COMMERCIAL SPENT 

NUCLEAR FUEL

Observations on the Key 

Attributes and Challenges 

of Storage and Disposal 

Options

Statement of Frank Rusco, Director

Natural Resources and Environment

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, April 11, 2013

GAO-13-532T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-532T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Water Development and Related Agencies, 

Committee on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

April 11, 2013

COMMERCIAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Observations on the Key Attributes and Challenges 

of Storage and Disposal Options 

Why GAO Did This Study

Spent nuclear fuel, the used fuel 

removed from commercial nuclear 

power reactors, is one of the most 

hazardous substances created by 

humans. Commercial reactors have 

generated nearly 70,000 metric tons of 

spent fuel, which is currently stored at 

75 reactor sites in 33 states, and this 

inventory is expected to more than 

double by 2055. The Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act of 1982, as amended, 

directs DOE to investigate the Yucca 

Mountain site in Nevada—100 miles 

northwest of Las Vegas—to determine 

if the site is suitable for a permanent 

repository for this and other nuclear 

waste. DOE submitted a license 

application for the Yucca Mountain site 

to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

in 2008, but in 2010 DOE suspended 

its licensing efforts and instead 

established a blue ribbon commission 

to study other options. The commission 

issued a report in January 2012 

recommending a new strategy for 

managing nuclear waste, and DOE 

issued a new nuclear waste disposal 

strategy in 2013. 

This testimony is primarily based on 

prior work GAO issued from November 

2009 to August 2012 and updated with 

information from DOE. It discusses the 

key attributes and challenges of 

options that have been considered for 

storage or disposal of spent nuclear 

fuel.

GAO is making no new 

recommendations at this time.

What GAO Found

In November 2009, GAO reported on the attributes and challenges of a Yucca 

Mountain repository. A key attribute identified was that the Department of Energy 

(DOE) had spent significant resources to carry out design, engineering, and 

testing activities on the Yucca Mountain site and had completed a license 

application and submitted it to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has 

regulatory authority over the construction, operation, and closure of a repository. 

If the repository had been built as planned, GAO concluded that it would have 

provided a permanent solution for the nation’s commercial nuclear fuel and other 

nuclear waste and minimized the uncertainty of future waste safety. Constructing 

the repository also could have helped address issues including federal liabilities 

resulting from industry lawsuits against DOE related to continued storage of 

spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. However, not having the support of the 

administration and the state of Nevada proved a key challenge. As GAO reported 

in April 2011, DOE officials did not cite technical or safety issues with the Yucca 

Mountain repository project when the project’s termination was announced but 

instead stated that other solutions could achieve broader support. 

Temporarily storing spent fuel in a central location offers several positive 

attributes, as well as challenges, as GAO reported in November 2009 and 

August 2012. Positive attributes include allowing DOE to consolidate the nation’s 

nuclear waste after reactors are decommissioned. Consolidation would decrease 

the complexity of securing and overseeing the waste located at reactor sites 

around the nation and would allow DOE to begin to address the taxpayer 

financial liabilities stemming from industry lawsuits. Interim storage could also 

provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or new 

technologies. However, interim storage faces several challenges. First, DOE’s 

statutory authority to develop interim storage is uncertain. Provisions in the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, that allow DOE to arrange for 

centralized interim storage have either expired or are unusable because they are 

tied to milestones in repository development that have not been met. Second, 

siting an interim storage facility could prove difficult. Even if a community might 

be willing to host a centralized interim storage facility, finding a state that would 

be willing to host such a facility could be challenging, particularly since some 

states have voiced concerns that an interim facility could become a de facto 

permanent disposal site. Third, interim storage may also present transportation 

challenges since it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported 

twice—once to the interim storage site and once to a permanent disposal site. 

Finally, developing centralized interim storage would not ultimately preclude the 

need for a permanent repository for spent nuclear fuel.

Siting, licensing, and developing a permanent repository at a location other than 

Yucca Mountain could provide the opportunity to find a location that might 

achieve broader acceptance, as GAO reported in November 2009 and August 

2012, and could help avoid costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain 

repository program. However, developing an alternative repository would restart 

the likely costly and time-consuming process of developing a repository. It is also

unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund—established under the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act of 1982, as amended, to pay industry’s share of the cost for the Yucca 

Mountain repository—will be sufficient to fund a repository at another site. 

View GAO-13-532T. For more information, 

contact Frank Rusco at (202) 512-3841 or 

ruscof@gao.gov.
Page 1 GAO-13-532T 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Kaptur, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on issues related to the 

management of commercial spent nuclear fuel. Spent nuclear fuel—which 

has been used and removed from the reactor core of a commercial

nuclear power plant—is considered one of the most hazardous 

substances on earth, and without protective shielding, its intense 

radioactivity can kill a person exposed directly to it within minutes, as well 

as cause environmental contamination and long-term health hazards, 

such as cancer, in those who receive smaller doses. As you know, the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) directed the Department of 

Energy (DOE) to investigate sites for a federal deep geologic repository to 

dispose of both civilian and defense-related spent nuclear fuel and other 

high-level nuclear waste.1

DOE began studying the Yucca Mountain site as early as 1978 and has 

spent billions of dollars on this effort. Activities at the site have included 

investigating the characteristics of the site through surface, underground, 

and laboratory tests, as well as computer simulations; constructing a 25-

foot diameter, 5-mile-long main tunnel, located 800 feet underground and

a smaller tunnel nearly 2 miles long; and developing and submitting an 

application for a license to construct a nuclear waste repository. After 

submitting the license application in 2008 to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, which has regulatory authority over the construction, 

operation, and closure of a repository, DOE took steps to terminate the 

Yucca Mountain repository program. DOE officials did not cite technical or 

safety issues with the Yucca Mountain site but stated that it was no longer 

a workable solution and that there are better solutions that can achieve a 

broader national consensus. DOE established the Blue Ribbon 

Commission on America’s Nuclear Future in 2010 to review policies for 

DOE studied several sites throughout the 

country. In May 1986, the Secretary of Energy recommended three 

candidate sites for site characterization, including Yucca Mountain, 

Nevada, and in 1987, Congress amended the act to direct DOE to focus 

its efforts only on Yucca Mountain—a site about 100 miles northwest of 

Las Vegas.

 

1

This testimony concerns the disposal of civilian spent nuclear fuel (i.e., spent nuclear fuel 

that is periodically removed from commercial power reactors) and not defense-related 

spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste from nuclear weapons production.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-532T 

managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, including nuclear waste 

management approaches. Staff from the commission consulted with us 

and used some of our prior work in their analysis.

In its January 2012 report, the Blue Ribbon Commission recommended a 

strategy for managing nuclear waste with eight key elements. These 

included a new, consent-based approach to siting future nuclear waste 

management facilities; a new organization, rather than DOE, dedicated 

solely to implementing the program and empowered with the authority 

and resources to succeed; and prompt efforts to develop facilities both for 

interim storage and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. According to the 

commission’s report, an interim storage site should be developed first and 

focus on the spent fuel that is stored at closed reactor sites where nothing 

exists at the site except for the spent nuclear fuel. At the same time, the 

nation could be developing a final repository, which is likely to take 

decades to develop but that needs to be started in conjunction with any 

interim plans. In January 2013, DOE issued a strategy for the 

management of spent nuclear fuel, which used the Blue Ribbon 

Commission’s recommendations as a starting point and endorsed the 

commission’s key principles. In summary, DOE’s strategy includes a 

consent-based approach to siting and implementing a waste 

management system and consists of developing and making available a 

pilot interim storage facility by 2021, a larger interim storage facility by 

2025, and a geologic repository by 2048. DOE’s January 2013 spent 

nuclear fuel strategy also stated that legislation should include 

requirements for a third party to manage the nation’s spent nuclear fuel 

program.

Over the past decade, we have issued several reports related to the 

management of spent nuclear fuel.2

 

2

For example, see GAO, Spent Nuclear Fuel: Options Exist to Further Enhance Security, 

We assessed in the findings of these 

reports the safety and security of spent nuclear fuel; the benefits, 

GAO-03-426 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003); GAO, Nuclear Waste Management: Key 

Attributes, Challenges, and Costs for the Yucca Mountain Repository and Two Potential 

Alternatives, GAO-10-48 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2009); GAO, Yucca Mountain: 

Information on Alternative Uses of the Site and Related Challenges, GAO-11-847

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2011); GAO, Commercial Nuclear Waste: Effects of a 

Termination of the Yucca Mountain Repository Program and Lessons Learned, 

GAO-11-229 (Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2011); and GAO, Spent Nuclear Fuel: 

Accumulating Quantities at Commercial Reactors Present Storage and Other Challenges, 

GAO-12-797 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 2012).
 

Page 3 GAO-13-532T 

challenges, and costs of the Yucca Mountain repository and two potential 

alternatives; lessons learned from the past 30 years of spent nuclear fuel 

management; alternative uses of the Yucca Mountain site and related 

challenges; and the challenges of accumulating quantities of spent 

nuclear fuel at reactor sites. This testimony is primarily based on prior 

work GAO issued from November 2009 to August 2012 and updated with 

information from DOE. It discusses the key attributes and challenges of 

options that have been considered for storage or disposal of spent 

nuclear fuel. A detailed description of our methodologies can be found in 

our published reports. We conducted the performance audit work that 

supports this testimony in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform audits to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since the publication of a 1957 report by the National Academy of 

Sciences,3 a geologic repository has been considered the safest and 

most secure method of isolating spent nuclear fuel and other types of 

nuclear waste from humans and the environment.4

 

3

National Academy of Sciences, The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land 

(Washington, D.C.: September 1957). This report suggested several potential alternatives 

for disposal of spent nuclear fuel, stressing that there are many potential sites for geologic 

disposal of spent fuel at various depths and in various geologic formations. Subsequent 

reports by the National Academy of Sciences and others have continued to endorse 

geologic isolation of spent nuclear fuel and have suggested that engineered barriers, such 

as corrosion-resistant containers, can provide additional layers of protection to such sites. 

International consensus also supports geologic disposal.

During the 1950s and 

1960s, managing spent nuclear fuel received relatively little attention from 

policymakers. The early regulators and developers of nuclear power 

viewed spent fuel disposal primarily as a technical problem that could be 

solved when necessary by application of existing technology. Attempts 

were made to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel, but they were not 

4

In addition to commercial spent nuclear fuel, DOE manages about 13,000 metric tons of 

defense-related spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste—primarily generated by the 

nation’s nuclear weapons program. We issued a separate report on the impacts of 

terminating Yucca Mountain on the spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste managed by 

DOE. See GAO, DOE Nuclear Waste: Better Information Needed on Waste Storage at 

DOE Sites as a Result of the Yucca Mountain Shutdown, GAO-11-230 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 23, 2011).

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-13-532T 

successful because of economic issues and concerns that reprocessed 

nuclear materials raised proliferation risks. The Atomic Energy 

Commission, a predecessor to DOE, attempted to develop high-level 

waste repositories in Kansas and New Mexico in the late 1960s and early 

1970s, but neither succeeded because of local community and state 

opposition. NWPA established the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and 

high-level nuclear waste as a federal responsibility. Briefly, NWPA 

provided for the development of two geologic repositories and directed 

the Secretary of Energy to recommend three candidate sites and conduct 

studies to characterize each site. This same process was to be used for a 

second set of sites for the second repository. Table 1 summarizes some 

of the key decisions and events just prior to and as a result of NWPA.

Table 1: Summary of Key Decisions and Events Related to Spent Nuclear Fuel Management

Year Summary of key decision or event

1978 As part of the National Waste Terminal Storage program, DOE began exploring Yucca Mountain, one of more than 

25 sites that were being examined.

1983 The President signed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), which directed the DOE to investigate sites 

for a federal deep geologic repository to dispose of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level waste. The act also 

authorized DOE to contract with commercial nuclear reactor operators to take custody of their spent nuclear fuel for 

disposal at the repository beginning in January 1998.

1983 DOE initially considered nine sites for the first repository; six of these were in the West, and three were in the 

South.

1984 DOE issued draft environmental assessments on all nine sites for the first repository.

1984 DOE issued general guidelines (with the concurrence of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and after public 

review and comment) to be used by the Secretary of Energy in considering candidate sites for recommendation. 

1986 Of the nine sites for the first repository, the Secretary nominated five sites (Richton Dome, MS; Yucca Mountain, 

NV; Deaf Smith County, TX; Davis Canyon, UT, and Hanford, WA) as suitable for site characterization. Each 

nomination was accompanied by an environmental assessment, as required by NWPA. 

1986 Of the five nominations for the first repository, DOE recommended to the President three candidate sites for 

characterization: Yucca Mountain, NV; Deaf Smith County, TX; and Hanford, WA. The recommendation document 

stated that DOE assessed the sites using 14 performance measures including health and safety of the public and 

workers, environmental and socioeconomic factors, and repository and transportation costs. Yucca Mountain was 

the top-ranked site; the site that would cause, in aggregate, the least adverse impact.

1987 Congress amended NWPA to direct DOE to investigate only Yucca Mountain for a permanent repository. NWPA, 

as amended, authorized DOE to perform studies to determine if the Yucca Mountain site was suitable for a 

repository and make a site recommendation to the President if it met certain requirements. The amendments also 

directed the phaseout of funding for all research programs designed to evaluate the suitability of crystalline rock, 

which DOE had been studying for the second repository.

1987 - 1998 DOE continued to study the Yucca Mountain site.

1998 DOE was unable to begin taking custody of spent nuclear fuel in 1998 because of a series of delays due to, among 

other things, state and local opposition to the construction of a permanent nuclear waste repository in Nevada and 

technical complexities. However, DOE issued a viability assessment stating that Yucca Mountain was still a viable 

alternative.
 

Page 5 GAO-13-532T 

Year Summary of key decision or event

2002 As per the process outlined in NWPA, DOE recommended to the President approval of the Yucca Mountain site as 

a repository for spent nuclear fuel. The then-President subsequently recommended the site as suitable for a 

repository to Congress. The Governor of Nevada submitted a notice of disapproval to the Congress, and Congress 

effectively overrode the disapproval by voting to approve the site for the development of a permanent, high-level 

waste repository.

2008 DOE submitted a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the construction of a permanent 

repository at Yucca Mountain.

2009 DOE announced plans to terminate its licensing efforts on Yucca Mountain.

2010 DOE terminated its efforts on Yucca Mountain and undertook an ambitious set of steps to dismantle the Yucca 

Mountain program by September 30, 2010: DOE took steps to preserve scientific and other data, eliminated the 

jobs of all federal employees working on the program, terminated program activities by contractors, and disposed of 

property from its Las Vegas offices by declaring the property abandoned. 

2011 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission terminated its licensing efforts on Yucca Mountain.

Source: GAO analysis of DOE documents.

In the Secretary of Energy’s February 2002 recommendation to the 

President that Yucca Mountain be developed as the site for an 

underground repository for spent fuel and other radioactive wastes, the 

Secretary described the three criteria to make the determination that 

Yucca Mountain was the appropriate site. Specifically:

• Is Yucca Mountain a scientifically and technically suitable site for a 

repository?

• Are there compelling national interests that favor proceeding with the 

decision to site a repository there?

• Are there countervailing considerations that would outweigh those 

interests?

The Secretary also described the steps DOE had taken to inform 

residents and others. Specifically, DOE held meetings in the vicinity of the 

prospective site to inform the residents of the site’s consideration as a 

repository and receive their comments, as directed by NWPA. The 

Secretary added that DOE went beyond NWPA’s requirements for 

providing notice and information prior to the selection of Yucca Mountain. 

He concluded that the Yucca Mountain site was qualified as the site for 

the repository and accordingly recommended the site to the President.

Since the Secretary’s recommendation was made, the nation’s inventory 

of commercial spent nuclear fuel has continued to grow. The nation 

currently has about 70,000 metric tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel 

stored at 75 sites in 33 states (see fig. 1). This inventory is expected to 

more than double by 2055—assuming that the nation’s current reactors 

continue to produce spent nuclear fuel at the same rate and that no new 

reactors are brought online, and that some decline in the generation of 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-532T 

spent fuel takes place as reactors are retired. Although some elements of 

spent nuclear fuel cool and decay quickly, becoming less dangerous, 

others remain dangerous to human health and the environment for tens of 

thousands of years.

Figure 1: Current Storage Sites for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

Note: Locations are approximate. DOE has reported that it is responsible for managing nuclear waste 

at 121 sites in 39 states, which includes high-level waste from nuclear weapons production and spent 

nuclear fuel at 5 sites managed by DOE—2 of which are licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission and contain commercial spent nuclear fuel, at Fort St. Vrain in Colorado, and at the 

Idaho National Laboratory—and several sites that have only research reactors that generate small 

amounts of waste that will be consolidated at the Idaho National Laboratory for packaging prior to 

disposal.
 

Page 7 GAO-13-532T 

Most commercial spent nuclear fuel is stored at operating reactor sites; it 

is immersed in pools of water designed to cool and isolate it from the 

environment. Without a nuclear waste repository to move the spent 

nuclear fuel to, the racks in the pools holding spent fuel have been 

rearranged to allow for more dense storage of the spent fuel. Even with 

this rearrangement, spent nuclear fuel pools are reaching their capacities. 

As reactor operators have run out of space in their spent nuclear fuel 

pools, they have turned increasingly to dry cask storage systems that 

generally consist of stainless steel canisters placed inside larger stainless 

steel or concrete casks. A dry storage facility typically consists of security 

and safety mechanisms, such as a defensive perimeter with intrusion 

detection devices and radiation monitors surrounding a concrete pad with 

the dry storage casks emplaced on it. Regulatory requirements for 

radiation exposure for this type of facility are significantly different from 

those of a repository. For example, spent fuel need only be stored safely 

for the life of the storage facility, currently 40 years, which is in contrast to 

the 1 million year period for which safe storage must be demonstrated 

under the Environmental Protection Agency regulation promulgated for 

the Yucca Mountain repository. In August 2012, we reported that reactors 

at nine sites have been retired and that seven of these sites have 

completely removed spent fuel from their pools, as well as removing all 

infrastructure except that needed to safeguard the spent fuel. Since then, 

an eighth site has also emptied its pool, and is in the process of removing 

associated infrastructure. These sites serve no other purpose than to 

continue storing this spent fuel. As additional reactors retire, reactor 

operators will likely move all their spent nuclear fuel to dry storage and 

remove all other structures. We reported in November 2009 that experts 

we spoke with stated that dry cask storage systems are expected to be 

able to safely store spent nuclear fuel for at least 100 years.5

 

5

The experts 

said that, if these systems degrade over time, the spent nuclear fuel may 

have to be repackaged, which could require construction of new spent 

nuclear fuel pools or other structures to safely transfer the spent nuclear 

fuel to new storage systems. In addition, the experts said that spent fuel 

in centralized interim storage could present future security risks because, 

as spent fuel cools, it loses some of its self-protective qualities, potentially 

making it a more attractive target for sabotage or theft.

GAO-10-48. 
 

Page 8 GAO-13-532T 

NWPA also authorized DOE to contract with commercial nuclear reactor 

operators to take custody of their spent nuclear fuel for disposal at the 

repository beginning in January 1998. Ultimately, DOE was unable to 

meet this 1998 date. As we reported in August 2012,6 because DOE did 

not take custody of the spent fuel starting in 1998, as required under 

NWPA, DOE reported that, as of September 2011, 76 lawsuits had been 

filed against it by utilities to recover claimed damages resulting from the 

delay. In August 2012, we reported that these lawsuits have resulted in a 

cost to taxpayers of about $1.6 billion from the U.S. Treasury’s judgment 

fund. We also reported that DOE estimated that future liabilities would 

total about an additional $21 billion through 2020.7 In November 2012, 

DOE reported that the cost to taxpayers is now $2.6 billion and that future 

liabilities are now approximately $19.7 billion for a total of about $22.3 

billion. DOE has also estimated that future liabilities may cost about $500 

million each year after 2020.

In November 2009, we reported on the attributes and challenges of a 

Yucca Mountain repository.8

 

6

We reported that DOE had spent billions of 

dollars for design, engineering, and testing activities for the Yucca 

Mountain site and had submitted a license to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. If the repository had been built as planned, we stated that it 

would have provided a permanent solution for the nation’s nuclear waste, 

including commercial nuclear fuel, and would have minimized the 

uncertainty of future waste safety. Based on a review of key documents 

and interviews with DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and 

numerous other officials, we also reported in November 2009 that the 

construction of a repository at Yucca Mountain could have allowed the 

government to begin taking possession of the nuclear waste in about 10 

to 30 years. DOE had reported in July 2008 that its best achievable date 

for opening the repository, if it had received Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission approval, would have been 2020. If the Yucca Mountain 

repository was completed and operational sooner than one or more 

temporary storage facilities or an alternative repository, it could have 

helped address the federal liabilities resulting from industry lawsuits 

GAO-12-797. 

7

GAO 12-797. 

8

GAO-10-48. 

Attributes and 

Challenges of the 

Yucca Mountain 

Repository 
 

Page 9 GAO-13-532T 

related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel at reactor sites. We also

reported in August 2012 that states and community groups had raised 

concerns that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was extending the 

licenses of current reactors or approving licenses for new reactors without 

a long-term solution for the disposition of spent nuclear fuel.9

However, we reported in November 2009 that the Yucca Mountain 

repository also faced challenges. The key challenge that we reported was

that the repository did not have the support of the administration or the 

state of Nevada. Although the President in 2002 recommended the Yucca 

Mountain site for a repository, by 2010, the President’s fiscal year 2011 

budget submission proposed eliminating all funding for the repository. In 

April 2011, we reported that DOE officials did not cite technical or safety 

issues with the Yucca Mountain repository project when the project’s 

termination was announced.

If Yucca 

Mountain was licensed and constructed and began accepting spent 

nuclear fuel for disposal by 2027, which was the earliest likely opening 

date we estimated in our August 2012 report, some of these concerns 

could have been addressed.

10

 

9

In December 2010, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a determination and 

associated rule stating that spent fuel can be safely stored for up to 60 years beyond the 

licensed life of the reactor, or up to 120 years. Four states, an Indian community, and 

environmental groups petitioned for review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s rule, 

however, arguing in part that the commission violated the National Environmental Policy 

Act by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement in connection with the 

determination. On June 8, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 

Circuit held that the rulemaking required either an environmental impact statement or a 

finding of no significant environmental impact and remanded the determination and rule 

back to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for further analysis. The commission is 

conducting an environmental review and is not approving any new licenses or license 

extensions until the review is complete.

Instead officials stated that other solutions 

could achieve broader support. The state of Nevada and other groups 

that oppose the Yucca Mountain repository have raised technical points, 

site-specific concerns, and equity issues. These efforts to delay or 

terminate the repository could continue if the licensing process were 

resumed. For example, the state of Nevada had previously denied the 

water rights DOE needs for construction of a rail spur and facility 

structures at Yucca Mountain. DOE officials told us that constructing the 

rail line or the facilities at Yucca Mountain without those water rights 

would be difficult. Second, as we reported in April 2011, DOE could also 

10GAO-11-229. 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-532T 

face challenges in reconstituting its work force. According to DOE, 

contractor, and former DOE officials we spoke with, it could take years for 

DOE to assemble the right mix of experts to restart work on the license 

application. When DOE terminated its licensing efforts, many of the 

federal and contractor staff working on the program retired or moved on 

to other jobs. Third, project funding could continue to be a challenge. As 

we reported, DOE’s budget for the Yucca Mountain repository program 

was not predictable because annual appropriations varied by as much as 

20 percent from year to year. We recommended that Congress consider a 

more predictable funding mechanism for the project, which the Blue 

Ribbon Commission also recommended in its January 2012 report.

We reported in November 2009 on several positive attributes of 

centralized interim storage—a near-term temporary storage alternative for 

managing the spent fuel that has accumulated and will continue to 

accumulate. First, centralized interim storage could allow DOE to 

consolidate the nation’s nuclear waste after reactors are 

decommissioned, thereby decreasing the complexity of securing and 

overseeing the waste located at reactor sites around the nation and 

increasing the efficiency of waste storage operations. Second, by moving 

spent nuclear fuel from decommissioned reactor sites to DOE’s 

centralized interim storage facility and taking custody of the spent fuel, 

DOE would begin to address the taxpayer financial liabilities stemming 

from industry lawsuits. Third, centralized interim storage could prevent 

utilities from having to build additional dry storage to store nuclear waste 

at operating reactor sites. Fourth, centralized interim storage could also 

provide the nation with some flexibility to consider alternative policies or 

new technologies by giving more time to consider alternatives and 

implement them. For example, centralized interim storage would keep 

spent fuel in a safe, easily accessible configuration for future recycling, if 

the nation decided to pursue recycling as a management option in the 

future.

However, centralized interim storage also presents challenges. First, as 

we reported in November 2009 and August 2012, a key challenge 

confronting centralized interim storage is the uncertainty of DOE’s 

statutory authority to provide centralized storage.11

 

11

Provisions in NWPA 

GAO-10-48 and GAO-12-797. 

Attributes and 

Challenges of 

Centralized Interim 

Storage 
 

Page 11 GAO-13-532T 

that allow DOE to arrange for centralized storage have either expired or 

are unusable because they are tied to milestones in repository 

development that have not been met. It is not clear what other authority 

DOE or an independent entity might use for providing centralized interim 

storage of spent nuclear fuel. A second, equally important, challenge is 

the likelihood of opposition during site selection for a centralized interim 

storage facility. As we reported in November 2009, even if a community 

might be willing to host such a facility, finding a state that would be willing 

to host it could be extremely challenging, particularly since some states 

have voiced concerns that a centralized interim facility could become a de 

facto permanent disposal site. In 2011, the Western Governors 

Association passed a resolution stating that no centralized interim storage 

facility for spent nuclear fuel can be established in a western state without 

the expressed written consent of the governors. Third, centralized interim 

storage may also present transportation challenges. As we reported in 

August 2012, it is likely that the spent fuel would have to be transported 

twice—once to the centralized interim storage site and once to a 

permanent disposal site. The total distance over which the spent fuel 

would have to be transported would likely be greater than with other 

alternatives. The Nuclear Energy Institute has reported that of all the 

spent fuel currently in dry storage, only about 30 percent is directly 

transportable because of its current heat load, particularly since the 

nuclear industry packaged some spent nuclear fuel in dry storage 

containers to maximize storage capacity. We also reported in August 

2012 that officials from a state regional organization that we spoke with 

said that transportation planning could be a complex endeavor, potentially 

taking 10 years to reach agreement on transportation routes and safety 

and security procedures. Fourth, although DOE had previously estimated 

that it could site, license, construct, and begin operations of a centralized 

interim storage facility within 6 years, it could take considerably longer 

depending on how long it takes to find a willing state and community, as 

well as license and construct the facility. Finally, as we reported in 

November 2009, developing centralized interim storage would not 

ultimately preclude the need for final disposal of the spent nuclear fuel.
 

Page 12 GAO-13-532T 

As we reported in November 2009, siting, licensing, and developing a 

permanent repository at a location other than Yucca Mountain could 

provide the opportunity to find a location that might achieve broader 

acceptance than the Yucca Mountain repository program. If a more widely 

accepted approach or site is identified, it carries the potential for avoiding 

costly delays experienced by the Yucca Mountain repository program. In 

addition, a new approach that involves a new entity for spent fuel 

management, as we concluded in our April 2011 report and the Blue 

Ribbon Commission recommended in January 2012, could add to 

transparency and consensus building.

However, there are also key challenges to developing an alternative 

repository. First, as we reported in April 2011,12 developing a repository 

other than Yucca Mountain will restart the likely time-consuming and 

costly process of siting, licensing, and developing a repository. We 

reported that DOE had spent nearly $15 billion on the Yucca Mountain 

project.13

 

12

It is not yet clear how much it will ultimately cost to begin the 

process again and develop a repository at another location. Moreover, it 

is uncertain what legislative changes might be needed, if any, in part 

because the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, directs DOE to 

terminate all site specific activities at candidate sites other than Yucca 

Mountain. Second, it is unclear whether the Nuclear Waste Fund will be 

sufficient to fund a repository at another site. The fund was established 

under NWPA to pay industry’s share of the cost for the Yucca Mountain 

repository and was funded by a fee of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatthour of nuclear-generated electricity. The fund paid about 65 percent, or 

about $9.5 billion, of the expenditure for Yucca Mountain. According to 

DOE’s fiscal year 2012 financial report, the Nuclear Waste Fund currently 

has about $29 billion and grows by over $1 billion each year from 

accumulated fees and interest. However, utilities only pay into the fund for 

as long as their reactors are operating, and it is not clear how much 

longer reactor operators will be paying into the fund. For example, two 

utilities have announced plans—one in 2010 and the other in 2013—to 

shut down two reactor sites prior to their license expiration. As reactors 

are retired, they will need to be replaced by new reactors paying into the 

fund, or according to DOE officials, the fund might be drawn down faster 

than it can be replenished when developing a new repository.

GAO-11-229. 

13In 2010 dollars. GAO-11-229.

Attributes and 

Challenges of a 

Permanent Repository 

at a Location Other 

Than Yucca Mountain
 

Page 13 GAO-13-532T 

When more comprehensive information becomes available both about the 

process that DOE, or another agency, will be using to select a site and 

possible locations for a permanent repository, additional positive 

attributes as well as challenges may also come to light.

Chairman Frelinghuysen, Ranking Member Kaptur, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this testimony, 

please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or ruscof@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. Janet Frisch, Assistant Director, 

and Kevin Bray, Robert Sánchez, and Kiki Theodoropoulos made key 

contributions to this testimony.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(361482)
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