedical Evacuation 

Flight related, “The skills we use in flight 

need to be practiced daily. My experience in 

the OR and ER has helped me become a better nurse.”50 Captain McCormick brought 

years of medical experience from her civilian hospital in Worchester, Massachusetts. 

In 2009, she was serving on her third deployment. “I couldn’t picture myself doing anything but this—giving someone the 

chance to survive when they risk their lives 

every day for us.”51 

POST-IRAQ SURGE

On 1 January 2009, the United States handed 

control of the Green Zone to the Iraqi government in a ceremony that restored Iraq’s 

sovereignty. Henceforth, 1 January would 

be a national holiday. Civilian deaths due to 

insurgent activities had declined as a result 

of the troop surge, and Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr called for his militia to observe 

a cease fire.52 On 31 January, Iraq held 

tients and acted as an emergency medical team 

as needed.48 

Air Force Reserve Command personnel were 

part of the medical operations on the ground, 

providing crucial support for combat troops. 

Using their knowledge from civilian work, 

these medical professionals brought years of 

experience to bear on the modern battlefield. 

As an example, Lieutenant Colonel Wendell 

Becton, an AFRC flight surgeon, spent his civilian time as a team doctor for the St. Louis 

Cardinals baseball team. In early 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Becton deployed to Bagram 

Air Base, Afghanistan, for his first deployment 

to a combat zone. He was the only physician 

at the air base for nearly two months and was 

responsible for the day-to-day well-being of 

more than 2,500 airmen. He and two mediprevious conflicts.47 

Advancing care, the Air Force medical service 

collaborated with its joint and coalition partners in 2011 to establish an en route critical 

care patient movement system to augment the 

existing tactical transport, enabling a wounded 

patient to be transferred to a forward surgical 

team as soon as possible, usually within an 

hour. Most often these patients were moved 

via helicopter to the trauma center. Accordingly, Tactical Critical Care Evacuation Teams 

(TCCETs) would support these inter-hospital 

transfers as necessary. The TCCETs would 

augment the Army flight medic and the Air 

Force pararescue on missions as well as on 

the aeromedical missions or augment the far 

forward Critical Care Air Transport Teams 

(CCATTs), who flew with severely injured paThere was an abundance of joint interactions with the Army especially during my last deployment, 

and that is why I do not like it when someone separates the services, puts one of the branches 

down, or mentions that one is better than another. I try to explain to people, that once you have 

been in a combat zone with other service members that negative comments are unacceptable. We 

are all one, we are doing the job together, and we are still working jointly today. Whether it was 

Army personnel providing our security when we first got here or the Marines on the front lines . . 

. we are one team in need of each other. We still have Army medics integrated with us now for all 

different reasons. Last time that I was here, back in 2004, the Army did not have as many vehicles 

as we did, and yet the Army started taking over our critical care patients. When those missions 

were happening, we would assist the Army by physically getting the critical patients from the assigned medical tents, since they lacked the vehicles. However, they did the majority of the care 

for us, and we helped them with the transportation. It is a constant state of assisting one another, 

what can we do for you, and what can you do for us. Together, we get the mission done!

 Master Sergeant Jenny K. Carney, AFRC, NCOIC CASF, Balad, Iraq, Interview with SSgt Scott 

J. Gaitley, Historian, November 2008

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On 3 July 2007, at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Army Sergeant Dan Powers’ injury defined for the armed forces how unifying Total Force efforts have been. 

Sergeant Powers, a squad leader with the 118th Military Police Company (Airborne) from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was stabbed in the head with a 

9-inch knife penetrating 4 inches into his brain by an insurgent on the streets of Baghdad. 

Sergeant Powers “had no idea what was going on.” He only felt like he had been hit hard; fellow soldiers told him “sit down, you have a knife stuck in 

you.” A medic from the squad began to treat him, and he was soon on his way to the Balad hospital. At the medical facility in Iraq, Sergeant Powers 

was assessed and immediately moved to the operating room where Army doctors performed surgery to remove the blade with Air Force hospital staff 

supporting. Air Force personnel e-mailed images of Powers’ head to an Army neurosurgeon in the United States who parked his car, opened his laptop, 

and guided the operation to remove the weapon via electronic communication. Removal of the knife from Sergeant Powers’ head caused him to bleed 

excessively, requiring more medical attention from the stateside neurosurgeon via e-mail. Meanwhile, back at Balad, a critical care air transport team 

(CCATT) was alerted to fly non-stop to Bethesda Naval Hospital, Maryland. The team would provide in-flight care to Sergeant Powers and another 

soldier with a penetrating gunshot wound to the neck. 

An Air Force Reserve Command CCATT from the 433rd Aeromedical Staging Squadron, assigned to Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, responded to the 

urgent mission. Normally, a critical aeromedical mission stopped at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany before flying to stateside facilities. 

Because of the medical attention each soldier needed, changing crews or planes was deemed too risky. 

A Total Force team of active duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve comprised the 14-hour air travel to the United States. The trip went 

smoothly until a furious thunderstorm began tossing the aircraft around during an air refueling. Air Force Reserve Captain Patricia Hayden, a registered nurse with the critical care air transport team recalled, “with the help and support of the amazing aeromedical evacuation crew, I made it through...

monitoring the patients.” Touching down on the United States’ soil on 4 July 2007, the Navy provided facilities for the Army neurosurgeon to complete 

Sergeant Powers’ operation and also for his recovery.

The combined and integrated effort of the Air Force, Army, and Navy saved the wounded soldier’s and Sergeant Powers’ lives. The joint service effort demonstrated how effective Total Force could be when sharing 

the work load. Aeromedical evacuations such as this one proved that for anyone wearing any US uniform, 

our country will deliver regardless of the cost involved. Life should not have a price tag attached when saving an American. Sergeant Powers suffered no lasting effects from the knife attack.

 

By Staff Sergeant Sa’Maad I. Bynum, 916th Air Refueling Wing Historian

TOTAL FORCE EFFORTS SAVE SOLDIER

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“The horrors of war” is a common expression that rightfully tells of how war exposes participants to men and women at their worst. Here the ordinary do and see the extraordinary from the death of another human being to the embrace of a wounded child. And among the worst injuries is when 

a soldier is burned. That truly marks a horror of war. But, what happens when a burn occurs and, more importantly, what do the highly skilled 

surgeons do when all they can provide is simply not enough? For Chaplain (Captain) Howard S. Bell, it’s when he has to literally do and hope for his 

best through the power of prayer.

As told by Chaplain Bell, the night of Tuesday, 20 May 2008, was such a night. Already busy from hosting distinguished visitors and preparing the 

remains of a Muslim national, word was received that two US service members were coming to the Bagram hospital, and both were badly hurt. They 

had been victims of an IED (improvised explosive device) attack. One had burns over 75 percent of his body. Chaplain Bell along with other hospital 

and wing chaplains watched and prayed as the doctors did what they could. 

When it became apparent the doctors were taking the soldier to surgery and no priest had arrived, Chaplain Bell went in to the emergency room and 

asked the senior surgeon, known as the Trauma Czar, if he could bless the soldier. He said, “Of course, chaplain, get right in there.”

The emergency room staff stopped what they were doing and allowed him to lay hands on the soldier and the three chaplains prayed for him. Then 

the priest arrived and the chaplains went to find the other soldier who Chaplain Bell knew was Catholic. Coming back, the priest said, “Let me anoint 

the first victim, just in case.” But by that time, they were wheeling the soldier into the sterile operating room. Again, the Trauma Czar said, “I don’t 

care . . . get in there and anoint him.” So the priest and Chaplain Bell went into the room and anointed him. They found out later the patient was 

Baptist but were sure he didn’t mind.

At about 11 p.m. that night, the soldier died. The next morning there was a Fallen Comrade Ceremony after which Chaplain Bell went on to the 

morning staff meeting. He thanked the doctors and nurses for allowing him to do his job the night before. The Trauma Czar said, “There was really 

nothing we could have done to save that life. Probably the best care we gave him was what we allowed our chaplain to do.”

 By Colonel Thomas A. Deall, Special Assistant to the Vice Commander, HQ AFRC

WHERE MODERN MEDICINE ENDS

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The use of body armor has primarily limited combat injuries to the head and extremities. These particular types of injuries have been a focal point for 

our advanced treatment methods. Patients that have extremity and/or head injuries place an additional burden on the healthcare system, since they now 

are functioning with disabilities that would have taken the lives of service members in previous conflicts. When the centers of excellence procedures 

are in place, and suitable medical care is provided to those particular casualties requiring rehabilitation and specialty treatment, I think that we will 

always continue to learn ways of making things better. 

We have learned a great number of things in terms of our approach to medical treatment, and I believe that we have contributed to the civilian community by sharing our experiences in trauma, and what works best in those types of settings. The civilian medical specialists, who have had the opportunity 

to visit the area of responsibility (AOR) and witness this conflict firsthand, will be able to provide valuable lessons learned, enabling us to have access 

to this information, which will benefit us into the future.

It will be necessary for us to commit to memory and integrate not only those lessons learned, but we need to embrace those practical experiences into 

our current training lessons. One thing that has happened in previous conflicts, Vietnam included, is that we have personnel arriving in a combat theater, and literally starting their medical training over again, in regards to treating casualties. Our desire for unconventional aspects of medical training 

led to the C-STARS [Center for Sustainment of Trauma and Readiness] program. This allows folks a training environment where we will teach them at 

places like Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Baltimore. Then, if they have to step in and assist during a medical mission, they can recall their training in the 

C-STARS program and perform more efficiently.

I am hopeful that we will improve on our abilities of maintaining and integrating what we have learned, proving our readiness and knowing how to treat 

casualties in the beginning when we go in the next time. 

 

 Colonel Dominic A. DeFrancis, AFRC Command Surgeon, June 2010

IMPROVING CARE

245 246
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Dilapidated fired orange brick walls with cracked mortar lines and ragged shell holes betrayed the critical cyber connectivity capacities encased in 

the Iraqi building located at Camp Ramadi FOB on the Euphrates River in the western provincial province named Al Anbar in 2008. A dull orange 

glow filtered through the heavy dust hanging in the doorway from the Skype center inside. An angry screaming, the slap of a hand on plywood, and a 

sustained string of profanities preceded the sudden appearance of a young male exploding through the opening into stifling heat of the night. ‘I can’t 

do a #!* thing about your *%#! problems from this *#%! Hell-hole!’ Instinctively, as a chaplain I trailed the form with the M-4 carelessly slung over 

his shoulder through the countless rows of billeting containerized housing units (CANs) hoping for an opportunity to engage at the DFAC—dining 

facility. However, I soon lost him behind the maze of concrete protective t-walls that shielded us from mortar shelling.

In seminary, I was recruited for the Chaplain Corps service in 1984 during the Cold War promises that the reserve Air Force strategic posture for 

individual mobility augmentees (IMA) required 24 days a year of training at a local base. An eight-month Joint Forces Command combat deployment 

as senior garrison chaplain in a Marine AO (area of operation) with an Army commander and Navy deputy commander was impossible then to even 

conceive so, too, would be a prediction that young men and women could have instant, regular contact with loved ones struggling to carry on a half-aworld away back home. Even in January 1991 on active duty for two weeks when the Gulf War kicked off, I had been stunned to be actually standing 

at a deployment line and on the flight line at McClellan AFB, California, sending a security forces unit to Saudi Arabia. But still, the mission prior 

to 9/11 for an IMA chaplain consisted of supporting and sending from a secure US base as well as backfilling for deploying active duty chaplains. 

My experience above demonstrated the many ways the reserve Chaplain Corps mission has changed in my 27 years of service: deployed in combat, 

working on a joint forces team, attending to young Marines’ distresses, struggling to survive separations both helped and hurt by continual contacts 

with loved ones back home.

 Chaplain Colonel Gary R. Califf, March 2010

AIR FORCE CHAPLAIN CORPS – WORKING ON THE JOINT TEAM

We learn more and more with our CCATT experiences in terms of our ability to move what were formerly the previous aeromedevac paradigm, which 

was just moving stable patients. Now, we move stabilized patients with the idea that these folks are continually ventilated and under pain management. Again, they have had incomplete surgeries or stabilizing surgeries at our trauma centers, and they are moved on to Landstuhl Regional Medical 

Center, Germany, and those types of places. One of the things that we are happy with is the small footprint that we make with all of our equipment, 

and we are looking to improve this even more. A lot of that research has gone into the equipment itself. There are ventilators that sense the need of 

the patient and deliver ventilator support automatically, versus adjustments made by the medical staff in the air. All that stuff is amazing; they are 

continually looking to add to that piece. Also, access to the patients as well, because when they are all packaged up with the many pieces of equipment 

that surrounds them, obviously, it is in our interest to make that equipment smaller so that our access to the patient improves.

 Colonel Dominic A. DeFrancis, AFRC Command Surgeon, Interview, June 2010

CCATT

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252
On 28 July 2008, a US special forces (ODA) element, including Afghani National Army (ANA) soldiers, operating near the Afghani town of Tarin Kowt was ambushed 

by a Taliban force of superior size and unknown strength. Due to the severity of the ongoing firefight, the ODA team was not able to immediately confirm the number 

of sustained casualties to their team. They quickly maneuvered to a defensive position and were subsequently able to identify at least three critical casualties. While 

continuing to fight, they contacted ISAF Regional Command-South (RC-S) and requested the rescue/recovery of the wounded soldiers, close air support (CAS), and an 

emergency re-supply of ammo to replenish their severely depleted stores. The crew of Shocker 21, a US Air Force medevac helicopter attached to the 101st Airborne 

Division based nearby, listened on their radio as the battle unfolded. Factoring the request/requirement for urgent ammo re-supply against the only other means 

of delivery, ground transport of no-less-than three hours through confined IED-saturated enemy territory, the aircraft commander, in anticipation of their tasking, 

ordered the load-out of as much ammo as their aircraft could safely carry. Shortly after the ODA call for help went out, RC-S contacted the crew of Shocker 21 (Lt 

Col Paul Nevius, 1Lt Brough McDonald, SSgt Sean Loose, SSgt James Benson, SSgt Jeffrey Hamilton and SrA Scott Dowd) and assigned them to perform a daytime 

battlefield evacuation mission to extract three critically wounded Afghan commandos attached to a United States special forces element in contact with enemy forces. 

Lead aircraft, Shocker 21, proceeded with Stab 41, a coalition AH-64 gunship, to the point of injury. Lt Col Nevius and 1Lt McDonald maneuvered their aircraft 

through heavily occupied enemy territory and, upon arrival in the terminal area, received an urgent call-for-fire by an embedded USAF combat control technician 

(CCT) to engage enemy forces (EF). Shocker 21 released Stab 41 from their RESCORT role, transferring control to the USAF CCT for targeting prosecution; simultaneously, Shocker 21 continued to the hot LZ. Under continuous enemy fire, ammo was offloaded; PJ’s secured the two severely injured personnel and loaded them on 

the aircraft. The RESCORT aircraft and ODA continued to engage EF’s within 300 meters of Shocker; Shocker 21 departed the LZ under heavy SA fire enroute to the 

nearby US Field Surgical Team (FST).

 Upon patient delivery to the US FST, Shocker was informed a third patient was now in need of immediate evacuation. While the crew refueled for the continuing mission, the crew members coordinated with special forces for a second emergency ammo re-supply.

They rescued three critically wounded Afghans on two previous sorties by landing in exposed, targeted landing zones. During the entire mission, consisting of four 

separate landings to locations within 300 meters of active enemy positions, SSgt Hamilton and SrA Dowd repeatedly departed the aircraft under heavy small arms 

fire to unload ammunition or collect battlefield casualties. Three critically wounded Afghan National Army personnel were saved by SSgt Hamilton and Amn Dowd’s 

courageous actions. On two separate occasions during the mission, they triaged and loaded casualties onto Shocker 21. They treated the casualties’ gunshot wounds 

and stabilized them until their delivery to a US Forward Surgical Team at Forward Operating Base Ripley. Their actions permitted the re-supply of US and Afghani 

soldiers, which was previously impossible via ground transportation, critical to removing enemy resistance in the heavily contested Uruzgan Province. On four separate occasions, despite the heavy volume of enemy fire impacting within 50 meters of his helicopter, Hamilton and Dowd voluntarily exposed themselves to fire while 

delivering over 3,000 pounds of small arms ammunition, 40 millimeter grenades, and 82 millimeter mortar rounds. Upon arriving in the objective area on the third 

sortie, the special forces team, under heavy effective enemy fire requested Shocker 21 execute ordinance delivery in close air support. Colonel Nevius immediately 

maneuvered his aircraft and, with the help of Lt McDonald, visually acquired overwhelming enemy forces actively firing upon the Special Forces Team and his aircraft 

from numerous locations. He then directed the aircraft’s gunners, SSgts Sean Loose and James Benson to suppress the enemy threats. Throughout the five ensuing 

weapons employment patterns, the crew of Shocker 21 maneuvered their aircraft into a position to protect the special forces team while directing continued accurate 

and destructive fire onto numerous points of origin, neutralizing multiple enemy firing positions. Despite intelligence indicating enemy action specifically targeting 

his rescue helicopter, Colonel Nevius and his crew voluntarily returned to the area for a fourth time to provide an emergency re-supply. Colonel Nevius and his crew 

are credited with eliminating eight Taliban fighters, including three high-value targets, and crippling enemy resistance by decapitating the Taliban’s Uruzgan Province 

command structure. The outstanding heroism and selfless devotion to duty displayed by Colonel Nevius reflect great credit upon himself and the United States Air 

Force.

 Reported by Lieutenant Colonel Paul Nevius, H-60G Pave Hawk 90-26228

SHOCKER 21 MISSION

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Office of the Press Secretary August 31, 2010 

Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq [Extract]

Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Tonight, I’d like to talk to you about the end of our combat mission in Iraq, the ongoing security challenges we face, 

and the need to rebuild our nation here at home. 

I know this historic moment comes at a time of great uncertainty for many Americans. We’ve now been through nearly a decade of war. We’ve endured 

a long and painful recession. And sometimes in the midst of these storms, the future that we’re trying to build for our nation—a future of lasting peace 

and long-term prosperity—may seem beyond our reach.

But this milestone should serve as a reminder to all Americans that the future is ours to shape if we move forward with confidence and commitment. It 

should also serve as a message to the world that the United States of America intends to sustain and strengthen our leadership in this young century.

From this desk, seven and a half years ago, President Bush announced the beginning of military operations in Iraq. Much has changed since that night. 

A war to disarm a state became a fight against an insurgency. Terrorism and sectarian warfare threatened to tear Iraq apart. Thousands of Americans 

gave their lives; tens of thousands have been wounded. Our relations abroad were strained. Our unity at home was tested.

These are the rough waters encountered during the course of one of America’s longest wars. Yet there has been one constant amidst these shifting tides. 

At every turn, America’s men and women in uniform have served with courage and resolve. As Commander-in-Chief, I am incredibly proud of their 

service. And like all Americans, I’m awed by their sacrifice, and by the sacrifices of their families.

The Americans who have served in Iraq completed every mission they were given. They defeated a regime that had terrorized its people. Together with 

Iraqis and coalition partners who made huge sacrifices of their own, our troops fought block by block to help Iraq seize the chance for a better future. 

They shifted tactics to protect the Iraqi people, trained Iraqi Security Forces, and took out terrorist leaders. Because of our troops and civilians—and 

because of the resilience of the Iraqi people—Iraq has the opportunity to embrace a new destiny, even though many challenges remain.

So tonight, I am announcing that the American combat mission in Iraq has ended. Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people now have lead 

responsibility for the security of their country.

That’s what we’ve done. We’ve removed nearly 100,000 U.S. troops from Iraq. We’ve closed or transferred to the Iraqis hundreds of bases. And we 

have moved millions of pieces of equipment out of Iraq.

This completes a transition to Iraqi responsibility for their own security. U.S. troops pulled out of Iraq’s cities last summer, and Iraqi forces have moved 

into the lead with considerable skill and commitment to their fellow citizens. Even as Iraq continues to suffer terrorist attacks, security incidents have 

been near the lowest on record since the war began. And Iraqi forces have taken the fight to al Qaeda, removing much of its leadership in Iraqi-led 

operations.

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This year also saw Iraq hold credible elections that drew a strong turnout. A caretaker administration is in place as Iraqis form a government based 

on the results of that election. Tonight, I encourage Iraq’s leaders to move forward with a sense of urgency to form an inclusive government that is 

just, representative, and accountable to the Iraqi people. And when that government is in place, there should be no doubt: The Iraqi people will have 

a strong partner in the United States. Our combat mission is ending, but our commitment to Iraq’s future is not.

Going forward, a transitional force of U.S. troops will remain in Iraq with a different mission: advising and assisting Iraq’s Security Forces, supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counterterrorism missions, and protecting our civilians. Consistent with our agreement with the Iraqi government, all U.S. 

troops will leave by the end of next year. As our military draws down, our dedicated civilians—diplomats, aid workers, and advisors—are moving into 

the lead to support Iraq as it strengthens its government, resolves political disputes, resettles those displaced by war, and builds ties with the region 

and the world. That’s a message that Vice President Biden is delivering to the Iraqi people through his visit there today.

This new approach reflects our long-term partnership with Iraq—one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect. Of course, violence will not 

end with our combat mission. Extremists will continue to set off bombs, attack Iraqi civilians and try to spark sectarian strife. But ultimately, these 

terrorists will fail to achieve their goals. Iraqis are a proud people. They have rejected sectarian war, and they have no interest in endless destruction. They understand that, in the end, only Iraqis can resolve their differences and police their streets. Only Iraqis can build a democracy within 

their borders. What America can do, and will do, is provide support for the Iraqi people as both a friend and a partner.

Ending this war is not only in Iraq’s interest—it’s in our own. The United States has paid a huge price to put the future of Iraq in the hands of its 

people. We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at 

home. We’ve persevered because of a belief we share with the Iraqi people—a belief that out of the ashes of war, a new beginning could be born in 

this cradle of civilization. Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it’s time 

to turn the page.

As we do, I’m mindful that the Iraq war has been a contentious issue at home. Here, too, it’s time to turn the page. This afternoon, I spoke to former 

President George W. Bush. It’s well known that he and I disagreed about the war from its outset. Yet no one can doubt President Bush’s support for 

our troops, or his love of country and commitment to our security. As I’ve said, there were patriots who supported this war, and patriots who opposed 

it. And all of us are united in appreciation for our servicemen and women, and our hopes for Iraqis’ future.

 The greatness of our democracy is grounded in our ability to move beyond our differences, and to learn from our experience as we confront the many 

challenges ahead. And no challenge is more essential to our security than our fight against al Qaeda.

 Americans across the political spectrum supported the use of force against those who attacked us on 9/11. Now, as we approach our 10th year of 

combat in Afghanistan, there are those who are understandably asking tough questions about our mission there. But we must never lose sight of 

what’s at stake. As we speak, al Qaeda continues to plot against us, and its leadership remains anchored in the border regions of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. We will disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, while preventing Afghanistan from again serving as a base for terrorists. And because of 

our drawdown in Iraq, we are now able to apply the resources necessary to go on offense. In fact, over the last 19 months, nearly a dozen al Qaeda 

leaders—and hundreds of al Qaeda’s extremist allies—have been killed or captured around the world.

Within Afghanistan, I’ve ordered the deployment of additional troops who—under the command of General David Petraeus—are fighting to break 

the Taliban’s momentum. 

256
As with the surge in Iraq, these forces will be in place for a limited time to provide space for the Afghans to build their capacity and secure their own 

future. But, as was the case in Iraq, we can’t do for Afghans what they must ultimately do for themselves. That’s why we’re training Afghan Security 

Forces and supporting a political resolution to Afghanistan’s problems. And next August, we will begin a transition to Afghan responsibility. The pace 

of our troop reductions will be determined by conditions on the ground, and our support for Afghanistan will endure. But make no mistake: This transition will begin—because open-ended war serves neither our interests nor the Afghan people’s.

Indeed, one of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all 

elements of our power—including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America’s example—to secure our interests and stand by 

our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that’s based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes—a vision that recognizes the real dangers 

that exist around the world, but also the limitless possibilities of our time.

Today, old adversaries are at peace, and emerging democracies are potential partners. New markets for our goods stretch from Asia to the Americas. 

A new push for peace in the Middle East will begin here tomorrow. Billions of young people want to move beyond the shackles of poverty and conflict. 

As the leader of the free world, America will do more than just defeat on the battlefield those who offer hatred and destruction—we will also lead among 

those who are willing to work together to expand freedom and opportunity for all people.

. . .

And so at this moment, as we wind down the war in Iraq, we must tackle those challenges at home with as much energy, and grit, and sense of common purpose as our men and women in uniform who have served abroad. They have met every test that they faced. Now, it’s our turn. Now, it’s our 

responsibility to honor them by coming together, all of us, and working to secure the dream that so many generations have fought for—the dream that 

a better life awaits anyone who is willing to work for it and reach for it.

. . .

 Part of that responsibility is making sure that we honor our commitments to those who have served our country with such valor. As long as I am President, we will maintain the finest fighting force that the world has ever known, and we will do whatever it takes to serve our veterans as well as they 

have served us. This is a sacred trust. That’s why we’ve already made one of the largest increases in funding for veterans in decades. We’re treating 

the signature wounds of today’s wars—post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury—while providing the health care and benefits that all 

of our veterans have earned. And we’re funding a Post-9/11 GI Bill that helps our veterans and their families pursue the dream of a college education. 

Just as the GI Bill helped those who fought World War II—including my grandfather—become the backbone of our middle class, so today’s servicemen 

and women must have the chance to apply their gifts to expand the American economy. Because part of ending a war responsibly is standing by those 

who have fought it.

Two weeks ago, America’s final combat brigade in Iraq—the Army’s Fourth Stryker Brigade—journeyed home in the pre-dawn darkness. Thousands 

of soldiers and hundreds of vehicles made the trip from Baghdad, the last of them passing into Kuwait in the early morning hours. Over seven years 

before, American troops and coalition partners had fought their way across similar highways, but this time no shots were fired. It was just a convoy of 

brave Americans, making their way home.

Of course, the soldiers left much behind. Some were teenagers when the war began. Many have served multiple tours of duty, far from families who 

2578
bore a heroic burden of their own, enduring the absence of a husband’s embrace or a mother’s kiss. Most painfully, since the war began, 55 members 

of the Fourth Stryker Brigade made the ultimate sacrifice—part of over 4,400 Americans who have given their lives in Iraq. As one staff sergeant said, 

‘I know that to my brothers in arms who fought and died, this day would probably mean a lot.’

Those Americans gave their lives for the values that have lived in the hearts of our people for over two centuries. Along with nearly 1.5 million Americans who have served in Iraq, they fought in a faraway place for people they never knew. They stared into the darkest of human creations—war—and 

helped the Iraqi people seek the light of peace.

 In an age without surrender ceremonies, we must earn victory through the success of our partners and the strength of our own nation. Every American who serves joins an unbroken line of heroes that stretches from Lexington to Gettysburg; from Iwo Jima to Inchon; from Khe Sanh to Kandahar—

Americans who have fought to see that the lives of our children are better than our own. Our troops are the steel in our ship of state. And though our 

nation may be travelling through rough waters, they give us confidence that our course is true, and that beyond the pre-dawn darkness, better days 

lie ahead.

Thank you. May God bless you. And may God bless the United States of America, and all who serve her.

 

 

258
Ms Kennedy: Let’s turn to building the Iraqi Air Force. When did you go over there specifically, and what were the kinds of things that you had to set up? 

Maj Gen Haddad: General Frank Padilla had to deal with some sticky issues prior to my arrival in Iraq. This concerned the multinational training command that 

was there.

Ms Kennedy: And the army was in charge.

Maj Gen Haddad: The army was in charge of standing up the Iraqi Air Force. There were no airmen involved in it. Then, they had that Comp Air crash and that’s 

what highlighted the fact that maybe the Air Force needed to get involved in helping to orchestrate and organize the Iraqi Air Force. When General Padilla was the 

MA at the TACC, he was brought over to bring strat airlift into Balad. He took this base at Balad, controlled by the Army, and pushed them aside. Tactfully, and with 

diplomacy, he turned that base into an air force base. He did such a good job that General Walter Buchanan, Ninth Air Force, asked him to come back and help with 

the Iraqi Air Force. He went in there and started the command organization staff that really did the CONOP and the strategic vision for the Iraqi Air Force. 

Ms Kennedy: That’s where General Clay McCutchan comes into it.

Maj Gen Haddad: Clay came into it because he did that aircraft assessment. Then, he brought me in to do their biggest operation of all, the New Al Muthana airport. 

All they had then were some Comp Airs, a couple of helicopters, and a couple of other platforms like the CH2000s. The main emphasis was on the three 130s that 

were gifted to them. So, that’s why he was brought in.

Ms Kennedy: So, elaborate on the new air base if you would. 

Maj Gen Haddad: I wasn’t at Keesler very long before General Padilla asked me to go to Iraq to help stand up the Iraqi Air Force. I spent six months in Baghdad 

helping to stand up their first air force base. It’s the New Al-Muthana Air Base in Baghdad. It’s right near Sather Air Base, which had been an Iraqi air force base 

at one time. The Republican Guard had taken it over. We destroyed the buildings, and later we rebuilt the structures. There were some Americans watching the 

construction prior to my arrival. Forty million dollars were spent on this project, and it was really shabby. I learned more about contracting than I ever wanted 

to. We were continually dealing with the warranty issues on it. Nevertheless, the buildings were rebuilt. General Padilla brought me in to oversee the whole project. 

I arrived there and found I had this combined forces staff. The guy that was in charge of mission support was Lieutenant Colonel Mawson. Mr. Jerry Ruiz, who 

works upstairs here in A4, was then Captain Ruiz. He was the supply guy. There was another officer, who did security forces. Then there was a civil engineer, motor 

vehicle, COM, medic, a Danish supply sergeant, and an Army sergeant major. They were setting up this whole base from force protection to you name it. They were 

doing everything. They were there to help prepare this base for the arrival of three C-130s from Tallil, the Iraqis who had been training on those airplanes, and the 

Americans who were their instructors. But, when I arrived, it was just the Americans I mentioned and a small contingent of maybe 20 Iraqi military. This included 

the commander of the base (a one-star general), the vice commander, and some other folks that were helping to get this base ready. A few weeks later, the three airplanes arrived with all the Americans that had been training the Iraqis and the Iraqis themselves. Overnight, the base was populated with all sorts of different people 

including the American trainers, the Iraqi maintainers, flyers, doctors, and other personnel. 

Ms Kennedy: I believe two of those C-130s were Air Force Reserve aircraft, and one was an Air National Guard C-130.

Maj Gen Haddad: You are right. The two Air Force Reserve aircraft were from Willow Grove. We had some challenges. You know all the things you take for granted 

being on bases in this country? There was nothing like that. All these things were built by this group of people that were just outstanding. We set up vehicle operations. We started training security cops from scratch, a fire department, and an operations section and a maintenance section for the C-130s. They built a nice little 

BUILDING THE IRAQI—AFGHAN AIR FORCES

259 260
clinic. The civil engineer began civil engineering projects all around the base and made sure they were taking care of the electrical system, the fuel, and the things 

that needed to be done from a civil engineering perspective.

Once again, it’s my mantra, but it’s all about relationships. We got on very well with the guys at Sather Air Base. General Dennis Ployer, one of our Air Force Reservists, was the commander there. He and I developed a great bond. I also worked with the State Department. Money was tough to come by. The Iraqis needed 

resources. All they had were buildings with basic equipment and then the airplanes with a CLS package. There was the maintenance piece there for them to be able to 

work on the airplanes, and they brought some things from Tallil. But, computers, pencils, paper, and basic supplies were very limited. I had to beg, borrow, and steal 

from all over the place to help bring this along. The State Department had an annex there at Baghdad. They gave me all their old furniture because they were bringing in new westernized furniture. I went back to the base with a deuce-and-a-half truck full of furniture for General Kareem. I said, ‘I brought you furniture.’ They 

were so grateful and thankful. What’s really interesting is that all that furniture belonged to Saddam. It had his symbols all over it. The Iraqis were very impressed 

to be sitting on Saddam’s furniture. We were able to go to the DRMO [Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office] and get all sorts of equipment for them. Their 

MOD [Ministry of Defense] would provide us supplies, but their supply system was hard to deal with. Their maintenance system was based on a Russian-type construct. They were good pilots and good maintainers, but they did things differently from the way we did it. We were training them and showing them our processes.

I had to make the point with many of the Americans that this was the Iraqi’s Air Force. We were not there to build an American air force. We were there to build an 

Iraqi Air Force. One example of this was we use seven people to tow a C-130. They didn’t have seven people to this. In the airline business, we did it with two. Why 

couldn’t you do it with three or four there? We had to make some changes in the way that we did things. They had a huge, beautiful hanger. You could probably put 

four or five C-130s in it. But, it didn’t have a fire suppression system in it. Technically, it is illegal to use the hanger in America. We weren’t in America. We needed 

to make sure that our guys understood that they needed to get the job done. Be as safe as you possibly could. Put fire extinguishers in the hanger. It doesn’t have a 

suppression system; we have fire extinguishers. That’s as good as it’s going to get.

 

There were a lot of such things. It was all about developing relationships and gaining their trust. If you sat down with them and said we think you need to do something this way because of these reasons, they would listen to you. But, if they didn’t trust you, they would listen, but they wouldn’t do a thing you said. I think we were 

successful in developing those positive relationships with them. It was a great time.

War was exciting. The adrenalin and the exhilaration of going to war were exciting. But, it was gratifying living with foreigners that I had been shooting up in Desert 

Storm. Now, I had the opportunity to break bread with them and hear about their families. I learned about their former air force and what it was like during Saddam. 

Then, I got to help them build this new air force, which I hear is doing quite well today with C-130s, King Airs, helicopters, and all sorts of things. I had a great six 

months there. It was very difficult for me to leave because of the relationships and watching this base progress right under my leadership so to speak. 

Ms Kennedy: You also worked on standing up the Afghan Air Force.

Maj Gen Haddad: Yes. General Padilla was asked to go do the same thing that he did in Iraq in Afghanistan. I wasn’t back at Keesler from Iraq very long when 

General Frank Padilla said, ‘I need you to go with me to Afghanistan to help do the strategic assessment there.’ We were there for about a month. This time, instead of 

being on the building part of the base, he asked me to be part of the team that went in to do the strategic assessment. We did the thinking to determine what were the 

priority missions and which bases we should start standing up within Afghanistan. It was prioritized based on the most important things such as the movement of the 

president, CASEVAC [casualty evacuation], and MEDEVAC [medical evacuation], because the latter are important in the Muslim faith that they get their bodies back 

within a certain period of time. So, that’s the way we set up that one. It was neat because I saw it at the operational-tactical level in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan, 

I saw it from the strategic level. General Padilla went back over there to be the first commander, so he got to see the buildup of the Afghani Air Force as well. In 

General Padilla, we have a man that has been the leading edge of the Iraq Air Force and the Afghani Air Force, and he is a reservist. I think that’s pretty remarkable. 

Major General Richard S. Haddad, Interview, 14 December 2011

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The 38th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron based at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, was inactivated 15 September 2010. A true Total Force team of regular, 

Reserve, Guard, and civilians; the squadron provided air, space and cyber capabilities for the US Europe Command, the US Africa Command, and US 

Central Command theater of operations. In response to an increased demand for airlift missions to the Balkan region, the 38th moved to Rhein-Main, 

Germany, in the 1990s.

By 1994, the 38th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, nicknamed the “Delta Squadron” had assumed its mission at Ramstein under the 86th Operations 

Group. Delta Squadron was different from other Ramstein units because it was faced with almost constant personnel turnover, as most of their airmen 

were Air Reserve personnel serving no longer than six months at a time. Prior to its inactivation, the squadron consisted largely of personnel from the 

910th Airlift Wing’s 737th and 773rd Airlift Squadrons from Youngstown Air Reserve Station, Ohio. Their focus was to provide mission-ready forces, 

airlift operations and base support.

While at Ramstein, the squadron contributed to the success of operations Joint Endeavor, Joint 

Forge, and Allied Force. The unit also provided extra airlift capability to reduce the strain on the 

active-duty folks who supported not only United States Air Forces in Europe, but operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom missions according to Technical Sergeant Kevin Merritt, C-130H2 Hercules 

flight engineer with the 773rd AS.

“In the past, this has been a win-win situation for both Team Ramstein and the Reservists,” said 

Major Gary Dodge, the last 38th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron mission commander with the 757th 

Airlift Squadron. “Team Ramstein gets additional aircraft to relieve some of the flying strain on 

the active-duty squadron, while the rotational squadrons from the Guard and Reserve get valuable 

experience flying in Europe and Africa – something they can’t get stateside.”

In 2004, the Delta Squadron flew medical and humanitarian supplies to Beslan, Russia, where a hostage crisis situation in a school there claimed more 

than 330 lives. Along with providing medical supplies and aid when needed, the 38th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron has also supported several other 

major events, such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration missions and the 65th anniversary of D-Day in Normandy, France. Between 2005 

and 2010, the unit logged more than 14,000 flying hours, carrying nearly 13,500 tons of cargo to various locations.

“I am a traditional Reservist and have been here for Operation Enterprise (formerly called Joint Forge) six times,” said Major Dodge. “Each time I have 

been here, I’ve been surrounded by great men and women from my unit that are very good at what they do. This translates into mission success for Team 

Ramstein.”

This success is thanks to the partnership of the active-duty base and the Guard and Reserve personnel stationed there temporarily.

“Since the 86th became an airlift wing, Guard and Reserve service in Delta and later the 38th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron has been absolutely critical to accomplishing our mission,” said Colonel Tim Budd, 86th Operations Group commander at Ramstein AB, Germany. “Most recently, we couldn’t 

have made the transition to the C-130J without them.”

DELTA SQUADRON

2612
secure Iraq, but an economically prosperous and stable one as well. With our Iraqi 

partners, our hope is to be able to enhance 

the ties of trade and commerce, increase our 

cultural and educational exchanges, open 

consulates in Basra and Erbil—all to ensure 

that our engagement spans the breadth and 

length of this country.”58

SURGE – AFGHANISTAN

Although the United States and the coalition partners had maintained a military presence in Afghanistan since 2001, the Taliban 

remained in common cause with al Qaeda 

and sought the overthrow of the Afghan 

government. By the summer of 2009, troop 

levels in Afghanistan were only a fraction 

of what they were in Iraq. The Taliban increasingly controlled more territory. United 

States commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for more forces to address the 

more serious security situation. In response 

to these requests, on 1 December 2009, 

President Barack Obama announced “as 

Commander-in-Chief, I have determined 

that it is in our vital national interest to 

send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will 

begin to come home.”59 As the President 

related, the goals of the surge in Afghanistan were twofold. First, the surge would 

seize the initiative with respect to stemming 

the growing insurgency. Second, additional 

troops would allow for the acceleration of 

building the Afghan capacity to provide for 

u l a t i o n . 

President 

O b a m a 

also proc l a i m e d 

that all 

t r o o p s 

would be 

out of Iraq 

by the end 

of 2011.55

D u r i n g 

the weeks 

leading up 

to the end 

of Iraqi 

Freedom, 

Air Force Reserve Command flying units carried on and flew more than 4,000 hours in the 

months of August and September 2010.56

 

On 1 September 2010, a change of command 

ceremony, held at the Al Faw Palace in Baghdad, commemorated the end of the war in Iraq. 

The American flag was lowered, and the Iraq 

flag now stood alone in front of the Al Faw Palace. The previous evening, President Barack 

Obama had addressed the American people 

on the end of combat operations. At Al Faw 

Palace, Vice President Joseph Biden was in attendance and delivered the remarks on behalf 

of the United States: “Operation Iraqi Freedom is over, but American engagement with 

Iraq will continue with the mission that begins 

today—Operation New Dawn.”57 Further, 

“Our goal—our goal is not just a physically 

provincial elections. Encouraged by a wave 

of positive news, President Barack Obama 

announced on 27 February 2009 from Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina, a plan that would end 

the war by August 2010.53 Accordingly on 31 

August 2010, President Obama declared, “So 

tonight, I am announcing that the American 

combat mission in Iraq has ended. Operation 

Iraqi Freedom is over, and the Iraqi people 

now have lead responsibility for the security 

of their country.”54 For some, the beginning 

of Operation New Dawn meant that the end of 

the US military’s role was in sight, but much 

work still remained for the Air Force and Air 

Force Reserve Command.

Supportive roles by the US military continued 

and included training and advising Iraqi Security Forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism missions, and protecting the civilian popSince war is a human endeavor, its contours can never be fully drawn with numbers. But the sheer scope of our commitment to the Iraqi people bears some reflection.

More than a million American service members have deployed here since the conflict began. And I am awed—I mean, I am in awe of their accomplishments and 

their significant sacrifices, including all of you sitting before me today.

This is particularly true for more than 30,000 troops wounded in action, and over 

4,408 fallen angels who have made the ultimate sacrifice along with members of 

the international coalition.

Remarks, Vice President Joseph Biden, Change of Command, Al Faw Palace, 1 

September 2010 

262
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Office of the Press Secretary

December 12, 2011

Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister al-Maliki of Iraq in a Joint Press Conference

South Court Auditorium

12:24 P.M. EST

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Please have a seat. Good afternoon, everyone.

When I took office, nearly 150,000 American troops were deployed in Iraq, and I pledged to end this war, responsibly. Today, only several thousand 

troops remain there, and more are coming home every day. 

This is a season of homecomings, and military families across America are being reunited for the holidays. In the coming days, the last American soldiers will cross the border out of Iraq, with honor and with their heads held high. After nearly nine years, our war in Iraq ends this month.

Today, I’m proud to welcome Prime Minister Maliki —the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant and democratic Iraq. We’re here to mark the end of 

this war; to honor the sacrifices of all those who made this day possible; and to turn the page—begin a new chapter in the history between our countries 

—a normal relationship between sovereign nations, an equal partnership based on mutual interests and mutual respect.

Iraq faces great challenges, but today reflects the impressive progress that Iraqis have made. Millions have cast their ballots—some risking or giving 

their lives—to vote in free elections. The Prime Minister leads Iraq’s most inclusive government yet. Iraqis are working to build institutions that are 

efficient and independent and transparent.

Economically, Iraqis continue to invest in their infrastructure and development. And I think it’s worth considering some remarkable statistics. In the 

coming years, it’s estimated that Iraq’s economy will grow even faster than China’s or India’s. With oil production rising, Iraq is on track to once again 

be one of the region’s leading oil producers.

With respect to security, Iraqi forces have been in the lead for the better part of three years—patrolling the streets, dismantling militias, conducting 

counterterrorism operations. Today, despite continued attacks by those who seek to derail Iraq’s progress, violence remains at record lows. 

And, Mr. Prime Minister, that’s a tribute to your leadership and to the skill and the sacrifices of Iraqi forces.

Across the region, Iraq is forging new ties of trade and commerce with its neighbors, and Iraq is assuming its rightful place among the community of nations. For the first time in two decades, Iraq is scheduled to host the next Arab League Summit, and what a powerful message that will send throughout 

the Arab world. People throughout the region will see a new Iraq that’s determining its own destiny —a country in which people from different religious 

sects and ethnicities can resolve their differences peacefully through the democratic process.

Mr. Prime Minister, as we end this war, and as Iraq faces its future, the Iraqi people must know that you will not stand alone. You have a strong and 

enduring partner in The United States of America. 

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And so today, the Prime Minister and I are reaffirming our common vision of a long-term partnership between our nations. This is in keeping with 

our Strategic Framework Agreement, and it will be like the close relationships we have with other sovereign nations. Simply put, we are building a 

comprehensive partnership. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you’ve said that Iraqis seek democracy, ‘a state of citizens and not sects.’ So we’re partnering to strengthen the institutions upon 

which Iraq’s democracy depends —free elections, a vibrant press, a strong civil society, professional police and law enforcement that uphold the rule 

of law, an independent judiciary that delivers justice fairly, and transparent institutions that serve all Iraqis. 

We’re partnering to expand our trade and commerce. We’ll make it easier for our businesses to export and innovate together. We’ll share our experiences in agriculture and in health care. We’ll work together to develop Iraq’s energy sector even as the Iraqi economy diversifies, and we’ll deepen 

Iraq’s integration into the global economy.

We’re partnering to expand the ties between our citizens, especially our young people. Through efforts like the Fulbright program, we’re welcoming 

more Iraqi students and future leaders to America to study and form friendships that will bind our nations together for generations to come. And we’ll 

forge more collaborations in areas like science and technology. 

We’ll partner for our shared security. Mr. Prime Minister, we discussed how the United States could help Iraq train and equip its forces— not by 

stationing American troops there or with U.S. bases in Iraq —those days are over—but rather, the kind of training and assistance we offer to other 

countries. Given the challenges we face together in a rapidly changing region, we also agreed to establish a new, formal channel of communication 

between our national security advisors.

And finally, we’re partnering for regional security. For just as Iraq has pledged not to interfere in other nations, other nations must not interfere in Iraq. 

Iraq’s sovereignty must be respected. And meanwhile, there should be no doubt, the drawdown in Iraq has allowed us to refocus our resources, achieve 

progress in Afghanistan, put al Qaeda on the path to defeat, and to better prepare for the full range of challenges that lie ahead.

So make no mistake, our strong presence in the Middle East endures, and the United States will never waver in defense of our allies, our partners, or 

our interests. 

This is the shared vision that Prime Minister Maliki and I reaffirm today—an equal partnership, a broad relationship that advances the security, the 

prosperity and the aspirations of both our people. 

Mr. Prime Minister, you’ve said it yourself —building a strong and ‘durable relationship between our two countries is vital.’ And I could not agree 

more.

So this is a historic moment. A war is ending. A new day is upon us. And let us never forget those who gave us this chance —the untold number of 

Iraqis who’ve given their lives; more than one million Americans, military and civilian, who have served in Iraq; nearly 4,500 fallen Americans who 

gave their last full measure of devotion; tens of thousands of wounded warriors, and so many inspiring military families. They are the reason that we 

can stand here today. And we owe it to every single one of them —we have a moral obligation to all of them —to build a future worthy of their sacrifice. 

Mr. Prime Minister.

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PRIME MINISTER AL-MALIKI: (As interpreted, and in progress)—positive atmosphere that prevailed among us, and for the obligations, the common obligations, of ending the war, and the commitment to which the American forces will withdraw from Iraq, which is a withdrawal that affects—that 

indicates success, and not like others have said that it was negative, but the goals that we established were achieved.

Iraq had a political process established, a democratic process, and adoption of the principles of elections and the transfer—peaceful transfer of authority. Iraq is following a policy, a foreign policy, which does not intervene in the affairs of others and does not allow the others to intervene in its 

own affairs. Iraq is looking for common grounds with the others, and establishes its interest at the forefront and the interest of the others, which it is 

concerned about, like from any confusion.

Your Excellency, today we meet in Washington after we have completed the first page of a constructive cooperation in which we also thank you and appreciate you for your commitment to everything that you have committed yourself to. And anyone who observes the nature of the relationship between 

the two countries will say that the relationship will not end with the departure of the last American soldier. It only started when we signed in 2008, in 

addition to the withdrawal treaty, the Strategic Framework Agreement for the relationship between our two countries.

And because we have proven success in the first mission, a very unique success -- nobody imagined that we would succeed in defeating terrorism and 

the al Qaeda—we must also establish the necessary steps in order to succeed in our second stage, which is the dual relationship under the Strategic 

Framework Agreement, in the economic sphere, as well as in educational and commercial and cultural and judicial and security cooperation fields.

Iraq now has become—reliant completely on its own security apparatus and internal security as a result of the expertise that it gained during the confrontations and the training and the equipping. But it remains in need of cooperation with the United States of America in security issues and information and combating terrorism, and in the area of training and the area of equipping, which is needed by the Iraqi army. And we have started that. And 

we want to complete the process of equipping the Iraqi army in order to protect our sovereignty, and does not violate the rights of anybody—or do not 

take any missions that sovereignty of others. 

Today, the joint mission is to establish the mechanisms and the commitments that will expedite our—we have reached an agreement, and we have held 

a meeting for the higher joint committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Biden, the Vice President, and myself in Baghdad, and we spoke about all the 

details that would put the framework agreement into implementation.

And here we talked about it and its activation. And there will be other discussions and other meetings with the higher committee here in Washington in 

order to put the final touches regarding the necessary mechanisms for cooperation and achieving the common vision that we followed, which was based 

on our common wills and political independent decision, and the desire to respect the sovereignty of each other. 

And we feel that we need political cooperation as well, in addition to cooperating in the security and economic and commercial fields. We need a political cooperation, particularly with regard to the matters that are common and are of concern for us as two parties that want to cooperate.

The common vision that we used as a point of departure we have confirmed today. And I am very happy, every time we meet with the American side, I 

find determination and a strong will to activate the Strategic Framework Agreement. And I will say, frankly, this is necessary and it serves the interests 

of Iraq, as it is necessary and serves the interests of the United States of America. 

This makes us feel that we will succeed with the same commitment, common commitment that we had in combating terrorism and accomplishing the 

2678
missions, the basis of which Iraq was independent. Iraq today has a lot of wealth and it needs experience and expertise, and American and foreign 

expertise to help Iraq exploiting its own wealth in an ideal way. Iraq is still suffering from a shortage of resources, and we have established a strategy to increase the Iraqi wealth. And we hope that the American companies will have the largest role in increasing our wealth in the area of oil and 

other aspects as well.

Iraq wants to rebuild all these sectors that were harmed because of the war and because of the adventurous policies that were used by the former 

regime, and we need a wide range of reform in the area of education.

We have succeeded in signing several agreements through the educational initiative, which put hundreds of our college graduates to continue their 

graduate studies and specialized subject in American universities. And I am putting it before everyone who is watching the relationship between the 

U.S. and Iraq. It is a very—it has very high aspirations. 

And I would like to renew my thanks for His Excellency the President for giving me this opportunity, and I wish him more success, God willing. Thank 

you very much.

268
Sather Air Base, Iraq, located at the Baghdad International Airport and surrounded by the Victory Base Complex, was a very busy base during the last 

part of 2011. Sather housed a few thousand military personnel from all branches of service along with other government personnel and contractors.

As the group commander, it was my responsibility to run the base, get it ready to turn over as the military left, keep our personnel safe, and then get 

them out of the country in December 2011. All of which happened successfully but at times kept us wondering whether or not we would get there. We 

endured multiple rocket attacks, that last of which occurred on 8 December.

My group staff included four Air Force Reservists and one active duty member, my CSA. My six squadron commanders and squadron members came 

from the three components of the Air Force. We blended into a strong and efficient force as any contingency requires.

During my tenure, our aerial port personnel helped the Iraqi government by loading ten 30-ton electric generators onto IL-76s, so they could be refurbished in Canada and then returned to Iraq for use in their power grid. The Iraqis lacked the capability to load these onto an aircraft. By the end 

of 2011, we had moved approximately 110,000 passengers, 10,000+ short tons of cargo on over 62,500 aircraft and helicopter movements in and out of 

Iraq. Sather was affectionately known as the ‘Busiest Hub in Iraq.’ We took pride in this and maintained the bragging rights to our title.

Another notable contribution was our support to the Iraq Training and Advising Mission (ITAM- Purple force). Despite the fact that our airman were 

deployed to run Sather AB (a Blue force) each squadron contributed several instructors to support the purple mission in teaching and showing the Iraqi 

Air Force (IAF) ‘what right looks like.’ Security forces members taught Iraqi Air Force security forces about air base defense; our CE firefighters 

worked with the Iraqi AF and international airport firefighters on how to correctly fight aircraft fires. We also sent dozens of other airmen to teach the 

IAF airmen English. Our hope was we left the Iraqi AF in better shape than when we deployed to Sather AB.

My good fortune to serve as the very last 447th Air Expeditionary Group commander at Sather Air Base was a great opportunity to show all the other 

branches of the military that the active duty Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve Command are really one and the same—one integrated team. This also held true to show our brethren in the three branches that we do work great together, and when it comes time to deploy, there is 

no difference between the highly trained airmen in the USAF.

This deployment felt as if it was the culmination of 30 years of service and training. We train to deploy and take the fight to our enemies but also with 

the hope we never have to exercise the training.

We departed Sather AB knowing we had completed our mission and left behind a secure and fully capable operating location. I felt a twinge of uncertainty knowing how far the Iraqis had come and how much farther they had yet to go as well as relief in that we had completed our assignments to 

the best of our abilities. Realizing that Iraq as the country we now know it was less than eight years old is a stark reminder of how far they have to go.

At approximately 1400, 19 December 2011, upon the stand down of the 9th Air Expeditionary Task Force Iraq (AETFI), I relinquished my command and 

about 6 hours later I climbed aboard our aircraft and departed the AOR. 

 Colonel Thomas E. Kirkendall, 447th Air Expeditionary Group Commander, Sather Air Base, Iraq, April-December 2011

GROUP COMMANDER - SATHER

269 270
The surge alone was an extensive undertaking by the military. However, 2010 proved 

more operationally challenging than originally envisioned, as the military would 

also respond to the Haiti earthquake; the 

drawdown in Iraq; the effects of the coup 

in Kyrgyzstan; the April eruption of a volcano in Iceland, which also impacted airlift 

missions; the May Deep Horizon Gulf oil 

spill response; and in July 

and August the Pakistan 

flood relief, requiring the 

movement of emergency 

food and shelter, rescue 

helicopters, and Bailey 

bridges. Historically, a 

military operation could 

expect an additional event 

or two; six was precedent 

setting. Moreover, the 

surge required the speedy 

delivery of the new 16-

ton, mine-resistant, ambush-protected, all-terrain 

vehicles (MATV)—some 

2,643 vehicles—and some 

2,225 containers. Accordingly, in addition to volunteers, it was necessary to mobilize 2,400 C-5, C-17 aircrews, 

maintainers, and aerial porters from the Air 

National Guard (800) and Air Force Reserve 

Command (1,600) in April. Nevertheless, 

the Total Force closed the force on 31 August 2010 for the Afghanistan surge, meeting 

the requirement!62

 

tion Command worked with operations specialists at US Joint Forces 

Command to design a multi-faceted 

approach to add and sustain forces. 

The plan included airlift, sealift options, truck convoys from Karachi, 

Pakistan, and shipments via the 

Northern Distribution Route utilizing railways. This multi-modal 

approach facilitated the timely and cost efficient movement of troops and supplies. 

Air Force Reserve Command, Air National 

Guard, and Air Force resources played a vital 

role in the success of this innovative approach. 

The response to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010 had successfully drawn upon a multimodal concept as well, portending its future 

employment.61 

the national security of the country and for a 

“responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.”60 

To meet the requirement of sequencing American forces into the theater and providing the 

necessary support, planners at US Transporta

270
At approximately 1630Z 12 February 2009, a dire request for airlift support was received from Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), and orders were given for Daddy-05 to fly a high-risk mission to Sharana FOB, a dirt landing strip with no instrument approach, to medevac four 

critically wounded Afghan National Police (ANP). Earlier in the day a suicide bomber had detonated his improvised explosive device (IED) at a government turnover ceremony, wounding ten personnel and killing one. To extend the lethal range of the IED, the insurgent had packed the device with steel 

ball bearings which had penetrated one man’s chest and skull, making it imperative to obtain crucial medical care at BAF [Bagram Air Field], the only 

hospital in Afghanistan with the capability to provide CT scan and a neurosurgeon, if survival was to be possible. While Daddy-05 pilots and navigators planned the route, loadmasters and maintenance personnel completely reconfigured the aircraft from its normal TAC-1 configuration to a medevac 

transport. Within 40 minutes of alert, Daddy-05 was de-iced, manned and engines were running. Upon departure, the #1 prop oil light illuminated 

thus requiring the aircraft to return to chocks and stealing precious minutes from this life saving mission. Moments after engine shut down, the flight 

engineer, with the help of maintenance personnel, had the prop serviced and again the aircraft taxied for departure with its crew; an Army doctor, Navy 

flight surgeon, Air Force flight surgeon and 4 medical technicians. With near whiteout snow conditions, Daddy-05 was required to conduct an instrument take-off from Bagram AF without the use of navigational aids. Due to inoperable TACAN, air traffic control at Bagram directed Daddy-05 to a 

non-standard departure plan and radar vectors for an MC-130E. Despite the extremely hazardous weather conditions and degraded navigation systems, 

the crew of Daddy-05 pressed on to accomplish this vital flight. Complete crew coordination was required; while the pilot and copilot flew the aircraft in 

complete IMC, the Talon I navigators used terrain following radar to maneuver the Talon I over the unforgiving mountain regions of Afghanistan. With 

the constant threat of hostile fire from insurgents, the EWO constantly monitored the threat avoidance instruments to dispense flares or chaff or call evasive maneuvers if needed and the AMSS monitored and transmitted on numerous radio frequencies to obtain threat and weather conditions at Sharana 

and to apprise command and control of mission situation while loadmasters and the med team completed final preparations for receipt of the wounded. 

After an hour of difficult and demanding flight, the crew of Daddy-05 prepared for landing. With no navigation aids at the airfield and less than 1⁄2 mile 

visibility, the Talon I performed a daring self contained approach (SCA) landing on night vision goggles in IMC. Immediately upon touch-down the ice 

and snow covered runway caused an abrupt loss of control and the 135k pound aircraft slid uncontrollably until the pilot performed immediate corrective 

actions and saved the aircraft from sliding off the 60 ft wide landing strip. Despite blinding snow and a frozen taxiway, the aircraft was brought to the 

terminal and in less than one hour loaded the four wounded ANPs on board, began administering medical treatment, and Daddy-05 was again airborne 

and en route to BAF. The return trip was no less perilous than the inbound leg, weather conditions continued to deteriorate and upon arrival at BAF, 

Daddy-05 was notified that the airfield was closed to all traffic due to inclement weather and poor visibility. Knowing the urgency of the mission, the 

crew of Daddy-05 requested and was granted another IMC SCA landing waiver, which was executed with precision to bring the aircraft to a safe landing. The aircraft was immediately taxied behind a snowplow, clearing the way to the BAF hospital to offload the wounded ANP where they underwent 

emergency care and immediate surgery. Due to the courage, dedication and devotion to duty of the crew of Daddy-05, all four Afghan National Police 

survived the attack and are recovering, to return to duty. The crew’s bravery, and disregard for personal safety in order to provide emergency medevac 

to fellow coalition forces exemplifies the skill and spirit of the Air Force Special Operations warrior.

Aircrew members of Daddy-05

LTC Dan Flynn-pilot Capt Miriam Williams-copilot

LTC Steve Jensen- left navigator LTC Tim Broeking- right navigator

LTC Tom Frazier- electronic warfare officer MSG Kevin Woodward-flight engineer

CMS Mike Klausutis-radio operator SMS Tom Haddock-loadmaster

SMS Bruce Callaway-loadmaster

DADDY 05 – GEN TUNNER AWARD

2712
On 10 February 2007, Staff Sergeant Kathryn Robinson found herself in the middle of a firefight in Iraq. She had been in the military for 13 years and 

had carried out various duties. In the past, she had served as a crane operator, military police, and motor transportation in the Army National Guard 

and the Air Force Reserve. On that fateful day in 2007, Sergeant Robinson was on a cordon and search mission with US and Iraqi Army soldiers near 

Baqubah, Iraq. As a member of the 4th Combat Camera squadron, March AFB, California, Robinson was attached to the infantry as a videographer 

recording what they did on a daily basis. Suddenly, there was the unmistakable sound of small arms fire. In an instant, the battery in the video camera 

she was using exploded in her face causing abrasions to her chin. But that was not her only wound.

The same bullet that had shattered her camera, also penetrated Sergeant Robinson’s left forearm and took off the end of her right thumb. Her first 

reaction was to shout to her comrades, “They shot my damn thumb off!” Then, she quickly jumped in a corner and took cover with two Iraqi soldiers. 

Remaining under cover and assessing the situation, Sergeant Robinson knew she had to first stop the bleeding. She began to apply aid procedures 

learned in her combat skills training in Fort Dix, New Jersey. At that moment, it comforted her to remember something her instructor had said, “If you 

feel pain, then you know you’re alive.”

Before long, Sergeant Robinson was evacuated from the scene of the firefight. She rode in an armored fighting vehicle to a landing zone where a 

helicopter waited to fly her to the hospital at Balad Air Base. On arrival, medical personnel performed surgery on her arm and a partial amputation 

of her right thumb. Shortly after waking up the next morning Colonel Lawrence Jackson II, 732nd Expeditionary Mission Support Group commander 

presented Sergeant Robinson with the Purple Heart medal.

After Sergeant Robinson was awarded the Purple Heart she remembered feeling disappointment at the loss of her video camera. After all, it was brand 

new and it took great pictures. She summed up the fate of that piece of equipment in four words, “Man, it was toast!” Sergeant Robinson also recalled 

the soldiers with whom she had shared the experience of combat. “My guys are trying really hard to get the Iraqis up to speed,” she remarked. “It’s a 

constant process and they’re doing a great job.”

Although facing several weeks of rehab after surgery, Sergeant Robinson was thinking about the future. She would really like to finish her deployment. 

“If there is something I can do, I’ll stay,” she said pretending to type with her nine other fingers. Sergeant Robinson would recover from her wounds 

and go on to produce video she had recorded in the days before being wounded in action.

COMBAT CAMERA VIDEOGRAPHER - PURPLE HEART

272
One of the worst Caribbean earthquakes in more than 200 years hit the island nation of Haiti on the evening of 12 January 2010. The force of the quake 

demolished the country’s capital, Port-au-Prince, causing as much as $14 billion in damages. It also killed an estimated 316,000 people.

According to Air Force Reserve Colonel Michael J. McCully, then commander of the 482nd Mission Support Group, 482nd Fighter Wing, Homestead 

Air Reserve Base, Florida, “The air traffic increased dramatically during the ensuing hours.” Almost as soon as news of the earthquake broke, Homestead began receiving components of the Air Force, Army, Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard, as they quickly began staging troops, equipment and supplies to be flown to Port-au-Prince airport.

At dawn the next morning, US Southern Command formed Joint Task Force – Haiti as a command and control element for conducting the humanitarian 

assistance and disaster relief operations known as Operation Unified Response. US Southern Command officially established Homestead ARB and 

Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, as aerial ports of embarkation for the relief efforts. At Duke Field, Florida, members of Air Force Reserve Command’s 919th Special Operations Wing launched an MC-130E aircraft to deliver personnel and equipment to Haiti. In California, the Air Force Reserve 

Command’s 452nd Air Mobility Wing was also engaged in the earthquake relief effort. Airmen prepared a C-17 Globemaster III to carry Office of US 

Foreign Disaster Assistance personnel and rescue equipment to Port-au-Prince.

At Dobbins Air Reserve Base, Georgia, members of the 94th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron deployed in support of Operation Unified Response to 

provide medical care to injured Haitians. Injured earthquake victims were flown into various airports across the southeast for treatment in Miami and 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and Atlanta, Georgia, area hospitals. A particular aeromedical evacuation (AE) C-130 mission, ten days after the quake, “was 

the most complex AE I’ve ever done,” said Lieutenant Colonel David E. Rodberg, medical crew director, 94th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. “Unlike in a combat situation with standard gunshot wounds and blast injuries we are dealing with crush injuries. On this flight, we had depressed-skull 

fractures, burns, spinal cord injuries, amputations, not to mention neo-natal care.” 

Back at Homestead, the flight line, usually home to the 482nd Fighter Wing’s F-16s, was now hosting C-130 cargo planes and an occasional C-17. “Air 

Force reservists from Homestead Air Reserve Base are providing outstanding support for our nation’s relief efforts for the Haitian earthquake victims,” 

said Brigadier General William B. Binger, 482nd Fighter Wing Commander. 

As a fighter wing, the 482nd had limited capabilities to conduct air mobility airlift operations and lacked the quantity of material handling equipment 

or the personnel for cargo handling. Even so, from 14 January through 6 March 2010, Homestead Air Reserve Base, with assistance from other AFRC 

units, supported 744 missions and facilitated transportation of 528 pallets, totaling 3,440,074 pounds of cargo. What is more, without intrinsic medical treatment capability, Homestead dealt with a rapid influx of military personnel, received repatriated American citizens, and medically evacuated 

patients from Haiti.

“Converting Homestead Air Reserve Base from mainly a fighter base to a huge mobility humanitarian support hub almost overnight was something 

to behold,” recalled Colonel McCully. “From the very start, on the airfield, in the Base Gym for casualty processing, to the front gate and beyond, the 

base and community rallied together to meet the need. It was America at its best, and they did it with little fanfare and a great deal of professionalism!”

Approximately 50 Air Force Reservists and two C-130 Hercules from Colorado’s 302nd Airlift Wing left on 22 January 2010, to fly humanitarian missions in support of Haitian relief efforts. The Air Force Reservists supported airlift operations including aeromedical evacuation and aerial delivery 

UNIFIED RESPONSE

2734
missions, transporting much needed food and water as well as other relief supplies. The airlift missions were part of a previously-scheduled Coronet 

Oak rotation, which provided rapid-response airlift to the US Southern Command. Throughout their two-week deployment, the Air Force Reservists 

were based in Puerto Rico and flew multiple sorties into Haiti daily. 

Despite all the pluses, the suddenness and magnitude of the Haitian disaster exposed some issues that warranted close attention. First among these 

concerns was command and control. Shifting command relationships and responsibilities degraded Air Force Reserve force generation capabilities 

and responsiveness. Unclear lines of command meant that routing of requests for Air Force Reserve Command forces were inefficient – processing of 

a request initiated on 14 January took over three weeks! A second major issue was funding. 

The Air Force Reserve Command’s Haiti response resulted in at least two recommendations. One, the Air Force Reserve Command needed a 24-7-365 

Force Generation Center to be its single access point for information and resources (personnel and assets). And two, the Air Force Reserve Command 

required immediate response capability in terms of funding appropriations to meet similar emergency situations. The Haiti response confirmed the 

need to address military personnel appropriation (MPA) man-day resourcing, prioritization and execution. The inability to pay for the mobilization of 

Air Force Reservists to support Reservists delayed the response. Due to a lack of Air Force Reserve Command MPA, there was also no mechanism in 

place for Air Force Reserve Command to generate expeditionary combat support (ECS) resources in support of Homestead ARB.

Between 13 January and 25 February 2010, Air Force Reserve Command crews flew more than 220 aircraft missions supporting Operation Unified 

Response efforts. Aircraft involved included C-130s, MC-130s, C-17s, C-5s, KC-10s, and KC-135s. During that same timeframe, Air Force Reservists 

took part in 30 aeromedical evacuation missions, involving more than 1,000 patients. Hundreds more Air Force Reserve Airmen served in other capacities and in non-active duty statuses at thirteen airlift wings, two air mobility wings, a special operations wing, and a fighter wing located at bases 

in fifteen states.

The Air Force Reserve Command assistance to Haiti would continue for months into the future. On the last day of 2010, Air Force Reservists from 

the 315th Airlift Wing, Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, awoke in the early morning hours to prepare for a humanitarian mission aboard a C-17 

Globemaster III aircraft bound for Haiti. The mission was made possible by the Denton Amendment. The Denton Amendment provides the authority 

for the Department of Defense to use extra space on US military cargo aircraft to transport humanitarian assistance materials donated by non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private voluntary organizations for humanitarian relief. Between 30 December 2010 and 24 

February 2012, the 315th flew at least 17 missions to Haiti and delivered more than 680,000 pounds of food, medical supplies, vehicles, and miscellaneous equipment.

Looking back over the command’s response to the Haiti 

disaster, Lieutenant General 

Charles E. Stenner Jr. Commander, Air Force Reserve 

Command stated, “I could not 

be more proud of all our men 

and women who answered the 

call and provided life-saving assistance and help to the people of 

Haiti.”

274
On the night of 8-9 February 2010, 36 avalanches buried Highway A76 at the 11,500-foot-high Salang Pass tunnel north of Kabul, Afghanistan. The 

avalanches killed dozens of people and trapped hundreds more. Pararescuemen (PJs) from the Air Force Reserve Command’s 308th Rescue Squadron, 

920th Rescue Wing, Patrick AFB, Florida, were among the Joint Expeditionary Tasking (JET) team who arrived to assist as many of the survivors as 

possible as their US Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters approached the landing zone, the PJs saw frozen bodies and dozens of vehicles scattered about 

the area and buried in snow. Nothing was moving. “That was an eerie feeling,” recalled Captain Gabriel Hensley, 308th combat rescue officer, “given 

the fact that we didn’t see anything moving.”

When the airmen dismounted, they found themselves waist deep in snow with sub-zero temperatures and 35mph winds with the potential for secondary 

avalanches and insurgent activity. Suddenly, dozens of avalanche survivors crowded out of the tunnel and rushed the landing zone. “This is going to 

get crazy pretty quick,” thought Master Sergeant Jonathan Grant, 308th team leader.

“We don’t really receive formal training on crowd control,” Senior Master Sergeant Mike Ziegler stated, “and in this situation we had a learning curve of 

about 15 seconds to decide how we were going to protect and reassure these people who are frantic and at the same time ensure we are safe and able to 

do our job.” Acting quickly, the pararescuemen established a perimeter and secured the area. Captain Hensley decided to evacuate the healthiest people 

first, so the more seriously injured could be safely treated and those trapped in vehicles could be freed. Once the PJs airlifted the anxious crowd out of 

the area, evacuation of the injured proceeded at a steady pace. “It was really amazing how smooth the organization was,” remarked 308th team leader 

Technical Sergeant Blain Morgan.

As this was happening, Staff Sergeant Daniel Warren, another 308th Rescue Squadron airman, began searching the numerous overturned and buried 

vehicles on the mountain. He spent five hours extricating and triaging people. Returning to Bagram Airfield on one evacuation flight, Sergeant Warren 

performed CPR on one unconscious patient for about 30 minutes until he could turn over the individual to the medics on the ground. For his efforts, 

Sergeant Warren was awarded the Air Force Commendation Medal with Valor.

While the Florida airmen and others dealt with the situation on the ground, other elements of the JET team were patrolling above them. “Our Apaches 

provided overhead security and located landing zones for aircraft to land and pick up victims,” said Army Staff Sergeant Tremayne Gilchrist of the 3rd 

Combat Aviation Brigade Task Force Falcon. “They also searched for people we couldn’t see. They gave the ground units grid coordinates when they 

found other survivors.”

Meanwhile, back on the ground, Staff Sergeant Greg Predmore and Airman First Class Eric Gray, 817th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron TACP controllers maintained smooth control of the air traffic. “We had helicopters waiting in line,” explained Sergeant Predmore. “As one moved 

out with survivors we had another moving in to take its place and that allowed everyone else to focus on assisting people.” At the end of the day, the 

helicopters completed 12 flights between Salang Tunnel and Bagram Airfield. The PJs dug through the snow and used heavy extraction equipment to 

cut open damaged vehicles to reach people inside. After seven hours, the JET team had rescued over 300 people!

In the aftermath of the successful Total Force operation, Lieutenant Colonel Katrina Hall, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade surgeon, summed up her 

thoughts on the mission: ”Being able to provide assistance to these people today was an honor, not just because it will hopefully plant a seed that will 

change the hearts and minds, but because providing care to those in need is what we do.”

JOINT FORCE RESCUES AFGHAN AVALANCHE VICTIMS

275 276
“As we left Islamabad, you could tell the rivers were a little bit high,” remembered Lieutenant Colonel Ken Ostrat, a 908th Airlift Wing C-130 pilot. “As we flew 

south towards Sukkur, which is downriver, you could see the widening of the river as the floodwaters continued to go farther over the banks of the normal river 

channel. By the time we got to Sukkur there were thousands of acres flooded, virtually the entire area. Farms, small villages, and houses were completely inundated 

with water for miles in every direction,” he said. The floods, which began on 29 July 2010, affected 20 million people, damaged or destroyed more than two million 

homes, and ruined nearly two million acres of crops. Six months later, many people displaced by the floods still did not have proper shelter. Besides the deployed 

908th’s effort, on August 23, a C-17 Globemaster aircrew assigned to 446th Airlift Wing, departed McChord Field, Washington, and picked up and transported a 

Marine Corps CH-53 from Cherry Point, North Carolina, to Afghanistan, where it was used in flood relief operations.

The 439th Airlift Wing, Westover Air Reserve Base, Massachusetts, also contributed with three C-5 Galaxy missions in late August and early September. The 

aircraft commander on the third flight, Lieutenant Colonel Dave Heroux, most recently had served six months in Haiti leading part of the military’s relief efforts 

following the massive earthquake that hit the island nation. In early October 2010, two 302nd Airlift Wing C-130 Hercules deployed to the AOR. One pilot, Major 

Kevin Baylis, related that final day, “The mission was our last flight into some of the forward operating bases in support of humanitarian operations—the end of the 

fixed wing operations. We flew into Skardu which is up toward the Pakistani border up in the mountains. Hopefully we [delivered] the supplies the folks need to 

make it through the winter. When you look at the numbers of folks who have been displaced by the flood, it’s good to be able to help out with that.” It was the major’s 

first humanitarian deployment. Between 16 August and 3 October, C-130 Hercules, C-5 Galaxy, and C-17 Globemaster III aircraft and their aircrews transported 

nearly 6 million pounds of much-needed relief supplies to Pakistan aid distribution centers throughout the country.

AIR FORCE RESERVISTS - PAKISTAN FLOOD RELIEF

On 11 March 2011, Major General Richard A. Shook, Jr., mobilization assistant to the commander Ninth Air Force and Commander US Air Forces 

Central Command, represents US Central Command during a re-equipping ceremony in which the Pakistan Air Force formally activated Squadron 5.

276
2778
The 302nd Airlift Wing, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado, was the only aerial firefighting wing in the Air Force Reserve. Its 731st 

Airlift Squadron of C-130s was equipped with the United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service modular airborne fire fighting systems 

(MAFFS).

Besides fighting fires, the 302nd consistently deployed to the AOR. Between July 2008 and January 2012, the unit deployed some 44 percent (575) of 

its airmen.

In 2010, the firefighting mission in the United States slowed for the 302nd Airlift Wing due to cooler weather, but the unit remained busy elsewhere 

such as deployment to the AOR and training the Royal Thai Air Force in aerial firefighting. In December 2010, the 302nd Airlift Wing organized a 

mission to fight fires in Israel. The unit received the alert order late on 3 December and coordinated aircrews and equipment in approximately 24 hours, 

but the fires had been already contained by Israeli firefighters. 

Missions during the 2011 fire season “heated up” significantly. In a six-month period between April and September 2001, the 302nd deployed its aerial 

firefighting C-130s to fight fires in Texas, Mexico, and New Mexico. Within this time frame, the unit flew 161 sorties dropping 500,816 gallons of fire 

retardants and suppressants.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Fairbanks observed in mid September that it was pretty obvious how dry south and east Texas were just by flying over it. 

“You can tell these fires are going to be a challenge with the amount of timber and pines in the area. We’ve been flying alongside helicopters and single 

engine air tankers that have already been out here, so it’s good we can all bring in enough retardant to draw that line that keeps the fires from spreading. Our ability to help contain the fires with support to the guys on the ground is very important.”

“Our primary task is to work with the National Interagency Fire Center to help augment the commercial tanker force in times of need and natural disaster,” stated Lieutenant Colonel Dave Condit, the 302nd Chief of Aerial Firefighting in a 2011 interview. The main objective was to lay lines of fire 

retardant down in front of advancing wildfire to protect lives and property. At that time, he was looking forward to a new US Forest Service system, 

the MAFFS II that provided increased capability. “And that includes the ability to respond a little quicker, with a little bit of a different type of products 

that we can put on the fire for more flexibility.” 

The 2011 fire season was the first to successfully fly fire missions using the new MAFFS II concept of operations that increased effectiveness while 

decreasing costs. Reflecting in September 2011, Lieutenant Colonel Condit expressed, “This has been a very active fire season. We exceeded our annual average of fire missions two months ago, and this is now becoming one of the most active fire seasons we have faced.”

AIR FORCE RESERVIST FIGHT SOUTHWEST FIRES

278
On 20 April 2010, the oil well under the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico experienced a fatal blowout. The resulting explosions and uncontainable fire caused the rig to sink on 22 April. Before workers finally capped it in mid-July, the gray-brown geyser of crude spewed 

almost 5 million barrels of oil into the Gulf. Federal Scientists called it “by far the world’s largest accidental release of oil into marine waters.”

Under a memorandum of agreement between the Director of Military Support and the US Coast Guard, the Coast Guard can “request and the United 

States Air Force Reserve...will provide aircraft, equipment and personnel for the application of oil dispersants during oil spill cleanup and removal 

operations.”

On 29 April, Rear Admiral M.E. Landry, Commander US Coast Guard District 8, requested that modular aerial spray system aircraft (and support personnel) from the Department of Defense assist commercial assets in restricting the spread of oil on the surface. At approximately noon on 29 April, the 

US Northern Command released a request for forces for two modular aerial spray system C-130 aircraft. 

In response to the US Northern Command’s request for forces, two specially-modified C-130 aircraft and 60 Air Force Reservists from the 910th Airlift 

Wing, Youngstown Air Reserve Station, Ohio, flew to Stennis International Airport, Mississippi, on 30 April 2010. The Air Force Reservists conducted 

the first aerial spray missions on 1 May 2012. They spent the next five weeks flying over the Gulf of Mexico supporting cleanup efforts related to the 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill. While they were on the Gulf coast, the 910th aircrews flew 92 sorties, spraying 30,000 acres with nearly 149,000 gallons 

of aerial spray dispersant.

About the same time the Youngstown aircraft deployed, the Coast Guard’s Pacific Strike Team in California contacted officials from the Air Force Reserve’s 349th Air Mobility Wing at Travis Air Force Base. The Coast Guard needed help moving inflatable oil-trapping booms to the spill site. A C-17 

Globemaster III from the 349th Air Mobility Wing’s 301st Airlift Squadron, partnered with Coast Guard members to fly the equipment to the Gulf of 

Mexico to assist with oil slick cleanup efforts.

Air Force Reserve aerial porters from Travis Air Force Base went to work weighing and palletizing the equipment, 17 pallets in all. The cargo included 

10 reels of inflatable boom, 656 feet each, to be positioned off shore to keep the oil slick from coming ashore. Four of the booms were in the shipment, 

each with a capacity to hold 70,000 gallons of oil. The crew departed Travis Air Force Base, arriving at Mobile, Alabama, on 2 May.

“For such a short notice tasking, everything went quite smoothly,” recalled Captain Adam Walsh, aircraft commander. Captain Walsh went on to say, 

“We do so many contingency missions, and so little humanitarian, that it is a welcome opportunity. It is great to be part of the solution.” “This was a 

historic event for me,” related Coast Guard Lieutenant Junior Grade Michael Oubre of the Gulf Strike Team. “I was there to meet the load, and it was 

my first experience using a Department of Defense asset for something like this. We usually load our equipment on trucks for transport.”

Back over the Gulf, the 910th Airlift Wing’s aerial spray mission continued. The 910th was home to the only full-time, fixed-wing aerial spray unit 

within the Department of Defense. Its 757th Airlift Squadron conducted assorted missions throughout the year from various military installations using four C-130H aircraft with modular aerial spray systems. In addition to the 757th’s modular aerial spray systems aircraft, civilian C-130s owned or 

contracted by Marine Spill Response Corporation (MSRC) provided aerial-dispersant systems to the disaster. “We also have seven spotter aircraft that 

tell the C-130s when to spray on a given area of the slick,” MSRC executive vice president Donald A. Toenshoff, Jr., told interviewers.

BATTLING GULF OIL SPILL - 2010

27980
“When we disperse the oil, we fly down to 100 feet above 

the slick, and the spotter will tell us when to spray and 

when to stop,” reported Major Phil Townsend, 757th Airlift Squadron chief of aerial spray. “Seeing the oil the 

first time we flew out over the Gulf was quite an amazing 

thing. For 20 to 30 miles out, we were seeing different 

streamers of oil and slicks 10 miles in length. When flying 

down at 100 feet, sometimes we could smell the vapors 

from the oil.”

The Deepwater Horizon mission was the first time the 

President of the United States and the Department of Defense used the oil dispersing capability of the 910th Airlift 

Wing in an actual spill of national significance. “We’re 

very proud to have supported this cleanup effort,” stated 

Colonel Stephen J. Linsenmeyer, 910th Airlift Wing commander.

In 2011, the 910th Airlift Wing was honored with the Air 

Force Outstanding Unit Award recognizing the unit’s 

Deepwater Horizon oil spill cleanup efforts. “Our Airmen have been training for this type of response,” said 

Colonel Linsenmeyer, “and we are pleased to have been 

able to utilize their skills and capabilities to help make a 

difference.”

280
The year 2010 was a busy time for the Air Force Reserve Command in many ways. An up-tempo surge was being planned for the Global War on Terrorism. There were avalanches in Afghanistan, an earthquake in Haiti, a major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, and a devastating flood in Pakistan. No 

one predicted that something like a volcanic eruption would shut down air space in Europe, diverting or delaying flights into and out of the AOR.

On 14 April 2010, a huge volcano in Iceland erupted and threw a mass of volcanic ash as high as six miles into the air. The Eyjafjallajokull volcano 

filled flight-paths over Europe with tiny volcanic particles. The ash cloud brought air traffic in Europe to a standstill and forced the cancellation of 

some 100,000 trans-Atlantic flights for more than a week. Air Force Reserve Command flights either into or out of Europe and Southwest Asia were 

also delayed or diverted. Troop movements, cargo missions, and medical evacuations adapted to the emergency. 

The usual first stop for injured troops from Afghanistan was Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany where the staff treated them before heading on to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, DC. During the air space shut-down in Europe, US forces Central Command designated 

the Air Force Theater Hospital at Joint Base Balad, Iraq, as temporary new hub for all aeromedical evacuations from Afghanistan.

“It dramatically changed our day-to-day operations,” remembered Air Force Reserve Major Eric Davidson, then director of aeromedical operations, 

332nd Operations Group, Joint Base Balad. Before the closure of Europe’s airspace, Balad had three to four scheduled missions in country, and one 

or two alerts per week, both to Germany and in country, with small to medium loads of non-battle injuries. According to Major Davidson, “After the 

volcano erupted we had an increased aeromedical evacuation transit crew population (the Afghanistan crews) and daily large missions from Afghanistan 

to Washington DC area hospitals of battle injury troops.”

At this time, the Balad aeromedical operation team was made up primarily of reservists. All of the ground support personnel and the aeromedical crews 

were from the reserves. The Critical Care Air Transport Teams (CCATT) were active duty. During the aeromedical diversion, the unit was “bursting 

at the seams” with an increase of equipment and supplies. “We were essentially doing the work that called for the manpower and space of 300 percent 

more people,” Major Davidson stated. “It was a great experience that challenged us and I am thankful that it wasn’t because additional servicemen and 

women were getting hurt. When you look at the way the whole situation played out, the aeromedical evacuation troops stepped up in the only way you 

could when you are dealing with such an ever-changing, fluid situation. I think the flexibility and experience of the aeromedical evacuation operations 

team that I had working with me made all the difference!”

After leaving Balad, medical C-17s flew wounded warriors in a more southern route and re-fueled at either Naval Station Rota or Moron Air Base, both 

in Spain. These bases also became the destination for military flights carrying troops and supplies that would normally have flown though Ramstein 

or Spangdahlem Air Bases in Germany. Flying through Spain rather than Germany added hours to a flight between Afghanistan and the United States. 

Also returning to the US, Air Force Reserve Command and Air Mobility Command C-5s shared space on the flight line at Naval Station Rota, Spain, 

on 17 April.

According to Colonel Michael Dankosky, AFRC Chief, Aeromedical Evacuation Branch, members of five AFRC aeromedical squadrons were deployed 

to the affected areas during the eruption time-frame. These were the 36th, 315th, 446th, 911th, and 914th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons.

VOLCANO – DISRUPTS AOR FLIGHTS

2812
Delays were also in store for C-130 maintainers and aircrew members of the Air Force Reserve Command’s 95th Airlift Squadron, 440th Airlift Wing, 

Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. The airmen were at the end of a 120-day deployment to Germany when the volcanic eruption extended their time 

overseas for an extra week until flight clearances could be obtained for the trip home. The squadron members were previously supporting the war on 

terrorism in the African theater.

While the volcano in Iceland spewed ash into the air and shut down air travel across Europe, the global war on terrorism raged on, and troops on the 

ground still needed supplies and cargo. As a result, some C-5 airlift missions from the 439th Airlift Wing, Westover Air Reserve Base, Massachusetts, 

had to fly westward, circumnavigating the globe. The flights departed Westover and headed west across the US and the Pacific. According to Captain Jonathan Beale, a mission pilot, the west-bound trips took about twice as long as going through Europe and required a number of additional stops 

through the Pacific Ocean.

For Captain Scott Kuhrt, these trips around the world were definitely very challenging because of maintenance, operational issues, and the extra length 

of the westward heading. However, he expressed the 

opinion that going through the Pacific region was a 

nice change of scenery.

There were other ripple effects. Troops leaving the 

US were put on hold waiting for flights to deploy 

them. This was the case with some members of Air 

Force Reserve’s 908th Airlift Wing, Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama, trying to fly to Southwest 

Asia. It took five delays within a four-day window 

before the main body could get off the ground. Each 

time a flight was scheduled, members bade emotional goodbyes to their families. Each time it was 

postponed, those who live in the immediate area 

were released, while Reservists from outside the 

area had to be billeted.

282
With the continent of Africa populated by over one billion people, divided among 800 ethnicities speaking over 1,000 different languages and spread 

over 50 countries on a land mass about three and a half times the size of the continental United States, there is no doubt the challenge and prospects 

in United States Africa Command’s area of responsibility are dynamic and complex. 

In 2011, I deployed to the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa J4 Logistics Directorate at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti in support of Operation 

Enduring Freedom. In my 13 years of working in military logistics, I had witnessed many organizations strive to be more efficient with their resources. 

But, few have matched the quality of the Total Force effort with the CJTF-HOA in US Africa Command in its effort to make the transportation of critical 

assets more effective for the warfighter and more cost-effective to American taxpayers. 

The CJTF-HOA J4 Logistics Directorate consisted of a broad mix of Active Duty, Reserve and National Guard logistics professionals from the Army, 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. This team of logistics professionals partnered with more than 10 African nations, the United Kingdom, France, 

Japan and South Korea. While a joint staff worked at Camp Lemonnier, many Total Force service members were forward deployed and embedded with 

African partner nations performing an array of activities such as military-to-military programs, civil-to-military affairs projects, and professional 

military education programs. This diverse team expanded the understanding of partner-nation logistics operations, established cooperative partner 

nation relationships, and built on those relationships for the future. 

The CJTF-HOA commander, US Navy Rear Admiral Michael T. Franken, charged the Logistics Directorate with finding more cost-effective ways to 

transport cargo and personnel throughout the area of operations. My team analyzed C-130 intratheater airlift missions, known as the EA LION, from 

March through July 2011. During our review, the EA LION was achieving a capacity rate average of 27 percent. As a result, EA LION crews were 

experiencing a 50 percent mission cancellation rate, thus signifying a substantial underutilization of C-130 airlift. 

Once the research was complete and the findings presented to our leadership, my team of Air Force Active Duty and Reserve members developed 

a plan, which identified commercial air, land, and sea carriers as cost-effective compared to just military airlift in the Horn of Africa under benign 

conditions. As a result, the Defense Logistics Agency civilian planner initiated ground convoy support in Djibouti and Ethiopia, demonstrating how 

commercial carriers could carry some of the EA LION’s cargo requirements. The Army Reserve planners took it a step farther by utilizing commercial 

shipping companies to mail smaller packages to resupply forward operating locations in Uganda and Kenya. The Navy Reserve logisticians engaged 

the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command to coordinate commercial carriers to move larger items, such as the self contained above-ground 

storage tanks, to Kenya utilizing multi-modal sealift to the Port of Djibouti and then ground transportation from there. 

By reducing the number of C-130’s by 50 percent each month, the Logistics Directorate saved the Defense Department an estimated $5.6 million per 

year in operational costs. Moreover, $2.16 million was recouped annually by not having to reposition one C-130 from Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 

each month. To retain the flexibility of a military airlift capability, two C-12 aircraft were used to fly military-sensitive cargo. Additionally, enlisted 

Air Force air transportation specialists and a Marine Corps pilot explored a mutual airlift sharing agreement between coalition partners to move 

cargo on their aircraft on an as-needed basis. 

TOTAL FORCE LOGISTICS - HOA

2834
To encourage more deliberate planning, CJTF-HOA unit planners projected their airlift requirements to the Logistics Directorate up to 90 days in 

advance, enabling more cost-effective scheduling. As a result, the EA LION C-130 average utilization rate went from 27 percent during March to July 

to 90 percent in August and September 2011, while the C-12 average utilization rate went from 42 to almost 84 percent in the same time period. These 

improved cargo utilization rates far exceeded US Africa Command’s cargo minimum requirements and substantially reduced the number of cancelled 

intratheater missions, saving the US Government millions of dollars annually. Most importantly, because of the diligent efforts in refining logistics 

processes in the Horn of Africa, the African partner nations benefited from the tremendous impact that these Total Force logisticians have had on the 

three primary capacity-building functions: building operational capacity, building institutional capacity, and developing human capital. While I was 

not in Afghanistan or Iraq, this tour was personally very enriching and rewarding in making a difference in Africa, and I am proud of the Total Force 

team.

 Major Gregory M. Kuzma, Operations Officer, 919th Logistics Readiness Squadron, June 2012

284
Brigadier General Mark A. Kyle distinguished himself by meritorious achievement 

as Director of Mobility Forces, United States Air Forces Central Command, while 

supporting ground and air operations against the enemy at Al Udeid Air Base, 

Qatar from 20 June 2010 to 8 January 2011. During this period, in support of 

Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and New Dawn, General Kyle’s 

leadership enabled historic combat effectiveness. A tactical expert, he drove a 

record 98 percent on-target recovery for over 1,000 airdrops of 25,000 bundles 

to Coalition forces. Using warfighter requirements as the measure of merit, he 

forward-deployed to assess and certify new C-17 landing zones, streamlining reliefs-in-place for two army divisions and a Marine Expeditionary Unit. During 

Operation Hamkari, the heaviest fighting in recent years, General Kyle directed 

the all-time high passage of nearly 5 million pounds of aviation fuel in a single day, 

assuring persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and close air 

support for troops in contact with the enemy. In the wake of devastating floods in 

Pakistan, he orchestrated the rapid airlift of 436,000 Halal meals to flood victims 

within 72 hours of notification and deployed experts to establish a distribution 

hub, ultimately flying 481 sorties with 2,500 tons of humanitarian aid to flood isolated areas with no impact to warfighting operations. Indicative of his stalwart efforts, mobility forces flew over 40,000 airlift sorties, carrying 570,000 passengers, 

evacuating 7,000 patients and delivering 200,000 tons of cargo, while meeting a 

presidentially directed reductions of 50,000 personnel in Iraq and an increase of 

30,000 personnel in Afghanistan. The exemplary leadership, personal endeavor, 

and devotion to duty displayed by General Kyle in this responsible position reflect 

great credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.

increase supply, and change the culture of oil 

dependency. According to the US Transportation Command Commander, General Duncan 

J. McNabb, the multi-modal approach saved 

up to $500 million a year.64

Specifically, for the MATV movements, initially the goal was set at transporting 500 

vehicles per month through a combined airlift effort. Commercial 747 freighter aircraft 

moved the MATVs from Joint Base Charleston to Manas Air Base with the vehicles then 

transferred to the military C-17 to haul into 

Camp Bastion, Afghanistan (theater direct 

delivery). A southern route from Charleston 

utilized the out-size capable C-5 and AN-124 

transport aircraft to bring the MATVs into the 

airfield at Kandahar while the C-17 and 747 

delivered MATVs to Bagram Air Base. When 

in March the US Central Command increased 

the MATV requirement to 1,000 per month, a 

multi-modal operation commenced. Sealift 

hauled the vehicles to Bahrain, where trucks 

hauled them inland for the C-17 to fly the final 

miles into Camp Bastion, Kandahar, and Bagram at a cost avoidance of $110 million per 

1,000 MATVs, per month. This multimodal 

effort further allowed the C-17s to haul five 

versus three 16-ton vehicles due to the shorter distance which meant less fuel weight and 

more cargo capacity.65 Air Force Reservists 

were proud to have contributed.

As a significant part of the air mobility community during the 2010 Afghan surge, the Air 

Force Reserve Command executed airlift misand the 

suspended 

operations 

at Manas 

due to the 

K y r g y z -

stan coup 

a f f e c t e d 

airlift and 

tanker ope r a t i o n s , 

the multim o d a l 

bridge eff e c t i v e l y 

supported 

theater ope r a t i o n s 

and the 

A f g h a n istan troop 

s u r g e . 

M u l t i -

modal ope r a t i o n s 

cut transportation 

costs by 

more than 80 percent over air-only operations 

(time requirements were less a factor).63 The 

multi-modal network was part of a specific set 

of demand reduction practices on limited resources which also optimized fuel consumption. Aviation fuel economy was part of a 

broader Air Force and Defense Department 

green energy plan designed to reduce demand, 

In the years prior to the Afghan surge, the Air 

Force had transitioned into an expeditionary 

force to provide better support to national security requirements in a continuously engaged operational environment. In 2010, the combined 

air/surface/ground bridge ensured a seamless 

link for theater distribution to forward operating areas. Although significant additional 

taskings for humanitarian and relief missions 

DIRMOBFOR- BRONZE STAR

285 286
TO MY EXTENDED AFRC FAMILY,

After the terror attacks of September 11th, I answered not only my nation’s call but a call from AFRC to come and support our command in a time of great need. It has been almost 10 years since I received that call and put my civilian 

career on hold. Now, the time has come for me to make my transition back to the civilian workforce. 

I came to HQ AFRC as a young master sergeant full of spunk and energy. The mentoring, guidance, friendships, successes, failures, and personal relationships I have developed through the years is the reason why I am leaving AFRC as 

a well seasoned and humble chief master sergeant. 

It has been an honor and a pleasure to serve with so many talented and dedicated professionals. 

I hope I served you well as you continue to propel AFRC into the future!

Chief Master Sergeant Kimberley A. Hagerty, 22 June 2011

the initiative from the Taliban and other insurgent elements, develop the Afghan Security Forces, and support the establishment 

of Afghan governance that is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people.”70 The goal 

included equipping and training 100,000 

additional Afghan Security Force personnel 

over the next 18 months and was fostered by 

the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan.71

A year later, General Petraeus indicated the 

insurgent attacks were down and showed 

real progress since 2006. However, he forewarned that the military still needed to consolidate gains in southern Afghanistan and 

push the Taliban from their strongholds in 

northern Helmand province, a deadly battleground and where opium bankrolled the insurgency. Likewise, the outlying districts in 

Kandahar province needed more securing to 

stem infiltration routes. And, al Qaeda had 

found sanctuary in the remote northeastern 

ing tanker units included the 459th, 434th, and 

507th Air Refueling Wings.68

 On 16 March 2010, General David H. Petraeus, then US Central Command Commander 

and subsequently Commander of US Forces 

in Afghanistan, announced the aims and significance of the operation to the American 

people during congressional testimony. He 

stated that coalition forces in Afghanistan 

sought to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al 

Qaeda and its extremist allies and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of trans-national extremist sanctuaries 

like the ones al Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 

9/11.”69 Additionally, policymakers geared 

the US involvement to the new “Clear-HoldBuild” counterinsurgency plan forged in the 

battlefields of Iraq and known as the Petraeus 

Doctrine. General Petraeus promised to “improve security for the Afghani people, wrest 

sions that resulted in more 

than 2,800 airlift sorties 

per month. By July 2010, 

more than 19,600 active 

and reserve airlift sorties had been flown with 

the support of Air Force 

Reserve Command aircrews, aircraft maintainers, aerial porters, and 

base operating support 

forces. The Combined 

Air Operations Center in 

Southwest Asia reported 

that during those seven 

months, Air Force airlift 

units delivered 183,600 tons of cargo to the 

Afghanistan theater. This was more than double the amount for 2009. The number of airlift passengers also increased in 2010. In the 

first seven months of 2010, active and reserve 

airlifters moved more than 441,000 passengers 

as part of the surge operations. The ability of 

AFRC aircraft and crews to deliver critical 

supplies and personnel into the most remote 

regions of Afghanistan enabled land component commanders the freedom to maneuver 

and emplace forces as needed during a critical 

period of surge operations.66 Air Force Reserve Command tanker resources provided 

essential air refueling support as part of the 

airlift effort. The 916th Air Refueling Wing, 

Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, undertook a year-long sustained effort 

for Enduring Freedom operations, amassing 

nearly 4,000 flying hours.67 Other support

286
In the early morning hours of 11 March 2011, 133 foot-waves traveled as far as six miles inland after the 8.9 magnitude Tohoku earthquake struck off 

the coast of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake and the tsunami waves wiped away portions of the Japanese coast in minutes. Observing 

the damage just days later, Technical Sergeant Daniel St. Pierre, an Air Force Reservist assigned to the 4th Combat Camera Squadron, stated that “it 

looked like a wrecker ball had torn through the houses, leaving nothing but a square mile of tiny pieces tossed with boats, cars and telephone poles.”

At the time nature unleashed its fury on Japan, the Air Force Reserve Command had 165 airmen on various assignments throughout that nation. Within 

hours, those Air Force Reservists joined the massive US military effort to assist the over 200,000 refugees who had lost their homes, businesses, and 

family members. 

On 12 March 2012, Air Force Reservists assigned to the 349th Air Mobility Wing, Travis AFB, California, refueled a C-17 transporting Los Angeles 

County Fire Urban Search and Rescue Team, Task Force II to Japan. Technical Sergeant Daniel St. Pierre sat aboard the C-17 as it headed toward the 

devastation. Upon landing, St. Pierre documented the unloading process as he had been ordered to do before leaving March. After quickly checking 

in at billeting, a converted gym filled with Vietnam-era cots and sleeping bags, St. Pierre joined Task Force II as they headed to the city of Ofunato. 

Technical Sergeant St. Pierre recalled seeing the city transform from “looking completely normal to being completely destroyed and swept away.”

As Technical Sergeant St. Pierre captured the scene with his digital camera, an active-duty Air Force KC-135 loaded with 50 civil engineers assigned 

to Kadena Air Base, Japan, arrived at Misawa Air Base, Japan, to help prepare the base for the arrival of personnel and aircraft. Hours later, more Air 

Force, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, Navy, and Marine aircraft and ships arrived in Japan loaded with personnel ready to assist. 

In the early morning hours of 14 March 2011, Air Force Reservists assigned to the 452nd Air Mobility Wing, March ARB, California, landed in Japan 

with another group from Los Angeles County Fire Urban Search and Rescue Team, Task Force II aboard. By the end of that day, as the Los Angeles 

team began searching for survivors assisted by live human-scent working dogs, the Air Force Reserve had 21 aircraft and 51 volunteer aircrews ready 

to support the growing relief operations.

Meanwhile, at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, Brigadier General Thomas P. Harwood III, an Air Force Reservist working as mobilization assistant to 

the commander, sprung into action as the Pacific Air Force chief of staff during Operation Tomodachi. Air Force Reservists from the 713th Combat 

Operations Squadron, Beale Air Force Base, California, augmented the Thirteenth Air Force staff. Lieutenant Colonel Roger Gibson, 713th detachment 

commander, explained that his unit’s presence allowed the Thirteenth “to surge its forces during increased operational requirements, like Tomodachi, 

that occur with little notice.”

While General Harwood and the 713th Reservists facilitated the movement of personnel and cargo to Japan, two Air Force Reserve airlift planners departed for Yokota Air Base, Japan. Majors Robert Devlin and John Koenig joined other airlift planners at the Thirteenth Air Force’s 613th Air and Space 

Operations Center to help plan and execute the numerous relief airlift missions needed along the northeastern coast of Japan. Major Koenig expressed 

that “it’s a blessing to help other people who are experiencing very desperate times.”

OPERATION TOMODACHI

2878
As Majors Devlin and Koenig orchestrated the airlift missions, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense authorized eligible family members, located 

on Japan’s largest island of Honshu, to depart for the United States. Termed Operation Pacific Passage, the Department of Defense operation quickly 

relocated American civilians from Japan to avoid exposing them to the radioactive fallout from the damaged Fukushima nuclear plant. On 24 March 

2011, Air Force Reservists assigned to Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, joined a multi-service team of military and nongovernmental agency workers 

welcoming four flights carrying military families from Japan at the Denver International Airport. Four days later, Air Force Reservists assigned to the 

349th Air Mobility Wing, Travis Air Force Base, California, assisted arriving dependants with lodging, transportation, follow-on travel arrangements, 

childcare, luggage, and pet care. In total, the Air Force Reserve, Air Force, and Air National Guard aircrews helped airlift 5,269 passengers and 409 

pets via military aircraft. Another 1,936 passengers arrived aboard commercial flights.

While Air Force Reservists busily supported relief operations both in Japan and in the United States, Air Force chaplains ministered to the spiritual 

needs of airmen and their families. The Air Force Chaplains Corps personnel on 43 installations, including several Air Force reserve bases, received 

special offierings totaling $257,000 to support relief operations in Japan. 

By the end of Operation Tomodachi on 4 May 2011, Air Force Reservists had flown 32 C-5 and C-17 airlift sorties, delivering relief supplies and equipment to Japan. In addition to providing critical airlift, Air Force Reservists completed three aerial refueling sorties in KC-10 aircraft that facilitated the 

arrival of more relief materiel and personnel. The Air Force Reservists were part of a force of more than 750 Air Force Reserve, Air Force, Air National 

Guard Airmen, and Air Force civilians who had deployed to assist the 13,000 Air Force personnel stationed in Japan with recovery operations. In total, 

over 20,000 United States military personnel and 460 aircraft participated in Operation Tomodachi.

On 23 August 2011, Vice President of the United States Joseph Biden traveled to Japan to pledge continued United States involvement. While speaking 

at the Sendai International Airport, an area ravaged by powerful tsunami waves, Biden explained to the Japanese people that he was proud that “our 

military was given the privilege of being able to join your forces” and “re-open the runway that enabled the arrival of hundreds of relief workers and 

more than two million tons of humanitarian supplies.” Biden continued, stating that the United States military would continue assisting Japan rebuild 

“because of a genuine affection the American people (have) for the Japanese people.” 

 

 By Paul H. Larson, AFRC Historian

288
Col Bowers: From what I have seen, we have gone to the expectation that we are going to be an enduring part of the solution. You see it with our current banding construct in the M band and across all the specialty codes. There are expectations on our forces that you see with our volunteers across 

the spectrum, not aviation-specific or any AFSC or ECS, expeditionary combat support assets. There is an expectation that we are going to be part of 

the solution, and our members see that.

I do not see that changing in the near future. I think there are constraints out there; there are budgetary constraints like there are with anything. There 

are airframe constraints; there are people constraints. But frankly, I think this probably made us more of a partner with our RegAF brothers and sisters, 

and that is not going to change. We are more intertwined than we ever have been. In fact, when you look at the new DOD Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Component as an Operational Force,” that lays that out. The white paper to follow it states flat out that the work to do is in excess of 

what the active component can handle. So, when we talk about having thousands of Air Force Reservists around the world, volunteers and mobilized, 

at least as far as the horizon we can see, that is how we are being used. That has developed. Desert Storm is when the department and the Air Force 

backed off of the old construct of just taking us on, transferring our records, and using us more as units, than splitting us up. Now, they are not using 

us in unit-size chunks but are using us as UTCs (the unit type codes) and individuals. That came from our Bosnia and Kosovo experiences. We have 

gotten to the point that it is rare right now that we are asked to provide a wing as an entity or a unit as an entity. Anything above the squadron level is 

rare, and that seems to be how the Air Force wants us. They want us in smaller chunks; they want us even down to individual skills.

We have done some tactical things to provide our resources. We set up an AEF Cell; we did some things like that. We have the Air Force Reserve 2012 

Initiative. What we are really talking about in the AFR 2012 is the first fundamental changes to structure, functions, and processes since we became a 

MAJCOM in 1997—to adjust to the fact that the Air Force wants a lot of us every day. But, they want us in small pieces.

Col Vitalis: Establishing the AFRC Force Generation Center has been huge. We need the Force Generation Center to be the single entry point for 

requests and the single exit point for generation of our reserve forces to the Air Force and combatant commanders. Our strength is our forces, but it is 

a precious and limited resource that has to be carefully managed. 

As we look to the horizon, we are not going back to what we were before 1991. The fiscal reality is that the Department of the Air Force cannot afford 

to have us as something in the cabinet on tap to open it up if they need us. They need the ongoing capability that we give. So, the balancing act is how 

do you make sure that our part-time force—that really has a family, job, and the military—that we preserve that while giving some level of support to 

the Department of the Air Force daily? It has to do with us bargaining the right type of participation. It has to do with policies and compensation—all 

that stuff. That will be the challenge, to balance those, to be able to do that because if we leave it to our active component brethren, invariably, and 

with the best of intentions, they will suck the capability dry and not realize that they killed the goose. When it happens, it will be like when they used 

two years of mobilization, and a week later they said, ‘Why can’t you guys go fly?’ ‘You just used them for two years.’ ‘Yes, but I need them this week.’ 

Colonel Bruce A. Bowers, AFRC A3 deputy director, and Colonel Gregory L. Vitalis, AFRC A5/8 program manager organizational/force structure, 

Interview, April 2010

AN ENDURING PART

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ordered the go ahead. On 1 May 2011, a 

small team of US Navy SEALs executed 

a surgical raid in the early morning hours 

on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, 

Pakistan. The 40-minute raid resulted in 

the death of the world’s most notorious and 

most wanted terrorist.75 Osama bin Laden’s 

death laid bare the weakened and fractured 

state of al Qaeda.76

DRAWING DOWN

On 15 June 2011, President Barack Obama 

set a course for drawing down the war in Afghanistan when he announced plans to bring 

10,000 troops home within a year. The death 

of Osama bin Laden, military successes on 

the ground, and the improvement in Afghanistan security forces training and operations 

provided the opportunity to begin a gradual 

troop reduction. Yet, the President’s tone 

was somber, as he was mindful of the realities facing the Afghan people.77 On 18 

December 2011, the last Air Force Reserve 

Command units left Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan. However, Air Force Reservists 

continued to volunteeer to support operations in the region.

chase of roadside bombs.73

On 13 October, 

the Department 

of Defense announced the 

deaths of multiple insurgents 

including Mohammad Ali, a senior Taliban leader who 

coordinated IED attacks in the Nimroz province. On that same day, coalition forces killed 

Mowlana Sahib, a Taliban leader in the Ghazni 

province.74

BIN LADEN - KILLED

Although the United States armed forces and 

intelligence communities had success in targeting and eliminating al Qaeda leadership, the 

most wanted terrorist, Osama bin Laden, remained elusive. However, on 14 March 2011 

Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta reported to President Barack Obama that 

satellite photographs suggested that previous 

intelligence of bin Laden’s whereabouts was 

accurate. The President now had his “actionable intelligence,” and courses of actions were 

prepared. A 

plan for a 

h e l i c o p t e r 

assault had 

emerged as 

the best option. President Obama 

Afghanistan.72 Ultimately, the people of Afghanistan must decide.

WEAKENED TALIBAN

During the course of the Afghanistan surge, 

several high-value Taliban leaders were killed 

by US military forces. Part of that success was 

attributed to the effective employment of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) in Pakistan by 

the Air Force. Concentrating these attacks in 

North Waziristan in early February 2010, the 

active and reserve Air Force units targeted 

militant compounds in the mountains west of 

Miram Shah, the capital of North Waziristan. 

After more than a dozen strikes in early 2010, 

American and Pakistani officials announced 

the death of Taliban Leader Hakimullah 

Mehsud who was responsible for the bombing 

against a US base in Khost, Afghanistan. As 

the year progressed, air strikes from RPAs became more frequent and effective. The number 

of Taliban leaders killed each week increased 

substantially. During the month of June 2010, 

precision air strikes in Kunar Province resulted 

in the killing of key Taliban fighters including 

Taliban commander Shyster Uhstad Khan who 

was involved with the distribution and purI think the difference is we saw an end with Desert Shield/Storm. We saw a 

return to normalcy. I think we are at our normal state now, and it’s going to be 

like this for a long time. There are a whole lot of bad guys that don’t play by 

our or anybody else’s rules. It’s not like we can declare victory anymore and 

have a parade. When you have the parade, you’re a target again.

 Major General Robert E. Duignan, End Of Tour Interview, 2009

There is no single place where you can go and see what is going on with the 

70,000 Air Force Reservists other than what we just built here with the AFRC 

Force Generation Center.

Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr., CAFR & Commander AFRC, End 

Of Tour Interview, July 2012

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In late February 2011, Libya descended into chaos as Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi fought to retain power during a period of turmoil in the Middle 

East referred to as the “Arab Spring.” In response to reports of atrocities against Libyan civilians mounted, President Barack Obama ordered General 

Carter F. Ham, United States Africa Command, to immediately develop a plan to assist the loosely-organized Libyan rebels. General Ham promptly 

called General Raymond T. Odierno, United States Joint Forces Command, requesting joint forces support.

 

Within 48 hours of General’s Ham’s call to General Odierno, Colonel John Williams, Commander of the 953rd Reserve Support Squadron, received a 

telephone alert. Hours later Williams and four other 953rd Reservists left to join Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn aboard the USS Mount Whitney, the 

most advanced command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence vessel in the world.

On 17 March 2011, as Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn readied for action, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973, authorizing 

“all necessary measures” to protect Libyan civilians caught in the developing civil war. Resolution 1973 allowed UN member states to establish and 

enforce an arms embargo, maintain a no-fly zone over Libya, and use any another means deemed necessary to protect Libyan civilians short of foreign 

occupation.

The passage of Resolution 1973 changed the US’s approach toward Libya. Colonel Williams, who served as the deputy for the J3 (operations), chaired 

the targeting team, oversaw the MET crew, directed covert missions, and planned future operations. The US effort to aid Libya quickly became part of a 

broader North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission. Williams recalled that, “while we didn’t see it changing that fast, the Canadians and Brits 

had planned for it without us from the start.” However, while the British and French may have planned to move forward without US help, they required 

significant aerial refueling support from the US Air Force throughout the conflict. 

Brigadier General Ray Uptegraff, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, soon found himself directing the US aerial refueling assets supporting operations 

in Libya. Hours after Resolution 1973 passed, General Uptegraff, received a call from Headquarters Air Mobility Command asking him if he could “go 

someplace far, sometime soon.” The next morning, General Uptegraff gathered his staff and began crisis action planning early on the morning of 18 

March 2011. The following evening, General Uptegraff headed to Moron Air Base, Spain, aboard a C-17 to prepare the installation to generate aerial 

refueling sorties in support of Operation Odyssey Dawn.

As General Uptegraff and his staff readied to depart for Moron, the Air Force Reserve Command’s Force Generation Center received word from the 

931st Air Refueling Group, McConnell AFB, Kansas, that Air Mobility Command’s Eighteenth Air Force wanted the unit to deploy immediately alongside its associate partner, the 22nd Air Refueling Wing. The Force Generation Center approved the 931st’s deployment, believing that it was an AFRC 

requirement. However, on the morning of 19 March 2011, as French, United Kingdom, and US forces struck Libyan targets, the Force Generation Center 

discovered that the 931 ARS tasking belonged to the active-duty component.

The Air Mobility Command’s Eighteenth Air Force contacted the Force Generation Center to determine how many aircraft and aircrew members AFRC 

could provide for up to 60 days. After brief deliberation, Air Force Reserve Command planners concluded that the command could send three aircraft 

and five aircrews on a rotational basis. Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command then re-directed an aircraft, an aircrew, and maintainers from 

Seymour-Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina, who were on orders supporting United States Central Command operations in Turkey, to Moron.

ODYSSEY DAWN—“NO DOUBT WE HAD A PLACE AT THE TABLE”

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The Air Force Reserve Command’s initial contribution to Operation Odyssey Dawn increased during the final weeks of March 2011 as NATO readied 

to launch Operation Unified Protector, the strike phase of operations supporting the Libyan rebels. Air Force Reserve aircrews arriving at Moron Air 

Base joined the 313th Air Expeditionary Wing composed of active-duty, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard aircrews. Referred to by General 

Uptegraff as the “calico wing” because of the different color aircraft tail-flashes, the 313th Air Expeditionary Wing proved it was “always available for 

thirsty fighters.”

While the 313th Air Expeditionary Wing refueled NATO aircraft coming and going out of Libya, Colonel Williams and the members of Joint Task Force 

Odyssey Dawn busily planned and coordinated air strikes against Gaddafi’s forces. Colonel Williams stated that the servicemen and women aboard USS 

Mount Whitney “brought our knowledge to the operation to good effect. For example, the battle damage assessment had not shown if we were effective 

in hitting the targets with cruise missiles we launched. However, I knew what the percent of success rate was and knew we may need another pass to 

show results. Sure enough, we had knocked out the targets.”

The extensive sorties flown by NATO aircraft against Gaddafi’s forces demanded all that the 313th AEW could give. By September 2011, the KC-135 

and KC-10 aircrews operating from Moron Air Base had completed over 20,000 flying hours and transferred over 110 million pounds of fuel in support 

of Operation’s Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector. During this period, over half of the 313th’s aerial refueling aircrews rotated into and out of Moron 

each week in order to ensure that Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard aircrews did not exceed maximum flying hour restrictions.

As the 313th Air Expeditionary Wing fueled the air war, Air Force Reserve airlift aircrews delivered cargo needed to support NATO actions in Libya. 

Some of the most significant Air Force Reserve airlift support took place from 23-27 March 2011. On 23 March, three C-5M Super Galaxy aircraft 

and integrated aircrews from the active-duty’s 9th Airlift Squadron and its classic association partner, the Air Force Reserve’s 709th Airlift Squadron, 

delivered 160,000 pounds of cargo to staging areas on Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy. By 27 March 2011, crews from the two Dover Air Force Base 

units had delivered over 387,000 pounds of cargo to the theater. The aerial port and maintenance personnel facilitated the effort by readying each C-5M 

for launch within four to five hours after its return to Dover.

On 18 October 2011, as Gaddafi’s forces showed signs of buckling, Air Force Reservists from Joint Base Lewis-McChord’s 97th Airlift Squadron and 

one active-duty pilot from the 62nd Airlift Wing, their classic association partner, transported US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Tripoli, Libya, 

aboard a C-17. Shortly after arriving in Tripoli, Secretary Clinton met with Libyan students and opposition leaders at a town hall-style gathering. 

Clinton stated that ‘the United States was proud to stand for you in your fight for freedom and we will continue to stand with you as you continue this 

journey.’ Clinton’s unannounced visit helped solidify relationships with the new Libyan regime and reassure the Libyan people that US aid would continue after the fighting ceased. Two days after Clinton’s visit, on 20 October 2011, Libyan rebels killed Muammar Gaddafi as he resisted capture near 

his hometown of Sirte, Libya.

The United Nations Security Council voted to end NATO’s mandate in Libya on 27 October 2011, one week after Gaddafi’s demise. Three days later, on 

31 October 2011, NATO operations in Libya ended. During Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector, United States military airmen completed 

5,316 sorties over Libya, including 1,210 strike and 101 MQ-1 Predator sorties. Over the course of both operations, Air Force Reserve Command aerial 

refueling aircrews conducted 535 sorties while its airlift aircrews performed 112 sorties.

 By Paul H. Larson, AFRC Historian

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Office of the Press Secretary

September 11, 2011 

Remarks by the President at “A Concert for Hope” 

Kennedy Center Washington, D.C. 8:12 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: The Bible tells us –‘weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning.’

Ten years ago, America confronted one of our darkest nights. Mighty towers crumbled. Black smoke billowed up from the Pentagon. Airplane wreckage smoldered 

on a Pennsylvania field. Friends and neighbors, sisters and brothers, mothers and fathers, sons and daughters—they were taken from us with a heartbreaking swiftness and cruelty. And on September 12, 2001, we awoke to a world in which evil was closer at hand, and uncertainty clouded our future.

In the decade since, much has changed for Americans. We’ve known war and recession, passionate debates and political divides. We can never get back the lives that 

were lost on that day or the Americans who made the ultimate sacrifice in the wars that followed.

And yet today, it is worth remembering what has not changed. Our character as a nation has not changed. Our faith—in God and in each other—that has not 

changed. Our belief in America, born of a timeless ideal that men and women should govern themselves; that all people are created equal, and deserve the same 

freedom to determine their own destiny—that belief, through tests and trials, has only been strengthened.

These past 10 years have shown that America does not give in to fear. The rescue workers who rushed to the scene, the firefighters who charged up the stairs, the 

passengers who stormed the cockpit—these patriots defined the very nature of courage. Over the years we’ve also seen a more quiet form of heroism—in the ladder 

company that lost so many men and still suits up and saves lives every day, the businesses that have been rebuilt from nothing, the burn victim who has bounced back, 

the families who press on.

Last spring, I received a letter from a woman named Suzanne Swaine. She had lost her husband and brother in the Twin Towers, and said that she had been robbed of, 

‘so many would-be proud moments where a father watches their child graduate, or tend a goal in a lacrosse game, or succeed academically.’ But her daughters are 

in college, the other doing well in high school. ‘It has been 10 years of raising these girls on my own,’ Suzanne wrote. ‘I could not be prouder of their strength and 

resilience.’ That spirit typifies our American family. And the hopeful future for those girls is the ultimate rebuke to the hateful killers who took the life of their father.

These past 10 years have shown America’s resolve to defend its citizens, and our way of life. Diplomats serve in far off posts, and intelligence professionals work 

tirelessly without recognition. Two million Americans have gone to war since 9/11. They have demonstrated that those who do us harm cannot hide from the reach of 

justice, anywhere in the world. America has been defended not by conscripts, but by citizens who choose to serve—young people who signed up straight out of high 

school, guardsmen and reservists, workers and business-people, immigrants and fourth-generation soldiers. They are men and women who left behind lives of comfort for two, three, four, five tours of duty. Too many will never come home. Those that do carry dark memories from distant places and the legacy of fallen friends. 

The sacrifices of these men and women, and of our military families, reminds us that the wages of war are great; that while service to our nation is full of glory, war 

itself is never glorious. Our troops have been to lands unknown to many Americans a decade ago—to Kandahar and Kabul; to Mosul and Basra. But our strength 

is not measured in our ability to stay in these places; it comes from our commitment to leave those lands to free people and sovereign states, and our desire to move 

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from a decade of war to a future of peace.

These 10 years have shown that we hold fast to our freedoms. Yes, we’re more vigilant against those who threaten us, and there are inconveniences that come 

with our common defense. Debates—about war and peace, about security and civil liberties—have often been fierce these last 10 years. But it is precisely the 

rigor of these debates, and our ability to resolve them in a way that honors our values and our democracy, that is the measure of our strength. Meanwhile, our 

open markets still provide innovators the chance to create and succeed, our citizens are still free to speak their minds, and our souls are enriched in churches and 

temples, our synagogues and our mosques.

These past 10 years underscores the bonds between all Americans. We have not succumbed to suspicion, nor have we succumbed to mistrust. After 9/11, to his 

great credit, President Bush made clear what we reaffirm today: The United States will never wage war against Islam or any other religion. Immigrants come 

here from all parts of the globe. And in the biggest cities and the smallest towns, in schools and workplaces, you still see people of every conceivable race and 

religion and ethnicity—all of them pledging allegiance to the flag, all of them reaching for the same American dream—e pluribus unum, out of many, we are one.

These past 10 years tell a story of our resilience. The Pentagon is repaired, and filled with patriots working in common purpose. Shanksville is the scene of friendships forged between residents of that town, and families who lost loved ones there. New York—New York remains the most vibrant of capitals of arts and industry 

and fashion and commerce. Where the World Trade Center once stood, the sun glistens off a new tower that reaches towards the sky. 

Our people still work in skyscrapers. Our stadiums are still filled with fans, and our parks full of children playing ball. Our airports hum with travel, and our buses 

and subways take millions where they need to go. And families sit down to Sunday dinner, and students prepare for school. This land pulses with the optimism of 

those who set out for distant shores, and the courage of those who died for human freedom.

Decades from now, Americans will visit the memorials to those who were lost on 9/11. They’ll run their fingers over the places where the names of those we loved 

are carved into marble and stone, and they may wonder at the lives that they led. And standing before the white headstones in Arlington, and in peaceful cemeteries 

and small-town squares in every corner of the country, they will pay respects to those lost in Iraq and Afghanistan. They’ll see the names of the fallen on bridges 

and statues, at gardens and schools.

And they will know that nothing can break the will of a truly United States of America. They will remember that we’ve overcome slavery and Civil War; we’ve 

overcome bread lines and fascism and recession and riots, and communism and, yes, terrorism. They will be reminded that we are not perfect, but our democracy 

is durable, and that democracy—reflecting, as it does, the imperfections of man –also give us the opportunity to perfect our union. That is what we honor on days 

of national commemoration—those aspects of the American experience that are enduring, and the determination to move forward as one people.

More than monuments, that will be the legacy of 9/11—a legacy of firefighters who walked into fire and soldiers who signed up to serve; of workers who raised new 

towers, and citizens who faced down their private fears. Most of all, of children who realized the dreams of their parents. It will be said that we kept the faith; that 

we took a painful blow, and we emerged stronger than before.

‘Weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning.’

With a just God as our guide, let us honor those who have been lost, let us rededicate ourselves to the ideals that define our nation, and let us look to the future 

with hearts full of hope.

May God bless the memory of those we lost, and may God bless the United States of America.

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AFRC Heritage Hall

Twisted steel from the World Trade Center, a stone from the Pentagon’s West Wall, and earth from near the impact site of Flight 93 

are on display at Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. Men and women of the Air Force 

Reserve Command served and sacrificed at all three sites on that fateful day, including Major Leroy Homer, co-pilot of Flight 93.

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2001

11 September – The first World Trade Center attack occurred at 0846 Eastern Standard Time via a commercial airliner controlled by terrorists.

11 September – At 08:57 EST, the White House Situation Room informed President George W. Bush of the first World Trade Center attack during his arrival at Booker Elementary School. The President and his staff initially believed that the first impact was an accident. 

11 September – At 09:06 EST, President George W. Bush, while reading to a group of second graders, was notified by a staff member of a second commercial airliner striking the World Trade Center.

11 September – 09:26 EST, Federal Aviation Administration Administrator Jane Garvey, acting on the request of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, initiated a national ground stop, which forbade takeoffs and required planes in the air to get down as soon as possible.

11 September – 10:03 EST, Flight 93 crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, after being hijacked by four terrorists. The copilot of that flight, 

Air Force Reservist Major LeRoy Homer, Jr., was among the 11 crew members and 47 passengers killed.

11 September – In a nation-wide address, President George W. Bush spoke to the American people and said, “There is no distinction between 

the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.” Secretary of State Colin L. Powell called for the formation of an international coalition.

14 September – President George W. Bush signed an executive order establishing Operation Noble Eagle and calling for the activation of 50,000 

reservists. Service reviews identified 35,500 for recall: 10,000 Army, 13,000 Air Force, 3,000 Navy, 7,500 Marines, and 2,000 Coast Guard.

15 September – At a National Security Council session at the Camp David, Maryland, the Central Intelligence Agency was given the priority 

mission by the President to develop a response to 9/11.

18 September – President George W. Bush signed into law a joint resolution authorizing the use of force against those responsible for attacking 

the United States on 9/11.

20 September – Prime Minister Tony C. Blair visited the White House and was advised by the President that Afghanistan was the primary target. 

That evening, the President spoke to a joint session of Congress.

25 September – During a Pentagon press conference, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz called for a “broad and sustained” campaign against al Qaeda.

 

AFRC GWOT Chronology

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26 September – The first Central Intelligence Agency operation in Afghanistan began. The goal of the operation was to establish contact with the 

Northern Alliance and provide resources for indigenous operations. 

7 October – Operation Enduring Freedom commenced. Air Force Reserve Command fighters, bombers, airlifters, tankers, special operations, 

intelligence, civil engineers, rescue, medical and aeromedical had rolled into the fight to support operations in Afghanistan.

9-10 November – Taliban forces suffered a major loss at Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. The Taliban regime began to unravel rapidly 

during the following week when several major Taliban strongholds fell to coalition forces.

14 November – General Fahim Khan forces liberated Kabul from the Taliban fighters after weeks of air assaults.

14 November – Jalalabad was abandoned by Taliban forces.

23-27 November – The Northern Alliance gained control of Konduz, the last Taliban stronghold in Northern Afghanistan.

5 December – The Taliban surrendered the city of Kandahar. Mullah Omar fled the area, marking the end of the Taliban regime.

6-18 December – The Battle of Tora Bora in the White Mountains of Eastern Afghanistan took place. US forces assaulted an al Qaeda stronghold 

consisting of a series of caves fortified and improved in the 1980s by the United States for use by the Mujahedeen

20 December – The International Security Assistance Force is established by the United Nations Security Council. This NATO-led coalition 

initially consisted of troops from 27 countries with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and France comprising the majority of 

the force.

20 December – By 20 December 2001, more than 11,000 Air Force Reservists and individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs) had participated 

as part of America’s anti-terrorism campaign.

21 December – The interim Afghan government was sworn in with Hamid Karzai as the interim administration chair.

2002

January – President George W. Bush tasked CENTCOM Commander General Tommy R. Franks with designing Operation Iraqi Freedom. Franks 

supported a Total Force attack as outlined in Standing Operation Plan 10003v.

January – Operation Freedom Eagle began in the Philippines. The mission was to advise and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines to help 

combat terrorism in the country. Much of the mission took place on the island of Basilan in the southern Philippines. 

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29 January – Citing their support of international terrorism in his State of the Union Speech, President George W. Bush declared that North 

Korea, Iraq, and Iran constitute an “axis of evil.” 

2-19 March – Coalition forces launched Operation Anaconda, the first large-scale operation since Tora Bora, in the Shahi-Kot Valley in Afghanistan. 

17 April – President George W. Bush called for the reconstruction of Afghanistan during his speech at the Virginia Military Institute.

1 June – President George W. Bush announced his doctrine of “preemptive action” to destroy threats before they fully materialize.

13 June – The Afghan People elected Hamid Karzai as head of state of the new interim Afghanistan government.

June – Air Force Reserve Command mobilization in support of America’s war on terrorism reached its peak with more than 13,000 Reservists 

called to active duty at home and abroad. 

October – Congress approved a resolution for sending military assets to Iraq.

October 7 – The Pan-Sahel initiative began in Northwest Africa to assist Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movements of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation. The operation included 

Army Special Operations and Air Force Reserve units. 

16 October – President George W. Bush signed the “Authorization for the use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”

2003

January – President George W. Bush placed the responsibility for toppling of the Saddam regime as well as stability and reconstruction of Iraq 

under the Department of Defense.

25 February – Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that several hundred thousand troops 

will be required for the war.

19 March – Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced. President George W. Bush signed the order at 06:30 EST (20 March, Baghdad). 

23 March – Coalition forces began attack against Baath forces in Baghdad.

9 April – Coalition forces asserted control over Saddam Hussein’s seat of government in Baghdad.

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16 April – General Tommy R. Franks, Commander, Central Command issued an order that outlawed the Baath Party and announced the deBaathification of Iraqi society.

1 May – President George W. Bush announced from the deck of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln that major combat operations in Iraq had 

ended.

7 July – General John P. Abazaid succeeded General Tommy R. Franks as commander of the United States Central Command.

11 August – The North Atlantic Treaty Organization officially assumed command of peacekeeping in Afghanistan.

19 August – A truck bomb exploded outside the United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad causing severe damage. The top United Nations envoy, 

Sergio de Mello, was killed.

September - About 36,000 pounds of medical and humanitarian supplies were delivered by Air Force Reserve Command aircrews to relief agencies treating hundreds of victims of a terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, Russia. 

5 October – National Security Director Condoleezza Rice established the Iraqi Stabilization Group to coordinate reconstruction and transition 

activities. 

12 November – Operation Iron Hammer began as an attempt to disrupt enemy operations in Baghdad.

13 December – Coalition forces capture Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq until 9 April 2003, near Tikrit during Operation Red Dawn.

2004

4 April – In Iraq, the First Battle of Fallujah began. Codenamed Operation Vigilant Resolve, it was the US military response to the killing and 

mutilation of four private military contractors. The operation ended with the recapture of Fallujah in November 2004, Operation Phantom Fury.

8 April – Operation Resolute Sword began against Sadrist forces in Southern Iraq.

May – Al Sadr ordered his followers to battle the US-led coalition in Iraq.

24 June – Lieutenant General John A. assumed command of the Air Force Reserve Command and became Chief of the Air Force Reserve from 

Lieutenant General James E. Sherrard III.

24 June – The Interim Iraqi Constitution was released by the Iraqi government.

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9 October-Air Force Reservists and active duty airmen provided top cover for the millions of voting Afghans during the country’s first direct 

election.

9 October – Afghanistan’s first presidential election was held. Hamid Karzai won with 55.4 percent of the votes among 18 candidates.

8-20 October – The Battle for Mosul was fought for control of the capital of the Ninawa Governorate in northern Iraq.

December – January 2005 – Air Force Reserve Command, Regular Air Force, and Air National Guard personnel flew 54 Operation Unified Assistance missions between December 29 and January 13 in support of humanitarian efforts in the wake of a tsunami that struck South East Asia 

on 26 December 2004. 

2005

25 January – Iraqi National Assembly elections were held for the first time. This was a transitional parliament tasked with writing a new and 

permanent constitution. The National Assembly chose Iyad Allawi as the interim prime minister. 

12 May – President Hamid Karzai and President George W. Bush established a formal strategic partnership by issuing a joint declaration providing US forces access to Afghan military facilities.

15 May – Operation Mountain Thrust commenced in the Kandahar, Helmand, and Paktika provinces in Afghanistan. The operation ended on 

31 July 2006.

28 June – Operation Red Wings began in the Kunar Province, Afghanistan, with the objective of killing or capturing a Taliban leader. Three 

Navy SEALs were killed in the initial operation. Marcus Luttrell, the only surviving SEAL, was rescued by an Air Force Reserve Command 

search and rescue mission working with Army Rangers.

August - November – From 25 August to 14 November 2005, more than 1,465 Air Force Reservists provided assistance in support of Hurricanes Katrina, Ophelia, Rita, and Wilma. 

18 September – Afghanistan held parliamentary and provincial council elections. Voter turnout was about 50 percent, and women won 28 percent of the seats.

13 October – Air Force Reservists delivered aid to Pakistan after an earthquake rocked the region.

19 October – Secretary of State Condolezza Rice testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee stating the US political-military strat

326
egy should be “Clear, Hold, Build.” 

13 November – Air Force Reserve Command F-16 crews participated in Operation Steel Curtain, a joint operation to restore control over Iraqi 

towns bordering Syria and to reduce the flow of foreign insurgents crossing the border and joining the Iraqi insurgency. 

2006

1 February – The Afghan Compact was announced. The agreement established a framework for international cooperation with Afghnaistan.

22 February – The Al-Askari Mosque was bombed by Sunni extremists causing widespread anger among Shiah Muslims. The bombing was 

viewed by the Bush Administration as a definitive moment for Iraq’s counterinsurgency.

29 March – Battle of Lashkagar. Taliban fighters launched an unsuccessful attack on a forward operating base in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. 

The fighting ended after B-52 bombers attacked militant positions.

April – May Afghan National Army (ANA) and coalition forces initiated Operation Mountain Lion in Afghanistan.

15 June – 31 July – The Air Force Reserve Command participated in Operation Mountain Thrust, the largest anti-insurgent operation in Afghanistan since October 2001. 

July – After fighting broke out in Lebanon, Air Force Reserve Command airlift crews helped evacuate Americans transitioning out of Cyprus to 

Ramstein Air Base, Germany, and then on to stateside bases.

2 – 7 September – Air Force Reserve Command assets support Operation Medusa in Afghanistan.

29 December – Saddam Hussein was hanged for one of his many “crimes against humanity.” 

2007

10 January – In a televised address to the nation, President George W. Bush announced the 2007 troop surge that increased the number of troops 

for providing security to Baghdad and Al Anbar Province by 20,000.

February – Operation Imposing Law launched as the initial action of the 2007 surge.

May – The final troop deployment of the 2007 Iraqi surge was completed.

3278
16 June – Operation Phantom Thunder was launched against insurgents in Diyala and Anbar provinces as part of the 2007 Iraqi surge.

September – The Air Force Reserve Command developed the Three Bases Plan that resulted in a higher degree of involvement in operations at 

Balad, Bagram, and Kirkuk air bases.

2008

24 June – Lieutenant General Charles E. Stenner, Jr. assumed command of the Air Force Reserve Command and became Chief of the Air Force 

Reserve, replacing Lieutenant General John A. Bradley.

September – Air Force Reserve Command assets participated in Hurricane Ike relief efforts in the Corpus Christie, Texas, area. 

2009

27 March – President Barack H. Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The President linked the future of Afghanistan 

with Pakistan’s. The goal was to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban rule while investing in both countries. 

21 September – General Stanley A. McCrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force and Commander, US Forces Afghanistan, 

issued a report stating additional forces were required to achieve the mission in Afghanistan.

1 December – President Barack H. Obama announced the Afghanistan surge, requiring the swift deployment of 30,000 troops in 2010. Air 

Force Command aircrew members, aircraft maintainers, logisticians, aerial porters, and base operating support forces provided support for the 

additional troops sent overseas.

15 December – TSgt Anthony C. Campbell, Jr., an Air Force Reserve Command EOD technician with the 932nd Civil Engineer Squadron, Scott 

AFB, Illinois, was killed in action as the result of an IED explosion. 

2010

13 January – The Air Force Reserve Command began support of Operation Unified Response to provide relief to the victims of the Haiti earthquake.

13-26 February – Operation Together began in the Helmand Province. The operation consisted of 15,000 US and Afghan forces, who successfully cleared Marjah city of Taliban militants.

14 April – 21 May – The Eyjafjallajokull volcano eruption in Iceland created an ash plumb that rose to a height of 30,000 feet. The drifting ash 

328
cloud resulted in significant adjustments for the Air Force Reserve Command. Medical evacuations for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan were flown 

directly to Washington, D.C. rather than to Germany.

1 May – The Air Force Reserve Command deployed assets to the Gulf of Mexico in support of Deepwater Horizon oil spill mitigation. 

2-4 June – The Consultative Peace Jirga was held between the Afghan government and representatives of the Northern Alliance with informal 

Taliban representation. The Taliban used the jirga to continue its call for an Islamic government and the removal of all foreign troops.

23 June – General Stanley A. McChrystal, who had earlier replaced General David D. McKiernan, was relieved of his post as commander of US 

forces in Afghanistan. President Barack H. Obama immediately nominated General David H. Patraeus for this position.

16 August – 3 October – Air Force Reserve Command C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemaster III aircraft and their aircrews transported nearly 6 

million pounds of relief supplies to Pakistan in response to major flooding in the region.

31 August – President Barack H. Obama announced the end to the American combat mission in Iraq.

1 September – Operation Iraqi Freedom ended. Operation New Dawn began.

1 September – A change of command ceremony was held at the Al Faw Palace in Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq commemorating the end of the 

Iraq War.

13 October – The Department of Defense announced the deaths of multiple insurgents including Mohammad Ali, a senior Taliban leader who 

coordinated improvised explosive device attacks in the Nimroz province.

16 December – In announcing the results of a US policy review, President Barack H. Obama stated that the United States fully backs the concept 

of reconciliation with insurgent leaders who meet certain conditions.

2011

28 March – The Air Force Reserve Command began operations in support of the Japanese earthquake relief effort and in support of Operation 

Unified Protector in Libya.

2 May – US forces Navy SEALs, killed Osama bin Laden in a raid of his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

15 June – President Barack H. Obama announced plans to bring 10,000 troops home from Afghanistan and end the war there in the upcoming 

years. 

32930
6 August – Taliban insurgents shot down a Chinook helicopter resulting in 38 US deaths. Hours later, an airstrike killed 11 insurgents responsible for the shoot-down.

31 October – Operation Unified Protector ended with the successful liberation of Libya.

15 December – Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visited Baghdad Airport and announced the conclusion of the Iraq War in a brief ceremony.

18 December – The last Air Force Reserve Command unit personnel left Bagram Air Base, Iraq. However, Air Force Reserve Command personnel ontinued to support operations in the region.

330
3312 
3312
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Support and guidance on our endeavors make us excel. Such has been the benefit to Turning Point 9.11: Air Force Reserve in the 21st Century, 

2001-2011. Upon my arrival at AFRC in May 2005, I soon conceptualized a book on the Air Force Reserve Command’s contribution to the Global 

War On Terrorism—GWOT. My commander, Lieutenant General John A. Bradley, reinforced my thinking with his remark that it had been a while 

since we had had a history book on the command. He was referring to Gerald T. Cantwell’s Citizen Airmen book—an outstanding work, but it 

was now some twenty years since its publication. Additionally, I found a command interested in its accomplishments and eager for its permanent 

recording. Over the next years, other senior officers and wing commanders were supportive as well as the many Air Force Reservists that I engaged 

in conversations with on their GWOT deployments. Thus, the book was soon underway. It would relate how Air Force Reservists have served and 

their contributions since the inception of the Air Force Reserve and how the Air Force Reserve as an entity has evolved from a strategic reserve mobilized only for a full-scale war to a strategic reserve force that is well integrated and serving on a daily basis around the world the national security 

requirements of the United States. The record is one of excellence, and Turning Point 9.11 provides just a glimpse into the individual motivation 

and service of Air Force Reservists—these citizens who readily volunteer to serve their nation, again and again, and in doing so simply do amazing 

things. I am privileged and honored to have had the role of being their historian.

 

Foremost, I sincerely and deeply appreciate the support of my bosses—Lt Gens John A. Bradley, Charles E. Stenner, Jr., and James F. Jackson. Each 

ensured the book’s success. I personally thank you. I also especially want to note the encouragement and support of Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, 

Maj Gen Hanferd J. Moen, Jr., and Brig Gen Richard R. Severson; they are really AFRC historians, too. Col Gregory L. Vitalis also deserves special 

thanks for reading parts of the drafts in the last days of his outstanding military career.

 

I express my thanks and acknowledge the contributions of: Lt Gen James E. Sherrard III, Maj Gen Robert E. Duignan, Maj Gen Richard S. Haddad, Maj Gen Mark A. Kyle, Maj Gen Clay T. McCutchan, Maj Gen Allan R. Poulin, Maj Gen Charles E. Reed, Jr., Maj Gen James T. Rubeor, Maj 

Gen David E. Tanzi, Maj Gen Larry L. Twitchell, Maj Gen Michael N. Wilson, Brig Gen William B. Binger, Brig Gen Elizabeth A. Grote, Brig 

Gen Robert E. Lytle, Brig Gen George F. Williams, William C. Redmond, Edward S. Jones, Gerald J. Cardinal, Col Bruce A Bowers, Col Herman 

C. Brunke, Jr., Chaplain Col Gary R. Califf, Col Michael Dankosky, Col Dominic A. DeFrancis, Col Brian C. Guthrie, Col Paul Hastert, Col John 

A. Hickok, Col Thomas E. Kirkendall, Col Victor Kuchar, Col Jeffrey Macrander, Col Michael J. McCully, Col Robert Mortensen, Col James Myers, Col Robert P. Palmer, Col George J. Pierce, Chaplain Col Mark P. Rowan, Col Robert R. Swain, Jr., Col Michael E. Swaney, Col Timothy E. 

Tarchick, Col Robert K. Thompson, Col John E. Trnka, Jr., Col John Williams, Col C. Faylene Wright, Col Eugene V. Ziemba, Col Stephen W. 

Zander, Col Nancy C. Zbyszinski, Lt Col Dale Andrews, Lt Col Michael Brill, Lt Col James Fabio, Lt Col Robert A. Hedglin, Jr., Lt Col James M. 

Larkin, Lt Col Paul Nevius, Lt Col Anthony G. Polashek, Lt Col Leslie J. Pratt, Lt Col David Re, Lt Col Patrick Rupel, Lt Col Nathaniel L. Ward, 

Major David C. Belton, Maj Eric Davidson, Maj Tim Donnelly, Maj Gregory M. Kuzma, Maj Doug Lomheim, Maj Susan Lukas, Maj Michael J. 

Paoli, Maj Jose L. Rivera, Maj Wes White, Chaplain Cpt Howard S. Bell, Cpt Annette Bonaro, David Holly, Dan N. Powell, Richard D. Sawyer, 

Ann F. Skarban, Cathleen Snow, Carl E. Vogt, Mark D. Whitlow, CMSgt Dwight D. Badgett, CMSgt Reginald Bass, CMSgt Richard Brown, CMSgt 

Joe DiTommaso, CMSgt Troy J. McIntosh, CMSgt Kimberly A. Hagerty, CMSgt Raymond Sturm, CMSgt Gerardo L. Villagomez, SMSgt Donald 

Andreasen, SMSgt Dirk H. Danielson, SMSgt Nicole J. Girard, SMSgt Stephen N. Klinger, SMSgt Anthony J. Sobieski, SMSgt Casey E. Wieland, 

3334 
MSgt Jenny K. Carney, MSgt Vernon L. Cohrs, MSgt (ret) Keith Davis, TSgt Charles Boyette, and SSgt Francisco T. Martinez. Many of you 

directly contributed to the side bar stories or provided information.

I thank our own AFRC unit and IMA historians for their contributions. Among this special group are: SMSgt Robin J. Rosenberger (22AF/HO), 

MSgt Richard D. Sawyer (419th FW/HO), MSgt Kenneth E. Sloat (910th AW/HO), MSgt Angela M. Vazquez (403rd WG/HO), MSgt Gerald A. 

White (514th AMW/HO), SSgt Sa’Maad I. Bynum (916th ARW/HO), TSgt Scott J. Gaitley (931st ARG/HO), TSgt John B. Snowman (301st FW/

HO), TSgt Robert Wade (349th AMW/HO), and SSgt Cathi D. Bradford and SSgt Maria L. Eames (920th RQW/HO).

Within AFRC Historical Services, I especially acknowledge the writings and contributions of Dr. Donald C. Boyd (Part V, VI), Stephen P. Ove (II, 

III, IV), and Keith L. Barr (side bars, research, imagery, reviews) to which they undertook with much dedication. Dr. Boyd also assumed the task 

of learning Adobe InDesign and was the master here. Together, we laid out the book in its conceptual form. Other AFRC staff historians wrote 

side bar entries and assisted with the editing and reviews required to bring the book into final written and final layout form. For these notable 

efforts, I sincerely thank SMSgt Angela M. Vazquez and Paul H. Larson for their good read, as well as Keith L. Loney, Jason D. Huddleston, and 

Dr. Gregory L. Mattson for their earlier involvement. Over the years, we also had some additional assistance from Col Thomas A. Deall, Lt Col 

Teresa M. Riley, Heidi A. Vion, and Maria L. Eames, who partnered with me on the initial design. Turning Point 9.11 was a Historical Services 

team event. I also wrote Part I, selected the imagery, sought and compiled side bar entries, and worked the drafts into final form as the overall 

editor. 

To our colleagues in the Air Force Art program—Russell D. Kirk, Gregory A. Thompson, and Elsy R. Morataya—I express my thanks for allowing us to showcase our Air Force Reservists and their missions through the artist’s perspective. Major Warren F. Neary, IMA historian and 

artist, designed the layout of the artwork pages. I note Richard D. Sawyer’s efforts as an artist, photographer, and former AFRC historian; he 

accomplished his Angela II artwork especially for this book. 

I also sincerely thank Ms. Patricia M. Richcreek who provided her expertise and guided us through the DAPS/GPO process.

Betty R. Kennedy

AFRC Director of Historical Services

September 2012

3334
END NOTES

PART I

1Book, Charles de F. Chandler and Frank P. Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings (New York: Ronald, 1943), p 80. 

2 Book, Charles de F. Chandler and Frank P. Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings (New York: Ronald, 1943), pp 76, 101, 316. 

3Book, Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History reprint, 1985) pp 129, 

131, 132. 

4Book, Juliette A. Hennessy, The United States Army Air Arm, April 1861 to April 1917 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History reprint, 1985) p 155; 

Book, Origins, History and Accomplishment of the US Army Reserve (Annandale, VA: Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, April 1965), pp 49, 50. 

5Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 

pp 8, 9; Speech, Maj Gen Oscar M. Westover, CAAC, “Reserve Officers National Convention, Oakland, California,” 23 Sep 37. 

6Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 

pp 11, 13. 

7Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 19, 20; Article, Maj Gen James E. Fechet, CAAC, “The Training of Air Corps Reserve Officers,” Aero Digest, Feb 30, pp 53, 54, 264, 265; Article, 

Cy Caldwell, “Preserve Our Air Reserve,” Aero Digest, Jul 36, pp 21-23; Speech, Maj Gen Oscar M. Westover, CAAC, “Reserve Officers National Convention, 

Oakland, California,” 23 Sep 37. 

8Book, Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History reprint, 1985), pp 

100, 101.

9Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 

pp 20, 21.

10Plan, AAF/AC/AS-3, Army Air Forces Plan for the Air Reserve, 12 Jul 46, pp preface, 1-7; Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air 

Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), pp 28, 29, 32. 

11Book, Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Vol I, 1907-1950 (Washington, DC: Air Force History 

and Museums Program, 1997), pp 387, 415, 416.

12Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 48, 51, 52, 392; Letter, HQ ADC/CC to Commanding Generals All Air Forces ADC, “Activation of the Air Reserve Program,” 3 Jun 46.

13Letter, Circular 103 and AF Letter 35-124, Departments of the Army and Air Force, “Air Force Reserve and Air Force Honorary Reserve,” 14 Apr 48. 

14Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 21, 65.

15Executive Order 10007, Harry S. Truman, 15 Oct 48.

16Memorandum, Gordon Gray to Mr. James Forrestal, “Synopsis of Major Recommendations of the Gray Board,” 2 Jul 48; Hearing, Maj Gen Ellard A. Walsh, 

Pres National Guard Association, Gray Committee on Civilian Components, 6 Feb 48; Hearing, Brig Gen E. A. Evans, Ex Dir Reserve Officers Association, Gray 

Committee on Civilian Components, 12 Feb 48; Hearing, Col Robert J. Smith, Nat Pres Air Reserve Association, Gray Committee on Civilian Components, Feb 

48; Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 59-61, 71, 72.

335 336 
17Order, HQ CONAC, GO 1, 1 Dec 48; Letter, DAF, “Continental Air Command Is Organized,” 18 Nov 48.

18Biography, AF/PA, Lt Gen Elwood R. Quesada, Feb 93.

19Staff Study, HQ ADC, “Comparison of Approved War Department Policies Relating to the Post-war National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps,” Dec 46.

20Report, “USAF Statistical Digest,” FY50; Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, 

DC:Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), pp 74-76. 

21Study, Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Force Reserve and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRC Historical Services, 2001), pp 25, 67, 73, 

74, 85; Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums 

Program, 1997), p 115. 

22Study, Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Force Reserve and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRC Historical Services, 2001), pp 37, 38, 40, 

43, 45; Book, Frank F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,1950-1953 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp 231, 353, 354, 569.

23Study, Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Force Reserve and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRC Historical Services, 2001), pp 48, 50-52, 55, 

56; Book, Frank F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,1950-1953 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp 71, 323, 330-331, 352, 

453-461.

24Book, Frank F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea,1950-1953 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp 352, 353, 367, 665, 566; 

Study, Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Force Reserve and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRC Historical Services, 2001), pp 69, 70.

25Public Law No. 66-476, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Sec. 201, 9 Jul 52.

26Study, Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Force Reserve and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRC Historical Services, 2001), p 85.

27Public Law No. 66-476, Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, Sec. 204-211, 233, 240-245, 9 Jul 52.

28Public Law No. 773, The Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954, 3 Sep 54; Article, “ROPA Passes,” The Air Reservist, Oct 54, pp 5, 6; Fact Sheet, HQ CAC/

IS, “Reserve Officer Personnel Act,” 54.

29Report, House Armed Services, “Implementation Of The Reserve Forces Act of 1955,” (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956), Jan 56; Report, House Armed Services, “Reserve Forces Act of 1955: Pertinent Questions And Answers With Respect To The Final Version of H.R. 7000, A Bill To Provide For The Strengthening Of The Reserve Forces,” (Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 55.

30Report, No. 457, House, 84th Congress, 1st Sess, National Reserve Plan, p 4, 28 Apr 55.

31Report, No. 457, House, 84th Congress, 1st Sess, National Reserve Plan, p 11, 28 Apr 55.

32History, CONAC/HO, “Continental Air Command, January 1956-June 1956,” p 143-146, Feb 57. 

33History, Aerial Port Control Office NY Naval Air Station, “History Of Operation 16 Ton Continental Air Command, 22 June 1956-15 September 1956,” pp 

1-5, 14, 15, circa 56.

34History, Aerial Port Control Office NY Naval Air Station, “History Of Operation 16 Ton Continental Air Command, 22 June 1956-15 September 1956,” p 

2, circa 56.

35Message, HQ CONAC, Army Airborne Support, 27 Nov 56.

36Plan, HQ 4AF, “Operations Plan NO. 51-57, Air Reserve Logistical Airlift Plan,” 1 Apr 57; Article, Lt Col Jaffus M. Rodgers, HQ CONAC/DO, “Operation 

Swiftlift: Peacetime Utilization of Air Reserve Forces,” Air University Quarterly Review, pp 109-112, Spring 59; Article, HQ CONAC, “Swift Lift,” The Air 

Reservist, pp 5, 13, Jun-Jul 57; Point Paper, HQ CONAC, “CONAC Accomplishments,” 4 Sep 59.

37Point Paper, HQ CONAC, “CONAC Accomplishments,” 4 Sep 59. However, subsequently, the civil airlines in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet were successful 

in restoring a decline in their government business.

38History, CONAC/HO, “Continental Air Command, January 1956-June 1956,” p 141, Feb 57.

 39Point Paper, HQ CONAC, “CONAC Accomplishments,” 4 Sep 59.

40Article, HQ CONAC, “Swift Lift,” The Air Reservist, p 13, Jun-Jul 57.

335 336
41Study, Gerald T. Cantwell, Lt Victor B. Summers, and Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Reserve Technician Program—Its Antecedents And Evolution, 1948-1987 

(Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRES Historical Services, 1987), pp 2, 4, 8, 13, 15, 16; History, CONAC/HO, “Continental Air Command, July 1957-December 1957,” 

pp 165-192, Jun 58.

 42History, CONAC/HO, “Continental Air Command, January 1957-June 1957,” p 154, Jan 58.

43Book, Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, Vol II (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, December 

1989), p 38.

 44Plan, HQ AF, “Guidelines For Task Force On Implementation Of Reserve Forces Management Plan,” Tab A, 12 Feb 60. 

 45History, CONAC/HO, “Continental Air Command, July 1957-December 1957,” pp 53, 56-59, Jun 58.

 46Article, Gen Thomas D. White, CSAF, “New Accent On The Air Reserve Forces,” Air Force, Vol. 43, No. 7, p 103, Jul 60.

47Statement, “Major General Chester E. McCarty, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee,” 62; Statement, “Mr. 

Benjamin W. Fridge, Special Assistant For Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee,” 62; Message, HQ CONAC, 

[Rescue Units], 9 Nov 61; Order SO G-77, HQ TAC, [Release From Extended Active Duty], 13 Jul 62. 

 48Statement, “Major General Chester E. McCarty, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee,” 62.

49Letter, Maj Wesley C. Brashear, CONAC, to Lt Col W. L. Spencer, AFRES/DOO, “TAC Airlift Request,” 7 Nov 62; Report, Col John Hall, CONAC/DCS 

Ops, to HQ USAF/OOP-PC, “CONCAC Activities in Support of Cuban Operations,” 1 Feb 63.

50Message, CSAF to HQ TAC w/info CONAC and others, [President Under PL 87-736 Orders to Extended Active Duty Following Units], 280255Z Oct 62; Executive Order 11058, John F. Kennedy, 23 Oct 62; Memo, Col Vincent J. Lozito, AFPMP, to AFPMP-11, “General Information on Reserve Forces Called to EAD 

for Cuban Crisis,” 29 Nov 62; Memo, Maj Wesley C. Brashear, “Statistics on Cuban Crisis,” 8 Jan 63; Report, Col John Hall, CONAC/DCS Ops, to HQ USAF/

OOP-PC, “CONCAC Activities in Support of Cuban Operations,” 1 Feb 63; Outline, CONAC Commanders’ Conference, “Operations Outlook,” 1 Mar 63.

 51Article, Liam S. White, “Sorry Situation in the Reserves,” Washington Star, 18 Dec 61.

 52Letter, President John F. Kennedy to Eugene M. Zuckert, SECAF, [Berlin], 17 Jul 62.

 53Statement, “Major General Chester E. McCarty, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee, 62; Statement, “Mr. 

Benjamin W. Fridge, Special Assistant For Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee,” 62.

 54Letter, John A. Lang, SECAF Dep for Reserve and ROTC Affairs to Lt Gen Edward J. Timberlake, CONAC Commander, 15 Aug 62.

 55Letter, Lt Gen Edward J. Timberlake, CONAC Commander, to John A. Lang, SECAF Dep for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 9 Nov 62.

56Statement, “Major General Chester E. McCarty, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee, 62; Statement, “Mr. 

Benjamin W. Fridge, Special Assistant For Manpower, Personnel and Reserve Forces, Before House Armed Services Committee,” 62.

57Letter, Maj Wesley C. Brashear, CONAC, to Lt Col W. L. Spencer, AFRES/DOO, “TAC Airlift Request,” 7 Nov 62.

 58Letter, Maj Wesley C. Brashear, CONAC, to Lt Col W. L. Spencer, AFRES/DOO, “TAC Airlift Request,” 7 Nov 62.

 59Report, Col John Hall, CONAC/DCS Ops, to HQ USAF/OOP-PC, “CONCAC Activities in Support of Cuban Operations,” 1 Feb 63.

60Presentation, Lt Col Charles A. Rawls, 2494th AFR Sector, circa Fall 62.

61Presentation, Lt Col Charles A. Rawls, 2494th AFR Sector, circa Fall 62.

62Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 193, 194, 214-217, 220-223. 

63Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 193, 194, 208-211, 213. 

64Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 

1997), pp 210, 211, 214, 215, 223, 225.

65Study, Rand, The Air Reserve Forces Study, Vol.1: Summary and Integration, Jul 67, p 2.

3378 
66Study, Rand, The Air Reserve Forces Study, Vol.1: Summary and Integration, Jul 67, pp 2, 3.

67Memorandum, Melvin R. Laird, SECDEF, “Support for Guard and Reserve Forces,” 21 Aug 70; Memorandum, James R. Schlesinger, SECDEF, “Readiness 

of the Selected Reserve,” 23 Aug 73.

68Memorandum, Melvin R. Laird, SECDEF, “Support for Guard and Reserve Forces,” 21 Aug 70.

69Memorandum, Melvin R. Laird, SECDEF, “Support for Guard and Reserve Forces,” 21 Aug 70.

70Memorandum, James R. Schlesinger, SECDEF, “Readiness of the Selected Reserve,” 23 Aug 73.

71History, AFRES/HO, “History of Air Force Reserve, 1 July 1973-30 June 1974,” p 187, Feb 75; Study, Gerald T. Cantwell, Lt Victor B. Summers, and Kenneth C. Kan, The Air Reserve Technician Program—Its Antecedents And Evolution, 1948-1987 (Robins AFB, GA: HQ AFRES Historical Services, 1987), pp 

56, 57.

72History, AFRES/HO, “The History of Air Force Reserve, January-December 1977,” pp 93, 94, Sep 78; History, AFRES/HO, “The History of Air Force 

Reserve, January-December 1978,” pp 101, 102, Aug 79.

73Chronology, AFRC/HO, AFRC Milestones 1948-2011, Jul 11; Point Paper, HQ AFRES/DOTM, “Air Force Reserve Participation in Worldwide Contingencies During Last Week of October, 1983,” 23 Nov 83; Note, Gerald T. Cantwell, AFRES/HO, “Operation Eldorado Canyon, 14 April 1986,” 21 Dec 87; Report, 

AFRES/HO, “Operation Just Cause,” Jan 93.

74History, AFRES/HO, “History Headquarters Air Force Reserve, 1 October 1990-30 September 1991,” Annex 1, p 28 (Table A1-3), Apr 92; Report, AFRES, 

“AFRES/ANG Desert Shield/Storm Statistics,” circa 91; Report, AFRES Command Post, “AFRES Operation Desert Storm Duty Status Report,” 15 Mar 91.

75Chronology, AFRC/HO, AFRC Milestones 1948-2011, Jul 11; History, AFRES/HO, “History Headquarters Air Force Reserve, 1 October 1992-30 September 1994,” pp 70, 74, 75, Mar 94; Memo, Dave Lanfear, AFRES/HO, [Provide Comfort I and II], 5 Dec 96; After Action Report, 301 FW and 944 FG, Deny 

Flight, 1 December 1993- 6 February 1994, circa 94; History, AFRES/HO, “History Headquarters Air Force Reserve, 1 October 1995-30 September 1996, pp 

39-46, Aug 97; History, AFRC/HO, “History Headquarters Air Force Reserve/Air Force Reserve Command, 1 October 1996-30 September 1999,” pp 37-48, 

Jun 03.

76Letter, DAF/XPM, Air Force Reserve Command, 11 Feb 97.

77Chronology, AFRC/HO, AFRC Milestones 1948-2011, Jul 11; History, AFRC/HO, “History Headquarters Air Force Reserve/Air Force Reserve Command, 1 October 1996-30 September 1999,” pp 113-129, 142, 143, Jun 03.

3378
PART II 

1Worksheet, 514 AMW, “76th and 78th ARS World Trade Center Alert Crews,” Sep 01.

2Account, MSgt Keith Davis, 305 AMW, 11 September 2001, Sep 06.

3Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 278, 316, 22 Jul 04. 4Interview, Dr. Thomas Snyder and Dr. Larry Morrison, AFCA/HO, with TSgt Shawn Haynes, SSgt Mark Provo, SSgt Craig Walentowski, and SSgt Lonnie 

Wells, pp 4, 5, 25 Sep 01.

5Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Military Heroes Calls Others ‘Real Heroes’ of 9/11,” 20 Sep 02.

6Chronology, CNN, “September 11: Chronology of Terror,” 12 Sep 01; Press Briefing, White House, “Press Briefing by Karen Hughes, Counselor to the 

President,” 11 Sep 01.

7Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 7, 22 Jul 04; Chronology, CNN, “September 11: 

Chronology of Terror,” 12 Sep 01.

8Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Military Hero Calls Others ‘Real Heroes’ of 9/11,” 20 Sep 02; Article, Maj Richard C. Sater, 514 AMW/PA, “A Life-Saving 

Mission,” Air Force Civil Engineer, p 7, Fall 01. 9Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 8, 22 Jul 04; Chronology, CNN, “September 11: Chronology of Terror,” 12 Sep 01; Press Briefing, White House, “Press Briefing by Karen Hughes, Counselor to the President,” 11 Sep 01.

10Article, Maj Richard C. Sater, 514 AMW/PA, “A Life-Saving Mission,” Air Force Civil Engineer, p 7, Fall 01. 11Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Military Hero Calls Others ‘Real Heroes’ of 9/11,” 20 Sep 02; Article, Maj Richard C. Sater, 514 AMW/PA, “A Life-Saving 

Mission,” Air Force Civil Engineer, p 7, Fall 01. 12Email, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba to Ms. Betty R. Kennedy, “9/11,” 1 May 09; Interview, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba by Col Thomas A. Deall, May 09. 13Email, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba to Ms. Betty R. Kennedy, “9/11,” 1 May 09. 14Interview, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba by Col Thomas A. Deall, May 09. 15Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley, AFRC/HO, with Brig Gen (Ret) Robert E. Lytle, AFRC/ACV, Mar 08. 16Email, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba to Ms. Betty R. Kennedy, “9/11,” 1 May 09 17Interview, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba by Col Thomas A. Deall, May 09; Interview, Col Bruce A. Bowers and Col Gregory L. Vitalis, by Betty R. Kennedy 

and Stephen Ove, Apr 10.

18Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 11, 22 Jul 04. 19Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 11, 22 Jul 04. 20Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 11, 22 Jul 04. 21Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 12, 22 Jul 04. 22Although the 9/11 Commission Report stated a passenger yelled “Roll it,” a GTE airphone operator heard Todd Beamer express: “Are you guys ready? Let’s 

roll!”

23Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 14, 22 Jul 04. 24Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 11, 13, 22 Jul 04. 25Biography, HQ AFRC/PA, Maj LeRoy W. Homer, Jr. 26Article, MSgt Dorothy Goepel, AF News Service, “Pentagon Hero Receives Purple Heart, Airman’s Medal,” Sep 02; Article, MSgt Dorothy Goepel and 

MSgt Rick Burnham,“Honoring Heroes: Two Reservists among 28 Recognized for 9/11 Actions,” Citizen Airman, pp 6-7, Jun 02. 27Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Dr. Gregory L. Mattson, and Stephen P. Ove, AFRC/HO, with Maj Gen Robert E. Duignan, End of Tour Interview, Feb 09.

28Study, Alfred Goldberg, Sarandis Papadopoulos, Diane Putney, Nancy Berlage, and Rebecca Welch, OSD/Historical Office, Pentagon 9/11, p 135, 07. 29Article, Maj Susan Lukas, “Air Force,” The Officer, Reserve Officer Association, p 22, Sep 02.

33940 
30Article, Maj Susan Lukas, “Air Force,” The Officer, Reserve Officer Association, p 22, Sep 02. 31Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley, AFRC/HO, with CMSgt Troy J. McIntosh, Apr and May 08.

32Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08.

33Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08. 34Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08. 35Article, Spec Casondra Brewster, MDW News, “‘Extractors’ Put Training To Test Special Unit Vital in ‘Operation Noble Eagle’ at Pentagon Site,” 19 Sep 01. 36Article, Maj Susan Lukas, “Air Force,” The Officer, Reserve Officer Association, p 22, Sep 02. 37Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08. 38Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A.Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08. 39Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08. 40Article, Maj Susan Lukas, “Air Force,” The Officer, Reserve Officer Association, pp 22-24, Sep 02. 41Interview, Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Col Victor Kuchar, Oct 08. 42Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 17, 24, 26-28, 31, 44-45, 22 Jul 04. 43James Roche and Gen John Jumper, “Secretary, Chief Thank Heroes,” Space Observer, p 2, 21 Sep 01. 44Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 22, 22 Jul 04.

45Draft Report, FAA, The Air Traffic Organization’s Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack: ATC System Assessment, Shutdown, and Restoration,

Appendix F, 21 Mar 02; Notes, Maj Kevin Bridges, “Air Traffic Services Cell (ATSC) Events on 11 Sep,” 11 Sep 01; Article, Robert F. Dorr, “Back Talk: 

Reservists Are Vital To The Air Traffic System,” Air Force Times, ca 00; Article, William B. Scott, “Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks, Aviation 

Week & Space Technology, 3 Jun 02; Interview, Condoleezza Rice with Bob Woodward, Washington Post, pp 361, 367, 370, 24 Oct 01; Press Briefing, Karen 

Hughes, White House, 11 Sep 01; Article, Mark Hosenball and Evan Thomas, “Bush: ‘We’re At War,’” Newsweek Blog, 23 Sep 01.

46Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 325, 326, 22 Jul 04; Draft Report, FAA, The Air 

Traffic Organization’s Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attack: ATC System Assessment, Shutdown, and Restoration, p 4, 21 Mar 02; Article, William 

B. Scott, “Exercise Jump-Starts Response to Attacks,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 Jun 02.

47Statement, Gen Ralph E. Eberhart, NORAD/CC, “National Commission On Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States,” 17 Jun 04. 48Statement, Gen Ralph E. Eberhart, NORAD/CC, “National Commission On Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States,” 17 Jun 04. 49Statement, Gen Ralph E. Eberhart, NORAD/CC, “National Commission On Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States,” 17 Jun 04; Interview, Gregory L. 

Mattson, Stephen P. Ove, and Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, with Col James Myers, Dec 08; Worksheet, 514 AMW, “76th and 78th ARS World Trade Center 

Alert Crews,” Sep 01.

50Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, 

and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

51Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 35, 38-40, 22 Jul 04. 52Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, 

and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

53Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, 

and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

54Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, 

and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

55Article, Michael Johnson, “Pilot on Escort Flight,” Alamogordo Daily News, 11 Sep 11; Article, “The Tragic Timeline,” The New York Times, 12 Sep 01; 

Article, Dan Balz and Bob Woodward, “America’s Chaotic Road to War,” Washington Post, 27 Jan 02; Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and 

Gregory L. Mattson , AFRC/HO, with Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

56Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 4, 285-289, 304-306 22 Jul 04. 57Article, 514 AMW/PA, “514th Reservists put service before self,” Beacon, Vol. 9 No.4, Special Edition, p 4, Sep 01, Sep 01; Article, “McGuire Reservists 

helping national efforts,” Sep 01; Article, “Recalling the horror and heroism of the 9/11 attacks,” Beacon, p 9, Sep-Oct 02; History, 514 AMW/HO, “514th Air 

33940
Mobility Wing History 1 October 00 to 30 September 01, p 10, 02. Others members of the 514th Air Mobility Wing at nearby McGuire Air Force Base, New 

Jersey, assisted bandaging victims, carrying litters, sifting through rubble, giving blood, and protecting the skies overhead. Some 200 514th Reservists either 

lived or worked in lower Manhattan.

58Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Military Hero Calls Others ‘Real Heroes’ of 9/11,” 20 Sep 02. 59Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Military Hero Calls Others ‘Real Heroes’ of 9/11,” 20 Sep 02. 60Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Military Hero Calls Others ‘Real Heroes’ of 9/11,” 20 Sep 02; Article, AFRC/PA, “McGuire Reservist Receives Heroism 

Award,” 31 Jul 02; Transcript, “September 11th Memorial Tribute Honoring Court Officers Harry Thompson, Mitchel Wallace and Tommy Jurgens,” 11 Sep 

03.

61Article, DOD News, Mike Richmond, AFOSI/PA, “Air Force Special Investigator Dan McNally: AF Reservist Awarded Medal of Valor,” Jan 03. The 9/11 

report has Tower One collapsing at 10:28.

62Richards’ body and those of two of his team would not be located until the following year. 63Article, DOD News, Mike Richmond, AFOSI/PA, “Air Force Special Investigator Dan McNally: AF Reservist Awarded Medal of Valor,” Jan 03. Lt Col 

Timothy Duffy and Major Daniel S. “Nasty” Nash of the 101st Fighter Squadron came off of alert and launched their jets, Panta 45 and 46, at 8:52.

64Article, SMSgt Sandi Michon, 439th AW/PA, “Westover Med Tech Joins Triage at Ground Zero,” 07 Nov 01; Article, SSgt Sonny Cohrs, 320 AEW/PA, 

“Reservist Fights Battles On Two Fronts,” 18 Jun 02.

65Article, Maj Mike Paoli, AF/PA, “US Troops Respond to Tragedy as Units, Individuals,” 20 Sep 01. 66Article, SSgt Sonny Cohrs, 320 AEW/PA, “Reservist Fights Battles On Two Fronts,” 18 Jun 02. 67Article, Maj Christie L.S. Dragon, 514 AMW/PA, “McGuire Reservists Receive Heroes’ Honor,” 12 Mar 02. 68Article, Maj Christie L.S. Dragon, 514 AMW/PA, “McGuire Reservists Receive Heroes’ Honor,” 12 Mar 02. 69Article, AFRC/PA, “McGuire Reservists Go On Duty; Others Work in New York,” 18 Sep 01. 70Article, Cpt Lars Anderson, AWS/PA, “Airmen apply skills to twin towers rescue,” Space Observer, p 4, 21 Sep 01. 71Article, Cpt Lars Anderson, AWS/PA, “Airmen apply skills to twin towers rescue,” Space Observer, p 4, 21 Sep 01. 72Article, Cpt Lars Anderson, “Airmen apply skills to twin towers rescue,” Space Observer, p 4, 21 Sep 01; Interview, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick with Betty 

R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Donald C. Boyd, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, p 50, Nov 08 and Nov 10. 73Article, Maj Christie L.S. Dragon, 514 AMW/PA, “McGuire Reservists Receive Heroes’ Honor,” 12 Mar 02. 74Article, SSgt Devin Fisher, ARPC/PA, “Emergency Response Officers Decorated for 9/11 Actions,” Sep, 02. 75Interview, Stephen Ove, AFRC/HO, with Major Ron Hack, 76 ARS, circa 09. 76Article, Maj Arno Wichers, 514 AMW/PA, “Ready to Roll,” The Beacon, p 27, Sep-Oct 02; Report, Team 23/76 ARS, “Team 23 Mission Narrative” 11 Sep 

01; Worksheet, 514 AMW, “76th and 78th ARS World Trade Center Alert Crews,” Sep 01. 

77Spreadsheet, 514 AMW, “76th and 78th ARS World Trade Center Alert Crews,” Sep 01. Report, Team 23/76 ARS, “Team 23 Mission Narrative” 11 Sep 01. 78Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 326, 330, 331, 22 Jul 04; Speech, President George 

W. Bush to the Nation, Statement on the 9/11 Attacks, 11 Sep 01.

79Speech, President George W. Bush to the Nation, Statement on the 9/11 Attacks, 11 Sep 01. 80Public Law, US Congress, “Joint Resolution: Authorization For Use Of Military Force,” 107th Congress, 18 Sep 01. 81Report, White House Press Office, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 17 Sep 02. 82Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 47, 22 Jul 04.

83Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 174, 22 Jul 04; Book, Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, 

ed., Global Responses To Terrorism: 9/11 Afghanistan and Beyond (Rutledge Press, 2003), p 11; News, release, CNN, “Clinton, Bush 41 Reflect On Regrets,” 

27 Jan 09.

84Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 48, 22 Jul 04. 85Press Briefing, White House, “Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft,” 15 Sep 01; Report, National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 330-333, 22 Jul 04. 86Address, President George W. Bush, “Address To A Joint Session Of Congress and the American People,” 20 Sep 01.

3412 
87Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 332, 333, 336, 22 Jul 04; Book, Gary C. Schroen, 

First In: An Insider’s Account Of How The CIA Spearheaded The War On Terror In Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine, 2005), pp 17, 39, 40. 88Book, Donald P. Wright, and others, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005 (Ft 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), pp 43-46.

89Book, Donald P. Wright, and others, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005 (Ft 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), pp 43-46, 72, 73, 93.

90Book, Donald P. Wright, and others, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-September 2005 (Ft 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), pp 35-39. 

91Book, Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2003, Chap 14 “Global War on Terrorism” 

(Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), p 466.

92Article, AFRC/PA, “Reservists Help Keep Moron Up, Moving,” 27 Sep 01; Article, Maj Arno Wichers, 514 AMW/PA, “Ready to Roll,” Beacon, p 27, Sep 

– Oct 02. 

93History, 439 AW/HO, “History of the 439th Airlift Wing, 1 October 2001- 30 September 2002,” pp 64, 65, 71, 72, circa 03. 94History, 512 AW/HO, “History of the 512th Airlift Wing, 1 January 2000 – 30 September 2001, pp 23-25, Aug 05. 95History, 512 AW/HO, “History of the 512th Airlift Wing, 1 January 2000 – 30 September 2001, p 24, Aug 05. 96History, 349 AMW/HO, “History of the 349th Airlift Wing, 1 October 2001- 30 September 2002,” pp 20-25, 33-35, circa 03. 97History, 507 ARW/HO, “History of the 507th Air Refueling Wing, 1 January 2000 - 30 September 2001, p 10, Jun 05.

98History, 940 ARW/HO, “History of the 940th Air Refueling Wing, 1 October 1999 – 30 September 2002,” Oct 04.

99Interview, Lt Gen John A. Bradley with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, p 66, Apr and May 08. 100Briefing, Col Randy Howell, AFRC/ADO to OSD, “DO Update,” Slide 5, 25 Sep 02. 101Article, “Barksdale B-52’s called to Active Duty,” The Times (Shreveport, LA), 20 Sep 01; Article, “B-52’s Leave Barksdale; Questions Still Remain,” The 

Times (Shreveport, LA), 23 Sep 01; Article, Clint Land, “Bases Overseas,” Bossier Press-Tribune, 7 Nov 01; Form, AF 1206, 93 BS/CC, [Award Campaign 

Streamer Liberation of Afghanistan, 11 Sep 01-30 Nov 01], Feb 11.

102Article, AFRC/PA, “KC-135 Crews Support Enduring Freedom, Return Home,” Oct 01. 103Interview, 919 SOW/HO, “Activation Interviews,” Jun 03.

104Spreadsheet, 919 SOW, “Activation List Sep 2001 – Feb 2003,” circa Feb 03. 105Spreadsheet, AFRC/DO, “AFRC Sorties Statistics From Oct 01-Sep 02,” circa 02 106Briefing, Col Randy Howell, AFRC/ADO, “DO Update,” Slide 5, 25 Sep 02; Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson , 

AFRC/HO, with Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09; Report, 513 ACG, “513 Air Control Group Activation-in-Review 2001-2003,” circa 03.

107News Release, DOD, “National Guard, Reserve Mobilization Issued for More than 5,000,” 20 Sep 01. 108Spreadsheet, HQ AFRC/DO, “2001-10-01 AFRC Sorties Statistics from Oct 00 to Sep 01—37059,” ca. Oct 01. 109Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Mobilization Conference,” 29 Nov 01.

3412
PART III 

1Photo, SRA Rebeca M. Luquin, in The Air Force Civil Engineer, Vol 9, No 3, p 36, Fall 01. 2Briefing, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 AFRC Operations Year in Review,” 1 Nov 01; News Release, AFRC/PA, “War On Terrorism Keeps Reservists Overseas,” 18 

Jul 02; Book, Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2005), pp 78-82; Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (US Army Center 

for Military History, Washington, DC, 2005), p 465. 3Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 38, 39, 57-62. 4News Release, DOD, “Statement Of The Secretary Of Defense,” 7 Oct 01. 5Report, Margaret Emery and Hiram Ruiz, Descent Into Disaster? Afghan Refugees, Middle East Report 221, Winter 01, pp 16, 17. 6News Release, DOD, “U.S. Humanitarian Relief Mission To Afghanistan” and 7 Oct 01. 7Chronology, John Leland, AMC/HO, “The Air Mobility Command 2001 Historical Highlights,” 01. 8News Release, DOD, “Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Update – Oct 10,” 10 Oct 01; Chronology, John Leland, AMC/HO, “The Air Mobility Command 

2001 Historical Highlights,” 01; Article, Terry Joyce, C-17 Humanitarian Drops, Post and Courier (Charleston, SC), Oct 01; Article, MSgt Randy Mitchell, AFIS, “Afghan Food Drop Underscores Bush’s Humanitarian Pledge,” 9 Oct 01; Article, MSgt Scott T. Sturkol, AMC/PA, “OEF Anniversary: History Shows AMC’s 

Critical Support As Operation Grew,” 6 Oct 10. 9Article, MSgt Randy Mitchell, AFIS, “Afghan Food Drop Underscores Bush’s Humanitarian Pledge,” 9 Oct 01. 10News Release, AMC/PA, “A Look Back at OEF HUMRO – The Operation,” 11 Apr 02. 11News Release, AFRC/PA, “March Loadmaster Returns After Missions Over Afghanistan,” 12 Dec 01. 12News Release, AFRC/PA, “Reserve C-17 Crews Drop Humanitarian Aid in Afghanistan,” Oct 01. 13Article, Elizabeth A. Neuffer, “Report Finds Food Airdrops In Afghanistan Ineffective/Meal Packs Ruptured, Spoiled – Were Mistaken For Bombs.” Boston 

Globe, 26 Mar 02. 14Report, Margaret Emery and Hiram Ruiz, Descent Into Disaster? Afghan Refugees, Middle East Report 221, Winter 01, p 17. 15Book, Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York, New York: Ballantine 

Books, 2007), pp 83, 90. 16Book, Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan (New York, New York: Ballantine 

Books, 2007), pp 26, 34, 38, 72, 74; History, 346 AW/HO, “History of the 436th Airlift Wing, The Eagle Wing and Dover Air Force Base,” Feb 09, p 22 17Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (US Army Center for Military His- tory, Washington, DC, 2005), p 465; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 

2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) p 73; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Re- search Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 2007), pp 88, 89, circa 07. Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, with Maj Gen Richard S. Haddad, AFRC/A5/8, 14 

Dec 11; Award, “Justification For The Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, 513th Air Control Group, 1 August 2002-31 July 2004” 04. 18Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (US Army Center for Military His- tory, Washington, DC, 2005), p 465; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 

2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) p 73; Book, Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account of How the CIA Spear- headed the War on Terror in Afghanistan, p 175. 19Document, Lt Col Michael Brill, 419 FW/SE to TSgt Scott Gaitley, 931 ARG/HO, “OEF Mission,” 17 Sep 10. 20Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Batbie’s Slides,” ca Mar 02. 21Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Batbie’s Slides,” ca Mar 02 22Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (US Army Center for Military His- tory, Washington, DC, 2005), p 464. 23News Release, “Operation ENDURING FREEDOM Update – Oct 10,” 10 Oct 01. 24News Release, “JDAM Misses Intended Target In Afghanistan,” 13 Oct O1. 25Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) p 66. 26Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

3434 
Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 72-82; Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 

1917-2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2005), pp 466. 27News Release, DOD, “Statement Of The Secretary of Defense,” 1 Nov 01. 28Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), pp 10-14; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 

2001-September 2005 (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 78. 29Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 2007), pp 90, 91, circa 07; Book, Richard 

W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), pp 15-18; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 

2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 75-82. 30Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 96, 97; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 2007), pp 90, circa 07; Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003

(US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), pp 14, 15. 31Article, Jim Garamone, DOD, “No. 2 Al Qaeda Terrorist May Have Been Killed,” 16 Nov 01; Article, “Text: Pentagon Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld,” 

Washington Post, 19 Nov 01. 32Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) p 76; Book, Michael Hirsh, None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen In The Afghanistan War (Penguin, NY, 2003) p 39. 33Article, Academy of Achievement, “Biography: Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan,” 2 Nov 09; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 98, 99; Book, Rich- ard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for Military History, 

Washington, DC, 2003), pp 14, 15. 34Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 98-101. 35Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), p 14; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, 

circa 2007), pp 89, 90, circa 07. 36Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 2007), p 90, circa 07; Book, A Dif- ferent Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 95, 96. 37News Release, DOD, “Two U.S. Servicemembers Die In Helicopter Crash,” 19 Oct 01; News Release, DOD, “DOD Announces Names Of Servicemembers Killed in Helicopter Accident,” 21 Oct 01; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 

2007), p 90, circa 07. 38Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 101-105. 39Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 105-107, 111. 40Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 107, 108. 41Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), pp 21-23; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 

2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 108-113; Book, Michael Hirsh, None Braver: US Air Force Para- rescuemen In The Afghanistan War (Penguin, NY, 2003) pp 41-52. 42Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 113-115; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, 

FL, circa 2007), p 93, circa 07. 43Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 116-120. 44Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 127, 128-132; Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), pp 30-33. 45Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, The United States Army In Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001-March 2003 (US Army Center for 

3434
Military History, Washington, DC, 2003), pp 32, 33, 35-37; Report, HQ AF/XOL, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective, pp 52, 57, 58, 7 Feb 05; 

Article, Richard Sanders, “Major Jeremy Reynolds, a.k.a. ‘Globemasher:’ A Canadian C-17 Pilot Reflects On His Iraq Experiences,” Press For Conversion, pp 

46-48, Dec 10. 46Report, HQ AF/XOL, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective, pp 39, 43, 44, 60-70, 72-75, 79, 7 Feb 05; Memorandum, 919 OG/CC to USCENTAF/

UDPU, “Recommendation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation – 919th Operations Group, 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003,” 7 Sep 04. 47Report, HQ AF/XOL, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective, pp 73, 74, 7 Feb 05; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Op- eration ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 157, 158; Book, Michael 

Hirsch, None Braver: U.S. Air Force Pararescuemen In The Afghanistan War (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), pp 226-228, 230. 48Report, HQ AF/XOL, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective, pp 74-78, 7 Feb 05; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Op- eration ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 159, 160. 49Report, HQ AF/XOL, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective, pp 83-87, 100, 101, 7 Feb 05; Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 137, 163-174. 50Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 181, 183, 185, 215. 51Article, Jim, Garamone, AFPS, “Myers Discusses Mideast Terror, Iraq and the Way Ahead in Afghanistan,” 7 Apr 02. 52Article, Jim, Garamone, AFPS, “Myers Discusses Mideast Terror, Iraq and the Way Ahead in Afghanistan,” 7 Apr 02. 53Book, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005, (US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2010) pp 183, 184, 193-195, 200; Book, Michael Hirsh, None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen In The Afghanistan War 

(Penguin, NY, 2003) p 38, 39, 184, 185, 219, 222-230. 54Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Senior Leaders Conference,” 22 Jan 01. 55News Release, AFRC/PA, “AWACS Crew Flies 100th Mission For Homeland Defense, 11 Mar 02. 56History, 514 AMW/HO, 514th Air Mobility Wing 2002 History, p 20; Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Senior Leaders Conference,” 22 Jan 02; Briefing, Col Randy 

Howell, AFRC/ADO, “DO Update,” 25 Sep 02. 57Testimony, Lt Gen James Sherrard III, CAFR and AFRC/CC, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee: Air Force Reserve Programs, p 6, Feb 02. 58Testimony, Lt Gen James Sherrard III, CAFR and AFRC/CC, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee: Air Force Reserve Programs, p 6, Feb 02.

59Article, Capt James R. Wilson, 419 FW/PA, “Rescue Helicopters Enhance Security at Olympic Games,” Feb 02. 60News Release, Capt James R. Wilson, 419 FW/PA, “Rescue Helicopters Enhance Security at Olympic Games,” Feb 02; News Release, SRA Lara Gale, 419 FW/PA, “Hill Reservists Volunteer To Support Olympic Games,” 28 Feb 02. 61Briefing, AFRC/DO, Air Force Reserve Command Senior Leaders Conference, 22 Jan 02; Briefing, Maj Gen John J. Batbie, Jr., AFRCCV, AF Reserve Command Briefing to WRALC/CC, Maj Gen Donald J. Wetekam,, 19 Feb 02; News Release, Jim Miller, AFRC/PA, “Utah, Olympic officials show support for 

Guard, Reserve,” 25 Jan 02; News Release, Capt Wilson Camelo, 439 AMW/PA “Westover Supports Olympic Security Mission,” 8 Feb 02; News article, SRA 

Lara Gale, 419 FW/PA, “Hill Reservists Volunteer To Support Olympic Games,” 28 Feb 02; News Release, Capt James R. Wilson, 419 FW/PA, “Rescue Helicop- ters Enhance Security at Olympic Games,” 28 Feb 02; Spreadsheet, AFRC/DO, “2201-09-15 AFRC Ops Sum 00-03 for 2001 and 2002,” ca 02. 62Capt James R. Wilson, 419 FW/PA, “Rescue Helicopters Enhance Security at Olympic Games,” 28 Feb 02. 63Report, US Dept of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001: Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism,” May 02; Book, Mike Tucker and Charles S. Faddis, Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2009), pp 14-16. 64Article, Peter Baker and Jim VandeHei, “Bush’s Political Capital Spent, Voices in Both Parties Suggest,” The Washington Post, 31 May 05; Speech, President 

George W. Bush to the Nation, Address to the Nation, 20 Sep 01. 65Speech, President George W. Bush to the Nation, Statement on the 9/11 Attacks, 11 Sep 01; Speech, President George W. Bush to the Nation, “Address Before 

a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 29 Jan 02. 66Article, Jim Garamone, AFPS, “Rumsfeld Singles Out Iraq, Iran, Syria,” 1 Apr 02. 67Public Law, 107th Congress, “Congressional Resolution on Iraq,” 11 Oct 02. 68Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 29. 69Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Two Bipartisan Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and Inappropri- ate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office,” 5 Jun 08. 70Memorandum, UN Security Council, “Resolution 1441 (2002): Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th Meeting,” 8 Nov 02. 71Public Law, 107th Congress, “Congressional Resolution on Iraq,” 11 Oct 02 (principally UN Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 

677). 72Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 47, 48, 87-90. 73Speech, President George W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Declaration of War on Terrorism, 20 Sep 01.

345 346 
74News Release, DOD, Statement of the Secretary of Defense, 7 Oct 01. 75Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, p 361, 22 Jul 04. 76Article, Col Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military Review, Dec 06, p 2, 77History, 349 AMW/HO, 349 Air Mobility Wing 2002 History, p 9. Originally termed FREEDOM EAGLE, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM–PHILIP- PINES was the Joint Chiefs of Staff terminology used to describe the broader US effort to reinforce the Philippine military forces and reduce the influence of 

terrorism. 78Report, AFRC/DO, “AFRC Sorties FY 2002,” 02. 79Article, George Baylon Radics, “Balikatan Exercisese in the Philippines and the US ‘War on Terrorism’,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol 4, No 2, 

Summer 04, p 11. 80Report, AFRC/DO, “AFRC Sorties FY 2002,” 02. 81Article, Mark S. Steinitz, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America’s Andean Region,” Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol XIII, Study 5, Jul 2002, pp 1, 11-12. 82Thesis, Lt Col John E. Dumoulin, Army War College, “The Domestic Counterdrug Mission: Increase DOD Support, 02 Mar 04; Briefing, “Palmetto Ghost,” 

Jul 03. 83Hearing, US Senate: Subcommittee on Technology, Terrrorism, and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary, “Narco-Terror: The World- wide Connection Between Drugs and Terrorism,” 107th Congress, Second Session, 13 Mar 02. 84Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Palmetto Ghost,” Jun 01. 85Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Palmetto Ghost,” Jun 01. 86Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Palmetto Ghost: Redeployment 03-04,” Jul 03. 87Interview, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/CV, with Betty R. Kennedy, End Of Tour Interview, 10 Nov 09. 88Briefing, Maj Gen Martin Mazick, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03. 89Briefing, Maj Gen Martin Mazick, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03. 90Briefing, Maj. Gen. Martin Mazick, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Email, Lt Col Gregory Vitalis, AFRC/DOO to Maj Steve Smith, AFRC/

DOOM, “Inputs,” 17 Sep 03.

345 346
PART IV

1Speech, President George W. Bush, Address To The Nation, 19 Mar 03.

2Award of the Presidential Unit Citation – 919th Operations Group, 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003,” 7 Sep 04; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ 

USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 2007), pp 114, 115, circa 07; Report, USCENTAF/AAD, Operation Iraqi Freedom 

– By The Numbers, p 15, 30 Apr 03. 3Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (US Army Center for Military 

History, Washington, DC, 2005), p 479; Report, Congressional Research Service, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for 

Congress, p CRS-19, 22 Feb 08; Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 90; Book, Williamson Murray and Maj Gen 

Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp 154-156. 4Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 80, 86, 90, 91, 94, 104-108, 119-112.

5Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 97, 98, 111.

6Notes, MSgt Richard D. Sawyer, 419 FW/HO, “Operation Iraqi Freedom (Air War) – 19 Mar to 12 Apr 2003,” 03.

7Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 88-90, 147; Book, Richard W. Stewart, editor, American Military History, 

Vol II: The United States Army In A Global Era, 1917-2003 (US Army Center for Military History, Washington, DC, 2005), p 479; Article, SSgt Jeff Schoen, 

AFRC/PA, “Reservists Perform Diverse Missions In Support Of War,” circa May 03; Briefing, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “GO Steering Group 

Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Chronology, US Marine Corps/History Division, “Campaign Chronologies of the United States Marine Corps, Global War on Terrorism: 

2001-2008,” ca 09. 

8Report, USCENTAF/AAD, Operation Iraqi Freedom – By The Numbers, p 15, 30 Apr 03; Book, Williamson Murray and Maj Gen Robert H. Scales, Jr., The 

Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp 167-169; Recollections, Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO; Briefing, Lt Col 

Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 Year In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col 

David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute 

Press, 2004), p 86; Article, Sgt Rick Burnham, “B-52 Crews Make History Over Iraqi Skies,” Bossier Press-Tribune, 7 Apr 03. 9Article, Michelle Pinkard, “Barksdale Deploys 200,” The Shreveport Times, 19 Mar 03; Article, Clint Land, “917th Wing Could Play Major Role,” Bossier 

Press-Tribune, 20 Mar 03; Article, SSgt Kristina Barrett, 457 EAG/PA, “Air Force Reservist, Active Duty Make For Successful Mix,” Bossier Press-Tribune,

7 Apr 03.

10Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson, AFRC/HO, with Col John Trnka, Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Patrick Rupel, 

Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

11Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson, AFRC/HO, with Col John Trnka, Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Patrick Rupel, 

Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

12Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 Year In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Factsheet, USAF, Humanitarian Donations, 

circa 03; Article, Joe Malinconico, “’Gas Jockeys’ From Jersey Help Keep The Warplanes In The Air: Air Force Reserve Unit’s Tankers Let Aircraft Refuel 

While in Flight,” The Newark Star-Ledger, 27 Mar 03; Spreadsheet, 514 AMW, [Missions and Planning], Sep 01. 13Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 101, 108, 109.

14Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

3478 
Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 100, 101.

15Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 87.

16Award of the Presidential Unit Citation – 919th Operations Group, 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003,” 7 Sep 04; Book, USSOCOM History, 1987-2007 (HQ 

USSOCOM/SOCS History and Research Office, MacDill AFB, FL, circa 2007), p 115, circa 07.

17Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 179-195, 245.

18Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 88, 116, 121; Spreadsheet, SMSgt Angela Vazquez, AFRC/HO, “Timeline,” 

11; Article, Marni McEntee, “A-10’s Move to Kirkuk to Protect Troops,” Stars and Stripes, 2 May 03; Article, Adam J. Hebert, “Adventures In Bare Bones 

Basing,” Air Force Magazine, Oct 03; Article, AFRC News Service, “Whiteman Reservists Return Home From Iraq ‘With Honor,’ 21 Nov 03; Briefing, Lt 

Col David Re, 914 AW, “The Story Of 914th Airlift Wing In OIF/OEF,” 05; Briefing, Col Timothy E. Tarchick, 920 RQW/CC, “920th Rescue Wing,” circa 03.

19Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 154-160; Report, Executive Summary, US Army, 507th Maintenance Co.: 

An Nasiriyah, Iraq, 23 March 2003, circa 03.

20Chronology, US Marine Corps/History Division, “Campaign Chronologies of the United States Marine Corps, Global War on Terrorism: 2001-2008,” ca 09;

Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 89, 243; Article, Rich Connell and Robert J. Lopez, “A Deadly Day For Charlie 

Company,” Los Angeles Times, 26 Aug 03. 21Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 160; Report, Executive Summary, US Army, 507th Maintenance Co.: An Nasiriyah, 

Iraq, 23 March 2003, circa 03; Chronology, US Marine Corps/History Division, “Campaign Chronologies of the United States Marine Corps, Global War 

on Terrorism: 2001-2008,” ca 09.

22Article, AFRC/PA, “Air Force Reserve Continues To Support Operations In Iraq,” circa May 03. 23Article, AFRC News Service, “Reservists Provide Medical Care on POW’s Return Flight,” 14 Apr 03; Article, “Rescue Operations in the Second Gulf 

War;” Article, Larry Margasak, “Jessica Lynch Returns to US Amidst High Security, Pittsburgh, Post-Gazette, 13 Apr 03. See also OIF PR briefing; Briefing, 

“FY2002 and Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03.

24Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 123-135, 143, 150, 196, 197, 208, 209, 211.

25Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 222-224, 227-229; Report, USCENTAF/AAD, Operation Iraqi Freedom – 

By The Numbers, p 15, 30 Apr 03. 26Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 225-229.

27Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 227.

28Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 223, 227-230; Briefing, AFRC/XX, “FY2002 and Iraqi Freedom,” May 03; 

Study, Lt Col M. Shane Hershman, Employment Of The C-17 In Airdrop And Airland Operations In Closing The Force, Army War College, 18 Mar 05; Article, 

Richard Sanders, “Major Jeremy Reynolds, a.k.a. ‘Globemasher:’ A Canadian C-17 Pilot Reflects On His Iraq Experiences,” Press For Conversion, pp 46, 

47, Dec 10.

29Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson, AFRC/HO, with Col John Trinka, Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Patrick Rupel, 

Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

3478
30Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson, AFRC/HO, with Col John Trinka, Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Patrick Rupel, 

Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe DiTommaso, 19 Feb 09.

31Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 227-229; Briefing, “FY2002 and Iraqi Freedom,” slide 24, 29 May 03; Study, Lt Col 

M. Shane Hershman, Employment Of The C-17 In Airdrop And Airland Operations In Closing The Force, Army War College, pp 7, 18 Mar 05.

32Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp 15, 17, 19. 33Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 340-344; Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point 

II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, 

Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p 19.

34Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 337, 338, 341, 342; Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, 

On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of 

Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p 19.

35Article, “First American Plane Lands At Baghdad Airport,” Aero News Network, 7 Apr 03; Award of the Presidential Unit Citation – 919th Operations 

Group, 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003,” 7 Sep 04; Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 301, 309, 310. 36Briefing, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “General Officer Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03. 37History, 437 AW/HO, “History Of The 437th Airlift Wing,” circa 08. 38Chronology, Dr John Leland, AMC/HO, “2003 Highlights,” circa 04. 39Article, David Esler, “Dangerous Destinations Part 2: Flying Into Harm’s Way,” Aviation Week, 1 Apr 12; Article, “Missiles Miss US Plane in Iraq,” CNN, 

8 Sep 03; Article, “Two US Troops Killed In Mosul,” Sun Sentinel, 11 Dec 03; Study, Lt Col Jacqueline D. van Ovost, Global Mobility: Anywhere, Anytime, 

Any Threat? Countering The MANPADS Challenge, Air War College, pp 9, 27, Dec 05. 40Briefing, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “General Officer Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Report, Maj Steve Smith, AFRC/DOOM, “Air 

Force Reserves ‘On Point,’ FY03 AFRC Operational Highlights,” circa Fall 03.

41Book, Mike Tucker and Charles S. Faddis, Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2009), 

pp 15, 19, 20, 22, 140; Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp 15, 16;

Book, Williamson Murray and Maj Gen Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p 191; 42Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the 

Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 250.

Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 229-331; Book, Mike Tucker and Charles S. Faddis, Operation Hotel California: 

The Clandestine War Inside Iraq (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2009), pp 112-114, 117, 119. 43Book, Mike Tucker and Charles S. Faddis, Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2009), 

pp 140, 141, 146; Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p 16; Book, Williamson Murray and Maj Gen Robert H. Scales, Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp 194, 195; Book, Col 

Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army Chief of 

Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 250, 251.

44Article, “Battle For Tikrit Awaits US Forces,” NewsHour, 12 Apr 03. 45Article, Robert Wall, “Litening Strikes: As Combat Operations in Iraq Wind Down, B-52/Litening Combo Makes Debut,” Aviation Week & Space Technol34950 
ogy, p 35, 28 April 03. 46Article, Brett Sadler, “Sadler: Shots Fired At CNN Crew In Tikrit,” CNN, 13 Apr 03; Article, “Marines Advance Into Tikrit,” CNN, 13 Apr 03; Article, 

Anthony DePalma, “A Nation At War – An Overview: April 13, 2003,” New York Times, 14 Apr 03. 47Briefing, OSD/PA, “Pentagon Daily Briefing, 14 Apr 03. 48Article, Col Darrel D. Whitcomb, “Rescue Operations In The Second Gulf War,” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 05; Article, Marni McEntee, “A-10s 

Move To Kirkuk To Protect Troops,” Stars and Stripes, 2 May 03; Caption, [First A-10s Land In Kirkuk], 30 Apr 03; Spreadsheet, SMSgt Angela Vazquez, 

AFRC/HO, “Timeline,” 11.

49E-mail, Scott J. Gaitley, AFRC/HO to Lt Col John P. Marks, 303 FS/DO, “Northern Iraq Missions in 2003,” 27 Jan 11, pp 2-3. 50Article, AFRC News Service, “Whiteman Reservists Return Home From Iraq ‘With Honor,’ 21 Nov 03; Fact Sheet, 332 AEG/PA, “332d Air Expeditionary 

Wing,” Nov 10; Article, Executive Editor, John A. Tirpak, “Desert Triumph,” Aerospace World Special: Gulf War II, Air Force Magazine, 10 Apr 03; Fact 

Sheet, 442 FW/PA, “303rd Fighter Squadron,” Apr 09; Fact Sheet, 442 FW/PA, “44nd Fighter Wing,” Apr 09; Fact Sheet, 506 AEG/PA, “506th Air Expeditionary Group,” Jul 08; Article, AFRC News Service, “Whiteman Reservists Return Home From Iraq ‘With Honor,’ 21 Nov 03; Article, Marni McEntee, Stars 

and Stripes, “A-10’s Move to Kirkuk to Protect Troops,” 2 May 03; Article, Executive Editor, John A. Tirpak, “Desert Triumph,” Aerospace World Special: 

Gulf War II, Air Force Magazine, 10 Apr 03. 51Article, USAID/PA, [USAID Iraq], 12; Report, GAO, Rebuilding Iraq, 15 May 03. 52Photo Caption, MSgt Dave Ahlschwende, 15 Apr 03; Article, Marni McEntee, “Air Force C-17 Crew Ferries Humanitarian Aid Supplied From Ramstein To 

Iraq,” Stars and Stripes, 17 Apr 03. 53Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Report, Maj Steve Smith, AFRC/DOOM, “Air Force Reserves 

‘On Point,’ FY03 AFRC Operational Highlights,” circa Fall 03; Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

29 May 03; Chronology, Dr John Leland, AMC/HO, “2003 Highlights,” circa 04; Report, Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, “OIF Three-Year Mark Perspectives 

On The Combat Phase (19 March-1 May),” 06; Report, Maj Steve Smith, AFRC/DOOM, “Air Force Reserves ‘On Point,’ FY03 AFRC Operational Highlights,” circa Fall 03.

54Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Report, Maj Steve Smith, AFRC/DOOM, “Air Force Reserves 

‘On Point,’ FY03 AFRC Operational Highlights,” circa Fall 03; Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 

29 May 03; Spreadsheet, SMSgt Vazquez, AFRC/HO, “Timeline,” 11.

55Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Notes, MSgt Richard D. Sawyer, 419 FW/HO, “Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (Air War) – 19 Mar to 12 Apr 2003,” 03; Notes, MSgt Richard D. Sawyer, 419 FW/HO, “Operation Southern Watch – Jan 2003,” 03.

56Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, 

“GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03.

57Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03. 58Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, 

“GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03.

59Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Briefing, Brig Gen Martin Mazick, “GO Steering 

Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03.

60Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Briefing, Lt Col David Re, 914 AW, “The Story 

of the 914th Airlift Wing In OIF/OEF,” circa 05; Briefing, 440 AW, “Crome 32 Operation Iraqi Freedom,” circa 05; Spreadsheet, SMSgt Vazquez, AFRC/HO, 

“Timeline,” 11.

61Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Spreadsheet, SMSgt Vazquez, AFRC/HO, “Timeline,” 11; Briefing, Brig Gen Martin Mazick, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03; Report, Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, “OIF Three-Year Mark Perspectives On The Combat Phase (19 March-1 May),” 06.

62Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “FY02 In Review and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” 29 May 03; Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, 

“GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03.

63Speech, President George W. Bush, aboard USS Abraham Lincoln, “President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations In Iraq Have Ended,” 1 May 03.

34950
64Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Two Bipartisan Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office,” 05 Jun 08.

65Report, Congressional Research Service, Iraq: US Military Operations, p CRS-4, 23 Jan 06. 66Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp 89-91.

67Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp 94-97, 109. 68Article, Patrick Tyler, “Aftereffects: Law and Order; American Troops Step Up Efforts to Curb Crime and in Iraqi Capital,” The New York Times, 16 May 03.

69Article, Patrick Tyler, “Aftereffects: Law and Order; American Troops Step Up Efforts to Curb Crime and in Iraqi Capital,” The New York Times, 16 May 03. 70Article, “Truck Bomb Kills Chief UN Envoy in Iraq,” CNN, 20 Aug 03. 71Article, Capt William M. G. Manley, 447 AEG/PA, “Pararescuers Save Lives After Attack on U.N. in Iraq,” AFRC News Release, 05 Sep 03. 72Article, “Rescue Unit Completes Tour of Duty in Iraq,” AFRC News Release 03129, 12 Sep 03; Article, Capt William M. G. Manley, 447 AEG/PA, “Air 

Force Professionalism, Teamwork Save UN Lives,” Aug 03; Chronology, SSgt Cathi D. Bradford, 920 RQW/HO, “920th Rescue Wing, 1 October 2002-30 

September 2003,” 04; Briefing, Col Tim Tarchick, 920 RQW/CC, “920th Rescue Wing,” circa 03.

73Book, Charles H. Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos, (New York, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008), pp 146-149, 155, 156, 159; 

Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp 100, 105, 121, 122, 318-322. 74Book, Charles H. Ferguson, No End in Sight: Iraq’s Descent into Chaos, (New York, New York: Public Affairs Books, 2008), pp 312-317; Article, “Bodied 

Mutilated In Iraq Attack,” BBC News, 31 Mar 04.

75Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p 168.

76Report, Ken Wood, USJFCOM/JCOA, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View Of Operation Iraqi Freedom From Saddam’s Senior Leadership, pp 92, 97 98; 

Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of the Army 

Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), pp 171-174.

77Caption Photo, Myles Cullen, USAF, On Point Collection.

78Caption Photo, Brandon Aird, US Army, On Point Collection.

79Article, A1C Kara Philp, “A Day in the Life of Air Force EOD in Iraq,” Air Force News Service, 27 Oct 03.

80Report, DOS, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iraq,” 8 Mar 05.

81Report, Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaeda’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, (West Point, New York: Combating 

Terrorism Center, US Military Academy, December 2007), pp 4, 5; Article, AF News, “Air Force F-16 Airstrike Kills Al-Zarqawi,” 9 Jun 06; Article, “US 

Military: Al-Zarqawi Was Alive After Bombing,” CNN World, 8 Jun 08; Article, Amnon Barzilai, “Israeli-made Targeting POD Used To Kill Al Zarqawi!” 

18 Jun 06.

82Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p 34. 83Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), p 35. 84Manual, US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, p 1-9, 15 Dec 06. 85Manual, US Army, Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, p 3-20, 15 Dec 06. 86Book, Dr Donald P. Wright and Col Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition To The New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

May 2003-January 2005 (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), pp 34, 35, 39. 109, 168, 322-337; Article, 

“Adul Majid al-Khoei, The Economist, 17 Apr 03; Article, Jack Fairweather, “The Army’s Stern Words Beat Sadr’s Men In Basra,” The Telegraph, 28 May 04; 

Article, Robert Collier, “Radical Cleric Declares Cease-fire With US/Al Sadr’s Aide Notifies Followers During Sermon, Condemns Recent Violence,” The 

San Francisco Chronicle, 27 Jul 12.

3512 
87Address, George W. Bush, “Address To A Joint Session Of Congress and The American People,” 20 Sep 01. 88Report, White House Press Office, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 17 Sep 02. 89Report, White House Press Office, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 17 Sep 02; Report, White House Press Office “Peace 

in the Middle East,” 5 De 08.

90Briefing, AFRC, “AFR Staff Meeting,” 25 Mar 09; Briefing, Brig Gen Mark Schissler JCS, “The Global War on Terrorism: The Long War,” 30 Jan 07 91Publication, CIA, Somalia World Factbook.

92Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, pp 109, 110, 22 Jul 04. 93Report, Andre Feickert, CRS, US Military Operations In The Global War On Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, p CRS-7, 4 

Feb 05. 

94Article, Catherine Fellows, “US Targets Sahara ‘Terrorist Haven,’” BBC News, 8 Aug 05; Article, “Al Qaeda ‘Behind’ Mauritania Raid,” BBC News, 6 Jun 

05; Article, Elizabeth Blunt, “US Targets Sahara Militant Threat,” BBC News, 14 Jan 04; Article, Donna Miles, AF Press Service, “New Counterterrorism 

Initiative To Focus on Saharan Africa,” 16 May 05; Report, Andre Feickert, CRS, US Military Operations In The Global War On Terrorism: Afghanistan, 

Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, p CRS-8, 4 Feb 05. 95Article, Donna Miles, AF Press Service, “New Counterterrorism Initiative To Focus on Saharan Africa,” 16 May 05. 96Article, Donna Miles, AF Press Service, “New Counterterrorism Initiative To Focus on Saharan Africa,” 16 May 05. 97Report, Andre Feickert, CRS, US Military Operations In The Global War On Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, p CRS-8, 4 

Feb 05.

98Article, Maj Ann Peru Knabe, 379 AEW/PA, “Lifeblood of Africa: Reserve Crew Flies C-130 Missions,” ROA, 13 Apr 06. 99Publication, CIA, Somalia World Factbook.

100Book, Gary C. Schroen, First In: An Insider’s Account Of How The CIA Spearheaded The War On Terror In Afghanistan (New York: Ballantine, 2005), pp 

383, 384; Book, Michael Hirsh, None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen In The Afghanistan War (New York, New York: NAL Caliber, 2003), pp 38, 39. 101Remarks, President Barak Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 27 Mar 09. 102Report, Andre Feickert, CRS, US Military Operations In The Global War On Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, pp CRS-13, 

CRS-14, 4 Feb 05.

103Article, Kenny Pruitt, 315 AW/PA, “315th Crews Train Over South America Terrain,” Palmetto Airlifter, Mar 05.

104Article, Jill Replogle, “Colombian Ambassador To The US Talks Drug War,” KPBS News, 25 Apr 12. 105Article, “Afghanistan’s Presidential Election, CBC News, 12 Oct 04; Article, Carlotta Gall, “Election Of Karzai Is Declared Official,” The New York Times 

International, 4 Nov 04; Report, CMI/PRIO, “Afghanistan Peacebuilding,” circa Dec 05. 106Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 13, 14; Article, Richard Miniter, “Rescue 

In Afghanistan,” American Legion Magazine, 1 May 08; Article, Tucker Reals, “Infamous Taliban Leader Killed in Pakistan,” CBS News, 11 Feb 09.

107Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 14, 179. 108Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), p 184. 109Citation, Lt Michael P. Murphy, USN, [Medal of Honor]; Document, USN Medal of Honor, “Summary of Action: Operation Redwing, June 28, 2005” Oct 

07; Article, Richard Miniter, “Rescue In Afghanistan,” American Legion Magazine, 1 May 08. 110Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 198-207. 111Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 210, 211. 112Citation, Lt Michael P. Murphy, USN, [Medal of Honor]. 113Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 236-242. 114Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 242-245. 115Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 247-250; Document, USN Medal of Honor, 

“Summary of Action: Operation Redwing, June 28, 2005” Oct 07.

116 Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 282,-285, 305-309. 117Article, Leo W. Banks, “Navy SEAL Down, Tucson Weekly, 17 Nov 09; Briefing, Lt Col Jeffery Macrander, 920th Operations Group/CC, “SEAL Team 

3512
Recovery—Afghanistan,” Jul 05.

118Book, Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor (New York, New York: Back Bay Books, 2007), pp 288-317, 355-357; Article, Leo Banks, 

“Navy SEAL Down,” Tucson Weekly, 17 Nov 09; Briefing, Lt Col Jeffery Macrander, 920th Operations Group/CC, “SEAL Team Recovery—Afghanistan,” 

Jul 05; Interview, Col Jeffery Macrander with Betty R. Kennedy and TSgt Maria Eames, AFRC/HO, Feb 11.

119Briefing, Lt Col Jeffery Macrander, 920th Operations Group/CC, “SEAL Team Recovery—Afghanistan,” Jul 05. 120Article, Lt Col Robert R. Scott, A Battalion’s Employment Of ‘The Elements Of National Power,’ Small Wars Journal, pp 3-5, 8-10, 08. 121Article, Tucker Reals, “Infamous Taliban Leader Killed In Pakistan,” CBS News, 11 Feb 09.

122Article, Paul Wiseman, “Revived Taliban Waging ‘Full-Blown Insurgency,’” USA Today, 19 Jun 06; Book, Seth G. Jones, In The Graveyard Of Empires

(New York, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), pp XV, 178, 179, 201, 213-218; Spreadsheet, SMSgt Angela Vazquez, AFRC/HO, “Timeline,” 11.

123E-mail, Scott J. Gaitley, AFRC/HO to Lt Col John P. Marks, 303 FS/DO, [Northern Iraq Missions], 27 Jan 11. 124Report, US House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “Private Military Contractors in Iraq: An Examination of Blackwater’s Actions in Fallujah,” Sep 07.

125Article, Capt James T. Cobb and SFC William H. Hight, “TF 2-2 in FSE AAR: Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah,” Field Artillery, Apr 05. 126CPA Order, L. Paul Bremer, Administrator. “Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities,” 23 May 2003. 127Report, Maj Scott A. Grundahl, “Standing up the Iraqi Air Force: Bridging the Gap Between Foreign Internal Defense and Starting From Scratch,” Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, p 5, Apr 08.

128Article, “Iraqi air force assumes control of their C-130 operations,” US Air Force News, 30 Sep 09. 129Article, SSgt Scott McNabb, “US Airmen help Iraqi Airmen help themselves,” Red Tail Flyer, p 9, 1 Dec 09. 130Report, Lt Col Michael J. Bauer, “An Iraq C-130 Aviation Advisor Mission and Lessons for the Future,” Air University Research Report, pp 1, 17, Apr 07. 131Report, “Comparative Aircraft Study for Iraq Air Force Counter Insurgency Air Operations,” United States Central Command Air Forces, pp 11, 12, 10 

Dec 05.

132Article, Allen G. Peck, “Airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular Warfare,” Military Technology, pp 21, 22, Mar 08. 133Article, Van Williams, “Building the Iraqi Air Force,” The Advisor, p 6, Jul 09. 134Report, “Comparative Aircraft Study for Iraq Air Force Counter Insurgency Air Operations,” United States Central Command Air Forces, 10 Dec 05, p 2. 135Report, Maj Scott A. Grundahl, “Standing up the Iraqi Air Force: Bridging the Gap Between Foreign Internal Defense and Starting From Scratch,” Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Apr 08, p 1.

136Report, “Comparative Aircraft Study for Iraq Air Force Counter Insurgency Air Operations,” United States Central Command Air Forces, 10 Dec 05, p 11. 137Report, Lt Col Michael J. Bauer, “An Iraq C-130 Aviation Advisor Mission and Lessons for the Future,” Air University Research Report, pp 29, 30, Apr 07. 138Article, SMSgt Elaine Mayo, 403 AW/PA, “Where’s the Beef,” 1 Oct 07. 139Article, “Iraqi air force flying training school opens at Kikurk,” US Air Force News, 5 Oct 07.

140Article, Staff Sergeant Michael J. Green, “Iraqi Air Force Increases Training, Capabilities,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08. 141Report, Linwood B. Carter, CRS, “Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces,” 28 Nov 05. 142Spreadsheet, SMSgt Angela Vazquez, AFRC/HO, “Timeline,” 11. 143Contingency Flying Reports 2004 and 2005. 144Reports, AFRC/DO, Contingency Flying Reports 2004 and 2005. 145Article, AFRC/PA, “Air Force Fighters Destroy Terrorist Hideout,” 28 Nov 05; Article, “Iraq’s First Multi-battalion Force Joins ‘Steel Curtain’ Ops,” World 

Tribune, 7 Nov 05.

146Report, Mark Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) FY06 Flying Hour Reimbursement Program (Contingency Execution),” 

30 Sep 06.

147Report, US Dept of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2005 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Iraq,” 8 Mar 05. 148The insurgency was once seen as part and parcel to an al Qaeda attempt to expand training facilities and perhaps even overthrow a comparatively moderate secular government in the Middle East. However, time soon demonstrated that although al Qaeda members infiltrated Iraq to take the fight to American 

forces, the insurgency was more homegrown and virulent than originally expected. 

3534 
149Article, Jeremy Brown, “Iraq’s Civil War Nightmare,” 23 Feb 06; Article, James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs, Apr 07. 150Article, Jeremy Brown, “Iraq’s Civil War Nightmare,” 23 Feb 06; Article, James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs, Apr 07. 151Article, Jeremy Brown, “Iraq’s Civil War Nightmare,” 23 Feb 06. 152Briefing, White House National Security Council, “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” p 5, Jan 07. 153Report, James A. Baker III et al, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” p 15, 6 Dec 06. 154Article, Steve Schifferes, “US Names Coalition of the Willing,” BBC News, 18 Mar 03; Article, Tom Raum, “Coalition of the Willing Shrinking,” USA 

Today, 21 Feb 07.

3534
PART V

 

1Speech, President George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses War On Terror In South Carolina,” 24 Jul 07.

2Speech, President George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses War On Terror In South Carolina,” 24 Jul 07.

3Report, Defense Science Board, “Report Of The Defense Science Board Task Force On Deployment Of Members Of The National Guard And Reserve In 

The Global War On Terrorism,” Sep 07, 

4Speech, President George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses War On Terror In South Carolina,” 24 Jul 07.

5Testimony, Lt Gen Charles E. Stenner, Jr., CAFR and AFRC/CC, to House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, “Supporting 

The Reserve Components As An Operational Reserve—Key Military Personnel Legislative Initiatives,” p 6-8, 15 Apr 10. 

6Briefing, HQ AFRC, Staff Meeting, 5 Mar 09.

7Briefing, AFRC, GWOT Book Summary, 25 Aug 08; Report, HQ AFRC/A3, Fiscal Year 2007 Flying Hour Report, Oct 07.

8Interview, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, HQ AFRC/CV, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, pp 118-129, 10 Nov 09.

9Testimony, Lt Gen Charles E. Stenner, Jr., CSAFR and AFRC/CC, to House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Military Personnel, “Supporting 

The Reserve Components As An Operational Reserve—Key Military Personnel Legislative Initiatives,” pp 6-8, 15 Apr 10.

10Speech, President George W. Bush, “The New Strategy In Iraq: Primetime Address To The Nation,” 10 Jan 07. 11Testimony, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, “Opening Remarks Before The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” 19 Oct 05; Field Manual 3-24, DOA, 

Counterinsurgency, 16 Jun 06. Field Manual 3-24 was designed to fill the doctrinal gap in counterinsurgency operations created by the 20 years since the 

previous publication on the subject. The manual took a general approach to COIN and required soldiers to employ a mix of both familiar combat tasks and 

skills and those more often associated with nonmilitary agencies.

12Paper, 2Lt Colin Ahern, US Army University of Military Intelligence, “Clear, Hold, Build: Modern Political Techniques In COIN,” Dec 08. 13Article, George Packer, “The Lesson Of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, 10 Apr 06. 14Press Release, UN, “UNESCO Launches The Reconstruction Project Of The Al-Adkari Shrine In Iraq,” 27 Jun 07. 15Article, Col James K. Greer, “Operation Knockout: COIN In Iraq,” Military Review, p 16, Nov-Dec 05.

16News Release, MNF-Iraq/MND/PAO, “In 24-hr Battle, Hawr Rajab Turns On al-Qaeda,” 10 Sep 07. 17Article, Eric Slaven, “Hawr Rajab Rebounds From Attack: Businesses Reopening Their Doors With Help From US Forces,” Stars and Stripes, 4 Dec 07.

18News Release, Army SSgt Michael Paredes, 3rd ID/PA, “Hawr Rajab Sees Significant Economic, Quality Of Life Improvements,” 10 Mar 08. 19News Release, DOD, Army Sgt David Turner, 3rd ID, 2nd Brigade Combat Team Public Affairs, “Village Of Hope Graduates Ready To Rebuild,” 11 May 

08.

20Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley, AFRC/HO with SMSgt Casey E. Wieland, 556 RHS, 23 Sep 09. 21Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley, AFRC/HO with SMSgt Casey E. Wieland, 556 RHS, 23 Sep 09. 22Briefing, AFRC/A7, “GWOT/Long War Deployments,” 13 Jun 07. 23Briefing, 931 ARG, “Concept Of Operations Brief: AEF Deployment Tasking, Incirlik AB, Turkey,” ca. Apr 07; Article, SSgt K.L. Kimbrell, 931ARG/PA, 

“Destination: Turkey,” Kanza Spirit, May 07; Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY07 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 07. 24Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY07 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 07; Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY10 Contingency 

Execution,” 30 Sep 10; Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY11 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 11.

25Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY07 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 07. 26Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY07 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 07, Report, HQ AFRC/A3OO, “Airpower Summary, FY 08,” 30 Sep 

08.

27Interview, TSgt John Snowman, 301FW/HO, “Interview, Colonel Robert “Mort” Mortensen, 301st Fighter Wing Vice commander/332nd Expeditionary 

Fighter Squadron Commander,” Jun 08.

355 356 
28Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY07 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 07. 29News Release, AFRC/PA, “C-17 Crews Support Missions In Europe, Africa,” 6 Feb 08; Article, Lt Col Scott Lavigne, 618 TACC, “Theater Direct Delivery: 

Mobility Force Projection for the 21st Century,” 27 Mar 09; Article, Capt Justin Brockhoff, 618 AOC, “Deployed C-17s Deliver Millionth Ton Of Cargo To 

US Central Command,” 22 Nov 10.

30Briefing, Maj Travis England, 618 TACC/XOCR, “Theater Direct Delivery: The Pointy End Of AMC,” ATA, Oct-Nov 09. 31Article, Capt Justin Brockhoff, 618 AOC, “Deployed C-17s Deliver Millionth Ton Of Cargo To US Central Command,” 22 Nov 10. 32Briefing, Maj Gen Rusty Moen, AFRC/A2/A3, “Force Presentation,” Sep 07. 33Briefing, Maj Gen Rusty Moen, AFRC/A2/A3, “Force Presentation,” Sep 07; Memorandum, Maj Gen Allan R. Poulin, AFRC/CV, “AFRC AEF Way 

Ahead,” 5 Sep 07.

34Briefing, Maj Gen Rusty Moen, AFRC/A2/A3, “Force Presentation,” Sep 07. 35Interview, Lt Gen John A. Bradley, CAFR and AFRC/CC, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, p 103, April and May 08. 36Briefing, Maj Gen Rusty Moen, AFRC/A2/A3, “Force Presentation,” Sep 07; Memorandum, Maj Gen Allan R. Poulin, AFRC/CV, “AFRC AEF Way 

Ahead,” 5 Sep 07.

37Memorandum, Maj Gen Allan R. Poulin, AFRC/CV, “AFRC AEF Way Ahead,” 5 Sep 07. 38Report, Global Security, “US Casualties In OIF, May 2007,” 7 May 11. 39Article, Blake Morrison and Peter Eisler, “Commanders Pushed To Make Bomb Disposal Choices,” USA Today, 14 Nov 07.

40Briefing, HQ AFRC/A7XED, “EOD Commander’s Briefing,” 22 Oct 08; Briefing, HQ AFRC/A7XO, “AFRC CE CC Workshop, ‘UTC Transformation,’” 

25 Oct 08.

41Article, Sharon Weinberger, “Improvised Bombs: Down In Iraq, Up In Afghanistan; Tech Barely A Factor,” 14 Feb 08; Article, Blake Morrison and Peter 

Eisler, “Commanders Pushed To Make Bomb Disposal Choices,” USA Today, 14 Nov 07; Report, Center for Strategic & International Studies, IED Metrics 

For Iraq: June 2003-September 2010, 11 Nov 10.

42Report, Center for Strategic & International Studies, IED Metrics For Iraq: June 2003-September 2010, p 4, 11 Nov 10. 43Article, Capt Marnee A.C. Losurdo, 512 AMW/PA, “Dover EOD Specialist Earns Awards For Combat Actions,” Citizen Airman, pp 12-13, Oct 10. 44Article, Capt Marnee A.C. Losurdo, 512 AMW/PA, “Reservist Under Fire: Airman Awarded Bronze Star, Air Force Combat Action Medal,” 8 Aug 10. 45Testimony, Maj Gen Kimberly A. Siniscalchi, AF/SG, to Senate Defense Appropriations Committee, “Presentation To The Committee on Appropriations 

Subcommittee On Defense United States Senate, Medical Air Force Nursing Services” p 19, 18 Mar 09.

46Testimony, Lt Gen (Dr) Charles B. Green, AF/SG, to House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, “FY 2012 Medical Programs,” p 1, 11 

May 1; Testimony, Maj Gen Kimberly A. Siniscalchi, AF/SG, to Senate Defense Appropriations Committee, “Presentation To the Committee On Appropriations Subcommittee On Defense United States Senate, Medical Air Force Nursing Services” p 19, 18 Mar 09.

47Briefing, HQ AMC, “Aeromedical Evacuation: A Shining Past – An Even Brighter Future,” Airlift Tanker Association, Oct 07; Briefing, Capt Angela 

Miller, “86 Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron Mission Brief,” Airlift Tanker Association, 07.

48Testimony, Maj Gen Kimberly A. Siniscalchi, AF/SG, Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, “Defense Health Programs,” p 24, 6 

Apr 11.

49Article, Annie Getsinger, “Decator Doctor Recounts Time Deployed With Air Force Reserve In Afghanistan,” 12 Nov 10. 50Article, SrA Erik Cardenas, AF Press Service, “Face of Defense: Flight Nurse Provides Care In The Air,” 20 Apr 09. 51Article, SrA Erik Cardenas, AF Press Service, “Face of Defense: Flight Nurse Provides Care In The Air,” 20 Apr 09. 52Report, Congressional Research Service, “Iraq Casualties: US Military Forces And Iraqi Civilians, Police, And Security Forces,” p 2, 11 Jun 10. 53Speech, President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending The War In Iraq,” 27 Feb 09. 54Speech, President Barack Obama, Address To The Nation On The End Of Combat Operations In Iraq, 31 Aug 10. 55Report, President of the United States, “National Security Strategy,” pp 25, 27 May 10; Speech, President Barack Obama, Address To The Nation On The 

End Of Combat Operations In Iraq, 31 Aug 10.

56Report, Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY10 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 10. 57Speech, Vice President Joseph Biden, “Remarks By Vice President Joseph Biden At The Change Of Command Ceremony For United States Forces—Iraq,” 

355 356
1 Sep 10.

58Speech, Vice President Joseph Biden, “Remarks By Vice President Joseph Biden At The Change Of Command Ceremony For United States Forces—Iraq,” 

1 Sep 10.

59Remarks, President Barack Obama, “Remarks By The President In Address To The Nation On The Way Forward In Afghanistan And Pakistan,” 1 Dec 09. 60Remarks, President Barack Obama, “Remarks By The President In Address To The Nation On The Way Forward In Afghanistan And Pakistan,” 1 Dec 09. 61News Release, Jim Garamone, DOD, “Transportation Officials Confident In Afghan Deployment,” 4 Dec 09; Briefing, Gen Duncan McNabb, USTRANSCOM/CC, “Meeting A Global Challenge,” Airlift Tanker Association, 4 Nov 10.

62Briefing, Gen Duncan McNabb, USTRANSCOM/CC, “Meeting A Global Challenge,” Airlift Tanker Association, 4 Nov 10; Notes, Betty R. Kennedy, 

AFRC/HO, [Gen Duncan McNabb’s Remarks ATA], 4 Nov 10.

63Briefing Slides, General Duncan McNabb, USTRANSCOM/CC, “Meeting A Global Challenge,” Airlift Tanker Association, 4 Nov 10.

64Article, Sandra I. Erwin, “Air Force: To Save Fuel, We Must Change How We Fly,” National Defense, Jul 10.

65Briefing, Gen Duncan McNabb, USTRANSCOM/CC, “Meeting A Global Challenge,” Airlift Tanker Association, 4 Nov 10. 66News Release, MSgt Scott T. Sturkel, AMC/PA, “Airlift Moves Mountains For Afghanistan Surge,” 2 Sep 10. 67Report, Mr Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY10 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 10, 68Report, Mr Mark D. Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, “FY10 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 10, 69Statement, Gen David H. Petraeus USCENTCOM, to Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Posture Of US Central Command,” 16 Mar 10.

70Statement, Gen David H. Petraeus USCENTCOM/CC to Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Posture Of US Central Command,” 16 Mar 10.

71Statement, Gen David H. Petraeus USCENTCOM, to Senate Armed Services Committee, “The Posture Of US Central Command,” 16 Mar 10.

72Article, Carlotta Gall, “Petraeus Confident As He Leaves Afghanistan,” 10 Jul 11. 73News Release, DOD, “Officials Report On Numerous Afghanistan Operations, 28 Jun 10. 74News Release, DOD, “Afghan, Coalition Forces Kill, Detain Insurgents,” 14 Oct 10. 75Briefing, White House, “Press Briefing By Senior Administration Officials On The Killing of Osama Bin Laden,” 2 May 11; Article, Elizabeth Bumiller, 

“Behind The Hunt For Bin Laden,” New York Times, p 1, 3 May 11. 76Article, Carlotta Gall, “Petraeus Confident As He Leaves Afghanistan,” 10 Jul 11. 77Speech, President Barack Obama, “Speech Regarding The Withdrawal Of Troops From Afghanistan,” 15 Jun 11.

3578 
ARTIST CREDITS 

PART I

 

William Lacey.

PART III

John M. Down, Michael Kane, Richard D. Sawyer, Lawrence M. Salk, Harley F. Copic, Daniel W. Hartmann, and Thomas Herzberg.

PART IV

Diana Thewlis, Donald R. Kramer, Barbara Staples, Marc Ericksen, Barbara Staples, John M. Downs, Anthony M. Stencel, and John P. Lucey.

PART V

Richard A. Taylor, John J. Witt, Constance K. McLennan, Charles Lilly, Karen Chandler, Paul E. Rendel, Steven S. Walker, and Frank Ordaz.

PART V MEDICAL SECTION

Lori A. Dawson, John M. Downs, Robert L. Cooley, and Harley F. Copic.

3578
SIDE BAR SOURCES

PART I

LIEUTENANT CHARLES D’OLIVE

Source: NMUSAF papers.

AIR CORPS RESERVE – LOST SOULS

Source: Cy Caldwell, “Preserve Our Air Reserve,” Aero Digest, Jul 36.

GENERAL JAMES H. DOOLITTLE

Source: Biography, DOD/PI, “Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle,” Jan 55; James H. Doolittle, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again: An Autobiography

(Schiffer Publishing, 1991); John L. Frisbee, Makers of the United States Air Force (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987). 

FIRST TEN BASES – FIRST PHASE

Source: Letter, HQ Air Defense Command, “Activation of the Air Reserve Program,” 3 Jun 46.

ARMY AIR FORCES PLAN FOR AIR FORCE RESERVE

Source: Army Air Forces Plan for the Air Reserve, approved 12 Jul 46.

GRAY COMMITTEE – AIR RESERVE ASSOCIATION

Source: Col Robert J. Smith, ARA, Appearance before the Gray Committee, 16 Feb 48.

AIR FORCE RESERVE KOREAN WAR ACES & CREDITS

Source: NMUSAF.

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

Source: Report, No. 457, House, 84th Congress, 1st Sess, National Reserve Plan, pp 4-7, 28 Apr 55.

NEW ACCENT ON THE AIR RESERVE FORCES

Source: Gen Thomas D. White, CSAF, Air Force Magazine, Jul 60.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY MESSAGE BERLIN CRISIS

Source: Letter, President John F. Kennedy, 17 Jul 62.

TOTAL FORCE SECDEF MEMORANDUM 21 AUGUST 1970

Source: Memorandum, Melvin R. Laird, “Support for Guard and Reserve Forces,” 21 Aug 70.

TOTAL FORCE SECDEF MEMORANDUM 23 AUGUST 1973

Source: Memorandum, James R. Schlesinger, “Readiness of the Selected Reserve,” 23 Aug 73.

359 360 
SHADOW – 71ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON

Sources: 14th SOW History, Book, Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift (Washington, DC: USAFHMP, 1983), pp 190-197; Book, Gerald T. Cantwell, Citizen 

Airmen: A History Of The Air Force Reserve, 1946-1994 (Washington, DC: AFHMP, 1997), pp 221-222; Article, “Gunship Support Earns Praise;” Article 

“71st SOS Returns From Vietnam, Jun-Jul 69; and web site: 71st SOS.

PARARESCUEMAN SAVES HC-97 AND CREW

Source: History 305 ARRS Apr-Jun 69, p 9.

BABYLIFT

Sources: History, Military Airlift Command, 1 July 1974-31 December 1975, pp xvi, 204; Interview, Maj Gen Hanferd J. Moen, Jr., with Betty R. Kennedy, 

Gregory L. Mattson, and Steven P. Ove, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, pp 59, 60, Feb 09.

 JUST CALL AND WE’LL BE THERE

Interview, Brig Gen Richard R. Severson, AFRC/ACV, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, Jul 08.

AFR JUST CAUSE SUMMARY

Source: Report, AFRES/HO, “Operation Just Cause,” Jan 93.

CLAY T. MCCUTCHAN

Source: Citation DFC.

FIRST A-10 AIR-TO-AIR KILL 

Source: Colonel Robert R. Swain, Jr., Jun 12.

THE THREE-SHIP RAID

Sources: Interviews and Recollections, Maj Gen Clay T. McCutchan, Maj Gen Michael N. Wilson, Brig Gen George F. Williams, and Maj Gen Richard 

S. Haddad, 11 and 12.

AIR FORCE RESERVE MOBOLIZATION CALL-UPS, 1950-1999

Source: HQ AFRC/HO.

PART II

AT WAR

Source: Email, Lt Col Eugene V. Ziemba to Ms. Betty R. Kennedy, “9/11,” 1 May 09.

A REMEMBRANCE TO 9/11 FIRST FALLEN AFRC HERO

Sources: Biography, HQ AFRC, Major LeRoy W. Homer, Jr.; Article, MSgt Tim Barela, “Dear LeRoy,” Airman, Sep 02, pp 38-41; Email, Lewis Carlyle, 

AOG USAFA to SSgt Sa’Maad Bynum, HQ AFRC/HO, “Homer Article,” 14 Aug 08; and Article, Capt Caroline Wellman, 445 AW/PA, “Building Dedication Honors Fallen Citizen Airman,” 6 Oct 08.

359 360
AIR FORCE RESERVISTS ASSIST

Sources: Article, Dorothy Goepel, “Pentagon Hero Receives Purple Heart, Airman’s Medal,” Sep 02, Article, People Magazine, 5 Nov 01, p 63; Article, MSgt 

Dorothy Goepel and MSgt Rick Burnham,“Honoring Heroes: Two Reservists among 28 Recognized for 9/11 Actions,” Citizen Airman, pp 6-7, Jun 02; Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley, AFRC/HO, with CMSgt Troy J. McIntosh, Apr and May 08.

OVERWHELMING

Sources: Article, Peter Sheehan, “Father Rowan Describes ‘Overwhelming’ Situation,” The Long Island Catholic News, 24 Oct 1; Report, Maj Mark Rowan, 

514 AMW/HC, “After-Action Report, Call up to Dover Port Mortuary, following the 11 Sept 01 attack on the Pentagon, 16 Sept –05 Oct 2001,” 20 Oct 01; History, 349 AMW/HO, “History of the 349th Airlift Wing, 1 October 2001- 30 September 2002,” p 38, circa 03; History, 315 AW/HO, “History of the 315th Airlift 

Wing, 1 October 1998-30 September 2001, p 10, May 05; History, 940 ARW/HO, “History of the 940th Air Refueling Wing, 1 October 1999 – 30 September 

2002,” p 3, Oct 04; History, 512 AW/HO, “History of the 512th Airlift Wing, 1 January 2000 – 30 September 2001, p 22, Aug 05.

CASUALTIES 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

Source: Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, Jul 04; Shanksville, Pentagon, and WTC Memorial web sites.

DAN MCNALLY – NYPD MEDAL OF VALOR

Source: Article, DOD News, Mike Richmond, AFOSI/PA, “Air Force Special Investigator Dan NcNally: AF Reservist Awarded Medal of Valor,” Jan 03.

TYREE BACON – NY STATE COURT MEDAL OF VALOR & DOD/AF HEROISM AWARDS

Source: Article, Bo Joyner, AFRC/PA, “Humble Hero: McGuire Firefighter: Focus Should Be On Those Who Died on 9/11.” Citizen Airman, p 19. Oct 02.

514 AMW – MOST FORTUNATE

Source: History, 514 AMW/HO, “514 AMW History, 1 October 2000-30 September 2001,” p 10.

US TROOPS RESPOND TO TRAGEDY

Source: Article, Maj Michael J. Paoli, AF/PA NY Office, “US Troops Respond To Tragedy As Units, Individuals,” American Forces Press Service, 20 Sep 01.

QUOTE

Lt Gen James E. Sherrard III from Article, AFRC/PA, “4 Reserve Flying Units Receive Call-Up Notice,” Sep 01.

ACC’S IMA MOBILIZATION ASSISTANT READY TO STEP IN

Source: Interview, Maj Gen Allan R. Poulin, AFRC/CV, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, Apr 09.

INTEL IMAs

Source: Col Brian C. Guthrie, AFRC/A2-SA, Aug 12.

QUOTE

Col Nancy C. Zbyszinski from Interview, Col Nancy C. Zbyszinski, RMG/CC, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, Nov 10.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Source: Executive Order, White House, “President Orders Ready Reserve of Armed Forces to Active Duty,” 14 Sep 01.

3612 
QUOTE

 Source: Remarks, President George W. Bush, Camp David, 15 Sep 01.

RECOLLECTIONS

Source: Interview, Col C. Faylene Wright and Col John A. Hickok, AFRC/A4, with Betty R. Kennedy and MSgt Kenneth E. Sloat, AFRC/HO, Interview, Aug 

09. 

MORE THAN 30 PERCENT

Source: Interview, Col James T. Rubeor, 349th AMW/CC, with TSgt Robert Wade, 349th AMW/HO, 24 Feb 03.

AFRC RAVENS RESPOND

Source: Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley, AFRC/HO, with SMSgt Anthony J. Sobieski, 16 Oct 08.

TANKER AIR BRIDGE ACROSS THE PACIFIC – 2001

Source: Article, AFRC/PA, “KC-135 Crews Support Enduring Freedom, Return Home,” Oct 01.

NATO AWACS – OPERATION EAGLE ASSIST

Source: Chronology, NATO, “NATO’s Operations 1949 – Present,” circa 10; Statement, NATO, “Statement by the Secretary General on the Conclusion of 

Operation Eagle Assist,” 3 May 02; Release, NATO, Operation Eagle Assist, circa 02

AFRC SUMMARY 25 NOVEMBER 2001

Source: Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Mobilization Conference,” 29 Nov 01.

AFRC SUPPORT AS OF NOVEMBER 2001

Source: Briefing, AFRC/DO, “Mobilization Conference,” 29 Nov 01

AIR FORCE RESERVE CHANGED FOREVER

Source: Statement, Lt Gen James E. Sherrard III, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Personnel, “Air Force Reserve Programs,” Feb 02.

PART III

NEGROPONTE LETTER TO UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT

Source: Letter John D. Negroponte to US Security Council, [US Exercise of Individual and Collective Self-Defense], 7 Oct 01.

US SECDEF STATEMENT

Source: Statement, Donald H. Rumsfeld, SECDEF, “Statement of the Secretary of Defense,” 7 Oct 01

JUST ROWS AND ROWS

Source: News Release, AFRC/PA, “March Loadmaster Returns After Missions Over Afghanistan,” 12 Dec 01.

C-17 AIRLIFTERS

Source: Interview, Col Bruce A. Bowers, AFRC A3 deputy director, and Col Gregory L. Vitalis, AFRC A5/8 program manager organizational/force structure, 

3612
Interview, Apr 10.

FIRST F-16 MISSION

Source: Document, Lt Col Michael Brill, 419 FW/SE to TSgt Scott Gaitley, 931 ARG/HO, “OEF Mission,” 17 Sep 10; E-mail, Lt Col Michael Brill, 419 FW/

SE to TSgt Scott Gaitley, 931 ARG/HO, “OEF & OIF Combat Hours and Missions,” 2 Sep 10.

PONY EXPRESS

Source: Interview, Col Victor Kuchar with Stephen P. Ove, Betty R. Kennedy, Heidi A. Vion, and Gregory L. Mattson, AFRC/HO, Oct 08.

WHAT WAS A TYPICAL ENDURING FREEDOM MISSION FOR OUR F-16s?

Source: Interview, Lt Gen John A. Bradley, CAFR & AFRC Commander, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, Apr and May 08.

711TH SOS – AMAZING GUYS

Source: Interview, Maj Gen Richard S. Haddad, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, Interview, 14 Dec 11.

WE DID WHAT WE ARE TRAINED TO DO

Sources: Article, SSgt Marnee Carlson, 919 SOW/PA, “711th SOS Aircrew Honored for Heroic Mission,” Midnight Express, ca. Aug 02, p 2; News Release, 

“Reserve Aircrew Honored for Heroic Mission,” Marnee Carlson, 15 Aug 02.

MC-130 RECOVERY EARNS 2002 MARCHBANKS AWARD

Source: Article, Sandra Henry, 919 SOW/PA, “2003: 711th SOS Aircrew Honored for Heroic Mission, 30 Jul 08.

AFRC SPECIAL OPERATIONS – AWARD CITATION – PART I

Source: Memorandum, 919 OG/CC to USCENTAF/UDPU, “Recommendation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation – 919th Operations Group, 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003,” 7 Sep 04.

WAR TAKES RESERVIST TO AFGHANISTAN

Sourrce: News release, Lt. Col Sally Nutt Morger, 439th AW/PA, “War on terrorism takes reservist to Afghanistan,” Oct 02.

B-1 RESCUE

Source: History, 349 AMW/HO, “History of 349 AMW 1 October 2001-30 September 2002, p 14.

QUOTE

Source: Lt Gen James E. Sherrard III, AFRC Commander and CAFR, March 2002

AFRC SPECIAL OPERATIONS – AWARD CITATION – PART II

Source: Memorandum, 919 OG/CC to USCENTAF/UDPU, “Recommendation for Award of the Presidential Unit Citation – 919th Operations Group, 19 October 2001 to 1 July 2003,” 7 Sep 04.

COMBAT CONTROLLER

Source: Book, Michael Hirsh, None Braver: US Air Force Pararescuemen In The Afghanistan War (Penguin, NY, 2003) pp 178-185, 235; Speech, TSgt Jim 

Hotaling, “Special Operation Forces Brief,” 16 Sep 02.

3634 
WE WILL PREVAIL

Source: Article, AFRC/PA, “B-52 Weapons Loader Recalls War, How It Changed Him,” Feb 02.

WESTOVER – APOE 

Source: Interview, Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/CV, with Betty R. Kennedy and Donald C. Boyd, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, 10 Nov 09.

QUOTE

Source: Col Nancy C. Zbyszinski from Interview, Col Nancy C. Zbyszinski, RMG/CC, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, Nov 10.

17TH EAS – 1,000TH MISSION

Source: Article, 438 AW/PA, “Squadron Logs 1,000th Enduring Freedom Mission, Jun 02.

PART IV

ADDRESS TO THE NATION – ULTIMATUM TO SADDAM HUSSEIN 

Source: Address, President George W. Bush, Address To The Nation, 17 March 2003

AIR BRIDGE

Source: Article, MSgt Tom Allocco, 439 AW/PA, “Westover Bridges Airlift Effort To Southwest Asia,” Feb 03

NORTHEAST CHILL FAILS TO STEM AIR BRIDGE

Source: Article, AFRC/PA, “Northeast Icy Blast Fails To Chill Air Bridge Pace,” 13 Mar 03

QUOTE

Source: Maj Gen Martin M. Mazick, General Officer Steering Group, 21 Oct 03.

WESTOVER SECURITY FORCES ON ROAD TO BAGHDAD

Source: News release, Master Sgt. Tom Allocco, 439th AW/PA, “Westover Security Forces Dig in on Road to Baghdad,” Jun 03.

SECDEF – AFRC C-130

Sources: Article, Chris Gray, “Home for Christmas,” philly.com, 23 Dec 03; Report, 913AW/327AS Willow Grove ARS, PA, “FY 2003 Summary Report,” 23 

Sep 03; Army News Service Release, SPC Robert Woodward, Mosul, Iraq, “Rumsfeld visits troops in Iraq,” 8 Sep 03.; Transcript, DOD, “Secretary Rumsfeld 

Interview with Dan Rather, CBS News,” 5 Sep 03; Transcript, DOD, “Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the Lebanese Broadcasting Corp.,” 5 Sep 03; Transcript, DOD, “Secretary Rumsfeld Media Roundtable at Camp Victory, Iraq,” 5 Sep 03.

A-10 - 442d FIGHTER WING – IRAQ 2003

Sources: Fact Sheet, 442 FW/PA, “44nd Fighter Wing,” Apr 09; Article, Bill Huntington and Leo Brown, “Making History...Again: 442d Fighter Wing Carries on Proud Tradition Established During World War II,” Citizen Airmen, 1 Feb 04, pp 2; Article, AFRC News Service, “Whiteman Reservists Return Home 

From Iraq ‘With Honor,’ 21 Nov 03; Article, Marni McEntee, “A-10’s Move to Kirkuk to Protect Troops,” Stars and Stripes, 2 May 03.

I’VE GOT A-10s

Source: Book, Col Gregory Fontenot, Lt Col E. J. Degen, and Lt Col David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Office of 

3634
the Army Chief of Staff, Washington, DC: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p 250, interview of Lt Col J.R. Sanderson, Commander, TF 2-69 AR, 12 

May 03.

C-17 DROP AT BASHUR

Source: Interview, Col Bruce A. Bowers, AFRC A3 deputy director, and Col Gregory L. Vitalis, AFRC A5/8 program manager organizational/force structure, 

Interview, Apr 10.

IRAQ 920TH RESCUE WING - 2003

Sources: Article, Col Darrel D. Whitcomb, “Rescue Operations In The Second Gulf War,” Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 05; Article, Gordon Trowbridge, “A Piece of Iraq,” Air Force Times, 14 Apr 03; Article, Bradley Graham, “Patriot System Likely Downed US Navy Jet,” Washington Post, p A34, 4 

Apr 03; and Article, “Patriot Missile Downed US Jet,” Associated Press, 14 Apr 03; Article, Jim Garamone, “Thunderbolt over Baghdad, ‘Pilot-Dude’ Down 

in the Countryside,” American Forces Press Service, 16 Jul 03; Chronology, SSgt Cathi D. Bradford, 920 RQW/HO, “920th Rescue Wing, 1 October 2002-30 

September 2003,” 04; Briefing, Col Tim Tarchick, 920 RQW/CC, “920th Rescue Wing,” circa 03.

A-10s 303 FS – TALLIL, KIRKUK

Source: Article, AFRC News Service, “Whiteman Reservists Return Home From Iraq ‘With Honor,’ 21 Nov 03.

IT TOOK ALL OF US DOING SOMETHING RIGHT

Source: CMSgt Dale Berryhill.; Article, “Pitsenbarger Award,” AF Times, 26 Apr 04.

AFRC PROVIDED COMMUNICATIONS IN THE AOR

Sources: News Release, AFRC/PA, “Communicators deal with sand, heat in Kuwait,” 31 Oct 03; Email, Col Michael O Cannon to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 

21 Sep 11; News Release, 386th AEW/PA, “5th Expeditionary Air Mobility Squadron changes Command,” 12 May 09. 

EARLY LESSONS

Source: Col Gregory L. Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, 03.

AFRC FY03 FLYING HOUR SUMMARY 

Source: Briefing, Brig Gen Martin M. Mazick, AFRC/DO, “GO Steering Group Meeting,” 21 Oct 03.

DFC – MAJORS MOEDING & MOOR 

Sources: Order, SO GO-1849, HQ AFCENT Lt Gen North, “DFC Awarded to Major Moeding, 22 May 06; Memo, Maj Michael Moeding to 384 AEW/SE, 

“MFD and CDU Failure During Flight,” 14 Jan 03; Article, SSgt Kenny Kimbrell, 931 ARG/PA, “Two 931st ARG Members Receive DFC,” 24 Jul 06.

C-130 SERVICE

Source: Lt Col Anthony G. Polashek, 514th Operations Group Deputy Commander, May 12. 

STORY OF THE 914 AW IN OEF/OIF

Source: Briefing, Lt Col David Re, 328th AS, 914 Warrior Briefing, 06

 TESTING OUR WILL

Source: Article, Archives of the US Embassy Montevideo, “President Bush Makers Surprise Visit to Baghdad,” 01 Dec 03

3656 
AFRC MAJOR GENERAL ENSURES RELATIONS - SAUDI ARABIA

Sources: Article, Tad Lichtenauer, “USAF Major General Retires,” Cross & Crescent, Dec 06; Book, Karl S. Twitchell, Saudi Arabia, p 151; Official Biography, Maj Gen Larry L. Twitchell, Jan 07; Email, Maj Gen Larry L. Twitchell to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 4 Jun 12.

EXTRAORDINARY GALLANTRY AGAINST AN ARMED ENEMY

Sources: Report, “The 919th Operations Group, PAS Code W60VFJ92, is nominated for the Presidential Unit Citation for the period of 19 October 2001 to 1 

July 2003” ca. Mar 04; Article, “Gallant Unit Citation,” Air Force Times, 25 Apr 06.

970TH AIRBORNE AIR CONTROL 

Sources: Report, 513 ACG, “513 Air Control Group Activation-in-Review 2001-2003,” ca 03; Award, 513 ACG, “Justification For The Air Force Outstanding 

Unit Award, 513th Air Control Group,” ca 03; Interview, Col John Trnka, Lt Col Douglas Lomheim, Lt Col Pat Rupel, Lt Col Dale Andrews, and CMSgt Joe 

DiTommaso, with Betty R. Kennedy, Stephen P. Ove, and Gregory L. Mattson, AFRC/HO, 19 Feb 09.

INCREDIBLE JOB 

Source: Interview, Maj Gen James D. Bankers, Twenty Second Air Force Commander, with SMSgt Robin J. Rosenberger, 22 AF/HO, 31 Jan 06

AFRC - EOD

Sources: Article, Ernesto Londono, “US Troops in Iraq Face a Powerful New Weapon,” Washington Post, p A1, 10 Jul 08; Article, Sara Carter, “Troops Innovate Online,” Washington Times, 21 Sep 07; Article, “IEDs: Iraq’s deadly roadside bombs,” BBC News, 18 Aug 06

COMBAT CONVOY AIRMEN IN IRAQ 2004 - 2006

Sources: Email, Col Gary Schick, 732 EMSG/CC to Col Thomas C. Lorimer, USCENTAF/A1, “494th Air Expeditionary Force Truck Company,” 25 Jul 04; 

Report, Cpt Annette Bonaro, “1058th AEF TC Historical Account,” no date; Briefing, Cpt Annette Bonaro, HQ USAFE/A4RI, “1058th Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Truck Company (TC),” 22 Jul 05; Article, Christina Oxtra, “LRS war heroes return home,” Viking Flyer, Nov 04, p 5; Interview, Jay 

Lawrence, “Technical Sergeant Marcus Erickson,” Fox Sports North, 30 May 10; Article, Lt Col William Clark, 732nd ELRS, “732nd Expeditionary Logistics 

Readiness Squadron inactivates, leaves proud legacy,” 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing News Story, 17 Jun 10; Email, Jeff J. Seiken, USAF ACC/HO, to Keith 

L. Barr, HQ AFRC/HO, “AEF Transportation Companies,” 6 Jan 11; Email, Elijah Roberts, Civ AF/ILGF, to Robert Harrison Civ AF/DPMO, “494th Air Expeditionary Force Truck Company,” 22 Jul 04; Email, SMSgt Dirk H. Danielson, AFRC/A4RX, to Keith L. Barr, HQ AFRC/HO, “2T1XX T Series Deployed,” 

1 Apr 11; Article, TSgt Doug Hays, 434 ARW/PA, “Grissom transporter earns bronze star,” Heartland Warrior, Apr 05.

CROME 32 - 440 AW

Sources: Article, Cpt Aaron Burgstein, “Deployed Aircrew Reacts, Saves Lives,” The Flying Badger, Jan 05, pg 4-5; Briefing, 440 AW, “Crome 32,” 19 Jun 

06, pg 1-16.

AFRC AND THE CAPTURE OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Sources: Briefing, Gen Richard Myers, CJCS, Media Availability from Baghdad, Iraq 16 Dec 03; Interview of BIF Commander by Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 

29 Mar 11; Email, Robert O. Babcock, author: Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Year in the Sunni Triangle, to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 3 Mar 11; Article, Geoff 

Ziezulewicz, “Bronze Star awarded to Mildenhall Colonel,” Stars and Stripes, 10 Oct 07.

AFRC AIDS BESLAN SCHOOL VICTIMS 

Sources: Article, J.F.O. McAllister and Paul Quinn-Judge, “Defenseless Targets,” Time Europe, Sep 04, p 2; Article, BBC News, “High Death Toll in Russia 

siege,” 4 Sep 04; Article, MSgt Jon Hanson, “Air Force Provides Humanitarian Aid to Russian Victims,” American Forces Press Service, Sep 04, p 1; TSgt 

Stefano Collins, 302 AW/ PA, “Wing extends helping hand after Russian tragedy,” Space Observer, Sep 04, p 4.

3656
DENTON ASSISTANCE - IRAQ

Source: Report, Kenneth Hundemer, 437 APS/DPX, “JRI-Denton Operations: Unit Support Report,” 12 Apr 11

EARTHQUAKE RELIEF – PAKISTAN 2005

Source: Article, “South Asia Quake Victims Honoured,” BBC News, 8 Oct 06; Article, USCENTCOM/PA and AMC/PA, “Air Force Continues Pakistan Aid,” 

17 Oct 05; Article, SSgt Alicia Prakash USCENTCOM/PA, “CFACC Air Power Flies Through 2005 Successes,” 05 Jan 06; Article, MSgt Peter Borys 379 

AES/PA, “C-17 Crew Delivers Humanitarian Aid to Pakistan,” Palmetto Airlifter, Nov 05

AFRC A-10’s RETURN – TOTAL TEAM AFGHANISTAN

Sources: Article, Bill Roggio, “Operation Mountain Lion in Afghanistan,” The Long War Journal, 13 Apr 06; Article, Sgt Joe Lindsay, USMC, “Operation 

Mountain Lion Roars into Korengal Valley,” Defense Link News, 8 May 06; Article, Maj David Kurle, 455 AEW/PA, “Bagram A-10s Surge For Summer Offensive,” Air Force News, 17 Aug 06; Article, Maj David Kurle, 455 AEW/PA, “Whiteman Reservists Arrive in Afghanistan,” Air Force News, 13 May 06; 

Article, “US, Afghan Forces Begin Large ‘Thrust’ Against Taliban Fighters,” FOX News 16 Jun 06.

LION – THRUST – MEDUSA

Sources: Article, Bill Roggio, “Operation Mountain Lion in Afghanistan,” The Long War Journal, 13 Apr 06; Article, Sgt. Joe Lindsay, USMC, “Operation 

Mountain Lion Roars into Korengal Valley,” Defense Link News, 8 May 06; Report, CRS Report for Congress, “U.S. and Coalition Military Operations in 

Afghanistan: Issues for Congress,” 11 Dec 06, p 3; Book, Seth G. Jones, In The Graveyard Of Empires (New York, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 

2010), pp XV, 201, 212-218.

HONORED TO SERVE

Source: Email Maj Gen Clay T. McCutchan, to Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, May 11.

STORY OF THE 914 AW IN OEF/OIF

Source: Briefing, Lt Col David Re, 328th AS, 914 Warrior Briefing, 06.

RESERVE COMMANDER AVERTS DISASTER

Source: Interview, Lt Col Teresa M. Riley interview of Lt Col James M. Larkin, 09.

LAST C-141 OIF MISSION

Sources: Article, Maj Ted Theopolos, 445 AW/PA, “Air Force Reservists Fly Last C-141 Mission to Combat Zone,” 25 Sep 05; Captioned Digital Image, USAF 

photo by Maj Ted Theopolos, “Air Force Reservists Fly Last C-141 Mission to Combat Zone,” 25 Sep 05.

AFRC RESPONDS TO 2005 HURRICANES

Sources: Report, Daniel L. Haulman, AFHRA, “The US Air Force Response to Hurricane Katrina,” 17 Nov 06; History, “Air Force Reserve Command 1 

January 2005-31 December 2006,” pp xxviii-xxx; Article, Lt. Gen. John A. Bradley, “Reservists have stepped up in response to devastating hurricane,” Citizen 

Airman, October 05, p. 2; News Release, Cpt Steve Alvarez, American Forces Press Service, “Air Reservists Mobilize for Katrina Relief Efforts,” 6 Sept 05; 

Article, Sgt Sara Wood, AFIS, “DOD Leaders Report on Hurricane Response,” 10 Nov 05. 

AFRC AIRLIFT WORK EFFORT – FLYING TIME, OCTOBER 2002 – MARCH 2003

Source: Briefing, Lt Col Greg Vitalis, AFRC/DOO, “Operation Iraqi Freedom and FY03 Year in Review,” 29 May 03. 

3678 
PART V

4TH COMBAT CAMERA - AFGHANISTAN

Sources: Article, SSgt Christine Jones, 4 CTCS, “Behind the Lens: Combat cameramen capture critical time in history,” Citizen Airman, Jun 10, pp 22-23; 

News Release, SSgt Christine Jones, 22 Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, “Behind the Lens: 4th Combat Camera in Afghanistan,” 7 Apr 10.

JUST MINUTES OUTSIDE THE GATE

Source: Lt Col Teresa M. Riley interview of Maj Jose L. Rivera, 08.

SENIOR AIRMAN LOPES – SECURITY FORCES

Sources: Correspondence, Betty Lopes with 920 RQW/HO, “920 History – My Reactions,” 8 Dec 08; Article , “The Heart of Freedom,” Angel’s Wings, Oct 

07; Interview, SSgt Maria Eames with SRA Diane Lopes, 11 Jan 09; Article “Security Forces airman given Purple Heart,” Florida Today, 1 Oct 07; Article, 

“Wounded Iraq Vets Find Comfort in Dog Training,” ABC News, 19 Aug 08; Article , “Refuge for Iraq War Veterans Amazing People,” Reader’s Digest, Aug 

08; Webpage, White House, “Guest List for the First Lady’s Box at the 2008 State of the Union.”

US SENATOR - AFRC JAG

Sources: Article, James Rosen, “Air Force Reservist Sen. Lindsey Graham Served In Afghanistan,” 25 May 07; American Forces Press Release, TSgt Chuck 

Marsh, “Air Force ‘Legal Eagles’ Meet With Afghan Military Legal Leaders,” 23 Aug 06.

WORLD RECORD – LT COL BRILL

Sources: Web Page, 1st Lt Lisa Spilinek, 332 AEW/PA, - Air Force Pilot Breaks Own World Aviation Record, 4 May 08; Web Site, World Record Academy, 

- Most Hours Spent Flying the F-16, 2 May 08; Web Site, F-16.net, 26 Aug 10.

LAW AND ORDER - IRAQ

Source: Article, Kari Tilton, 419 FW/PA, “Hill JAG Helps Restore Law, Order in Iraq,” 7 Jul 08.

BALAD F-16 FIGHTER DEPLOYMENT, MAY 2007 – JULY 2008

Source: Interview, Col Robert Mortensen, 301 FW/CC and 332 EFS/CC, by TSgt John Snowman, 301 FW/HO, 08.

IRAQI AERO-EVACUATION

Source: Interview, SSgt Scott J. Gaitley, 332 AEW/HO, with Lt Col Robert A. Hedglin and MSgt Jenny K. Carney 332 EAMDS/CASF, 28 Nov 08.

MOBILIZATION – ACCESS

Source: Interview, Lt Gen Charles E. Stenner CAFR & Commander AFRC, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End Of Tour Interview, Jul 12.

HUGE DIVIDENDS

Source: Lt Gen John A. Bradley, CAFR & AFRC Commander, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, April and May 08.

VOLUNTEERISM – MOBILIZATION

Source: Lt Gen John A. Bradley, CAFR & AFRC Commander, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End of Tour Interview, April and May 08.

IN HIS SON’S FOOTSTEPS

Sources: Article, MSgt Shawn David McCowan, “Following in His Son’s Footsteps,” Citizen Airman, Oct 09; Article, Gina Cavallaro, “Losing a Friend,” 

3678
Army Times, 1 Apr 05; Article, MSgt Shawn David McCowan, “Following in His Son’s Footsteps, Deployment helps father find closure following son’s death 

in Iraq” Citizen Airman, Feb 10; Blog, Francisco “Paco” Martinez, “Paco’s Blog,” 31 Jul 06, 1 Jun 08, 23 Jan 09.

AFRC C-17 - AFGHAN PRESIDENT

Sources: Transcript, The Embassy of Afghanistan, “President Karzai addresses UN General Assembly,” 24 Sep 08; News Release, The Embassy of Afghanistan, “President Karzai Visits Washington, Meets President Bush” 26 Sep 08; News Release, ABC News, “Thanks for Putting Up with the Yelling, Karzai tells 

Bush” 27 Sep 08; Email, Lt Col Nathaniel L. Ward Jr., AFRC 732 AS/ADO to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 6 Apr 11.

AFRC C-17 CREW – VICE PRESIDENT

Sources: USAFE News Release, “Vice President Joe Biden visits with RAF Mildenhall Airmen,” 15 Sep 09; Article, David Jackson, “Biden Back in Iraq,” 

usatoday.com, 15 Sep, 09; News Release, “Shells Hit Green Zone as Biden Visits Iraq,” cbsnews.com, 15 Sep 09; Article, Steven Lee Myers, “4 Mortar Shells 

Land Near U.S. Embassy in Green Zone Takes as Biden Visits Baghdad,” nytimes.com, 15 Sep 09; Article, Steven Lee Myers, “Green Zone Takes More Fire 

During Biden Visit,” nytimes.com, 16 Sep 09; News Release, “Biden Discusses Iraqi Oil with Kurdish Leaders,” VOANews.com, 17 Sep 09; Article, Andrew 

Malcolm, “Joe Biden Update: He’s back safely into seclusion,” latimes.com, 18 Sep 09; Email, Lt Col Nathaniel L. Ward Jr., AFRC 732 AS/ADO, to Keith L. 

Barr, AFRC/HO, 5 Nov 11.

TECHNICAL SERGEANT ANTHONY C. CAMPBELL, JR 

Sources: Article, Ben Gilbert, “Afghanistan’s Hurt Locker: Facing off with IEDs,” Global Post, 10 Feb 10; Citation, AF, “Citation To Accompany Award Of 

The Bronze Star Medal With Valor (Posthumous) To Technical Sergeant Anthony C. Campbell, Jr.” Dec 09; Booklet, HQ AF/MMG, Portraits in Courage, Vol 

5, p 9, 10; Emily Campbell and Family, “Campbell Family Statement,” WLWT.com; Article, Scott Fontaine, “Stories detail heroic actions of brave airmen,” 

Air Force Times, pp.11-14, Dec12; Article, Major Stan Paregien, “Fallen EOD,” Air Force Civil Engineer 18:1, p.38, Jan10.

EOD – BRONZE STARS

Sources: Article, Cpt Marnee A.C. Losurdo, “Dover EOD specialist earns awards for combat actions,” Citizen Airman, Oct 10; Article, “Reservist Receives 

Bronze Star,” 944th Fighter Wing, 6 Mar 11; Certificate, Bronze Star Medal to TSgt Tim Haffner, 10 May 07; Citation, “TSgt Timothy Haffner Bronze Star 

Citation,” 7 Feb 07

MILITARY INTEGRATIONS - MEDICAL

Source: Interview, SSgt Scott J. Gaitley, 332 AEW/HO, with Lt Col Robert A. Hedglin and MSgt Jenny K. Carney 332 EAMDS/CASF, 28 Nov 08.

TOTAL FORCE EFFORTS SAVE SOLDIER

Sources: Article, “Never Say Die,” Angel’s Wing, Vol. 6, No. 4, p 13, Jul/Aug 08; E-mail, Cpt Patricia Hayden, 920 RW to SSgt Sa’Maad Bynum, AFRC/HO, 

“Re: Verification of facts for GWOT Study for AFRC/HO,” 17 Sep 08.

WHERE MODERN MEDICINE ENDS

Sources: E-mail, Chaplain (Cpt) Howard S. Bell, 932 AW/HC, to Col Thomas A. Deall, HQ AFRC/CVA, “Weekly letter from Howard S. Bell 20080704,” 04 

Jul 08; E-mail, Chaplain (Cpt) Howard Bell, 932 AW/HC, to Col Tom Deall, HQ AFRC/CV, “May 23, 2008: Dear Family and Friends,” 23 May 08.

IMPROVING CARE

Source: Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, HQ AFRC/HO, with Col Dominic A. DeFrancis AFRC/SG, 15 Jun 10.

AIR FORCE CHAPLAIN CORPS – WORKING ON THE JOINT TEAM

Source: Chaplain Col Gary R. Califf, Mar 10.

369 370 
CCATT

Source: Interview, Betty R. Kennedy, HQ AFRC/HO, with Col Dominic A. DeFrancis AFRC/SG, 15 Jun 10.

SHOCKER 21 MISSION

Source: Report, Lt Col Paul Nevius, 08.

WHITE HOUSE 

Source: Remarks [Extract], President in Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq, 31 Aug 10.

BUILDING THE IRAQI—AFGHAN AIR FORCES

Source: Interview, Maj Gen Richard S. Haddad, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, Interview, 14 Dec 11.

DELTA SQUADRON

Sources: News Release, “A1C Ciara M. Travis, 86 AW/PA, “YARS, Ramstein bid farewell to 38th EAS,” 10 Jan 11; Article, TSgt Stefano Collins, “Wing extends helping hand after Russian tragedy,” Space Observer, 20 Sep 04.

QUOTE

Source: Remarks, Vice President Joseph Biden, Change of Command, Al Faw Palace, 1 Sep 10. 

WHITE HOUSE: WE HAVE MET

Source: Press Release, White House, “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister al-Maliki of Iraq in a Joint Press Conference,” 12 Dec 11.

GROUP COMMANDER - SATHER

Source: Col Thomas E. Kirkendall, 447 AEG/CC, Sather Air Base, Iraq, Apr-Dec 11.

DADDY 05 – GEN TUNNER AWARD

Source: Citation.

COMBAT CAMERA VIDEOGRAPHER - PURPLE HEART

Source: News release, SSgt Carlos Diaz USCENTCOMAF, “Combat camera videographer receives Purple Heart,” 15 Feb 07.

UNIFIED RESPONSE

Sources: Article, “Haiti News,” The New York Times, 19 Jan 12; Conversation, Col Michael J. McCully, AFRC/A7, to Mr. Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 22 Feb 12; 

News Release, Ian Carrier, 482 FW/PA, Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla., “Help to Haiti,” 14 Jan 10; US Southern Command web page, “Operation Unified 

Response: Support to Haiti Earthquake Relief.” n.d.; Article, AFRC/PA, “Unified Response: Command continues to provide assistance to earthquake-rocked 

nation,” Citizen Airman, updated 6 APR 10; News Release, Dan Neely, 919 SOW/PA, Duke Field reservists answer call for Haiti quake relief,” 15 Jan 10; 

News Release, Megan Just, 452 AMW/PA, “March Air Reserve Base assists with Haiti earthquake relief efforts,” 14 Jan 10; News Release, 2nd Lt. Nicholas 

J. Mercurio, 6 AMW/PA, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., Dobbins ‘angels’ rescue injured Haitians,” 26 Jan 10; News Release, Ian Carrier, 482 FW/PA, Homestead Air Reserve Base, Fla., “Homestead helps launch disaster relief into Haiti,” 15 Jan 10; Study, Kevin M. Rieders, HQAFRC/HO, Unstable Ground: The 

Air Force Reserve Command’s Response to the Haiti Earthquake 13 January-14 February 2010, p 8; Email, From Col. Michael J. McCully, AFRC AFRC/

A7, to Ms Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, 7 Mar 12; News Release, TSgt Daniel Butterfield, 302 AW/PA, Peterson Air Force Base, Colo., “Colorado-based AF 

Reservists deploy in support of Haiti earthquake relief,” 22 Jan 10; News Release, Cpt Wayne Capps, 315 AW/PA, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, “Reservists continue 

Haiti humanitarian relief,” 7 Feb 12; Spreadsheets, JRI-Denton Operations Unit Support Report, 01/Oct/09 to 29/Feb/12; Article, Lt Gen Charles E. Stenner 

369 370
Jr. Commander, Air Force Reserve Command, “When the call went out for help in Haiti, Reservists once again stepped forward,” Citizen Airman, Apr 10.

JOINT FORCE RESCUES AFGHAN AVALANCHE VICTIMS

Sources: Article, SSgt Richard Williams, 455 AEW/PA, “Combined efforts save lives in Salang avalanche,” Bagram News Express, 19 Feb 10, p 1; Email, 

Cathleen Snow, 920 RQW/PA, to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 12 Oct 11; SSgt Richard Williams, 455 AEW/PA, “Deployed Air Force Reserve pararescuemen 

save lives from Afghanistan avalanches,” 24 Feb 10; Booklet, USAF HAF/IMMG, Portraits in Courage Vol. VI, 2011; Official US Army News Release, SPC 

Monica K. Smith, 3rd CAB, TF Falcon/PA, “Soldiers aid avalanche victims in Afghanistan,” 25 Feb 10.

AIR FORCE RESERVISTS - PAKISTAN FLOOD RELIEF

Sources: Article, SSgt Kali L. Gradishar, USAF Central Combat Camera, “Bringing the world to Sukkur,” Southern Flyer, Sep 10; Article, Malcolm Brabant, 

“Children and families face increasing challenges in aftermath of 2010 Pakistan floods,” UNICEF.org, 7 Feb 11; News release, 446 AW/PA, “Reserve, activeduty aircrews support Pakistan flood relief efforts,” 23 Aug 10; Article, Major Wilson Camelo, 439 AW/PA, “Patriot Wing airlifts supplies to Pakistan flood 

victims,” Patriot, Nov 10; News Release, SSgt Kali Gradishar, USAFCENT/PA, “AF reservists play key role in Pakistan flood relief as air operations end,” 7 

Oct 10.

AIR FORCE RESERVIST FIGHT SOUTHWEST FIRES

Sources: Fact Sheet, 302 AWPA, 302nd Airlift Wing, ca. 2009; Email, Ann F. Skarban, 302 AW/PA, to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 1 Jun 12; News Release, SSgt 

Stephen J. Collier, 302 AW/PA, “AF Reserve aerial firefighting experts head back to Thailand,” 2 Feb 11; News release, 302 AW/PA, “Colorado AF Reservists 

answer call to provide assistance for Israel fires,” 6 Dec 10; Report, David Eck, HQ/AFRC/A30C, “AFRC Unique Missions,” 16 Feb11; News Release, SSgt 

Stephen J. Collier, 302 AEG/PA, “Air Force C-130s deliver fire retardant support to Walker County fire,” 14 Sep 11; News Release, 302 AEG/PA, “MAFFS 

aircraft join aerial firefighting efforts in Texas, Northwest US,” 9 Sep 11.

BATTLING GULF OIL SPILL - 2010

Sources: NOAA web page, “About the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill;” Article, Campbell Robertson and Clifford Krauss “Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind, 

Scientists Say,” The New York Times, 2 Aug 10; “Memorandum of Agreement Between the Director of Military Support (DOMS) and the United States Coast 

Guard for Aerial Application of Dispersants During Oil Spill Cleanup and Recovery Operations,” ca. 1996; Memo, USNORTHCOM J3 to Joint Staff J3 DEPDIR, “USNORTHCOM Request for Forces for Mobile Spray System Capable C-130 Aircraft in Support of Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill,” 29 Apr 10; News release, 

Maj Brent J. Davis, 910 AW/PA, “Air Force Reserve’s 910th Airlift Wing provides initial response to Deepwater Horizon spill,” 24 Jun 10; Report, 757 AS (P), 

“SITREP 1,” 1 May 10; News Release, SMSgt Ellen L. Hatfield, 349 AMW/PA, “Travis Airmen help deliver Coast Guard equipment to assist cleanup efforts 

in Gulf,” 10 May 10; Fact Sheet, 910 AW, 757th Aerial Spray Squadron; News release, 910 AW/PA, “Aerial spray mission ends, crews return to Youngstown,” 

8 Jun 10; Article, Joe Gorman and Bob Coupland, “910th Airlift Wing receives Air Force award,” TribToday.com, 6 Mar 11.

VOLCANO – DISRUPTS AOR FLIGHTS

Sources: Remarks, Gen Duncan McNabb, Commander, USTRANSCOM, “Meeting a Global Challenge,” ATA, 30 Oct 10; News release, Gene H. Hughes, 908 

AW/PA, “Have we left yet? After several delays, 908th Airlift Wing deployers finally take to the sky,” Southern Flyer, Jun 10; News Release, TSgt Timm Huffman, 439 AW/PA, “Aircrews fly west to deliver supplies down range during volcanic eruption,” 4 Jun 10; News release, A1C Allison M. Boehm, 332 AEW/PA, 

“Balad AFTH becomes divert base for wounded OEF troops,” 20 Apr 10; Email, Maj Eric Davidson, AFRC 446 AES/DOA, to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 28 

Mar 12; Email, Maj Eric Davidson, AFRC 446 AES/DOA, to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO 5 Apr 12; Article, John Yang, “Volcano ash creates logistics headache 

for military,” NBC News, 20 Apr 10; Email, Col Michael Dankosky AFRC/A3TM, to Keith L. Barr, AFRC/HO, 27 Mar 12; Article, Jerry Green 440 AW/PA, 

“Wing Airmen return from Germany deployment,” 11 Jun 10.

TOTAL FORCE LOGISTICS - HOA

Source: Maj Gregory M. Kuzma, Jun 12.

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DIRMOBFOR – BRONZE STAR

Source: Citation.

TO MY EXTENDED FAMILY

Source: CMSgt Kimberley A. Hagerty, 22 Jun 11.

OPERATION TOMODACHI

Sources: Article, TSgt Daniel St. Pierre, “A grim reality met with compassion,” 6 May 11; Article, Amy McCullough, “Out of Reserve,” Air Force Magazine, 

20 Dec 11; Article, 452 AW/PA, “In Japan,” 9 Apr 11; Report, HQ AFRC, “Weekly Activity Report,” 18 Mar 11; Article, MSgt Kerry Jackson, 13AF/PA, “Totalforce team supports Operation Tomodachi,” 28 Mar 12; Article, MSgt Donna T. Jeffries, 514 AMW/PA, “McGuire Reservists bound for Japan to assist with 

earthquake relief planning,” 22 Mar 11; Article, SSgt Desiree Economides, 310 SW/PA, “Multi-service team welcomes DOD families evacuating from Japan,” 

1 Apr 11; Article, TSgt Renni Thornton and A1C Michael Battles, 60 AMW/PA, “Travis Team assists more than 500 who voluntarily depart Japan,” 28 Mar 11; 

Article, MSgt Amaani Lyle, AFPAA, “Air Force chapel community raises money for quake victims,” 13 Jun 11; Report, Mr. Mark Whitlow, HQ AFRC/A3TF, 

“FY11 Contingency Execution,” 30 Sep 11; Fact Sheet, Secretary of the Air Force/PA, “Operation Tomodachi,” 1 Apr 11; Article, Jim Garamone, “Biden: US 

honored to have helped Japan after Tsunami,” 23 Aug 11; Article, A1C Katrina R. Menchaca, 374 AW/PA, “Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives thanks 

for Operation Tomodachi,” 5 July 2011; Article, Jim Garamone, “Biden: US honored to have helped Japan after the Tsunami,” 23 Aug 11.

AN ENDURING PART

Source: Interview, Col Bruce A. Bowers, AFRC A3 deputy director, and Col Gregory L. Vitalis, AFRC A5/8 program manager organizational/force structure, 

Interview, Apr 10.

 QUOTE

 Source: Interview, Lt Gen Charles E. Stenner CAFR & Commander AFRC, with Betty R. Kennedy, AFRC/HO, End Of Tour Interview, Jul 12.

 QUOTE

Source: Maj Gen Robert E. Duignan, End of Tour Interview, 09.

ODYSSEY DAWN—“NO DOUBT WE HAD A PLACE AT THE TABLE”

Source: Article, AFRC/PA, “Support squadron provides Air Force capabilities at the operational level of war,” 16 Nov 11; Report, Col Rich Hughey and Col 

John Williams, “AF Capabilities at the Operational Level of War,” HQ AFRC Weekly Staff Meeting, 13 Jul 11; Resolution, United Nations Security Council, 

“S/RES/1973 (2011),” United Nations, 17 Mar 11; Briefing Transcript, Brig Gen Ray Uptegraff, et al., 2011 Airlift Tanker Association Convention, p. 1; Report, 

HQ AFRC/A9, “Operation Odyssey Dawn,” 16 Aug 11, p. 1; Interview, Jeff McKaughan and Gen Raymond Johns Jr., AMC/CC, “Global Transporter: Bringing Together Global Vigilance, Global Reach and Global Power,” Military Logistics Forum, Sep 11; Article, Lt Col James Dermer, 91 ARS/CC, “Operation 

Unified Protector integrated operations,” 24 Nov 11; Article, SSgt Danella Shea 512 AW/PA, “Dover Airmen support Operation Odyssey Dawn,” 4 Apr 11; 

Adam Gabbat, “Gaddafi killed as Sirte falls,” The Guardian, 20 Oct 11; Article, Jake Chapelle, 446 AW/PA, “McChord aircrew transport Secretary of State to 

Libya.” 21 Oct 11; Article, Matthew Lee, Associated Press, “Clinton in Libya to offer new aid package,” 18 Oct 11; Article, “War in Libya cost United States 

US $896 million,” Defenseweb, 24 Aug 11.

WHITE HOUSE 

Source: Remarks, President Barack Obama, at “A Concert for Hope,” 11 Sep 11.

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IMAGERY CREDITS

Imagery is official Air Force and DOD; a few images are from deployed service members. Every effort was made to credit these remarkable and 

talented photojournalists; they too made an amazing contribution, visually documenting the Global War on Terrorism. 

COVER

 Lt Col Jim Fabio, AFRC IMA at SAF/PAYL

CONTENT

Maria L. Eames, SSgt Cherie A. Thurlby, AF photos, and AF graphics.

PART I

AF/AFRC images, Tom Brewer, Maria L. Eames, Ken Hackman, Maj Gen Clay McCutchan, MSgt Ken Hammond, Norman Taylor, Lou Drendel, Betty R. 

Kennedy, TSgt Brad Fallin, SRA Chris Steffen, Bill Chan, SRA Sean Worrell, Sgt Sarah Steele, TSgt Gary Coppage, A1C William L. Keogh, NMUSAF, and 

AC-119 Gunship Association.

PART II

AF images, Cpt Jim Fabio, MSgt Vernon “Sonny” L. Cohrs, Mate Eric J. Tilford (USN), J1C Preston Keres (USN), M2C Jim Watson (USN), PH1 Dewitt D. 

Roseborough (USN), Gerald J. Gilmore, SSgt Steve Lewis, TSgt Shaun Withers, SSgt Steve Kline, Scott H. Spitzer, J1C Preston Keres (USN), TSgt Shaun 

Withers, Cpt Jim Fabio, MSgt Chadwick J. Eiring, and Cpt Jim Fabio.

PART III

AF images, TSgt Cedrick H. Rudisill, SRA Rebeca M. Luquin, Col Bruce A. Bowers, TSgt Scott Reed, TSgt Efrain Gonzalez, TSgt Scott Reed, MSgt Dave 

Nolan, Richard D. Sawyer, Richard D. Sawyer, Richard, D. Sawyer, Richard D. Sawyer, MSgt Dave Nolan, SSgt Ricky A. Bloom, MSgt Vernon “Sonny” L. 

Cohrs, TSgt Melissa Sanscrainte, SSgt Ken Bergmann, SSgt Russell Lee Klika (Army), USSOCOM 20th Anniversary book p 96, SSgt Jeremy T. Lock, CWO2 William D. Crow (Army), SFC Joe Belcher C-17 landing at Bagram rocks (Army), TSgt Mike Buytas, SSgt Scott T. McCord, SSgt Shane Cuomo, sSgt Sarah 

Webb-Frost, 1Lt Wayne Capps, Abner Guzman, SSgt Ricky A. Bloom, MSgt Dave Nolan, MSgt Greg Kobashigawa, MSgt Dave Nolan, and MSgt Vernon 

“Sonny” L. Cohrs.

PART IV

AF images, TSgt Stephen Faulisi, MSgt W. C. Pope, Sgt Igo Paustovski (Army), Richard D. Sawyer, MSgt Andrew E. Lynch, SSgt Shane Cuomo, A1C Stacia 

M. Willis, SRA Jorge A. Rodriquez, TSgt Shane Stabile, MSgt Scott Wagers, SMSgt Billy Johnston, TSgt Keith Brown, TSgt Shane Stabile, TSgt Andy Dunaway, Maj David Kurle, MSgt Billy Johnston, TSgt Stephen Faulisi, TSgt Keith Brown, Col Richard L. Kemble, Col Bruce A. Bowers, TSgt Andy Dunaway, 

John Sidoriak, Jr., SSgt James A. Williams, MSgt Terry L. Blevins, MSgt Terry L. Blevins, SRA Joann S. Makinano, MSgt Dave Ahlschwede, Douglas Nicodemus, SSgt Cherie A. Thurlby, 514 AMW, MSgt James M. Bowman, SSgt Cherie A. Thurlby, Sgt Shane Cuomo, Maj Gen Larry L. Twitchell, 446 AES, 

3734 
Maj Robert Couse-Baker, 913 AW, SSgt Reynaldo Ramon, Lt Col Leslie Pratt, Cpt Aaron Burgstein, SSgt Reynaldo Ramon, Col Jeffrey Macrander, Maj 

David Kurle, Richard D. Sawyer, TSgt Julie Briden-Garcia, Lt Col Matt Meintel, MSgt Bill Huntington, Richard D. Sawyer, Richard D. Sawyer, and Richard 

D. Sawyer.

PART V

SSgt Christine Jones, Lt Col Marcel Dionne, A1C Jason Epley, Cpt Marnee A. C. Losurdo, SSgt Christine Jones, Chuck Brown, MSgt Chance C. Babin, MSgt 

Michael E. Best, Richard D. Sawyer, Richrd D. Sawyer, TSgt Erik Gudmundson, MSgt Rick Sforza, 419 CES, TSgt Scott T. Sturkol, MSgt Mitch Gettle, TSgt 

Daniel St. Pierre, Richard D. Sawyer, 442 SFS, TSgt Jeff Walston, SSgt Eunique P. Stevens, MSgt Rick Sforza, Lt Col Nathaniel L. Ward, Lt Col Nathaniel L. Ward, TSgt Jeffrey Allen, A1C Jason Epley, 944 CES, SRA Julianne Showalter, Lt Col Tsuyoshi Tung, Chaplain Howard Bell, Band of the Air Force 

Reserve, A1C Nathan Doza, TSgt Heather Kelly, MSgt Keith Brown, MSgt Demetrius Lester, MSgt Keith Brown, SSgt Katherine McDowell, MSgt Shawn 

D. McCowan, Spc Edward A. Garibay, MSgt Keith Brown, SSgt Manuel J. Martinez, Col Thomas E. Kirkendall, SRA Felicia Juenke, SRA Felicia Juenke, 

1Lt Lory Stevens, TSgt Rick Sforza, MSgt Scott T. Sturkol, Lt Col Leslie Pratt, Lt Col Leslie Pratt, TSgt Mark R. W. Orders-Woempner, 434 AW, SPC April 

York (Army), Col Thomas E. Kirkendall, SrA Lou Burton, MSgt Dawn Price, MSgt Chance C. Babin, Lt Col Michael Shavers, SSgt Eric Harris, Capt Jody L. 

Ritchie, TSgt Adrian Cadiz, MSgt Keith Meyers, Maj Gregory M. Kuzma, TSgt Daniel St. Pierre, A1C Michael Battles A1C Katherine Windish, Maj Andra 

Higgs,SrA Erik Cardenas, A1C Jason Epley, SrA Tony R. Ritter, SrA Candace Romano, SSgt Andy Kin, TSgt Tim Huffman, Betty R. Kennedy, Shanksville 

NPS, Sgt Randall A. Clinton (Marine), S1C Corey Lewis (Navy), Timothy L. Hale, MC1 Chad J. McNeeley (Marine), MC1 Chad J. McNeeley (Marine), and 

AF imagery.

3734