J-A04041-18

*Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

C.T.E. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

D.S.E.

Appellant No. 1107 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 2016-50628

PACSES NO. 241115910

D.S.E. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

C.T.E.

Appellee No. 1107 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Dated June 13, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Domestic Relations at No(s): 2016-50682

PACSES NO. 699115940

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., AND RANSOM, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2018

Appellant, D.S.E. (“Father”), appeals from the order dated June 13, 

2017, entered in an action for support of the parties’ four minor children. 

Appellee, C.T.E. (“Mother”), has also filed a motion to quash the appeal. 

After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s entry of a sanction against 
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Father in the form of establishing his income at $4,388.00 per month, but 

we remand this case to the trial court and vacate the orders of January 6, 

2017, March 2, 2017, and June 13, 2017, for the limited purpose of allowing 

the trial court to clarify whether Father’s specified income was gross or net

and to allow any necessary recalculation of the child support award as a 

result of that clarification. Mother’s motion to quash is denied.

On May 4, 2016, Mother filed a complaint for child support against 

Father. On May 25, 2016, Father filed a complaint for alimony pendente lite.

On August 2, 2016, Mother served Father with her first set of 

interrogatories and her first request for production of documents. Pursuant 

to Pa.R.C.P. 4006 and 4009.12, Father was required to answer these 

requests within thirty days. Having received no response, on October 19, 

2016, Mother filed a motion to compel discovery. On October 21, 2016, 

Father answered the interrogatories but produced only a fraction of the 

items in Mother’s request for production of documents. On November 16, 

2016, the trial court entered an order requiring Father to answer Mother’s 

discovery requests within twenty days or be subject to sanctions. Mother’s 

counsel contacted Father’s counsel about the missing documents on 

November 3 and 17, 2016. On November 23, 2016, Mother’s counsel sent 

an e-mail to Father’s counsel itemizing missing documents. On December 7, 

2016, Father filed objections to Mother’s request for production of 

documents.
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On December 15, 2016, Mother filed a motion for sanctions for 

Father’s failure to respond to discovery. Father never responded to this 

motion. On January 6, 2017, the trial court entered an order imposing 

sanctions, including a sanction establishing Father’s income at $4,388 per 

month.

On March 2, 2017, the trial court dismissed Father’s complaint for 

alimony pendent lite and ordered Father to pay $1,232 per month in 

support. This child support obligation was based upon the monthly income 

ordered for Father of $4,388 as a sanction in the January 6th order.

Thereafter, Father filed exceptions to the support order, and, on 

June 13, 2017, the trial court entered an order overruling Father’s 

exceptions. In that order, the trial court explained that its reasons for 

entering the sanctions on January 6, 2017, were:

because of [Father’s] dilatory conduct in failing to timely provide 

the requested discovery regarding his income and expenses and 

in light of his failure to timely respond to counsel’s repeated 

requests for said information after we had entered an Order 

dated November 16, 2016 directing him to produce the 

requested discovery without objection within twenty days, which 

he ignored, other than to file a dilatory Answer and Objections, 

and also in failing to respond to a further Motion for Sanctions 

establishing his income at $4,388.00 per month; by failing to 

respond to said Motion, [Father] waived any argument he may 

have otherwise [had] as to whether that income was gross 

business receipts, a monthly gross income figure or a monthly 

net income figure.

Trial Ct. Order, 6/13/17, at 1-2.
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On July 10, 2017, Father simultaneously filed a notice of appeal and 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

(“1925(b) Statement”). On July 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order 

that its order of June 13, 2017, would serve as its opinion pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

By order of August 2, 2017, this Court directed Father to show cause 

as to why this appeal should not be quashed as having been taken from an 

order that is interlocutory and not appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) (“an 

appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a government unit or 

trial court”). Father filed a timely response, arguing why the subject order is 

final and appealable, as follows:

With the entry of [the trial court]’s Order of June 13, 2017, the 

Interim Support Order became a Final Support Order, and a Final 

Order as it relates to the Judge’s prior Sanctions Orders, and 

with the entry of the Order of June 13, 2017 the instant support 

matter became final, since it disposed of all claims of all of the 

parties, and there are no claims pending before the Court of 

Common Pleas of Schuylkill County.

Father’s Answer to Order of Aug. 2, 2017, 8/10/17, at 2. Thereafter, this 

Court discharged the show cause order and referred the appealability issue 

to this merits panel.

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1), “[a] final order is any order that 

disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Since the June 13 order disposes of 

all claims and all parties, Father is correct that it is a final, appealable order.

On August 23, 2017, Mother filed with this Court what she labelled to 

be a “motion to quash appeal.” More accurately, Mother is not requesting 
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that the entire appeal be quashed but that any issues raised in Father’s brief 

that were not raised in his Statement not be considered by this Court. 

Based upon our review of Father’s 1925(b) Statement and of the statement 

of questions involved in Father’s Brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2116, we find no 

issues raised in Father’s Brief that were not also preserved in his 1925(b) 

Statement.1

Father now raises four issues for our review:

I. Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion by entering 

an order sanctioning [Father] for allegedly[

2] failing to fully and 

completely respond to [Mother]’s discovery requests, without 

providing [Father] with the opportunity to argue the merits of 

the motion for sanctions, and without requiring that [Mother] 

follow the strict procedure, dealing with motions practice in 

Schuykill County.

II. Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion by 

imposing the severe sanction of attributing an inflated earning 

capacity to [Father], as a sanction for [Father]’s alleged failure 

to file full and complete answers to [Mother]’s discovery 

requests, and did the [trial] court impose the sanction without 

evaluating the factors which this [C]ourt has indicated must be 

evaluated before sanction may be imposed, including whether 

the violation of the discovery rules was willful, whether the 

alleged failure to respond was in bad faith, whether [Mother] had 

been prejudiced as a result of [Father]’s alleged failure to fully 

and completely respond to the discovery requests, the number 

of prior violations of the discovery rules, whether the alleged 

____________________________________________

1 Moreover, since any issues not included in a statement of matters 

complained of on appeal are deemed waived pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii), we would not consider any such issues, in any case.

2 Throughout his brief to this Court, Father “respectfully submits that he did 

fully and completely answer [Mother]’s discovery requests[.]” Father’s Brief 

at 21; see also id. at 9-10, 14.
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failure to respond could be cured, the nature and severity of the 

discovery violation, and the importance of the precluded 

evidence in light of the failure to comply?

III. Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion by sua 

sponte imposing sanctions by its sanctions order of January 6, 

2017, although the [trial] court had previously directed, by its 

order of December 28, 2016, that the support paperwork be 

returned to the domestic relations office, in light of [Father]’s 

answers and objections filed in response to [Mother]’s discovery 

requests?

IV. Did the [trial] court err and abus[e] its discretion by 

imposing, as a sanction, an earning capacity of $4,388.00 on 

[Father], without indicating whether this was [Father]’s gross or 

net income, which the support hearing officer indicated he was 

obliged to accept, without permitting [Father] to offer any 

evidence whatsoever to establish his income and expenses.

Father’s Brief at 5-6 (suggested answers omitted).

Our standard of review is as follows:

Generally, imposition of sanctions for a party’s failure to comply 

with discovery is subject to the discretion of the trial court, as is 

the severity of the sanctions imposed. The trial court’s 

discretion, however, is not unfettered. When a discovery 

sanction is imposed, the sanction must be appropriate when 

compared to the violation of the discovery rules. Because 

dismissal is the most severe sanction, it should be imposed only 

in extreme circumstances, and a trial court is required to balance

the equities carefully and dismiss only where the violation of the 

discovery rules is willful and the opposing party has been 

prejudiced.

Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied Am. St., LP, 28 A.3d 

916, 926 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal brackets, citations, and quotation 

marks omitted).

In the current action, Father contends that:

the [trial] court erred and abused its discretion by entering an 

order sanctioning [him] for allegedly failing to fully and 
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completely respond to [Mother]’s discovery requests, without 

providing [him] with the opportunity to argue the merits of the 

motion for sanctions, and without requiring that [Mother] follow 

the strict procedures under the Schuylkill County Rules of Civil 

Procedure, dealing with motions practice in Schuylkill County.

* * *

The [trial] court erred and abused its discretion by imposing the 

severe sanction of attributing an inflated earning capacity to 

[Father], as a sanction for [Father]’s alleged failure to file full 

and complete answers to [Mother]’s discovery requests, without 

carefully evaluating the factors which this Court has clearly 

indicated must be evaluated before sanctions may be imposed, 

including whether the violation of the discovery rules was willful, 

whether the alleged failure to respond was in bad faith, whether 

[Mother] had been prejudiced as a result of [Father]’s alleged 

failure to fully and completely respond to the discovery requests, 

the number of prior violations of the discovery rules, whether the 

alleged failure to respond could be cured, the nature and 

severity of the discovery violation, and the importance of the 

precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply. . . .

[I]t is also clear that the [trial court is] essentially “throwing him 

out of Court”, without taking into consideration the factors which 

have been repeatedly enunciated by this Court, when the [trial 

c]ourts are determining a sanction, warrant this Court’s 

reversing the [trial c]ourt’s Order of January 6, 2017 imposing 

sanctions, and remanding the instant matter to the Court of 

Common Pleas of Schuylkill County for a new Support Hearing.

Father’s Brief at 18, 21-22.

3

Mother answers:

____________________________________________

3 We combine our analysis of Father’s first and second issues raised on 

appeal, because both concern whether the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion in granting Mother’s motion for discovery sanctions and imposing 

a sanction of a specific monthly income without first allowing a hearing on 

either the motion for sanctions or the underlying child support claim. See 

Father’s Brief at 18-25.
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The trial court properly entered an order imposing sanctions on 

[Father] for his repeated and willful failure to cooperate with 

discovery and with an order compelling him to provide evidence 

of his income and expenses without a hearing when [Father] also 

failed to answer the motion for sanctions or request a hearing 

pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure and the 

Schuylkill County local rules, thereby waiving his objections.

Mother’s Brief at 18.

According to Pa.R.C.P. 208.3(b):

A court, by local rule, numbered Local Rule 208.3(b), may 

impose requirements with respect to motions listed in the rule 

for the filing of a response, a brief or both. Where a response is 

required, any party opposing a motion governed by Local Rule 

208.3(b) shall file the response within twenty days after service 

of the motion, unless the time for filing the response is modified 

by court order or enlarged by local rule.

The applicable local rule, here, states:

Every motion not certified as uncontested shall be accompanied 

by a memorandum containing a concise statement of the legal 

contentions and authorities relied upon in support of the motion 

and an affidavit of service upon the party against whom relief is 

sought, or to his attorney.

Any party opposing the motion shall file and serve such answer 

or other response that may be appropriate, a memorandum in 

opposition, and an affidavit of service upon the other party 

within twenty (20) days after service of the originating motion 

and supporting brief, unless the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure mandate a period of time different than twenty (20) 

days. In the absence of a timely response, the motion 

may be treated as uncontested. The Court may require or 

permit further briefing, if appropriate.

Schuylkill Cty. R.C.P. 208.3(b) (emphasis added).

4

____________________________________________

4

It is undisputed that this local rule of civil procedure applies to Mother’s 

motion for sanctions, as both parties cite to it. Father’s Brief at 19; Mother’s 

Brief at 18-20, 22-23.
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Here, Father never filed an answer to Mother’s motion for sanctions. 

By his own admission, he did not follow the local rules of civil procedure, 

Father’s Brief at 19. Hence, the trial court properly treated Mother’s motion 

as uncontested. See Schuylkill Cty. R.C.P. 208.3(b). Since the motion was 

deemed uncontested, there was no reason for the trial court to schedule a 

hearing on the motion or to evaluate any factors prior to imposing sanctions. 

Father also contends that the trial court should not have considered 

Mother’s motion for sanctions, because it was not accompanied by the 

memorandum required by Schuylkill Cty. R.C.P. 208.3(b). Father’s Brief at 

19. He argues:

[A]lthough the Schuylkill County Local Rule did provide that a 

Motion had to be responded to, since the Court of Common Pleas 

of Schuylkill County ignored the Rule dealing with the 

requirements of a movant who files a motion, which includes the 

filing of a brief, and Cove Centre, Inc.[ v. Westhafer Constr., 

965 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. 2009),] makes it clear that Pa. R.C.P. 

208.3 and Pa. R.C.P. 4019 effectively mandate oral argument 

whenever a discovery motion is neither uncontested nor facial 

meritless, [Father] respectfully submits that the [trial] court 

erred and abused its discretion by imposing the severe sanction 

of attributing an income to him for support guideline purposes, 

without allowing him to present testimony on his true earning 

capacity.

Id. at 20-21.

However, since Father never responded to Mother’s motion for 

sanctions, he never raised this claim before the trial court. “Issues not 

raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time 
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on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Consequently, this challenge is waived.5 

Accordingly, Father’s first and second issues are meritless.

Additionally, Father alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by 

imposing sanctions “sua sponte.” Nevertheless, the trial court did not 

impose sanctions sua sponte. Mother motioned for sanctions, and the trial 

court’s imposition of sanctions against Father was in direct response to 

Mother’s motion. Father’s third issue is therefore meritless.

Finally, Father argues that the trial court “erred and abused its 

discretion by imposing a sanction which provided that, for purposes of the 

support action, [Father]’s income was established at $4,388.00, without 

indicating whether this was his gross or net income[.]” Father’s Brief at 27. 

Father is correct that the trial court should have specified in its sanctions 

____________________________________________

5 Assuming this issue were not waived, Father still misapplies Cove Centre, 

Inc. v. Westhafer Constr., 965 A.2d 259 (Pa. Super. 2009). While Cove 

Centre held that “both Rule 208.3 and Pa.R.C.P. 4019 effectively mandate 

oral argument whenever a discovery motion is neither uncontested nor 

facially meritless,” id. at 263, Father disregards the fact Mother’s motion for 

sanctions was deemed uncontested by operation of Schuylkill Cty. R.C.P. 

208.3(b), due to Father’s failure to file a timely response.

Moreover, the procedural history in Cove Centre can be distinguished from 

the current action in a number of ways. In Cove Centre, there was no prior 

order compelling discovery, the motion for discovery sanctions was granted 

three days after it was filed, and there was no record as to whether the 

motion for discovery sanctions was ever served upon the sanctioned party. 

965 A.2d at 264. By contrast, here, there was an earlier order compelling 

discovery and a basis upon which to conclude that the sanctioned party was 

aware of the motion and had ample opportunity to respond.
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order whether Father’s stated income of $4,388 was gross or net income, 

because Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2 requires that “the amount of support to be 

awarded is based upon the parties’ monthly net income.” Hence, we remand 

this case to the trial court and vacate the orders of January 6, 2017, March 

2, 2017, and June 13, 2017, for the limited purpose of allowing the trial 

court to clarify whether the income specified for Father in the January 2017 

discovery sanction order was gross or net and to allow any necessary 

recalculation of the child support award as a result of that clarification.

Motion to quash denied. Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. 

Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/27/2018