This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

Before 

CRISFIELD, HOLIFIELD, and LAWRENCE

Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

UNITED STATES

Appellee

v.

Austin R. CHAMBLEE

Master-at-Arms Third Class (E-4), U.S. Navy

Appellant

No. 201900279

Decided: 24 November 2020

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judges: 

Aaron C. Rugh (arraignment)

Jonathan T. Stephens (motions, trial)

Sentence adjudged 19 June 2019 by a general court-martial convened 

at Naval Base San Diego, California, consisting of a military judge 

sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E--1, 

confinement for 24 months, and a dishonorable discharge.

For Appellant: 

Major Brian L. Farrell, USMCR

For Appellee: 

Lieutenant Gregory A. Rustico, JAGC, USN

Major Kerry E. Friedewald, USMC

Lieutenant Catherine M. Crochetiere, JAGC, USN

_________________________
United States v. Chamblee, NMCCA No. 201900279

Opinion of the Court

2

This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but 

may be cited as persuasive authority under 

NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

_________________________

PER CURIAM:

Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of 

simple assault, five specifications of assault consummated by a battery, and 

four specifications of aggravated assault, in violation of Article 128, Uniform

Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], 10 U.S.C. § 928.1

Appellant asserts one assignment of error: the Government failed to 

maintain personal jurisdiction over Appellant when his term of enlistment 

expired. We find no prejudicial error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellant’s convictions involve numerous incidents of physical abuse of 

his wife and, later, his girlfriend, occurring between November 2014 and 

February 2016 while he was assigned to USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). The 

following dates and events are relevant to the question of jurisdiction: 

Appellant began his active service on 3 December 2013, with an initial end of 

active obligated service [EAOS] date of 2 December 2017. On 26 September 

2017, Carl Vinson’s command judge advocate [CJA] sent an internal memo to 

the command’s administrative officer [AO] saying Appellant was being 

extended beyond his EAOS due to an ongoing criminal investigation and that 

Appellant was not to be discharged without permission from the commanding 

officer or CJA. This six-month extension was reflected in the Navy Standard 

Integrated Personnel System as part of Appellant’s electronic service record, 

with an effective date of 3 December 2017 and a new EAOS of 3 June 2018.

Due to a poor interface between pay and personnel systems, Appellant’s pay 

stopped and his Common Access Card [CAC] expired at his original EAOS of 

2 December 2107. Both issues were quickly remedied by his command.

 

1 Additional specifications of simple assault and assault consummated by a 

battery and charges and specifications alleging sexual assault, rape, attempted rape, 

and attempted killing of an unborn child were withdrawn and dismissed pursuant to 

a pretrial agreement.
United States v. Chamblee, NMCCA No. 201900279

Opinion of the Court

3

On 29 May 2018, the CJA sent another memo to the AO, saying that 

Appellant was being extended for another six months. Appellant signed an 

Administrative Remarks form (NAVPERS 1070/613) [Page 13] on 30 May 

2018, acknowledging this second extension. (No Page 13 had been issued for 

the first extension.) This six-month extension was reflected in Appellant’s 

electronic service record as being effective 31 May 2018. On 19 November 

2018, the CJA sent a third memo to the AO, saying Appellant was being 

extended for an additional six months, until 2 June 2019. Appellant 

acknowledged this extension by signing a Page 13 sometime between 21 and 

31 December 2018. Appellant signed his final extension-related Page 13 on 16 

May 2019, acknowledging that he was being extended through 2 December 

2019.

Appellant first asserted the lack of personal jurisdiction at his 17 December 2018 pretrial hearing, when he also informed the Government that his 

pay had again stopped. The Government acted immediately to restart his 

pay, correcting the issue in two days. Again, this pay stoppage was attributable to poor communication between pay and personnel systems, rather than 

to any intent of the Government to discharge Appellant.

While awaiting trial, Appellant, through counsel, requested to be assigned 

on temporary orders to Naval Air Station North Island, California. As Carl 

Vinson was then making a homeport shift from North Island to the State of 

Washington, the command agreed to issue the orders to facilitate Appellant’s 

access to his San Diego-based defense counsel. When these orders expired on 

14 February 2019, no new orders were issued. Appellant continued to comply 

with the orders of his temporary command, but, receiving no clarification of 

his duties or status, he simply took it upon himself to spend several weeks at 

his home.

On 15 April 2019, Appellant and his defense counsel signed a pretrial 

agreement in which Appellant acknowledged that he was on active duty.2

Appellant also specifically agreed to remain on active duty past his then-2 

June 2019 EAOS to allow the convening authority to process him for 

administrative discharge.3

 

2 See App. Ex. IX.

3 The convening authority ultimately did not elect to process Appellant for administrative discharge.
United States v. Chamblee, NMCCA No. 201900279

Opinion of the Court

4

Initial charges were preferred on 22 March 2018, with additional charges 

preferred on 22 August 2018. These charges, referred to a general courtmartial on 30 August 2018, were withdrawn and dismissed on 13 November 

2018. The present charges were preferred on 29 November 2018 and referred 

on 20 March 2019. Appellant was sentenced on 19 June 2019. 

At no time was Appellant issued a Department of Defense Form 214, 

Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty (August 1999) [DD Form 

214]. Appellant never received a final accounting of pay nor commenced, let 

alone completed, any part of the separation clearing process.

Additional facts necessary to resolve the assignment of error are addressed below.

II. DISCUSSION

We review questions of personal jurisdiction de novo, “accepting the 

military judge’s findings of historical facts unless they are clearly erroneous 

or unsupported by the record.” United States v. Christensen, 78 M.J. 1, 4 

(C.A.A.F. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Members of a regular 

component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after 

expiration of their terms of enlistment,” are subject to court-martial 

jurisdiction. UCMJ art. 2. And “military jurisdiction continues until a 

servicemember’s military status is terminated by discharge from his 

enlistment.” United States v. Poole, 30 M.J. 149, 150 (C.M.A. 1990). “It is 

black letter law that in personam jurisdiction over a military person is lost 

upon his discharge from the service, absent some saving circumstance or 

statutory authorization.” Christensen, 78 M.J. at 4. Generally, the three 

elements enumerated in 10 U.S.C § 1168(a) and § 1169—delivery of a final 

discharge certificate, a final accounting of pay, and completion of the clearing 

process required under Service regulations—are necessary to effect a valid 

discharge. Id. (citing United States v. King, 27 M.J. 327, 329 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).

However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] has specifically 

held that section 1168 provides only guidance, and “its demands are not 

binding when they go against reason or policy.” United States v. Nettles, 74 

M.J. 289, 291 (C.A.A.F. 2015). The CAAF’s reasoning regarding section 1168 

should also apply to section 1169.

The present facts differ from those in Christensen and Nettles, in that 

both of those cases involved circumstances in which the government was 

attempting to exercise jurisdiction despite one or more of the section 1168

and section 1169 factors having been met. In the case before us, none of the 

three factors was met. While Appellant, citing Nettles, invites us to ignore 

this fact and proceed directly to a “reason or policy” analysis, we pause to 
United States v. Chamblee, NMCCA No. 201900279

Opinion of the Court

5

note that the absence of any of the section 1168 factors weighs heavily 

against a finding that the Appellant was discharged. Our superior court has 

held that these factors are not binding—not that they are not relevant.

Accordingly, we will consider the absence of these factors in the totality of the 

circumstances when determining if continued jurisdiction goes against reason 

or policy.

A. Policy

Appellant first claims that Navy policy supports a finding that he was 

effectively discharged at his original EAOS date, citing to Part 1160-050 of 

the Naval Military Personnel Manual (Ch-19, 12 Apr 2007) [MILPERSMAN], 

which addresses, inter alia, involuntary extension of enlisted personnel 

beyond expiration of enlistment. Paragraph 1 of this Part reads,

1. Policy. Under certain conditions, members may legally be 

retained beyond the date of expiration of enlistment or other 

period of obligated service (OBLISERV), either voluntarily or 

involuntarily until discharged, released to inactive duty, or 

transferred to the Navy Reserve and released to inactive duty. 

When a member is retained in service beyond expiration of enlistment, or other period of OBLISERV, an entry as to reason 

and authority for retention must be made on the appropriate 

page of the member’s service record and signed per this manual.

MILPERSMAN, Part 1160-050, at 1.

Appellant would have us read this last sentence to mean that, since a 

signed entry in a member’s service record (accomplished via a Page 13) is 

required when a member is retained beyond the member’s EAOS, the failure 

to make such an entry proves the member was not properly retained. We 

disagree.

First, a plain reading of the MILPERSMAN language—“[w]hen a member 

is retained in service beyond expiration of enlistment . . . an entry as to 

reason and authority for retention must be made” (emphasis added)—

indicates retention is a condition precedent for the service record entry, not 

the reverse. While the lack of a Page 13 may be of some evidence that a 

retention did not occur, the cited policy language does not say that retention 

cannot occur without a Page 13 entry. Unlike the policies addressed in 

Christensen, 78 M.J. at 5 (Army Regulation declaring when a discharge 

becomes effective), and Nettles, 74 M.J. at 292 (statute imposing strict 

timeline for discharge of certain officers who fail to select for promotion), 

MILPERSMAN Part 1160-050 creates only a documentation requirement; it 

does not delineate how or when a discharge (or retention) takes effect.
United States v. Chamblee, NMCCA No. 201900279

Opinion of the Court

6

Accordingly, we do not find a policy-based reason for questioning the 

effectiveness of the Government’s actions to retain Appellant involuntarily on 

active duty due to criminal proceedings. However, the fact that the Government did not notify Appellant of the initial involuntary retention may be of 

value in appraising whether a finding of jurisdiction is reasonable. We now 

turn, then, to the second prong of Appellant’s argument.

B. Reason

“The overarching interest implicated by the law of personal jurisdiction, 

and especially discharge jurisprudence, is the need—of both servicemember 

and service—to know with certainty and finality what the person’s military 

status is and when that status changes.” Nettles, 74 M.J. at 291. In the 

present case, there is no evidence indicating Government intent to discharge 

Appellant. The CJA first directed the AO to place Appellant on legal hold 

more than two months before Appellant’s original EAOS. (The military judge 

found that the CJA’s memo was “reflective . . . of the command’s intent.”4) 

The CJA consistently repeated this direction before each subsequent adjusted 

EAOS; every extension beyond the first was documented by a Page 13 signed 

by Appellant before the then-current extension expired. Significantly, the 

Government neither prepared nor delivered to Appellant a DD Form 214 or a 

final accounting of pay, nor did it direct Appellant to begin the separation 

clearing process.

There was no objectively reasonable basis for Appellant to believe he was 

discharged. While there were numerous examples of poor administrative 

oversight (pay stoppages, CAC deactivation, expiration of temporary orders 

with no follow-on direction, periods with no muster requirement), these were 

outweighed by other events and facts demonstrating to Appellant that he was 

still on active duty. Other than the short, quickly remedied periods during 

which his pay stopped, he continued to receive pay and allowances throughout the entire time between his initial EAOS and trial. At no time was 

Appellant told he was out of the Navy. (The closest statement to this end was

a confession of ignorance by personnel within Carl Vinson’s Administrative 

Department when Appellant first asked about his status following his initial 

EAOS. He received a definitive answer within days.) And Appellant was on 

notice (via a signed Page 13) that he was on legal hold for a period fully 

encompassing the muster-less time after his temporary orders expired.

 

4 R. at 82.
United States v. Chamblee, NMCCA No. 201900279

Opinion of the Court

7

Finally, Appellant’s actions belie any assertion that he was uncertain of 

his status. On the occasions when his pay stopped and his CAC no longer 

worked, he did not walk away as a discharged civilian; rather, he notified his 

command so that they could correct the matter to accord with his active duty 

status. He acknowledged his legal hold status by signing several Page 13s 

collectively covering the period from 30 May 2018 to 2 December 2019. Even 

when his temporary orders expired and he was not required to muster for 

several weeks, he still continued to follow the orders of his temporary 

command.

The facts of this case do not indicate that Appellant was ever discharged,

and reason does not dictate a different conclusion. Accordingly, considering 

the totality of the circumstances—including the absence of all three section 

1168 and section 1169 factors—we find neither reason nor policy supports a

severance of jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, 

we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and 

fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights 

occurred. UCMJ arts. 59, 66.

The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT:

RODGER A. DREW, JR.

Clerk of Court