In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐3464

PATRICK L. GIDDEON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

EDWARD A. FLYNN, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:14‐cv‐00331‐RTR — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED JUNE 15, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 28, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and FLAUM, Circuit

Judges.

POSNER, Circuit Judge. Patrick Giddeon sued the City of

Milwaukee and several of its police officers under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, claiming that the police had violated his civil rights

three times in quick succession by unlawfully stopping a car

in which he was a passenger and arresting him, placing him

in the back seat of their uncomfortably hot squad car while

they searched the stopped car, and after they found a gun in
2 No. 15‐3464

that car eliciting from him (while he was still in the squad

car) an admission that it was indeed his gun. The district

court granted summary judgment for the defendants,

prompting this appeal.

A woman reported to the police that Giddeon (a former

boyfriend) had attacked her in her home and threatened to

shoot her. The police searched the area near the home for the

culprit without success, but later they spotted a woman

(who turned out to be Giddeon’s sister, though the police

didn’t know that at the time) leaving the victim’s house and

entering a car in which the police could see there were five

other occupants. As the car pulled away, the police followed,

stopped the car, recognized Giddeon as one of the passen‐

gers, and handcuffed him and put him in the back seat of

their squad car.

A car search ensued, consented to by the driver, and re‐

vealed a shopping bag that contained a gun wrapped in

clothing. Giddeon, told of the discovery, admitted after a

half hour that it was his gun. Prosecuted in a Wisconsin state

court, he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a

firearm and to disorderly conduct, see Wis. Stat. §§ 941.29(2),

947.01(1), and was sentenced to five years in prison and five

years of supervised release.

The defendants concede that the police lacked probable

cause to stop the car containing Giddeon because the driver

had not violated any traffic laws and at the time of the stop

none of the car’s occupants was suspected of having been

involved in the domestic‐violence incident that had put the

police on Giddeon’s trail. Police have probable cause to stop

a car that they have reason to believe contains an armed

criminal even if they have no reason to suspect the driver of
No. 15‐3464 3

any legal infraction. Cf. Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823,

826–27 (7th Cir. 2011). But the only thing the officer who

stopped and searched the car knew was that a woman had

left the home of the domestic‐violence victim and had en‐

tered a car in which there were already other passengers.

That wasn’t enough to justify the seizure of the car. Nor

was there any other lawful basis for it. Granted there was

some probability that the woman leaving the home was ei‐

ther an accomplice of the victimizer or the victim’s friend

who might be able to give the police valuable information,

but the police had only to follow the car until it stopped and

either Giddeon got out, at which point they could arrest him,

or the woman got out, whom they could approach to try to

obtain relevant information. The seizure in short was prema‐

ture; the police had no reason to believe that the car con‐

tained an armed criminal—though it did, which is critical

because the unlawful stop of the car did not make Giddeon’s

arrest unlawful. As the district court found, the police had

probable cause to arrest him, which is all that is needed to

arrest a person in a public place; a warrant is not required.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415–17 (1976); United

States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 2004).

But the vehicle stop was an unreasonable seizure of his

person, entitling him to damages. They may well be nomi‐

nal, but he is entitled to a hearing in the district court to de‐

termine their amount.

As for the search of the car, which revealed the bag with

Giddeon’s gun in it, thus yielding evidence that could be

and was used to convict him, the driver had consented to the

search, and the consent extended to the search of the bag.

United States v. Jackson, 598 F.3d 340, 348 (7th Cir. 2010). The
4 No. 15‐3464

bag didn’t even belong to Giddeon. The driver told the po‐

lice that Giddeon’s sister—another passenger in the car—

had placed the bags in the trunk, and the sister in turn told

the police that the gun in the bag was Giddeon’s.

Giddeon complains about the discomfort he experienced

from having to sit in the squad car for half an hour on a hot

day (the outside temperature was almost 90°F), but there is

no evidence that he was overcome by the heat or that it

caused him to admit that the gun was his. One of the car

doors was open during almost the entire 30 minutes, so the

interior temperature was probably close to the outside tem‐

perature. 90°F is hot, but it is a common summer tempera‐

ture in the midwest and is not disabling.

The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin‐

ion.