alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**32.1 SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CEO**

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Commonwealth Income & Growth Fund V, (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Kimberly A. Springsteen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

| /s/ Kimberly A. Springsteen                                                                                             |   |   |  |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--|
|  

 

 

Kimberly A. SpringsteenChief Executive OfficerNovember 14, 2006

 

 

 

  |
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 49 (Wednesday, March 14, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 11909]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-4573]



[[Page 11909]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-59,838]


Sara Lee Intimates, Currently Known As Hanesbrands, Inc., 
Statesville, NC; Amended Certification Regarding Eligibility To Apply 
for Worker Adjustment Assistance and Alternative Trade Adjustment 
Assistance

    In accordance with Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 
2273), and Section 246 of the Trade Act of 1974 (26 U.S.C. 2813), as 
amended, the Department of Labor issued a Certification of Eligibility 
to Apply for Worker Adjustment Assistance and Alternative Trade 
Adjustment Assistance on August 17, 2006, applicable to workers of Sara 
Lee Intimates, a division of Sara Lee Branded Apparel, Statesville, 
North Carolina. The notice was published in the Federal Register on 
September 6, 2006 (71 FR 52583).
    At the request of the State agency, the Department reviewed the 
certification for workers of the subject firm. The workers at the 
Statesville, North Carolina location produce women's intimate apparel.
    New information shows that Sara Lee Intimates is currently known as 
Hanesbrands, Inc. In September 2006, Sara Lee Corporation spun-off its 
Branded Apparel business and created an independent company, 
Hanesbrands, Inc. Workers separated from employment at the subject firm 
had their wages reported under a separate unemployment insurance (UI) 
tax account for Hanesbrands, Inc.
    Accordingly, the Department is amending the certification to 
properly reflect this matter.
    The intent of the Department's certification is to include all 
workers of Sara Lee Intimates who were adversely affected by a shift in 
production to Honduras.
    The amended notice applicable to TA-W-59,838 is hereby issued as 
follows:

    ``All workers of Sara Lee Intimates, currently known as 
Hanesbrands, Inc., Statesville, North Carolina, who became totally 
or partially separated from employment on or after August 1, 2005, 
through August 17, 2008, are eligible to apply for adjustment 
assistance under Section 223 of the Trade Act of 1974, and are also 
eligible to apply for alternative trade adjustment assistance under 
Section 246 of the Trade Act of 1974.''

    Signed at Washington, DC, this 7th day of March 2007.
Linda G. Poole,
Certifying Officer, Division of Trade Adjustment Assistance.
 [FR Doc. E7-4573 Filed 3-13-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-FN-P
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 95-40949 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus MIGUEL HERNANDEZ-MARTINEZ, Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 95-CR-105-1
- - - - - - - - - - August 20, 1996 Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Miguel Hernandez-Martinez appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute and importation of more than five kilograms of cocaine, arguing there was insufficient evidence to convict him. We have reviewed the record and determined that when the evidence is viewed in the light mostNo. 95-40949 - 2 - favorable to the jury’s verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Resio-Trejo , 45 F.3d 907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995). AFFIRMED.
Vista International Technologies, Inc. - 10K/A





Exhibit 32
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 The undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to, and as required by, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report of Vista International Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 3 for the period ended December 31, 2010 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that information contained in such Annual Report on Form 10-K/A Amendment No. 3 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Date: August 5, 2011
By:
/s/ Bradley A. RippsBradley A. RippsInterim Chief Executive Officer

(principal executive officer and principal

financial and accounting officer)
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

AUSl-IN 
. !331 
Road dlatrlot baada are autb0eir.d by Articlr 3, 

s*otlon 82, Conctltutlon of ToxA8, axl eenoml L-r, 39th 

~&a&two, lirrt Celled 5ouion, l@IM, p~go Q8 (hrtiolor 

TSRA, et aoq.# Ymaoll'r hmotAted Clvll MAtutu 1. iload di8- 

ta t8 a ~0 l Mx&sod to ~SBW bond8 r0r we purpot0 0r %b 

o~wOtiOa, mai-8 rad 0jt0aia 0r ~0a6wd, +~TOI1.d OP plYed roAda And tl3Pnp~8, or la Aid twOor.* 

It 18 8 funda5fJntal prlnolpl* of lm tat t-.0 proowdc dorlvmd &cm tb ula ot bonds suet be devoted ta tM 

pll'gow ror whioh tbr boadr wwo lrawd, m not ot~i~nlu. 

BgAtwmt T. RAtt&w artrrf~t Land CO*, 824 2. 'i;. 539 (6rroP 

~fu8.d); 6iPrproa v. city ot Ii~~@oobor, 152 Z. r;, 3591 Armmaa County Y* Cols~ur-R&tan F'naturm Campany, 191 t. .:. 334. 

IA Y~OW Of the A~fih0dtiO# dkd &OYO it 18 OUF 

oplnlon thnt the Caalaf1lon4rr~ Court or my indlvldual oaw 

nny purpaur other tbn r6r the purgxm rc.82 eloh tu bcmdt 

ww i$BU#d, uX! rOr tbOP8 

TIUIq, Vmnon’.r btwtatad Civ%?&uto.. 

8 Autbxd.8.d by AHlale 

8&? th0 TW m & prOO00d8 Of bond& O.CEW&y 

kmwaaa the Construatlon~, mustbo phoedinn fund to 

bo uaod mol.4 ror the pwpou r0P whloh t!xo bond. *era voted. 

Tlw Caml88lonor8~ Cwrt, belag 8 oourt of 1M'aci JwlsdLotlon, 

AUthOPiXAtiO& 60 hAV0 bW UaablO tO il~d u?y h8 

tb Cowlssloa+a~r* Court to lnvut ~11s xd in 

urj tm 0r 800titr. 

The Legld,cture iau provided ior the invertwent of 

mlrglu8 mozmy In the rink& fuwh of bond 18ml48 in ooctaln 

emmer utl ao od urtiu l . If thorn la uly surplur in tiie 8lnklng 

rund or ea. 188u8 in quutlon, thie 8urplu.s lccy be inrastmd $Il 

United sktu SAP 801~4~ In oanpllraoe witn tiir provlrioria or 

Artlole 779, Vernon'r Annoktod civil st&tutar* 

Fe r,drot ttut.m oumot agree rltb your o?lnion, but 

be- Our anmor M thr authoritl.~ oltod Above, te belier. 
wt both Fuatiolu dlaa188.d ln SOUP o&dnlon &cult ba 

$MwPod in tb, noggtl?..
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JULY 27, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 04-11660

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 03-00996-CV-T-23-MSS

KATHLEEN MILLER, 

ROD MILLER, 

husband of Kathleen Miller, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

versus 

SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(July27, 2006)

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT and KRAVITCH, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:
 The facts are set out in our initial opinion. Miller, 410 F.3d at 678-79. 1

2

This case returns to us after we certified a question to the Florida Supreme

Court regarding the interpretation of § 627.848, Fla. Stat. (2002). The question we

certified read: “Whether § 627.848, Fla. Stat. (2002) contemplates a single date of

cancellation for the insurance contract as a whole or whether the contract can be

cancelled as to different insureds at different times depending on when a statutorily

required notice is given to that insured?” Miller v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 410 F.3d

678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 

1

The Florida Supreme Court answered that “the plain language of section

627.848, Florida Statutes (2002), contemplates a single cancellation date for the

insurance policy as a whole” and that “all statutory, regulatory, or contractual

requirements for cancellation must be satisfied before a policy may be canceled.” 

Miller v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. SC05-936, 2006 WL 1375241, at *5 (Fla. May

18, 2006). Here, the district court construed the statute to allow for two different

cancellation dates, one of which occurred before the insurer, Scottsdale Insurance,

complied with all contractual requirements for cancellation and granted summary

judgment in favor of the insurer. Miller, 410 F.3d at 679. This ruling plainly

conflicts with the Florida Supreme Court’s answer to our certified question. 

Therefore, we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings
3

consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001097504
<NAME>                        Power Kiosks, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Currency

<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Jul-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 Aug-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   Jul-31-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  35,153
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    40,965
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               118,308
<PP&E>                                         479,019
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 597,327
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3,233,009
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       538
<OTHER-SE>                                     (2,635,682)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   597,327
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          595,443
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  1,031,914
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               3,233,975
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             171,742
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                6,230,796
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,230,796)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    1.73
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  1.73



</TABLE>
#### State, *ex rel.*Louis Morenco, v. Nathan Mayo, as State Prison Custodian, and L. F. Chapman, as State Prison Superintendent.

175 So. 806.

Opinion Filed September 3, 1937.

*E. L. Bryan,*for Petitioner;

*Cary D. Landis,*Attorney General, and *Tyrus A. Nor-wood,*Assistant Attorney General, for Respondents.

Buford, J.

This is an original proceeding in habeas corpus. The question which we are requested to determine is: “Where a prisoner has been paroled by the State Board of Pardons for a period of six months, and one of the conditions of the parole is that it was to be effective during good behavior, or until otherwise ordered by the Board, can said parole be revoked during the perod of six months by the State Board of Pardons ? And where it affirmatively appears from the writ of habeas corpus and return thereto that the six months period of parole has expired, can the Supreme Court, under said writ and return, release said prisoner, and if so, for how long?” The order of parole entered March 18th, 1936, was a follows:

> “Therefore, Be It Known, That the said Louis Marenco be, and he is hereby paroled into the care and custody *272of Reverend C. W. Duke, Tampa, Florida, for a period of six months, who is required to report periodically to the Board as to his conduct, effective during good behavior or until otherwise ordered by the Board, at the expiration of said time he is to return to the Florida State Penitentiary, Raiford, Florida, and serve the remainder of his original sentence.”

It will be observed that by the express terms of the order the Board of Pardons limited the extent of the period of parole “until otherwise ordered by the Board.” Therefore, the Board of Pardons reserved the right to cancel the parole at any time. Whether or not the parole should be cancelled before the end of the period of six months was retained as a matter in the discretion of the Board. See State, *ex rel.*Brown, v. Mayo, 126 Fla. 811, 171 So. 822; *Ex Parte*Elvarez v. State, 50 Fla. 24, 39 Sou. 481.

So it is the contention of the petitioner is without merit and petitioner must be remanded to the custody of respondent.

So ordered.

Terrell, Brown and Chapman, J. J., concur.
No. 63126.

#### J. J. Boll *v.*United States,

protests 58/17364 and 58/17365 (New York).

Opinion by

Richardson, J.

In accordance with rule 5(b) of the rules of this court, as amended, the protests were dismissed for lack of prosecution.
-1- Case No.: CIV-S-04-1916 MCE/DAD 

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY AND ORDER 

COX, WOOTTON, 

GRIFFIN, HANSEN 

& POULOS, LLP

190 THE EMBARCADERO 

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 

94105 

TEL 415-438-4600 

FAX 415-438-4601 

CAN.Ferreira/2400 

1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

COX, WOOTTON, GRIFFIN, 

HANSEN & POULOS, LLP 

Richard C. Wootton (SBN 88390) 

Christopher S. Kieliger (SBN 209121) 

190 The Embarcadero 

San Francisco, California 94105 

Telephone No.: (415) 438-4600 

Facsimile No.: (415) 438-4601 

Attorneys for Defendant 

PORT OF STOCKTON 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LESTER A. FERREIRA, SR., AND EVA 

JEAN FERREIRA 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

M/V CCNI, ANTOFAGASTA, her engines, 

tackle, apparel, furniture, etc. IN REM, 

PORT OF STOCKTON, SECHSTE 

REEDEREI ALSTERUFER 26 GmbH & 

CIE, KG and SOPHIE RICMERS 

SCHIFFAHRTGESELLSCHAFT mbH & 

CIE, KG 

 Defendants. 

___________________________________ 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Case No.: 2:04-cv-1916-MCE-DAD 

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY 

AND ORDER 

TO: ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORDS HEREIN: 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendant, PORT OF STOCKTON, hereby 

substitute: 

 COX, WOOTTON, GRIFFIN, HANSEN & POULOS, LLP 

 Richard C. Wootton 

 190 The Embarcadero 

 San Francisco, CA 94105 

 Telephone: (415) 438-4600 

 Facsimile: (415) 438-4601 

as its attorneys of record in place and stead of: 

Case 2:04-cv-01916-MCE -DAD Document 119 Filed 07/06/06 Page 1 of 2
-2- Case No.: CIV-S-04-1916 MCE/DAD 

SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEY AND ORDER 

COX, WOOTTON, 

GRIFFIN, HANSEN 

& POULOS, LLP

190 THE EMBARCADERO 

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 

94105 

TEL 415-438-4600 

FAX 415-438-4601 

CAN.Ferreira/2400 

1

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 NEUMILLER & BEARDSLEE 

 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 

 Daniel S. Truax 

 Post Office Box 20 

 Stockton, CA 95201-3020 

 Telephone: (209) 948-8200 

 Facsimile: (209) 948-4910 

I consent to this substitution PORT OF STOCKTON 

Date: _______________________ _____________________________________ 

 

I consent to this substitution NEUMILLER & BEARDSLEE 

Date: _______________________ _____________________________________

 Daniel S. Truax 

I accept this substitution COX, WOOTTON, GRIFFIN, 

HANSEN & POULOS, LLP 

Date: _______________________ _____________________________________ 

 Richard C. Wootton 

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 5, 2006

__________________________________ 

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:04-cv-01916-MCE -DAD Document 119 Filed 07/06/06 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 4999 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 4999

 To amend the Aquifer Recharge Flexibility Act to clarify a provision 
         relating to conveyances for aquifer recharge purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 10, 2024

   Mr. Risch introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Aquifer Recharge Flexibility Act to clarify a provision 
         relating to conveyances for aquifer recharge purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CONVEYANCE FOR AQUIFER RECHARGE PURPOSES.

    Subsection (c)(3) of the Aquifer Recharge Flexibility Act (43 
U.S.C. 390g-9) is amended by striking ``may transport water for aquifer 
recharge purposes without requiring additional authorization from the 
Secretary where the use does not expand or modify the operation'' and 
inserting ``may, acting for the holder or on behalf of a third party, 
use the right-of-way, easement, permit, or other authorization for the 
purpose of aquifer recharge without requiring additional authorization 
from the Secretary, which use shall not be considered an expansion or 
modification''.
                                 <all>
```
No. 49209.

#### Protests 26406-K, etc., of S. A. Haram et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Cole, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400, the court dismissed the protests.
**Exhibit 32(b)**

 

CERTIFICATION OFCHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350

 

In connection with the Form 10-Qof Frederick County Bancorp, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31,2010, I, William R. Talley, Jr., Executive Vice President and Chief FinancialOfficer of Frederick County Bancorp, Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tothe best of my knowledge and belief, that:

 

(1)   such Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31,2010, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)   the information contained in such Form 10-Q forthe quarter ended March 31, 2010, fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of Frederick CountyBancorp, Inc.

 

 
| /s/ William R.  Talley, Jr.                      |   |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| William R.  Talley, Jr.                          |
| Executive Vice  President and Chief Financial Officer |

 

----
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LANCE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

KERKFOOT, Deputy; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-56230

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-07583-GW-KK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 13, 2016**

Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Lance Williams, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district 

court’s judgment dismissing as time-barred his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging 

excessive force and racial discrimination. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291. We review de novo both the district court’s dismissal based on the statute 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 21 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 15-56230 

of limitations and the legal question of whether equitable tolling applies. Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Williams’ action as time-barred

because, even with the benefit of statutory and all arguably applicable equitable 

tolling, Williams failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations. 

See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal 

injury claims); 352.1 (statutory tolling for up to two years due to incarceration); 

Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 claims are

governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Jones, 

393 F.3d at 928 (“[A]ctual, uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone for 

applying California’s tolling provision of the disability of imprisonment.” (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ervin v. County of Los Angeles, 848 F.2d 

1018, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that plaintiff’s unwarranted delay of 

more than a year in filing her federal civil rights claim after filing a tort action in 

state court was neither reasonable nor in good faith). 

We review the denial of an extension of time for abuse of discretion. See 

Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court 

did not abuse its discretion when it denied Williams’ request for an extension of 
3 15-56230 

time to obtain counsel because, at the time Williams made the request, no action 

was due. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) (“When an act may or must be done within a 

specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time.”). 

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first

time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

In light of our disposition, Williams’ request for the court to reverse and 

remand the action to the district court, filed on February 24, 2016, is denied.

AFFIRMED.