United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted November 23, 2021*

Decided November 24, 2021 

Before 

MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge 

CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge

No. 20-1473 

PETER GAKUBA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LARRY HENDERSON, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois. 

No. 19-cv-01273-NJR 

Nancy J. Rosenstengel, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

While incarcerated at the Vienna Correctional Center in southern Illinois, Peter 

Gakuba sued multiple prisons and their staffs for a host of alleged violations of his 

constitutional and statutory rights. Upon screening the complaint, the district court 

severed the one lawsuit into several. This one concerns Gakuba’s claim that officials and 

staff members at Vienna failed to accommodate his self-reported seafood allergy. The 

*

 After examining the briefs and record, we unanimously agree that oral 

argument would not substantially aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 
No. 20-1473 Page 2 

district court denied Gakuba’s motion for a preliminary injunction barring the 

defendants from serving him fish, and Gakuba filed this interlocutory appeal. One 

month later, Gakuba was let out of prison on supervised release. Shortly thereafter, the 

district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies and entered final judgment. Because of his 

release and the resolution of his case, Gakuba’s appeal is moot, and so we do not reach 

the merits of his arguments. See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 171–72 (2013). 

First, Gakuba’s release from prison renders his claim for injunctive relief moot. 

See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008). When Gakuba was released, the 

defendants stopped providing his food. The threat he sought to enjoin no longer exists. 

See Loertscher v. Anderson, 893 F.3d 386, 392–93 (7th Cir. 2018). Gakuba argues that, 

because he is still on parole, he could be reincarcerated. But that is too speculative an 

injury to sustain a live controversy; we will not presume that Gakuba will disobey his 

conditions of release or engage in unlawful conduct. Id. See also Ortiz v. Downey, 561 

F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Second, Gakuba appeals a denial of a preliminary injunction, but the district 

court has now entered a final judgment resolving the entire case. Because a preliminary 

injunction lasts at the latest until a final judgment, there is no relief we could provide 

for even an erroneous denial, and so the appeal is moot. See Auto Driveaway Franchise 

Sys. LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2019). Whether 

the district court should have entered a preliminary injunction could be raised in an 

appeal from the final decision, Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 607 F.3d 453, 456 

(7th Cir. 2010), although we note that Gakuba has not yet filed a notice of appeal. 

DISMISSED