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S. HRG. 112–739

BENGHAZI: THE ATTACKS AND

THE LESSONS LEARNED

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 20, 2012

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Burns, Hon. William J., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening statement ..... 1

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 6

Nides, Hon. Thomas R., Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 

Resources, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letter from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Senators John 

F. Kerry and Richard G. Lugar .......................................................................... 37

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1)

BENGHAZI: THE ATTACKS AND

THE LESSONS LEARNED 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:03 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Shaheen, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Inhofe, Isakson, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order. My apologies to 

everybody for the switch in time, but as everybody knows, with the 

loss of our colleague, Senator Inouye, the course of events was 

uncertain yesterday. And it was decided that his remains will be 

brought here at about 10 a.m. And everybody felt that it would be 

inappropriate for us to be simply having a hearing and to prevent 

Senators from being able to attend. And all of us would like to 

attend that. So we are going to try to compact this into the period 

of time we have between now and about quarter of so that Senators 

can get over there to take part in that ceremony. In addition, obviously with the switch in time, some colleagues and others have not 

yet gotten here. 

I do want to share some thoughts at the appropriate time about 

Senator Lugar and Senator Webb and Senator DeMint, who will be 

leaving the committee. But I think I will wait until some more of 

our colleagues are here to be able to share those thoughts. 

I want to thank everybody for joining us this morning. 

As everyone is aware, Secretary Clinton is recovering from a serious virus and concussion. And given her condition, it was simply 

not possible for her to appear here today. We all wish her a speedy 

recovery. And in her place we have both deputies from the State 

Department, and I want to thank them for coming in on short 

notice. 

Let me emphasize this, please, to everybody. All of you who know 

Hillary know that she would rather be here today. I know how 

deeply she feels the importance of the discussion that we’re having 

today, and I assure you it is not her choice that she is not here 

today. And she looks forward to appearing before the committee in 

January, and I want to make that clear. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2

I also want to emphasize that every member of this committee 

felt the loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and his team in a very 

personal way. We knew Chris Stevens well before he came before 

us for confirmation. He was a Pearson fellow for Senator Lugar and 

the committee. We knew the depth of his character, of his intelligence, and his dedication. His death was a horrible blow in personal terms to the committee, as well as to the country and to his 

family. 

It evoked an outpouring of emotion on our committee from the 

condolence book in our office in the Capitol to the private gestures 

of members of this committee who shared their grief in private 

ways—at Senate 116, signing the condolence books, touching the 

picture, saying a prayer. 

Equally tragic was the loss of three courageous men whom I have 

personally never met, but whose families I had a chance to greet 

and hug when the military brought their loved ones’ remains back 

one last time to Andrews Air Force Base. That heartbreaking and 

solemn ceremony brought home the impact of our Nation’s loss. 

Glen Doherty was a former Navy SEAL. He was also from my 

home State, and I talked a couple of times with his family. And 

Tyrone Woods was a former SEAL, Sean Smith, an Air Force veteran; all people for whom service to country was their life. So today 

we again say thank you to all of them, to the fallen and the families. They all gave to our Nation, and we are grateful beyond words 

for their service and their sacrifice. 

From the very beginning of the Benghazi events, every member 

of this committee has shared with the President and Secretary 

Clinton our determination to get all the facts about what happened 

and why in Benghazi. We submitted many questions to the State 

Department to be incorporated into this investigation, and we are 

very pleased that they have been. 

We have had a number of classified briefings for our members, 

and yesterday the committee heard from Ambassador Tom Pickering and ADM Mike Mullen. We heard them deliver a very frank 

and comprehensive set of findings of the Accountability Review 

Board. 

Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen are two of America’s 

most distinguished and capable public servants. Ambassador Pickering has served as an Under Secretary of the State Department 

and an Ambassador to seven countries, among them India, Russia, 

Israel, and other important nations. Admiral Mullen, as we know, 

was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

I think that their backgrounds, their service to our country, 

showed up starkly in the quality of the Board’s report. And I want 

to thank them for their extraordinary service to our country, and 

I want to thank Secretary Clinton who appointed them—who selected them. 

The report pulls no punches. It tackles head on many of the 

questions that we have been asking. The report makes 29 recommendations in total, 5 of which are classified. Secretary Clinton 

has embraced every single one of them. In fact, she has gone above 

and beyond the Board’s recommendations by taking immediate 

steps to strengthen security at high-threat posts, and requests from 

Congress the authority to reprogram funds to increase diplomatic 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3

security spending by $1.3 billion. In Washington where too often 

we see the recommendations of blue ribbon panels ignored, delayed, 

or deferred, as they were for a long time on even the 9/11 Commission, I think the Secretary’s swift action underscores how determined she is to apply the lessons of Benghazi. 

Clearly mistakes were made, and we learned of those yesterday 

in very stark terms about the mistakes leading up to the attacks. 

The report makes that very clear, and one of the most candid and 

important observations was the failure by certain leaders to see the 

forest through the trees. There were clear warning signs that the 

security situation in Libya had deteriorated, and going forward it 

is important, and I think it is important for all of us to think in 

terms of going forward, that we need to do a better job of ensuring 

a free and open dialogue among ambassadors, their embassy security personnel, and officials in Washington where decisions on security staffing levels and funding are made. 

Now, as we draw the lessons, I want to be crystal clear about 

something else. Congress also bears some responsibility here. Congress has the power of the purse. We use it for any number of 

things, but it is our responsibility. And for years we have asked our 

State Department to operate with increasingly lesser resources to 

conduct essential missions. And because of the gridlock and excesses in the Senate and Congress itself, we have not even been 

able to pursue the regular order of authorizing legislation. That 

must change. And in the next session of the Congress, I hope it 

will. 

As in any government entity, we know that when a budget is cut 

and money is fungible, you stretch every dollar. So for some time 

now, overseas resources have been withheld or cut, and important 

foreign policy objectives have, in some cases, been starved. Consider that last year we spent approximately $650 billion on our 

military. By contrast, the international affairs budget is less than 

one-tenth of the Pentagon’s. Secretary Gates has spoken about this 

and strongly urged the Congress to redress that imbalance, but we 

have not yet. Admiral Mullen once pointed out, ‘‘The more significant the cuts, the longer military operations will take, and the 

more and more lives are at risk.’’

So we need to make certain that we are not penny-wise and 

pound-foolish when it comes to supporting America’s vital overseas 

interests. Adequately funding America’s foreign policy objectives is 

not spending. It is investing in our long-term security, and more 

often than not it saves far more expensive expenditures in dollars 

and lives for the conflicts that we fail to see or avoid. 

We need to invest in America’s long-term interests in order to do 

the job of diplomacy in a dangerous world. And this report makes 

that crystal clear. 

Since 1985, I have had the privilege, as most of you, of making 

official journeys to one trouble spot or another. 

I have met a lot of our men and women in the Foreign Service, 

as all of you have, and we have sat and talked about the work that 

they do and the lives that they lead. They spend years learning the 

languages of a country so that they can be on the front lines of 

direct diplomacy—foreign policy outdoors, as my dad used to call 

it. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4

When my father served in Berlin after World War II, I remember 

my mother sometimes looking at the clock nervously in the evening 

when he was late for coming home to dinner in a city where troops 

guarded the line between East and West, and the rubble of war 

was still very fresh. But my father knew that what he was doing 

was worth whatever the risk might have been, and so do the Foreign Service personnel that we send all over the world today. They 

want to be accessible to people on the ground. They need to be accessible to people on the ground when they are representing

our country. They want those people to see and touch the face of 

America. 

It is no understatement that our diplomats are on the front lines 

of the world’s most dangerous places. They leave their families behind. They miss holidays at home. They risk their safety to make 

the world safer and to protect the interests of our country. They do 

not join the Foreign Service to get rich, and sadly many of them 

are only—their names are only learned when a tragedy like 

Benghazi takes place. Our diplomats do not wear a uniform, but 

they swear the same oath as the men and women of our Armed 

Forces, and their sacrifice is no less important. 

So take note, everybody. As we learned yesterday, the Board’s re- port calls for an investment of $2.3 billion a year over 10 years in 

order to meet the fundamental charge of protecting our personnel 

overseas. We owe it to them, to our responsibility, and to the memory of Chris Stevens and those others who have lost their lives to 

make good on that request. And I make that clear today. 

Some may ask why we are in Benghazi. The reasons are really 

central to everything that we want our Foreign Service to do. They 

are central to advancing America’s values and furthering our security. We are in Benghazi because that is where the revolution in 

Libya began. That is where the vanguard of the transition is today. 

That is where some principle actors in the future of Libya come 

from. 

We were there to learn and help Libyans deliver on the promise 

of their revolution. And many of our most important contacts and 

the future leaders of Libya reside in the volatile east. We have to 

be on the ground outside the wire reaching out to those people. 

That is the enterprise of U.S. foreign policy today to help men, 

women, and children around the world share in the vision of 

democracy and the values of freedom, and through it to bring stability to whole regions of the world and reduce the threats to our 

Nation. 

I believe we all ought to be very proud of what we have achieved 

in Libya. By taking military action when we did, we liberated a 

country that had been under the yoke of a dictator for more than 

40 years. We gave the Libyan people a fighting chance for their 

future, and I am convinced that we prevented the slaughter of 

thousands of innocent lives. 

The tragic events of the last 9/11—2012—illustrate the magnitude of the challenge ahead, that the thousands of everyday Libyans who marched in outrage against the militias with signs declaring their love for Chris Stevens and for the United States, their 

gratitude for our country, provide, I think, a measure of hope. That 

demonstration of affection for America and for our envoy who gave 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5

his life, for those people summed up exactly why we must not look 

inward and walk away. 

Finally, let me just say that what happened in Benghazi really 

cannot be seen in isolation. There is a truth about diplomacy and 

Foreign Service that needs to be processed through the committee 

and the Congress and the country as we examine the events of 

Benghazi. We have an expeditionary diplomatic corps, and they do 

face very real risks every day; day in and day out. 

Bad things have happened before, and bad things will happen 

again; unfortunately in the future. There will always be a tension 

between the diplomatic imperative to get outside the wire and the 

security standards that require our diplomats to work behind high 

walls, concertina wire, and full body searches. We do not want to 

concertina wire America off from the world. Our challenge is to 

strike a balance between the necessity of the mission, available 

resources, and tolerance for risk. 

We have talked about this on this committee. We have had hearings specifically about the design of our embassies, the danger of 

becoming a fortress America. And we need to be safe, but we also 

need to send the right message to the people that we are trying to 

reach. 

I distinctly remember feeling and seeing the difficulty of this in 

Vietnam where villagers would examine us suspiciously and give 

us a stare, an unmistakable stare, that raises many more questions 

than we are ever able to answer. 

In Iraq and Afghanistan, I have revisited that stare. As you pass 

through a village with masses of guns, and big armored personnel 

carriers, and Humvees. And the look of confusion and alienation 

from average Iraqis or Afghans who just do not understand why we 

are rumbling through their streets that way is unmistakable. I will 

tell you, every diplomat worth their salt feels this tension and worries about the misimpression our security footprint can create in 

the minds of the very people that we are trying to reach, an 

impression that is starkly revealed on their faces when you are 

surrounded by gun-toting security personnel. 

So balancing our values and our interests with the risks inherent 

in 21st century diplomacy is sort of fundamental to the questions 

raised by the events in Benghazi, by what we are here to talk 

about today. To paraphrase Ambassador Ryan Crocker, we need to 

be in the business of risk management, not risk avoidance. 

So there are costs, but that is no reason to retrench from the 

world, and it is, I think, a reason to honor the memory of Ambassador Stevens and the others who were deeply committed to a 

strong American role in the world. That is why he was out there. 

So in the end, colleagues, we are all Americans first. 

We cannot lose sight of that fact, particularly in the face of this 

tragedy. And we are very pleased that Secretary Burns, Secretary 

Nides, have come here today. Secretary Burns recently established 

the Christopher Stevens Youth Network to honor Chris’ memory by 

building bridges of understanding and compassion between American youth and their Middle Eastern peers. And we look forward 

to continuing that work with them. 

Senator Lugar. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming back Secretary Burns and Tom Nides, both who are good 

friends of the committee. And we extend our very best wishes to 

Secretary Clinton as she recovers from her mishap. 

The Secretary’s pace of activities has been, during the last several years, extraordinary by any measure, and we are grateful for 

her devoted service to our country and for the courtesy she has 

shown to our committee throughout her tenure. 

Our hearing today gives us a chance to review events at our consulate in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador 

Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service officer Sean Smith, two U.S. 

Embassy security personnel, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods. 

Many questions have been raised about this tragedy, including 

whether we had sufficient intelligence ahead of time and whether 

there was a breakdown in security protocols. 

Our interest in these questions is especially personal because of 

our respect and affection for Ambassador Stevens, who became a 

good friend of this committee while he was detailed to my staff during 2006 and 2007. His advice to me on the complexities of events 

and relationships in the region was invaluable. After he went back 

to State, he continued to brief staff from time to time, and he 

returned to meet with me after his remarkable tour as the United 

States representative to the rebels in Benghazi. All of us have read 

accounts of Chris Stevens’ extraordinary service. 

It should be clear to everyone he was personally instrumental in 

advancing United States interests in Libya. 

Chris was providing the kind of energetic leadership we need for 

our embassy teams. He went beyond the embassy walls to meet 

and converse with soldiers, militiamen, shopkeepers, and villagers, 

as well as with ministers, and generals, and bureaucrats. Like U.S. 

Embassy personnel around the world, Chris and his team recognized that effective diplomacy in this era carries substantial risk. 

Nevertheless, it is up to the President, the State Department, 

and the Congress to ensure that our diplomats have enough support and security to do their jobs as safely as possible. And just as 

we give our men and women in uniform the weapons they need to 

carry out their mission, we must make sure our diplomats have all 

the tools that they need, which include a safe place to work. 

Embassies are both outposts of the U.S. government and symbols 

of our country, and as such, they have been prime targets for 

terrorists. Almost every day the United States receives threats 

against its embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic facilities 

overseas. 

When I became chairman of this committee for the second time 

in 2003, one of the first things I did was to initiate an inquiry into 

embassy security. We conducted a hearing and numerous briefings 

on the topic, and my staff interviewed dozens of security and diplomatic personnel at embassies around the world. 

I also commissioned a GAO report that was completed in 2006, 

and that report noted the significant progress that had been made 

by the State Department in building secure embassies in a costefficient manner. It recommended that the State Department

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7

develop an integrated and a comprehensive facilities plan to more 

closely track costs and results. 

Working with former Secretary of State Powell, we initially were 

successful in getting extra money to accelerate the embassy construction program. But in my view, funds for this purpose have 

never caught up to the threats faced by our diplomats in the post9/11 world. There have been suggestions that cross-considerations 

contributed to the inadequate protection in Benghazi. 

Last week as preparations for this hearing were getting under way, the State Department announced it would seek $1.4 billion in 

the 2013 budget for an increased security proposal based on a 

recent review of the worldwide security posture. I am pleased to 

see that the proposal notes, ‘‘We must ensure we strike the right 

balance between security and engagement.’’ I will be interested to 

hear from the panel how the Obama administration would apply 

these funds and how they would affect the pace of new embassy 

construction and staffing levels in the diplomatic security service. 

In the end, however, our embassies are unlikely to be both effective and safe if Congress fails to devote adequate funding to the 

150 Account, which pays for State Department operations. We 

should not forget lessons learned in the 1990s when the sharp 

budget cuts at the State Department at the same time we were 

establishing many new embassies in the former Soviet Union and 

the Balkans. This funding squeeze resulted in clear deficiencies in 

our overall diplomatic capabilities that took years to correct. 

The State Department budget remains a popular target for cuts. 

In recent years, we have avoided the type of funding decline that 

the State Department experienced in the 1990s. But it is still common for Congress to vote on indiscriminate proposals that show little understanding of the contributions of the State Department to 

the safety and prosperity of our country. 

Diplomacy is not a luxury. It is essential to American national 

security, especially in an era of terrorism. We should fund the 

State Department as the national security agency that it is. 

I look forward to a discussion with our witnesses, and I thank 

the Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar, thank you very much. If I could 

ask the committee, I am going to just take a moment. 

I will not ask questions. I am going to yield my time so that others have more time because I took a little longer with the opening. 

But I just want to say a special thank you—this will be Senator 

Lugar’s last hearing. It is the committee’s last hearing in this session. And I think whether you have served as chairman or as ranking member, Dick, you have been just an extraordinary influence 

on all of us. I know the Nunn-Lugar initiative is synonymous with 

bipartisanship in serious foreign policy, and it stands as an amazing legacy. 

But I will always remember the work we did on the Philippines, 

your efforts on the floor. You have always had this amazing humility and sense of purpose in finding the common ground and reaching out to people on both sides of the aisle. 

Every member of the committee has joined in presenting you 

with a resolution, and I just want to read just the introduction. 

‘‘Whereas throughout his 36 years in the United States Senate, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8

Richard Lugar has served Indiana and the United States with 

grace, distinction, and tenacity, and will have many more contributions still to a Nation he reveres and that reveres him.’’ And we 

want to present this to you, everybody on the committee, my friend. 

[Applause.] 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I am very grateful to have 

had this opportunity to serve with each one of you. Thank you for 

this very special tribute. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Well, it is small compared to 

your service, but we honor you. 

And then finally, we are also going to be losing Jim Webb and 

Jim DeMint. Jim, as we all know—Jim Webb came here and did 

something very few freshmen can do by getting a major piece of 

legislation passed, a new GI bill. And on the committee, he has 

been really critical to our thinking about the Far East. He was the 

first American to visit Burma in 10 years, and I am proud to say 

I think I may have been the one who was there before that. But 

he changed the policy. He knew we had to lift the sanctions and 

move it. And his contribution to our thinking about the TransPacific Partnership, the continued efforts on Vietnam MIAs has 

been a superb contribution. He is a great thinker, and we appreciate his service. 

And Jim DeMint—Jim DeMint and I have obviously disagreed on 

a number of the treaties, a number of the initiatives in front of the 

committee. But one of the great things about Jim DeMint is you 

know where he stands. He knows what he believes; we do. He has 

been a terrific advocate for his point of view, and we are confident 

that in the new hat that he is going to wear, we are going to continue to debate and continue to feel his presence. And we thank 

him very much for his service on the committee also. So we thank 

both of them. 

Gentleman, thanks for putting up with our early efforts here on 

the committee. We appreciate your patience. And thank you very, 

very much for being here today. 

Who is first? Secretary Burns, you are you going to lead off? 

Thank you very much. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, DEPUTY SECRETARY 

OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BURNS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members 

of the committee, thank you for this opportunity. 

Secretary Clinton asked me to express how much she regrets not 

being able to be here today. And I would like to join you, Mr. 

Chairman, on behalf of the Secretary and the men and women of 

the Department of State in expressing our deep respect and admiration for the many years of service of Senator Lugar to our 

Nation. 

Since the terrorist attacks on our compounds in Benghazi, State 

Department officials and senior members from other agencies have 

testified in four congressional hearings, provided more than 20 

briefings for members and staff, and submitted thousands of pages 

of documents, including the now full classified report of the 

Accountability Review Board. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9

Secretary Clinton has also sent a letter covering a wide range of 

issues for the record. So today I would like to highlight just a few 

key points. 

The attacks in Benghazi took the lives of four courageous Americans. Ambassador Stevens was a friend and a beloved member of 

the State Department community for 20 years. He was a diplomat’s 

diplomat, and he embodied the very best of America. 

Even as we grieved for our fallen friends and colleagues, we took 

action on three fronts. First, we took immediate steps to further 

protect our people and our posts. 

We stayed in constant contact with embassies and consulates 

around the world facing large protests, dispatched emergency security teams, received reporting from the intelligence community, and 

took additional precautions where needed. You will hear more 

about all this from my partner, Tom Nides. 

Second, we intensified a diplomatic campaign aimed at combating the threat of terrorism across North Africa. We continue to 

work to bring to justice the terrorists responsible for the attacks in 

Benghazi, and we are working with our partners to close safe 

havens, cut off terrorists’ finances, counter extremist ideology, and 

slow the flow of new recruits. 

And, third, Secretary Clinton ordered an investigation to determine exactly what happened in Benghazi. 

I want to convey our appreciation to the Accountability Review 

Board’s chairman and vice chairman, Ambassador Tom Pickering 

and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Mike 

Mullen, and also Hugh Turner, Richard Shinnick, and Catherine 

Bertini. 

The Board’s report takes a clear-eyed look at serious systemic 

problems; problems which are unacceptable, problems for which, as 

Secretary Clinton has said, we take responsibility, and problems 

which we have already begun to fix. 

Before Tom walks you through what we are doing to implement 

fully all of the Board’s recommendations, I would like to add a few 

words based on my own experiences as a career diplomat in the 

field. 

I have been a very proud member of the Foreign Service for more 

than 30 years, and I have had the honor of serving as a chief of 

mission overseas. I know that diplomacy by its very nature must 

sometimes be practiced in dangerous places. As Secretary Clinton 

has said, our diplomats cannot work in bunkers and do their jobs. 

When America is absent, there are consequences. Our interests suffer, and our security at home is threatened. 

Chris Stevens understood that as well as anyone. Chris also 

knew that every chief of mission has the responsibility to ensure 

the best possible security and support for our people. As senior officials here in Washington, we share that profound responsibility. 

We have to constantly improve, reduce the risks our people face, 

and make sure they have all the resources they need. 

That includes the men and women of the State Department’s 

Diplomatic Security Service. I have been deeply honored to serve 

with many of these brave men and women. They are professionals 

and patriots who serve in many places where there are no Marines 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10

on post and little or no U.S. military presence in-country. Like Secretary Clinton, I trust them with my life. 

It is important to recognize that our colleagues in the Bureaus 

of Diplomatic Security, and Near East Affairs and across the 

Department at home and abroad get it right countless times a day, 

for years on end, in some of the toughest circumstances imaginable. 

We cannot lose sight of that. But we have learned some very hard 

and painful lessons in Benghazi. We are already acting on them. 

We have to do better. We owe it to our colleagues who lost their 

lives in Benghazi. We owe it to the security professionals who acted 

with such extraordinary heroism that awful night to try to protect 

them. And we owe it to thousands of our colleagues serving America with great dedication every day in diplomatic posts around the 

world. 

We will never prevent every act of terrorism or achieve perfect 

security, but we will never stop working to get better and safer. As 

Secretary Clinton has said, the United States will keep leading and 

keep engaging around the world, including in those hard places 

where America’s interests and values are at stake. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM J. BURNS

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, thank you for this 

opportunity. Secretary Clinton asked me to express how much she regrets not being 

able to be here today. 

Since the terrorist attacks on our compounds in Benghazi, State Department officials and senior members from other agencies have testified in four congressional 

hearings, provided more than 20 briefings for members and staff, and submitted 

thousands of pages of documents—including now the full classified report of the 

Accountability Review Board. Secretary Clinton has also sent a letter covering a 

wide range of issues for the record. So today, I would like to highlight just a few 

key points. 

The attacks in Benghazi took the lives of four courageous Americans. Ambassador 

Stevens was a friend and a beloved member of the State Department community 

for 20 years. He was a diplomat’s diplomat, and he embodied the best of America. 

Even as we grieved for our fallen friends and colleagues, we took action on three 

fronts: 

First, we took immediate steps to further protect our people and posts. We stayed 

in constant contact with embassies and consulates around the world facing large 

protests, dispatched emergency security teams, received reporting from the intelligence community, and took additional precautions where needed. You’ll hear more 

about all this from my partner, Tom Nides. 

Second, we intensified a diplomatic campaign aimed at combating the threat of 

terrorism across North Africa. We continue to work to bring to justice the terrorists 

responsible for the attacks in Benghazi. And we are working with our partners to 

close safe havens, cut off terrorist finances, counter extremist ideology, and slow the 

flow of new recruits. 

And third, Secretary Clinton ordered an investigation to determine exactly what 

happened in Benghazi. I want to convey our appreciation to the Accountability 

Review Board’s chairman and vice chairman, Ambassador Thomas Pickering and 

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. And also Hugh 

Turner, Richard Shinnick, and Catherine Bertini. 

The Board’s report takes a clear-eyed look at serious, systemic problems. Problems 

which are unacceptable. Problems for which—as Secretary Clinton has said—we 

take responsibility. And problems which we have already begun to fix. 

Before Tom walks you through what we’re doing to implement fully all of the 

Board’s recommendations, I’d like to add a few words based on my own experiences 

as a career diplomat in the field. I have been a very proud member of the Foreign 

Service for more than 30 years, and have had the honor of serving as a Chief of 

Mission overseas. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11

I know that diplomacy, by its very nature, must sometimes be practiced in dangerous places. As Secretary Clinton has said, our diplomats cannot work in bunkers 

and do their jobs. When America is absent, there are consequences. Our interests 

suffer and our security at home is threatened. 

Chris Stevens understood that as well as anyone. Chris also knew that every 

Chief of Mission has the responsibility to ensure the best possible security and support for our people. As senior officials here in Washington, we share that profound 

responsibility. We have to constantly improve, reduce the risks our people face, and 

make sure they have the resources they need. 

That includes the men and women of the State Department’s Diplomatic Security 

Service. I have been deeply honored to serve with many of these brave men and 

women. They are professionals and patriots who serve in many places where there 

are no Marines on post and little or no U.S. military presence in-country. Like Secretary Clinton, I trust them with my life. 

It’s important to recognize that our colleagues in the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and Near East Affairs and across the Department, at home and abroad, get it 

right countless times a day, for years on end, in some of the toughest circumstances 

imaginable. We cannot lose sight of that. 

But we learned some very hard and painful lessons in Benghazi. We are already 

acting on them. We have to do better. 

We owe it to our colleagues who lost their lives in Benghazi. We owe it to the 

security professionals who acted with such extraordinary heroism that awful night 

to try to protect them. And we owe it to thousands of our colleagues serving America 

with great dedication every day in diplomatic posts around the world. 

We will never prevent every act of terrorism or achieve perfect security—but we 

will never stop working to get better and safer. As Secretary Clinton has said, the 

United States will keep leading and keep engaging around the world, including in 

those hard places where America’s interests and values are at stake.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Nides. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. NIDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY 

OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. NIDES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, I also want to thank you for this opportunity. 

I want to reiterate what Bill has said. All of us have a responsibility to provide the men and women who serve this country with 

the best possible security and support. From senior departmental 

leadership studying the priorities, to the supervisors evaluating 

security needs, to the Congress appropriating sufficient funds, we 

all share this responsibility. Secretary Clinton has said that as Secretary of State, this is her greatest responsibility and her highest 

priority. 

Today I will focus on the steps we have been taking at Secretary 

Clinton’s direction and that we will continue to take. 

As Bill said, the Board reports take a clear-eyed look at serious, 

systemic problems for which we take responsibility and that we 

have already begun to fix. We are grateful for the recommendations 

from Ambassador Pickering and his team. We accept every one of 

them, all 29 recommendations. Secretary Clinton has charged my 

office with leading a task force that will ensure that all 29 are 

implemented quickly and completely, and also to pursue steps 

above and beyond the Board’s report. 

The Under Secretary of Political Affairs, the Under Secretary for 

Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service, and the 

Deputy Legal advisor will work with me to drive this forward. 

The task force has already met to translate the recommendations 

into 60 specific action items. We have assigned every single one to 

the responsible bureau for immediate implementation, and several 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12

will be completed by the end of this calendar year. Implementation 

of each and every recommendation will be under way by the time 

the next Secretary of State takes office. There will be no higher priority for the Department in the coming weeks and months. 

And should we require more resources to execute these recommendations, we will work closely with the Congress to ensure that 

they are met. 

As I said, Secretary Clinton wants us to implement the ARB’s 

findings and do more. Let me offer some very clear specifics. 

For more than 200 years, the United States, like every other 

country around the world, has relied on host nations to provide 

security for our embassies and consulates. But in today’s evolving 

threat environment, we have to take a new and harder look at the 

capabilities and the commitments of our hosts. We have to reexamine how we operate in places facing emerging threats, where 

nationalist security forces are fragmented or may be weak. 

So at Secretary Clinton’s direction, we have moved quickly to 

conduct a worldwide review of our overall security posture with 

particular scrutiny on the number of high-threat posts. With the 

Department of Defense, we deployed five interagency security 

assessment teams made up of diplomatic and military security 

experts to 19 posts in 13 countries, an unprecedented cooperation 

between our Departments at a critical time. These teams have provided us a roadmap for addressing emerging security challenges. 

We are also partnering with the Pentagon to send 35 additional 

Marine detachments. That is about 225 Marines to medium- and 

high-threat posts where they will serve as visible deterrence to hostile actors. This is on top of the approximate 150 detachments we 

have already deployed. 

We are aligning our resources to our 2013 budget request to 

address physical vulnerabilities, and we have reinforced structures 

wherever needed, and to reduce risk from fire. And let me add, we 

may need your help in ensuring that we have the authority to 

streamline the usual processes to produce faster results. 

We are seeking to hire more than 150 additional diplomatic security personnel, an increase of about 5 percent, and to provide them 

with the equipment and training they need. As the ARB recommended, we will target them squarely at securing our high-threat 

posts. 

I want to second Bill’s praise for these brave security professionals. I have served this Department for only 2 years, having 

come from the private sector. However, I have traveled to places 

like Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I have seen firsthand 

how these dedicated men and women risk their lives every day. We 

owe them a debt of gratitude as they go to work every day to protect us in more than 270 posts around the world. 

And as we make these improvements in the field, we are also 

making changes here in Washington. We have named the first-ever 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat Posts within 

the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We are updating our deployment procedures to increase the number of experienced and welltrained staff serving in those posts. And we are working to ensure 

that the State Department makes decisions about where our people 

operate in a way that reflects our shared responsibility for security. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13

Our regional Assistant Secretaries were directly involved in our 

interagency security assessment process, and will assume greater 

accountability for securing our people at our posts. 

We will provide the Congress with a detailed report on step we 

are taking to improve security and implement the Board’s recommendations. We will look to you for support and guidance as we do 

this. Obviously part of this is about resources. We must equip our 

people with what they need to deliver results safely, and we will 

work with you as needs arise. But Congress has a bigger role than 

that. You have visited our posts. You know our diplomats on the 

ground and the challenges they face. You know our vital national 

security interests are at stake, and you know that we are all in this 

together. 

We look forward to working with you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for your support and counsel and for this opportunity to discuss 

these important matters. We would both be happy to take your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nides follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE THOMAS R. NIDES

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I also thank you for 

this opportunity. 

I want to reiterate what Bill said: All of us have a responsibility to provide the 

men and women who serve this country with the best possible security and support. 

From senior Department leadership setting priorities . . . to supervisors evaluating 

security needs . . . to Congress appropriating sufficient funds—we share this

responsibility. Secretary Clinton has said that, as Secretary of State, this is her 

greatest responsibility and highest priority. 

Today I will focus on the steps we have been taking at Secretary Clinton’s direction, and that we will continue to take. 

As Bill said, the Board’s report takes a clear-eyed look at serious, systemic problems for which we take responsibility and that we have already begun to fix. 

We are grateful for the recommendations from Ambassador Pickering and his 

team. We accept every one of them—all 29 recommendations. Secretary Clinton has 

charged my office with leading a task force that will ensure that all 29 are implemented quickly and completely—and to pursue steps above and beyond the Board’s 

report. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Under Secretary for Management, 

director general of the Foreign Service, and deputy legal advisor, will work with me 

to drive this forward. 

The task force has already met to translate the recommendations into about 60 

specific action items. We have assigned every single one to a responsible bureau for 

immediate implementation—and several will be completed by the end of the calendar year. 

Implementation of each and every recommendation will be well underway by the 

time the next Secretary of State takes office. There will be no higher priority for 

the Department in the coming weeks and months. And, should we require more 

resources to execute these recommendations, we will work closely with Congress to 

ensure these needs are met. 

As I said, Secretary Clinton wants us to implement the ARB’s findings—and to 

do more. Let me offer some specifics. 

For more than 200 years, the United States—like every other country around the 

world—has relied on host nations to provide security for our embassies and consulates. But in today’s evolving threat environment, we have to take a new and 

harder look at the capabilities and commitment of our hosts. We have to reexamine 

how we operate in places facing emerging threats, where national security forces are 

fragmented and political will may be weak. 

So, at Secretary Clinton’s direction, we moved quickly to conduct a worldwide 

review of our overall security posture, with particular scrutiny on a number of highthreat posts. 

With the Department of Defense, we deployed five Interagency Security Assessment Teams—made up of Diplomatic and military security experts—to 19 posts in 

13 countries . . . unprecedented cooperation between our Departments at a critical 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14

time. These teams have provided a roadmap for addressing emerging security challenges. 

We’re also partnering with the Pentagon to send 35 additional detachments of 

Marine Security Guards—that’s about 225 Marines—to medium and high threat 

posts, where they will serve as visible deterrents to hostile acts. This is on top of 

the approximately 150 detachments already deployed. 

We are realigning resources in our 2013 budget request to address physical 

vulnerabilities and reinforce structures wherever needed, and to reduce the risks 

from fire. And let me add: We may need your help in ensuring we have the authority to streamline the usual processes and produce faster results. 

We’re seeking to hire more than 150 additional Diplomatic Security personnel—

an increase of 5 percent—and to provide them with the equipment and training they 

need. As the ARB recommended, we will target them squarely at securing our high 

threat posts. 

I want to second Bill’s praise for these brave security professionals. I have served 

in this Department for only 2 years, having come from the private sector. However, 

as I have traveled to places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, I have seen firsthand how these dedicated men and women risk their lives. We all owe them a debt 

of gratitude, as they go to work every day to protect our more than 275 posts around 

the world. 

As we make these improvements in the field, we’re also making changes here in 

Washington. 

We named the first-ever Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat 

Posts within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. And we’re updating our deployment 

procedures to increase the number of experienced and well-trained staff serving at 

those posts. 

We are working to ensure that the State Department makes decisions about 

where our people operate in a way that reflects our shared responsibility for security. Our regional Assistant Secretaries were directly involved in our Interagency 

Security Assessment process and they will assume greater accountability for securing their people and posts. 

We will provide this committee with a detailed report on every step we’re taking 

to improve security and implement the Board’s recommendations. 

We will look to you for support and guidance as we do this. Obviously, part of 

this is about resources. We must equip our people with what they need to deliver 

results safely, and we’ll work with you if needs arise. But Congress has a bigger 

role than that. You have visited our posts, you know our diplomats on the ground 

and the challenges they face. You know our vital national security interests are at 

stake—and that we are all in this together. We look forward to working with you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your support and counsel. And for this opportunity 

to discuss these important matters. We would be happy to answer your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Nides and Secretary Burns. 

Senator Lugar is also going to yield his time, so we will go 

directly to Senator Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And, Senator Lugar, I will miss you very much. 

I want to join in sending my very best wishes to Secretary Clinton as she recovers. And would you please tell her that all of us 

do? We would like to get that message to her. 

And I send my deepest thanks and grief once again to those that 

we lost, to the families of those that we lost. I know they are suffering, especially in this holiday season. 

I praise Secretary Clinton for ordering a truly independent and 

tough investigation of what happened in Benghazi. I attended a 

classified briefing with most of my colleagues yesterday, and while 

I cannot say everything or much, I can say this. I found this to be 

an extraordinary presentation. It was clear. It was tough. And I 

believe if we do not listen and follow the recommendations, it 

would be a disaster for our people out there in the field. And I 

believe that we will. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15

And I thank our chairman and our ranking for having this hearing because I know it is the end of the year, but we have to change 

the way we view the security at our missions because times are 

changing and he needs are changing. Look, let us be clear. The administration requested $2.6 billion 

for embassy and diplomatic security for fiscal year 2012, but the 

House cut this request by more than $300 million. Now, we, the 

Senate, helped restore some of the funds, but it still was $200 million short. 

Now, I love our military bands. As a matter of fact, I always go 

to the concerts. And it is just important to note that in the House, 

there was an amendment to cut some funds from the military 

bands, which failed, and the funding for the military bands is $388 

million. 

So all I want to say is we need to get our priorities straight 

around here, and we cannot walk away and invite another tragedy. 

And as much as people like to say, well, it is not the money, it is 

the money. You cannot protect a facility without the funding. I am 

looking at the security at our schools now just after the tragedy in 

Connecticut, and it costs money to get the facilities hardened, to 

get the personnel that are needed. 

So Ambassador Stevens was a proud Californian. There is a hole 

in all of our hearts. 

I am going to get to my questions, and I guess I am going to ask 

it straight out. Do you plan in the next budget to request the funding levels that are necessary for protecting all of our facilities? 

Mr. NIDES. The answer to that is ‘‘Yes,’’ Senator. I am all too 

aware, as we all are, of the constraints in which we are living. To 

remind the committee, as you all are well aware, for everything we 

do at the State Department, and that includes protecting over 275 

locations around the world, for all of the assistance we provide, 

including the assistance to Israel, all of our programs, including 

PEPFAR—everything we do at the State Department, as Secretary 

Clinton has articulated many times, it is less than 1 percent of our 

Federal budget. 

Senator BOXER. So my question is, Are you going to submit to us 

a plan and the money request that you believe you need, absolutely 

paying attention to fiscal constraints? 

We are not asking for bells and whistles. But will that be what 

you truly believe you need? Because I hope so, because you cannot 

count on us to know what the needs are. 

Mr. NIDES. There is no question, Senator Boxer, that we will be 

doing so. As you know, Secretary Clinton asked us—or ordered 

us—to come to the Congress and amend the 2013 budget request 

to do three things: to pay for additional Marine deployments in 

some of our high-risk posts, No. 2, to add $750 million for our construction costs, and, three, to increase diplomatic security about 5 

percent. 

We are now in the midst of the 2014 budget process. We intend 

to come back to this committee once we do our assessments. As you 

know, as I pointed out earlier, we had an assessment team between 

the Department of Defense and the State Department and looked 

at 19 high-risk posts. My assumption is we will be coming back to 

do that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16

Senator BOXER. I do not want to cut you off, but I have to

because I only have a minute. 

Mr. NIDES. Please. 

Senator BOXER. So you are going to ask us for what you need, 

and that is important. 

Mr. NIDES. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator BOXER. And second, the troubling thing here is that 

there were repeated requests to implement security upgrades in 

Tripoli and Benghazi, and as we look at this report, we know what 

happened. And I would like to know, do you intend to put into 

place a process that would allow for a second review of these requests by another body within the State Department, because it 

seems like what happened is the request came. It went to one particular individual or desk, and then it never saw the light of day. 

Mr. NIDES. Senator, the answer to that is ‘‘Yes.’’ You know, one 

of the recommendations that ARB has is that we, in fact, look at 

the requests, how they are given to us, how we examine those 

requests. And, yes, we will learn from the incidents in Libya and 

very clear about digging into those requests. As I pointed out earlier, we have already begun to set up individual tasks to look into 

that. 

Senator BOXER. May I ask one last quick question? Thank you. 

Was it appropriate to rely so heavily on Libyan militias to guard 

American personnel? How was that decision made, and how do we 

avoid these types of failures? Are there standard policies and procedures for the hiring of guards? Was Libya an anomaly, or are there 

other facilities around the world where we are relying on the same 

type of forces? 

Mr. NIDES. Well, as you know, Senator Boxer, we rely upon the 

Vienna Convention, which we have for over 200 years. The fact for 

us on the ground is that we rely on the local governments and the 

government’s forces to protect us. We have to do that because we 

do not have the ability to have enough troops on the ground, and 

most of the countries will not allow us to. 

So one of the tasks that Secretary Clinton asked us to do when 

we sent out the assessment teams, to ask two very clear questions: 

Countries intent to protect us and their ability to protect us. And 

sometimes those two are different. And as we see what we refer to 

as the new normal, we have to constantly ask ourselves those questions, and that is what we are doing. 

Senator BOXER. Would you write to us and let us know if there 

is any other facilities that are relying on militia? Thank you. 

[The written answer by the State Department to Senator Boxer’s 

question follows:]

Host governments are obligated to protect diplomatic missions under the Vienna 

Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Libya was unique, but I will be happy 

to send up experts to brief you on our security posture in high threat places. In the 

case of Libya, the militia forces are affiliated with the Government of Libya and the 

17 February Brigade personnel were supplied to us by the Libyan Govermnent. 

Thus, these militia forces were host-nation-provided security. 

The Accountability Review Board provided a comprehensive evaluation of serious 

security challenges that we have already begun to address. Secretary Clinton has 

accepted all of the Board’s recommendations and has asked Deputy Secretary Nides 

to lead a task force to ensure the recommendations are implemented quickly and 

completely, as well as to pursue steps above and beyond those recommended in the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17

Board’s report. We look forward to working with the Congress as we take measures 

to improve security at our posts around the world.

I thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Boxer. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, want to 

thank Senator Lugar for many, many years of great service, and 

we will miss him. 

And I also want to wish Secretary Clinton a speedy recovery. I 

do think it is imperative that—we appreciate both of you being 

here. I think it is imperative that she come before this committee, 

and I think it would be really a shame to turn the page on this 

without—and go to a new regime without her being here. So I do 

look forward to that happening whenever her health permits. 

But I thank you for being here, and I do want to say that I was 

on the ground in Libya right after this happened and was with our 

team there, and witnessed the shock of them losing the colleagues 

they lost. Met the JSOC folks who were nothing short of absolute 

American heroes in what they did. But also witnessed the despair 

of a group that felt like I think, they were out on a tether and did 

not have the support of Washington. 

I am dismayed that this hearing is already centered on additional money, which may well be needed, but as Senator Boxer just 

said, we would have no idea because we have never done a top-tobottom review of the State Department ever since I have been here 

in the minority for 6 years. And I hope that will change with this 

next Congress. So we have no idea whether the State Department 

is using its money wisely or not, and I think that is a shame. 

To each of you, I will tell you, what I saw in the report is a 

department that has sclerosis, that does not think outside the box, 

that is not using the resources that it has in any kind of creative 

ways, is not prioritizing. I cannot imagine sending folks out to 

Benghazi after what we saw from the security cameras and the 

drones—I cannot imagine that we had people out there with a lack 

of security existing. And it seems to me that what the State 

Department would have done is to prioritize, and if, in fact, we cannot have people safely there, not send them there. 

So I would just like a brief response from Secretary Nides as to 

why we did not prioritize that. Secretary Clinton just sent up a 

notification to Congress asking for $1.3 billion. Why did she never 

ask for any notification or change of resources to make sure 

Benghazi was secured? Why did that not happen? 

Mr. NIDES. Thank you, Senator. As you know, we have fully and 

completely embraced the recommendations——

Senator CORKER. I understand—by the way, you all have had 18 

ARBs in the past, and you have never fully implemented one yet—

not one. So I do not want to talk about this ARB. I want to talk 

about why you did not ask for the resources for Benghazi just like 

was done this week on this ARB. Just tell me why. 

Mr. NIDES. As you know, Senator, we must reexamine all of our 

high-risk posts and determine the situation as we see as new evolving risks are occurring. As you are well aware, we are in a situation where the Middle East is evolving, democracies are growing, 

militaries are forming, and we must look at each and every one of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18

those sites and every one of our posts and reexamine under a new 

normal——

Senator CORKER. You were aware of the security risks there. We 

have read the cables. You were fully aware, and either you send 

people there with security or you do not send them there. I do not 

understand why you did not send a notification up with the cables 

coming in, with concerns about security. Why did you not do just 

what you did with this ARB seeking additional funds? I do not 

understand. 

The Appropriations Committee has never received from the State 

Department a notification asking to shift funds for security in 

Benghazi. I just want you to tell me why that did not happen, 

because you do it all the time. It happens almost weekly. 

Mr. NIDES. Senator, as you know, we are constantly evaluating 

our security. We are constantly reevaluating where we need funds. 

And we are constantly evaluating the current situation the ground 

in all of our countries. As you know—as you are well aware, we 

have risks all over the world, and we are constantly evaluating and 

determining at the time. 

And clearly, as the ARB points out, mistakes occurred. We need 

to look at those mistakes. We need to examine those mistakes. We 

need to make ourselves accountable for those mistakes. And we 

need to figure out how to make sure this does not happen again. 

I should point out, as you know, we get this right about 99 percent of the time. We would like to be at 100 percent without question. We have over 275 posts around the world. Our men and 

women are in danger all over the world, and we attempt to try to 

do this 100 percent. And we hope that this ARB and the recommendations, we will actually learn from them and we are determined to make sure this does not happen again. 

Senator CORKER. Just one last point. There has been a lot of talk 

about money, and it is just amazing every time there is an issue 

we start talking about more money. The fact is that you had 16 site 

security team personnel on the ground. They were at no cost to the 

State Department, totally funded by the Defense Department, no 

money issue. They had been there for a long, long time. They had 

been extended multiple times at no cost to you other than the lodging for them to be there. The Defense Department totally pays for 

them. 

Tripoli asked that they be extended, and you did not do it. This 

has nothing to do with money. Why did you not do that? 

Mr. NIDES. As you know, Senator, that team was in Tripoli, it 

was not in Benghazi. Members of that team visited Benghazi a few 

times. But the team, just to be clear, was posted in Tripoli. 

Senator CORKER. And they would have been a team—we only 

had a person there on the ground 40 days a year. I assume they 

would have traveled and been there when we had our Ambassador 

there. So I just do not understand. You talk about money, but you 

had 16 people there free from the Defense Department they 

requested that they stay, and you denied that. I do not understand 

that. 

Mr. NIDES. They were extended three times, Senator, and they—

but more importantly, the team was, in fact, in Tripoli. And some 

did, in fact, visit Benghazi a few times during their time. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker, let me just say I think you 

asked good questions, but I also would ask you to review Admiral 

Mullen’s and Ambassador Pickering’s request because it has a very 

specific set of requirements with respect to funding they talked 

about. 

Senator CORKER. I have reviewed it, and I will say that there 

have been 18 ARBs. Not a single one of them has ever been fully 

implemented. So I understand about this process. I am just saying 

that the culture within the State Department to me is one that 

needs to be transformed. This committee can help. Maybe the next 

Secretary of State can help. But the fact is there is a lot of work 

that needs to be done there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to 

say to Senator Lugar that he is leaving behind an extraordinary career and lasting legacy. I am sure he is going to serve in many 

other ways in the future. We appreciate your service, and we certainly remember Ambassador Stevens as the hallmark of what Foreign Service is all about. 

Our challenge—both here at home and abroad—is that, in the 

context of terrorism, terrorists have only to be lucky once. We have 

to get it right 100 percent of the time. It is a heavy burden and 

not an easy one. Obviously, this time we did not get it right, but 

the State Department acknowledges where it made a mistake. 

What I find extraordinary, as Congress is always very good at 

doing, is that it only casts blame on one side, but never seems to 

take any responsibility of its own. I still hear voices that will not 

take responsibility. There have been about 18 Accountability 

Review Boards but, if I am not mistaken, this is the first that is 

inside the administration. 

Obviously, this is going back and forth, and you cannot even implement all of the Accountability Review Board’s recommendations 

since a significant part of the recommendations are about resources 

and Congress does not have the resources to meet those recommendations. 

We need to frame this in the context of making sure that we collectively—both the State Department and Congress—take our responsibilities to protect our embassies and our diplomatic personnel abroad. 

In that respect, reading directly from the unclassified section of 

the report, the Accountability Review Board says, ‘‘Among various 

departments, bureaus, and personnel in the field, there appears to 

be a very real confusion over who ultimately was responsible and 

empowered to make decisions based on both policy and security 

considerations.’’ 

Can you tell me, Ambassador Nides, how we are going to change 

that? It sounds like there are silos. It sounds like there was a lack 

of understanding, and a lack of clear definition of responsibility. 

How are we going to meet that challenge and change it in terms 

of that recommendation? 

Mr. NIDES. As recommended by the ARB, we are going to focus 

very clearly on the issues of organizational structure within Diplomatic Security. We are, two, going to look very closely at the 

involvement of the Bureau, which oversees the countries in which 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20

the security recommendations are put forward. We are going to 

make sure that communications between the field and diplomatic 

security is correct. And we will, as suggested, continue to make 

sure there are double checks to make sure that those requests are 

evaluated and looked at with a lot of eyeballs. 

So we are going to learn from what the ARB has suggested as 

we look at the security requirements, but be very clear-eyed about 

the requests and the determination on the security situation on the 

ground. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So, are we going to have a more horizontal 

effort within the State Department instead of silos? Both in sharing information and knowledge, but with a clear delineation of who 

takes the ultimate responsibility? 

Mr. NIDES. Yes, sir. We need to learn from this, and I think that 

was one of the lessons that came out of the report, and we intend 

to incorporate that not only in our thinking, but in our actual 

reality of how we do our operations. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, one of the other elements of the report 

is intelligence: in essence, an intelligence failure. We have relied 

upon specific threats as the basis of reacting and preparing, versus 

a careful consideration of a deteriorating threat situation, in general, as a basis for improving security posture. Can you talk about 

how the State Department seeks to pursue that new reality? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes, Senator, sure. I mean, that is a challenge that 

we need to be much effective in addressing, both within the State 

Department and also, I think, throughout the intelligence community. 

The truth is across Eastern Libya for many months before the 

attack took place in Benghazi, there was a troubling pattern of 

deteriorating security, not all of which was directed at the United 

States. But there has been a tendency, not just in the case of Eastern Libya, but I think across the world in recent years, for us to 

focus too much on specific credible threats, and sometimes lose the 

forest for the trees. 

And I think that is something that, you know, we were painfully 

reminded of in the case of the Benghazi attack that we need to do 

better at. And there are some specific recommendations that the 

Accountability Review Board has made that we will implement 

relentlessly. And the State Department will certainly work with 

the rest of the intelligence community. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, we read from the Accountability

Review Board report again and listened to the testimonies of both 

Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen, where they made it 

very clear that, while many mistakes were made—and they outlined and responded to each of them—a significant problem was 

resources. We can hide our heads in the sand, or we can ultimately 

meet that challenge. They say it is imperative for the State Department to be mission oriented rather than resource constrained, particularly with its increasing presence in risky areas of the world 

that are integral to U.S. national security. 

So, in that respect, I hope that when the State Department presents its new budget it asks for what the Accountability Review 

Board has recommended as one of its suggestions. I also hope that, 

in fact, it also gives us the sense of the reforms that you are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21

pursuing so that Congress will feel empowered to be responsible, 

and to therefore, help the Department of State meet the challenges 

of our diplomatic support. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, it is really 

unfortunate that we have to go through an incident like this in 

order to get our act together, if you would. Everybody here has 

been to embassies all over the world, and what has already struck 

me is, first of all, I feel really good when I see those marines standing there and they say, good morning, sir, when you walk in. 

But usually before that, you have to go through a tranche of 

these locals, as you have told us, that are operating under a 200-

year-old agreement to protect our operations in their own countries. And, you know, the world has really changed over the last 

200 years, and you get a real sense of incompetence when you go 

through there. Generally, those people are confused. Most of them 

you wouldn’t meet going into a theater here in the United States 

having the kind of competency that they have. 

So I guess what you are going to have to do is instead of treating 

all these the same, each one is going to have to be treated differently. Every host country is going to have to be treated differently because our reputation in the world or the feeling about 

Americans in the world has changed dramatically over the last 200 

years, and there is countries where, such as Western Europe, 

where we don’t have to have what we have. And yet you go to other 

places, and I have been shocked in some of the countries I have 

been in that are not countries friendly to the United States and 

seen the minimal amount of Marine presence that we have had 

there. 

And then, of course, we all learned, I think, at least I did for the 

first time—or I guess I had heard it, but it didn’t stick previously—

that the Marines are there to guard the documents. And I mean, 

that is shocking. Their first obligation ought to be to protect Americans that are serving in that embassy. I am hoping that is going 

to change. I am sure it will change. 

And it would seem to me the rules of engagement really need review. I looked at those people streaming through the front gate in 

Benghazi. That wouldn’t have taken that much to stop that attack 

if, indeed, they would have responded to it immediately, it seemed 

to me. Again, you are looking at film, and I understand it is a lot 

more sterile than actually being there on the ground at the time. 

But when armed people are coming through the front gate, it 

would seem to me it is time to do something about it, and nothing 

was done about it until virtually everybody was in. 

So, again, I really don’t have any questions for you. I have looked 

at the review board. We all have our own view of maybe what 

should be stronger, what should be less. But the bottom line, the 

take-away for me is things are going to have to be done a lot different than what they have been done. And we really need to discriminate amongst countries as to what kind of effort that we put 

forward. 

So, with that, I will yield the rest of my time. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, thank you very much. Good observations. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22

Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I also want to add my congratulations to Senator Lugar for his 

incredible career. We are losing a real partner on this committee 

in the U.S. Senate, but I know you will continue your service to our 

country. Thank you very much. 

And to Secretary Burns and Nides, I thank you for your service, 

and our prayers once again go out to those who we lost in 

Benghazi. 

I want to follow up on—and one other point I might make, Mr. 

Chairman, and that is I know you have worked on the State 

Department authorization bill. I think it is important in the next 

Congress that we have full committee discussions on the State 

Department Authorization Act so that we can weigh in in a more 

deliberative way on the policies that are under the jurisdiction of 

this committee. 

I want to follow up on both Senator Corker and Senator Menendez’s points on intelligence. Recommendation 21 is very clear on 

this, that post 2001 intelligence collection has expanded exponentially. That is true. The Benghazi attacks are a stark reminder that 

we cannot overrely on the certainty or even likelihood of warning 

intelligence and that careful attention should be given to factors 

showing deterioration, threat situations in general, as a basis for 

action. 

Let me just point out that it was clear in Benghazi that the security was deteriorating. Maybe not a specific threat. We didn’t have 

information about that. That was also clear. 

We also knew that the local security team was not 100 percent 

reliable. And yet the security details that we had in Benghazi, as 

the report points out, were inadequate. 

So I would like you to expand more on how we are going to institutionalize careful attention so that we do not allow a situation 

such as Benghazi to occur in the future. You can’t eliminate all 

threats. We know that. But we also understand there was not adequate security at the Benghazi facility based upon the deteriorating 

circumstances. 

How do we institutionalize that careful attention to make sure 

that in those types of dangerous assignments that we have adequate security? And I want to add one more thing. 

Ambassador Stevens knew Libya perhaps better than any other 

American. His judgment will never be second-guessed. 

But it is important that in dangerous posts that there be more 

than just the head of mission, who is responsible for the security, 

no question about it. But that he has the best advice on a broader 

basis as we go into these types of circumstances. How do we institutionalize that? 

Mr. BURNS. Let me start, Senator, because you raise a very good 

point. I think the truth is, as I said before, first with regard to the 

intelligence that in eastern Libya, there was a troubling pattern 

that had developed. A lot of the violence and the security incidents 

were intra-Libyan. You know, some of them were directed at the 

U.S. and Western targets, but not all of them. 

And I think we made the mistaken assumption that we wouldn’t 

become a major target for those——

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23

Senator CARDIN. But this was also the anniversary of 9/11. There 

was a lot of reasons to believe——

Mr. BURNS. There were. There were a number of different motives, potential motives, as the ARB report makes clear. And as you 

said, Senator, Chris Stevens understood Benghazi as well as anyone and understood the risks as well as anyone. 

But I think one of the painful lessons we have learned is the importance of being able to take a step back and try to analyze better 

the broader pattern of security challenges that were emerging and 

so that there is a sense of responsibility on the part of all of us in 

the State Department for trying to better understand those challenges and not be so fixated on specific credible threats and then 

take that into account in dealing with what were the obvious security inadequacies made obvious by the Accountability Review Board 

in Benghazi. 

Senator CARDIN. I know that I am going to be interested and I 

think all the members of the committee are going to be interested 

as to how you institutionalize that review that goes beyond just 

specific threats. And I would hope you would share that with us. 

Secretary Nides, you mentioned that there is a streamlining 

process so that you can move quicker to implement. You also mentioned there may be some concerns with additional Marine assignments with the host country. 

Is there anything that we need to be aware of, as you implement 

these recommendations, as it relates to bureaucratic streamlining 

that may require congressional attention or problems with host 

countries as we want to put more Marines in-state, in-country? 

Mr. NIDES. Senator, thank you. 

It has been an unprecedented cooperation between the State 

Department and the Defense Department I should say. I mean, not 

only did they agree to send very competent, very trained officials 

with our State Department colleagues to those 19 posts immediately, right after the incident, to evaluate all these countries during the period of time of the current unrest that is going on. 

But two, one of the recommendations that came back that General Dempsey along with SECDEF Panetta and Secretary Clinton 

and the White House agreed to, that the use of additional Marine 

detachments would be enormously helpful. Again, the Senator is 

correct. The mission of those Marines is, in fact, statutorily to protect classified information, but there is also no question, for all of 

us who have come into those embassies with the Marine detachments, they are a deterrent. They are imposing deterrence, and it 

comes with a lot of other things. 

So the additional request of the 35 additional detachments, 

which include about 250 additional Marines, we are also going to 

be asking to build potential barracks on our grounds, where we 

possibly can. So the marines, the five individuals in each detachment, could actually potentially live on the facilities that are close 

by. 

So the cooperation between the Defense Department and the 

State Department, in my view, is somewhat unprecedented for a 

situation like this, and we will be coming to the Congress for not 

only the appropriations to pay for that, but also potentially the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24

authorities in which we will be working with DOD and come and 

discussing that with the relevant committees. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by commending Senator Lugar on his service to 

our country. And what I am about to say I hope you will take as 

a compliment. I have been watching you since I was in high school, 

and I mean that as a compliment. 

Growing up in Miami, foreign policy somehow found its way into 

our local politics, too, and I have a passion for foreign policy partially by watching your career. I am just pleased that I got a 

chance to serve with you for 2 years on this committee. 

I also want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today 

and for your service to our country. I do that every time because 

I know how unrewarding the job could be at times, but how rewarding it could be at others. So thank you for being here. 

I want to say this report has really furthered our understanding 

of what happened in Benghazi, and I appreciate it. There is one 

part of it that I am, I don’t want to say the word ‘‘concerned,’’ but 

I am a bit puzzled by. And that is that it places a lot of the blame 

on lower level officials, particularly Assistant Secretary level 

officials. 

And why I find that quite puzzling is because Benghazi and 

Libya, in general, is not some remote outpost. It is not Luxembourg. I mean, this is a country that we were involved in militarily 

not so long ago in a high-profile intervention. 

And so, I am curious because on page 5 of the report, the unclassified version, it talks about the—you know, it was just not a priority for Washington. The special mission was not a priority for 

Washington when it came to security-related requests, especially 

those relating to staffing. 

So I want to understand who Washington is, and in that frame 

of mind, I think, Secretary Burns, I have a number of questions. 

I know that Secretary Clinton visited Libya in October 2011. Did 

the security situation, the deteriorating security situation come up 

during her visit there, whether with the country team or in her 

interactions with the Libyans? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Senator, I am sure in general terms that it did. 

I wasn’t on that trip. So I don’t know specifically. 

I can speak to my own experience. I also visited Libya——

Senator RUBIO. In July, correct? 

Mr. BURNS. I visited in July. I also visited in September after the 

attack in Benghazi. And so, I can speak to my own experience. And 

you know, as Secretary Clinton has said, all of us as senior leaders 

in the Department are accountable and responsible for what happened. And I certainly fault myself. 

You know, I accompanied the remains of my four colleagues back 

after the attack in Benghazi. I had been in the Middle East on a 

trip and cut short a trip to Iraq to come back with them. And on 

that long flight home, I certainly had a lot of time to think about 

sharper questions that I could have asked, sharper focus that I 

could have provided. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25

Senator RUBIO. But on your visit in July or September as well—

did you go in July? 

Mr. BURNS. September—I was in July. 

Senator RUBIO. After—correct? 

Mr. BURNS. Yes. 

Senator RUBIO. Did that issue in specific come up? Did the folks 

on the ground there say to you, ‘‘We are really worried about what 

is happening here with security. We have made a number of 

requests.’’

Mr. BURNS. There was no specific discussion of that. I did talk 

to Ambassador Stevens in general terms about the security situation, but we didn’t talk about specifics at that time. 

Senator RUBIO. Now Secretary Clinton met with the Prime Minister of Libya in March. Do you know if the security situation came 

up in that meeting? 

Mr. BURNS. This is in March of? 

Senator RUBIO. Of 2012. 

Mr. BURNS. I am certain it did. We certainly emphasized the

importance of not only improving the security capabilities of the 

Libyan interim government at that time, we offered a number of 

programs to help them build those institutions, which remained 

one of the greatest weaknesses of the Libyan interim government. 

That was a central feature, as it was in July, when I met with the 

Prime Minister as well. 

Senator RUBIO. But in that particular meeting, you don’t know 

if that—you are pretty sure that the issue came up. You just don’t 

know the full content? 

Mr. BURNS. I don’t know all the details. No, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, you met with the Deputy Prime Minister 

in June of this year. Did it come up in that meeting? 

Mr. BURNS. It did. And again——

Senator RUBIO. What did they say? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, the focus there was on urging them and offering support for their development of security institutions, which at 

that time, and to this day, are still extremely weak. 

Senator RUBIO. All right. Who in the Department reviewed or 

was briefed on the cables that were sent from the post in June and 

August 2011 regarding the security situation? To what level did 

those cables get reviewed? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, they certainly would have been reviewed up 

through Assistant Secretary level, and it may be that some of my 

colleagues on the seventh floor saw them as well. 

Senator RUBIO. So beyond that level, were any senior officials

beyond the Assistant Secretary level made aware of the repeated 

requests from the posts for extended or additional security? In particular, there were requests made in March and July 2011. Do you 

know, beyond the Assistant Secretary level, those requests were 

ever forwarded in a memo or in some other written document? 

Mr. BURNS. I am not aware of any specific memo that went

beyond the sixth floor with regard to those specific requests at that 

time. No, Senator. 

Senator RUBIO. Do you know if anyone beyond the Assistant

Secretary level going up to the Secretary’s level, were they made 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26

aware of the more than 200 security incidents that had occurred 

in Benghazi in the 13 months leading up to the attack? 

Mr. BURNS. There were certainly memos that came up to the seventh floor that talked about the deteriorating security situation in 

eastern Libya. Yes, sir. 

Senator RUBIO. And finally, after all these different trips to 

Libya yourself, the Secretary, others, other senior officials in the 

State Department, were there any memos produced after those 

visits to the tune of basically saying we have been to Libya, and 

by the way, there are two things. 

The station is concerned about security in general, and the Libyans are concerned about their ability to provide security as we are 

relying on them. 

Do you know if any memos were produced in that or any highlevel meetings about that topic took place above the Assistant Secretary level? Were there any meetings convened, memos produced 

on that issue? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, there were certainly meetings that took place 

at senior levels with regard to the situation in Libya in general and 

particularly with regard to the concern about the very weak security capabilities of the Libyan Government at that time. And so, 

certainly, that was the subject of fairly consistent concern. 

And as I said, we made a number of offers and on a number of 

occasions pushed the Libyan interim government to try to move to 

accelerate their efforts to develop those institutions, which related 

directly to the security——

Senator RUBIO. So my last question is beyond the Assistant

Secretary level. There was a general and specific awareness of a 

rapidly deteriorating security situation in Libya, of the repeated requests from the team on the ground for security, and of the inability of the Libyans to——

Mr. BURNS. Senator—sorry. Senator, what I would say is there 

was certainly a general awareness of both the deteriorating security situation in eastern Libya, and also there was not only a general awareness, but a real concern about the difficulty that the Libyan interim government was having in developing capable security 

institutions. 

Senator RUBIO. Above the Assistant Secretary level, that awareness existed. Correct? 

Mr. BURNS. The awareness with regard to the incapacity of the 

Libyan interim government in developing security institutions; yes, 

sir. And we worked hard to try to push the Libyans to move faster 

in that direction. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to reiterate what has been said by many on this 

panel today about Senator Lugar’s great leadership and been a 

mentor to so many of us, even when he didn’t know he was being 

a mentor, and a great example to us. We are certainly grateful for 

his service, and I know he will continue to serve in another capacity or many capacities. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27

We also want to express again the condolences that I have, I 

know, and so many in this room today, about the loss that the 

State Department suffered, Ambassador Stevens and the others 

who were killed. And that is why the questions that we are debating are so grave and so meaningful. 

Reflecting upon the challenge that you both have and the State 

Department has in light of the report and in light of the subject 

matter that led to the report, because of that, I guess you try to 

think in your own life what experiences are relevant to inform the 

questions that you have or the points that you want to make. 

Two are relevant in my life. One is the traveling that I have done 

across the world as a member of this committee—three times in 

Pakistan, three times Afghanistan, several trips to the Middle 

East. The last time, Senator Shaheen and I were traveling together, and seeing the difficulty of providing security not only for 

folks in embassies and consulates, but when Members of Congress 

travel and the danger that we feel sometimes, even with the knowledge that we have security around us. 

So getting that balance right, but as you know, we do have to 

get it right every time. And taxpayers expect that, and they expect 

us to put forth every effort. They expect it of you. They also expect 

it of us. 

The other experience I have as a State official leading investigations and audits of public agencies and at times kicking the hell 

out of them, really hitting them hard, being very critical, calling for 

people to be fired, demanding accountability for tax dollars and for 

results. 

I do know this, though, when a report is issued and findings are 

made, you can’t simply have us in Congress, or in the case of State 

officials in my experience, just yelling and screaming about the 

results and yelling and screaming about recommendations. You 

have to implement them. 

Resources matter. Whether it is personnel or, in the case of some 

of the work that I did, information technology, hardware, whatever 

it takes, we have got to dedicate the resources. You cannot get the 

results that you want just by yelling and screaming. You have got 

to have investment in resources. 

Third. The third point I would make is that your credibility as 

a department will be greatly enhanced by the pace of implementation, by the demonstrable success you have—in other words, the 

taxpayers can see that you have made those changes—and by the 

steps that you are taking now in the next couple of days and 

weeks. 

That is mostly important for the broader concerns that we have, 

but it is especially important when you come back here and ask for 

dollars. So I will stand with anyone to say that resources matter. 

I know that from personal experience. But your credibility would 

be enhanced when you ask for those resources, when you can specifically focus on what those resources will go for, and how you are 

going to be able to change the dynamic. 

So let me just—I don’t have much time, but with that predicate, 

let me ask a question that I am not sure has been raised yet. Or 

maybe two quick questions. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28

No. 1, host country cooperation and partnership. I know there is 

great variance or it varies by country and by situation. But if 

either of you, Deputy Secretary Burns or Deputy Secretary Nides, 

can speak to the question of the challenge of having host country 

partnership? 

And then, Mr. Nides, if you could just quickly one more time 

walk through the timeline of implementation of some of the recommendations? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, first, Senator Casey, I mean, obviously, one of 

the lessons of all the changes that have taken place across the Middle East in the last couple of years, as you have revolutions and 

then post revolutionary governments coming into place, is that the 

development of security institutions in those countries and their capacity for following through on their Vienna Convention obligations 

for protecting foreign diplomats is very uneven and sometimes extremely weak. And that is something that we have to both understand and adapt to, and that is exactly, as Tom described earlier, 

what we are determined to do as we make changes and strengthen 

our security at our diplomatic facilities over the coming years. 

Mr. NIDES. And Senator, we have done four very quick things. 

No. 1, we quickly went up here and asked the Appropriations Committee for additional funds for 2013. As you know, the 2013 appropriations process is already well on its way, as you know. 

No. 2, we formed the ISAT teams and got them out into the field 

immediately with DOD to the 19 posts, and we will have recommendations on those high-risk posts very soon and very quickly. 

No. 3, we took the 60 tasks—excuse me, the 29 recommendations 

and broken them down into 60 specific tasks, and assigned them. 

I had my first meeting 2 days ago with the steering committee, 

with the task force, and divided them up, giving them timelines, 

dates, making sure we will execute many of them, hopefully, before 

the end of this calendar year and be able to set up for the next Secretary to come in and make sure that we are executing the rest of 

them. 

Then finally, obviously, we named the first-ever Deputy Assistant Secretary for High Risk Posts. We have taken those four very 

quick action steps as we proceed in taking the recommendations of 

the ARB. 

Senator CASEY. Anything you can do to keep us updated as you 

go. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first say that I agree with the sentiments of Senator 

Rubio in his reference to you, Senator Lugar. Except since we were 

both in high school at the same time, I didn’t get that message. 

[Laughter.] 

But you have done a wonderful job for a lot of years, and we 

respect you. 

Both Senator Corker and Senator Rubio talked about some of the 

events leading up to the disaster. However, they assumed, I guess, 

that everyone already knew, and I think it is imperative for us to 

put these things in the record so that we know what signs were 

out there. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29

I am referring to the one sentence on the report that says, ‘‘The 

Board found the intelligence provided no immediate specific tactical 

warning of the September 11 attacks.’’ We will run over some of 

these things and then ask you both if you agree with that statement. If it is more than a yes or no answer, you could do it for the 

record. 

In April, two former security guards for the consulate in Benghazi threw IEDs over the consulate fence. In May, the offices of 

the Red Cross in Benghazi were hit by an RPG. 

The Red Cross closed their doors, and they got out of town. 

In June, militants detonated an explosive at the perimeter gate 

of the Benghazi consulate, blowing a hole through it large enough 

for 40 people to go through. In June, a rocket-propelled grenade hit 

the convoy carrying the British Ambassador to Libya in Benghazi, 

and they, like the Red Cross, got out of town. They left. 

In June, Ambassador Stevens wrote that the al-Qaeda flags were 

flying over the government buildings and training facilities in that 

area. In August, security officers stated that they did not believe 

the Benghazi consulate could withstand a ‘‘coordinated attack.’’ 

That was in August. 

In August, a State Department cable—we are talking about 

cables now, information that came to you folks—discussed the 

location of approximately 10 Islamist militias and al-Qaeda training camps within Benghazi. On September 4, Ambassador Stevens 

warned that Libyan officials had introduced a state of maximum 

alert in Benghazi. 

And then, finally, on September 9, Ambassador Stevens requested additional security, 2 days before it happened. Like the 

rest of the members of this panel, I knew him. I knew him quite 

well. I had a great deal of respect for him. 

Now in light of all these findings, these are facts that no one has 

argued with, do either one of you want to say that you agree with 

the statement that I read first in the report saying that there were 

no warnings? 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Senator, the statement in the report that says 

that there was no specific tactical threat I think is a statement of 

fact. But you are right to point out the pattern, the troubling pattern of deteriorating security in eastern Libya in each of the incidents that you discussed. 

The reality is that amongst that deterioration or part of that deterioration was a lot of intra-Libyan violence as well. Some of it 

was targeted against the United States. We did not do a good 

enough job, as the report highlights, in trying to connect the dots 

between that troubling pattern, even in the absence of an immediate tactical threat. 

Senator INHOFE. OK. And Mr. Secretary Nides, I will assume 

that you pretty much agree with the statement he made. 

Now there isn’t time to go into it, but for the record, if you would 

please respond, I would appreciate it very much. 

Mr. NIDES. Yes; I do. Yes; I do. 

Senator INHOFE. Then there are two questions. One not so significant. It is pretty obvious. And the other is the most significant 

question that isn’t asked, is not covered in the report, that I would 

like to get your response to. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The first is, Were the comments of Ambassador Rice completely 

inaccurate regarding her assertion on five TV shows 5 days after 

the event with the video responsible for the deaths of Ambassador 

Stevens and three other Americans? 

And the second question, and this is the one that is important, 

because we all knew, we had testimony. And I will read the testimony of the CIA before the house. It said, ‘‘Although the intelligence community knew from day one that al-Qaeda terrorists 

were responsible for the deadly Benghazi consulate attack, someone cut reference to al-Qaeda and terrorism from the overview they 

released on September 14 instead of those talking points they 

added.’’

Now somebody in the White House—because this report went to 

the situation room—someone in the White House changed the talking points from General Petraeus and the CIA before they were 

given to Ambassador Rice. I assume that they were changed and 

that she was not aware of it or she was aware. That is not too 

pertinent. 

Someone changed it. Do either one of you guys know? Do you 

care? 

Mr. BURNS. Senator, here is what I would say. What happened 

in Benghazi was clearly a terrorist attack. Secretary Clinton, on 

the day after the attack, said quite directly that what happened in 

Benghazi was an assault by heavily armed militants on our 

compound. 

Later that same day, President Obama spoke to an act of terror. 

What was not clear at that time was exactly which terrorists were 

involved, what their motives were, exactly how this came about, 

whether this had been planned well in advance or was more a 

target of opportunity. And I am convinced, Senator, that my colleagues in the administration who addressed this issue and the 

intelligence professionals, on whom they relied, operated in good 

faith. 

Their focus was on being as factual as possible, and their focus 

was on action. And you have to remember, sir, at this time there 

were mobs coming over the walls of our Embassies in Cairo and 

Tunis and Sana’a. And that was what people were focused on. 

And so, the initial inaccuracies, because just as the ARB report 

points out, there were no protests before the attack took place. It 

took several days for the intelligence community to conclude definitively that there weren’t any protests and that there weren’t 

any——

Senator INHOFE. Let me respond to that because we are running 

out of time. 

Mr. BURNS. Sure. 

Senator INHOFE. And I want to give Secretary Nides an opportunity to respond. Specifically——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have actually—we have actually run 

out of time. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I know. Others did, too. 

Specifically, the report from the CIA references al-Qaeda and terrorism. That is specific. It can’t be any more specific than that. So 

I will get your response. If you have time, if you will give Mr. Nides 

time to respond, that is fine. If not, he can do it for the record. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want him to do it quickly. I am trying to 

honor other Senators who want to get to the Inouye ceremony. But 

I think we have time if you can do it quickly. 

Mr. NIDES. No, I concur with Secretary Burns’s comments, and 

I do think that the interagency was operating in good faith. As 

someone who was in the room during those 3 days with Secretary 

Clinton, our full and complete focus was on saving lives. Sitting 

there with her as she made calls to leaders of all those countries 

where our men and women were in danger, that was what our 

focus was, and that is what we spent our time and energies on. 

Senator INHOFE. And you don’t know who changed the talking 

points? 

Mr. NIDES. I do not. This was an interagency process. I am not 

aware of how that occurred. It was an interagency process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, we would be happy to help you follow 

up to get that pinned down. I think there is actually some testimony with respect to that within the intel community—or within 

the Intel Committee. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you both for being here this morning. I think the 

report, the Accountability Review Board report was very direct. It 

was very honest about pointing out that mistakes were made within the agency. 

And hopefully, now as the result of the report, as you all have 

indicated, we can move forward. We can hold people accountable. 

We can make the appropriate changes and follow up on the lessons 

that are learned as a result of this tragedy in Benghazi. 

I appreciate Secretary Clinton’s taking responsibility for what 

happened and, as she points out in her letter to this committee, for 

going even further than the recommendations in the report to 

address the mistakes that were made. 

The CHAIRMAN. If I could just interrupt you there? I want to put 

the letter from Secretary Clinton to me and to Senator Lugar in 

the record at this time. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

One of the things that you pointed out is that you have gone out 

to—or there have been teams to assess the 19 State Department 

locations around the world where they are high-risk areas, and I 

wonder if you can talk about the metrics that are being used as we 

think about how we determine what is a high-threat, high-risk 

location and how we are then responding to those metrics. 

Mr. NIDES. We tasked the teams between the Defense Department and the State Department with a variety of questions to ask. 

The principal question to ask was, What was the ability for the 

host government to protect us? Not just their willingness, because 

all of the countries in which we examined, every one of them without question wanted to protect us. And so——

Senator SHAHEEN. Right, and I appreciate that you gave us that 

information in your testimony. 

Mr. NIDES. Yes. 

Senator SHAHEEN. But I wonder if you could be a little more specific. When we asked that question, what then is the followup to 

that? 

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Mr. NIDES. Sure. The security professionals then examined the 

practical things: the abilities for fire, protections of perimeter, how 

close are they to the street. 

I mean, very exact. In fact, we then asked them for recommendations, three sets of recommendations—immediate recommendations, what things need to be done tomorrow, things that could be 

done between now and 6 months, and then 6 months to a year. 

So we got very exact, detailed assessments from each one of the 

teams. We then put them all in a matrix, and we were basically 

going through each one of those requirements, putting budget 

requirements to it, prioritizing them, and we will be coming back 

to this institution, enlisting and helping you think through that. 

But we are getting very exact. This was not an esoteric discussion. It was very clear and very specific requirements for each one 

of those posts. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And apropos Senator Corker and Senator 

Casey’s questions about implementation of the report, have we 

attached a timeline to all of the various recommendations for when 

those are going to get done, and is that something that can be 

made available to this committee? 

Mr. NIDES. Yes, we have already—as I pointed out, we broke the 

29 recommendations down into individuals tasks. 

As mundane as that might sound, it is critically important. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. NIDES. We have assigned individuals to each task. 

We have given the dates that we want the tasks completed and 

whatever recommendations that will actually derive from that. So 

we can certainly share that with the committee at the appropriate 

time. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Also can you talk about the coordination between the State 

Department and the Department of Defense? There is a New York 

Times story today that points out that at the time of the crisis in 

Benghazi, the Pentagon had no forces that could be readily sent. 

The closest AC–130 gunship was in Afghanistan. There were no 

armed drones within range. There was no Marine expeditionary 

unit available to the African Command. 

And given the potential for further unrest in Syria, in Egypt, and 

across the Middle East, it seems to me that that is a question that 

is really critical as we look at how we continue to provide protection for our personnel on the ground. 

Mr. BURNS. Well, Senator, first with regard to the specific issue 

of Benghazi, Admiral Mullen addressed this publicly yesterday——

Senator SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. BURNS [continuing]. And it was addressed in the report. And 

his judgment and the ARB’s judgment is there was simply not 

enough time to have used military force to respond and make a difference in that situation. But you raise a very good broader question. It is certainly something that we will be working through with 

our colleagues in the Pentagon and elsewhere in the administration. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Chairman, given again the potential for 

unrest across the Middle East, I would hope that we would follow 

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up on this specific question because it seems to me to be critical 

as we look at the situation going forward. 

And I will just conclude by adding my personal thanks and 

appreciation to Senator Lugar. It has truly been an honor to serve 

with you, and you leave a tremendous legacy for this committee 

and for the country. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen, thank you. 

Let me just say that I have thought a lot about what you have 

just said with respect to the availability of teams or forces with 

respect to emergency extraction and/or emergency response in various parts of the world, and I think it is something we really need 

to pay attention to and think about in terms of deployment and 

preparedness. So we have got to do that. 

Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. I will be real fast so Senator Barrasso can also 

ask questions, too. 

Let me quote my predecessor in the Senate, Senator Sam Nunn, 

by saying they don’t make them any better than Dick Lugar. I 

would like to echo that statement. 

Dick, you have been a great public servant and a great friend. 

We appreciate you very much. 

My statement is in your report—in the report by Admiral Mullen 

and Secretary Pickering, it says there was a culture of pushback 

in the State Department. Not a question, but a statement. I have 

seen that culture of pushback. I have been to embassies in Africa 

that have made requests, security-related requests that basically 

were really minor, like securing ground-level residence of an apartment building in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, that couldn’t get done 

until a United States Senator asked for it. 

So I think the State Department really needs to look at their 

process internally to see to it there is a flow to the top of important 

security requests coming from embassies, and that is just a statement on my part. 

My question is, Secretary Nides, you made the statement, and I 

will read the following, ‘‘And let me add, we may need your help 

in assuring we have the authority to streamline the usual processes and produce faster results.’’

And this is related to security. What process is inhibiting faster 

results in terms of security in our embassies? 

Mr. NIDES. I was using it broadly speaking. As you know, every 

time we put a contract out, there is a bidding process that needs 

to take place. Nothing can be done quickly, as I am learning as 

someone who has come from the private sector into the Government again for the second time. 

And it is done rightly, right? The people—bids are put out. Contracts are awarded. There is a process. That process, unfortunately, 

takes time. We have oversight that has to be done. The contracts 

are rewarded and are challenged. And so, we may need to ask for 

some authorities to allow us to expedite some of those, and that is 

what I was generally talking about in security and other construction. 

Just to build a wall at an embassy could potentially take months 

to go through the contracting process, to get an agreement, to get 

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the bid. So we may need to come to this institution to protect ourselves for challenges that we have during the contracting process. 

And that is what I was referring to, sir. 

Senator ISAKSON. So it is competitive bid requirement? 

Is that right? 

Mr. NIDES. Yes, I am not an expert in it, I should be honest with 

you. But there is—what I am an expert on, there is nothing can 

get done quickly. And I think it is—and some of it is legitimate. 

Some of it needs to be done quickly, and we will need to get the 

authorities in which to do that. 

Senator ISAKSON. What we should do, Mr. Chairman, is investigate negotiated bid because there is a way around the competitive 

bid process in a security situation where you can react quickly, and 

we ought to give you that authority. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very, very good suggestion, Senator, 

and we will do that for sure. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And first, to Senator Lugar, in Wyoming, we have the code of the 

West. And, No. 1 is, live each day with courage, and No. 2 is, take 

pride in your work. And you really are the embodiment then of the 

code of the West. So you are always welcome in the Rocky Mountain West, and specifically in Wyoming. So thank you so much for 

your leadership, Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

Senator BARRASSO. Now for our guests, President Obama claims 

that the moment he heard about the attack on the United States 

consulate in Benghazi, he said he gave three directives. And one 

of those was find out who did this so we can bring them to justice. 

In Secretary Clinton’s letter to us just 2 days ago, she states, 

‘‘We continue to hunt the terrorists responsible for the attacks in 

Benghazi and are determined to bring them to justice.’’ Have you 

identified the terrorists responsible for the deaths of these four 

brave Americans and the additional injuries and the destruction of 

the U.S. facilities? 

Mr. BURNS. Senator Barrasso, first, just to restate that we are 

absolutely committed to bringing those responsible to justice. We 

are absolutely committed to bringing every resource of the U.S. 

Government to bear to accomplish that. 

We are pursuing this through a number of different channels, 

some of which can best be discussed in other settings. But as you 

know, the FBI is leading the investigation. The State Department 

is very actively supporting this. 

I have been in Libya to talk to the Libyan leadership about the 

importance of their cooperation in the investigation. I think we are 

making some progress. Our charge on the ground, Ambassador 

Pope, works every day on this issue in support of the FBI. 

I was in Tunisia last week to emphasize to the Tunisian President and Prime Minister the importance we attach to cooperation 

since they are detaining one of the suspects in the Benghazi attack, 

and I believe we are making some progress there. 

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So the answer, sir, to your question is we don’t have all the 

answers yet, but we are working this relentlessly, and I think we 

are making some progress. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you. 

With regard to implementation of the recommendations of this 

report, you go through the report and Senator Corker referred to 

18 different Accountability Review Boards over a number of years. 

A recurring theme seems to be stovepipe decisionmaking. I mean, 

just earlier today, I have heard the bureaucratic verbiage of what 

got to the sixth floor, what got to the seventh floor. 

That doesn’t mean anything to Senators or to people at home 

around the country that see a terrible situation and failed security 

effort. And truly, what is the State Department going to do to get 

beyond this, what goes to what floor to make sure that this doesn’t 

happen again? 

Mr. NIDES. Senator, as someone who has spent a lot of time in 

corporate America as well, there is plenty of stovepiping that goes 

on there, too, as you are well aware. 

We have got to learn from this. We have got to hold people 

accountable, which we are doing, and we have to change processes 

to make sure we are getting it right. 

We are going to relook at them from how we make our decisions 

as relates to the security decisions, how the Bureau reacts to that, 

who is making decisions. And we are going to have to embrace this 

and hold ourselves accountable. Secretary Clinton has been very 

clear to us, we are accountable for executing these recommendations, and we are going to have to learn from this quickly and get 

to the bottom of the answers that are set up as it relates to the 

specific tasks that are laid out for all of us to look at. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In the interest of time, I will cease questions there. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Barrasso. 

Let me just say, as we conclude, I was just thinking, you know, 

this is a good process. Not a fun process, and it is not meant to 

be, but it is open accountability. 

I have been impressed by the directness and professionalism of 

the report that was delivered to us yesterday, but I am also impressed today by the just obvious combination of some pain at the 

losses that took place for which, obviously, everybody feels a sense 

of responsibility within the Department and the acknowledgment, 

difficult as it is, that mistakes were made and things have to be 

done differently. 

So I just want to salute both of you for coming in here, and I 

think good questions have been asked, legitimate ones, and this 

process will result in improvements. I am confident of that. 

So we thank you very, very much for coming in today. It has 

been, I think, very, very helpful, and we will look forward to working with you with the committee to make sure that the implementation is as effective as possible and to make sure that we do our 

part, that the Congress steps up here in ways that are important. 

I think Senator Corker’s questions about the money, you know, 

we have got to analyze it and see where the improvements can be 

made. There is no question in my mind that we need additional 

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resources in significant ways, and we are going to have to document that and do all the things necessary to make it clear. 

So thanks very, very much for coming in today. We wish you well 

and look forward to picking up whenever the next hearing will be 

with the Secretary. 

Thank you. 

Thanks. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 9:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON TO SENATORS JOHN

F. KERRY AND RICHARD G. LUGAR

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