1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) JOHN C. CHEEKS, et al. ) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Case No: 14-cv-00914-RCL ) FORT MYER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, et al. ) ) ) Defendants. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION This case concerns allegations brought by plaintiffs John C. Ch eeks, Cheeks of North America, Inc. (“CNA”), 1 and Juanita Gallardo of a vast bid rigging conspiracy undertak en by numerous defendants participati ng in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) enterprise. On Octobe r 17, 2014, this Court granted s everal motions to dismiss, thereby dismissing nineteen defendants from this action, and ordered pl aintiffs’ to file a motion for leave to amend their Complaint in response to the remaining defendant s’ motions for a more definite statement. Plaintiffs have now moved three times for leave to amend their already amended complaint. Currently pending before this Court are plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 103, plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint, ECF No. 118, and plai ntiffs’ Cross Motion for Order to Show Cause as to Evidence

1 One of the insurance defendants in this action is named either CNA Surety or C NA Financial. These entities are not associated with plaintiff Cheek s of North America, which is referred to simply as CNA. When this Court discusses the insurance defendan t, it will refer to it as eithe r CNA Surety or CNA Financial.2 Adduced Supporting RICO Existence and Violations of Law, ECF No . 127. Due to the existence of plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Compla int, plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint will be denied as moot. For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint will be denied. In addition, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to show cause as to why defendant CNA Surety should not be dismissed, and has not shown why previously dismissed insura nce defendants should be added back in to this action. Plainti ffs’ Motion for Order to Show C ause will also be denied. Accordingly, the Court looks back to plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. The Court’s dismissal of nineteen defendants remains intact, leaving those defendants who filed motions for a more definite statement. Because plaintiffs’ have failed to ad equately respond to this Court’s Order granting defendants’ motions for a more definite statemen t, and its instructions to file a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint that compli ed with the requirements noted by the Court, this Court concl udes that this action should be d ismissed.
II. BACKGROUND This case is brought by three plaintiffs: John Cheeks, CNA, and Juanita Gallardo. Plaintiffs Cheeks and CNA (of which John Ch eeks is the principal owner) al lege that they are the targets of a vast bid rigging conspiracy in which dozens of defendants—nam ely, other construction companies, their principals, and insurance entities—have engage d in antitrust and RICO violations. Plaintiffs claim that the “Rodriguez(s)-Shrensky F amily Rico Enterprise,” along with an insurance carrier CNA Surety/CNA Financial, “unlawfully coll ude[ed] over the last 20 years in the District of Columbia[] to m onopolize District of Columbia i nfrastructure cont[r]acts.” 2 Fourth

2 Plaintiffs’ Complaint is replete with spelling and grammatical errors. Although this Court quotes from the Complaint and plaintiffs’ other written s ubmissions at length, it will no t endeavor to correct every mistake.3 Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF. No. 118-1. According to plaintiffs’ Compl aint, the members of the alleged enterprise have engaged in “atte mpted murder, death threats[,] at least 2 likely murders, obstruction of justice, witness intimidation, [and] malicious p rosecution” in order to continue monopolizing long-term contracts to the exclusion of minority b usiness like CNA. Id. at ¶ 1–2. The insurance carrier is alleged to have been “a willing accomp lice because of multiple rake-offs received from insurance underwriting of each single contract.” Id. at ¶ 2. Plaintiff Gallardo alleges that she was once employed by a member of the alleged RICO ente rprise, and that after witnessing collusion among members of the ent erprise, she was targeted and framed for embezzlement, was denied her civil rights, and was prevented from testifying agai nst the enterprise. Id. at ¶ 28. On May 19, 2014, plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint

. See Court’s Oct. 17, 2014 Mem. Op. 3, ECF No. 67. The following defendants filed mo tions to dismiss: Western Surety Company, Paul T. Bruflat (the “We stern Surety defendants”); Com mittee on Transportation and the Environment, Phillip Mendelson, Mary M. Cheh, Jim Graham, D avid Grosso, Kenyan McDuffie, Tommy Wells (the “Council defendants”); and the Gover nment of the District of Columbia, Mayor Vincent Gray, the Executive Office of the Mayor , the D.C. Department of Small and Local Business Development, Robert N. Summers, Harold B. Pe ttigrew Jr., the District of Columbia, James D. Staton, the Department of Transportation, an d Terry Bellamy (the “District defendants”). Id. at 2. The other defendants filed motions for a more definite s tatement: Fort Myer Construction Corp., Francisco R odrigues Neto, Jose Rodrigues(z) , Lewis Shrensky, Anchor Construction Corporation, Floren tino Gregorio, Cristina Rodrigu es Minton, Dora Rodrigues Cooper, Civil Construction, and Capitol Paving of D.C. Id. at 2. This Court granted those motions and dismissed nineteen defendants from this case (the Western S urety defendants, the Council defendants, and the District defendants). Id. at 13. In response to various defendants’ motions for4 a more definite statement, this C ourt ordered plaintiffs to fil e a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Id. It specifically ordered plainti ffs to “provide[] a complete lis t of statutory violations alleged and which defendant(s) engaged in each viola tion, in an orderly, clear, and nonrepetitive arrangement,” and to “identif[y] all known defendant s and plaintiffs and how each individual or entity named in th e Second Amended Complaint and attached exhibits is involved in the violations raised by plaintiffs.” Id. at 7–8. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leav e to file a Second Amended Co mplaint, ECF No. 72, but before the Court ruled on that motion, filed a Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, and again, before the Court rule d, filed a Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint. Thus, the Court previously found that the Motion for Leave to f ile a Second Amended Complaint was moot, ECF No. 104, and now finds that the Motion for Leave to file a Third Amended Complaint is also moot. The Court now examines plaintiffs’ Mot ion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint and the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint att ached to that motion, as well as plaintiffs’ attempts to bring claims against the insura nce defendants, and plaintiffs’ request for an order to show cause as t o why a RICO entity should not b e found to exist.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS Parties have a right to amend their pleadings once as a matter of course. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). After this, a party ma y amend if the opposing party consents, or if the court grants leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts “should freely give leave whe n justice so requires.” Id. Whether to grant leave is within the discretion of the District Court. Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Reasons for denying leav e to amend include “undue dela y, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies b y amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of5 amendment.” Id. “An amendment would be futile if it merely restates the same fa cts as the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the co urt previously ruled, fails to state a legal theory, or could not with stand a motion to dismiss.” Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc. , 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 114 (D.D.C. 2002). If a party alleges that amendmen t would be futile because the a mended complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss, the court’s “review . . . is , for practical purposes, identical to review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on the allegations inthe amended complaint.” In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig. , 629 F.3d 213, 216 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive a 12(b)(b) motion to dismiss “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is pl ausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that all ows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant i s liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). P laintiffs must provide more than labels, conclusions, or “formulaic recitation of the elements o f a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enoug h to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Plaintiffs bring claims for vio lations of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 196 2(c), for a RICO conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and for violations of the Sherman Antitrus t Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act. To have standing under RICO, a plaintiff must claim that “he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. , 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); see also Hourani v. Mirtchev , 796 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2015). RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any ent erprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or6 indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs througha pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt,” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), and to consp ire to commit the above offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The elements of a civil RICO violation ar e “(1) the conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a patternof racketeering activity.” Salinas v. United States , 522 U.S. 52, 62 (1997). “Racketeering activity,” also known as “predicate acts ” or “predicate offenses,” is defined in a lengthy statutory provision which enumerates various crimi nal acts under both state and federal law. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Thus, plaintiffs m ust allege that the def endants committed predicate acts to state a civil RICO claim. In addition, to su cceed on a civil RICO claim, plaintiffs must also show proximate cause—“th at a RICO predicate offense ‘ not only was a “but for” cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well.’” Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of N.Y., N.Y. , 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010). There must be “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. A link that is too remote, purely contingent, or indirect[t] is insufficient.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The elements of a RICO conspiracy claim are “that (1) two or mo re people agreed to commit a [18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)] offense, and (2) a defendant agr eed to further that endeavor.” RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP , 682 F.3d 1043, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2012). A court need not find that a defendant is liable for underlying RICO violations in order to find that he is liable for a RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. , 327 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Salinas , 522 U.S. at 66). To be liable for conspiracy, “[a] conspirator must intend to further an endea vor which, if completed, would s atisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.” Salinas , 522 U.S. at 65.7 It is unclear what provisions of the Sherman Act and the Clayto n Act that plaintiffs allege violations of; their Complaint m erely mentions the Acts in thei r entirety. The Clayton Act allows “any person injured in his business or property by reason of an ything forbidden in the antitrust laws,” which include both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, to recover damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). It appears that plaintiffs may be alleging gen eral antitrust/monopolization violations under these Acts, see 15 U.S.C. § 1–2, or violations of the prohibition on interlocki ng directorates and officers, see 15 U.S.C. § 19.
IV. ANALYSIS The major issue before this Court, which is analyzed first, is whether to grant leave to file a fourth amended complaint. The Court first finds that grantin g leave to file a fourth amendment complaint would be futile because plaintiffs’ claims are unable to survive a motion to dismiss, and that plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to cure the deficiencies in their complaints. Second, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to show cause as to why defendant CNA Surety should not be dismissed and that the insurance defendants should remain dismissed from this action. Third, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ request for an order to show cause as to why a RICO entity should not be found to exist is inappropriate. Finally, the Court concludes that this action should be dismissed with prejudice.
A. Futility of Amendment for Failure to State a Claim Defendants Dora Monica Rodrigues, Cristina Rodrigues Minton, Capitol Paving of D.C., Inc., Francisco Rodrigues Neto, Fort Myer Construction Corp., J ose Rodriguez, Lewis Shrensky, and Civil Construction LLC hav e filed oppositions to plaintiffs ’ motion for leave to amend. See ECF Nos. 120, 122, 123, 124. They all argue that amendment wou ld be futile because the allegations in the amended complaint do not survive a Rule 12(b )(6) analysis. Defendants Dora8 Monica Rodrigues and Cristina Rodrigues Minton argue that the a llegations against them “are utterly conclusory and lack any specific facts linking [them] t o any actual wrongdoing.” Defs. Dora Monica Rodrigues & Cristina Rodrigues Minton’s Opp’n 2, EC F No. 120. Defendants Capitol Paving of D.C., Inc. and Francisco Rodrigues Neto argue that plaintiffs have “continued to assert broad outlandish legal conclusions rather than pleadi ng specific allegations of fact.” Defs. Capitol Paving of D.C., Inc. & Francisco Rodrigues Neto’s Opp’n 2, ECF No. 122. Defendants Fort Myer Construction Corp., Jose Rodriguez, and Lewis Shrensk y argue that “[p]laintiffs remain unable to connect any of the uns ubstantiated actions imputed to the [d]efendants to a specific harm that has befallen them” and that “[i]t is abundantly clear that the failure of [p]laintiffs to be awarded public procurement contracts is s olely the result of [p]laintif fs own actions, and therefore, any RICO claim is improper.” Defs. Fort Myer Construction Corp., J ose Rodriguez, & Lewis Shrensky’s Opp’n 3, EC F No. 123. Finally, defendant Civil Cons truction argues that “[p]laintiffs still have failed to allege any facts about what Civil purporte dly did to cause injury to them,” and that “[p]laintiffs fail to allege that Civil had anything to do with any of their other outrageous claims concerning alleged wrongful conduct by purported (and of ten unnamed) members of the RICO Enterprise.” Def. Civ il Construction’s Opp’n 2–3, ECF No. 124. In reply to the defendants’ oppositions, plaintiffs argue that they have obtained new facts and added them to the complaint regarding witness/potential pla intiff Juanita Gallardo which “state more detail which links named Defendants, through the common ow nership and/or management of the Enterprise to the obstruction of justice regarding Galla rdo, her malicious prosecution and incarceration.” Pls.’ Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n 2, ECF No. 126. T hey argue that some of the defendants are incorrect in argui ng that plaintiffs would have never have received a contract award, stating that “if the alleged RICO family were disqualified for their actual illegal monopolistic9 collusive bidding and perjured Non Collusion Affidavits, Plaint iff would have been the only bidder remaining and be entitled to the award.” Id. at 5. Plaintiffs further contend that they have complied with this Court’s Opinion a nd Order of October 17, 2014 because they “specified and corrected charges against all RICO members and entities known to exist at this time,” and “provided specificity as to dates, locatio ns, events and persons in Exhib it K and body of the Proposed Third and Fourth Amended Complaints a nd stated claims upon which reli ef can be sought.” Id. at 6. In response to the defendants’ argum ents that the complaint contai ns no allegations that the defendants directly committed RICO violations, plaintiffs rely on the Pinkerton doctrine, which provides for “co-conspiratorial liability premised upon the def endants’ facilitation and furtherance of the conduct of co-conspirators ’ engaging in the participatio n and conducting the affairs of the RICO enterprises.” Id. at 7–8. Finally, plaintiffs argue that the defendants failed t o address claims independent of the RICO claims, citing the underlying illegal “ predicate acts,” and state law violations including “attempted mu rder, perjury, i ntimidation o f witness, stalking and obstruction of justice.” Id. at 9–10. The Court finds that amendment here would be futile because pla intiffs have failed to sufficiently state claims for relief, and nothing indicates tha t they would be able to state claims for relief if allowed to amend in the future. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded two elements of civil RICO claims: predicate acts and proximate cause. With re spect to their RICO conspiracy claims, plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged the existence of any agreement, nor have they shown proximate cause. Finally, plain tiffs have alleged virtually no facts supporting t heir Sherman and Clayton Act claims.10 1. Civil RICO Amendment would be futile because plaintiffs have failed to est ablish with particularity that the defendants committed the underlying predicate acts all eged, an essential element of RICO claims. Plaintiffs generally allege the following categories o f predicate acts: 1) violent criminal acts directed towards plaintiff Cheeks; 2) fraud committed in the course of submitting noncollusion affidavits as part of contract solicitations; 3) vari ous violations in connection with the incarceration of plaintiff Gallardo; and 4) other criminal acts . The Court will take each of these categories in turn. In addition, plaintiffs have failed to all ege proximate cause. a) Predicate Acts
i. Violent Criminal Acts towards Plaintiff Cheeks With regard to the violent criminal acts directed towards plain tiff Cheeks—including death threats, attempted murder, destruction of property, theft, stal king (in the name of witness intimidation), and witness retaliation (by doing the aforementi oned acts)—the Complaint only alleges that an “unknown associate” of the alleged enterprise c ommitted each of these crimes. Plaintiffs rely on the allegation that plaintiff Cheeks has “no other known enemies” to draw this conclusion. Not a single defendant is named as the perpetrator of these crimes, and there are absolutely no facts supporting the inference that any of the de fendants committed the crimes or directed others to do so. These allegations fail to plausibly show that any defendant committed a necessary predicate act under RICO.
ii. Allegations Regarding Plaintiff Gallardo Next, plaintiffs claim that plai ntiff Gallardo, who allegedly w itnessed the enterprise’s unlawful acts as an employee of defendant Dora Monica Rodrigues and Hawk Enterprises, “a now defunct shell company member of the RICO Enterprise,” Fourth Am . Compl. ¶ 33, was essentially11 framed for embezzlement by the defendants (a charge which resul ted in her conviction and incarceration) so that she would be prohibited from testifying against the defendants in an unrelated case, therefore obstruc ting justice and tampering wit h a witness. At various points throughout the Complaint, plainti ffs mention civi l rights viola tions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 committed by defendants against plaintiff Gallardo. To the ext ent that plaintiffs are relying on these violations as predicate acts, this argument fails. Secti on 1983 violations do not constitute racketeering activities and cannot form the basis of a RICO cla im. See Taitz v. Obama , 707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2010). In addition, the other allegation s regarding plaintiff Gallardo are factually insufficient. Plaintiffs claim that four of the defe ndants—Dora Monica Rodrigues, Cristina Rodrigues Minton, Christopher Kerns, and James Abely, “aided by others”—obstructed Gallardo’s testimony in a different case alleging corruption an d bribery against D.C. government officials and Fort Myer Construc tion, and framed her for false theft charges. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 128–29. They provide no additional facts beyond these concl usory statements that the defendants committed criminal acts to show how each of the defe ndants obstructed plaintiff Gallardo’s alleged testimony or they framed her. The chart pur porting to detail the crimes of these defendants is similarly of no hel p. It merely restates (in cha rt form) the conclusory allegations of obstruction of justice against these defendants. See Chart of Criminal Violations, Pls.’ Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. K, ECF No. 118-20. Furthermore, the Complaint does not sufficiently allege that pl aintiff Gallardo suffered a business injury. It appears from the Complaint that as a resul t of these alleged activities directed at plaintiff Gallardo, she suffered injury in the form of impro per incarceration and deprivation of her civil rights. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 129, 131. Even if plaintiffs had sufficie ntly alleged the existence of the predicate acts regarding plaintiff Gallard o, “mere commission of the predicate12 offenses” is “obviously not in itself a violation of § 1962.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. , 473 U.S. at 496. Plaintiffs have failed to allege that plaintiff Gallardo suffer ed a business injury as a result. 3 They only allege that “Gallardo was injured by activities designed t o remove her as a viable witness by obstructing justice to cover-up illegal actions of the RICO Ent erprise.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff Gallardo appears to be seeking to litigate a claim fo r wrongful conviction and/or deprivation of civil rights, both of which occurred in the stat e of Maryland. A RICO action revolving around a purported bid rigging scheme in the District of Columbia is clearly not the appropriate time or venue for such a claim.
iii. Fraud Plaintiffs also claim that the defendants committed mail and wi re fraud by signing noncollusion affidavits—defendants Jo se Rodriguez(s), Francisco Ro drigues Neto, Florentino Gregorio, “and others”—or aided and abetted in the signing of t he affidavits—Jason Shrensky, Lauren Shrensky, Manuel Fernandes, Anita Bonds, “and others.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 115. These allegations appear to be the crux of plaintiffs’ Complain t. Plaintiffs essentially claim that defendants committed fraud by signing affidavits asserting thatthey had not colluded with others in connection with contract solic itations, when in fact they ha d committed such collusion, and then submitted those affidavits along with their bid proposals. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 113–21. Plaintiffs Cheeks and CNA were then allegedly excluded from being awarded those contracts, despite their status as low bidder. Accordingl y, plaintiffs argue that if th e defendants were not engaging in illegal collusion or had been pr operly excluded from bidding, p laintiffs would have won the

contracts.

3 Merely stating that “[e]ach Plaintiff herein has been a victim of one or more of the unlawful RICO activities,” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 25, is insufficient to allege that they have each suffered a compensable injury to his or her business.13 Specifically, plaintiffs claim that the officials who signed th e affidavits “would be unable to demonstrate an absence of the intent to deceiv e, as to the n on-collusion requirement in the face of public records of interlocki ng ownership and board of direct ors of the allegedly colluding RICO entities,” that “[e]vidence is available from witnesses to the effect [] the preparation of bids for many year has been accomplished on a joint basis, with discussi ons amongst bidders preceding the submission of coordinated bids,” and that “[d]iscovery woul d increase specificity.” Id. at ¶¶ 116, 120, 121. The chart attached to plaintiffs’ Complaint, which purports to detail the alleged criminal violations of the enterprise, lists the individual who signed the affidavit, the contract solicitation at issue, the date of such solicitation (spanning from 2008 to 2013), and the location of the solicitation ( e.g. , bid rooms). See Chart of Criminal Violations. Because plaintiffs are alleging that the defendants committed f raud, they are subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). See Sandza v. Barclays Bank PLC , 151 F. Supp. 3d 94, 108 (D.D.C. 2015). Plaintiffs must “stat[e] the time, plac e and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented[,] and what was ret ained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts should exercise cau tion when considering RICO claims premised on fraud; they “must be partic ularly scrutinized because of the relative ease with which a plaintiff may mold a RICO pattern fr om allegations that, upon closer scrutiny, do not support it.” W. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, ex rel. Ave. Assocs. Lt d. P’ship v. Mkt. Square
Assocs. , 235 F.3d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs may successfully state the time and place of the all eged fraud in their criminal violations chart. They fall short, however, of successfully pl eading the content of the false misrepresentations. Plaintiffs’ claims of fraud are based sole ly on the claim that plaintiff Gallardo has evidence that the defendants were colluding to coordinate t heir bids. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶14 120, 123. There are several issues with this argument, all of which convince this Court that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pl eading standard . First, plaintiffs claim that Gallardo “was in a key observational posit ion as the accountant and conf idant of 2 key enterprise members,” and “[i]n this position, during the term of her employment, she had access to probative evidence of the Enterprise’s unlawful operations.” Id. at ¶ 122. The Complaint states, however, that Gallardo left her employment in 2005—three years before the first of the allegedly fraudulent noncollusion affidavits was submitted in 2008 according to plainti ffs’ own chart of criminal violations.
See id. at ¶ 124; Chart of Criminal Violations. Second, the Complaint relies primarily on reference to “Exhibit L,” which purports to contain sworn statements of p laintiff Gallardo regarding the alleged collusion among bidders. After examining all of the at tachments to the Fourth Amended Complaint, however, the Court is unable to find any document la belled “Exhibit L,” or any document that contains the sworn statements of plaintiff Gallar do. 4 Third, the other documents referenced—the non-collusion affi davits and a chart constructed by plaintiffs showing the

4 Plaintiffs have again made it difficult for this Court to disc ern their arguments. The exh ibits attached to the Fourth Amended Complaint are labelled numerically, but are referenced by letter in the Complaint. Furthermore, the exhibits—once opened—are not labelled alphabetically. The exhi bits that are lettered—some inexplicably are lettered while others are numbered—use letters arbitrarily pulled from t he content of the document. The Court has nonetheless examined each exhibit and has not found an “Exhibit L” or an ot herwise labelled exhibit containing the sworn statements of plaintiff Gallardo. The Court has found a document labelled “Exhibit L” which claim s to contain the sworn statements of plaintiff Gallardo attached to the Third Amended Complaint. That exhibit is not an affidavit or an affirmation or any type of document signed by plaintiff Gallardo under penalty of perjury. Rather, it appears to be written by plaintiffs’ counsel of record in this matter, who claims that plaintiff Gallardo wa s duly sworn, and who has se lectively excerpted pieces of a conversation he had with plaintiff Gallardo. The Court wi ll not accept this document as the sworn statements of plaintiff Gallardo. The Court recognizes that for the purposes of dismissal for fai lure to state a claim, it must presume that all of plaintiffs’ factual allegations are true, and that plaintiffs could submit a properly sworn affidavit from plaintiff Gallardo attesting to the allegations claimed. Nonetheless, such an affidavit wou ld not change this Court’s conclusion that plaintiff Gallardo’s allegations of collusion between 2002 and 2005 are u nrelated to the claimed bid rigging of contracts beginning in 2008. Furthermore, this Court doubts whether at t he summary judgment stage the Court would find that a reasonable jury could find plaintiff Gallardo to be a credibl e witness. As much as plaintiffs claim that plaintiff Gallardo is the victim of a framing, her conviction still stand s; it has not been vacated or overturned. A jury verdict for plaintiffs at trial based on such testimony is difficult to fathom.15 relationships among the defendants—do not show fraud. The non- collusion affidavits merely show that the defendants swore th at they had not colluded with others in connection with the submission of bids; there is nothing in these documents showing that these statements were fraudulent. See Non-Collusion Affidavits, Fourth A m. Compl. Attachment 1, ECF N o. 118-3. The chart of relationships among alle ged members of the enterprise shows that the companies alleged to be part of the enterprise shared officers, some of whom were related; it does not clearly show that these individuals were improperly colluding and then lied about it in the non-collusion affidavits. See Chart of Documented Interrela tionships, Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. F , ECF No. 118- 13. Finally, merely stating that “[e]vidence is available” to show collusion (and therefore fraud) and that “[d]iscovery would incr ease specificity” is not suffic ient. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 120–21. Plaintiffs bear the burden of s ufficiently stating a plausible claim for relief in their Complaint; they cannot rely on facts that may be discovered in yet to be conducted discovery to meet this bur den. Therefore, the Court is essentially left with the conclusory st atements that defendants were colluding and committing fraud, with no true factual allegation s. For these reasons, the Court finds that the allegations of fraud do not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s pleadi ng standard.
iv. Other Criminal Acts Finally, there are three allegations that do not fit comfortabl y in the previous categories, but that nonetheless fail to show the element of predicate acts . First, plaintiffs claim that “at least 3 suspicious deaths of courier a nd security employees of Fort M yer Construction Corporation” have occurred under similar circumstances during the relevant p eriod of time. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 104–05. There are no allegations that the deaths were commit ted by members of the alleged enterprise, or that they are c onnected to the alleged pattern o f criminal acts here, or even that the deaths were the result of foul play. It goes without saying th at the statement that “[f]urther16 discovery is necessary or criminal investigation to further det ail these factual allegations,” id. at ¶ 105, is insufficient to state aplausible claim on the face o f the Complaint. Second, plaintiffs state that members of the enterprise committ ed and were convicted of committing bribery. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 107–109. Specifically , it alleges that in 2002 Florentino Gregorio and C&F Construction Company (who is not a named defendant) were convicted of bribery, and that i n 2003 Fort Myer Construction w as convicted of bribery for acts taken in 1995–1998. Id. at ¶¶ 108–09. There is no allegat ion—and no inference—that the se crimes were part of the pattern of alleged racketeering activity aimed at plaintiffs, or in any way connected to the alleged bid rigging conspiracy at issue. See Ganzi v. Washington-Baltimore Reg’l 2012
Coal. , 98 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2000) (“[A] Plaintiff must show that the predicate acts are related and that they ‘amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.’”). Third, plaintiffs allege that members of the alleged enterprise have intimidated D.C. officials and employees, and that “[o]n information and belief RICO members were instrumental in conjunction with Mayor Fenty, and Attorney General Peter Nic kles in the firing of Stephen Amos, a District of Columbia whistle blower, employee who attem pted to take action against Fort Myer Construction Corporation.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 132. Agai n, these conclusory allegations free of any factual detail are who lly insufficient to state a p lausible claim. In sum, plaintiffs have largely failed to sufficiently allege f acts showing an essential element of a civil RICO claim: that the defendants committed th e alleged predicate acts. b) Proximate Cause Even if plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded the existence of pr edicate acts committed by the named defendants, plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead another essential element of a RICO claim: causation. To succeed on a civil RICO claim, plaintiffs must show proximate cause; there17 must be “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged. A link that is too remote, purely contingent, or indirect[t] is i nsufficient.” Hemi Grp., LLC , 559 U.S.
at 9. Plaintiffs allege that they have been the victims of bid riggin g scheme in which defendants unfairly colluded and competed for infrastructure contracts. J ohn Cheeks alleges that he was denied profitable contracts as a result. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 2 7. Remarkably, however, the Fourth Amended Complaint does not state which specific contracts plain tiffs were denied as a result of defendants allegedly illegal activity, nor does it state to who m such contracts were awarded. Nonetheless, the Court will assume that plaintiffs are complain ing about the contracts or invitations for bids (“IFBs”) listed in Exhibit K of the Compla int, which purports to list the criminal violations of each defe ndant. Those contracts and IFB s are: IFB 080020, IFB 090080, IFB 090020, DCKA-2013-B-0029, and DCKA-2009-B-0193. See Chart of Criminal Violations

. Plaintiffs also attach two recent contract solicitations in whi ch they claim to have been the low bidder: the aforementioned DCKA-2013-B-0029, and DCKA-2013-B-00 07. See Two Recent Contracts wherein CNA, Inc was low Bidder, Pls.’ Fourth Am. Com pl. Ex. G, ECF No. 118-4. 5 Going even further, this Court has examined plaintiffs’ exhibit of bid tabulations. It appears that

5 These are also the IFBs and c ontracts listed in Exhibit A to p laintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, see Affidavit of Ronald J. Bonfilio, Pls.’ Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. A, ECF No. 118- 2, and Attachment 1, see Non-Collusion Affidavits, Fourth Am. Compl. A ttachment 1, and Attachment 2, see Bid Bond, Pls.’ Fourth Am. Compl. Attachment 2 Item 2, ECF No. 118-4. The Court notes that plaintiff Cheeks submitted an affidavit in which he states that since 2002 he has bid on 15 IFBs in D.C., refers to the latest tw o bids which are the “subject o f this complaint,” and states that “[t]he prior about 13 contracts involve the same patte rn of violations of RICO referr ed to herein.” Cheeks Affidavit, Pls.’ Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. CH, ECF No. 118-9. G iven that Cheeks states that th e two most recent bids (DCKA-2013-B-0029 and DCKA-2013-B-0007) are the subjectof this Complaint, it is uncl ear whether he is in fact complaining about being denied any other contracts as a result of RICO violations. In addition, he has not named th e other thirteen contracts, nor has he claimed that he bid against the defendants for them or that he was a low bidder.18 plaintiffs bid against defendant s in one more contract not prev iously listed: DCKA 2009-B-0025.
See Invitation for Bid S olicitation Documents, P ls.’ Fourth Am. Com pl. Ex. D, ECF No. 118-10. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint never explicitly discusses causation. It never specifically claims that plaintiffs were not awarded these contracts (the apparent injury) as a result of defendants’ racketeering activity. Plaintiffs appear to res t their argument on the statements of plaintiff Gallardo, i.e. , that the defendants colluded to coordinate their bids, then f raudulently attested to non-collusion in affidavits submitted with bids. H ad defendants been excluded from bidding due to this allegedly frau dulent activity, plaintiffs c laim that CNA would have been awarded the contracts. Plainti ff Gallardo allegedly had knowle dge of this activity by reason of her employment with members of the enterprise. Again, as previousl y discussed, there are no sworn statements of plaintiff Gallardo attached to the Fourth AmendedComplaint. More importantly, as stated in plaintiffs’ Complaint, plaintiff Gallardo’s employmen t with members of the enterprise ceased in 2005. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 124. The contracts and IF Bs at issue occurred between 2008 and 2013, three years after plaintiff Gallardo claims to ha ve observed collusion. Plaintif fs have failed to point to any cont racts that they were not awarde d as a result of collusion witnessed by plaintiff Gallardo. 6 Furthermore, plaintiffs have failed to adequately respond to de fendants’ arguments that plaintiffs’ failure to be awarded contracts was the result of i ts own actions, or of the actions of an entity not named in this lawsuit. See Def. Civil Construction LLC’s Opp’n 2–3; Defs. Fort Myer Construction Corp., Jose Rodrigu ez & Lewis F. Shrensky’s Opp’n 2–3; Defs. Capitol Paving & Francisco Rodrigues Neto’s Opp’n 2. Plaintiffs’ exhibits demon strate that CNA was outbid on

6 At one point plaintiffs identify the “time in question” as 200 6–2012. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 132. At others, they somewhat vaguely allude to unlawful collusion over the last tento twenty years. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 103. Still, however, the harm that pla intiffs’ appear to be complain ing of began in 2008. The Court cannot find any allegations that plaintiffs were harmed as a result of collusio n or other illegal activity prior to 2008.19 IFB 090020 by Nastos Constructio n, and was outbid on IFB 090080 by Corinthian Contractor, Invitation for Bid Solicitation Documents at 3, 4, neither of w hom are named defendants in this action or named as part of the alleged RICO enterprise. Anothe r court in this district—in a different case brought by Cheeks against Fort Myers—previously confirmed these events. See Cheeks v. Fort Myer Const. Co. , 722 F. Supp. 2d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 20 10). Clearly, plaintiffs’ argument that “if the alleged RICO family were disqualified for their actual illegal monopolistic collusive bidding and perjured Non Collusion Affidavits, Plaint iff would have been the only bidder remaining and be entitled to the award,” Pls.’ Reply at 5, is b elied by these facts. There were others involved in the bidding pr ocess who plaintiffs have not named as part of the “RICO family.” The actions of those companies are the clear cause of plaintiff s’ “injury,” i.e. , that they did not receive the contract awards. With respect to the remaining contracts/IFBs, plaintiffs fail t o respond to the argument that they did not receive these awards due to their own actions. Th e District of Columbia procurement regulations state that the contracting officer may accept three forms of security: bonds provided by a surety, certified checks or irrevocable letters of credit, or U.S. government securities. 27 DCMR § 2700.4. They also state that “[i]f a bid fails to compl y with the bid security requirements set forth in the solicitation, the contracting officer shall re ject the bid,” but may accept the bid if “(a) The bid or proposal meets the criteria set forth in this s ection; and (b) Acceptance of the bid or proposal would be in the bestinterests of the District.” 2 7 DCMR § 2701.1. Plaintiffs do not state in their Complaint that they properly submitted bid secur ity. They do not claim in their Reply brief that they properly submitted bid security. Plaintiffs’ o wn exhibits show that DCKA 2009-B0025, DCKA 2013-B-0007, and DCKA 2013-B-0029 were accompanied b y checks, but plaintiffs do not argue that the contracting officer accepted the bid in a ccordance with Section 2701.1.20 Furthermore, other courts in this District have found that plai ntiffs’ bids on IFB 080020 and
DCKA-2009-B-0193 7 were rejected specifically because they failed to include the required bid security. See Cheeks v. Fort Myer Const. Co. , 722 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2010); Cheeks of N. Am., Inc. v. Fort Myer Const. Corp. , 807 F. Supp. 2d 77, 94 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d , No. 11- 7117, 2012 WL 3068449 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2012). Rather, plaintiffs argue that “[m]inor matters involving cash b onds or bid bonds or adequate financing would have b een routinely and easily cured.” Pls.’ Reply at 5–6. This wholly fails to respond to the argument that their bids simply did not comply with D.C. law. Plaintiffs essentially argue that even though they submitted noncompliant bids, they would have nonetheless been awarded the contracts if defendants had been disqualified and if they had the chance to cure the defects in their bids and if the District then accepted the non-defective bids. This line o f inferences contains far too many contingencies to establish pro ximate cause. See Hemi Grp., LLC , 559 U.S. at 9. Furthermore, leaving aside any alleged fraud in bid submission process, the Complaint fails to allege that other predicate acts were the proximate cause of the injury to plaintiffs Cheeks and CNA. With regard to the acts alleged to have been committed in the course of the prosecution and incarceration of plaintiff Gallar do, the Complaint states that the defendants “obstructed justice successfully by obstructing her probable testimony as an advers e witness in this case potentially fatal to the Enterprise.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 128. There are no allegations that these actions were the proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiffs Cheeks a nd CNA—the illegal monopolization

7 Plaintiffs’ exhibits show that plaintiff was also not the low bidder on this contract. See Invitation for Bid Solicitation Documents.21 of infrastructure contracts to t he exclusion of plaintiffs Chee ks and CNA—nor are they even alleged to be the but for cau se of the injuries. Therefore, not only have plaintiffs failed to sufficiently alle ge facts showing that defendants committed predicate acts of racketeering activity, they have failed to plead that these acts were the proximate cause of harm to plaintiffs Cheeks and CNA. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for c ivil RICO violations.
2. RICO Conspiracy Plaintiffs have also failed to s ufficiently allege a RICO consp iracy (Claims Two, Three, and Four). Plaintiffs allege that “at a time unknown” several of the defendants “conspired to violate [RICO] (i.e., each Defe ndant agreed that a conspirator would conduct or participate in the affairs of the Enterprise) thr ough a pattern of racketeering, ( i.e., the commission of acts indictable . . . all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)).” Fo urth Am. Compl. ¶ 154. They allege that all of the defendants are liable under the Pinkerton Doctrine. Id. The Court finds, however that plaintiffs have failed to allege both the existence of any agreements or that the conspiracy was the proximate cause of their injuries. To plead a RICO conspiracy, plai ntiffs must allege agreements—a greements to commit RICO offenses and agreements to further the endeavor to commit RICO offenses. See RSM Prod. Corp. , 682 F.3d at 1048. Plaintiffs here have failed to allege any facts directly showing such agreements. In fact, the only time an agreement is even mentioned in the Complaint is in the excerpt quoted above, i.e. , the conclusory statement that each defendant agreed that a co nspirator would conduct or participate in th e affairs of the Enterprise. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 (“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle [ment] to relief’ requires more than22 labels and conclusions, and a form ulaic recitation of the eleme nts of a cause of action will not do.”). There are no fur ther details. It is true that the Court may in fer the existence of a conspira cy from the relationships and circumstances alleged. See e.g. , United States v. Mellen , 393 F.3d 175, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[A] conspiracy can be inferred from a combination of close relation ships or knowing presence and other supporting circumstantial evidence.”); Gagan v. Am. Cablevision, Inc. , 77 F.3d 951, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A ‘RICO conspiracy, like all conspiracies, does no t require direct evidence of agreement; an agreement can be inferred from the circumstances. ’”). The Court here is unable, however, to infer an agreement to commit RICO offenses or to in fer an agreement to further the enterprise’s endeavors to commit RICO offenses. Beyond the con clusory allegations described above, the only factual allegations that would begin to allow t he Court to infer the existence of a conspiracy are 1) that the membe rs of the alleged enterprise ha d interlocking or overlapping directorates or officers; and 2) that they colluded to coordina te bids and shared employees and equipment, as attested to by plaintiff Gallardo. Plaintiffs’ second point—that pl aintiff Gallardo witnessed coll usion—suffers from the same defects as previously disc ussed. Not only does the FourthAmended Complaint not include as an exhibit actual sworn statem ents of plaintiff Gallardo, an y collusion that s he observed would be relevant to the time period prior to the termination of her employment in 2005, not the time period in which plaintiffs’ allegedly conspired to rig bids andexclude plaintiffs from fairly competing for infrastructure contracts, the earliest of which o ccurred in 2008. The Court therefore does not credit her statements as circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy during the relevant time frame. In support of the first point, plaintiffs provide chart s and tables that show the relationships among individuals associated with t he companies at the center o f the alleged conspiracy—Fort23 Myer, Anchor Construction, Capitol Paving, and Civil Constructi on—and positions each held as officers of the aforementioned companies. See Chart of Documented Interrelationships; Defendants Affiliation Matrix, Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. O, ECF No. 118-22. Plaintiffs also submit an affidavit of Ronald J. Bonfili o, a retired auditor once empl oyed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, who states that the relationships among members of the alleged enterprise “appear to be contradictive of claims of the affidavits of inde pendence and non-collusion,” and that “the long-term pattern contained in the documents examined appears to demonstrate that actual independence in bidding c ould not reasonably exist.” Af fidavit of Ronald J. Bonfilio, Pls.’ Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. A. However, the non-collusion affidavits submitted by plaintiffs do not on their face state that the defendant companies did not have o fficers or board members in common; they state that the signatory company “has not, either directly or indirectly, entered, entered into any agreement, participated in any collusion, or o therwise taken any action in restraint of free competitive proposal submitted in connected with propos ed contract.” Non Collusion Affidavits for IFBs. The Court therefore disagrees that the no n-collusion affidavits are clearly contradicted by the relations hips among the companies. Left only with allegations regar ding the relationships among me mbers of the alleged enterprise, parts of which do not indicate fraud or collusion at all, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege circumstances from which it could infer the necessary agreements of a RICO conspiracy. See RSM Prod. Corp. , 682 F.3d at 1052 (“[B]ecause RSM failed to allege facts sufficient to support a plausible inference that Freshfie lds knew of and agreed to further the bribery-racketeering conspiracy, the complaint fails to state a claim against Freshfields for RICO civil conspiracy under § 1962(d).”); Son Ly v. Solin, Inc. , 910 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27–28 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for conspi racy to violate RICO because they24 “merely incorporate by reference their allegations of a single- event RICO violation based on alleged securities fraud committed by [defendants]” and “other than plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations, plaintiffs have not set forth any allegations that any defendants agreed to further any such RICO conspiracy”). Moreover, plaintiffs have again failed to sufficiently allege p roximate causation. Plaintiffs allege that the “conspiratorial conduct violates RICO § 1962(d) , and such conduct caused direct injury to [p]laintiffs.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 156. This Court has already found, however, that plaintiffs failed to respond to d efendants’ arguments that plai ntiffs’ failure to be awarded the contracts at issue was the result of its own actions, or of the actions of an entity not named in this lawsuit, and that plaintiffs’ have failed to sufficiently plead proximate causation. Therefore, even if the Court were to infer the existence of a c onspiracy, plain tiff has still failed to state a claim for relief under Section 1962(d) for RICO conspiracy. See Knit With v. Knitting Fever, Inc. , No. CIV.A. 08-4221, 2011 WL 891871, at *11 (E.D. P a. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[E]ven assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s allegations as t o [defendant’s] participation in the purported conspiracy to coverup the initial fraud were adequate to allege a new RICO conspir acy under § 1962(d), Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the cove r-up was the proximate cause of its monetary losses.”). Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Pinkerton Doctrine is misplaced. The Pinkerton Doctrine holds that members of a conspiracy are liable for reasonably foreseea ble substantive criminal acts committed by other co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspi racy. See Pinkerton v. United
States , 328 U.S. 640, 646–48 (1946). Pinkerton liability presupposes the e xistence of a conspiracy, and for a conspiracy to exist, the defendants must have agreed to commit a RICO offense. See RSM Prod. Corp. , 682 F.3d at 1048. As stated above, plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy, so the Pinkerton Doctrine is inapplicable.25 3. Sherman and Clayton Acts Finally, plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege violatio ns of the Sherman and Clayton Acts (Claim Five). 8 The only allegations with regard to the Sherman and Clayton A cts are as follows: Plaintiffs allege the above facts and those that follow violate provisions of the Sherman Anti Trust Act and Clayton Acts in the continuation of the mono polistic practices. Two recent contracts and their bid tabulations demonstrate the Defe ndants companies still enter bids as independent companies, wh en they are not independent. ( See Exhibit G and Exhibit D for previous bids ). Furthermore the District of Columbia Government, Office of Contracting and Procurement accepted these bid demonstrating th at the District of Columbia Government is aiding and abetting the RICO Enterprise in violating Federal Anti Trust law. Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 167. 9 Again, plaintiffs rely on future discovery to demonstrate vio lations of the statutes. Id. at ¶ 168 (“The evidence on hand and to be gathered by minimal d iscovery shall demonstrate to the extent required by statute, violation of 15 U.S.C. Chapter 1 Monopolies And Combinations In Restraint of Tra de.”). This is not the standar d. A plaintiff “must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide ‘plausible grounds’ that disco very will reveal evidence to support the plaintiffs’ allegations.” Long v. Safeway, Inc. , 842 F. Supp. 2d 141, 145 (D.D.C. 2012). The Court has already found that plaintiffs’ RICO allegations are f actually insufficient, and plaintiffs have pleaded no additional specific facts with respect to their Sherman and Clayton Act claims. These “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation [s]” are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. 10

8 It is unclear from the Complaint which provisions of the Sherm an and Clayton Acts plaintiffs are attempting to allege violations of.
9 The District of Columbia government and the D.C. Office of Con tracting and Procuring are no longer defendants in this action.
10 To the extent that plaintiffs are alleging violations of the p rohibition on interlocking directorates and officers under 15 U.S.C. § 19, which is again un clear, plaintiffs have not ple aded that each of the corporations has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than the amount required by statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (a)(5).26 Plaintiffs have now filed five complaints 11 in this action and have had two years to adequately respond to this Court’s October 17, 2014 Order. Sev eral of the amended claims are the same as those that have already been dismissed by this Court. Cf. BEG Investments, LLC v. Alberti , 85 F. Supp. 3d 13, 27 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he RICO and RICO consp iracy claims in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are virtually identical to those previously c onsidered and dismissed by this Court, reflecting only two changes.”). The other claims are fa ctually insufficient or fail to plead essential elements. Plaintiffs have not adequately responded t o the arguments of the defendants who noted these deficiencies. Furthermore, plaintiffs may not, as they have tried repeatedly to do, rely on the promise of evidence to be uncovered by hypothetical future discovery as a basis for bringing these claims. Cf. Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines , 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Appellants argue that if allowed to proceed with their RICO claim, they would allege and prove facts entitling them to recovery under RICO. But we are not told what those facts might be. Appellees, by contrast, assert that the complaint was fatally d efective in that it failed to allege an enterprise, the elements of any predicate act, or legally cogni zable injury to appellants; because each of these is required under RICO, and because appellants co uld not possibly make allegations to satisfy all of them, they ar gue, dismissal with prejudice un der Rule 12(b)(6) was proper. We agree.”). The Court therefore finds that because plaintiffs’ F ourth Amended Complaint cannot withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), amendment wo uld be futile. Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend will be denied.

11 Not to mention, Cheeks and CNA have previously brought similar claims against many of the same defendants in prior actions before another memb er of this District Court, and have lost. See Cheeks of N. Am., Inc. v. Fort Myer Const. Corp. , 807 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding that plaintiffs eit her lacked standing or failed to state claims for violations of the Sherman Ac t, contract steering, violation s on non-collusion affidavits, violations of procurement regulations, common law fraud and oversight failure, and tortio us interference with business relations); Cheeks v. Fort Myer Const. Co. , 722 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that plaintiffs lac ked standing or failed to state claims for antitrust violations for bid rigging conspiracy, violations of WASA procurement regulations, tortious interference, violations of non-collusion affidavits, discrimination in bid s olicitations, contract steering, oversight failure, and violations of civil liberties).27 B. Failure to Cure Deficiencies In addition to futility of amendment, courts may deny leave to amend for repeated failure to cure deficiencies. Foman , 371 U.S. at 182. This Court identified several issues with p laintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and orde red plaintiffs two years ago to submit an orderly, clear, and non-repetitive Complaint which i dentified how each defendant wa s involved in the many alleged violations claimed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have since submitted three amended complaints, but have been unable to satisfactorily comply with the Court’s Orde r. Plaintiffs still do not identify who committed many of the alleged crimes targeting plaintiff Ch eeks ( e.g. , attempted murder), they have included crimes and violations of the law that appear to have no relation to the injuries here ( e.g. , bribery, deprivation of civil rights), and they rely on the s tatements of plaintiff Gallardo about alleged collusion that occurred at least three years befo re any alleged fraud took place. Thus, the Court finds that not only would amendment be futile, plaint iffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint will be denie d because of plaintiffs’ repeate d failure to cure deficiencies.
C. The Insurance Defendants After finding that amendment would be futile and that plaintiff s have failed to cure the deficiencies in their complaints , the court now turns to the is sue of the insurance defendants. Plaintiffs originally brought cla ims against several insurance entities and individua ls in their First Amended Complaint: Western Surety, CNA Surety, and Paul T. Bruf lat. This Court dismissed defendants Western Surety and Pa ul T. Bruflat from this action, and, finding that defendant CNA Surety had not been served, ordered plaintiffs to show cause wh y defendant CNA Surety should not be dismissed from this action under Rule 4(m). Court’s Oct . 17, 2014 Order, ECF No. 66; Court’s Oct. 17, 2014 Mem. Op. 2 n.2. Plaintiffs now attempt t o add defendants Western Surety and Paul T. Bruflat back into t his actions and to bring claims against “CNA Financial.”28 The Court first addresses its order to show cause why defendant CNA Surety should not be dismissed under Rule 4(m), issued on October 17, 2014. Rule 4(m) states that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudi ce against that defendant or order that service be made within a spe cified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate p eriod.” F ED

. R. C IV

. P ROC . 4(m). Plaintiffs responded to the Court’s order to show cause on Dece mber 17, 2014. They argue that “it is very likely, as an ordinary and necessary business pract ice, that the parent company (CNA Surety) exercised some supervision over the actions of the offi cials of its subsidiary Western,” but that due to lack of availability of discovery, “the success or failure of plaintiffs’ effort to show cause as to why this action should not be dismissed with regard to CNA Surety depends upon whether the Court will allow pl aintiffs to supplement the recor d for the specificity documentation held at this time, or not.” Pls.’ Response to Court Order to S how Cause 3–4, ECF No. 73. They then argue that the insurance companies are necessary parties and that “CNA Surety should not be dismissed from this case until all of the facts as to necessaryparties are known.” Id. at 4. Nowhere in plaintiffs’ response do they address the crux of the issue or the Court’s directive—why defendant CNA Su rety should not be dismissed unde r Rule 4(m) for failure to timely serve. In an apparent—and inexplicably belated—attempt to respond to the Court’s Order, and to defendants’ argument that CNA Surety is not a legal enti ty that can be served, plaintiffs now argue that CNA Financial Inc. is doing business as CNA Sure ty in the District of Columbia. Pls.’ Reply to Defs. Western Surety & Paul T. Bruflat’s Opp’n t o Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File a Fourth Am. Compl. 4–5, ECF No. 121. Plaintiffs appear to conce de, however, that the entity they wish to sue is CNA Financial C orporation, not CNA Surety, stati ng “[o]n information and belief29 the correct name of the Defendant entity appears to be CNA Fina ncial Corporation.” Id. at 5. 12 Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not shown cause as to why defendant “CNA Surety” should not dismissed. The Court now turns to the claims against the insurance entitie s and individuals in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs now seek to bring claims against CNA Financial, and attempt to add previously dismissed defendants Western Surety and Paul Bruflat back into this action. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 44, 57, 58, 135–148. This Court previ ously dismissed the claims against Western Surety an d Bruflat, finding that “Plaint iffs’ irregular inclusion of facts regarding activities of the . . . Western Surety defendants is not sufficient to make out a claim for predicate criminal activity, much less a pattern of racketeerin g activity necessary for a RICO claim” and that “[i]t is unclear precisely what predicate crimi nal activities the . . . Western Surety defendants engaged in, if a ny.” Court’s Oct. 17, 2014 Mem. Op. It also found that “with regards to the Western Surety defendants, plaintiffs’ allegations are c onsistent with lawful conduct [ i.e. , providing surety bonds].” Id. at 12. Western Surety and Bruflat now argue that “the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint contain[ s] no substantive allegations that were not already addressed by [d]efendants’ Motion to Dismi ss and this Court’s Orders gran ting same,” and that the allegations now lodged against CNA Financial “are essentially t he same as those that led to the dismissal of Western and Mr. Bruflat and are a transparent atte mpt to circumvent this Courts October 17, 2014 Orders.” Defs. W estern Surety & Paul T. Brufl at’s Opp’n 2, ECF No. 119.

12 The confusing nature of plaintiffs’ written submissions to thi s Court make it very difficult to determine their argument. They argue that “CNA Surety was served with a green card and signed for by someone” and that “CNA Financial Corporation does business using the name CNA Surety,” which does not have a registered agent in the District of Columbia. Pls.’ Reply to Western Surety & Brufla t at 5. It appears, however, that despite these arguments, plaintiffs concede that the entity which they want to sue is CN A Financial Corporation, not CNA Surety.30 The Court agrees with defendants. The allegations against the insurance defendants in the First Amended Complaint—which led to the dismissal of defendant s Western Surety and Paul Bruflat—are as follows: the insurance companies knew or should have known the facts relevant to the unlawful alleged acts committed by the enterprise and th ey had a duty to refrain from aiding and abetting or participating inthose acts; the insurance defe ndants also knew or should have known of the alleged bid rigging conspiracy, the racketeering c ollaboration, interlocking directorates and management, and bribery as a result of informa tion received from the enterprise; and as a result of joint bidding, the insurance defendants have held a monopoly on insurance for bid bonds and have profited from the bidding monopoly created b y the enterprise. First Am. Compl., ¶¶ 97–102, ECF No. 10-1. The First Amended Complaint g oes on to allege that the insurance defendants furnished bid bonds, knew or should have k nown that the bidders were in violation of their non-collusion affidavits, and knew that the D.C. government was being deceived because the purportedly competitive bids were actually being ma de by the same interlocking
group. Id. at 103–06. Finally, the Complaint alleges that the unlawful ac ts committed by the enterprise would not have been possible, but for the actions of the insurance defendants. Id. at 107–09. The Fourth Amended Complaint make s essentially the same allegat ions, all of which center around the claim that the insuran ce defendants knew or should h ave known about illegal activity committed by the enterprise, and issued bid bonds anyway. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 135–48. The only apparent basis for this argument is that the insurance companies knew the owners/officers of the companies involved in the alleged enterprise. Indeed, p laintiffs state that the question is “whether it is ‘plausible’ after doing more than 15 consistent years of substantial business with the31 Fort Myer Construction Corporation’s family of companies, the i nsurance companies knew their owners, executives, and/or manag ers.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 147. 13 Again, these allegations are insufficient to demonstrate predic ate criminal activity conducted by the insurance defendants, or a pattern of racketee ring activity. Whether or not the insurance defendants knew the own ers of the construction compan ies—or whether they knew of an alleged racketeering conspiracy—does not answer the questionof whether the insurance companies undertook predicate criminal acts (or a pattern of su ch) as required for RICO liability. Knowledge of a racketeering activity alone is insufficient to i mpose RICO liability. See RSM Prod. Corp. , 682 F.3d at 1051 (finding that the complaint did not allege that the defendant itself committed any predicate acts, that the plaintiff’s argument rel ying on the defendant’s “knowledge of the bribery-racketeering cons piracy” was insufficient, and that the defendant’s actions were more likely explained by its normal business practices). Furthermore, nowhere in plaintiffs’ table of criminal violation s do plaintiffs claim that Western Surety or Paul Bruflat committed any criminal violation . The only allegation against CNA Financial Corp. is that it “aided and abetted fraud,” appar ently for the benefit of Fort Myer Construction and Anchor Construction. See id. at 6. The Complaint states that “[b]y ignoring and failing to report the well known collusion and inter-relationsh ips of the RICO Enterprise, the insurance company CNA Surety, dur ing the time in question and t o this day, aided and abetted the RICO activities,” and that “[b]ecause of the additional profits in premiums, it is plausible CNA Financial Corporation knowingly aided and abetted the RICO Ente rprise.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶

13 Plaintiffs argue that “[p]roof of [the allegation that the ins urance defendants knew the owners/officers of the construction companies] and evidence supporting ‘plausibility’ could be established through a few depositions of CNA Surety, Western Surety’s key personnel, and the constructio n companies.” Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 148. Again, plaintiffs’ argument is wholly u ntenable and demonstrates a lac k of understanding of the requirements of a properly pleaded complaint. Plaintiffs do not get to make factually spa rse and insufficiently pleaded claims in a complaint, and then ask for discovery to obta in the facts necessary to support those claims.32 137, 139. First, this Court has a lready found that defendants failed to sufficiently allege fraud by defendants Fort Myers and Anchor Construction, or that any suchfraud was the proximate case of plaintiffs’ injuries. Furthermore, the conclusory statements that the defendants knew or must have known about unspecified and generic incidents of alleged perjur y, collusion, and bid rigging are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Finally, while it may be possible that CNA Fina ncial aided and abetted the alleged enterprise in pursuit of profits from p remiums, plaintiffs have not stated enough facts to “nudge[] their claims across the line from conc eivable to plausible.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiffs attempt to save their argument by relying on the Pinkerton Doctrine. Again, plaintiffs have failed to plead the existence of a conspiracy. The Complaint does not allege with any level of particularity that the insurance defendants agreedto commit RICO violations, nor do any of the factual allegations s upport the inference that the i nsurance defendant agreed to join a conspiracy. The Pinkerton Doctrine is therefore inapplicable and the insurance defendants cannot be liable for the criminal acts allegedly committed by other de fendants. 14 In sum, because plaintiffs have failed to show cause why CNA Su rety should not be dismissed from this case, the Court will dismiss the entity des ignated as CNA Surety. In addition, the Court finds that the allegations against Western Surety, Pa ul Bruflat, and CNA Financial are the same as those this Court already found to be insufficient, and that plaintiffs have failed to state plausible claims against t he insurance defendants.

14 The Court’s conclusion regarding failure to state claims under the Sherman and Clayton Acts applies equally to the insurance defendants.33 D. Plaintiffs’ Request for Order to Show Cause Finally, plaintiffs also ask that this Court order the defendan ts to show cause as to why a RICO entity should not be found to exist. They argue that the defendants have only offered unsworn statements that fail to sufficiently oppose the plainti ffs’ “proffered probative evidence,” whereas the plaintiffs have offered “sworn evidence and genuine documents.” Therefore, according to plaintiffs, “[t]o de termine which set of facts are true, and which are false, the situation needs to be subjected to an evidentiary hearing.” This argumen t is absurd. It is axiomatic that the plaintiff bears the burden of sta ting a claim in his complaint. Defendants are under no requirement to essentially disprove a plaintiff’s allegations at the pleadi ng stage, particular ly before the Court has even determined the operative complaint in the case. 15 Defendants are furthermore under no obligation to provide “sworn ev idence and genuine documents” at this stage. The issues pending before the Court relate to whethe r plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs are attempting to reverse the burden of proof, short circuit this litigation, and jump to an evidentiary hearing where defenda nts are supposed to disprove the allegations in the complaint before the Court has even determined whether plaintiffs may pro ceed on the basis of their pleadings. Plaintiffs have cited no legal authority mandating or even allowing the Court to take such an action. Accordingly, the Court will not order the defe ndants to show cause as to why a RICO entity should not be found and plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.

15 Plaintiffs argue that it is “incorrect” and “misleading” for d efendants to argue that “[p]laintiffs do not yet have an operative complaint on file.” Pls.’ Reply to Defs. Dora Monica Rodrigues & Cristina Rodrigues Minton’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for an Order to Show Cause 2, ECF No. 132. Pl aintiffs argue that they have addressed this Court’s Order to provide specificity and that “[d]efendants continue to assert this false and misleading statement as if repeatedly stating an incorrect statement will make it true.” Id. at 3. On the contrary, plain tiffs are guilty of asserting an incorrect statement as if it was true. Until this decision of the Court, plaintiffs did not have an operative complaint on file due to the many times they have asked for leave to amen d and file a new complaint. It is furthermore not for plaintiffs to determine whether they have complied with this Co urt’s October 17, 2014 Order. That is the province of this Court.34 E. Dismissal with Prejudice Defendants have asked this Court to dismiss plaintiffs’ case wi th prejudice. Plaintiffs have inundated the docket in this case with five complaints, 16 along with clearly improper or premature requests for discovery and show cause orders. Despite instruct ions from this Court to submit an orderly, clear, non-repetitive complaint that contains descript ions of how each defendant was involved in the alleged violati ons against the plaintiffs, plai ntiffs have failed to do so. Plaintiffs have moreover failed again to show proximate cause—that they we re harmed due to the acts of the defendants as opposed to thei r own actions or the actions o f others—and nothing convinces this Court that plaintiffs would be able to do so if given the chance to submit yet another amended complaint. 17 Plaintiffs have had more than their fair share of attempts to b ring comprehensible and plausible claims against the d efendants. They do not get anoth er bite at the apple. Furthermore, the volume of legal memoranda defendants have been forced to fi le to oppose plaintiffs’ ever changing complaint is significant. The Court cannot justify in flicting continuing costs on the defendants for what amounts to an exercise in futility. The Co urt therefore finds that dismissal with prejudice is warranted here. See Hines , 995 F.2d at 299 (upholding the dismissal with prejudice because “appellants effectively have had multiple bit es at the apple already” and because “the law does not require the doing of vain things,” and “appel lants have yet to demonstrate that they can offer an amendment effective of a valid claim for reli ef”); E. Sav. Bank, FSB v.

16 It appears that plaintiffs are gearing up once again to seek t o amend their Complaint. See Fourth Am. Compl. ¶ 205 (“Details of these actions over and above what is specified in this Complaint are expected to be the subject of further amended complaints subsequent to discovery.”).
17 Plaintiffs cannot complain that they were not on notice of thi s deficiency in their Complaint. In response to plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, several defendants raised the argument that plaintiffs had submitted noncompliant bids and that there was no causal re lationship between plaintiffs’ alleged injuries and the alleged conduct of the defendants. Plaintiffs then filed a mot ion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint and, as the Court found, did not sufficiently address proximate cause.35 Papageorge , 31 F. Supp. 3d 1, 22 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[D]ismissal with prejudi ce is warranted here since there are no allegations in the plaintiff’s fifty-eight p age complaint, based on facts gathered over thirteen years of litigation, that could give rise to lega l liability under any of the theories advanced by the plaintiff.”); Hourani v. Mirtchev , 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 172 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d , 796 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[F]inding that Plaintiffs have al ready had two bites at the proverbial apple, [the Court] dismisses the Amended Complaint with prejudi ce.”); Hamrick v. United States , 775 F. Supp. 2d 140, 142 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing with prejudi ce because “given the virtually undecipherable nature of plainti ff’s allegations, it would be n ear-impossible for defendants to determine whether plaintiff’s current lawsuit actually involves ‘the same claims or cause[s] of action’ as any of his prior cases” and because “plaintiff’s ame nded complaint merely ‘recycles’ the allegations set forth in his first complaint”); Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. N. California & N. Nevada Pipe Trades Council , No. C-90-3628 EFL, 1992 WL 131162, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1992), aff’d sub nom. Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. Un ited Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipe Fitting Indus. of U. S. & Canada, Local Union No. 38, AFL-CIO , 8 F.3d 29 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissing with prejudice after finding that “multi ple amendments have already been attempted; the Court’s specific admonitions to the plaintiff ha ve not been heeded; and the potential chilling effect on the right to pe tition guaranteed by the firs t amendment”).
V. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that amendment w ould be futile and that plaintiffs have repeatedly failed to cure the deficiencies in their complaints. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint will be denied as moot, and plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint will be denied, along with p laintiffs’ attempt to add defendants Western Surety and Paul T. Bruflat back into this ac tion. Plaintiffs have also failed to