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i 

79–557 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–159] 

UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY 

SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC 

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL 

SECURITY 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

DECEMBER 19, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

ALEX GALLO, Professional Staff Member 

MARK LEWIS, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, December 19, 2012, Update on the Evolving Security Situation 

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Implications for U.S. National 

Security ................................................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, December 19, 2012 ............................................................................. 57 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2012 

UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. 

NATIONAL SECURITY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Affleck, Ben, Founder, Eastern Congo Initiative .................................................. 36 

Carafano, Dr. James Jay, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, 

The Heritage Foundation .................................................................................... 34 

Carson, Hon. Johnnie, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 6 

Chollet, Hon. Derek, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 4 

Frazer, Dr. Jendayi E., Ph.D., Distinguished Service Professor, Carnegie Mellon University ....................................................................................................... 31 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Affleck, Ben ....................................................................................................... 99 

Carafano, Dr. James Jay ................................................................................. 88 

Carson, Hon. Johnnie ....................................................................................... 70 

Chollet, Hon. Derek .......................................................................................... 65 

Frazer, Dr. Jendayi E. ...................................................................................... 79 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 61 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 63 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

‘‘The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector 

Reform,’’ by Ben Affleck, Founder, Eastern Congo Initiative ................... 113 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 137 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 138 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 137 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 138 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 143 
(1) 

UPDATE ON THE EVOLVING SECURITY SITUATION IN 

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 19, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, the House Armed Services 

Committee meets today to receive testimony on the situation in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Before I go any further, though, I want to acknowledge that this 

is our last hearing that we will hold this Congress, and we are losing several Members off of our committee. And I just want to mention their names: Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Akin, Mr. Platts, Mr. Rooney, 

Mr. Schilling, Mr. Griffin, Mr. West, and Mr. Young, on our side 

of the aisle; and Mr. Reyes, Mr. Heinrich, Ms. Pingree, Mr. Critz, 

Ms. Sutton, Ms. Hochul, Mr. Ryan, on the other side. 

So we are losing a lot of Members. We want to let them know 

they will be missed, and I hate to see you leaving. 

I guess you feel the same about them, too, right? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, Mr. Chairman, yes. 

I mean, this is a committee that, you know, the expertise is critical. And while we all replenish and restock and move forward, but 

as Members leave, we lose their expertise and their experience on 

this committee. And all of those Members have served this committee very, very well, and their expertise will be missed. 

So we appreciate their service to this committee. They have been 

part of what, you know, has given us our success as a bipartisan 

and successful committee. So I appreciate your bringing attention 

to their service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Some of them are freshmen that 

have been here one term. Some, like Mr. Bartlett, has been here, 

we came together 20 years ago, so a lot of memories. 

I want to start this morning by thanking my colleague, the committee’s ranking member, Mr. Smith, for suggesting that we hold 

this hearing on the DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]. I believe it will help the committee to understand the complexity of 

some of the issues within Central Africa. The situation in the 
2 

Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to evolve and is driven 

by a complex interplay of regional power dynamics as well as an 

intricate web of economic and social issues. 

What is clear is that the situation in the DRC is tragic for the 

innocent people caught in the conflict; innocent people who are simply trying to raise their families, and live their lives. As I have followed the media coverage of the situation in the DRC, I can’t help 

but reflect on the millions of innocent people around the world who 

are caught in fundamentally unjust and socially complex situations. These situations can make anyone’s heart break and, naturally, leads one to consider the simple question, what can be done? 

I know one thing, it sure makes me appreciate our country. You 

know, I have heard that less than 2 percent of the people that have 

ever lived here on the Earth have lived under the kind of freedoms 

that we enjoy. We are so blessed, and when we see how innocent 

lives are—how people are hurt so much by some of the things that 

are happening around the world, it just, again, really makes me 

appreciate home. 

The question, and likewise, the answer, becomes more complex 

as we contemplate what can be done within the context of U.S. national security interests, constrained budgets, ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and around the globe, and potential future 

contingencies that the military has to be prepared to execute. 

Given the looming threat of sequestration, or further cuts to the 

military, I believe most of us on this committee have become ever 

more focused on ensuring our military’s missions are both essential 

and appropriately tailored. 

That said, there may also be options outside of the DOD [Department of Defense] to address the situation in the DRC. I understand 

that, in the recent past, the Department of State conducted important diplomatic efforts, such as the Tripartite Plus, which furthered 

stability in Central Africa and within the DRC, in particular. 

Although the Administration is no longer pursuing this particular effort, perhaps there are other similar opportunities, given 

how the situation has negatively evolved in the DRC. Moreover, it 

seems the U.S. could pursue deeper diplomatic engagement with 

regional partners and our allies to leverage their knowledge, expertise, and resources to address this issue. 

Indeed, the world remains a complex and dangerous place. We 

cannot neglect to consider the linkages between instability in Central Africa and the global terrorist threat. But from Afghanistan, 

to Syria, to Iran, to North Korea, we also must recognize the existence of nonstate actors and regimes that directly threaten the 

United States and our allies. Therefore, we must ensure that our 

military is sufficiently resourced and that our national leaders 

prioritize our defense resources toward efforts that are appropriate 

for the U.S. military and our national vital security interests. 

I look forward to learning more about the situation on the 

ground, as well as what the U.S. Government is doing to address 

the situation in the DRC. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 61.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you very 

much for taking the time to hold this hearing. 

This is a very important issue. As you described, the situation in 

eastern DRC is dire. It is the largest humanitarian crisis, I think, 

that too few people have heard of. By some estimates, in the wars 

that have gone on there over the course of the last 15 to 20 years 

now, nearly 5 million people have been killed; many more wounded, injured, raped, displaced. It is a place where a lot of people are 

suffering. And it is a place where I believe we can make a difference in helping to reduce that suffering. 

Stability in the region is incredibly important to the United 

States. We have key partners in that area that we have worked 

with in Uganda and Rwanda, as we have dealt with situations in 

Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and the instability coming out of 

the DRC is a threat to all of that. 

We have seen, you know, in recent months that Africa is increasingly important in our national security interests. The instability 

there is giving rise to the many Al Qaeda-inspired insurgencies and 

that instability threatens our security. So one of the biggest purposes of this hearing is to get a greater feel for what the Department of Defense can do in that region to help. The biggest problem 

in eastern DRC is a lack of governance, a lack of the rule of law, 

and just a rogues’ gallery of warlords, revolutionaries, and violent 

groups and individuals have taken advantage of that ungoverned 

space and created no-ending problems. So building toward greater 

security and stability in that region, has to be our focus. 

Now, I know the DOD has done some work in that region. We 

are currently working with the Ugandan army and dealing with 

the Lord’s Resistance Army, one of those revolutionary groups that 

has helped to destabilize the DRC, but we have also in the past 

tried to work with the DRC’s military, training one battalion a few 

years back, to very, you know, strong success. That battalion is 

considered to be able and capable, but it is too small to make the 

big difference that needs to be made in that region. So I believe 

there is a critical role that the DOD can play in building the security capacity in the eastern DRC and working with the surrounding 

nations, like Rwanda and Uganda and Burundi and others that are 

critical to bring stability to us. So we want to explore further how 

DOD can be helpful. 

And obviously, there is a huge diplomatic element to this as well. 

I think it is critically important that the U.S. engage, that the U.N. 

[United Nations] engage a high level envoy to that region, either 

from the U.S. or the U.N., can make a critical difference in bringing the partners together. I know Ambassador Carson has been 

working—or, sorry, Secretary Carson has been working on those 

issues, and others have as well. And we are anxious to hear more 

about what we can do to help move forward those efforts and be 

successful in the region. 

This is something that does matter to us. In addition to the security issues, there is incredible economic opportunity in this region 

of Africa, economic opportunity for trade, partnerships with U.S. 
4 

businesses. But we have to get the stability there in order to take 

advantage of those opportunities. 

So, again, I thank the chairman for having this hearing. I look 

forward to the testimony. I look forward to learning what more we 

can do to help the situation in the eastern DRC. 

Thank you, I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will have two panels today. The first panel we have the Honorable Derek Chollet, from the Department of Defense. He is Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The 

Honorable Johnnie Carson, the Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Bureau of African Affairs. 

Mr. Chollet. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEREK CHOLLET, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS 

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking 

Member Smith, and the Members of this committee. Thank you for 

this opportunity to discuss the urgent crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the struggle to bring about long-term stability to the people of DRC and the Great Lakes region. I would 

like to submit my full statement for the record and offer some brief 

opening remarks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Both of your statements will be included in the 

record, with no objection. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Mr. Chairman, this committee knows well 

that the U.S. has many competing security priorities in Africa, 

from Somalia to Sudan, to Libya, to Nigeria, to Mali, but the DRC 

also remains important, both because of the potential opportunity 

lasting stability would bring but also because of the imperative to 

prevent mass atrocities, which is a priority for this Administration. 

One of the key threats facing Congolese civilians, particularly in 

the eastern DRC, is a wide array of violent armed groups, most notoriously including the M23 [March 23 Movement], the Lord’s Resistance Army, and the remnants of the genocidal militias, now 

calling themselves the FDLR [Democratic Forces for the Liberation 

of Rwanda]. But undisciplined state security forces have also proven to be a danger to civilians, particularly when the forces are not 

well supported, have absorbed armed groups without vetting for 

human rights abuses, operate under a separate chain of command, 

or have not been trained in their legal obligations. 

The confluence of such security concerns is why the Defense Department is closely following the security developments in DRC 

and the Great Lakes Region and are actively involved, along with 

our State Department colleagues, to address them. 

The unfolding crisis highlights the Congolese government’s failure to provide effective security, governance, and services in the 

eastern provinces. It has also highlighted the continued political 

and economic tensions between the DRC and its eastern neighbors, 

especially Rwanda. Outside support, in particular from Rwanda, 

has enabled the M23 to be the threat it is today and poses a seri-
5 

ous challenge to the efforts to stabilize eastern DRC and ensure the 

protection of civilians. 

As President Obama made clear yesterday in a phone call with 

Rwandan President Kagame, any support to M23 is inconsistent 

with Rwanda’s desire for stability and peace. 

Although the Rwandan military remains a valuable and capable 

partner in peacekeeping operations outside the immediate region, 

based on their support for M23, the Administration has suspended 

Rwanda’s foreign military financing. As a situation in eastern 

Congo develops, we will continue to monitor reports of external 

support closely and respond appropriately, including by reviewing 

our assistance. 

Inside the DRC, the U.S. is prioritizing security sector reform. 

This means working with our partners and the DRC to develop a 

comprehensive approach that addresses all three elements of security sector: the Congolese defense forces, military justice, and the 

police. 

We must work to develop more professional forces that respect 

human rights and protect both the DRC’s territorial integrity and 

population. In this regard, the Defense Department has provided 

training to the Congolese military, including the training of a light 

infantry battalion in 2010. 

Sexual- and gender-based violence prevention and human rights 

training were incorporated in every aspect of this effort. In addition 

to the ongoing training on human rights and law, the Defense Department engagements with the FARDC [Military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo] have included logistics, exercise participation, basic military intelligence training, military medicine, 

humanitarian assistance, and humanitarian mine action. Moving 

forward, the Defense Department stands ready to work with our 

state colleagues ensuring the best way ahead in supporting security sector reform, including by providing additional infantry training for the FARDC. 

Mr. Chairman, the scale of the need is significant. To date, we 

have trained one battalion of 500 soldiers in a military that numbers approximately 150,000. Other European and African partners 

have also provided training, but the FARDC absorptive capacity for 

assistance is limited. The Congolese Defense Ministry has been 

slow to respond to our requests for the provision of appropriate personnel for training and information necessary for congressionally 

mandated human rights vetting. The lack of language capacity further inhibits training opportunities. 

While the DRC continues to work to develop its own security capabilities, the United Nations peacekeeping operation or 

MONUSCO [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in 

the DRC], remains essential in providing security for the civilian 

population in the DRC. MONUSCO has a challenging mandate in 

a very fluid security climate. We are reviewing options for improving MONUSCO’s ability to meet the civilian protection requirements in the DRC. 

To assist MONUSCO, the Defense Department has secunded 

three U.S. military officers who are helping to support operational 

efforts and ensuring an efficient flow of information between 

MONUSCO headquarters and field components. 
6 

Despite many challenges, we have an interest, an enduring interest, in helping develop a more capable Congolese military, and this 

fits within Secretary Panetta’s broader policy emphasis on building 

partner capacity. Our persistent engagement helps our partners to 

provide for their own security. These relationships can also foster 

respect for the rule of law and human rights. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, I am grateful for the efforts of Congress, and specifically this committee, for continuing to 

shine a light on this important issue, one that deserves attention 

on a continent crowded with security challenges. And I should also 

note the indispensable work of the many nongovernmental organizations, who not only provide policy advice but are helping people 

on the ground in the DRC each day. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important issue 

with you today, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Chollet can be found in the 

Appendix on page 65.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Carson, Secretary Carson. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

Secretary CARSON. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, 

Members of the committee, thank you very, very much for the invitation to testify today on the crisis unfolding in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, also referred to as the DRC. 

The security and humanitarian situation in the DRC is the most 

volatile and violent in Africa today. An estimated 5 million people 

have lost their lives since 1998, and millions more have been uprooted and displaced. The people of North and South Kivu provinces in particular, have faced repeated cycles of conflict, atrocities, 

and displacement, with the current crisis simply being the latest 

iteration. 

The rapid fall of Goma last month to the Congolese rebel group 

known as the M23 provided a stark reminder that the root causes 

of the entrenched instability and recurring conflicts in the DRC 

and the region remain unresolved. 

At the highest levels of the United States Government, we are 

committed to helping the DRC and its neighbors in this cycle of violence and instability, so that we do not find ourselves back here 

in 3 years facing yet another crisis in eastern DRC. 

Secretary Clinton, Ambassador Rice, Under Secretary For Political Affairs Ambassador Wendy Sherman, and I have all spoken or 

met with senior Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and U.N. officials 

in the past weeks and months to advocate for a rapid and peaceful 

resolution to the current crisis. 

I have traveled to the region just last month with my British and 

French counterparts to press the Congolese, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments to work together to stop the crisis and to address 

the underlying causes of instability. All three governments reiterated to us their commitment to these shared goals. In the U.N. Security Council, we have taken action to ensure that five of the most 

senior M23’s most abusive commanders are now under targeted 
7 

sanctions, and we have placed those same individuals under U.S. 

sanctions. 

Talks between the DRC government and the M23 began on December 9, in Kampala, Uganda, and are being mediated by Uganda 

as the chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes 

Region, known as the ICGLR. 

While the two sides have yet to begin substantive talks, the current cease-fire in the eastern DRC is holding, and the parties continue to express commitment to a dialogue. 

Much of the M23’s military prowess and success would not have 

been possible without outside support. There is a creditable body 

of evidence that corroborates the assertions of the U.N. Group of 

Experts that the Rwandan government provided significant military and political support to the M23. 

While there is evidence of individuals from Uganda providing 

support to the M23, we do not have a body of evidence suggesting 

that the Ugandan government has a policy of supporting the M23. 

Nonetheless, we continue to urge Ugandan officials to ensure that 

supplies to the M23 do not originate or transit through Ugandan 

territory. 

We have not limited our response to diplomacy alone. As required by the Fiscal Year 2012 Appropriations Act, Secretary Clinton suspended foreign military financing, or FMF, to Rwanda in 

fiscal year 2012 because of its support to the M23. 

The Department continues to closely monitor reports of external 

support, and we will continue to respond appropriately, including 

by reviewing our assistance to deter this support if it should develop. 

The highest levels of the United States Government are committed to helping the DRC and the region achieve a sustainable 

peace. As my colleague, Mr. Chollet, said, President Obama spoke 

yesterday with President Kagame and underscored that any support to the M23 is inconsistent with Rwanda’s desires for stability 

and peace in the region. 

President Obama emphasized to President Kagame the importance of permanently ending all support for armed groups in the 

DRC. Abiding by the recent communication that he made in Kampala, along with Presidents Kabila and Museveni, and reaching a 

transparent and creditable political agreement that includes an end 

to impunity for M23 commanders and others who have committed 

serious human rights abuses. President Obama believes that from 

this crisis should emerge a political agreement that addresses the 

underlying regional security, economic, and governance issues, 

while upholding the DRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

President Obama has also delivered the message to President 

Kabila that the DRC must take concrete steps toward security sector reform and improve governance in order to reach a lasting 

peace in eastern DRC. 

Looking forward, we are using all the tools at our disposal to 

help address and end this crisis. We are monitoring humanitarian 

needs and working to mobilize resources to ensure continued emergency assistance to civilians in need. 

We are calling upon everyone involved in the conflict to maintain 

the current cease-fire, to permit humanitarian access, and to pur-
8 

sue a sustainable political resolution through honest and meaningful dialogue. 

While the talks between the M23 and the DRC government continue, we believe that direct dialogue between Presidents Kabila, 

Kagame, and Museveni is paramount to achieving a long-term, durable solution in the region. 

Some of the root causes of this conflict can only be addressed 

through government-to-government dialogue and negotiation. 

These include issues of land tenure, refugee resettlement, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, border security, and support 

networks for armed groups. 

While the responsibility to implement change rests first and foremost with the governments of the region, we encourage the United 

Nations Secretary General to appoint a high-level U.N. special 

envoy to engage the relevant countries on a sustained basis to help 

them reach a durable political resolution and ensure the successful 

implementation of that resolution over the long term. 

Throughout this peace-building process, civilian protection is and 

must remain a priority. The U.N. peacekeeping mission in the 

DRC, MONUSCO, has come under very heavy scrutiny in recent 

weeks. While we believe that MONUSCO’s performance has been 

acceptable given the very difficult circumstances, there is always 

room for improvement. 

We and our fellow U.N. Security Council members and troopscontributing countries are reviewing the proposals on the table to 

improve and strengthen MONUSCO’s capacity to protect civilians 

and to counter armed groups. We are encouraging our partners to 

ensure that any new efforts are coordinated with and perhaps even 

integrated into the U.N. peacekeeping efforts. 

In the meantime, we remain committed to supporting 

MONUSCO’s robust implementation of its current mandate. The 

primary responsibility for protecting the DRC and the Congolese 

people rests with the DRC government itself. 

The crisis over the past few months has demonstrated to devastating effect the critical need for a professional and capable Congolese army that can protect the country’s citizens. To reach a sustainable peace, the DRC government must accelerate its efforts towards comprehensive security sector reform. We have and will continue to work with the DRC government to professionalize its military, including continuing our training to army officers and support 

to the armed forces’ military justice capacities. 

Along with military reform, the DRC government must expand 

governance across the country. The governance vacuum that exists 

in parts of the country has allowed armed groups to set up parallel 

civil administrations and to exploit the population. 

Efforts to expand governance must include electoral reform, holding long-delayed provincial and local elections, and strengthening 

state institutions to provide much-needed public services. 

We believe that the time has come for the DRC and the international community to permanently break the cycle of violence and 

impunity that exists in the region. 

Today’s crisis is a deep tragedy, but it also offers an opportunity 

to help the DRC and the region to set a more sustainable course 

toward peace, prosperity, and long-term stability. 
9 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary CARSON. We urge the international community, the 

Great Lakes Region, and the Congolese people to demonstrate the 

resolve necessary to achieve this peace and prosperity, and achieve 

the goals that we all seek. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Carson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 70.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Chollet, please describe the strategic defense priorities 

within Africa, and how does the situation in the DRC situate within these priorities? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, thanks for the question. 

First and foremost, the priority recently has been on 

counterterrorism issues, and we have seen that—oh, I am sorry. 

Can you hear me right now? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Recently, the top priority is, of course, always with us, the Department of Defense, to protect the American 

people, and so we have been acutely focussed on counterterrorism 

issues throughout the continent, and that is, I think, most recently 

North Africa, where that has gotten a tremendous amount of attention. 

We are also, though, very, very keenly interested in the overall 

security as it bleeds into the atrocities prevention concerns that we 

have. And the Great Lakes Region, of course, the brutal history of 

that region is something that we are all very well aware of, and 

that is why we have sought to focus some of our Defense Department efforts on improving the capacity of partner countries to ensure that hardships can be alleviated and that we can prevent 

atrocities. 

But to be honest, the bulk of our focus in the Department, and 

particularly our AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] colleagues, has 

been on the counterterrorism mission as well as building partnership capacity to both fight that mission but address the humanitarian needs as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Carson, my understanding is that the 

State Department managed an effort known as Tripartite Plus to 

address issues in the DRC and in the region. My understanding is 

that the State Department stopped this effort in 2009. Can you explain why the Department of State is no longer pursuing this effort, and what has taken its place? 

Secretary CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. 

Prior to 2009, there was in existence an effort called the Tripartite Plus. When the Obama Administration came into office in 

2009, we contacted the leaders of the four key states in Uganda, 

Rwanda, DRC, and Burundi to ask those leaders whether they 

were interested in carrying on with the Tripartite Plus arrangement. There was no consensus among the states to do so. And in 

fact, Rwanda did not want to carry on the process. 

We did not, in fact, attempt to pursue it when we found there 

was division among the four countries. However, to maintain our 

high level of interest, Secretary Clinton appointed a Special Advisor for the Great Lakes, the late Howard Wolpe, who was a Mem-
10 

ber of the House of Representatives from the State of Michigan for 

many years, and he served for the first 2 years of the Obama administration as the special envoy. He passed away, and he was replaced by Special Envoy Ambassador Barry Walkley, an experienced diplomat who had served as Deputy Chief of Mission in the 

DRC and had served in a number of other francophone posts. He 

continues to work on regional Great Lakes issues, but the decision 

to stop the Tripartite Plus was based, in fact, on a reluctance of 

all of the governments in the region to carry on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Carson, Rwanda has increasingly been getting attention as a major source of the problem in the region. And obviously, 

there is a lot of history here going back and forth across the border 

of atrocities, frankly, committed on both sides, the Congolese 

against Rwandans, and vice versa. And Rwanda has an interest, 

obviously, in maintaining security across the border, but it is very 

clear that, you know, that they continue to deny involvement in 

M23, despite the fact that it is obvious that they are deeply involved in that and other aspects of it. 

And I think we are going to need as a country to start putting 

more pressure on Rwanda to change their behavior. And certainly, 

they are not the only part of the problem. There are a ton of gangs 

involved there. But I am curious, going forward, what do you think 

Rwanda sees as their interested in that region? Because, on the 

one hand, certainly they want to protect themselves from any 

cross-border problems. On the other hand, their support for M23 

seems to be simply driving up instability, you know, and creating 

more armed gangs and armed violence right on their border. So I 

am curious what you think their thinking is on that. 

And then the final piece of it is, you mentioned, I think both of 

you mentioned it in your remarks, the minerals that are so important to that region. There are a lot of folks involved there and a 

lot of people making a lot of money, despite the chaos. They figured 

out some ways to work with whatever local warlords they need to 

work with to get the stuff out. To what extent, in your opinion, is 

Rwanda involved with that? Is it the situation that the armed 

gangs that are there are creating enough wealth for Rwanda that 

they have got their cut, they have got their deal, and they are simply trying to protect that? Is that part of the equation now? What 

is Rwanda’s thinking, and how can we better move them toward 

working toward stability, because right now, they are not being a 

positive actor? They are not even being honest about what they are 

doing in the region. How can we improve that situation? 

Secretary CARSON. Ranking Member Smith, I think there are 

several obvious reasons for Rwanda’s involvement and engagement 

in the region. 

The first is their deep concern and worry about elements of the 

former Rwandan military who continue to exist in the eastern part 

of the country; the FDLR, as they are called, members of the 

Rwandan army who participated in the genocide in 1994. Rwanda’s 

desire is to see all of these individuals taken off the battlefield, 
11 

brought to justice. And part of their actions are motivated by security and their desire to see the FDLR completely eliminated. 

The second desire is to ensure that all Rwandaphone speakers, 

Tutsis in the region, who cross the borders between Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC, are treated fairly; that they are not 

subject to harassment and intimidation and to human rights violations. And there has been a deep concern that many Rwandaphone 

speakers have been disadvantaged in the eastern Congo. 

And thirdly, they would like to see the issues of refugee resettlement taken care of. There continue to exist a large number of Congolese who are in refugee camps in Rwanda and in the region who 

should be allowed to go back to the east. All of these are things 

that motivate their interest in the area. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

I have one more question, but I see we have been joined by Congresswoman Bass, so I want to ask unanimous consent that noncommittee Members be allowed to participate in today’s hearing 

after all committee Members have had an opportunity to ask questions, if the chairman will permit. 

The CHAIRMAN. No objection. So ordered. 

Mr. SMITH. I will tell you, Mr. Chollet, the question on the other 

side of it is, whatever role Rwanda may be playing and that the 

DRC is clearly the main source of the problem, that they cannot 

provide adequate security in that region. You mentioned in our efforts to train battalions there, we have legislative requirements in 

terms of human rights standards that need to be met by what any 

country that the DOD is going to be involved in training their military, and that the DRC struggles to meet those standards. Can you 

talk a little bit more about that, and what the DRC would have to 

do and how problematic it is, the Kabila government is, in getting 

to a solution to this problem? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Thanks for the question. You are absolutely 

right. The human rights concerns are huge in the DRC in terms 

of the—it is the FARDC, which is one of the reasons why we do 

have an interest in helping to train them. Because we have shown 

in the one battalion that we have trained, we have seen, as you 

pointed out, it is relatively successful. And that battalion has not 

shown any real—much evidence of human rights abuses or the certain things that we are concerned about when we think about the 

Congolese military. 

In terms of training a second battalion, and then training going 

forward, we are engaging with the Congolese government about 

what standards they would need to achieve for us to proceed with 

doing that. In fact, there is an outstanding training MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] that we are awaiting for signature that 

would then perhaps allow us to move forward in the future in 

terms of—— 

Mr. SMITH. Are we going to be able to get that signed do you 

think? Do you think we have reached the point where that is going 

to work? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, we will see. I mean, I think we are prepared on our end. It is on us to work with our Congolese colleagues 

to—— 

Mr. SMITH. Get the DRC to agree. 
12 

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely, absolutely. But that is a prerequisite for us being able to move forward for further training, 

which of course helps on the human rights abuses problem. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, today you mentioned this was the 

last hearing we would have this year, and you and the ranking 

member are always very gracious in thanking the Members of this 

committee and our witnesses for the great job that they do, but we 

want to thank both of you for your hard work and also maintaining—this still is probably the most bipartisan committee, I think, 

in Congress, and we appreciate your efforts towards that. 

Mr. Chollet, I have a question, and I don’t—I support what you 

do, and I don’t want you to misinterpret my question, but it is a 

question we have to ask, is, as we look—as you know, we have had 

cuts to national defense, and especially the Department of Defense. 

Some would argue $487 [billion]. It is really more like $800 billion 

in the last few years. We have got a half trillion we are looking at 

in sequestration. When you look at the dollars that we are spending with the DRC and Rwanda, can you give us any ballpark of 

what kind of resource dollars the Department of Defense is spending there? Secondly, are those dollars adequate? And third, how 

would you prioritize that in terms of some of the other cuts that 

you see coming down, and how do we justify that and explain that? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, it is a great question. As you know very 

well, Secretary Panetta is seized with the issue of sequestration 

and possible future defense cuts and very concerned about the impact that will have on our military and our national security generally. So it is something that we are very focused on in all of the 

issues that we confront in the Department. 

You ask a very good question about a total number. I would like 

to get back to you to add up all of the different pots of money that 

are coming in, so I can give you an accurate answer. I can say that 

in the grand scheme of our spending, it is a relatively modest expenditure in terms of our overall defense spending. And we are 

prioritizing the areas in terms of the security sector reform, as I 

said, particularly in the Congo, where through education and 

through basic training programs, we can help the Congolese—lift 

the Congolese military up and get it up to the—closer to the standards that we want to see in a military and the standards that we 

think would help solve the problem. 

I want to stress that that is still a relatively modest investment 

of our money and time, and we find that we are able to get a fairly 

large return on that investment in terms of the output. But it is 

no secret that if we were to seek further defense cuts, if we were 

to be—those reimposed on the Administration, that it would—we 

would have to take a close look at all of these efforts, even as modest as the expenditures currently are. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, Mr. Chollet, if you don’t mind, and I don’t 

want to catch you off guard today, but give that some thought and 

if you would get back to us for the record on that, and again, just 
13 

kind of pull together as best you can the dollars that we are spending. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 137.] 

Mr. FORBES. But also, we would love your thought, are they adequate? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Yeah. 

Mr. FORBES. I mean, are we putting the right dollars in? And 

then, third, just give us some idea of the prioritization because at 

some point in time, we have got to look at all of that in the grand 

scheme of things. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely. 

Mr. FORBES. And we appreciate your opinion. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

I would like to ask the panel what you felt like with regard to 

M23, their ultimate aims, and do you feel like that their threat is 

subsiding? Or do you think it is possible that it could lead to a new 

regional war in terms of M23’s motives and ambitions? 

Secretary CARSON. Thank you. I will take that question, Congressman McIntyre. 

The M23 is basically a rebel group that has been once integrated 

into the FARDC, the Congolese military, and has now broken away 

from the FARDC because they believe that the terms that were 

signed on their integration into the FARDC on March 23rd, 2009, 

were broken. 

What we are seeing in eastern DRC is a rebel group that has defied its military command. They refused to be relocated out of the 

eastern region as units, and they refused to be relocated out their 

separate senior officers. This is at the heart of the current rebellion, but the origin of the M23 is that it was, in fact, a rebel group 

prior to 2009. It went under a different acronym then, the CNDP 

[National Congress for the Defence of the People], but it is basically 

a rebel group of military commanders who have sought to parlay 

their military influence into political influence. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Do you believe their activities are going to lead 

to some kind of regional war? And how serious are their continuing 

activities? 

Secretary CHOLLET. That is the concern. They are a group of 

growing capability. They have shown in the recent months to be a 

match, if not a superior, of the Congolese forces. Their continued 

activity and the continued support that they get is something, that 

is the reason why we are concerned about it, because if this continues much longer, there is a fear that this would spark a deeper 

war, along the lines the Congo has unfortunately seen too much of 

in the last 20 years. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
14 

One question is, what is the estimated strength in terms of active participants in M23? Either one of you. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Roughly 1,000. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Roughly 1,000, and could you go over again—I 

think you mentioned that the support is coming from Rwanda. Do 

you believe, and if so, why again is Rwanda supporting M23? Why 

do you think that they are supporting M23? 

Secretary CHOLLET. There is, as Secretary Carson has outlined, 

there is a credible body of evidence that Rwanda is supporting the 

M23. This is the part of the conversation the President had yesterday with the Rwandan president. I think one of the reasons that 

there is support there, it goes to the origins of the group and 

Rwanda’s interest that Secretary Carson outlined, is that the M23 

sees themselves as the kind of the guardians of the Tutsi in the 

east, and so the argument would be that if they—the extent the 

Tutsi are threatened and the M23 can help protect the Tutsi in the 

east. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And what is the strength of the DRC military 

again, the army? 

Secretary CHOLLET. So there are roughly 150,000 total, but the 

Congo is about the size of Western Europe, so I believe the estimates are somewhere in the 6,000, 5,000 or 6,000 deployed in 

that—or no, there is more. That is the MONUSCO, sorry, 5,000 or 

6,000 deployed in that in the east. I don’t know what the exact estimate of the Congolese military deployment in the east is because 

this is a vast amount of territory that the military is trying to 

cover with 150,000 troops. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Still, I mean, we are talking about a force of 

1,000, and so why is this such a big issue for the DRC in order to 

be able to basically prevail in this situation? 

Secretary CHOLLET. You want to go? 

Secretary CARSON. Yeah, let me say just a slight revision. I think 

probably today, the M23 probably has some 2,000 or so troops. I 

think Mr. Chollet has pointed out the size of the Congo, but I think 

it is useful to graphically describe the Congo as a country which 

is as large as the eastern part of the United States, from the Atlantic to the Mississippi. It is an enormous country, and since the split 

of Sudan, it is, in fact, geographically, the largest in Africa. 

The eastern Congo is one of the most difficult areas in which to 

operate. It is an area that is deeply forested in some places, double 

and triple canopies. It is also an area that has a large number of 

volcanos, some of which are active, and it also sits in what is called 

the Western Rift Valley, which gives it both altitude and low-level 

depth at the same time. It is an area which is very difficult terrainwise to operate in. 

I think in terms of the estimation of the number of soldiers that 

the DRC has in the eastern Congo, probably is in the neighborhood 

of somewhere around 20,000 to 30,000, stretched over not only the 

North and South Kivus but also Ituri. They are not only faced with 

the rebellion of the M23. There are probably at least a half a dozen 

to a dozen other smaller rebel groups operating in the area, including the FDLR, which is an anti-Rwandan group which is of concern 

to the government in Kigali. But they are also operating against 
15 

probably seven or eight different groups that go under the name of 

Mai-Mai, that have a third acronym that goes behind them. 

So it is an area that is volatile. Instability prevails, and a number of rebel groups are operating there, which also requires the attention both of the FARDC, as well as the MONUSCO forces from 

the U.N. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being with us this morning. It is important that we are here discussing these issues, I think, talking 

about security and the abuse of human rights in the DRC, and I 

appreciate that effort. As you stated, the violence that is taking 

place in this part of the world is really a threat to stability and 

human rights across the globe. We know that such injustices always are. That is why we have to set those priorities, as has been 

stated, but we have to recognize the reality there. 

Could you please speak specifically to the successes or setbacks 

in the efforts to professionalize the military forces in the DRC with 

regards to the effectiveness of those forces in combating sexual violence against women and children? To any extent that our efforts 

have been successful in this endeavor, how can we further support 

those efforts? And to the extent that we have seen no marked improvement, you mentioned earlier that indiscipline and impunity 

persists, what should we be doing to address it? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you. 

And as I said in my statement, the sexual violence is something 

that—and preventing that is a huge priority for all of our programming in this part of the world, around the world, but particularly 

in this part of the world, where we have seen just horrific stories 

and accounts coming out. 

A couple of comments. First, in the specific battalion that we 

have trained, we have seen a successful effort in terms of—so far 

at least—in terms of human rights abuses, lack of human rights 

abuses coming out of that group compared to the rest of the Congolese military. Secondly, we have a program—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Can I just, to what do you attribute that? What is 

the—— 

Secretary CHOLLET. I think it is the training effort that we 

helped—to the education, the discipline that we were able to help 

instill in the command and control. The Congolese military is riddled with problems; among them logistics problems, and but simple 

training and education and lack of command and control. It is hard 

to keep discipline within that military. 

But we also have ongoing programming. In addition to these focused training efforts, ongoing programming on the rule of law and 

military justice, we spend a few million dollars on that per year to 

work with the Congolese military in a more wholesale way on helping with education and mentorship to ensure that the rule of law 

and human rights are instilled throughout that military. And that 

is programming, I think, that, although relatively modest, again, 

we see some benefit from. 
16 

Mrs. DAVIS. And where you have seen the efforts not working at 

all, I mean, what is it that—is it the same where we see the successful efforts? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Yeah, where we are seeing—again, the challenges are paramount. I mean, these are forces that don’t have a 

great amount of discipline, don’t have great training and, often 

cases, don’t have great education. As I mentioned in my statement, 

there is a real absorptive capacity problem within the DRC, and so 

it makes it even harder to try to train them up in a way that meets 

the standards that we would like to see in any military. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Did you want to comment further? 

Secretary CARSON. Yes, I would. I would say that security sector 

reform in the army has been a failure for the most part. It is a failure because of all of the things that my colleague, Mr. Chollet, has 

said, but it is also a failure because of elements of corruption. Soldiers are not paid on a regular basis. They are not sustained and 

re-equipped in the field. They do not have appropriate housing for 

themselves or for their families. And many times, when they are 

sent out, they are basically forgotten. 

I think that one of the reasons why our 391st Battalion has been 

successful is because we put down a number of very clear conditions on the Government of the DRC to ensure that this battalion 

would be effective. We said to the Government, they must be maintained as a cohesive unit; they cannot be broken apart and sent to 

different units. 

They must be paid on a regular basis, and we even talked directly, and I must say, I spoke with President Kabila and members 

of his Government about this, introducing a mobile banking system 

to ensure that soldiers would be able to get their pay as long as 

they had a cell phone. This is starting to take place. 

We also said that they must be properly housed, and they must 

be supported with resupply. And additionally, we also assigned and 

paid for a couple of mentors to work with them after their training 

to ensure that they would retain their cohesiveness and their 

sharpness. And in fact, they have been very, very good, and they 

were a part of the counter-LRA [Lord’s Resistance Army] operations, the counter-LRA operations in the northeastern part of the 

country for a long time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Chollet, I represent Robins Air Force Base, which is the 

home of the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System], and I would like to talk with you a little bit about both the 

security and the humanitarian situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the use of our ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance] platforms over there to assist both in the humanitarian mission and in the military mission. And could you 

speak to what is being done now with the use of our ISR platforms? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Thank you. And as you are very well aware, 

the ISR issue is incredibly important to us, and it is something 

that there is huge value in everything we are doing. 

I can say on the issue we have been talking here today about regarding eastern Congo, there is not much ISR work there that we 
17 

are providing. Most of the military assistance we are providing is 

in the form of training and mentorship. And that is the kind of 

support we have been talking about. 

Obviously, the ISR question is absolutely critical when it comes 

to the C–LRA [counter–Lord’s Resistance Army] mission, which is 

the northern part. And that is something that we can—we are 

helping to contribute to as we are working with the Ugandan military on the C–LRA mission. 

Mr. SCOTT. We do have the ability, though, with our ISR platforms, especially through the JSTARS, to show the tracks of where 

rebel units are moving. And I do think that is important, both from 

a humanitarian mission and from a military mission. 

And, Mr. Carson, you said that we are going to have to permanently break the cycle. You used the word ‘‘eliminated’’ with regard 

to the FDLR. Certainly, what has gone on in the country of Africa 

and the human rights abuses, very few things in the world, I think, 

reach the level of the abuses that have been occurring there for 

years. 

My concern with kind of the way we try to handle these things 

through the State Department, if you will, is that we are always 

playing defense. And so if it is going to be necessary to eliminate 

organizations like the FDLR and M23 to permanently break the 

cycle, at what point are we going to help the Democratic Republic 

of Congo go on offense against these groups? 

Secretary CARSON. Thank you for the question. 

As I said in my testimony, the responsibility for resolving the 

problems in the Great Lakes are principally the responsibilities of 

the Presidents and the leaders of the respective countries. 

We have to engage diplomatically with them to recognize that instability, violence, continued refugee flows, and impunity are not in 

the interest of any of these states. It requires political will on their 

part to recognize that it is in their interests to promote peace, prosperity, and stability not only in their countries but also in the 

states that border them. 

We will continue our diplomatic efforts, but we will also help, as 

we have pointed out, to train Congolese battalions. The 391st is a 

good example. We are committed to training a second battalion if 

the Congolese Government is prepared to sign an MOU with respect to how this battalion will be maintained. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Carson, I am close to being out of time. Can I 

ask you something—— 

Secretary CARSON. Sure. 

Mr. SCOTT. The 391st, how many men make up that battalion? 

And how well equipped are they? 

Secretary CARSON. Approximately 500 to 600. And they are well 

equipped. They have been maintained appropriately. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I again—and I apologize for interrupting you. 

But if we are going to permanently break this cycle, you can’t—I 

don’t understand how diplomacy works with somebody who has 

made a living out of raping and murdering other human beings. 

And I do believe that at some point, especially with our—I don’t 

think that it needs to be the United States military that does this, 

but I do believe that our ISR platforms are an asset that we can 
18 

deliver to the people who are trying to get rid of the people that 

are committing the murders and the rapes over there. 

And I would just encourage that as we go forward we help train 

another battalion and that we make our ISR platforms available to 

those battalions so that they can take out people who, quite honestly, aren’t going to stop murdering and raping people until they 

are eliminated. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the remainder of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Carson, the first question is for you, and it has to 

do with—has to do with training and equipping. And we have several tools—the State Department and the Department of Defense 

have several tools available to them. A few years back, last year 

perhaps even, we created the goal—or authorized the goal of a Security Contingency Fund that was created for complex challenges 

like the issues we have in the DRC. And can we expect to see a 

contingency fund proposal for the DRC in the future? 

For Ambassador Carson first. 

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, that is under—that is under review, and it is quite possible that you—that you will see one. 

We are, as I say, looking at the prospects of trying to train a second battalion in the DRC, provided the Government is willing to 

commit to a number of obligations which we think are important 

to ensure the effectiveness of those who might be trained. 

Mr. LARSEN. Would you use a different—did you use, then, a different source of money for the first battalion, to train the first battalion? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes, you did? What source of money was that? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I think PKO [peace-keeping operations] 

funding was the—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Peace-keeping operations. And why would you not 

use PKO this time? Or why didn’t you use Global Security Contingency Fund the last time? 

Secretary CARSON. I think it was a matter of—yeah, well, I 

think—— 

Mr. LARSEN. One at a time, one at a time. 

Secretary CARSON. It was a matter of what we had. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. 

Secretary CARSON. There is an enormous demand on all of our 

funding that is appropriated for Africa, both for our ACOTA [African Contingency Operations Training & Assistance] moneys as well 

as our PKO moneys. 

Much of what we have done in the last several years has been 

to support what has turned out to be a successful effort in Somalia 

to eliminate Al Qaeda’s representatives, Al-Shabaab, there. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

Secretary CARSON. So we have put a lot of money into that effort. 

And we have put a lot of money into the counter-LRA effort with 

respect to Uganda. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 
19 

So what would be in an MOU for the second battalion that 

wasn’t in an MOU for the first battalion? Have things changed? 

Have we learned some lessons? Were things missing the first time 

around that we need to have in the second—to develop a second 

battalion, and what were those things? 

Secretary CARSON. Let me—and Mr. Chollet can go into this. 

What we said to the DRC Government is that we want you to 

sign an MOU with the United Nations to prevent the recruitment 

and retention of child soldiers in your entire military—not just in 

the battalions that we—but in your entire military. They have now 

done that. That was done about 45 days go. 

We also said as a part of this MOU, there must be complete 

Leahy vetting of all of the participants who would be a part of this 

battalion. 

Mr. LARSEN. Just for the committee’s sake, Leahy vetting would 

be focusing on human rights. 

Secretary CARSON. Exactly. Exactly. 

And we also said, you must keep this as a composite unit, you 

must pay them regularly, you must equip them. And we said, these 

are the requirements going forward. 

Mr. LARSEN. So those weren’t in the first MOU? 

Secretary CARSON. Those are things that we have demanded the 

first time around and we are insisting upon them for this time. But 

as I said, we have expanded out because we insisted that they 

must sign a document with an action plan with the Government to 

deal with child soldiers, retention and recruitment across the entire—— 

Mr. LARSEN. So those two big issues would be different than the 

first MOU. 

Secretary CARSON. Exactly. 

Mr. LARSEN. What is the organic logistics capability of the 391st? 

And what would you expect the logistics capability to be for the 

second battalion, as well? Getting at the point of, who is backing 

these folks up? Is it us, or is the U.N. mission? For the logistics— 

communications, transportation, moving these people from A to B. 

Secretary CARSON. It the FARDC. It is the Government of the 

DRC that is responsible for moving these people around the country and providing additional equipment and supplies to them. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. That is great. 

Mr. Chollet, do you have anything to add to these—as answers 

to these questions? 

Secretary CHOLLET. No, the Ambassador has covered it quite 

well. 

Mr. LARSEN. That is great. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks, gentlemen, for being here. 

I would like to ask, we are talking about an area of operations 

here at the DRC, but I think we need to look at the bigger region, 

the area of interest. And so when we look at the DRC, Rwanda, 

Burundi, and Uganda, we talked about the M23, but what are the 

other—we kind of mentioned it—what are the other major 
20 

nonstate, nonuniform belligerents that we have to contend with in 

this region? 

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, Congressman West, there are 

probably a dozen. I don’t have a list, but I will give you one and 

make sure that you do have it. 

There is the FDLR, which is comprised of former Rwandan soldiers who participated in the genocide. 

Mr. WEST. Okay. 

Secretary CARSON. We know that there is a group of insurgents 

called the African Democratic Liberation Front who are in the eastern Congo, who are anti-Uganda and anti-President Museveni. And 

they have operated across the border. 

The M23 and the M23’s predecessor was something called the 

CNDP, which is a—was a rebel group. 

And there are at least 10 other groups that start off their rebel 

names with the name Mai-Mai: Mai-Mai Cheka—there are various 

groups that are based on ethnic communities and allegiances of 

rebels—— 

Mr. WEST. So it is a multifaceted, mostly tribal-based, would you 

say? 

Secretary CARSON. Yes, I would say mostly ethnically and regionally based. 

And someone has passed on to me—— 

Mr. WEST. Thank God for staffs. 

Secretary CARSON. That is absolutely right. 

Let me just quick—ADF, which I mentioned, ADF Nalu, an antiUgandan group; APCLS, a Mai-Mai group; FDLR, Hutus who carried out genocide in Rwanda; FRPI, based in the Ituri area, doing 

conflict minerals. There is the M23. There is the Raia Mutomboki 

group. There is the Mai-Mai Cheka. 

Mr. WEST. Well, let me get to my point because the time is running out. You know, I spent a few days in the military, and one 

of the things we always listened for: What are the tasks? So as I 

listened to the two gentlemen as you spoke, you talked about sustainable peace; you talked about training, you know, militaries, foreign internal defense type of mission; and then I also heard the 

term ‘‘eliminate,’’ which means that is more of an aggressive action. 

So what I am trying to understand, what exactly are you looking 

at being done? Because if you are talking about foreign internal defense, do we have the capability and the capacity with our SOC 

AFRICOM to be able to go in there and do that? 

And, furthermore, while I looked at this list of belligerent groups, 

as soon as you put American soldiers there in that position, I got 

to tell you that some of the things that you all were talking about 

reminded me of three previous regions that we were in: Vietnam, 

Afghanistan, and Somalia. And we didn’t do so well, you know, initially. 

So what I am trying to ascertain is, what are we initially going 

in to do as far as the goal and objective at a strategic and an operational posture? Do we have the capability and capacity to do that? 

Do we need to go to coalition partners, being Britain and France? 

Do we need to go to the Organization of American States? 

And then where is the potential of mission creep and escalation, 

which is exactly what we saw happen in Somalia? And we know 
21 

how that kind of dovetailed off in that battle at Mogadishu. And 

I don’t think you mentioned the amount of warlords, did you? 

Secretary CARSON. Warlords are not here, but these—— 

Mr. WEST. Yeah, so that is another that we added to the mix. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, very briefly, the goal of our efforts, the 

Defense Department’s efforts, are to help build up the Congolese 

military and to make them capable of taking care of these problems. 

Mr. WEST. So that is foreign internal defense. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Internal defense. 

And the footprint issue, which you have quite rightly raised, is 

extremely limited. Right now, we have three personnel who are 

part of the MONUSCO mission. We have secunded to the U.N. mission to help them on information-sharing as well as some intelligence issues. When we had the training effort under way for the 

391st, for this battalion, it was about 60 folks, special forces and 

others, to help train them up, but they are now out. 

So it is a very limited footprint. We are one of many players, including the British and the French, the Belgians, the South Africans, and the U.N., importantly. About 17,000 U.N. troops in the 

Congo. 

Mr. WEST. But my concern would be—and I will close on this— 

all of these different non-state, non-uniformed belligerents, you 

know, coming together against our efforts. Is that a potential to 

happen there? 

Secretary CARSON. No. 

And I would like to just underscore what Mr. Chollet has said. 

We are not talking about American soldiers on the ground engaged 

against rebel groups in the DRC. That is not something that is in 

our game plan or in our thinking. 

What we need to be focused on—— 

Mr. WEST. But we said that in Vietnam and Somalia and other 

places. 

But my time is gone. I yield back. 

Secretary CARSON. Train, enable, build capacity. Build capacity, 

enable, and train. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The continent of Africa, gentlemen, is the richest in the world in 

terms of minerals and natural resources. This continent of Africa 

is the source of 90 percent of the precious minerals, gemstones, and 

strategic raw materials used by the industrialized nations of the 

world. But yet the people on the continent of Africa are the poorest 

of the poor. And I am pretty sure I would get no disagreement from 

either one of you on that point. 

Another point I would like to make is that, over the recent centuries, dictators and corrupt leaders of failed African states have 

cut deals with multinationals from the developed world. These 

deals generally pay meager royalties for the raw materials that are 

extracted from the land. Part of the money goes into the Swiss 

bank accounts of the corrupt leaders, and the money never trickles 

down to the development within the country. 

And it is the multinationals that export the raw materials out of 

Africa to places where they can be developed. And in that develop-
22 

ment process, it means the people who live in the places where the 

goods are being refined are able to get jobs, and then they are able 

to have some prosperity throughout the land. But that does not 

take place in Africa. 

Then you have the issue of the debt that is extended or moneys 

that are extended to these African countries for development and 

then the debt is unpaid and unforgiven, which permanently locks 

in poverty. Because the resources that are available that are not 

going into the Swiss bank accounts have to go to be paid—have to 

go to repay the debt. 

And then in the DRC we have the same kind of abject poverty, 

hunger, starvation, disease, and lack of basic social services. And 

despite the fact that—and I will quote from our memo. It says, 

‘‘Economic growth, buoyed by high global commodity prices, has 

been strong in recent years,’’ speaking of the DRC, ‘‘reaching an estimated 6.9 percent in 2011.’’ And DRC also receives high levels of 

donor aid, with over $5.96 billion being disbursed in 2010. 

What I would like to know is, what part does the economic exploitation of Africa and its natural resources play in the support of 

these forces that are throughout the DRC? You mentioned the MaiMai Cheka, the M23, the FRPI, and others. What impact does the 

quest for the natural resources of Africa have to play on the support of those groups? 

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, thank you very much for the 

question. There is no question that conflict minerals contribute to 

sustaining conflicts in Africa. Groups are able to take control of 

mineral-rich areas and then to smuggle those minerals out through 

neighboring states into the international market. And so it does 

play a role in sustaining these kinds of conflicts. 

And this is why legislation passed here by Congress has been 

useful in putting a check and a control over what U.S. companies 

can buy in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the gentleman’s time has expired. 

If you could finish that for the record, please. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 138.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Could one of you all tell me how much the United States of 

America is spending on Congo efforts now, both military and nonmilitary aid? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I think, sir, the total cost in the last—from 

fiscal year 2009 to 2013, I believe, is about $137 million in the security sector, both—that is military—from State and Defense. 

Secretary CARSON. The total assistance package to the Democratic Republic of the Congo is running approximately $480 million. 

And that is the total package that includes both the military and 

the economic and humanitarian assistance that we provide to the 

country. 

Mr. BROOKS. Does the United States—— 

Secretary CARSON. Yes, a year, $485 million. 

Mr. BROOKS. Does the United States of America have a national 

security interest in Congo? And, if so, what is it? 

Secretary CARSON. We do have interests there. 
23 

Mr. BROOKS. A national security interest? 

Secretary CARSON. We have interests in helping to do as much 

as we can to maintain stability that can, in effect, have a direct impact on the United States. The largest single U.N. peacekeeping 

program in the world is in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

We spend and appropriate some 25 to 26 percent of what is authorized by the U.N. for this program. It consumes an enormous 

amount of time in New York at the Security Council, and we have 

to respond to humanitarian crises in the region—— 

Mr. BROOKS. Okay. Mr. Carson, I apologize for cutting you off, 

but we have limited time and I have some things that I wanted to 

cover. 

It sounds like to me you are talking about a humanitarian interest as opposed to a national security interest. Something that 

threatens the survival of the United States of America is my definition of a national security interest. 

And it also seems to me, and I may be wrong in my interpretation of your remarks, but the interest that you have just described 

would mean that the United States of America has a national security interest in every place in the world, the way you have defined 

‘‘interest.’’ And I noticed you focused on the word ‘‘interest’’ as opposed to ‘‘national security interest’’ in your answer to me. 

I have reservations about the United States of America continuing to be the world’s police cop. 

And, Mr. Chairman, we all know the impact of President 

Obama’s sequestration policy that Congress, unfortunately, approved in August of 2011, with the adverse effect on our uniformed 

personnel being numbers less than or equal to that of immediately 

before World War II, number of naval vessels being reduced or cut 

to naval operational size of World War I era, and then the Air 

Force having the smallest number of operational aircraft in the history of the United States Air Force. 

And so that is what we are looking at because of President 

Obama’s sequestration policy, again, that Congress approved. So it 

is everybody here in Washington that is involved in this attack on 

our national defense capabilities from a financial perspective. The 

United States of America has limited funding. 

And, Mr. Chairman, that all being the case, to the extent that 

you and this committee have significant influence over where that 

money goes, I would strongly urge us to use that $480 million 

being spent on the Congo, according to Mr. Carson’s testimony, instead being used to help people in the United States of America 

who are in need of help or to help reduce the deficit that Admiral 

Mike Mullen testified from these very same chairs is the national 

greatest—excuse me, is the greatest national security threat to the 

United States of America. So it is a matter of priorities. 

I would emphasize that I appreciate the very noble—and I emphasize the word ‘‘noble’’—effort to try to help people who are in 

harm’s way in various parts of the world. And my colleague from 

Florida mentioned Somalia and Mogadishu. Certainly, in Vietnam 

we tried to do the noble thing. But we are in a different financial 

reality. And in the absence of a compelling national security interest in the Congo and various other parts of the world, I am afraid 
24 

that sequestration is going to force us to retract, even though we 

may otherwise wish to the contrary. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. A couple of questions. 

First of all, if I recall correctly, sequestration is not only Obama’s 

but it is also our responsibility. I believe we all voted for it. Let’s 

keep that in mind. 

Mr. BROOKS. I did not vote for it. But I can’t speak for others. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I don’t believe I yielded to you. 

We have talked here about this whole issue. Mr. Frazer, who will 

be on the next panel, suggests that there is perhaps less than $30 

million of that $480 million that is actually for the military issues. 

Is that about correct? Is that basically the number? 

Secretary CARSON. 480—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. $480 million, but about $30 million of that is directly related to the military issues here in the eastern Congo. Is 

that more or less correct? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I am afraid I would have to get back to you 

on the specific number, but that sounds about—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, that is his testimony. We will hear that 

in a few moments. 

If that is correct, I would point out that this really is a national 

security issue for America because the destabilization of Africa provides the direct opportunity for Al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations to find safe havens. 

Is that the situation in Africa today? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I could speak first to this. 

It is certainly throughout the continent that is a concern. In this 

particular region that we are focused on this morning, we have not 

seen that concern yet. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Beyond this region. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Beyond this region, absolutely, that there is 

a concern in North Africa—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. All right. So let’s make it clear that Africa is a 

national security issue for the United States. Is that correct? 

Secretary CARSON. There is absolutely no question that where we 

have—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

Secretary CARSON [continuing]. Seen prolonged instability—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Just yes or no. I want to deal with the previous 

questioner. 

The other issue is that we are currently, today or tomorrow, 

going to vote for an $88 billion appropriation out of the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Afghanistan. That must assume the 

full contingent of American troops in Afghanistan for the entire 

year 2013 budget. And given the amount of money that is presently 

available to deal with the military situations in Africa, this committee might consider how we allocate American resources. I will 

put that on the table for the next NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. 
25 

My next set of questions deals with the issue of, in your testimony, Ambassador Carson, you wrote that the underlying issues of 

illegal exploitation of natural resources is one of the major problems in this region, and I believe in other testimony and answers 

you have said throughout Africa. Is that the case? 

Secretary CARSON. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Would you consider the ivory trade to be an exploitation of natural resources of Africa? 

Secretary CARSON. Absolutely. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Do you have any indication, any evidence 

that the ivory trade is supporting the M23 and related rebel organizations in the Congo? 

Secretary CARSON. I don’t know, but I could find out what we 

have on that and get back to you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I will share with you that the international environmental and wildlife community believe the answer is yes. 

What resources are we presently putting into the effort to understand the illegal ivory trade and its connection to not only the 

Congo situation but other destabilizing forces in Africa? 

Secretary CARSON. Thank you. 

Approximately 1 month ago, Secretary Clinton hosted at the Department of State a meeting between major African countries that 

have large wildlife populations and also a large number of countries in Asia that are believed to be the purchasers and recipients 

of illegal ivory. It was an effort to indicate our great concern. 

We are putting more money into trying to beef up anti-poaching 

operations across Africa and also trying very much to get the demand reduced in Asia. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Excuse me. On the military side of it, what is 

the DOD doing? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I am not aware of anything on that. I will 

have to get back to you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You should be aware. My final 27 seconds. You 

should be aware. In fact, it is, by all evidence presented at an ad 

hoc hearing here in Congress just less than 3 weeks ago, a major 

element in the destabilization and in the support of various rebel 

groups, many of whom are clearly aligned with Al Qaeda. I would 

appreciate a detailed response from the military about exactly 

what the African unit is doing. 

Thank you. 

Secretary CHOLLET. You will have that, sir. Thanks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I have specific questions. 

One, have you worked with the guys that have been training our 

troops in Afghanistan? When you talk about the Congolese military 

as unmotivated, illiterate, undisciplined, corrupt, a mobile banking 

system, all the stuff that we—those exact same words have been 

used to describe the Afghan military and the Afghan forces. I 

would hope there is crossover. All the lessons learned and the billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan over the last decade, the people that have been doing that there transferring their knowledge 

and capability to you and, frankly, anybody else in your situation 
26 

where you are training those types of troops and in the advise and 

assist role. 

So is there a crossover? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely. We have learned a lot of lessons 

over the years in Afghanistan in terms of training indigenous 

forces. And that is being applied across our military wherever we 

are performing these kinds of activities. 

Mr. HUNTER. Specifically, people from Afghanistan, though, and 

lessons learned, tactics, techniques, and procedures from Afghanistan, putting in place specific procedures? 

Secretary CHOLLET. As I said, there is—obviously, general doctrine has been influenced. I will have to get back to you whether 

the specific individuals who performed training in Afghanistan are 

perhaps some of those—the 60-some folks that helped train this 

Congolese battalion that I mentioned earlier. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. 

And the second question is specifically on the ISR. You talked 

about ISR. Mr. Scott mentioned JSTARS. Do you have any of the 

lower-flying ISR systems right now or platforms? You don’t, right? 

Secretary CHOLLET. In this region? 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. 

Secretary CHOLLET. No. 

Mr. HUNTER. And the money that has been authorized, I think 

$50 million I was just told, for ISR for the front end and the back 

end, what region is that going to? In this bill—— 

Secretary CHOLLET. I think that that is the counter-LRA mission. 

Mr. HUNTER. So that is not specifically the mission that you are 

talking about right now today? 

Secretary CHOLLET. It is not eastern Congo, no, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Then—well, my question is, then, how is that going to help you? 

Secretary CHOLLET. So it is a separate mission, the counter-LRA 

mission, which is in a part of Congo but not the specific issue that 

we are talking about in terms of the instability in the eastern 

Congo. But it certainly is related. It is what we are working with 

the Ugandan military on and to try to strengthen their efforts to 

go after the LRA. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I mean, are you going to be able to use that 

money to set up systems that can be used in both places? Do you 

have the flexibility to use it in both places? 

Secretary CHOLLET. I think it is—we are planning to use that 

against the C–LRA mission. In terms of using it for another mission, I don’t—that is not in our plans right now. 

Mr. HUNTER. And my last specific question on the ISR—and I 

don’t know, there is not a military person up here that could probably answer this better. Are you expecting any capability gaps in 

the ISR that we have been using in the Middle East and southwest 

Asia? I mean, because it is totally different country, obviously. You 

talked about triple-canopy jungle versus desert and mountainous 

regions. 

And I am curious to see, once this goes into effect, if we notice 

capability gaps because we haven’t been looking at ISR in that aspect. Can it see through triple-canopy jungle? Does it work in that 
27 

kind of an environment? Because we may learn that it doesn’t, 

right? 

Secretary CHOLLET. Sir, you are absolutely right. The terrain 

there presents specific challenges and unique challenges in terms 

of our ISR. I can get back to you a more detailed answer on the 

capability and how the money that we are asking for to spend on 

ISR on the C–LRA mission will go to the systems that will enable 

us to really use it. 

Mr. HUNTER. I would hope that you would capture that for us 

and maybe give it to us because a lot of—there is probably not a 

whole lot of people looking at how the platforms we have now and 

the weapons systems we have now work in that type of an environment because we haven’t had to be in that kind of an environment. 

But who knows what tomorrow brings. 

So I would hope that you could capture that, put down some requirements, so we at least have people looking at, if we are not in 

a desert or just mountainous region, if we are in that triple-canopy 

jungle, does the stuff that we have, does it actually work. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Well, we will definitely follow up with you on 

that. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Can I have an estimate from each of you as to how many rapes 

occur in the DRC a year? 

Secretary CARSON. I will get back to you on the precise number. 

It is extraordinary. It is probably a higher level than anyplace else 

in Africa and certainly maybe the highest in the world. 

We do have an estimate, but I would like to give you a precise 

answer. Some have described it as the—as the rape capital of the 

world. The number is extraordinary. I have a number in my mind, 

but I don’t want to—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, it is easily hundreds of thousands. 

Secretary CARSON. Yes. The number is extraordinarily high. 

Ms. SPEIER. So the rapes are taking place by representatives of 

M23 and the DRC; is that safe to say? 

Secretary CARSON. Yes. It is taking place by all the rebel groups, 

and the FARDC has also participated in these illegal activities, as 

well. 

Ms. SPEIER. So an article in The New York Times by Jeffrey 

Gettleman referenced the ‘‘rape capital of the world’’ comment. And 

he asked the question, ‘‘What strategic purpose is there of putting 

an AK–47 assault rifle inside a woman and pulling the trigger or 

cutting out a woman’s fetus and making her friends eat it? The 

government’s response has been a shrug.’’ 

Now, that is diabolical. And yet we are funding on a yearly basis 

$480 million into this country that allows this kind of horrendous 

abuse to go on. And it appears we do it with full knowledge of the 

extent of these rapes, and we are not holding them accountable. It 

is like giving an addict more dope. How do we justify it? 
28 

Secretary CHOLLET. Ma’am, if I could start, the funding that the 

Defense Department is providing is for the training and the education and the—that would instill the discipline to prevent this 

very kind of horrific behavior. Because it is absolutely unacceptable. And so the funding we have supported is for specific programming, for training and mentoring to make sure that we can prevent 

this from happening from the Congolese military. 

Now, the rebel groups, that is another problem. But with the 

Congolese military, we fully understand there is a huge capacity 

problem there, that there is outrageous and unacceptable behavior 

happening by members of that military, and that is why our program is specifically aimed to ensure that that doesn’t happen. 

We have seen, in the modest programs that we have conducted, 

some success along those lines—— 

Ms. SPEIER. All right, I would like to have a list of the programs 

that you have funded and the, quote, ‘‘modest success’’ that you 

have defined. 

Secretary CHOLLET. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Carson. 

Secretary CARSON. Let me say that we agree with you about how 

horrendous and horrible this is. And it has been a continuing priority of the Administration at all levels, including from the Secretary, to address this issue and to bring it to the leadership of the 

DRC Government. Starting from the very beginning of this Administration, we have pressed very hard that there be no impunity for 

anyone, including Government officials and soldiers. 

In early 2009, Secretary Clinton traveled to Goma in the eastern 

Congo to see President Kabila, and this was one of the major subjects on her mind. At that meeting, she demanded and asked for 

the arrest of five senior DRC officers whose troops had been engaged in the rape of women. They were called the ‘‘FARDC Five.’’ 

We have been—— 

Ms. SPEIER. My time is running out. Could you tell me what—— 

Secretary CARSON. We have been aggressive on this, and we continue to be aggressive on it. It is not an issue that we have tried 

to hide. As I said, it is horrendous. It is the rape capital of the 

world. Jeffrey Gettleman—— 

Ms. SPEIER. Actually, Mr. Carson, let me just ask a specific question. The Secretary asked for these individuals to be incarcerated 

or removed. What has happened since her request was made? 

Secretary CARSON. Three of them have been arrested. Two of 

them have fled—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. If you could 

answer that for her on the record, please. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 138.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. 

I have just one question of our military witness there. I would 

be very interested to follow up with respect to what Mr. Hunter 

asked about with respect to lessons learned out of Afghanistan and 

training up the military and police or whatever it is that we are 
29 

doing that, and the real specifics to that. So if you could provide 

that for the record, I would appreciate it. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 137.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And the rest of my questions are for our Department of State Secretary there. 

My question to you is about all the other programs, because it 

seems to me like the majority of the money is going in through the 

mission that we have there into other arenas. Some of the paperwork says, you know, trying to put in a justice system and local 

police, et cetera, et cetera. 

I am interested, because I also sit on Homeland Security, Mr. 

Secretary, about border security. Because if M23 is being—if we 

are seeing Rwandan-backed troops coming across to aid or be part 

of M23 and then going back across, what, if any, of the programs 

that we are putting in between the countries? 

Because it seems to me like this is a bad neighborhood. I have 

been in some of these areas, the Horn of Africa and coming toward—not specific to the Congo; I haven’t been to the Congo. But 

in most every other area around there, I have been there. 

And so my question would be border security and are we training 

up there. And what type—you know, give me a—paint a picture for 

me of what that looks like, if it can be easily traversed, if we are 

doing anything about it, if we are putting unmanned aerial to take 

a look at what is going on. 

Secretary CARSON. Border security in the region is almost nonexistent. There is very little security along the borders. People 

move back and forth. They are not clearly delineated for the populations who live in the regions. These are forested areas in 

which—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Are they mountainous? 

Secretary CARSON. They are indeed. Some areas are very mountainous. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am trying to look at this topography map to try 

to figure out what is going on here. 

Secretary CARSON. Yeah. No, they are. There are active volcanos 

right in and around Goma and both in the North and South Kivus. 

So people—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Is there some idea of maybe putting some effort 

toward that? Or is it just so porous that no matter where we would 

go—are we in passes? I mean, how do you do that? 

Secretary CARSON. It is an enormous challenge because of the 

enormous size of the—of the country. This is a country that shares 

borders with nine other countries—nine other countries. As I said, 

geographically, it is as large as the eastern part of the United 

States and certainly as large as all of western Europe by a multiple. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And it seems to me it shares some waterway borders, too. 

Secretary CARSON. It shares a—yes. The Congo River divides the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo from the Republic of the Congo, 

known as Congo-Brazzaville. And there are lakes that divide the 

country between its eastern neighbors and the Congo. 
30 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I would be interested, as Ms. Speier had asked for 

a delineation of the moneys, aside from military, that we are putting in there. And, you know, with a big question as to, why aren’t 

we helping them with border security? I mean, that is one of the 

main things that we have found in Iraq that we needed to put in 

in order to ensure that, you know, the bad guys weren’t going from 

one country into the other and then slipping across. And, of course, 

it is one of the biggest problems that we have with the mountainous regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

So, you know, some—some comment to this committee, specifically to me, about any ideas about how we handle some of that. 

Secretary CARSON. Absolutely. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Secretary CARSON. Will do. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 137.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. First of all, let me thank the chair and ranking member for letting me sit in on today’s hearing. I just have a couple of 

brief questions. 

Ambassador Carson, you were responding to Congressmember 

Speier, and I wanted to know if you could finish. You were talking 

about the five commanders that the Secretary asked to be arrested. 

Secretary CARSON. Yes. And I will get back to you and give you 

a status report on exactly what has happened to them. I know that 

this was back in 2009. We tracked these individuals for a period 

of time. Several were arrested; several of them fled. But I will get 

back and give you a status report on that. 

But beyond that, I would go to some of the things that my colleague, Mr. Chollet, has said. We have put a lot of effort in trying 

to get the Congolese to address the human rights problems within 

their own government and within the military. We have strengthened the capacity of the military judicial system. We have called 

for no impunity. We have trained judges. We have increased the 

number of military—female military police offers and police. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Let me ask a couple other questions. 

You mentioned the other rebel groups. I think you said there 

were about 10. And when we had the hearing last week in the Africa Subcommittee, I don’t remember that coming up, the other 

groups outside of the M23. 

But I wanted to know if you could talk about what their numbers 

are and who is supplying them. And if they are anti-DRC, are they 

collaborating with M23? You know, what is their basis for their—— 

Secretary CARSON. I can give you a listing of these organizations 

with a very, very rough approximation of their—the numbers. And 

I will pass that on to you. 

There certainly are at least a dozen. Many of these groups have 

no affiliation with the M23. They are groups that are both self-protecting of ethnic communities and regions, and they are groups 

that are both protecting communities and exploiting communities 

and their natural resources. 
31 

Ms. BASS. Are they more like gangs? And who is supplying them? 

Are they supplied through the—— 

Secretary CARSON. They are self-sustaining because they are marauding groups that live in communities and exploit those communities. And they may be exploiting minerals, as well. They are protecting and doing things that the Government would do if it were 

capable of doing. 

Ms. BASS. Right. Okay. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. That concludes our questions for Dr. Chollet and 

Dr. Carson. We want to thank you. 

And the committee will adjourn for a few minutes while we 

change the panels. 

Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

I don’t know why, but the media seems to be quite interested in 

this hearing. 

Our second panel is comprised of Dr. Jendayi Frazer, distinguished service professor, Carnegie Mellon University; Dr. James 

Carafano, vice president, foreign and defense policy studies, and director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies from The Heritage Foundation; and Mr. Ben 

Affleck, founder of the Eastern Congo Initiative, and a few other 

things. 

We are happy to have you here. And we will follow in that order. 

Dr. Frazer, please. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED SERVICE PROFESSOR, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY 

Dr. FRAZER. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and 

Members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify 

on the evolving security situation in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo and its implications for U.S. national security. 

I will keep my remarks to 5 minutes or so and ask that you place 

my full written testimony in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. Five minutes will 

be fine. 

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you. 

Giving your time and your attention at this critical moment is 

a welcome sign of U.S. leadership that is essential for reinforcing 

regional efforts to achieve sustainable peace. 

My analysis of the current crisis in eastern Congo is based on my 

shuttling between Kinshasa and Kigali since the M23 rebellion 

started in April. I have met and spoken repeatedly with Presidents 

Kabila and Kagame and senior ministers and officials in both governments. I have been an informal listener who knows the background, has built trust with the leaders, and is known to only be 

on the side of peace. 

I mention this context because I believe the dialogue on how to 

resolve the Congo crisis has become unhelpful and polarizing, driven by sensational but shallow news reporting. It has dissolved into 

emotional grandstanding and official finger-pointing. Without a 

foundation in U.S. strategic interests and objectives, our policy 
32 

risks becoming rudderless and driven by narrow and vested interests. 

So what are U.S. interests in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo? I believe the United States’ primary interest in DRC should 

be to support local and regional efforts to, first, achieve national 

peace and regional stability; second, advance good governance and 

national integration and reconciliation; and, third, create the enabling environment for the development that benefits all Congolese. 

Congo’s strategic location at the very center of Africa, bordering 

nine countries, means that instability in the Congo touches all of 

Africa to the north, south, east, and west. Moreover, the country 

of 70 million people was endowed with vast human and natural resources, great forest and mineral wealth, and enormous hydropower, making it a strategic country in the global effort to address 

food security, climate change, and generate clean and alternative 

sources of energy. 

Yet, despite its vast potential, 71 percent of the population lives 

below the poverty line, and many Congolese live in fear of marauding domestic armed groups, including the M23 rebels, and foreign 

negative forces that are on the U.S. terrorist exclusion list, namely 

the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR; the 

Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces, ADF; and the Lord’s Resistance 

Army. Tackling these negative forces is a necessary condition to 

achieve sustainable peace in DR Congo and regional stability in the 

Great Lakes region. 

In addressing the evolving situation—security situation, an urgent priority has to be resolving the current crisis of the March 

23rd Movement, M23, but doing so with an understanding that it 

is a symptom, while the root causes of insecurity in the Congo and 

region have to do with governance, institution-building, national integration, and porous borders. 

As background, M23’s precursor, the armed CNDP, signed a 

peace treaty with the Democratic Republic of the Congo Government on 23rd March 2009 that established CNDP as a political 

party. And many of its soldiers and officers were integrated into 

the country’s armed forces, the FARDC. The CNDP units within 

FARDC were viewed as both capable and highly motivated to take 

on FDLR. 

Two points are relevant from this background. The CNDP units 

saw their mission more locally and against FDLR. That is where 

they were fundamentally focused. And secondly, the DRC and 

Rwandan Governments were closely aligned from 2009 until this 

past April in their common efforts to eliminate negative forces from 

eastern Congo. 

This spring, three largely concurrent developments led to M23’s 

rebellion. First, the soldiers were dissatisfied with conditions in the 

army, particularly not receiving their pay and provisions, so they 

mutinied. Second, the international community’s relentless pressure—relentlessly pressured President Kabila to arrest their ICC 

[International Criminal Court]-indicted leader, General Bosco 

Ntaganda, and he led M23 into mutiny. And, third, the Government made clear its plans to mainstream and redeploy former 

CNDP soldiers out of the Kivus. And M23 claims, of course, that 

they were not protected, so they mutinied. 
33 

The main point is that the current crisis is fundamentally a mutiny within FARDC, so coming out of deeper challenges of governance and regional security. Also, whereas in 2008 Rwanda demonstrated its ability to influence CNDP’s actions when it prevented 

them from taking Goma, when we fast-forward to 2012 the past 

constructive cooperation between Kabila and Kagame has been severely undercut by the U.N. Group of Experts’ accusations of 

Rwandan and Ugandan support for M23. 

So what are the key recommendations for U.S. national security 

policy? My bottom-line three recommendations are: reinvigorate diplomacy, support regional mediation, back the proposed Neutral 

International Force. A whole-of-government effort is required for 

the United States to assist the Congo and the region to establish 

the conditions for sustainable peace and stability. 

First and foremost, Presidential leadership is needed. Advocacy 

to a point of Presidential envoy for the Great Lakes region will only 

achieve its intended purpose if the President is engaged. Envoys 

gain their clout from perceptions that they really have the ear of 

a President that cares. A call every few years won’t work. The sustained Presidential leadership of Bush, Rice, and Powell helped in 

the Congo war in 2003 and set the conditions for reasonably peaceful regional relations until they deteriorated this year. 

Second, backing regional mediation is the surest path to a sustainable peace. Here I commend the Howard G. Buffett Foundation’s recent announcement of an initiative to support the peace 

talks mediated by the Ugandan Government under the auspices of 

the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region. It is a 

beacon that should be followed by the U.S. Government and advocacy groups. 

The USG [U.S. Government] can also play a positive diplomatic 

role in the mediation by helping set the agenda and keep it focused 

on military grievances to prevent M23 from opening a wider and 

prolonged political dialogue that is better held in the DR Congo, 

where the broad civic participation is possible. 

Third, sustained, robust, and imaginative diplomatic engagement 

is essential. Peace-building requires establishing processes that can 

build confidence between protagonists and communities as milestones are achieved. It is much more effective than sanctions that 

simply drive a wedge between the essential actors capable of ending the M23 rebellion, will freeze the conflict, and undermines U.S. 

efforts to engage all sides. 

Fourth, to support confidence and peace-building efforts within 

Congolese communities, the State Department should consider 

properly securing and reopening Goma House to extend our diplomatic reach beyond Kinshasa. 

Beyond diplomacy, the U.S. national security policy—beyond diplomacy for U.S. national security policy, I would suggest four 

more initiatives on the military side. 

First, maintain the International Military Education and Training program and funding for demobilization, disarmament, reintegration, military justice; second, train a second battalion to 

augment the major military reform effort the USG has undertaken 

by training the 391st light infantry battalion; third, if asked, the 

USG should consider providing planners, logistics, and possibly 
34 

equipment to support a neutral international force to monitor borders between Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda and to act as a strike 

force against all negative armed groups. 

USG can also use technology to offset some of the—to some degree, the number of peacekeeping personnel needed by offering contract advisers with unmanned aerial vehicles to monitor the border 

areas, watching for unlawful rebel crossings and illicit activities. 

And, finally, there needs to be consideration of how to improve 

the peacekeeping MONUSCO’s poor record of protecting civilians. 

Some in the Administration are considering an option to bring the 

neutral international force under MONUSCO’s troop ceiling levels. 

Sierra Leone is a model that could be replicated. In that case, Pakistani forces joined the UNAMSIL [United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone] peacekeeping operation under a U.N. mandate but 

with a distinct mission to move the Revolutionary United Front 

rebels off the diamond mines in Sierra Leone. 

However, the neutral international force should not become part 

of a peacekeeping mission where the mandate is confused, the rules 

of engagement are varyingly interpreted and communicated by 

U.N. headquarters in New York, the special rep to the Secretary 

General in Kinshasa, and the force commander in the east. 

Dr. FRAZER. In conclusion, the U.S. Government, and we in civil 

society, must act with humility, recognizing that the governments 

and people of the regions themselves are ultimately responsible. 

We can only assist them to establish the inclusive governance, the 

robust regional security mechanisms that are the foundations for 

eliminating all armed negative forces in creating the conditions for 

empowered citizens and economic prosperity. 

Thank you very much, Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Frazer can be found in the Appendix on page 79.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Dr. Carafano. 

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES JAY CARAFANO, VICE PRESIDENT, 

FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, THE HERITAGE 

FOUNDATION 

Dr. CARAFANO. Thank you, sir. I want to start by saying, I believe the United States does have an interest in promoting peace, 

prosperity, and freedoms among the nations of Africa and that I believe the U.S. can play a constructive role in the DRC, albeit limited. And from a security standpoint, we want a stable Central Africa, so that we can focus on our real national security concerns in 

the region, which are a growing global Islamist insurgency and 

transnational terrorist threat out of North Africa. 

So I think where we start is we start by acknowledging where 

we are. And that is that the status quo is, and I think everybody 

agrees that there is no status quo, that things are getting worse. 

And you know, one witness stated last week in the Foreign Affairs 

hearings, the Congo is too big to fail. Well, I would submit, in the 

eastern Congo, we are failing. 

So I make three recommendations in my prepared statement. 

And the first one is, stop doing what isn’t working. The U.N. peacekeepers in the Congo have been a failure. Our efforts to reform the 
35 

Congolese army have been a failure, and we should stop throwing 

a lot of good effort at the bat. I spent 25 years in the military. I 

am hard pressed to find a security force less competent and less 

equal to the task at hand. 

So my second recommendation is that we really seriously think 

about the United States getting behind moving through a different 

model. Some people call this the Somalia model, but I do think that 

the alternative credible option is something like like-minded African nations banding together, working to provide security in this 

situation. And I think it may be controversial; I think, at the end 

of the day, Uganda and Rwanda have to be a part of that. They 

can’t be the lead, because, obviously, they are not objective, and 

they have to play by the rules. But I think if they—if we construct 

a situation where they see that it is in their interest to cooperate 

and work in that direction, that that is a force that could credibly 

bring some peace to the east Congo. 

So the third is, and what I principally want to talk about today 

is, what is the U.S. military role. And I think the U.S. military role 

is for the United States military in Africa under AFRICOM to continue to do the things that it does very well, which is limited but 

important capacity-building efforts. And the thing is, you build capacity, where you can; not where you want. So you have to work 

with countries that you can actually credibly do the capacity building. So some of these programs, such as IMET [International Military Education and Training program], the individual military education training program, they are very low cost and they have very, 

very high impact. For many years, I was affiliated with the National Defense University, the Fellows Program in the College of 

International Security Affairs. These are amazing programs. You 

know, I would meet—work with these guys one on one, and it 

wasn’t about Americans lecturing to them because they were with 

fellows from countries all over the world facing very similar situations learning from each other. Everyone I ever worked with was 

incredibly dedicated. They were smart, and they left wanting to go 

back to their country and make a difference. And the ones that I 

have kept in contact, over the years, they have made a difference. 

So I think these programs are enormously important. They have 

to be very well integrated with the rest of what the interagency 

community is doing on the other fronts. They have to be better integrated with other individual efforts, such as things being done 

like by the USIP [United States Institute of Peace] and some of 

their initiatives, and what some NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] and things can do. One of my favorites is Spirit of America. They are not currently active in the Congo, but Spirit of America is a terrific NGO that works with U.S. military on the ground, 

helping build capacity for what they need. 

My biggest concern that I think that this committee should focus 

on is, keeping AFRICOM doing the right things; is that a sustainable effort over the long-term? And I have significant concerns 

there, when you look at the global responsibilities that the United 

States has to protect its interest and you look at the long-term 

plans to provide for that, I think they are simply inadequate. One 

of the first things that will fall off the table, and this is somebody 

that lived through this in the 1990s, when we almost went hollow 
36 

then, is the small low-cost efforts that have very big pay off, because they keep brush fires from becoming forest fires, are often 

the first thing to cut, to go. 

And my two, I think, most important recommendations for the 

committee are: Number one, I really think you need an independent review of the next Quadrennial Defense Review to really 

get a cold, clear-eyed assessment if we are really providing the resources that our military needs to do all of these missions from the 

big important vital national security missions to these helpful tasks 

that prevent a future national security crisis. And the second is, I 

would recommend to the committee that you need a better way of 

really understanding the readiness of some of these low-end things, 

these assistance missions which are so important and helpful and 

very low cost—and if they are done correctly and they have the 

right mission sets, they don’t just lead to mission creep—that those 

things aren’t falling off the table. So I think this committee needs 

some way the Department of Defense can give them a better assessment of the readiness to do these mission and then the longterm viability of these missions. Because the Congo, regardless of 

the most brilliant solution that anybody on this panel comes up 

with today, this is not a problem that is going to go away in 5 minutes. 

Thank you so much for the opportunity to speak today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Carafano can be found in the Appendix on page 88.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Affleck. 

STATEMENT OF BEN AFFLECK, FOUNDER, EASTERN CONGO 

INITIATIVE 

Mr. AFFLECK. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, distinguished Members of the Armed Services Committee, on behalf of 

the Eastern Congo Initiative, I want to first thank you for holding 

this hearing and devoting your time and attention to the ongoing 

crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

My name is Ben Affleck. I am the founder of the Eastern Congo 

Initiative. We are the only U.S.-based grantmaking and advocacy 

organization entirely focused on working with, and for the people 

of eastern Congo, a region that has the unwanted distinction of 

being one of the most volatile in the world and the site of the deadliest conflict since World War II. 

From the outset, let me say that I am not here to ask for American tax dollars. I am here today to respectfully request that you 

use the most important power you have, your collective voice as 

Representatives of the United States of America. 

From 1998 to 2003, eight African nations fought on Congolese 

soil, causing the deaths of millions, forcing tens of thousands of 

children to become child soldiers and, in some areas of Congo, subjecting as many as two of every three women to rape and other 

forms of sexual violence. 

The United Nations estimates that as many as 900,000 Congolese have been newly displaced in the North Kivu Province since 

fighting reignited earlier this year. As you know, just a few weeks 

ago in Goma, the economic center and capital of North Kivu Prov-
37 

ince was temporarily controlled by the newly formed M23 militia 

and injuring hundreds, displacing tens of thousands. 

M23 is just the latest in the long list of armed groups who have 

destabilized the Congo since 1994. With the latest violence, the 

world is reminded that the systemic sources of instability in this 

region have yet to be addressed. 

Still, on the face of this violence and suffering, the people of eastern Congo remain committed to helping their neighbors and rebuilding their communities. ECI [Eastern Congo Initiative] staff 

and our partners have continued to work throughout the crisis, not 

only providing humanitarian assistance but continuing important 

development activities focused on a brighter future. 

When heavy shelling began last month near our office in Goma, 

the surgeons, doctors, and nurses of ECI’s partner, HEAL Africa, 

rushed to the hospital, anticipating increased numbers of wounded 

in what is already an overcrowded hospital. Many of these same 

caregivers were still at the hospital 5 days later, providing free 

treatment to numerous civilians wounded in the conflict. 

Another ECI partner, Mutaani FM, continued to broadcast news 

throughout the crisis. Mutaani, the only independent radio station 

in Goma, is located across the street from the Congolese army 

headquarters, which was seized and occupied by M23 during the 

height of the conflict. 

Despite the odds, these brave journalists, all young adults in 

their 20s, stayed on the airways, either reporting from the front 

lines or locked safely inside the radio station, reporting on the 

fighting as it spread across the region. 

Every day I am inspired by the resilience and the determination 

of the Congolese, who desperately want to live their lives in peace, 

earn a decent living, and raise their families just like the rest of 

us. 

Mr. Chairman, they deserve better than the cycle of violence and 

upheaval that continues to undermine their daily work of rebuilding this war-torn community. 

While the M23 has withdrawn from Goma, they have not disbanded. In fact, as of this morning, our team on the ground tells 

us they are just 4 miles away from the city center, and there are 

fears that they may attack Goma again. We have seen this cycle 

repeat itself too many times: Violence flares up, and the international community turns its attention for a moment to this part 

of the world. Violence recedes, and the world turns away in relief, 

without addressing the systemic issues that must be dealt with in 

order for lasting peace to be established and maintained. 

Since my very first visit to Congo in 2006, it is clear to me that 

the pursuit of durable peace in Congo is not hopeless; quite the 

contrary, in fact. The solutions are not new, nor are they particularly complex. But without persistent high leadership by the 

United States, the key players will not come to the table and will 

not do their part. 

First, let’s set aside the notion that the recent talks in Kampala 

will end this cycle of violence. Last week’s negotiations were not 

even attended by the region’s key players. It is for this reason that 

ECI has called on the U.N. Secretary General to appoint a special 

envoy under the joint auspices of the U.N. and the African Union 
38 

to bring all stakeholders together to craft real, implementable solutions. We are delighted that Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson 

announced the State Department’s support for this idea in his recent testimony. 

For 15 years, the United Nations has run a peacekeeping mission 

in Congo. The time has come to fundamentally reconsider its mandate. As M23 moved into Goma, the 17,000 troops deployed across 

DRC that make up the United Nations stabilization mission, 

known as MONUSCO, did not protect civilians in harm’s way. This 

failure raises serious concerns. That said, the larger failure most 

certainly lies with the DRC’s own security forces’ continued inability to protect their citizens. 

With focused U.S. leadership, the U.N. mandate should reflect 

the needs of the country, and the DRC security sector must be reformed. Last week we were delighted that the U.N. Secretary General launched a review of MONUSCO’s mission. We hope that the 

United States will take the lead in the Security Council, supporting 

significant changes to MONUSCO’s mandate. At a minimum, the 

mandate must be strengthened to enable whatever force remains 

to actually keep the peace and protect the people. 

We also believe the U.N.’s mandate in Congo should not be indefinite. An open-ended mandate undermines the urgency for the 

Congolese Government to take responsibility for protecting their 

own citizens. 

Looking beyond the United Nations, donor countries have enormous leverage in the region which they should exert to bring key 

regional players together for serious negotiations. International donors can play a more active role in preventing violence from returning. 

And of course, Congo’s neighbors play a critical role in regional 

security. There will be no lasting stability without their leadership. 

The United Nations has been presented with evidence that M23 

is sustained by significant outside support from Rwanda and Uganda. If these accusations are true, any support must end. Congo’s 

neighbors have legitimate security concerns and their national 

economies greatly benefit from DRC’s natural resources. We hope 

the President of Rwanda and Uganda will engage in serious discussions about the many issues that affect regional stability. 

The Obama administration can and should leverage its unique 

relationship with these leaders to insist they pursue resolutions directly with the Government in Congo, rather than indirectly 

through the support of armed militias. 

It is not enough for the M23 to withdraw from Goma. Until the 

militia is disbanded, the people of the eastern Congo will live with 

a daily threat of violence. To be clear, eliminating M23 alone will 

not restore peace. Just the last time I was in Congo in February, 

there were at least 27 armed groups operating in the eastern provinces. 

The regional aspect of this conflict include failures in Kinshasa. 

Since the last ceasefire in 2006, too little has changed inside 

Congo. Kinshasa must take seriously its lack of legitimacy in many 

parts of Congo and act now to address the grievances of its people. 

When Goma fell to M23, there were spontaneous riots in Bukavu, 

Kisangani, and Kinshasa, aimed not only at militia violence but 
39 

also at the failure of President Kabila’s government to protect its 

citizens. To restore legitimacy, the Independent National Electoral 

Commission should immediately set a date for and begin to organize the provincial elections that were supposed to take place in 

March of this year. The electoral commission itself has been seen 

by opposition parties and international election observers as an obstacle to political legitimacy. It must be reformed. 

President Kabila must also commit to the overdue reform of Congo’s security sector. This is critical. Without competent military 

and law enforcement institutions, Congo’s territory will continue to 

provide safe haven to armed groups who prey on civilians and disrupt economic development. 

In April of this year, ECI helped lead an effort alongside nearly 

300 Congolese civil society organizations to publish a comprehensive support about the need for security sector reform in Congo. 

This report, which I ask to be submitted for the record, calls for 

an end to the conflict through a comprehensive reform of security 

institutions, which include the military, law enforcement, such as 

police and the courts. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 

Mr. AFFLECK. President Kabila has expressed an interest in SSR 

[Security Sector Reform], but it has not been a priority of his administration. It must become a priority now, and the U.S. has an 

important role to play in assuring that this happens. 

Mr. Chairman, I realize we are laying out a very broad agenda, 

but we know that none of this, not the revised MONUSCO mandate, the increased donor involvement, the responsible behavior of 

DRC’s neighbors, or internal DRC reforms, will happen without direct, high-level, focused U.S. leadership. President Obama and 

many of you have unique leverage with key international and regional stakeholders, and the United States is held in very high regard by the Congolese people. Your leadership can make a difference if we act so decisively, and do so today. 

This is why ECI has called on the President to appoint a temporary special envoy to signal clearly that finding a lasting solution 

to the crisis in Central Africa is a priority for his Administration. 

Past models for this approach, including Senator John Kerry to 

Sudan, the late veteran diplomat Richard Holbrooke on the Balkans, or General Colin Powell to Haiti, demonstrates that highlevel diplomatic intervention at the right moment can cut through 

deadly impasses and open the way toward peace and lasting stability. 

At the United Nations, the new Presidential envoy should work 

with the Secretary General to establish a timetable for regional negotiations, revise MONUSCO’s mandate, and draw up a strategy 

for reinstating a ceasefire in case violence flares up again. 

Internationally, the U.S. should encourage our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and other key partners to provide 

police, judicial and military training so that the Congolese government can increase its capacity to protect its own people as 

MONUSCO’s mandate winds down. 

U.S. Africa Command’s, AFRICOM’s, work with the Congolese 

army has demonstrated that a little training could have a big im-
40 

pact. During the most recent crisis, ECI staff in Goma got a car 

stuck in a ditch. It happens a lot, unfortunately. A truck full of 

Congolese soldiers pulled up and offered to help, and to be honest, 

our staff wasn’t sure what to expect. In the past, this kind of help 

would most likely have been accompanied by a request for a bribe. 

In this case, the soldiers brought the car out of the ditch and simply waved goodbye. It turns out, they were part of the unit that 

AFRICOM trained in 2010. 

The successful AFRICOM training mission is only the latest example in the 52 years since Congo’s independence of the close U.S.- 

Congolese ties. As a major donor of humanitarian and other assistance our country has much more influence in Kinshasa than we 

have been willing to exert. 

The President’s envoy should engage directly with President 

Kabila to accept assistance in developing a strategy for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. With an agreedupon deadline in place for announcing the SSR strategy, the U.S. 

should step in to provide Congo with whatever technical support it 

needs in partnership with the EU [European Union], NATO, and 

others to complete planning. 

AFRICOM—I am rushing to try to get through the 5 minutes, 

which I think I passed about 15 minutes ago—AFRICOM’s plan to 

train a second unit of the FARDC should be put on hold until provincial elections are organized and President Kabila produces and 

commits to a workable plan for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. But once that commitment is clear, Congo will 

need and deserves international support to ensure that reform 

takes hold. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress and the Armed Services 

Committee in particular hear more urgent requests for U.S. leadership in the world than can be answered. Resolving the cycle of violence does not necessarily require significant new financial investment by the United States or U.S. boots on the ground. It does, 

however, require American political leadership, moral leadership 

even, to bring the parties together to address the larger sources of 

instability in the region. 

I may be naive, but I believe that our actions in foreign policy 

represent our values as a country. They represent who we are as 

a people. Soon, I will be making my tenth trip to Congo, and I 

know that if your constituents were to go to Congo and see what 

is happening there, they, too, would insist that we do something 

about it. 

I founded ECI in part to serve as a megaphone to amplify the 

voices of the people of eastern Congo, and I thank you very much 

for the opportunity to do that today. In fact, it is an honor. Even 

in the face of violence and upheaval, the Congolese remain resilient 

and entirely determined to rebuild their country. The 70 million 

Congolese deserve a better tomorrow, and they haven’t given up 

trying to build a better future. 

With support from Congress and leadership from the President, 

the United States can help them get there. We can help, and we 

should. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Affleck can be found in the Appendix on page 99.] 
41 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

You brought up a point that always bothers me about these hearings. We bring in experts, give them 5 minutes to tell us everything 

they know about it, and then we are supposed to absorb all of that 

and make policy. 

I would prefer sitting around the coffee table and discussing it 

to get really to the point of the matter. But it is what it is, and 

we will deal with it. 

You all are very familiar with the situation. I, frankly, knew 

nothing about the Congo, other than what I have learned here 

today. It is not an area of the world that we have focused on. We 

have a war in Afghanistan. We just completed a war in Iraq. We 

are looking at other very serious threats around the world, and 

that is kind of where my focus has been, so I really thank Adam 

for bringing this to our attention, and for encouraging us to hold 

this hearing, because I think it has been a real eye-opener to me. 

I was in a meeting the other day when it was brought up by a 

Member about the seriousness of Syria, and in a year, we have lost, 

had 40,000 people killed there. And that is something that the 

whole world is focused on. And yet, I come here today and learn 

that we have lost 5 million people in the Congo, and I didn’t know 

about it until right now. 

It is amazing what we know and what we don’t know. Having 

said that and having listened to this testimony and understanding 

that we are spending $480 million, roughly, a year in this area— 

you have all been there, you understand it—is that, are we spending it the way we should? 

If you were a king for a day, or queen, what would you—say we 

are able to keep spending that money. We have sequestration that 

is hitting us. We are cutting a trillion dollars out of defense over 

the next 10 years if all of this goes through. You already heard the 

stories of how much we are cutting back our military and our ability to carry out our missions, but assuming we could keep spending 

that same money there, what would you do with that money, each 

of you? 

Mr. AFFLECK. First of all, I am not sure sequestration is going 

to hit. We have to plan for success, I think, and my answers will 

reflect the assumption that that is—that doesn’t take place. 

There are a number of things I would do, you know, if I could 

wave a magic wand. But speaking in practical terms, you know, the 

mandate needs to be completely reexamined. Even if you talk to 

people within the United Nations, they talk about MONUSCO 

being a failure. You go to Congo and you talk to Congolese civilians, and they have got an anger and a resentment toward, you 

know, people from the United Nations that you can’t believe. They 

are spending a billion [dollars] plus total down there trying to help 

people, and they deeply resent it. And the reason they deeply resent it is because their mandate is to protect civilians, but when 

trouble breaks out, they are hiding in barracks, or they are avoiding these confrontations, or they are allowing militias like M23, 

which is the size of half a battalion in the United States military, 

to run roughshod and take over the city. 

So civilians are not being protected. The mandate is deeply 

flawed. 
42 

Leadership probably needs to be reexamined. I think that I 

would, in a very broad sense, look at making sure that we are protecting civilians and making sure that we are using the leverage 

that we have through MONUSCO—as you say, we are spending 

over $400 million, you know, a year—that we get our money’s 

worth for the American taxpayer, that we need to ask for better. 

It is a noble and valiant mission. It is a place where people are suffering, and we can do better. 

And one of the ways that we can do better is to try to expand 

upon some of the training that they are doing there, trying to address this issue of soldiers getting paid, which is one of the real 

problems down there, is that nobody gets paid. Their salary is $40 

a month, and they are not even getting that. And there is a culture 

handed down since Mobutu that says, you know, well, don’t worry 

about getting paid; you are really going to live off the population. 

And that is what has given rise to the FARDC being responsible 

for more than 40 percent of the gender-based violence in that country. 

As you can see, it is quite a web, but I think, you know, we have 

a lot of levers for sure at the U.N., and we ought to be examining 

those right away. 

Dr. FRAZER. Thank you, Chairman. 

I think the first thing to do is to get the policy or the diplomatic 

framework correct. And by that I mean that, without spending any 

money, really, if the Administration would put in place the type of 

bilateral commissions in which they can then focus the Congolese 

government’s attention on security sector reform and raise the priority and the attention of the Congolese government, that would go 

very far, without really costing anything more than plane tickets. 

So that is the first thing, is really focus on the diplomatic framework in which this relationship is happening. Right now, it is extremely weak. It was much stronger during the last Administration 

through mechanisms that were put in place, like the Tripartite 

Plus process and joint planning cells. 

Secondly, I think that Ben is exactly right; the MONUSCO mandate is problematic, but we strengthened it over many, many years. 

We are spending $1.5 billion. That mission costs $1.5 billion. I 

mean, it is not, obviously, having the effect that we want. I would 

really focus on training both the Congolese battalion that we talked 

about, but this international neutral force, which is really African 

forces, and we have done this before. We are doing it successfully 

in the AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia], which is 

mainly Uganda and Burundi, who have really stabilized Mogadishu 

and are playing a very positive role in Somalia. We did it very effectively in Liberia, when we first had African forces on the ground, 

and then they transitioned to blue helmets. In this case, we have 

a blue helmet force already, but I would say that if we can train 

up and work with regional forces, and the Southern African development community, namely South Africa, Tanzania, and maybe 

Angola, have said they would put forces. So plan with them, work 

with them, and they may not need equipment, and they may not 

even need movement because they actually have that capacity 

within their army. But the planning side, work very closely with 

them, bring them in as maybe part of MONUSCO’s mandate; 
43 

maybe not. I think that is for the Administration to work out, but 

get a real strike force that could have some real capability on the 

ground. 

And African forces are increasingly showing both the responsibility as well as the capacity to do this type of mission. And this 

is a planning mission. This is not U.S. boots, you know, getting into 

offensive operations. So that would be the second. 

Thirdly, I would say that really we are not spending very much 

on the type of issues, as my colleague here said, on the IMET, the 

International Military Education Training. We are spending less 

than half a million dollars, about $450,000, which is in military 

justice, on human rights training, and other types of 

professionalization and changing the ethos of the Congolese army. 

I think that, you know, $500,000 really is not going to hurt anybody. Those numbers are actually decreasing. We probably should 

sustain that level, if not increase it slightly. But I don’t want to ask 

for money in a certain environment, but certainly, we shouldn’t be 

decreasing or we really need to put a focus on that type of 

professionalization and training of the Congolese army. Thank you. 

Dr. CARAFANO. I will be very quick. I think we all agree, we 

could have different solutions, but we all agree that the security 

force that is there now is not adequate. So we are not getting the 

return on investment. I think that is very clear, and I would put 

that as number one. 

I certainly think spending a lot more money is not going to make 

a lot of difference. This is the largest country in Africa. It is the 

19th largest country in the world, [19th] most populous country in 

the world. But we can get much, much more efficiency for what we 

have. 

So the one area where I might differ a little, is this notion of 

kind of, I think, top-down reform, particularly in the security sector, I am just not very optimistic about that at all. I do think the 

key has to really be empowering at the provincial level. So I think 

the provincial level is very important, but I, honestly, I mean, you 

know, we can build all the battalions that we want. In a country 

of this size, you know, we have got to have capacity at the local 

level, and I think we have to go from a top-down approach to a bottom-up approach. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Carafano, your opening remarks said a couple of things that 

are very near and dear to my heart, talking to the Somalia model 

and how this is really sort of, you know, building capacity of local 

partners, and it is a light footprint approach that can yield huge 

results. I think that is the direction that our foreign policy needs 

to go in, is partnership between DOD, State, and also we do need 

to really improve on the development and economic piece as well, 

so that we are not spending a lot of money and we are not putting, 

you know, U.S. lives at risk. Both, that saves us money, and it is 

also, as you just said in your last remarks, it is much more effective. You build the local capacity. We can’t simply show up and say, 

we are here, we are going to fix your problems. That doesn’t work. 

It has got to be capacity building. It has got to be locally driven. 
44 

And I think Somalia is an excellent model. We worked with Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, and, you know, we have had 

success, by Somalia measures at any rate, based on their efforts in 

that country, in a very light footprint. And the partnership there 

has also helped us in Yemen. You look at what we invested in Iraq 

and Afghanistan versus what we invested in the Horn of Africa 

problem and what resulted, and you see the wisdom of this approach. And I definitely think that we need to move that that direction, and I think the DRC is a very important place to do that. 

It has to be locally driven. 

That said, I want to explore a little bit on the training of the battalion issue. That kind of is locally driven. You know, light footprint, we train their military to get better at security, and it seems 

to me that none of this is going to happen unless we figure out how 

to do it. 

I think the U.S. has to play a role. So, two questions about that. 

Do you think it makes sense to look for opportunities to train more 

battalions, use that light footprint to build the DRC capacity? And 

then, second, the thing that would be really helpful, but it is really 

tough in the eastern Congo, is to get the support from those countries I just mentioned, who gave us support in Somalia and also 

Angola to play a role in this, too. There is a lot of painful history 

with all of those countries in the eastern Congo. Do you think we 

can overcome that and that those countries can be a useful part of, 

sort of, you know, sort of flopping that Horn of Africa model over 

onto the eastern DRC? How do we build that vision? 

Dr. CARAFANO. Let me answer the second part of that question 

first. I am a strategist, so for a strategist, the right answer is the 

right answer, right. There is no such thing as a universal model 

that works everywhere. 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. 

Dr. CARAFANO. On the other hand, I would say that this region 

is prime for something that looks like the Somalia model, recognizing all of the difficulties involved. The payoff here I think is 

enormous, and I think it is the quintessential piece. 

To go back to the first question, I am just very skeptical about 

security sector reform in a country that is thoroughly corrupt, 

where the government is widely perceived as illegitimate, and 

where you don’t have the infrastructure, and you have this enormous army. So these little tiny battalions, I am sure are wonderful 

little models, but it is the 19th most populous country in the world. 

And the eastern Congo is a huge region. 

So I think if you want to get something in there and then stabilize that, the Somalia model a very worthy and important first 

step that stems the bleeding. 

And then I think this, as in the DRC, I mean unless we—you are 

not going to see this dramatic reform from the top down at any 

time in the near future. You really have to look at models in the 

countryside, at the provincial level, empowering provisional officials to look after this. 

Now, you can find bad examples of these things. If you don’t do 

it right, you can have war lordism, right, and the country can devolve into civil war. If you are just throwing money and weapons 

at people—— 
45 

Mr. SMITH. I think we—— 

Dr. CARAFANO. Right. So the key is actually something really you 

mentioned, and something where the United States has learned an 

awful lot of very good lessons, and that is to look at these things 

in a more holistic way, to do the kind of security development and 

economic development and civil society development. You know, 

there is no perfect model for this. Again, side by side, in tandem, 

keep these things in mind, and they do provide enduring solutions. 

Mr. SMITH. But, actually, I think we have resources that can do 

that. 

And, Mr. Affleck, I wanted to ask, if you could sort of put a positive piece on this, because I know in working with the Eastern 

Congo Initiative before, there are a lot of positive things going on 

in the eastern DRC, in terms of economic groups, in terms of 

groups. I was over there, visited with HEAL Africa, a group I know 

you support, trying to combat the institutionalized rape that happens there. There is economic development happening, which I 

know you guys have been focused on. Again, somebody can paint 

the picture and go, this is hopeless, nothing can be done there, but 

that is really not the case. Talk a little bit about some of the positive stuff that is going on, even now, in the DRC. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Sure. You know, at ECI, we really see the country 

through the prism of the people that we meet on the ground. And 

I agree with you that, you know, there necessarily needs to be an 

effort from the ground up to reform some of these larger institutions. 

I also believe that the top-down reform is necessary, as well. 

But when I think about Congo, when I look at Congo, I don’t 

think about well, you know, all of the dead and all of the sexual, 

the gender-based violence, all of the terrible things you hear; one 

in five children die before the age of 5 years old. That misery, that 

suffering, is real. Just as real is a tremendous and indomitable 

spirit that you see from Congolese people, that we see with so 

many of our grantees, who are teaching, who are building capacity 

with former child soldiers to help them find work in the economy, 

for people who are struggling mightily and oftentimes in the face 

of literal warfare to keep their country together, and not just keep 

their country together but to build their country. And so I have to 

reject on a very basic level this sort of pervasive notion of hopelessness that exists. 

It becomes sort of fashionable to say, like in a larger sense, the 

continent of Africa, oh, well, you know, hopeless, corrupt, problematic, can’t fix it. You know, not true. Not true in Africa. Not true 

in Congo. Not true in eastern Congo, because it is seeing advancements. 

And I do believe that there is, you know, necessarily a kind of 

incrementalism that has to be part of one’s approach that, yes, 

these battalions are rather small, and right now, they are just emblematic of what could happen, but it can in fact happen because 

I have seen other similar progress take place. And I have seen it 

engineered, conceived, and driven by people who live there, you 

know, which makes sense if you think about it. The people who are 

best equipped to rebuild their neighborhood are the people who live 

there. And so when I think about that, and when I think about the 
46 

hopefulness that I have seen, then I do believe that it is possible 

to, for example, where with funding through the Panzi Hospital in 

South Kivu, women’s organizations for, sort of, to pursue legal solutions to having been raped. We see that some of the police force 

can, in fact, be improved, and we take these signs, albeit, you 

know, small measurements, and we assume that if it can be done 

in this minor way, it can be done on a larger scope. Will it be easy? 

No. Is it, you know, are they simple solutions? No. But I know for 

a fact, from having been on the ground, from having seen the people there who have a tremendous desire to work, and many of 

whom who are educated, many of whom who understand and reject 

the corruption in their own country. It is not a pervasive thing 

where all Congolese are corrupt. You know, as you all know, we 

fostered and supported a corrupt guy named Mubutu during the 

Cold War because he was, for national security reasons, and that 

inculcated a culture of corruption within the sort of official government level. 

But people in that country don’t want that. They reject it. And 

if people show up and say, let us partner with you in trying to rid 

your country of this, I think you will find that the people of Congo 

will be extremely receptive and not just willing but active partners. 

Mr. SMITH. All right. Thank you very much. It is one of the, you 

know, most rich countries in minerals and resources. There is a lot 

of potential there for a very positive relationship with the U.S., you 

know. 

Beyond just the terrorism concerns that can arise from instability, there is an economic opportunity there that I think we 

should work to try and seize. Thank you. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. Affleck, Dr. Frazer, Mr. Carafano, I think you all raised one 

central issue, and that is the lack of security among the population. 

So, right now, we are relying upon the Congolese government to 

provide that security. In Afghanistan, we have had a questionable 

partner in the Karzai government, and that has been difficult. And 

we have a less than credible partner, I think, in the Congolese government. In Afghanistan, we have gone to these village stabilization operations to provide—as an alternative way to provide security at the local level within villages, within communities, whereby 

we have been providing some arms and some training to the local 

population there, so that they can provide their own security. Obviously, the Karzai government is opposed, has been opposed to that. 

Are there any opportunities for any alternative strategies, given 

the nature of the Congolese government in the DRC? 

Mr. Affleck. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Well, I will, you know, in a second just yield to expert fellow panelists here, but you know, one of the things that I 

think, the basic issue, and a really simple issue and one that would 

go a long way and I alluded to earlier, is that, you know, applying 

some influence to President Kabila so that payment is made to his 

troops. I think that, if there is one fell swoop, one stroke that 

would dramatically improve people’s lives off the bat, you know, 

that would be it. And that would do a sort of—that would take a 

wholesale step toward improving the security sector. 
47 

You know, but as we talk about security sector, as if it is this 

kind of mammoth thing, and on one level, it is, but on another 

level, if you had paid soldiers who had any incentive to fight, for 

example, you wouldn’t have a major capital overrun and taken over 

by 1,200 guys. I mean, that is half the size of the kids at my high 

school. That shows you the degree to which the Federal Government, in effect, is unable to exert control, even the smallest amount 

of control in the east. And I think that that issue is—goes hand in 

glove with security sector reform, and then I will—— 

Mr. COFFMAN. Dr. Frazer, and then Mr. Carafano. 

Dr. FRAZER. I will be very brief. This, actually, working in training in local communities for self-protection was actually done in 

Rwanda against the FDLR. 

I am not so sure about doing this in Congo. It is attractive to me, 

but I guess I would say, depends on the community. And I also 

would say that I think that the key here, again, is really to engage 

and embrace the Congolese government at the most senior level, 

but not just at the presidential level, but even at the ministerial 

level, which is why I keep talking about some type of binational 

commission, because then I think you can start penetrating those 

ministries, which have the responsibility, even bring governors 

over, so that you can, you know, deal at the provincial level. 

But I guess I think that the real heavy lift here is more on the 

diplomatic side and working very, very carefully with the Congolese government, which is essentially isolated and doesn’t have 

very much contact, frankly, with our officials at this point in time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Carafano. 

Dr. CARAFANO. So I remember about an army that wasn’t paid, 

and the Government reneged on all its promises. And when the 

American Revolution ended, the Continental Army went home. 

That says an awful lot about the nature and the character of the 

society, and I think that we will all agree that if you have a security solution that doesn’t fit with the situation on the ground and 

the people on the ground, it is simply not going to work. 

I am sorry, I am very skeptical that the Government in Kinshasa 

is ever going to be a force for good in resolving this. But, on the 

other hand, I totally agree with Mr. Affleck and Dr. Frazer. This 

is a country of great people, and if we can enable them to take control of their own lives, I think we will see constructive—that is why 

I am much more optimistic about solutions at the provincial level. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. West from Florida. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. And I want to try to a 

draw on, you know, what I saw my year in Iraq and 21⁄2 years in 

Afghanistan. I see this kind of, how do you put together a train? 

And too often what we do, we put a caboose before the engine, and 

then we have the train wreck and come back and say, why did it 

happen? Because we never figure out what comes first, the secure 

environment, or does the legitimate governance, or does the individual, the military education and training? 

So what I would like to ask you all, knowing what is the situation on the ground with Congo—and I do agree that you have to 

start at the provincial and the district level. I mean, we kind of 
48 

learned that lesson late in Afghanistan, because, I mean, that is 

the basis of that culture. Which is the right model to go with here? 

Because, Mr. Affleck, you talked about 27 different militia type 

of groups, so even if you try to have the governance corrected, if 

the militia groups are still running around, they continue to 

delegitimize the efforts that you are doing with the Government, 

which is exactly what we saw in Afghanistan when we tried to 

focus on Kabul, and Kabul doesn’t extend out beyond the city limits. So as we build this train in the Congo, which would you all recommend to come first in order for us to be on the track to success? 

Dr. CARAFANO. You know, I would just start that, you know, if 

you get the international security assistance piece right, and you 

had European—I mean, excuse me, African nations, including 

Uganda and Rwanda, participating, then I think that gives you 

some breathing space to move on. So, to me, that is the essential 

thing that has got to happen first. 

Dr. FRAZER. I guess I would say that, one, I take—I understand 

the premise, but I believe you can do both at the same time. I think 

you have to deal with governance, but obviously, creating greater 

security for the—— 

Mr. WEST. Governance at which level? 

Dr. FRAZER. At all levels, but you cannot, I don’t think, frankly, 

do real governance at the provincial level with governors, unless 

you are dealing with the capital, because of the nature of the Congolese government and how it works. 

That said, I think that you start where you are, and you have 

MONUSCO. You have this force that is of no real effectiveness. Try 

to bring in units or create a new unit within it that has that capacity. And so I guess I would say that you definitely need—I guess 

I would put my, if I were forced to make a choice, I would—and 

I was dealing at the provincial level, the only force that is out there 

right now is MONUSCO. So I would try to bring into MONUSCO 

units that are actually capable. 

What I would say is that it is ironic for me to hear the Somali 

model presented as a success because that is something that has 

taken years to get to the point where it is, and it is going to be 

the same thing in Congo. And we never said, well, we can’t deal 

with the transitional federal government at the same time that we 

are dealing with AMISOM. We had to do them together, recognizing that it was going to take a long time. There were going to 

be casualties on the ground, and we were going to learn as we 

went. I mean, I think that it is really getting in there and working, 

without putting our forces at real risk, that is going to be necessary. 

And so I—and also I would just say, add to that is, I have actually worked with the national government, and it is not as hopeless 

as is being presented here either. It obviously needs a lot of work, 

but you deal with who you are dealing with. 

Mr. WEST. Okay. 

Mr. AFFLECK. I did not have the honor to serve in the in our 

Armed Forces, and I did not have the opportunity to go to Afghanistan and Iraq, so I am speaking from secondhand experience. But 

the sense that I get was that the United States Government and 

United States Armed Forces successfully trained troops in Afghani-
49 

stan and in Iraq, both under circumstances where, very much unlike DRC, where they were doing so under hostile circumstances, 

folks who were sometimes—and some folks who turned out to be 

hostile to the United States, and there was a situation of violence, 

and lives were lost. 

What that tells me is that it is doable. It is a doable thing because the United States has done it. Not perfectly, you know, but 

it was done. Now, I am not suggesting that we spend the kind of 

money that that took, but I am pointing to that, in a much more 

difficult situation, this goal was achieved. Now, I don’t think it 

should be the United States that steps in and reforms the 100,000- 

plus FARDC military. I do think that it is a job for multinational 

forces. I think it is a good idea. It may be a good job for NATO. 

It is the step, I believe, that will go the furthest the quickest in 

changing the quality of life for people and eliminating the 27 

armed groups that you talk about—are going to find it much more 

difficult to operate when they feel as though there is a force 

present that they are not equal to. And all of a sudden people 

aren’t going to want to take Goma and people aren’t going to believe that they can achieve political goals through violent means 

because there is an active state security force that prevents that 

kind of thing from happening, so as happens in developed countries 

when people turn to the ballot box. I can’t speak to the exact model 

of how that would work because I am not qualified to. But I can 

speak to the fact that it is possible. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. West. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to all of our witnesses for coming today. 

Mr. Affleck, you mentioned in your testimony about how 

AFRICOM’s work with the Congolese army is demonstrating that, 

as you said, a little training can have a big impact, and you gave 

the instant about the car being stuck. ECI, obviously, has a great 

impression of that presence of U.S. Forces, and working with 

AFRICOM and helping in the ways that we haven’t been able to 

help. Do you feel like the perception of the U.S. by the people 

themselves, the Congolese, is a positive one for the presence we 

have in training and working with their forces? 

Mr. AFFLECK. Yeah, I do, for the most part, you know. I mean, 

you have a big country, and it has got, you know, so there are a 

number of different competing opinions about it, you know, and it 

is not unlike the way we are here. However, I would say that primarily—I will give you an anecdotal example. I was asked to shoot 

a film for the U.N., and I went into a bunch of refugee camps. It 

was about refugees, and this was during the fighting, the early 

fighting, when the previous version of M23, which is called the 

CNDP, was being led by a guy named Laurent Nkunda, and they 

were making very similar advancements on Goma, a lot of instability, a lot of fighting. 

And I was walking around with a camera with my big U.N. 

badge. And I was experiencing a lot of hostility from folks in the 

camp, and I was experiencing, you know, some real resentment to 

the point where I thought maybe it is not wise for me to be in here. 
50 

And so I took off the U.N. badge, and then people asked me, where 

are you from? You know, and I said, oh, America, I am American. 

And then, all of a sudden, among people who were really, really 

suffering at the bottom end of the pain ladder that was going on 

there, I was welcomed, you know, and treated quite nicely. 

Now, this is anecdotal. It is one incident, and it could be the only 

place that happened, and I don’t use this as an opportunity to beat 

up the U.N., who I do think, despite some of its failings, you know, 

also does do important work, you know, infrastructure work in particular in Africa and in the Congo in specific, but it did show me 

that Americans were respected and held in some esteem. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

And your efforts to call on the U.S. and the Administration for 

a special envoy, have those calls been received by anyone? Have 

you gotten any response yet from the Administration? 

Mr. AFFLECK. I have been given the impression that this is under 

review, which is ‘‘government-speak’’ that I just learned. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay, right, very good. Fair enough, thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I know we had a little question about the order 

a minute ago. I am going to yield the remainder of my time to my 

colleague, Ms. Sanchez, who I know had some questions she wanted to ask. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you to my colleague. 

I really want to talk to Mr. Carafano, but I would like to—but 

it relates to something that Mr. Affleck said. He thought that we 

had done a good job with respect to training military and police, 

or both, in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I would probably—maybe I 

am the only one on this committee, but I would say that that is 

a disaster for us, in most cases, a lot of the work that we have 

done. 

When we recruit in Afghanistan and 63-year-old Afghans come, 

I wouldn’t hire a 63-year-old for a police or an army position here, 

let alone somebody who is probably coming from a country where 

63 is really old. 

So we have got all those phantom army people that we have in 

Afghanistan. We have trained supposedly over 350,000, but when 

we really take a count to see who is there, maybe 20 percent of 

them are hanging out there. 

And remember, this is a force that we, the American taxpayer, 

are paying for. It is not being paid for by the Afghanistan government; it is being paid for by us. Their police stations are being paid 

for by us. So when I look at a situation like the Congo, where they 

can’t even pay them $40 a month, or what have you, I think there 

is a real problem. 

So, Doctor, tell me the truth. Do you think that this can work, 

that we are actually going to go in there or somebody is going to 

go in there and train these guys, or some African group is going 

to go in there and train these guys and, you know, we are talking 

about a battalion? I mean, I think Mr. Affleck got very lucky that 

day, but what do you think? And you know, usually I am the most 

optimistic person, but on this issue, I just see disaster. 

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, I mean, they are both good and bad lessons 

from Iraq and Afghanistan. We have learned an awful lot. But Afghanistan is a very good example, where at the end of the day, we 
51 

are kind of getting it wrong because we got on too quick a path, 

and we focused on a metric of just getting numbers by a certain 

dates. We are throwing a lot of people out there that don’t have 

their requisite skills and training and capacity to do the kinds of 

things we are going to expect them to do when we turn things over 

to them. 

So you draw yourself a little triangle, and you say, what is the 

security situation? What is my goal here? And then how much am 

I willing to spend? And then, on the third point of that triangle is, 

it says, okay, what is a realistic capability that I can put on the 

ground that is going to accomplish my goal? 

So it is all a question of, you know, good security is security that 

is good enough, right? So, you know, an American—creating an 

American unit is almost impossible feat. I mean, we spent, you 

know, years and years and years creating an NCO [non-commissioned officer] core, training officers, sending them to college. So I 

think it is about, you know, about this balance of having the cleareyed realistic goals for the amount of resources that you are willing 

to commit with and what you are going to accomplish. 

So you brought up the point of ISR and border security before. 

Those are good examples of things that are really extremely expensive to field and sustain. So ISR is great, and the question is like, 

well, what kind of ISR do you want. And my favorite story was, a 

guy from California told me, he said, we were having forest fires, 

and the DOD guy came in and said, here is some satellite imagery 

we have for you. And the guy goes, oh, this is cool. Usually, we use 

a Cessna, but thanks. I mean, so there is a case, you know, 

where—kind of a not good match of resources. 

So maybe the ISR you want isn’t necessarily a Global Hawk or 

a Scan Eagle. Maybe it is people on the ground that you can trust 

with a cell phone who are calling and telling you what is going on 

in the countryside. So it really is about this kind of realistic planning, and that is honestly, at the end of the day, that is the great 

thing about AFRICOM. If AFRICOM does its job right and it does 

the IMET and it does the training exercises and it does the capacity building that they know how to do, they are going to provide, 

they are going to help Africans provide realistic solutions. 

Heritage was, I think, the first foundation to make a credible argument for establishing AFRICOM. And we made the argument 

not because the United States is going to take over Africa, but because we want to facilitate solutions within those countries to solve 

the problems so the United States doesn’t get drawn in. So if we 

let AFRICOM do its job, it could lead people through these triangles in partnership with the other interagency people and the 

NGOs and create sustainable solutions. I really believe that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Doctor. 

And Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging. I am sorry. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Can I just add one thing? I think I may have—conjuring up Afghanistan may have been a mistake because it is associated with a lot of intense political feelings that folks have. And 

this was an example of a space where there were, you know, exponentially more hurdles to constructing a police force and a military 

force than there are in Congo. 
52 

My point simply was that we have done it in the past. Yes, we 

have failed in some ways; yes, in some ways, we have fallen short, 

but we have done it. It is doable, and if it is doable in places that 

are much more difficult to work in and operate in than DRC, then 

it can be done here. It is simply a note of optimism rather than 

an effort to try to sort of—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Affleck. 

I didn’t mean to—I mean, I was sort of just putting my position 

on this. 

Mr. AFFLECK. I understand. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Because there may be some on this committee, 

maybe a majority, who thinks that we have got the job done in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. I got news for you, America, we don’t have that 

job done. And it is going to be very expensive for us, and it continues to be very expensive for us, and you know, it is a lot of 

money. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Larsen, State of Washington. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A couple of issues where there seems to be maybe only slight differences among the three folks, and I just want to get some elucidation from you all on why you think the way you are thinking, 

and mainly under the purview of the committee, so it is mainly defense and training issues, as opposed to other issues. 

And it gets to the difference here between Mr. Affleck’s call to 

delay, if you will, the training in the second battalion until after 

there is a commitment from the Congolese government or commitment to reform, versus Dr. Frazer’s comments and even Mr. 

Carafano’s comments about, you know, focusing on the training. 

And maybe it is—maybe it is an omission that you think that 

ought to be delayed until there is a commitment to security reform, 

and maybe there is no difference at all. 

But if there is a difference, perhaps, Dr. Frazer, you could start 

by commenting, do you think we ought to move forward on training 

a second battalion without a commitment to reform, and why is 

that? 

And then, in interest, obviously, of the different view, Mr. 

Affleck, maybe respond about why you think it is important to have 

that reform in place first before you move forward. 

Dr. Frazer. 

Dr. FRAZER. Sure. Thank you for the question. 

Yes, I think we should move forward right away. And I don’t 

think that we should delay. I think the delay is an issue about trying to leverage the Congolese government to do some other things 

that they probably need to do for sure. But the amount of time that 

it actually takes us to actually do a training mission, the lead time 

that is necessary, the sort of, you know, interagency work that is 

necessary, it could be a very long time after the decision is made 

before we are actually doing that training mission. So I don’t think 

that we should delay. 

Moreover, I think—I don’t think, as a matter of policy, we should 

use this issue of training a battalion that can protect civilian lives; 

we shouldn’t hold it up for another issue about the nature of the 

election that has happened and, you know, the legitimacy. That is 

a different question that fundamentally has to be decided within 
53 

Congolese society. And if we had this high-level policy engagement 

that I am talking about, you could address that issue of legitimacy 

in the elections while at the same time preparing to protect people 

by training a battalion. 

Mr. LARSEN. Sure. 

Mr. Affleck. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Yeah, I respect and appreciate Ambassador Frazer’s position and admire her a great deal for her work in Africa. 

I think it is a very, very small distinction, frankly. Part of our 

position revolves around this notion of making sure that we are 

dealing with good partners in good faith. And that is really—really 

the question. 

And, again, it goes to the issue raised by many—many Congress 

men and women here today about, well, how do we know, you 

know, that we are working with good partners? And the idea is to 

take—to try to take equal steps down that road rather than just 

saying, hey, look, we are going to sort of come in and do this and 

the status quo can go on. 

Ambassador Frazer’s point is well-taken, that it is a time-sensitive thing to get people out there to protect civilians. I see that 

as sort of a micro-issue that would kind of be—not in principle; I 

believe it in principle. But what we are asking for are the symbols 

of that. What we are going to get out of Kabila and his government 

before we do this will probably be something that would be addressed once we sort of got into the weeds of that situation. But 

both the Ambassador and I, I think, agree on that. 

Mr. LARSEN. A second issue, and this gets at the envoy issue. 

And Ambassador Carson’s testimony from the previous panel said 

that the Administration encourages the U.N. Secretary-General to 

appoint a high-level U.N. special envoy, whether they—you know, 

whether they have done that recently or not, but they certainly encourage it. 

Should it be a U.N. envoy, as you all, ECI has said? Or should 

it be an envoy within the United States Government? Is that a better fit? 

Dr. Frazer and then Dr.—how about this? 

Mr. AFFLECK. Go ahead. 

Dr. CARAFANO. Well, I work at The Heritage Foundation, so I am 

never going to sign up thinking that another U.N. thing is a good 

idea. 

So, you know, I think there is a role for a U.S. interlocutor there. 

I think, you know, you have to bring something to the table. So I 

do think we—we need to get our strategy together so we are bringing something to the table when we are trying to move this. 

And I think that might be a helpful role if, indeed, we are bringing something in the sense of a coherent way to address this, other 

than the concerns which have rightly been raised, which is, we get 

excited when it is in the news, and then when, you know, Mr. 

Affleck goes back to Hollywood, we all ignore it again. 

Mr. LARSEN. I don’t think he lives there. 

Dr. FRAZER. Well, if you can have the disclaimer of The Heritage, 

I will disclaim as a former Assistant Secretary who never wants a 

special envoy. 
54 

But, with that said, I have seen them work. Senator Danforth’s 

worked extremely well. 

And I really do think it is about tying it with the President. So 

the U.N. has its envoy, the special representative of the SecretaryGeneral, that is on the ground there. I think if we are going to 

have a high-level, it should be a Presidential U.S. envoy, and they 

should be able to go into the Oval Office and tell the President 

what they are doing and the President gives them guidance about 

what they should do. And then it could be quite constructive. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Yes, I—Heritage Foundation never offered me a 

membership. I guess it is fitting that I am on the far left of the 

panel. 

But I do—I—I strongly believe, frankly, that we should have 

both. I think there is a role for both. I think there is a role for a 

U.N. envoy. That is quite important, as Ambassador Frazer said. 

There is a role for an envoy for the United States. 

And I do believe it should be a very, very high-level envoy. 

Again, I concur with this idea that these envoys are only as effective as their ability, or their perceived ability, at the very least, to 

access the President of the United States. 

And if we are able to do that, I think you will find that that person can make a huge difference just by doing shuttle diplomacy 

and can warm things up and can move policy. So, yeah, I would 

advocate for that. 

Mr. LARSEN. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just quickly, we all have to go home 

somewhere. It is a matter of if we keep thinking about the things 

we are working on when we are there. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Johnson of Georgia. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The history of the Congo, the Belgian Congo and all of its 

iterations from the, I guess, 1700s up to the mid-20th century, 

characterized by colonialization, European colonialization, extracting the raw materials and minerals, taking them elsewhere to be 

developed, leaving the nation impoverished. 

Then during the 1950s and 1960s you have insurgencies that 

seize power from the colonialists. And Mobutu Seko comes to 

power; renames the country Zaire. Gross corruption. His Swiss 

bank accounts were fatter than many industrialists’—$4 billion. He 

comes to power. He is corrupt, but he is an anticommunist, so he 

is America’s buddy. But when the Soviet Union falls, then he 

ceases to be useful. 

And, meanwhile, Laurent Kabila seizes power. He is—his son, 

Paul Kabila—excuse me—Paul Kagame is a child soldier—commander of a group of child soldiers participating in that movement 

to get rid of Seko. 

So Laurent gains power. Then he is assassinated within hours of 

the close of the Clinton Administration, back in 2001. His son, 30 

years old, former child—commander of a child army, emerges as 

the President. And he remains in power up to this time. 

Now, his daddy was supported by the Rwandans, the Angolans, 

the Ugandans, the Zimbabweans in his quest for power. And when 

he got to power, he told them all that I am going to be the one that 

controls the natural resources of this country. 
55 

After he is assassinated, his son, what—what attributes do any 

of you all attribute to the son, as far as his leadership abilities? Joseph Kabila, who was recently reelected in an election in 2011, 

which many characterized as a rigged election. What do we know 

about the current President? 

And why do we support leaders in Africa who exploit their citizens, and the poverty that ensues makes them more susceptible to 

extremist elements like Al Qaeda, talking about you will receive 

100 virgins when you—when you do the suicide attack and whatnot. You know, how—how can we get ourselves out of this, America? 

Somebody talk to me, please. 

Dr. CARAFANO. Can I just say very quickly that, you know, I 

think you are right and I think you raised a key issue. This is part 

of a generation of African leaders that are simply not going to move 

their countries forward. Fundamentally, at the end of the day, this 

is really an issue of economic freedom. And until they have the opportunity and these people in these countries to create societies in 

which there is economic opportunity and freedom so they can govern their own lives and their own use of the resources, we are just 

going to come back here and have hearings over and over again. 

So I do believe that you hit on exactly the right issue. And I hope 

it is the one thing that we all walk away today thinking is very 

important. 

The only other thing I would say is, from my perspective, Mr. 

Affleck is sitting on the far right, but I am okay with that. Because 

I think here today we really—— 

Mr. AFFLECK.—that point of view. 

Dr. CARAFANO. But we all do agree that the issues that you raise 

really are the things that fundamentally are—addressing those are 

really the fundamental future of these African countries. 

Dr. FRAZER. You asked a question about the character of Joseph 

Kabila and what we do know about him. I have actually worked 

with him. I first met him in 2001, in January, when he came to 

meet with Secretary Powell. And they sat in the—in the Secretary’s 

office, soldier-to-soldier and statesman-to-statesman. 

And Joseph Kabila laid out a vision about what he wanted for 

his government. And that was a vision of democratic governance, 

about peace with his neighbors, and economic development for his 

population. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What country put Joseph Kabila into—— 

Dr. FRAZER. I would probably say the entire international community, for the very reasons of the history that you just laid out, 

brought him to his position. Which is, it is a long and complicated 

and dirty history that we have all participated in. 

The point is is that Joseph Kabila is often underestimated. He 

is shy in nature. He has—he does—he is visionary. He is leading 

a huge and complicated country. And into a second term, it may 

show some weariness of leadership that often comes with trying to 

move such a big country forward. 

I think that there is much more that is needed from him. I think 

he is capable of delivering it. And that is why I think that the U.S. 

Government needs to work with him. He is isolated internationally 

today, and it doesn’t help. He is who he is, and he is where he is. 
56 

And our interests are to try to push him to deliver on that initial 

vision that he set out with President—with Secretary Powell. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Would you disagree with that, Mr. Carafano? 

Dr. CARAFANO. I guess I am just a pessimist. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Mr. Smith, Ranking Member. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is fine. I wasn’t sure 

if he was done or not. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Oh, I am sorry. 

Mr. SMITH. But respect for Members’ time, I think he is over 

time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Very well. 

Mr. SMITH. If you have any more questions, we could submit 

them for the record. 

I am sorry, and I think that will close our hearing. I don’t think 

there are any more Members asking questions. 

I just want to again thank the chairman and thank the Members 

of the committee for having this hearing. 

Thank our witnesses. This beings us together for a very important issue. 

Mr. AFFLECK. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Hearing adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

DECEMBER 19, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 19, 2012 

(61) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Update on the Evolving Security Situation 

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

and Implications for U.S. National Security 

December 19, 2012 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(DRC). 

I would like to start by thanking my colleague and the committee’s ranking member, Mr. Smith, for suggesting that we hold this 

hearing on the DRC. I believe that it will help the committee to 

understand the complexity of some of issues within Central Africa. 

The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues 

to evolve and is driven by a complex interplay of regional power dynamics as well as an intricate web of economic and social issues. 

What is clear is that the situation in the DRC is tragic for the innocent people caught in the conflict—innocent people who are simply trying to raise their families and live their lives. 

As I have followed the media coverage of the situation in the 

DRC, I cannot help but reflect on the millions of innocent people 

around the world who are caught in fundamentally unjust and socially complex situations. These situations can make anyone’s heart 

break and naturally leads one to consider the simple question: 

What can be done? 

Of course, the question—and likewise the answer—becomes more 

complex as we contemplate what can be done within the context of 

U.S. national security interests, constrained budgets, ongoing commitments in Afghanistan and around the globe, and potential future contingencies that the military has to be prepared to execute. 

Given the looming threat of sequestration, or further cuts to the 

military, I believe most of us on this Committee have become ever 

more focused on ensuring our military’s missions are both essential 

and appropriately tailored. 

That said, there may also be options outside of the DOD to address the situation in the DRC. I understand that in the recent 

past, the Department of State conducted important diplomatic efforts such as the ‘‘Tripartite Plus,’’ which furthered stability in 

Central Africa—and within the DRC in particular. Although the 

Administration is no longer pursuing this particular effort, perhaps 

there are other, similar opportunities—given how the situation has 
62 

negatively evolved in the DRC. Moreover, it seems the U.S. could 

pursue deeper diplomatic engagement with regional partners and 

our allies to leverage their knowledge, expertise, and resources to 

address this issue. 

Indeed, the world remains a complex and dangerous place. We 

cannot neglect to consider the linkages between instability in Central Africa and the global terrorist threat. But from Afghanistan, 

to Syria, to Iran, to North Korea, we also must recognize the existence of nonstate actors and regimes that directly threaten the 

United States and our allies. Therefore, we must ensure that our 

military is sufficiently resourced and that our national leaders 

prioritize our defense resources toward efforts that are appropriate 

for the U.S. military and our vital national security interests. 

I look forward to learning more about the situation on the 

ground as well as what the U.S. Government is doing to address 

the situation in the DRC. 
63 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Update on the Evolving Security Situation 

in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

and Implications for U.S. National Security 

December 19, 2012 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome our witnesses 

today and thank them for appearing to talk about this important 

topic. 

The United States faces complex national security challenges 

across Africa. The terrorism and violent extremism that plague the 

continent, along with instability, corruption, governance, poverty, 

illicit trafficking, and more, combine into a potent mix that threatens the long-term prospects of the African people, our interests, 

and the interests of our friends and partners. Nowhere are these 

challenges more apparent than in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo (DRC), particularly in the eastern portion of the country. 

The Eastern Congo has been mired in seemingly endless conflict 

and an insidious cycle of instability. It is a crisis that has, by some 

estimates, led to the death of over 5 million people over the last 

14 years, an untold amount of sexual violence and the current displacement of nearly 1.5 million people. 

The United States has clear strategic national security interests 

in the DRC due to its size, location, and especially because instability within the DRC can breed instability within the broader region. The government of the DRC cannot project law and order in 

much of its territory nor secure its borders and we know that Al 

Qaeda and affiliated groups are present in East Africa and in West 

Africa and are looking for places for safe haven. 

Any U.S. effort to address this instability has to take a ‘‘wholeof-government’’ approach. Diplomacy and development, under the 

direction of the State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), have the primary responsibility. 

But they can do nothing if there is no security. To that end, then, 

the Department of Defense, through U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM), has a significant role to play. Capacity-building efforts 

like those in place in Uganda to address the Lord’s Resistance 

Army (LRA) are an example of the way in which AFRICOM can 

play a significant role in the whole-of-government approach to promote American priorities within Africa and help inform our response to the Eastern Congo’s lack of security. 

As AFRICOM has recognized, Africans are best suited to solve 

African security challenges. The U.S. has trained the first of what 

was originally intended to be multiple Congolese Army battalions 

in 2010. Our assistance provided for basic military training, of 

course, but also the sharing of values that are intrinsic to our 

armed forces, such as military justice, human rights, civil-military 

relations, rule of law and defense resource management—qualities 
64 

that many military organizations in the region lack. From accounts 

on the ground, this battalion has been well regarded by those who 

have observed it in action. Too often the Congolese military 

(FARDC) are the perpetrators of violence and abuse. Additional 

training could go a long way toward the development of a meaningful Congolese security force that is not only capable but respects 

human rights. 

This process of enabling our partners to better deal with our 

shared security challenges is the way forward here. We have had 

success with this model in the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen, for 

a comparatively small amount of resources and troops. It is the 

right approach: it presents a light footprint, and it is also fiscally 

responsible in a time of tight resources. 

The key to any partnership is that both partners believe they 

share mutual interests and work toward mutual goals. The U.S. is 

fortunate in that we have a long-standing relationship with the 

DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda and so together we can work to achieve 

a long-term peaceful solution. As noted in the recent United Nations Group of Experts Report, however, the support DRC’s neighbors are providing to the primary rebel group, M23, is deeply concerning and must stop. The United States has cut off military aid 

to Rwanda in response but more can be done to hold to account 

anyone providing significant support to the M23. Additionally, 

today the House will take up the Conference Report on the FY2013 

National Defense Authorization Act, which will go a long way to reduce the financial support available for the M23 and potentially 

limit its ability to undermine stability in the region. 

While the challenges in the Eastern Congo may seem daunting, 

there is hope. It is an incredibly robust region with massive potential. The Congolese are anxious to grow and create greater opportunity, and end the constant displacement. If they can achieve 

peace and stability, there is an abundant amount of opportunity for 

the DRC, the region, and the world. 

I look forward to engaging with our expert witnesses today and 

continuing the dialogue about how best to achieve peace and stability in the Eastern Congo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
65 

Testimony for House Armed Services Committee 

"Democratic Republic of the Congo" 

Derek Chollet 

Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs 

U.S. Department of Defense 

December 19,2012 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the 

Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, or DRC, and the struggle to bring about long-term stability for the 

people of the DRC and Great Lakes region. 

One of the key threats facing Congolese civilians, particularly in the eastern 

DRC, is a wide array of violent armed groups - most notoriously including the 

M23, the Lord's Resistance Army, and the remnants of the genocidal militias now 

calling themselves the FDLR. But undisciplined state security forces have also 

proven to be a danger to civilians, particularly when the forces are not wellsupported, have absorbed armed groups without vetting for human rights abuses, 

are allowed to operate under a separate chain of command, or have not been 

trained in their legal obligations. 

The Department of Defense (DoD) is closely following the security 

developments in DRC and Great Lakes region. The unfolding crisis has 

highlighted the Congolese government's failure to provide effective security, 

governance, and services in the eastern provinces. It has also highlighted the 

continued political and economic tensions between the DRC and its eastern 

neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Outside support, in particular from Rwanda, has 

enabled M23 to be the threat it is today and has posed a serious setback to efforts 

to stabilizing eastern DRC and ensuring the protection of civilians. We will 

continue to closely monitor reports of external support and respond appropriately, 

including by reviewing our assistance, to deter this support as the situation 

develops. 

In the short term, U.S. efforts are focused on maintaining the tenuous ceasefire and ultimately resolving this crisis. In the long-term, we must also address the 

specific needs of the DRC for reform of its security sector. I note that the report 

published by the Eastern Congo Initiative in April states that "the Congolese 

government's inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines 

progress on everything else. An effective security sector - organized, resourced, 
66 

trained, and vetted - is essential to solving problems from displacement, 

recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic growth or the 

trade in conflict minerals." We agree with this assessment. 

The current crisis in eastern DRC has highlighted for international paI1ners 

the scope of the challenge within the DRC's problematic security sector, and has 

served as an eye-opener for the Congolese government including President Kabila. 

The United States aims to work with the intemational community and the DRC to 

develop a holistic and specific agreement for security sector reform - through 

training and institution building that addresses all three elements of the security 

sector: (I) the Congolese defense forces; (2) military justice; and (3) police. We 

would like to work to develop a more professional force, one that respects human 

rights, protects the DRCs territorial integrity, and protects civilians. These efforts 

must be led by the Congolese and supported holistically through coordinated 

efforts of the international community in order to promote domestic and regional 

peace in the long term. We recognize this is a long-tenn effort, but the DRC, 

working with its international partners, can make concel1ed progress in the 

medium-tenn. 

While the DRC builds its own security capabilities, the United Nations 

Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) will continue to be 

essential in providing security for the civilian population in the DRC, enabling the 

Government of the DRC to focus on reform, and coordinating international SSR 

efforts. MONUSCO has a challenging mandate in a very fluid security climate, 

and we will suppol1 the Department of State as the UN, Security Council members, 

and troop contributors review options for improving MONUSCO's ability to meet 

the security requirements in DRC. To assist MONUSCO, DoD has seconded three 

U.S. military officers, who are serving as military intelligence officers and the 

Chief Information Officer within the mission. These officers are helping to 

support MONUSCO operational efforts and ensuring an efficient flow of 

information between MONUSCO headquarters and field components. 

DoD's engagement in the DRC has largely been in support of State 

Department-led defense sector reform initiatives and providing training to the 

Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (F ARDC), including the 

training ofa light infantry battalion in 2010. U.S. Special Forces provided a 12-

week training course to the battalion commanders, platoon leaders, staff officers 

and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). This course focused on skills to train, 

manage and lead the battalion in accordance with the Law of Land Warfare. U.S. 

Special Forces also provided seven months of training for the entire battalion. 

2 
67 

Sexual and gender-based violence prevention and human rights training were 

incorporated into every aspect of the training and reiterated throughout it. The 

Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIlLS) delivered this training 

and continues to train elements of the F ARDe. 

In addition to the on-going DIlLS training funded through the Department of 

State, DoD engagements with the F ARDC have focused on logistics, exercise 

pariicipation, basic military intelligence training, military medicine, humanitarian 

assistance, and humanitarian mine action. These are areas that assist in the 

F ARDC modernization and professionalization and where there is absorptive 

capacity within the FARDe. DoD's logistics engagement is via the Defense 

Institute Reform Initiative (DIRI), which has been working with the FARDC to 

develop a logistics sustainment plan that can be used as a foundation for the 

sustainment of their forces across the DRe. 

DoD has also remained engaged with the FARDC leadership on efforts to 

counter the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). DoD has personnel at the UN's Joint 

Integrated Operations Center (JIOC) in northern DRC, focused on liaising with the 

F ARDC, UN, and Ugandan military personnel on operational and intelligence 

fusion efforts regarding the LRA. While the F ARDC leadership have not been as 

proactive in counter-LRA efforts as we would like, they continue to maintain their 

engagement with U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and thc regional Chiefs 

of Defense every two months to discuss ways to improve etfOlis in countering the 

LRA threat. 

The scale of the need is significant-- we have trained one battalion of 

approximately 500 of the approximately 120,000- 150,000 FARDC soldiers. 

There are significant security sector obstacles for moving ahead with the F ARDC 

and future engagement will require our continued patience and a long-term view. 

The FARDC's absorptive capacity for assistance is limited. The Ministry of 

Defense has minimal bureaucratic structure and activities are often ad hoc. As a 

result, for example, the Ministry of Defense has been slow in responding to our 

requests for the provision of appropriate personnel for training and information 

necessary for human rights vetting. The lack of English language capability 

further inhibits training opportunities both in the U.S. and in DRC. Coordination 

of international donor activities has also been a struggle. 

The current crisis in eastern Congo has reintorced the need for sweeping 

refonn within the Congolese military. The DRC government's signing in October 

2012 of a UN Action Plan to end the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers and 

3 
68 

efforts to systemize the electronic payment of soldiers are signs of the 

government's willingness to engage on SSR, but the current situation in eastern 

Congo and the increasing signs of F ARDC involvement in human rights abuses 

clearly demonstrates that more needs to be done. 

I will close by saying that these problems are significant, but so is the 

potential of a stable and secure DRC and Great Lakes region. If the Government 

of the DRC commits itself to reform, U.S. and international community assistance 

can help implement the needed ref0l111s. President Kabila has indicated his 

determination to enact needed changes, but his vision must resonate throughout the 

DRC government to ensure that donors have a pm1ner interested in working 

together for long-term success. Until that happens, reform will be minimal, and 

the prospects for instability will remain high. 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important issues with you 

today. I look forward to answering your questions. 

4 
69 

Derek Chollet 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 

Security Affairs 

Derek Chollet is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Affairs (ISA). He is the principal 

advisor to the Under Secretary of Dcfense and Secretary 

of Defense on international security strategy and policy 

issues related to the nations and international 

organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization), thc Middle East, and Africa, their 

governments and defense establishments. He also has 

oversight for security cooperation programs, including 

Joreign military sales, in these regions. 

Prior to being confirmed in June 2012, Mr. Chollet served 

at The White House as Special Assistant to the President 

and Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the 

National Security Council Staff. 

From February 2009 to 2011, ML Chollct was the 

Principal Deputy Director of the Secretary or State's 

Policy Planning Staff. From November 2008 to January 2009, he was a member ofthe ObamaBiden Presidential Transition Team. 

Previously. Mr. Chollet was a Senior Fellow at The Center for a New American Security (CNAS), 

a non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution, and an adjunct associate professor at 

Georgetown University. During the Clinton Administration he served as Chief SpeechwTiter for 

US Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, and as Special Adviser to Deputy 

Secretary of State Strobe Talbott From 2002 to 20()4, Mr. Chollct was foreign policy adviser to 

U.S. Senator John Edwards (D-N.C.). 

Mr. Chollet has also been a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a 

Fellow at the American Academy in Berlin. and a visiting scholar and adjunct professor at The 

George Washington University. He assisted fonner Secretmies of State James A. Baker lH and 

Warren Christopher with the research and writing of their memoirs, Ambassador Holbrooke with 

his book on the Dayton peace process in Bosnia, and Deputy Secretary Talbott with his book on 

U.S.-Russian relations during the 1990s. 

ML Chollet is the author, co-author or co-editor of six books on American foreign policy, 

including The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft (Palgrave Macmillan. 

2(05) and America Between the Wars: From I III) to 911 L coauthored with James GoJdgeicr 

(PublicAffairs. 20(8), and his commentaries and reviews on U.S. toreign policy and politics have 

appeared in many other books and publications. 
70 

Testimony 

Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson 

Bureau of African Affairs 

U.S. Department of State 

Before the House Armed Services Committee 

"Update on the Evolving Security Situation in the Democratic Republie of the 

Congo and Implications for U.S. National Security" 

Wednesday, December 19, 2012 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the 

Committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today on the crisis unfolding in 

the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC, and our comprehensive 

response. 

As you know, the security and humanitarian situation in the DRC is the most 

volatile in Africa today. An estimated five million people have died in the years 

since the second regional war began in 1998, and millions more have been affected 

and forced to flee their homes. The people of North and South Kivu provinces in 

particular have faced repeated cycles of contlict, atrocities, and displacement, with 

the current crisis simply being the latest iteration. 

We are committed to helping the DRC and its neighbors resolve not only 

this current crisis, but the longer-term sources of instability in the region as well, 

so that we do not find ourselves back here in three years, facing yet another cycle 

of violence in the DRC. Among other things, we are helping to mobilize an 

effective humanitarian response. We are also engaging with the highest levels of 

the DRC, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments to urge them to continue honest 

and transparent dialogue and find a durable political resolution to the underlying 

causes of instability. We have been steadlnst in our condemnation of all external 

support to the M23. We have also supported the involvement of the UN Security 

Council, the UN Secretariat, and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC in 

responding to the humanitarian and security crises. In addition, we are urging the 

DRC government to accelerate its efforts to professionalize and reform the 

Congolese army, recognizing that the responsibility of security in the DRC rests 

first and foremost with the government. 

The rapid fall of Goma last month to the M23 rebel group provided a stark 

reminder that, even as the international community has made major investments in 

humanitarian aid, development, security sector reform, and peacekeeping, the root 

causes of the entrenched instability and recurring contlicts in the DRC remain 
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unresolved. The Congolese government continues to suffer fl'om weak state and 

security institutions and has failed to provide effective security, governance, and 

services across its territory, including in North and South Kivu, in part due to the 

systemic disruption of violent armed groups and external support for such groups. 

Political and military tensions persist between the DRC and its eastern neighbors, 

particularly Rwanda. The current crisis in particular has been fueled and 

exacerbated by Rwanda's interference in the DRC. 

The M23 is one of the most lethal armed groups operating in eastern DRC. 

Most of its officers were at one time members of the National Congress for the 

Defense of the People, or CNDP, and nominally integrated into the Congolese 

army, a concession they extracted after nearly capturing Goma as part of a 

precursor insurgency in 2008. Once integrated, these officers operated in a parallel 

chain of command and enjoyed impunity for their human rights abuses and illegal 

exploitation of the country's mineral wealth. When the Congolese government 

appeared poised earlier this year to challenge these arrangements, several of these 

officers mutinied and reconstituted themselves under a new name, the M23. The 

commanders of the M23 represent a "who's who" of notorious human rights 

abusers in the eastern DRC, including Bosco Ntaganda, who faces an International 

Criminal Court arrest warrant for sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers 

and other crimes against humanity. 

The M23 would not be the threat it is today and would not have had the 

military success it has experienced without external support. There is a credible 

body of evidence that corroborates key findings of the UN Group of Experts' 

reports - including evidence of significant military and logistical support, as well 

as operational and political guidance, from the Rwandan government to the M23 

from the early stages of this most recent contlict. While there is evidence of 

individuals from Uganda providing support to the M23, we do not have a body of 

evidence suggesting that Uganda has a government policy of supporting the M23. 

Nonetheless, we continue to urge the government of Uganda to ensure that supplies 

to the M23 do not originate in or transit through Ugandan territory, including from 

individual officials that may be acting on their own. We have not limited our 

response to diplomacy alone. As required by Section 7043(a) of the FY 2012 

Appropriations Act, the Secretary suspended Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, 

to Rwanda in FY 2012 because of its support to the M23. The Department 

continues to closely monitor reports of external support, and we will continue to 

respond appropriately, including by reviewing our assistance, to deter this support 

as the situation develops. 
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After M23 attacked and captured Goma, the ORC government agreed last 

month to meet with the M23in Kampala and hear its grievances related to the 

March 2009 agreement. The government has rightfully made clear its refusal to 

hear those claims by the M23 that undermine state authority, threaten the territorial 

integrity of the ORC, or go against the ORC Constitution. While parties have yet 

to begin substantive talks, the current ceasefire is holding and the parties continue 

to express commitment to dialogue. We are concerned, however, by reports that 

M23 maintains a significant presence within the 20-km buffer zone around Goma 

in defiance of the November 21 and 24 agreements by the International Conference 

on the Great Lakes Region, or ICGLR, and about the repo11s that the M23 may be 

increasing its presence in the area. Such moves exacerbate instability and, should 

the conflict resume, will put at risk thousands of highly vulnerable individuals in 

the vicinity ofGoma who were displaced by the recent violence. We call on the 

signatories of the November 24 agreement to ensure the full implementation of the 

agreement. All parties must refrainfi'om provocative acts and respect the current 

ceasefire. 

The highest levels of the U.S. government are committed to helping the 

ORC and the region achieve a sustainable peace. President Obama spoke 

yesterday with President Kagame and underscored that any support to M23 is 

inconsistent with Rwanda's desire for stability and peace. President Obama 

emphasized to President Kagame the importance of permanently ending all support 

to armed groups in the ORC, abiding by the recent commitments he made in 

Kampala along with Presidents KabiJa and Museveni, and reaching a transparent 

and credible political agreement that includes an end to impunity for M23 

commanders and others who have committed serious human rights 

abuses. President Obama believes that from this crisis should emerge a political 

agreement that addresses the underlying regional security, economic, and 

governance issues while upholding the ORC's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

President Obama has also delivered the message to President Kabila that the ORC 

must take concrete steps toward security sector reform and improved governance 

in order to reach a lasting peace in eastern ORe. 

In addition to the President's engagement, we have actively engaged with 

regional leaders and key stakeholders throughout this crisis. Secretary Clinton, 

Ambassador Rice, and Under Secretary Sherman have spoken or met with senior 

Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and UN officials to advocate for a rapid and 

peaceful resolution to this crisis. I traveled to the ORC, Rwanda, and Uganda last 

month with my British and French counterparts to deliver a clear and common 

message that these three governments must work together to stop the crisis and 
73 

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work toward a sustainable resolution of underlying issues. We stressed that, while 

the DRC government has agreed to hear the political grievances of the M23, we 

absolutely will not accept any etTort to undermine the authority of the DRC 

government or infringe upon the country's territorial integrity. We have also been 

steadfast in insisting that there be no impunity for senior M23 leaders or other 

rebel group leaders who are under ICC indictment or international sanctions for 

human rights violations. Accountability is necessary to achieve ajust and durable 

peace in the DRC. All three governments have reiterated their commitment to 

finding a lasting solution, but we must now see the parties take affirmative action 

to make this a reality. 

Looking ahead, we are monitoring humanitarian needs and working to 

mobilize resources to ensure continued humanitarian access and assistance to 

civilians affected by this crisis. The humanitarian situation in the eastern Congo 

remains deplorable, with more than two million Congolese currently displaced 

internally or to neighboring countries. Over 700,000 people have been displaced 

during this year alone, many of them displaced for a second or third time. The 

United States provided more than $110 million in humanitarian assistance for 

Congolese refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict-afTected civilians in 

Fiscal Year 2012. 

We also believe that direct dialogue between Presidents Kabila, Kagame, 

and Museveni is paramount to resolving not only the immediate crisis, but also the 

underlying causes of instability in the region. Even while the talks between M23 

and the DRC government continue, there are root causes of conflict that can only 

be addressed through direct dialogue between governments, including issues of 

land tenure, refugee f10ws, the illegal exploitation of natural resources, economic 

and border security, and support networks for armed groups. In addition, 

government cooperation will drive the success, or failure, of economic integration 

and its potential contribution to regional stability and development. 

While the responsibility to implement change rests with these governments, 

we encourage the UN Secretary-General to appoint a high-level UN Special Envoy 

to engage with these governments on the ground and on a sustained basis. We 

want such a high-level Special Envoy to be dedicated to helping to coordinate with 

the government stakeholders to reach a durable political resolution and ensure the 

implementation of that resolution over the long-term. Even the most optimistic 

among us recognize that lasting stability in the Great Lakes region is a long-term 

goal that will require patience, perseverance, and political will. We will work with 

our partners and the proposed UN Special Envoy to ensure that any agreement 
74 

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between the regional governments is transparent, sustainable, inclusive, and enjoys 

the support and commitment of the region, including Congolese civil society and 

civilian communities. 

Throughout this peace building process, civilian protection is and must 

remain a priority. This includes substantial effolis by the DRC government on 

security sector reform, or SSR, which I will address shortly. But first, I want to 

address the mandate and CutTent efforts of the UN peacekeeping mission currently 

in the DRC, MONUSCO, which has come under heavy scrutiny in recent weeks. 

MONUSCO has endeavored to protect civilians under difficult circumstances since 

the onslaught of this cunent crisis last spring, often serving as the only buffer 

between the M23 and civilian populations. We commend the brave service of the 

peacekeepers from several dozen countries who are operating in very difficult, 

often dangerous conditions. No matter MONUSCO's mandate or resources, no 

peacekeeping mission is intended to take the place of a national army in the middle 

of an armed crisis. We must remain realistic about what MONUSCO can be 

expected to achieve with its mandate and resources and across a country the size of 

Western Europe. 

We agree that more must be done to protect civilians in the eastern DRC, 

and that includes working with the UN and MONUSCO, as well as with the DRC 

government, which has the primary responsibility for protecting its territory and all 

of its citizens. The United Nations has had a peacekeeping presence in the DRC 

since 1999. We have supported that presence as it has helped to avert regional 

war, support critical electoral processes, and deter human rights abuses. Yet UN 

peacekeeping effolis have struggled to fulfill their longer-term goal of stabilizing 

the eastern DRC because of the continued weakness of their Congolese 

counterparts and continued meddling from the outside. 

We and our fellow UN Security Council members and troop contributing 

countries are reviewing options for improving the UN's ability to protect civilians 

and helping to implement defined aspects of a potential regional political 

settlement. There are mUltiple proposals on the table for how to boost 

MONUSCO's capacity against armed groups. We are closely following the 

ICGLR proposal to develop an effective neutral and regional fighting force in the 

Kivus and the Southern African Development Community's proposal to possibly 

alter the mandate for the South African contingent in MONUSCO and move it to 

North Kivu. 
75 

-6-

We SUppOlt regional efforts to find a peaceful and enduring political solution 

to the threat posed by the M23 and other armed groups. We strongly encourage 

countries to coordinate with MONUSCO and the UN, particularly with regard to 

command-and-control, resourcing, and mandate, in order to avoid undennining 

current security efforts. Any new force or additional troops will take time to 

deploy. In the meantime, we continue to encourage MONUSCO to robustly 

implement its current mandate. 

I want now to draw specific attention to the critical need for comprehensive 

and sustained security sector reform, or SSR, in the DRC. As I noted earlier, the 

DRC government has the primary responsibility for protecting its territory and all 

its citizens. The crisis over the past few months has revealed the endemic 

weaknesses of the DRC national army, or FARDC, and has demonstrated to 

devastating effect the critical need for a professional and capable DRC army that 

can protect the country's citizens. While the FARDC experienced initial success in 

resisting the M23 in the early months of the offensive, the army rapidly lost ground 

to the M23 once the rebels started receiving outside support. The DRC military'S 

perennially problematic leadership and command and control, logistical 

deficiencies, and poor military planning have also made the army far less effective. 

The recent repOlts of rapes and other abuses committed by army forces in Minova 

show that indiscipline and impunity persist. 

We have been working with the DRC government for some time now on 

SSR. Our assistance has included the training of a light-infantry battalion, training 

to arn1Y officers and support to the armed forces' military justice capacities. 

However, much, much more must be done. We are urging President Kabila to 

undertake a credible and sustained effOlt to professionalize and refonn the 

Congolese security forces. [n a positive move, the Congolese government recently 

signed a Child Soldiers Action Plan with the United Nations, which we advocated 

over several months. This is one step but broader reform will take time, and the 

Congolese government needs to demonstrate the political will and commitment to 

achieving SSR, pmticularly after recent years of dismal progress and few signs of 

sustained political will. Demonstrable commitment includes taking clear and bold 

measures to ensure that Congolese soldiers are professionally trained, adequately 

paid and supported, and respectful of international human rights norms. 

SSR goes beyond the military. The DRC government must also work to 

build up its judicial infrastructure and other security apparatuses, including prisons. 

We will also work to ensure that civil society has a greater input in assessing the 
76 

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functions and overseeing the performance of the FARDC and Congolese National 

Police. 

As part of SSR, we are also pressing the DRC government to assertively 

address impunity, which is rampant in all ranks ofthe military and across all 

security services, and undercuts the civilian population's trust in the these security 

forces. The government needs to hold human rights abusers accountable by 

arresting and prosecuting them, regardless of their military rank. We will continue 

to speak out against the forcible recruitment of children, acts of sexual violence, 

and targeted attacks against civilians, whether committed by armed groups or the 

government forces. 

Along with military reform, we are making clear that the Congolese 

government must accelerate its efforts to deploy and strengthen state institutions 

and provide needed public services to all Congolese citizens in the Kivus. The 

governance vacuum that exists in parts of the countty has allowed armed groups to 

set up parallel civil administrations, including taxing the population and exploiting 

border crossings and the Congo's mineral rich resources. We are assisting the 

DRC government to better provide much-needed public services, including those 

focused on responding to and preventing sexual violence. We are training select 

security forces on how to address gender-based violence crimes and assisting the 

Congolese military justice system in their efforts to better investigate and prosecute 

cases of conflict-related sexual violence. 

The expansion of governance across the country must include electoral 

reform, as well as the holding of long-delayed provincial and local elections. This 

extension of effective governance, combined with legitimate provincial elections, 

is necessary for a lasting peace. There are a plethora of drivers behind the 

instability in the DRC, but we must not lose sight of the DRC government's own 

responsibilities to reform and build up its security forces and deliver effective 

governance to all comers of its telTitory. 

We believe that the time has come for the region's leaders and the 

international community to permanently break the cycle of violence and impunity 

in the region. The blame for this cycle of violence cannot be cast upon anyone 

entity; similarly, the solution lies not in an individual country or president, but in 

the combined and cooperative efforts of the region. We all have a moral, 

humanitarian, and security imperative to help build a future for the Congolese 

people who have seen more conniet than peace over the last two decades. Such a 

future must be rooted in strong and credible institutions, the transparent and 
77 

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legitimate use of the DRC's vast mineral wealth for transparent economic 

development, and respect for human rights. The people of the DRC share this 

responsibility with us. The current instability in the DRC did not arrive overnight 

and similarly it will not be repaired quickly. 

We need to build on recent signs of progress, many of which have been 

gravely set back by the M23 rebellion and the violence committed by other armed 

groups. The decisions taken now will set the trajectory of the next several years. 

The M23 and its supporters are waiting to see if their strategy of destabilization 

will win them what they want. Other abusive militias in the Kivus are similarly 

watching to see if violent behavior is an effective path to power ruld in±1uence. 

And the world is watching to see whether the eastem DRC can transcend its 

history as a theater for proxy con±1ict and finally advaJ1ce towards the peace and 

prosperity owed to its people and promised by its natural wealth and diversity. We 

are working diligently with our Congolese and intemational pruiners to ensure that 

armed groups are turned back, outside support ceases, and peace carries the day. 

Today's crisis is a tragedy, but it also offers a real oppOltunity to help the 

Congolese people and the broader region set a more sustainable course toward 

peace. We urge the international community, the Great Lakes region, and the 

Congolese people to demonstrate the resolve to see this process through to the 

peace that we know lays ahead for the Congo. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering 

your questions. 
78 

Johnnie Carson 

Assistant Secretary 

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

Term of Appointment: 0510712009 to present 

Ambassador Johnnie Carson was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of African 

Affairs, on May 7, 2009. Prior to this he was the National Intelligence Officer for Africa at the NIC, alter 

serving as the Senior Vice President of the National Defense University in Washington D.C. (2003-2006). 

Carson's 37-year Foreign Service career includes ambassadorships to Kenya (1999-2003), Zimbabwe 

(1995-1997), and Uganda (1991-1994); and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 

African Affairs (1997-1999). Earlier in his career he had assignments in Portugal (1982-1986), Botswana 

(1986-1990), Mozambique (1975-1978), and Nigeria (1969-1971). He has also served as desk officer in 

the Africa section at State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (1971-1974); Staff Officer for the 

Secretary of State (1978-1979), and Staff Director for the Africa Subcommittee of the US House of 

Representatives (1979-1982). 

Before joining the Foreign Service, Ambassador Carson was a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania from 

1965-1968. He has a Bachelor of Arts in History and Political Science from Drake University and a Master 

of Arts in International Relations from the School of Oriental and Africa Studies at the University of 

London. 

Ambassador Carson is the recipient 01 several Superior Honor Awards from the Department of State and 

a Meritorious Service Award from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Centers for Disease Control 

presented Ambassador Carson its highest award, "Champion 01 Prevention Award," for his leadership in 

directing the U.S. Government's HIVIAIDS prevention efforts in Kenya. 
79 

Testimony of Jendayi E. Frazer 

Distinguished Service Professor, Carnegie Mellon University 

Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 

Before the House Armed Services Committee 

"Update on the Evolving Security Situation in the Democratic Republic of 

Congo and Implications for U.S. National Security" 

Wednesday, December 19, 2012 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the invitation to testify on the evolving security situation in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo and its implications for U.S. National Security. Giving your time 

and attention at this critical moment is a welcome sign of U.S. leadership that is an 

essential ingredient for reinforcing regional efforts to achieve sustainable peace. 

I will take just a moment to give context to my remarks today. I have worked on the 

Great Lakes region since 1999 as a Director in the Clinton National Security Council 

and then from 2001 to 2008 as Special Assistant for Africa to President Bush and as 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs working with Secretary of State Condoleezza 

Rice. Many of the recommendations I will offer today are informed by the 

diplomatic initiatives developed and experience gained during those years. 

My analysis and framing of the current crisis in Eastern Congo is more driven by my 

shuttling between Kinshasa and Kigali since the M23 rebellion started in ApriL I 

have met and spoken repeatedly with Presidents Kabila and Kagame and senior 

Ministers and officials in both governments. I have been an informal listener who 

knows the background and have built trust with both leaders because the only side I 

have ever taken is for peace. 

I mention this context because I believe the dialogue on how to resolve the Congo 

crisis has become unhelpful and polarizing. It has dissolved into emotional 

grandstanding and finger pointing. Without a foundation in U.S. strategic objectives, 

our policy risks becoming rudderless and driven by narrow and vested interests. 

U.S. Interests in the DR Congo 

The United States primary interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR 

Congo) should be to support local and regional efforts to: 

1) achieve national peace and regional stability; 

2) advance good governance, national integration and reconciliation, and; 

3) create the enabling environment for development that benefits all Congolese. 

1 
80 

Congo's strategic location at the very center of Africa, bordering nine countries -

Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, 

Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia - means that instability in Congo touches all of Africa 

to the north, south, east and west. Moreover, the country of 70 million people is 

endowed with vast human and natural resources, great forest and mineral wealth, 

and enormous hydro power making it a strategic country in the global effort to 

address food security, climate change, and generate clean and alternative sources of 

energy. 

Yet, despite its vast potential wealth, 71 percent of the popUlation lives below the 

poverty line, and many Congolese live in fear of armed groups present in North and 

South Kivu, Equateur, Orientale Province, Maniema, and Katanga Provinces. These 

armed groups are domestic, including Mai Mai militia and the M23 rebellion, and 

foreign from neighboring countries such as the Ex-Rwandan Armed Forces, 

Interhamwe militia members, and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 

Rwanda (FDLR), the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Lord's Resistance 

Army (LRA). Tackling these negative forces is a necessary condition to achieve 

sustainable peace in DR Congo and regional stability in the Great Lakes region. 

The Evolving Security Situation 

Resolving the current crisis of the March 23 Movement (M23) rebellion is the most 

urgent priority given the national humanitarian crisis and regional destabilizing 

impact of the conflict in north Kivu. It is well known that M23's precursor, the 

armed rebel group, National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), signed 

a peace treaty with the DRC government on 23 March 2009. The agreement 

established CNDP as a political party and many of its soldiers and officers were 

integrated into the country's Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

(FARDC). Not as well known is that CNDP units within the FARDC were viewed as 

both capable and highly motivated to take on the FDLR. The DRC and Rwandan 

governments were closely aligned from 2009 until this past April in their common 

efforts to eliminate negative forces from eastern Congo. 

The M23 rebellion was sparked by three largely concurrent developments: First, 

the soldiers, like many in the FARDC, were dissatisfied with conditions in the army, 

particularly not receiving their pay and provisions. Second, the international 

community relentlessly pressured President Kabila until he called for the arrest of 

their leader, General Bosco Ntaganda, who is indicted by the International Criminal 

Court, despite the government lacking the capacity to execute an arrest. Third, the 

government made clear its plans to redeploy former CNDP soldiers out of the Kivus, 

and M23 claims, without the necessary security for those so redeployed. 

Whereas in 2008 Rwanda demonstrated its ability to influence CNDP actions when 

it helped prevent them from taking Goma; fast forward to 2012 and the past 

constructive cooperation between Kabila and Kagame has been severely undercut 

by the UN Group of Experts' accusations of Rwandan and Ugandan support for M23. 

2 
81 

What Lessons for U.S. Policy?: Reinvigorating Diplomacy 

A whole of government effort is required for the United States to assist Congo and 

the region to establish the conditions for sustainable peace and stability. 

First and foremost, presidential leadership is needed. President Bush, Secretary 

Powell, and especially National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were actively 

engaged in ending the Second Congo War. President Bush met with Kabila and 

Kagame together and separately throughout his Presidency and his Secretaries of 

State helped forge common understanding and backed robust and active U.S. 

diplomatic engagement to end the war and build confidence between the neighbors. 

Advocacy to appoint a "Presidential Envoy" for the Great Lakes Region will not 

achieve its intended purpose if the President is disengaged. Envoys gain their clout 

and gravitas from perceptions that they really have the ear of a President that cares. 

Second, sustained, robust and imaginative diplomatic engagement is essential. 

Peace building requires establishing processes across government ministries and at 

local levels and within communities that can build confidence as milestones are 

achieved. 

The Bush team's efforts included developing a "Tripartite Plus" Process in 

2004 that created a forum for problem-solving and sharing information between 

DR Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and eventually Burundi. It was attended by Foreign 

Ministers, Defense Chiefs of Staff, Intelligence Chiefs, and Presidential Advisors 

from the four countries and eventually led to the full normalization of diplomatic 

relations marked by sending Ambassadors to reopen their missions in capitals. 

We financed and supported a Joint Planning Cell in Kisangani for Operations 

and Intelligence officers from DR Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda to share 

information and develop plans to tackle the negative forces in eastern Congo. 

We launched the Awards for Justice program across the region to track former 

Rwandan genocidaires to reinforce accountability, remove spoilers, and as 

importantly to reinforce good faith between the neighbors. 

Third, more confidence- and peace-building efforts are needed within Congolese 

communities. The State Department should consider properly securing and reopening Goma House, initiated under Secretary Condoleezza Rice as an American 

Presence Post to extend our diplomatic reach beyond Kinshasa. 

Houses of Peace in major cities in each Province should be funded to provide 

neutral ground for diverse communities to nurture communication to prevent 

and mitigate conflict over local issues. 

Local government efforts to build cross border community ties can help to 

reduce regional tensions and promote economic development and cooperation. 

3 
82 

Fourth, regional mediation is the surest path to sustainable peace. Supporting 

the mediation process of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region 

(ICGLR) under President Museveni will deliver greater results in resolving the crisis 

than sanctioning Rwandan and Ugandan officials. The call for sanctions simply 

drives a wedge between the essential actors capable of ending the M23 rebellion. 

USG can playa positive diplomatic role in the ICGLR mediation by backing it 

financially and helping to shape the agenda, especially to keep the focus mainly 

on military grievances rather than allowing M23 to open a wider and prolonged 

political dialogue. Any national dialogue or reconciliation process should 

properly be held in DR Congo where broad civic participation is possible. 

The Howard G. Buffett Foundation's recently announced initiative to support the 

peace talks is a beacon that should be matched by the United States. 

What Next for u.s. National Security Policy? 

Backing the regionallCGLR initiative is also prudent in light of the limited U.S. 

government resources appropriated to effect lasting positive change in DR Congo. 

Comprehensive security sector reform is needed to improve the Congolese 

government's and especially its military's capacity to tackle armed negative forces 

marauding throughout the east. Preparations should also start now to mobilize 

international support for any Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 

(DDR) programs for M23's rank and file. Several initiatives can be undertaken to 

improve security and stability without deploying U.S. forces or a major new 

commitment ofUSG financial and personnel resources. 

First, the USG should increase funding for International Military Education 

Training and targeted security sector reform. The USG provided less than $20 

million in Peacekeeping Operation Funds (PKO), $6 million in International Crime, 

Narcotics and Law Enforcement (lNCLE) funds and $500,000 in International 

Military Education and Training (lMET) in FY2011. U.S. efforts to build institutional 

and operational capacity of the military and police as trustworthy providers of 

security are currently mainly focused on "seconding" a few advisors and trainers 

working with Congolese officials and holding workshops. The IMET funding is now 

declining to $450,000 (FY2012) and $400,000 (FY2013) at a time when more effort 

is needed to instill a new ethos and professionalize FARDC, especially on military 

justice, human rights and civil-military operations. 

Second, train a second battalion to augment the major military reform effort 

the USG has undertaken to date, i.e. the FARDe's 391st light infantry battalion. 

This training program known as "Operation Olympic Chase" began in 2009 and cost 

$15 million. In June/July 2012 the 391st was deployed to North Kivu to fight the 

M23 rebels. Positive consideration should be given to training a 392 nd to build an 

effective military that is respectful of Congolese citizens and accountable to civilian 

authority. 

4 
83 

Third, if asked, the USG should consider providing planners, logistics, and 

possibly equipment to support an International Neutral Force (INF) to monitor 

the borders between Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, and to act as a strike force against 

all negative armed groups. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 

has decided to commit 3,000 troops from Tanzania, South Ati-ica, and maybe Angola. 

The INF can fit within the current MONUSCO force ceiling of 19,000 since the UN 

force is currently undermanned at approximately 17,700. The USG has had success 

backing such African regional peacekeeping operations in Burundi and Somalia. The 

USG can also use technology to offset to some degree the number of peacekeeping 

personnel needed by offering contract advisors with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

(UAVs) to monitor the border areas watching for unlawful rebel crossings and illicit 

activities. 

Fourth, consider how to improve MONUSCO's poor record of protecting civilians. 

The force has been flawed from its beginning in 1998 and its damaged reputation, 

after allowing Goma to fall to M23 on November 20th, may be irreparable. Careful 

consideration is required to assess the best option for deploying the INF. It would 

be a mistake to bring the INF into a mission where the mandate is confused and the 

rules of engagement are varyingly interpreted and communicated to the command 

by UN headquarters in NY, the UN Special Representative in Kinshasa, and the Force 

Commander in the region. Sierra Leone is a model that could be replicated. 

Pakistani forces joined the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation under a UN mandate 

but with a distinct mission to move the Revolutionary United Front rebels off the 

diamond mines in Sierra Leone. 

Conclusion 

American leadership - including Presidential engagement; robust imaginative 

diplomacy; and targeted military and security assistance - can arrest the rapid 

decline since spring of security and confidence in the DR Congo and Great Lakes 

Region. 

A coherent, comprehensive and ambitious initiative is required to foster the 

conditions needed to build sustainable peace and development. Congo has for too 

long been portrayed as a country of continuous instability, insecurity, rampant 

human rights violations, and epidemic rape and sexual violence. This image 

obscures the country's vast potential, distorts the reality, and robs Congolese of 

their dignity. 

The U.S. Government and we in civil society must act with humility recognizing that 

the governments and people of the region themselves are ultimately responsible. 

We can only assist them to establish the inclusive governance, and robust regional 

security mechanisms, that are the foundations for eliminating all armed negative 

forces and creating the conditions for empowered citizens and economic prosperity. 

5 
84 

Dr. Jcndayi E. Frazer 

Distinguished Public Service Professor 

Director, Center for International Policy and Innovation 

Jendayi E. Frazer is a faculty member at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) with joint appointments 

in the Dietrich College of Humanities and Social Sciences' Department of Social and Decision 

Sciences. and in thc H. John Heinz III College's School of Public Policy and Managemcnt. She is 

the Director of Carnegie Mellon's Center for International Policy and Innovation (CIPI) that seeks to 

utilizc new technologies and apply innovative solutions to core issues of development and 

governance. Under her direction, CIPI recently published an edited volume, Preventing Electoral 

Violence in Africa, for which she served as co-editor and author. Frazcr is also an Adjunct Senior 

Fellow for Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations where she directs a high-level 

roundtable series entitled Afi'ica After 50 that examines new trends and regional dynamics that are 

shaping Africa's future and will impact U.S. policy opportunities on the continent. 

Ambassador Frazer served as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from August 

2005 to January 2009 and as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African 

Affairs at the National Security Coul1ci I from January 2001 until her swearing-in as the first woman 

U.S. Ambassador to SOllth Africa in June 2004. Frazer was instrumental in establishing the Bush 

Administration's signature initiatives, including the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 

(PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account. She is widely credited for designing the 

administration's policies for ending the wars in the Democratic Republic oCthe Congo, Sierra Leone. 

Liberia. and Burundi, and for helping resolve Kenya's 2007 post-election crisis. In recognition of 

her contributions, Condoleezza Rice prcsented Frazer with the Distinguished Service Award. the 

highest award bestowed by the Secretary of State. In July 20 I 0, Liberian President Ellen .lohnsonSirleaf awarded Frazer with the distinction of Dame Grand Commander in the Humane Order of 

African Redemption in recognition of her contribution to restoring peace and democracy to Liberia. 

Dr. Frazer received her B.A. degree in Political Scicnce (honors) and African and Afro-American 

Studies (distinction) in 1985, and M.A. degrees in lnternational Policy Studies in 1985 and 

International Development Education in 1989, and a Ph.D, in Political Science, 1994 all fi'om 

Stanford University. 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

Making the Most of U.S. Military 

Assistance in the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo 

Testimony before the 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States House of Representatives 

December 19,2012 

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. 

Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies and 

Director, The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis 

Institute for International Studies 

The Heritage Foundation 
89 

My name is James Jay Carafano. I am the Vice President of Foreign Policy and Defense 

Studies and the Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute tor 

International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this testimony 

are my own, and should not be construed as representing any official position of The 

Heritage Foundation. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today. The United States 

has important interests to safeguard in Central Africa. Those interests can best be served 

by being a constructive force for peace, stability, and economic freedom in the region. 

What I would caution against, however, is the bigger Band-Aid approach-just doing a 

little more to show we care. Throwing "more" at the challenges in Central Africa might 

satisfy the compulsion of the free world to do "something," but that is more abou[making 

us feel good about ourselves-·-not making the most effective use of U.S. power to 

achieve the greatest good. Certainly, much can be done to build a "better" Band-Aid and 

more efficiently apply assistance, but the most vital role U.S. power can play is in its 

broader mission of advancing policies to keep America and its friends and allies safe, 

free, and prosperous. 

In particular, U.S. military assistance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should 

remain limited. It would take a great deal more U.S. military assistance to have a very 

significant impact-and an intrusive American presence on that level would create as 

many problems, ifnot more, than it might potentially solve. Rather, across the Middle 

East and North Africa U.S. military assets must remain focused on deterring large-scale 

conventional cont1ict und supporting efforts to counter an enduring globallslamist 

insurgency that includes a serious transnational terrorist threat. Indeed. in meeting these 

missions there is much more that should and must be done to make the U.S. military 

presence more effective. 

Further, as you know, the U.S. draws forces globally to respond to military needs 

wherever they are in the world. My assessment is that current and projected funding for 

defense will be inadequate to meet the armed forces' global responsibilities. Readiness 

and capabilities will decline. This will exacerbate the challenges of the U.S. military 

remaining a constructive foree in Africa-for two reasons. First, when budgets get tight 

the low-cost. high-impact military programs that can make a difference on the margin, 

particularly when they are well integrated into an eflective package of assistance. are 

usually the first be cut. Second, the decline in U.S. military power will contribute to 

increasing instability in the Middle East and North Africa andlhe ripple of these troubles 

will carry them further south. 

In my testimony today, I would like to 1) review the current security situation in the 

region; 2) make the case that pouring more resources into the current strategy won't 

work. The United States should reassess its support for the current United Nations 

peacekeeping mission, increase accountability for the inept govemment in Kinshasa in 

addition to Rwanda and Uganda. and emphasize the need for an African-led strategy; 3) 
90 

outline the appropriate direct rolc of U.S. military assistance; and 4) outline the 

challenges the U.S. military faces in meeting these responsibilities and suggest 

substantive refonns in addressing regional issues. 

What We Do 

My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising all of the 

foundation's research on public policy concerning ioreign policy and national security. 

Over the past decade, we have assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team. 

I have the honor and privilege of leading that team. Our research is non-partisan and it is 

all freely available on the Heritage Web site at heritage.org. 

In recent years, we have recognized that U.S. policy towards Africa-in particular 

advancing economic, political, and religious freedoms as well as improving public 

safety-has become particularly important. The Heritage Foundation was the first think 

tank to make a compelling case for establishing the U.S. Africa Command. We argued 

this should be done to "provide American political leaders with more thoughtful, 

informed military advice based on an in-depth knowledge of the region and continnous 

planning and intelligence assessments [so that] better situational awareness of militarypolitical developments could preclude the need for intervention or limit the prospects for 

engaging in open-ended or unsound military operations.,,1 The right American military 

strategy is not more U.S. military in Africa. but making the U.S. military presence more 

effective-in particular helping to set the environment for advancements in public safety, 

civil society, and economic freedom. 

Since then Heritage analysts have studied and written authoritatively on regional issues 

regarding seeurity, economie freedom, counterterrorism, and peace and reconeiliation. I 

am particularly proud of our Africa Working Group, chaired by Heritage Researcher 

Morgan Roach. This forum brings together a diverse assembly of policy makers and 

thought leaders to discuss thc region's most challenging issues in a non-attribution 

setting. These discussions have not only greatly benefited our research agenda, but they 

have been an important eatalyst for fresh thinking on how to make the most of the U.S. 

presence in the region. 

In short, our researeh agenda on Africa refleets the foundation's eommitment to 

advancing public policies that enhance our security; encourage economie growth by 

promoting the legitimate exehange of goods, peoples, services, and ideas among free 

nations; and foster a free and open civil society-all at the same time. 

Where WeAre 

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has a long history of instability, poor 

governanee, and poverty. No one can credibly argue that things are getting better. A 

I James Jay Carafano and Nile Gardiner. "U.S. Military Assistance t()r An'ica: A Better Solution." Heritage 

Foundation Backgrounder No. 1697, October 15,2003. 

http://www .heritage.org/researchireports/2003i I Olus-m i 1 itary-ass istanee-for -an'iea -a -better-so lution. 

2 
91 

continuous U.N. peacekeeping presence for over a decade, billions of dollars in economic 

and humanitarian assistance, and ongoing diplomatic efforts have not averted the current 

crisis. For example, the Congres National pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP), one of the 

most prominent rebel groups in the country, of!1cially disbanded in 2009 but re-hatted 

under the new designation "M23" in reference to the March 23, 2009, peace agreement. 

In November, during M23 's attack on Goma, numerous media accounts reported that 

U.N. peacekeepers from the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 

Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) quickly retreated when the Congolese 

army, the Forces Armees de la Republi~ue Democratique du Congo (FARDC), fled, 

abandoning civilians to the M23 rebels. This incident casts serious doubts on the 

eompetence of MONUSCO and efforts to improve the capacity of the Congolese 

military. 

Further, there is a lack of government structure upon which to build effective security 

capacity, let alone civil institutions and economic opportunity. Thc govcrnment has used 

violence, corruption, and cronyism to maintain power. The November 2011 election was 

ridden with irregularities and targeted violence against the opposition. Government 

resources are awarded to bolster loyalty, not address needs or development. 

What We Can Do 

Building a better Band-Aid has to start by stopping policies that are not working. 3 For 

starters, the U.S. should increase accountability lilr the inept government in Kinshasa. 

The federal government is an impcdiment to stability because President Joseph Kabila 

and his government cannot delivcr on their commitments. Yet there are no legitimate 

local representativcs to fill thc void. The U.S. should press President Kabila to 

decentralize authority and transfer power away from Kinshasa to the provincial and local 

governments. Provincial and local elections should be scheduled to replace oflicials that 

were undemocratically handpicked by Kabila. 

Next, press Uganda and Rwanda to be part of the solution. Thc US should implemcnt 

sanctions on those shown to support activities that contribute to instability in the DRC. 

However, changing the rolc of Rwanda and Uganda requires more than the threat of 

sanctions, Rwanda and Uganda need to sec that their concerns economic and security 

will be addressed through a rcgional strategy. 

For instance, many argue that Rwanda and Uganda's contribution to instability in the 

DRC is directly linked to the DRCs mineral wealth. Rwanda and Uganda have much to 

, Jessica Hatcher and Alex Perry, 

Congo," Time, November 26, 20 12, h.llJ:&.!.'l'Q1:!Q,,!lill<;&'Qill'£Q,Lb'lli~'~Qill]gj~ITlsmill)~i::.<!(2':Ylll,{?lfJ1:: 

thc-u-n-debacle-in-castern-cougo; (accessed December 13,2012) and 

over 'Failed Mandate.'" The East Aji'ican December 1,2012, 

December 13,2012). 

section are adapted from Morgan Lorraine Roach and Brett D. Schaefer, "A Fundamental 

Rethink Is Needed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Heritage Foundation Issue Brier; December 

18,2012. 

~ 

.J 
92 

gain from a stable eastern DRC, particularly one with greater autonomy, that would be 

open to trade and investment. Following the decentralization of governance, provincial 

leadership should be granted the authority to forge economic ties with neighbors. 

Finally, the country needs to transition towards a different security framework. It is time 

to take steps to sharply diminish the size of MONUSCO, circumscribe its mandate, and 

establish a framework for terminating the mission. Peace can best be built with 

participation by regional stakeholders. The African Union Security Council has pledged 

its support towards the deployment of a Neutral International Force in Eastern Congo. 4 

Such a peacekeeping mission should ideally be led by a contingent not directly related to 

the conflict, but should allow for Rwandan and Ugandan participation to enable those 

governments to directly observe the situation to alleviate their concerns. 

What the U.S. Military Can Do 

The most constructive role tor the U.S. military is through the security-capacity-building 

programs managed by U.S. Afi'ica Command working through those countries and 

stakeholders willing to help bring peacc and security to the people of the DRC. These 

should include the traditional tools employed by the command, including International 

Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Sales and Financing, 

multilateral exercises. and training engagements conducted by small teams led by our 

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operations Components, which General 

Carter Ham described as being conducted "at a low cost and with a small footprint."s 

Further. the command should continue to work to ensure that its effol1s are synchronized 

with the rest of the government team, initiatives by independent agencies such as the 

United States Institute of Peace, and private sector and non-governmental organization 

initiatives. 

What this committee should be concerned about is the adequacy and sustainability of 

these programs. When General Ham testified before this committee in February. for 

example, he made only one brief reference in his prepared statement to the DRC and 

security challenges in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. prineipally referring to 

combating the remnants of the Lord's Resistance Army. Further, in Secretary Panetta's 

most recent Defense Strategic Guidance issued in January 2012. entitled "Sustaining U.S. 

Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense," the word "Africa" is only 

mentioned once in the whole 16-pagc document. That has to be a coneern, coming from a 

doeument which purports to give the U.S. Armed Forces and the civilians supporting 

them the Defense Secretary's broad vision and policy priorities6 I see neither document 

refleeting a recognition of the importance of appropriate military engagement activities, 

"Frank Kanyesigye. "Congo-Kinshasa: AU Commends Regional EtTorts on 

December 13, 20 12, llHl);JJl.Hfl.fw;.1l&I21TL!l!Q!]£,.{fliWt;;,lillJl'i'LllllrrL£!:j,:t.n1£:cll!fuftri£t::Q;lih.J]l;.iYiiJrr.irl: 

T':"L,~'-"=..!."'-,-,!:(accessed December 13,2012). 

General Carter Ham statement before the House Armed Services Committee, February 29, 2012, p. 15. 

pLL=-'.!c..C"-,-"~"",-,,-,,-,-,-,,,!.!,,,~w..--;L'4L'.V"~'~"-'-''''~''-'-''''''=''- (accessed December 18,2012). 

4 
93 

but rather ret1ecting the resource squeeze that is increasingly not leaving the armed forces 

the capacity to cover all its responsibilities to protect U.S. interests. 

What Needs to Change 

Beyond the immediate tasks of assisting in addressing regional security issues, the 

committee must be concerned about the adequacy of U.S. forces to playa construct role 

in advancing peace and security throughout the region from the northernmost regions of 

the Ncar East through Central Africa. 

The administration's Quadrennial Defense Review underestimated global force and 

modernization requirements and, in particular, the requirements tt.)f forces to promote 

stability in the region. 7 The President's 2011 Strategic Guidance only exacerbated the 

mismatch between missions and capabilities. Put simply, Washington is taking a peace 

dividend on an account that is overdrawn. This has to stop. 

How U.S. forccs are applied needs rethinking as well. The most urgent priority is U.S. 

counterterrorism strategy which is ovcrly focused on targeting the leadership of 

transnational terrorist groups rather than heing structured to engage with and defeat a 

global Islamist insurgency which sees its path to power through attacking the freedom, 

prosperity, and security of the U.S. and its friends and allies.s 

Next Steps 

The situation in the DRC and the capacity to int1uence it reflects the reality that America 

is at the tipping point in its capacity to defend our interests around the world. There are 

steps that the U.S. military should take. in concert with a more responsible and 

comprehensive regional strategy, but the confidence that that will happen in the long term 

is in grave doubt, because of the lack of overall military capacity. 

For starters. Congress should demand an independent review of the upeoming 

Quadrennial Defense Review. Further, Congress must have better assessments of 

readiness and capabilities to conduct assistance and engagement missions. The Congress 

needs a "canary in the mine shaft" so it know when the resources to undeltake the urgent 

are crowding investments to undertake the impoltant. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on this important issue. I look forward to 

your questions. 

7 The Heritage Foundation, "A Strong National Defense: The Armed Forces America Needs and What 

They Will Cost," Foundation Special Report No. 90. April 5, 20 II. 

The Heritage Foundation Counterterrorism Task Force, "Counterterrorism Strategy for the Next Wave." 

Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 98, August 24. 20 I I. 

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/20 II/OS/a-counterterrorism-strategy-for-thc-next-wavc 

5 
94 

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Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discllssing their OW11 

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institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board oftrustees. 

6 
95 

Dr. James Jay Carafano 

Viee President, Foreign and Defense Policy Stndies and Director, The Kathryn and 

Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation 

James Jay Carafano is a leading expcl1 in national security, defense atTairs, and homeland security at 

The Heritage Foundation, Belorc assuming responsibility Jor Heritage's entire defense and foreign 

policy team in December 2012, Carafano had served as deputy director of the Davis Institute as well as 

director of its Douglas and Sarah Allison Center lor Foreign Policy Studics since 2009. 

He has testitied before the U.S. Congress many times and has provided commentary for ABC, 

BBC, CBS, CNBC, CNN, C-SPAN. Fox News, MSNBC, NBC, SkyNews. PBS, National Public 

Radio, the History Channel, Voice of America. Al Jazeem, and Australian, Austrian. Canadian, 

French, Greek, Hong Kong, Irish, Japanese. Portuguese. and Spanish television. His editorials have 

appeared in newspapers nationwide including The Baltimore Sun, ]fie Bos/on Globe. 77lC New York 

Post, Philadelphia Inquirer. USA Todar and The lVashillgtol1 Times. He is a weekly columnist for the 

Washington Examiner. 

Carafano served as a member ofthe National Academy's Board on Army Science and Technology, the 

Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee, and is a Senior Fellow at the George 

Washington University'S Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Department of Homeland 

Security's Homeland Security Advisory Committee. I Ie was the creative director for the feature-length 

documentary 33 Minutes: Protecting America in the New lvlissile Age. 

An accomplished historian and teacher. Carafano was an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Military 

Academy in West Point, N.Y" and served as director of military studies at the Army's Center of 

Military History. He also taught at Mount Saint Mary College in New York and served as a fleet 

professor at the U.S. Naval War College. I-\e has also served as a visiting professor at the National 

Defense University and Georgetown University. 

He is the author of many books and studies. His most recent book is fViki at War: Conllict in a Socially 

Ne/worked rVorld (Texas A&M University Press. 2012), a of the revolutionary impact of the 

Internet agc on national security. Caratf1l10 coauthored Long War: Lessonsji'om the Cold 

Warlor D~feating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom. The to coin the tenll, the "long waL" the 

authors argue that a sLlccessful strategy requires a balance of prudent military and security measures. 

continued economic growth, the zealous protection of civil liberties and winning the "war of ideas" 

against terrorist ideologies. 

Carafano joined Heritage in 2003. Bett)re becoming a policy expert, he served 25 years in the AmlY. 

Carafano rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. I-Ie served in Europe, Korea and the United States. His 

assignments included head speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staft~ the service's highest-ranking 

ot1icer. Before retiring, Carafano was executive editor of Joint Force Quarrerly, the Defense 

Department's premiere professional military journal. 

A graduate of West Point. Carafimo also has a master's degree and a doctorate from Georgetown 

University and a master's degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War Collcge. 
96 

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House Armed Services Committee 

Testimony by Ben Affleck, Founder of Eastern Congo Initiative 

Wednesday, December 19, 2012 

Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith, Distinguished Members of the Armed Services 

Committee, on behalf of Eastern Congo Initiative, I want to first thank you for holding this 

hearing and devoting your time and attention to the on-going crisis in the Democratic Republic 

of Congo. My name is Ben Affleck, and I am the founder of Eastern Congo Initiative. We are 

the only U.S. based grant-making and advocacy organization entirely focused on working with 

and for the people of eastern Congo, a region that has the unwanted distinction of being one of 

the most volatile in the world and the site of the deadliest conflict since World War II. 

From the outset, let me say that I am not here to ask for precious American tax dollars, I am 

here today to respectfully request you use the most important power you have, your collective 

voice as representatives of the United States of America. 

From 1998 to 2003, eight African nations fought on Congolese soil, causing the death of 

millions, forcing tens of thousands of children to become child soldiers and, in some areas of 

Congo, subjecting as many as two of every three women to rape and other forms of sexual 

violence. The United Nations estimates that as many as 900,000 Congolese have been newly 

displaced in North Kivu province since fighting reignited early this year. As you know, just few 

weeks ago Goma, the economic center and capital of North Kivu province was temporarily 

controlled by the newly formed M23 militia injuring hundreds, displacing tens of thousands. 

M23 is just the latest in a long list of armed groups who have destabilized Congo since 1994. 
100 

With the latest violence, the world is reminded that the systemic sources of instability in this 

region have yet to be addressed. 

Still, in the face of this violence and suffering, the people of eastern Congo remain 

committed to helping their neighbors and rebuilding their communities. ECI's staff and our 

partners have continued to work throughout the crisis, not only providing humanitarian 

assistance but continuing important development activities focused on a brighter future. When 

heavy shelling began last month near our office in Goma, the surgeons, doctors and nurses of 

ECI's partner, HEAL Africa, rushed to the hospital anticipating increased numbers of wounded in 

what is an already overcrowded hospital. Many of these same caregivers were still at the 

hospital five days later, providing free treatment to numerous civilians wounded in the conflict. 

Another ECI partner, Mutaani FM, continued to broadcast news throughout the crisis. Mutaani, 

the only independent radio station in Goma, is located across the street from the Congolese 

Army's headquarters, which was seized and occupied by M23 during the height ofthe conflict. 

Despite the odds, these brave journalists, all young adults in their twenties, stayed on the 

airwaves either reporting from the front lines or locked safely inside the radio station --

reporting on the fighting as it spread across the region. 

Every day, I am inspired by the resilience and determination of the Congolese, who 

desperately want to live their lives in peace, earn a decent living, and raise their families just 

like the rest of us. Frankly, Mr. Chairman, they deserve better than the cycle of violence and 

upheaval that continues to undermine their daily work of rebuilding this war torn community. 

While the M23 has withdrawn from Goma, they have not disbanded. In fact, as of this 

morning, our team on the ground tells us they are just 4 miles away from the city center and 
101 

there are fears that they may attack Goma again. We have seen this cycle repeat itself too 

many times: violence flares up, and the international community turns its attention, for a 

moment, to this part of the world. Violence recedes, and the world turns away in relief, 

without addressing the systemic issues that must be dealt with in order for lasting peace to be 

established and maintained. 

Since my very first visit to Congo in 2006, it is clear to me that the pursuit of durable peace 

in Congo is not hopeless, quite the contrary in fact. The solutions are not new, or particularly 

complex. But without persistent, high-level leadership by the United States, the key players will 

not come to the table and do their part. 

First, let's set aside the notion that the recent talks in Kampala will end this cycle of 

violence. Last week's negotiations were not even attended by the region's key players. It's for 

this reason that ECI has called on the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Envoy, under 

the joint auspices of the UN and the African Union, to bring all stakeholders together to craft 

real, implementable solutions. We are delighted that Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson 

announced the State Department's support for this idea in his recent testimony. 

For 15 years, the United Nations has run a peacekeeping mission in Congo. The time has 

come to fundamentally reconsider the scope of its mandate. As M23 moved into Goma, the 

17,000 troops deployed across DRC that make up the United Nations Stabilization Missionknown as MONUSCO did not protect the civilians in harm's way. This failure raises serious 

concerns. That said, the larger failure most certainly lies with DRC's own security forces' 

continued inability to protect their citizens. With focused U.S. leadership, the UN mandate 

should reflect the needs of the country and the DRC security sector must be reformed. 
102 

Last week, we were delighted that the UN Secretary General launched a review of 

MONUSCO's mission. We hope the United States will take the lead in the Security Council 

supporting significant changes to MONUSCO's mandate. At a minimum, the mandate must be 

strengthened to enable whatever force remains to actually keep the peace and protect the 

people. We also believe the UN's mandate in Congo should not be indefinite. An open-ended 

mandate undermines the urgency for the Congolese government to take responsibility for 

protecting their own citizens. 

Looking beyond the United Nations, donor countries have enormous leverage in the region, 

which they should exert to bring key regional players together for serious negotiations. 

International donors can playa more active role in preventing violence from returning. 

And of course, Congo's neighbors playa critical role in regional security -- there will be no 

lasting stability without their leadership. The United Nations has been presented with evidence 

that M23 is sustained by significant outside support from Rwanda and Uganda. If the 

accusations are true, any support must end. Congo's neighbors have legitimate security 

concerns, and their national economies greatly benefit from DRC's natural resources. We hope 

the Presidents of Rwanda and Uganda will engage in serious discussion about the many issues 

that affect regional stability. The Obama administration can and should leverage its unique 

relationship with these leaders to insist they pursue resolutions directly with the government in 

Congo, rather than indirectly through the support of armed militias. 

It is not enough for M23 to withdraw from Goma. Until the militia is disbanded, the people 

of eastern Congo will live with the daily threat of violence. To be clear, eliminating M23 alone 
103 

will not restore peace. Just the last time I was in Congo, in February, there were at least 27 

armed groups operating in the eastern provinces. 

The regional aspects of this conflict include failures in Kinshasa. Since the last cease-fire in 

2006, too little has changed inside Congo. Kinshasa must take seriously its lack of legitimacy in 

many parts of Congo and act now to address the grievances of its people. When Goma fell to 

M23, there were spontaneous protests in Bukavu, Kisangani and Kinshasa, aimed not only at 

militia violence, but also at the failure of President Kabila's government to protect its citizens. 

To restore legitimacy, the Independent National Electoral Commission should immediately 

set a date for, and begin to organize the provincial elections that were supposed to take place 

in March of this year. The Electoral Commission itself has been seen by opposition parties and 

international election observers as an obstacle to political legitimacy - it should be reformed. 

President Kabila must also commit to the over-due reform of Congo's security sector. 

Without competent military and law-enforcement institutions, Congo's territory will continue 

to provide safe haven to armed groups who prey on civilians and disrupt economic 

development. In April of this year, ECI helped lead an effort, alongside nearly 300 Congolese 

civil society organizations, to publish a comprehensive report about the need for security sector 

reform (SSR) in Congo. This report, which I ask to be submitted for the record, calls for an end 

to the conflict through a comprehensive reform of security institutions, which include the 

military and law enforcement such as the police and the courts. President Kabila has expressed 

an interest in SSR, but it has not been a priority of his Administration. It must become a priority 

now, and the u.s. has an important role to play in ensuring this happens. 
104 

Mr. Chairman, I realize we are laying out a very broad agenda. But we know that none of 

this -- not the revised MONUSCO mandate, the increased donor involvement, the responsible 

behavior of ORCs neighbors, or internal DRC reforms -will happen without direct, high-level, 

focused U.S. leadership. President Obama and many of you have unique leverage with key 

international and regional stakeholders, and the United States is held in very high regard by the 

Congolese people. Your leadership can make a difference if we act decisively, and do so today. 

This is why ECI has called on the President to appoint a temporary special envoy to signal clearly 

that finding a lasting solution to the crisis in Central Africa is a priority for his administration. 

Past models for this approach sending Senator John Kerry to Sudan, the late veteran 

diplomat Richard Holbrooke to the Balkans, or General Colin Powell to Haiti demonstrate 

that high-level diplomatic intervention at the right moment can cut through deadly impasse and 

open the path toward lasting stability. 

At the United Nations, the new presidential envoy should work with Secretary General Ban 

Ki Moon to establish a time table for regional negotiations, revise MONUSCO's mandate, and 

draw up a strategy for reinstating a cease-fire, in case violence flares up again. 

Internationally, the U.S. should encourage our NATO allies and other key partners to 

provide police, judicial and military training so the Congolese government can increase its 

capacity to protect its own people as MONUSCO's mandate winds down. U.S. Africa 

Command's (AFRICOM) work with the Congolese Army has demonstrated that a little training 

can have a big impact. During the most recent crisis, ECI's staff in Goma got a car stuck in a 

ditch - it happens a lot, unfortunately. A truck full of Congolese soldiers pulled up and offered 

to help. To be honest, our staff wasn't sure what to expect: in the past, this kind of "help" 
105 

would most likely have been accompanied by a request for a bribe. In this case, the soldiers 

brought the car out of the ditch and waved good-bye. It turns out they were part of the unit 

that AFRICOM trained in 2010. 

The successful AFRICOM training mission is only the latest example in the 52 years since 

Congo's independence of the close U.S.-Congolese ties. As a major donor of humanitarian and 

other assistance our country has much more influence in Kinshasa than we have been willing to 

exert. The President's envoy should engage directly with President Kabila to accept assistance 

in developing a strategy for implementing comprehensive security sector reform. With an 

agreed-upon deadline in place for announcing the SSR strategy, the U.s. should step in to 

provide Congo with whatever technical support it needs in partnership with the EU, NATO, 

and others -- to complete planning. 

AFRICOM's plan to train a second unit of the FAR DC should be put on hold until provincial 

elections are organized and President Kabila produces - and commits to - a workable plan for 

implementing comprehensive security sector reform. But once that commitment is clear, 

Congo will need - and deserves international support to ensure reform takes hold. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that Congress - and the Armed Services Committee in particularhears more urgent requests for U.s. leadership in the world than can be answered. Resolving 

the cycle of violence does not necessarily require a significant new financial investment by the 

United States, or U.S. boots on the ground. It does, however, require American political 

leadership -- moral leadership even -- to bring the parties together to address the larger sources 

of instability in the region. 
106 

I may be na"ive, but I believe that our actions in foreign policy represent our values as a 

country they represent who we are as a people. Soon I will be making my tenth trip to Congo, 

and I know that, if your constituents were to go to Congo and see what is happening there, they 

would insist we do something about it. I founded ECI in part to serve as a megaphone to 

amplify the voices of the people of eastern Congo, and I thank you for the opportunity to do 

that today. Even in the face of violence and upheaval, the Congolese remain resilient and 

entirely determined to rebuild their country. The seventy million Congolese deserve a better 

tomorrow, and they haven't given up trying to build a peaceful future. With support from 

Congress, and leadership from the President, the United States can help them get there. We 

can help, and we should. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions. 
107 

BEN AFFLECK 

Actor, Writer, Director & Advocate 

In addition to a successful career as an actor, writer and director, Ben Affleck is 

also a passionate advocate and philanthropist. [n 2010, Ben founded Eastern Congo 

Initiative (ECI), dedicated to supporting effective, local, and community-based 

approaches to sustainable economic and social development in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo (DRC). ECI is the first U.S.-based advocacy and grant-making 

initiative wholly focused on working with and for the people of eastern Congo. 

Since 2007, Ben has made multiple trips to eastern Congo with the goal 

of understanding the causes and consequences of conflict in the area, and of 

supporting effective, African solutions to the problems affecting the DRC. Ben has 

partnered with multiple media, philanthropic, and government partners to raise 

awareness, amplify ECI's message and motivate global action. In 2011, Ben 

testified before the US House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights, encouraging directed support of women and children in 

eastern Congo. In June, Ben joined Secretary Hillary Clinton in delivering strong 

commitments to increase the survival rates of children under five in the DRC. He 

has also worked with multiple media outlets including TIME, ABC Nightline, 

Good Morning America, CBS, Washington Post and others to tell the hopeful 

Congolese story. 

Ben Affleck recently turned forty. He is malTied and has three children. He has 

appeared in over thirty films, written five and directed three, of which Argo is the 

most recent. 
108 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the u.s. 

House of Representatives for the 112'" Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Armed Services Committee in 

complying with the House rule. 

Witness name: 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

Individual 

_ Representative 

If appearing in a rCllre,seniIR1[Jve 

entity being rer'r~"cnterl. _-bD..;).l.ld",",,'--~~""'--'.C"'--'--"-''-'-'2-''~ _____ _ 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 
109 

FISCAL YEAR 2009 

Federal grant(s) / federal dollarvlIlue sUDJect\SI of contract or 

grant 

~---

--~. 

Federal Contract Information: or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts \"'Y'VM .. 'O subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following infbm1ation: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (20 11): 

Fiscal year 2010: ___________ _ 

Fiscal year 2009: ____ _ 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

Current fiscal year (20 11): _____ _ 

Fiscal year 2010: ________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2009: 

List of suhjects offederal --.... "'-.\.~J (for example, construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, structure C011Sulltant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc.): 

Current fiscal (201 

Fiscal year 

Fiscal year 2009: _________________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 

Current fiscal (20 11 L._~_ 

Fiscal year 

Fiscal year 2009: 

2 

-1 

~ 

I 

j 
110 

Federal Gran! Information: ]fyou or the entity you represent before the Committee on 

Anned Services has grants (induding subgrants) ''lith tbe federal govenunent, please 

provide the following information: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Fiscal year 

Fiscal year 2009: 

Federal agencies with which federal grants arc held: 

(2011 ): ___ --'voL)',"-'A-'-\u\:>"'--

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc.): 

Aggregate dollar value offederal grants held: 

NVF received 

subgrant the money 

c3 was a special project of NVF). NVF 

ECI DRe. So technically, this 

not typically need to be reported 

The Kivu-Coffee grant money will go 

from ECI c3, this would also not 

them as (they are 1m:ernat 10Ilal 

and ECI project of NVF) did 

the MNCH and the landscape analysis 

contracted with vendors (ECI prior to being 

out of to .implement 

and thus my un<lersta,nd:lne 

because Goma is a 

J 

this 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

DECEMBER 19, 2012 

(113) 

ASADHO 

Groupe Lotus 

iREFUGEE${ilP 

INTERNATlONAI. 
114 

CONTENTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMAHY 

HECOMMENDATlONS 

1 nsccurity: 

C~overnmenL 

Political Will 

International Community; 

J i'l,u!equate and f ncoheft'nt 

The Shan:d Imperative of 

neer!! on ssa 

Cuor.'dinvte and CommunicHte 

Benchmarking 

(:onsequcnces 

4-5 

6-7 

12T1 

Confkknee-B-uildlng Hi 

Learn fr0D1 - and failurcs 

ANNEX I -OECD statistics on spending in the DRC 

ACRONYMS 

ENDNOTES 

This report IS produced 

by the following organizations: 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

Congo Initimive (Eel) 

· The F,})(j"ugh Pl'ojcfl.. 

· Open Soclety Ini1i!ltlv't" fof' 'south"nT Afrlt'HYl (OS-18M 

· Hl'fugccs fntt·rna1Hlnal 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

?\'Iebnie Gnuby 

rcpllri wa~ produced 

gem!!'()US SUpp0l'1. from Open Squal'~: 

18 

20 

20-22 

CONGOLESE ORGANIZATIONS 
115 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 
116 

6. 

7. 

the worst offenders. 

8. This new puct must transcend traditional donors. China 

future generations to renp the rewards from its investment. 

Angola has 

9. 

10. 

Takll1g a Stand On Security Sector Reforrn 4 
117 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. 

2. 

a. 

4. Colilaborate 

support. 

5. 

sector reform. 

7. 

8. 

programmatic support. 

9. Ensure that the imperative of effective SSR, and the benchmarks and conditions agreed at the 

high-level forum, are reflected in any new programming decisions or bilateral agreements. 
118 

13. Amend the mandate of MONUSCO to include assisting the DRC government on all aspect.'> of' 

SSR, including military reform. 

individuals. 

16. 

18. Extend targeted sanctions to individuals hindering effective SSR 

To the AU 
119 

Congo's Achilles Heel 

L Taking stock of progress in the DRC since 2006 is sobering. 

The war has been over for a decade. An elected government has 

served a full term. Between 2006 and 2010, the DRC received 

considerable external assistance, including more than $14 

billion in official development aid and a UN mission costing 

more than $1 billion a year. Yet this investment has yielded 

little result. Life expectancy and child mortality remain far 

below the Central Africa uverage. National income per capita 

is less than 50 cents a day21. In fact, the DRC has slipped to last 

place in UN development rankings, 187(h out of 187 countriesn . 

Public discontentment is rife, and there are concerning signs 

of renewed violence in the EasL A decade on from the end of a 

devastating war, and all that has been invested in t.he DRC risks 

going to waste. The Congolese people deserve better. 

2. The proximate cause of this failure is simple, Congo's 

population continues to suffer, directly and indirectly, at the 

hands of men with guns. There are an estimated 1.7 millionn 

internally displaced people in the DRC, most in the conflictaffected Eastern provinces, driven from their homes by fear of 

a variety of armed groups - from the Lord's Resistance Army 

(LRA) in the North EJ.st, to Mai Mai groups, bandits and Front 

Democratique pour la I,iberation de Rwanda (FDLR) rebels 

further South - nod at the mercy of malnutrition, ill-health and 

pervasive fear. 

Nearly half a million a re refugees outside the country24. 

UNICEF estimates that thousands of children are still being 

used in various capacities by armed groups in DRC, including by 

the Congolese Armi~~. 

::\. This failure is not just indicative of the inability of the 

Congolese security apparatus to defeat these groups. It is 

also the result of abuses at the hands of the security services 

themselves, A survey of more than 10,000 households in North 

and South Kivu cited the PARDC as the second most common 

source of insecurity, after banditry26. In June and ,July 2011, 

UN human rights monitors recorded more abuses at the hands 

of the FARDe than armed groups2,. Congolese soldiers are 

responsible for some of the rapes reported across Eastern 

DRC2h• Members of the security services are also responsible 

for pervasive low·level predation, including involvement in 

illegal resource exploik'l.tion and theffw. Many abuses have been 

perpetrated by deserters from the military, or by those reacting 

to abuses at the hands of the army. 

Abuse by Congolese security forces extends beyond 

immediately conflict-affected zones. The abuse has been most 

visible in the brutal Buppression of political pl'otest or internal 

unrest, notably in the suppression of the Bundu diu Kongo 

group, the crushing of MLC forces loyal to ,Jean-Pierre Bemba 
120 

in Kinshasa, and heavy-handed responses to political protest.s 

around the 2011 elections. It has also been felt in the arbitrary 

arrest or killing of' regime opponents, human rights activists 

and journalists, as well as day-to-day predation and lack of 

access to even-handed justice. 

regional tensions from escalating. Adequate security is widely 

Pn.'sident Kabila in his address to the UN in November 20nn, 

All major bilateral and multilateral adors have engaged in a 

wide variety of security sector reform programs, from capacity 

building in the justice system, to rebuilding key infrastructure, 

or training military and police. The UN considers SSR to be 

the process of enhancing effective and accountable security in 

fi country and the transformation of ('security institutions to 

make them more professional and more accountable ~:12. Security 

institutions CRn include the armed forces, police, judic.iary and 

othersn. 

G. Yet despite this consensus, military reform efforts have failed. 

both during the transition and afterwards. They have failed for 

two primary reasons. The first is the lack of political will on the 

7. The Congolese Government has lacked the will to follow 

demonstrates the government has not wanted a professional 

and effective military, as it would eonst.it.ute a thn~at to the 

or effectively follow up plans that were agreed:H, enabled or 

turned H blind eye to corrupt.ion, delayed the passing of essential 

legislation, and consistently undermined donor coordination_ 

This was in part due to a lack of capacit.y and a very low 

ba:;eline for reform. The integration of former belligerents 

into unified military and polic(C: structures dming the 

army and ot.hpr ::;ecurity structures, and tens of thousands of 

combatants remained in non-state armed groups. Government. 

administrative control waH weak, notably in the East. The 

post-2006 administrntion i mmediaiely faced a variety of 

armed opponcnt.s;-)h. Additionally, sensitivity to international 

interferenee on security issues was acute ~ the close supervision 

that the international community had exercised during the 

transition, embodied in CIA'pr: and MONtJe, hud been a source 

of considerable frustration, even humiliation. Memories of 

wartime occupation were vivid, by powers widely perceived 

- rightly or wrongly - to be acting on behalf of elements of 

the international communityl~, The government is defensive 

of its autonomy, and wary of dealing collectively with the 

international community_ 
121 

9. But these issues are as much a result of (!"ontlnued failures: of 

SSR as they are the cause ~ and they do not present a compelling 

reason to ignore the need for SSR. The tact remains: that the 

take steps to end corruption, ill-discipline and weak command 

structures undermining reform efforts in the security sector. 

Despite President Kabila's high-profile declarat.ion of 'zero 

tolerance' for sexual violence and corruption in ,July 2009, 

inadequate ~ the Justice Ministry was allocated JURt 0.1% of 

government spending in 2011:w, and it.s budget reportedly fell by 

47% between 2007 and 20094°, Many in senior positions in the 

illegal mining, trade or protection rackets. 

10, No comprehensive national vision exists for defense and 

A joi.nt committee on justice reform was fOl'med in 2005, the 

'Comite Mixte de la Justice', co-chaired by the Minister of 

Justiw and a senior diplomat and a three year 'priority action 

plnn' for the justice sector was launt'hed in 2007. A coordinat.ion 

body for police refortn, t.he 'Comitt' de Buivi de la Reforme de In. 

Police' was launched by the Ministry ofInt.criorin 2008.1;). 

11. Though they represent posit.ive st.eps forward, these bodies 

are reportedly of mixed effectivenessH , suffer from poorlydefined roles and tenslons between stakuholdt'fs, and are not 

part of a comprehensive strategy for security. The army reform 

plan has not been followed up with practical planning for 

implementation'IS, remains theoretical and is routinely bypassed 

or undermined in day-to·day decision+making. ChangeR to 

military planning. The Presidential Guard and intelligence 

soldiers, despit.e some limited increases. remain inadequate and 

frequently unpaid-ll. An ICC indictee, Bosco Ntaganda, holds 
122 

International Community: 

I nadequate and Incoherent 

12. The second aspect key to understanding SSR efforts since 

2006 is the attitudes and actions of the international community. 

The international community has been frequently criticized for 

political incoherence, leading to inadequate, incompatible and 

ineffective interventions, based on short·term national priorities 

servicesso. These efforts have not resulted in meaningful, 

sustained improvements, let alone the transformation in 

attitudes and effectiveness required. 

lao The international community had been remarkably unified 

up to 2006. Under the leudership of an activist UN mission and 

heavy-hitting SRSG, and coordinHt.t~d through a body, CIAT, 

transition was completed, divisions began to appear. Some of 

elections, no single goal to work towards. International forums, 

notably the Great Lakes Contact Group, which had a broad 

memberships2 during the transition, swiftly devolved to include 

only traditional donors, and policy coherence even within 

multilateral organizations such as the EU fractured"" Pressure 

on the Congolese Government to sustain reform faltered. 

14. The success of the 2006 elections resulted in attention 

across much of the international community turning away 

from the DRC. With the DRC redefined in many capitals as a 

'post-conflict' statc, resources were reRllocated to concentrate 

on other issues of immediate concern across Africa. Policy was 

recalibrated to reflect this new reality. Many donors looked 

to long-term development. Despite manifest needs, official 

prot.ecting civilians, and in achie\"ing all other devt'lopment. 

objectives. 

1;>. And, far from being 'post-conflict', the DRC continued to 

Through the 

short-term political crises or humanitarian emergencies. There 

were demands for immediate action against armed groups such 

as the CNDP, FDLR or LRA· necessitating the mass deployment 

of ineffective and poorly trained FARDC units~'5. 

Political settlemenL;:; with Congolese armed groups, notably the 

CNDP, resulted in the unpla nned, ad hoc integration of tens of 

t.housands of former rebels and indicted war criminals into the ranks 

of the Congolese armj'f\. Df'mobilization programs have unwittingly 

encouraged a churn of individuals from disarmament. to recruitment. 

All ot' these factors are incompat.ible with stratf'gic reform. 

mixed. As seen above, committees bringing together donors, agencies 

and the Congolese government have been est.ablished on police and 

justice. They are functionnl, albeit with uncertain effectiveness. But 

Government's infamous refusal to coordinate SSR attempts with its 

different partners. 

This is reflected by a failure of coordination betw{,en memhcrs of 

the international community themselves. There have been attempt'> 

an Ambassadors Forum on SSR chaired by the UN, and regular 

ofSSH.'l'e1ated inwrventions<'~, or a comprehensive record of bilateral 

military programs lind financing. Given t.he weakness of Congolese 

administrative capacity, it is likely that not even the Congolese 

government had a coherent picture of SSR activities at anyone time. 
123 

18. The result has been a range of disconnected bilateral 

initiatives on training, sensitization, infrastructure 

rehabilitation 01' capacity building. There have been some 

successes, notably in relation to justiee and police"\i, and in the 

performance of some military units, though many were short· 

lived, due to a subsequent lack of support -accommodation, 

equipment and salaries - or the break-up of units. Some offers 

of training have not been taken up, with centers .and instructors 

standing idle. There have been attempts to engage with 

structural issues within the FARDC undprtaken by MONUSCOiiO 

and EUSEC, a mission of the European Union launched in 

2005. Involving small numbers of embedded European officers, 

EUSEC has had some success in relation to the 'chain of 

payments' - ensuring salaries reach individual soldiers - and 

in conducting a cenSllR of FARDC personne1. as well as in 

administrative reformlH• But 'while these initiatives have been 

valuable, they are not sufficient to bring about systemic change. 

19. This is by no means the exclusive responsibility of donors. 

As argued above, all coordination attempts suffered from 

patchy or inadequate engagement and political obstruction by 

the Congolese authorities. This has been most acutely felt by 

the UN. The most obvious candidate to carry out the t'Qle of 

in~country coordination is MONUSCO, But while it has a unit 

devoted to SSR, and has been mandated by the Security Council 

to act as coordinator and information hub since 2008, it has 

not been sufficiently well resourced, and was systematically 

facilitating collective discussion on SSR following the demise of 

the Ambassadors F01'um, which has been moribund since 2010. rt 

currently has no mandate to engage in military re1orm. 

of 

20. In combination, these factors have resu lted in the view that 

the Congolese security sector, and particularly its military, are 

simply too dysfunctional for reform to be achieved. The result 

has been an increasing detachment on SSR. Support for military 

reform is now frequently subsumed under wider stabilization 

efforts6:" or framed as n response to a specific threat, such as the 

US project to train units to tackle the LRN:l. Though numerous 

important challenge facing the country, namely systemic 

transformation of the military. has largely been abandoned. 

Initiatives on large-scale FARDC training redu('cd to the point 

that only hvo bilateral programs were reported to be operational 

in Januury 2011"". 

This is compounded by t.he view that pushing the DRC 

government to take serious action is too dangerous to attemptthat effective sanctions would generate a political backlash, disrupt 

bilateral relationships, and risk defections, mutiny or insurrection. 

This is certainly the case in relation to entrenched corrupt 

networks and. the impunity of the most. infamous war criminals. 

But this view must no longer be allowed to dominate. The 

status quo, of failed reform and popular discontent, presents 

far greater dangers. The most significant risk of renewed 

conflict comes from within the Congolese security services itself, 

particularly the }"ARDC(l6, and from the inability of the Congolese 

the long· term risk of inaction is far greater. The human, political 

and financial cost of the DRC again collapsing back into war is 

difficult to fathom. 
124 

2a. Yet these costs would be felt by all of the DBGs external 

partners. China struck a landmark deal with the DRC 

stability will be vital for this deal t.o come to fruition, 

demanding an effective security sector. South African 

companies have invested heavily in the DRe. and peace in the 

DRC and across Central Afriea will be vital for its long term 

to its national security'lIl, It too needs an effective Congolese 

state. All three states have already engaged in bilateral 

reform and retraining. 

24. Regional organizations, most importantly the African 

Union (Ae') and the Southern Africa Development Committee 

institutions - frequently cited as the actors with the most 

the nRC are now such that renewed, joint efforts on SSR could 

yield real and lasting results. The transition was characterized 

by acute political competition between wartime enemies, 

enmeshed in an unwieldy political structure. The years 

COllt3traints on the possibilities for reform~:\, 

2(\< These constraints are now less acut.e. Congolese non· 

state armed groups may be reduced in number and scopen. 

most telling step that the government. could take to rebuild its 

reputation at home and abroad, and to improve the lot of the 

population, would be to undertake meaningful reform of the 

security npparat.us.1'here have been some promising signs 

recently. For example, the Commissioner General of the Nalional 

Police in March 2012 publicly asked the international community 

for assistance in completing the police reform proccss:fl• 

The overriding need for meaningful SSR cannot be 

questioned. There is a broad synergy of interests across the 

int.ernl:ltional communit.y and t.he 

commitment at the very highest levels. 

2B. The international community must recognize this 

imperative. It. must act on it. All othf'r objectives -

humanitarian, developmental, economic or security·related 

stand on serious security sector reform, both to engender 

tlnancial and diplomatic support Bince the end of the war. The 

weight of these commitment.s must be brought to bear. 
125 

New Deal on 

2~). It is a new political commitment that is urgently needed 

above all, on both sides. The international community 

should seek to strike a new collective pact with the Congolese 

Government on SSR. This need not involve the immediatf' 

allocation of significant new reSOUl'ces. Tn the ahsence of political 

will and the establishment of oversight stJ'uctures., sign ifieant new 

certainly be necessary, a new push on SSR need not be expensive 

in the short-term. 

mutually agreed goals. It would need to involve all international 

actors engaged in the DRC, including the t.raditional donol' 

community, newer international udol's including China and 

financial institutions. It would demand renewed commitment, 

coordination and communication, robust benchmarks, and 

quick-win confidence raising projects. 

;)1. It should be launched in a spirit of transparency and 

confrontational attitude on the part of the international 

community could cause an unhelpful political backlash 

- managing tensions will requ il'e astute and fleet-footed 

diplomacy, and a leading role to be played by African actors. But 

above all. There will be disagreements, with Congolese 

Government, and between elements of the international 

community. Such a push will need sust.ained, high-level political 

commitment, and must be backed by real conditions. 

Co!.wdinate and Conmnmic,rre 

Renewed cool'dinHtion among all partners at both political 

and teehnicallevels is an essentjal pre-requisite, A broad-based 

coalition of international partners will be vital, including 

Af.rican bilateral actors, regional organizations - notably SADC 

and the African Union - the DRC's key economic partners, and 

traditional donors. This would enable on-going information 

active diplomacy by key donors - the US, ED, UK, France and 

Belgium .- to bring in the most important African bilateral 

for on-going oversight and a mechanism for the resolution 

~).J> Finally, a new working level cooperation mechanism 

on military reform should be launched in Kinshasa, again 

mutually acceptable alternative. It would ensure harmonization, 

communication and effective burden-sharing. It would also map 

on-going and planned programs and interventions, maintain 

comprehensive pl'oject database, and act as. a communication 

hub between donors, government and civil s.ociety. 
126 

B{-'DCh marking 

:j.;'). Though a new partnership should be launched in a spirit 

of positive collaboration, it should also be backed by robust, 

binding benchmarks. These would need to be discus~ed and 

calibrated against a realistic assessment of what is achievable. 

They should center on two key areas. The first key benchmark 

should be rooted in the human rights performance of the 

Congolese security services. This is a metric that would reflect 

whether soldiers or police are violating human rights, whether 

war criminals in the military have been arrested or removed 

(through vetting and effective military justice), and would act 

as a proxy for improved internal discipline and the coherence of 

or ad hoc bodies such as those authorized by UN sanctions 

provide for increased resources to monitor progress on SSR. 

:3G. The second should be the development and implementation 

of a practical path for FARDe reform. Legislation passed in 

2010 and promulgated by the Congolese President in 2011 

provides a framework, enshrining in law a long term vision 

for the security sector. A practical plan for its achievement is 

87. These conditions must be backed by real consequences in 

the event of continued failure or obstruction. This would not 

necessarily need to include hard conditionality on development 

spending or humanitarian aid, which would endanger the 

poorest and most vulnerable, and would risk a political backlash 

for internationallevemge, st.artingwith sustained political and 

diplomatic pressure at the highest levels. These could include: 

· A publicly available quarterly progress report discussed at each 

meeting of the high-level political follow-up mechanism; 

· Explicit linkage of progressive MONUSCO draw-down with 

successful SSR, as measured by agreed criteria: 

· A moratorium on non-essential inward and outward visits hy 

senior officials and ministers, and the hosting oflarge-scale 

conterenccs and events in the DRC~~; and 

· Extension of UN and EU targeted sanctions to military and 

political figures blocking security sedor reform. 
127 

Contidenel~· Build! ng 

n.chievable, realistic and high,impact short-term projects, to 

raise confidence and open space for reform. The first steps would 

need to be focused on minimizing the harm done by elements of 

the Congolese security apparatus to the civilians in their ureas 

need to be discussed and agreed, but could take three initial 

iormR - the progressive demilitarization of the EaBL action on 

corruption, and prosecution of those guilty of the most serious 

human rights abuses. 

;-m. Demilitarization would bring multiple benefit". The East of the 

DRC, particularly the Kivus, has seen large-scale deployments of 

Congolese military'K. By moving troops to barracks, away from 

contact with civilians, it would remove one of the key sources 

of insecurity for the population. Having the majority of h'oops 

in lk'lrracks would allow salaries and support to be monitored, 

removing the need for income from lllegal trade, predation or 

corruption. And it would allow structures to be mapped, training 

needs to be assessed, and discipline rebuilt. It. would thus both 

prolect civilians and simultaneously open space for reform. It 

would need to be progresRive and carefully considered, so that the 

most vulnerable were not left open to attack by non-state armed 

groups, and MONUSCO would need to fill any resulting security 

vacuums. Necessary international support to the process would 

include provision of sufficient barracks, support to redeployed 

troops and dependents, and logistics. Such support could be 

coordinak>d by the UN though IvIONUSCO and the 188SS, already 

engaged in similar projects: in conflict affected regionB-. 

40. The second would be to take on the ent.renched corrupt 

networks that have undermined reform. This would be a 

necessary step in pursuing demilitarization ~ without the 

{;xpcctation of support, soldiers might refuse to deploy away 

from resource-rich areas, or simply prey on the population 

around barracks. It would also bring enormous long-term 

wiH in Kinshasa - it is (l tnlism in anti-corruption initiatives 

that enforcement mechanisms are ineffective in the absence 

of commitment at. the highest levels. It would demand 

the clarification of senior command structures, 

the strengthening of central administrat.ive control, 

and t.he appointment of capable personnel. 

human rights abuses, including those in the most senior ranks, 

Not only wou.ld t.his be of clear benefit in its own right, it would 

and civilian justice systems. 

,·l2, These three goals interlock, and would constitute a 

significant t.est of Congo]Hse political will. Once they were 

achieved, and the steps outlined above taken, longer-term 

necessit.ies" such as reducing the number of personnel in both 

police and military, and conducting a thorough vetting of all 

personnel- could begin to be planned and implemented. 
128 

Learn from 

'13. Finally, the international community should learn the 

lessons ofthe past. 'l'he implementation of MONUSCO's 

conditionality policy ~ whereby peacekeepers do not work with 

Congolese personnel guilty of human rights abuses· shows that 

perpetrators can be identified and held to accounfi\J if made 

a priority. Improved rates of arrest and trial for sexual and 

gender~based violence (SGBV) in the Kivu provinces, notably 

the prosecution of a Lieutenant Colonel for l'tl.pe in 20ll"o, show 

that justice is posRible with the right combination of training, 

material support and political attention. That this landmark 

judgment was delivered by a 'mobile gender court' - a long~ 

standing Congolese solution to delivering justice in remote 

areas - demonstrates the importance of working flexibly within 

Congolese realities. The court was supported by the American 

Bar Association, using funding from an international NGO, and 

worked with the Congolese judicial system, local governmrnt 

and civil society8l. 

interventions executed in concert with the Congolese 

government, UN agencies and local Congolese organizat.ions. 

Children and adolescents who join armed groups whether 

through force or ignorance have a difficult time returning 

t.o their homes and communities ifihey are demobilized. 

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs 

supported by U~ICEF make a difference by reuniting some 

with their families and communities and supporting others in 

vocational training programs82• 

The E1TSEC project on reform of the Congolese military 

demonstrates that structural reform need not be expensive if 

in both headquarters and with individual un its. Designed to 

offer strategic advice and targeted support, its most significant 

initiatives have been working on the 'chain ofpaymcnts' ~ 

ensuring salaries reached individual soldinrs·- undertaking a 

census of F'ARDC personnel, developing a 'logistics doctrine' 

for th~ FAR DC, and conducting administrative training. The 

census started in 2006, and has been able to offer a far more 

t'eliable idea of numbers of serving soldiers than was previously 

available~3. The strategic purpose of interventions matters more 

than their cost. 

conduct and discipline are possible. Many police units trained for 

the 2006 elections were reported to have functioned well. But once 

being broken up and discipline slippingM • Training and equipment 

are vital, but attention also needs to be sustained. 
129 

ANNEX I -OECD statistics on spending in the DRC 

Fig L OE:CD Devel(\pment Rpending 2006-2010"-

200G 2007 2008 20()() 20j() Total 

This gives a headline total of more than $13 billion in official 

development commitments to the DRe between 2006 and 2010, 

and more than $11 billion in disbursements. This translates to 

an overall financial commitment of $2.8 billion a year between 

2006 and 2010. 

Fig 2. OECD development 2006-20:10 (excluding debt)''' 

2000 20(}7 200i' ZOO}) 20W 

Disbursed 1198.729 U;)6.323 liiJ4,]f;7 2;)3B.2(16 21HL93 

Committed 118~.S08 1710.224 2099.748 :W::m.H 2283JWfi 

S8.5 billion, and an average eommitmenl of just over $2 billion 

Fig 3. DEeD on 

200(-) 2007 

'Contlict, and .':ie- 89.9H 7.'LD6 

curity' 

Ml1.naw'- 1.05 fl.02 

Fig 4. ?vfONCC/.:vlONUSCO budget'" 

200G·2007 

JODL2,12 

20Ql·20()B 

1112.7:~m 

200B-ZO()O 

11M7.f'iiG 

zoos 

8DA 

19.6·1 

:2000-2010 

18HL}84 

2009 

124.83 

21.18 

Total 

1O,2G4.GRj 

2010 

142.:12 

3~.60 

2010·2011 

(disbnrsement 

Total 

;)80.51 

85.7U 

Total 

(j099 
130 

Top tell OECD 

Country 

Belgium 

,Japno 

Germany 

Sweden 

Spain 

00rway 

C~{nada 

;Jetlwrlands 

GK 

DRC debt l'Pli()f 

Xomlnal debt 2010 

reEd 

{SCS rni1lions) 

Under an}).;) 

enhaneed 

lllPC 

1.;nder ivlD1U fl.;'} 

Total 39·1 

donors to DRC 2010 (disbursement. exclllding deht'''') 

130.4{)'i' 

2011 

f-i2BA 

liL8 

R4~$.2 

Total 

164J19 

80 

32 

20,30 

20.,,2 

lD.59 

Bdgium 

2012 

16.8 

2013 

G] 1.2 

188 

G3(U 

Tht' Netherland", 

199-1;')1) 

2014 

498.n 

!B.3 

518..1 

290S.047 

These numbers give the begt estimate of the annual savings 

Reform 
131 

ACRONYMS 

AU; Mri(,flll Union (AU) 

CAR C('utral African R('publk (CAR) 

DN> De\'<'lopnwnt. A5si~lan('e Commi!,tel' (DAC) 

ORC: Dpll)ocrllti{' Rt'publk of tlw Congo (DRC) 

Extrnrled CI'Nht Fac1lir:v (Een 

EU: European limon (EU) 

i':!JPIH.: 'EO Pnlit(' Mission in fJRC (EUP()L) 

EUSEC: ElJ Advisory and Asshltance i>llssion fot' Security Reform in DRC 

(EUSEC) 

}j\RDC: FOffE'S Arm{>('s de In Ri'publiquf' D"mocl'f>t.1qm: du (\'llgO Al'tuNl 

ENDNOTES 

F0T\:es (lfthe DRC (FAROe) 10 

FDLR: Forces democratiques de libcraJion du RWi\llda· Democf31k FortI's 

f(1r the Libenltion of RWflndil (FDLR) 

FNL: Foret's for National I.ilwf(ltioll (Burundian F'NL) 

GN!: Gross NHtioIlallnmmc (GN!) 

!llI'C: fleavily Indebled Poor Coun1.rit,s (HIPC) 

ICC: InlernatiOllal Crllnina! COl1n (ICC) 

11M· hltCl"natiollal fkwlopnwnt A~,:;oeiaUon (IDA) 

IF!: In('rnalional Financial In!ltituUous (IF!) 

IFRI: French lw;l!lute of Int€rnationll! Rf'lMion8 (IFHI) 

!MF: lntnnatlonil! MOlwtary Fund (lMF) 

lSSS8: The International Sf'('urity .and Stabilisation S11ppnrt 8tri\teg~· 

tISSSS) 

LRA: Lurd>s Resistall('f' Army (LRA) 

MDR!: The Multilateral Debt Relief InitiaUw (MURl) 

MI,(;: Moypment for lh,> Liberation of the Congo (1\11,(;) 

).1GO: N{JIl·Governm('ntal Org,mizHLion (;\IGO) 

OIM: Offirial Dew:lol1wcnt Aid (ODA) 

OECD: The Organizallon for lkonomk C(HIPN-"lioll and D('w!opnwnt 

(OEeD) 

SA DC: Son! hern ,\ thcan D('V('lupmtl)t ('omU1llnity (,c;A DC) 

FGllV; St'XUHl and Gender-based ViU)('lH'P (SGBV) 

SR:iG: 81)(,<1al Rf'jWNlmtat!v(' of lhp SNT('rMY"(~l'n('rill (SRSC) 

~.sH: Security S('('lnr Refonn (BoSH.) 

STAREC: St<lbili1.<ltion and RO(,OllHtructiot! Plan fot' War,Affeded Arens 

(STARFC) 

UK: United Kingdom (UK) 

UN: United Nations (UN) 

UNDP: United Nlltion" Development. Prog-l'anlllll' (u~np) 

t;1\'HCR: Unitf'd ::-;RtiOllS High C()mmlsslOm'r for Rpfug('Ps (\]:\HCR) 

et-,'ICEF', l:nited N<ltinllfl Cllilul'lm's Fund (llNlCEFl 

us. t7nited St<ltl'S (US) 
132 

34 $et'paragraphlO. 

(,hUHI and Congo F'rwn<b in Ne~d'. Gi(>h~l W)tn~ES, :".larch 2011 

69 hy"Y"''''Y'''·.'''''''''' ,,[ 
133 

70 Cnnfklentwl l()tervicws by (luibnfwlth v[lnoul-,polttymaknrs"ianuurv 2()12 

71 Ibid. 

Fnrll1~H\m·{'. tl1f" 14th SummltofLB F'r~m'('Jlh()nH" 1~ dm· to Ink,· plJtrp m KH1."h(!HR in 

IMe2012. 

S::l LHt'>s.illsti!Ulltesl1t("ofat{>taiofupproxlma\('ly]()5f)()() 

81 Confidential intervlewsby uuthOl" wlth \'armus polkymakt·r~.,Janu[\ry :~012 

OECl)-J)AC, all figures in URn millions, CUrf("nt pnrc·s. A(""B~R("d"l1 20 Mureh 2012 

86ibld 

R1 

S9 

urUJrg 

90 OECD-DAC, \ll figures in u~;n mi!li()n~. cUn""nt rTl('('~, A,q·u(·rj on 2{) l\i~rfh 2012 

m ibid 

'" ~:~:,~,~:ti'(~:;;~~;:~:f!:~t";;;;;:";~~,~:~:,;~,'~:;::::~:: 
134 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

DECEMBER 19, 2012 

(137) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Secretary CHOLLET. U.S. forces used the same Afghanistan model of training and 

fighting alongside the host nation counterparts as the model when training and 

equipping the FARDC 391st battalion and this is the same model currently being 

used to train other African forces today in areas such as Senegal, Mauritania, Niger, 

Uganda, Burundi, etc. Also building on the Afghanistan model, when training partner forces, DOD works to develop a training plan that meets the host-nation’s requirements, which in the case of DRC and our training of the 391st, was a base 

line internal security capability. 

The geography and operational profile of Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are very different; and many lessons learned do not necessarily translate directly to DRC. However, experiences in Afghanistan have built 

capable and competent Special Forces operators who have the necessary skill sets 

to engage with foreign forces be successful in developing their capabilities. Also, lessons learned from efforts to build partner capacity (BPC) in Afghanistan are also 

being incorporated into U.S. doctrine and training for BPC, and the Department of 

Defense believes this will have a positive impact on global BPC efforts. [See page 

28.] 

Secretary CARSON. Border security in the region is almost non-existent. There is 

very little security along the borders. They are not clearly delineated. People move 

back and forth easily. Some of the areas are very mountainous. There are active volcanoes in and around Goma, and in both North Kivu and South Kivu. It is an enormous challenge also because of the enormous size of the country. This is a country 

that shares borders with nine other countries. As I said, geographically, it’s as large 

as the eastern part of the United States, and certainly is twice as large as Western 

Europe. It also has several water borders. The Congo River divides the Democratic 

Republic of the Congo from the Republic of the Congo, known as Congo Brazzaville. 

And, there are several lakes that divide the country from its eastern neighbors. 

In addition to the challenges posed by the size and terrain of the border, the DRC 

military does not have the manpower or the expertise to undertake effective border 

security. We continue to urge the DRC government to recommit and accelerate its 

security sector reform efforts. We have provided extensive training to the DRC military and are prepared to provide additional training; however, none of it is directly 

aimed at border security. 

While border security is not one of the mandated tasks of the UN Peacekeeping 

Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Security Council recently took note of 

and voiced no objection to the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for 

MONUSCO’s use. Rwanda, a member of the UN Security Council since January 

2013, joined the consensus. While it is unclear who will supply the UAVs, they are 

expected to be used, in part, along the DRC/Rwanda border to help track armed 

groups and provide real-time intelligence. Imagery from the UAVs may also assist 

the work of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM), a regional body 

tasked with investigating allegations of cross-border support. 

The UN is also weighing the option of integrating a regional peace enforcement 

brigade into MONUSCO. The force would consist of over 2,000 African troops and 

would have a mandate to pursue aggressively the armed groups in the DRC, including the M23. While border security would not be a specific component of the force’s 

mandate, greater border security could potentially result from its operations. [See 

page 30.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary CHOLLET. Some fiscal year (FY) 2013 budgets are still being determined. Assuming funding amounts remained the same, the U.S. Government 

planned to provide approximately $6.5 million in military assistance to the Government of Rwanda in FY 2013. 

The majority of these funds support HIV/AIDS prevention and Rwandan peacekeeping missions in Darfur and South Sudan. The Department of Defense (DOD) 
138 

portion of this assistance is approximately $3.5 million, which includes Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funding to renovate a school and 

community center and DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) funding to 

help counter the effects of HIV/AIDS within the Rwandan armed forces. 

Regarding the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the U.S. Government plans to provide approximately $21.7 million in security assistance in FY 2013. Approximately $15 million of this assistance is peacekeeping operations funding to 

build DRC military capacity. The DOD portion of this assistance is approximately 

$396 thousand in OHDACA funds to renovate hospitals in the DRC. 

Regarding questions as to whether the assistance provided to these countries is 

adequate and how funding should be prioritized for these countries in light of future 

budget constraints, the needs in Africa are always significant and there is always 

a need for more funding as DOD works to build the capacity of partner forces on 

the continent. In particular, the DRC has a significant need for assistance, but the 

U.S. Government should closely monitor the DRC’s ability to absorb additional assistance. 

USAFRICOM’s priorities remain to counter threats to the United States emanating from Africa and to be in a position to respond appropriately to areas of instability. [See page 12.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Secretary CARSON. Let me say, thank you very much for the question. There is 

no question that conflict minerals contribute to sustaining conflict in Africa. Groups 

are able to take control of mineral rich areas and then to smuggle those minerals 

out through neighboring states into the international market. And so it does play 

a role in sustaining these kinds of conflicts. And this is why legislation passed here 

by the Congress has been useful in putting a check and a control over what U.S. 

companies can buy in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Reducing the illegal trade in minerals and increasing conflict-free sourcing diminishes the revenue available to help sustain armed groups. Also, when there are jobs 

available to support conflict-free mining areas, the incentive to join a rebel group 

as a means of making a living is not as strong. Mineral smuggling also is one of 

the incentives for outside interference in the DRC. Smuggling by armed groups can 

benefit supporters of those groups by providing them with revenue or with the minerals themselves. We are working with our international and regional partners to 

increase conflict-free sourcing, counter mineral smuggling and address this contributing factor to the region’s destabilization. [See page 22.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Secretary CARSON. Of the so-called ‘‘FARDC Five,’’ senior officials of the Congolese 

military accused of raping women and girls in separate incidents in the eastern 

DRC between 2004 and 2006, three were subsequently arrested in response to U.S. 

and international lobbying efforts: Brigadier General Jerome Kakwavu, Lt. Col. 

Bebimobuli Engandela (a.k.a. Colonel 106), and Colonel Safari. The highest ranking 

officer of the FARDC Five, BG Kakwavu, remains on trial in Kinshasa for two 

counts of rape as a war crime. A second, broader file against Kakwavu, opened in 

May 2012, includes two acts of torture as a war crime, one act of murder as a war 

crime, and nine acts of murder as crimes against humanity. Charges are still pending against Lt. Col. Bebimobuli, who remains in prison in Kinshasa; proceedings 

have been delayed pending the transfer of his case to Bukavu and related logistical 

as well as security challenges. Bebimobuli’s prosecution is also complicated by the 

ongoing insecurity in the eastern DRC, which has also prevented prosecutors/investigators/police from reaching witnesses. Colonel Safari was acquitted by a military 

court in October 2011. The remaining two officers of the ‘‘FARDC Five’’ were removed from their command positions—a significant step—but subsequently fled. 

One of those officers, Colonel Mosala, remains at large. While charges are still pending against Mosala, the case hinges on the willingness of the sole victim to press 

charges. The other, Major Pitchen, was reported dead in April 2012. The arrests of 

such high-ranking officers—including Kakwavu, the first general officer to be prosecuted for rape by a military tribunal—represent significant progress, but major 

challenges remain to ending impunity and protecting Congolese women and girls 

from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) at the hands of security forces. We 

remain engaged not only in pursuing the prosecutions of these individuals, but also 

in pressing the GDRC to continue to arrest any official implicated in human rights 

violations as part of comprehensive security sector reform. U.S. and UN assistance, 
139 

as well as that of other bilateral partners and non-governmental organizations, to 

the Congolese military justice system through prosecution support cells and other 

programs have helped provide the tools, expertise, and skills that prosecutors and 

judges need to adjudicate cases such as these. Our programs and our diplomatic engagement have also helped to begin generating and sustaining the political will to 

take on cases so as to end impunity for the perpetrators of SGBV, regardless of 

rank. We continue to monitor incidents of alleged sexual violence in conflict, wherever they occur. [See page 28.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

DECEMBER 19, 2012 

(143) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What actions are being taken by the Department of Defense to 

address the trade of ivory within the Democratic Republic of the Congo and central 

Africa? 

Secretary CHOLLET. The Obama administration strongly condemns poaching and 

other wildlife trafficking crimes. Not only do these activities affect natural resources, but they pose a real threat to security public health, and economic prosperity. Counter-poaching is largely a law enforcement matter that is typically undertaken by police forces, but USAFRICOM will look for opportunities to leverage 

their engagements with African militaries to support counter-poaching efforts where 

possible. 

The presence of USAFRICOM enables greater engagement with African militaries 

in efforts to build their capacity for a broader range of military missions. Training 

on international legal norms is also a key component of USAFRICOM engagement. 

DOD believes the most effective way to reduce illegal activities is through African 

militaries that could, if so directed by their governments, contribute to counterpoaching efforts. 

The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for coordinating an interagency 

approach to address the increase in poaching and DOD participates in their efforts 

to build a whole-of-government approach to counter-poaching. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) 

have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

or in central Africa? 

Secretary CHOLLET. The Department of Defense has not identified any conclusive 

evidence that M23 rebels are directly involved in the hunting and illegal killing of 

elephants. M23 operates in the highlands and too far south and east for ivory. M23 

funds itself primarily through taxing the movement of goods and people through its 

territory. M23 also extorts labor and goods from locals. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) 

have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

or in central Africa? 

Secretary CARSON. We have seen no specific reporting that would indicate that 

M23 is involved in poaching or, specifically, involved in the trade of ivory. At the 

same time, M23 does control large swaths of Virunga National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where there is a small elephant population, providing 

a limited possibility that M23 is directly or indirectly benefiting from the trade in 

ivory, or from other forms of wildlife poaching. We will continue to assess the situation and respond accordingly should we obtain information of M23’s direct involvement in the ivory trade. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) 

have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

or in central Africa? 

Dr. FRAZER. The M23 rebel group has a diverse strategy for generating revenue 

to finance its activities. In addition to allegations they have been extracting payments for goods entering at border crossings, M23 rebels have also been accused of 

smuggling gold and other minerals across the Democratic Republic of Congo’s borders. However, at this time there is no direct evidence that demonstrates any involvement of the M23 group in the illegal ivory trade in central Africa. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement (M23) 

have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 

or in central Africa? 

Dr. CARAFANO. The ivory trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is 

widespread, specifically in Garamba National Park and the Okapi Reserve, located 

in the northeastern part of the country. International crime syndicates, rebel 

groups, militias, militaries from neighboring countries and even the DRC’s own 

troops, have either participated in the poaching industry or have been complicit in 

such activity. The ivory trade is particularly useful to groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Rwandan Democratic Liberation Forces (FDLR) and 
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Janjaweed fighters from Sudan and Chad who lack steady sources of income. While 

M23 has only been in existence since last spring, its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) (disbanded in March 2009) allegedly 

participated in poaching. Poaching is by no means limited to the DRC or Central 

Africa. Poaching is a threat to elephant and rhino populations across the continent—from Chad to Kenya to South Africa. The terrorist group, al-Shabaab in Somalia has reportedly sought to expand its income through the ivory trade in Kenya. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. a) Does the rebel group known as the March 23rd Movement 

(M23) have any involvement in the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the 

Congo or in central Africa? 

b) Does the Eastern Congo Initiative undertake any initiatives to address the 

trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or central Africa? 

c) Does the Eastern Congo Initiative have any recommendations as to initiatives 

that the Department of Defense and/or Department of State could undertake to address the trade of ivory in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or central Africa? 

Mr. AFFLECK. Eastern Congo Initiative is unable to determine whether or not 

M23 is involved in ivory trade. We know, however, that poaching remains a very 

serious problem in the region. It is a lucrative business fueled by high demand in 

international markets. In the past, ECI has partnered with ICCN at the Virunga 

National Park in North Kivu to help stem poaching and other activities that are 

detrimental to the ecosystem. For instance, we have funded economic development 

initiatives with the national park to provide new income opportunities for communities surrounding the park. ECI also operationally supported the national park 

during a critical time period when M23 took control of the vast majority of Virunga 

National Park. We have to view poaching and related activities in the context of the 

prevailing insecurity that plagues Congo, particularly in the eastern provinces. Just 

like militiamen seem to continuously elude DRC security forces, poachers are often 

better equipped and more motivated than law enforcement agents. Thus, the security of national parks and the protection of endangered species need to be part of 

security sector reform initiatives. The United States Government has in the past assisted Virunga National Park to stem poaching through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 

Department and the best way for the Department of Defense and the Department 

of State to help fight and stem poaching and ivory trade would be for them to lead 

international engagement in DRC security sector reform. Congo depends on international donors for nearly every critical function of the state. As one of DRC’s top 

donors, the U.S. is well-positioned to encourage the government of Congo to focus 

efforts on this important aspect of the country’s progress. Such international engagement would require substantial planning, logistical and training support from 

the U.S. and its allies and other partners. Without competent professional military 

and law enforcement institutions, DRC’s territory will continue to provide safe 

haven to various armed groups, which prey on the civilian population and illegally 

exploit Congo’s resources. In the absence of these critical institutions, poachers and 

their networks will also continue to thrive. 

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