Thomas Dwayne Cook v. State of Maryland, No. 14, September Term, 2023. Opinion by 

Eaves, J.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING – EXCULPATORY OR MITIGATING EVIDENCE

Section 8-201(d)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code provides that 

a person convicted of a crime of violence is entitled to post-conviction DNA testing if “a 

reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce 

exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or 

sentencing[]” and “the requested DNA test employs a method of testing generally accepted 

within the relevant scientific community.” Appellant claimed that DNA testing had a 

reasonable probability of producing evidence tending to show that he engaged in selfdefense and that the victim’s injuries lacked the requisite severity to sustain his conviction. 

The Supreme Court of Maryland held that there was not a reasonable probability that DNA 

testing of the evidence requested had the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or 

mitigating evidence. As such, the circuit court properly denied Appellant’s petition for 

post-conviction DNA testing without a hearing.
Circuit Court for Somerset County

Case No. 19-K-05-008029

Argued: June 3, 2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT 

OF MARYLAND

No. 14

September Term, 2023

THOMAS DWAYNE COOK

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Fader, C.J.,

Watts,

Booth,

Biran,

Gould,

Eaves,

Hotten, Michelle D., (Senior 

Justice, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

Opinion by Eaves, J.

Filed: August 20, 2024
I

INTRODUCTION

Section 8-201 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) of the Maryland Annotated 

Code (1957, 2018 Repl. Vol.) (the “DNA Testing Statute”) allows individuals convicted 

of certain crimes to petition for DNA testing of certain evidence.1 Under this statute, an 

individual is entitled to that DNA testing if a circuit court finds that two criteria have been 

met: (1) “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to 

produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or 

sentencing[]” and (2) “the requested DNA test employs a method of testing generally 

accepted within the relevant scientific community.”2

This case is a direct appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Somerset County,

denying a request for DNA testing.3 Thomas Dwayne Cook, Appellant, was convicted of

several crimes, including the first-degree assault of Lieutenant Aubrey Fletcher, while 

Appellant was serving a prison sentence for a prior, unrelated crime at Eastern Correctional

Institution (“ECI”) in Westover, Maryland. Appellant appeals an October 19, 2023, order

1 CP § 8-201(b)(1).

2

Id. § 8-201(d)(1)(i)–(ii).

3 The DNA Testing Statute provides for a direct appeal from the circuit court to this 

Court. Id. § 8-201(k)(6) (“An appeal to the [Supreme Court of Maryland] may be taken 

from an order entered under this section.”). The General Assembly enacted the DNA 

Testing Statute in 2001, see 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 418, but an individual’s direct right of 

appeal did not arise until two years later, see 2003 Md. Laws, ch. 240. While the original 

appellate right was limited only to orders issued pursuant to certain subsections at that time, 

a direct appeal to this Court—as the right exists today—may be taken from any order 

entered under CP § 8-201.
2

of the circuit court that denied, without a hearing, his July 2023 Petition for DNA Testing 

(the “Petition”), in which he seeks DNA testing of the shirt he wore at the time of the 

assault against Lt. Fletcher. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the 

circuit court.

II

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The pertinent facts underlying Appellant’s convictions come from the trial 

testimony of correctional staff, Appellant, and other inmates at ECI.

On the morning of October 30, 2004, Appellant started his work assignment as the 

housing tier’s laundryman. While doing his rounds, Correctional Officer (“CO”) Thomas 

Cook (unrelated to Appellant) and Appellant became involved in an argument. CO Cook 

believed that, at some point in the argument, Appellant called him an expletive. 

Accordingly, CO Cook informed his supervisor, Lt. Fletcher, about the infraction. Looking 

to question Appellant about the argument, Lt. Fletcher found and ordered Appellant to 

follow him to a part of the housing unit where other inmates would not hear the 

conversation. The testimony paints markedly different versions of what happened next. 

The correctional staff’s version is as follows. Lt. Fletcher claimed that, once in a 

more private area, he asked Appellant about the argument with CO Cook and whether 

Appellant used profanity. Lt. Fletcher described Appellant as “belligerent”—flailing his 

arms while declaring that he did not have to listen to the lieutenant. In response, Lt. 

Fletcher fired Appellant from his work assignment and instructed Appellant to return to his 
3

cell and “lock in” by shutting the door behind himself. Appellant did not comply and 

instead walked away to converse with other inmates. 

Lt. Fletcher approached Appellant, whose back was facing Lt. Fletcher, and 

reiterated that Appellant needed to lock in. At this point, CO Cynthia Powell, who was on 

duty in the housing unit, witnessed Appellant turn around and say, “I’m not going to have 

anyone disrespect me, you’re treating me like a child[,]” and “with a clenched fist . . . hit 

[Lt. Fletcher.]” Lt. Fletcher recounted that Appellant “started beating [him] in [his] head 

and face area.” Another inmate joined Appellant, kicking Lt. Fletcher in the same area. 

Lt. Fletcher recalled that he received six to eight blows before blacking out. He also 

asserted that he never touched Appellant during their encounter. CO Vanessa Jones, the 

second officer in charge of the housing unit, did not witness Appellant’s initial punch but 

observed Appellant and the second inmate assaulting Lt. Fletcher. CO Powell used a can 

of mace against the inmates assaulting Lt. Fletcher, but they continued their attack. The 

assault only concluded after CO Powell retreated to CO Jones’s station to retrieve another 

can of mace. By the time CO Powell returned to Lt. Fletcher, Appellant and the other 

inmate had fled from the area where the assault took place.

Appellant recalled the events differently. He described how Lt. Fletcher raised his 

voice while pointing his finger in Appellant’s face. After telling Lt. Fletcher that he did 

not curse at CO Cook, the conversation ended, and Appellant proceeded to grab his 

laundry. Appellant then explained that he started conversing with another inmate just as

Lt. Fletcher came from behind and grabbed his arm. Aware that it was Lt. Fletcher, but 
4

worried that he was going to be assaulted,4 Appellant “instinct[ually] . . . turned around 

and . . . struck [Lt. Fletcher].”

5 According to Appellant, he and Lt. Fletcher then exchanged 

three or four punches each. Appellant believed that, during the altercation, Lt. Fletcher

struck Appellant in the “lower eye”

6 with a “big ring” that Lt. Fletcher was wearing. The 

fight concluded, according to Appellant, after CO Powell deployed a can of mace, causing 

Appellant to retreat to the tier’s dayroom to wash his face. Another CO eventually detained 

Appellant.

COs Powell and Jones described Lt. Fletcher’s physical condition in the aftermath 

of the assault. CO Powell saw Lt. Fletcher crouched in the corner of the room fading in 

and out of consciousness as blood poured from his face. CO Jones observed Lt. Fletcher

slumped over and unable to move. CO Jones saw medical staff place Lt. Fletcher’s neck 

in a brace and take him by stretcher for medical treatment. At the local hospital where Lt. 

Fletcher was taken by ambulance, one of Lt. Fletcher’s neurologists determined that Lt. 

Fletcher suffered a concussion. The neurologist expressed that Lt. Fletcher deserved 

“appropriate attention and evaluation in the emergency room” because there was “certainly 

reason to believe there was a potential of serious injury[,] meaning . . . potentially

4 Given “the way [Lt. Fletcher] grabbed [him,]” Appellant feared that Lt. Fletcher 

was going to “assault [him].”

5 Two other inmates called to testify at trial similarly recounted that Lt. Fletcher 

grabbed Appellant’s arm, who responded by spinning around and striking Lt. Fletcher. 

However, desiring to stay out of the fray, the two inmates quickly left the area without 

witnessing the rest of the altercation.

6 The record does not indicate in which eye Appellant claims that Lt. Fletcher struck 

him.
5

intercranial bleeding[.]” As a result of the assault, Lt. Fletcher suffered hearing loss, 

tinnitus, dizziness, blurry vision, headaches, loss of balance, neck and back pain, 

depression as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder, and short-term memory loss. These 

injuries caused Lt. Fletcher to retire early. 

B. Procedural Background

In addition to the testimony recounted above, we highlight several components of 

Appellant’s criminal trial relevant to this appeal. Notably, the State introduced into 

evidence the shirt and shorts that Appellant wore during the altercation with Lt. Fletcher. 

On the shirt are several circular-shaped stains in a line across what would be the stomach 

area. The State also introduced a picture of Appellant taken during the subsequent 

investigation, which depicts Appellant wearing the same shirt bearing the stains just 

described. 

At the close of the evidence, the circuit court instructed the jury on the law of perfect 

self-defense, which we discuss further below. The jury was also instructed on the law of 

first-degree assault, with the circuit court saying that the “State must prove all of the 

elements of second[-]degree assault . . . and must also prove[] . . . that the defendant . . . 

intended to cause serious physical injury in the commission of the assault.” The circuit 

court then defined serious physical injury for the jury as one that either “creates a 

substantial risk of death or[] . . . causes serious and permanent or serious and protracted 

disfigurement or loss of impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 

In closing arguments, the State told the jury that “the most important part” of the 

instructions was the portion that a “defendant [must have] intended to cause serious 
6

physical injury[]” to be convicted of first-degree assault. That instruction was most 

important, the State argued, because pictures of Lt. Fletcher that were also introduced into 

evidence demonstrated Appellant’s intent to cause serious physical harm. Further, during

its rebuttal argument, the State argued to the jury that the pictures depict “blood splatter all 

over [Appellant],” and that the only source of that blood could be Lt. Fletcher. This, the 

State pressed, had to be so because, despite Appellant’s testimony to the contrary, the 

picture of Appellant did not depict any injury to his eye.

The jury convicted Appellant of first-degree assault and reckless endangerment for 

the attack on Lt. Fletcher. The circuit court merged Appellant’s convictions and sentenced 

Appellant to 25 years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to the life-sentence he

already was serving.7

On appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions. 

As to his first-degree assault conviction, he argued that “the jury could not have found 

[that] he possessed the requisite intent to cause serious physical injury,” because he did not 

use a weapon and because Lt. Fletcher was not a “vulnerable person.” Cook v. State, No. 

2930, Sept. Term, 2007, slip op. at 9–10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 24, 2009). While the 

Appellate Court recognized that it was unclear how many of Lt. Fletcher’s injuries were 

attributable to Appellant, as opposed to the other inmate who attacked Lt. Fletcher, it held 

7 Appellant also was tried on charges of second-degree assault and reckless 

endangerment against CO Powell. The jury could not reach a unanimous verdict for the 

former, but it did convict him of the latter. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to five 

years’ incarceration for the reckless endangerment of CO Powell, to be served 

consecutively to the sentence for the crimes against Lt. Fletcher.
7

that the jury “could reasonably conclude that [A]ppellant, who was the first inmate to attack 

[Lt.] Fletcher, was intentionally attempting to inflict serious physical injury by his repeated 

blows to [Lt.] Fletcher’s head.” Id. at 10. Appellant sought review in this Court, but we

declined to issue a writ of certiorari. Cook v. State, 411 Md. 600 (2009).

On July 31, 2023, Appellant filed the instant Petition, seeking DNA testing of the 

substance on the shirt he wore during the time he assaulted Lt. Fletcher.8In the Petition, 

Appellant alleges that the State misrepresented to the jury that the blood spatter was Lt. 

Fletcher’s blood. The Petition then concludes that DNA testing will identify the stain’s 

source, and, therefore has a reasonable probability of being exculpatory or mitigating. In 

its Answer, the State argued that Appellant simply failed to provide any “explanation as to 

what reasonable probability exists that this testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating 

evidence.” On October 19, 2023, the circuit court, having received no reply from 

Appellant, issued its Order denying the Petition without a hearing.9 The court stated:

A clear review of the evidence and testimony from the trial of [Appellant] 

reflects overwhelming and persuasive evidence that [Appellant] assaulted Lt. 

Aubrey Fletcher and . . . that the assault on Lt. Fletcher was of such a heinous 

and vicious nature so as to constitute finding, beyond reasonable doubt, by a 

duly sworn and empaneled jury in the Circuit Court for Somerset County of 

first[-]degree assault.

8 Appellant previously filed for post-conviction relief under the Uniform 

Postconviction Procedure Act, CP § 7-101, et seq., but he was unsuccessful in obtaining 

any relief via that avenue.

9 The circuit court previously denied the Petition in August 2023 via a one-sentence 

order. This Court remanded the matter back to the circuit court to issue an order compliant 

with Maryland Rule 4-709(e), explaining why the Petition should be denied without a 

hearing. The circuit court then issued the order currently on appeal.
8

The court, thus, was “not persuaded . . . that DNA testing in [Appellant’s] case ha[d]

the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of 

wrongful conviction or sentencing and, therefore, that the Petition . . . should be denied 

without a hearing.” Appellant then noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, 

which was transferred to this Court.

III

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court ‘reviews without deference the legal standard that a [circuit] court uses 

in ruling on a petition[]’ for post-conviction DNA testing.” Satterfield v. State, 483 Md. 

452, 463 (2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 671 (2014)). 

The issue presented in this case is whether the circuit court erred in denying the Petition 

without a hearing. Under Maryland Rule 4-709(b)(1)(B), “the court shall deny the petition 

. . . as a matter of law,” where the “facts alleged in the petition . . . do not entitle the 

petitioner to relief” under the DNA Testing Statute. This Court reviews questions of law 

de novo. See Satterfield, 483 Md. at 466 (holding that, “as a matter of law, the facts alleged 

do not afford Petitioner relief[]”).

IV

ANALYSIS

We first provide an overview of the relevant law before we address the parties’ 

arguments and our resolution of those arguments.

A. The DNA Testing Statute, Associated Rules, and Relevant Caselaw

Because Appellant seeks relief through DNA testing, we first review the pertinent 

provisions of CP § 8-201, the associated Maryland Rules, and relevant precedent from this 
9

Court. The DNA Testing Statute authorizes an individual, who has been convicted of a 

crime of violence, pursuant to § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”) (1957, 2021 

Repl. Vol.),

10 to petition for DNA testing of “scientific identification evidence” that (1) the 

State possesses and (2) is related to the judgment of conviction. “Scientific identification 

evidence” is any evidence that:

(i) is related to an investigation or prosecution that resulted in a judgment of 

conviction;

(ii) is in the actual or constructive possession of a law enforcement agency 

or agent of a law enforcement agency; and

(iii) contains biological evidence from which DNA may be recovered that 

may produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of a 

convicted person of wrongful conviction or sentencing if subject to DNA 

testing.

CP § 8-201(a)(5). A court must order DNA testing if the court finds that:

(i) a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific 

potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim 

of wrongful conviction or sentencing; and

(ii) the requested DNA test employs a method of testing generally accepted 

within the relevant scientific community.

Id. § 8- 201(d)(1)(i)–(ii).

Under subsection (d), a “reasonable probability” is a “fair likelihood that something 

is true[,]” Givens, 459 Md. 694, 707 (2018) (citing Beaman v. State, 453 Md. 407, 420 

10 When discussing the DNA Testing Statute, we have often referred to the 

requirement that an individual be convicted of a necessary predicate offense before being 

able to file a petition as “standing.” See Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 725 n.3 (2009) 

(“Appellant, as a person convicted of first[-]degree murder, has standing to file the

petition.”). Appellant meets the standing requirement because of his conviction for firstdegree assault. See CR § 14-101(21).
10

(2017)); it does not mean that an individual must establish “that the result would have been 

different if the DNA results sought were known at the time of trial[,]” id. (quoting Edwards 

v. State, 453 Md. 174, 196 (2017)). Nor does an individual who seeks DNA testing need 

to prove that the results would exonerate the individual. Edwards, 453 Md. at 191 

(“Nothing in the plain language of the statute suggests that the testing results must 

‘exonerate’ a petitioner or ‘prove’ that someone else committed the crime.”). Rather, the 

evidence need only “tend to clear the accused of guilt, or tend to establish [the accused’s] 

innocence.” Givens, 459 Md. at 708 (emphases omitted) (quoting Edwards, 453 Md. at 

196). We move next to the procedural requirements outlined in CP § 8-201’s 

accompanying rules.

Maryland Rule 4-704(a) governs the content of an individual’s petition. As relevant 

here, a petition has three requirements. First, the petition must include a description of the 

specific scientific identification evidence that an individual seeks to test. Md. Rule 4-

704(a)(2)(A). Second, the petition must state a factual basis establishing that (1) the State 

either possesses that evidence or can acquire it, (2) the evidence relates to the conviction, 

and (3) a reasonable probability exists that the testing has the scientific potential to produce 

exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to the wrongful conviction or sentencing claim. 

Id. 4-704(a)(2)(B). Third, “to the extent known[,]” the petitioner must describe the type of 

DNA testing they wish to employ and explain that method’s general acceptance within the 

relevant scientific community. Id. 4-704(a)(2)(C).

Upon receiving notice of the filing of a petition, the State is required to file an 

answer within 60 days, unless the time to answer has been extended by the court. Id. 4-
11

706(a), (c)(1). A petitioner may then respond to the State no later than 60 days after receipt 

of the answer, id. 4-708; however, “[u]pon consideration of the State’s answer, the court 

may deny the petition if it finds as a matter of law that (1) the petitioner has no standing or 

(2) the facts alleged in the petition do not entitle the petitioner to relief[,]” id. 4-707(a). As 

we recently have held, the court’s discretion to deny the petition under Rule 4-707(a) does 

not require that it wait to receive a petitioner’s response or for the window in which the 

petitioner may file a response to close. Satterfield, 483 Md. at 481 (“Rule 4-707(a) neither 

requires the circuit court to await or consider [a p]etitioner’s response nor entitles [a 

p]etitioner to a response.”).

As relevant to this case, a court must hold a hearing if it finds that a petitioner has 

standing, the identified “scientific identification evidence” exists and is related to a 

judgment of conviction, there is a method of DNA testing that may exist and is “generally 

accepted within the relevant scientific community,” and “there is or may be a reasonable 

probability that [DNA] testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or 

mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing[.]” Md. Rule 

4-709(a)(1). However, the court must deny the petition without a hearing if the petitioner 

has no standing or, as a matter of law, the facts alleged in the petition, as required by Rule 

4-704, do not entitle the petitioner to relief under CP § 8-201. Id. 4-709(b)(1). “If the court 

declines to hold a hearing, it shall enter a written order stating the reasons why no hearing 

is required.” Id. 4-709(e). Where a hearing is not required by the Rules, a reviewing court 

nevertheless has the discretion to hold a hearing on the petition. Id. 4-709(c).
12

B. The Petition’s Facial Sufficiency

At the outset, the State contends that the Petition fails to comply with CP § 8-201 

and Rule 4-709 in that the Petition “does not so much as hint” at how testing has the 

scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The State argues that 

the Petition “provided no factual basis for [Appellant’s] bare assertion that DNA testing 

had a reasonable probability of producing exculpatory or mitigating evidence.” (Emphasis 

added). The State also highlights how Appellant asked the circuit court for permission to 

reply to the State so he could explain how DNA testing would have a reasonable probability 

of producing exculpatory or mitigating evidence. This, the State believes, “is exactly the

factual basis that [Appellant] was required to include in [the P]etition[]” and believes that

Appellant’s request concedes the Petition’s facial inadequacy, requiring that it be denied 

without a hearing. (Emphasis added).

The State does not cite to Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B) in making these assertions. But, the 

requirement that a petition contain “statement[s] of the factual bas[e]s” for certain claims

comes directly from that Rule. See Md. Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B) (“The petition shall contain: 

. . .a statement of the factual basis for the claims that . . . .”) (emphasis added)). Naturally, 

then, the State’s allegation that the Petition contained “no factual basis” for one of the three 

required claims is an argument that the Petition did not conform to the pleading 

requirements in Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B).11

11 Our interpretation of the State’s argument is further confirmed by the State’s 

position during oral argument. There, the State reiterated that it believed the Petition was 

“legally insufficient” because it contained only three facts: (1) the introduction of the 

picture showing Appellant in his stained shirt, (2) the shirt contained a blood-like substance 
13

We recognize that Appellant petitioned the circuit court pro se and that we liberally 

construe such pleadings, Simms, 409 Md. at 731 (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 

n.7 (1980)), especially in the case of remedial laws like the DNA Testing Statute, id. at 

731–32. Applying a liberal construction, the Petition meets the pleading requirements of

Rule 4-704. The Petition asserts that Appellant “seeks to have tested [the] clothing that’s 

under the State’s control purportedly with the victim’s blood on them.” It also alleges that,

during the criminal trial, the State presented evidence of a “blood[-]like substance” on the 

Appellant’s clothes from the incident, which “[t]he State misrepresented . . . by indicating 

that [Appellant’s] clothing was covered in blood.” The Petition also asserts that the State 

told the jury that there was only one place “this blood” could have come from—the victim, 

Lt. Fletcher. Finally, Appellant’s Petition concludes by stating that there “is a reasonable 

probability that the DNA testing will produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence” by 

“identify[ing] the source of . . . the blood splatter that’s on [Appellant’s]clothing.”

Appellant, thus, identified the scientific evidence to be tested as the blood or other 

substance on his clothing, alleged that the clothing is in the State’s control, and explained

how the State used the evidence at trial. These assertions satisfied Maryland Rules 4-

704(a)(2)(A)–(a)(2)(B)(ii). This leaves us to discern whether Appellant’s assertion that the 

on it, and (3) the State’s suggestion to the jury that the blood came from Lt. Fletcher. From 

that, the State believes that it was “not reasonable” that the circuit court could come up 

with the “novel theory” that Appellant advances, i.e., that the blood stain came from Lt. 

Fletcher and, therefore, supports Appellant’s claim of self-defense. Thus, the State 

believes that the Petition “did not allege facts on which a court could find in his favor.” 

(Emphasis added). Again, we interpret the State to be arguing that the Petition did not 

contain the requisite “factual basis” as required by Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B).
14

State misrepresented the stains as Lt. Fletcher’s blood, and his contention that DNA testing 

would determine the stains’ source satisfies Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B)(iii)’s requirement to plead 

the existence of a reasonable probability that testing the stain has the scientific potential to 

produce relevant exculpatory or mitigating evidence. 

While Appellant’s formulation perhaps is not the most fine-tuned, applying the 

liberal construction appropriate to his pro se pleading, we hold that it is sufficient. The 

Petition reflects Appellant’s theory that the State improperly argued to the jury that 

Appellant’s shirt, which was introduced into evidence, contained Lt. Fletcher’s blood. Cf.

Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 184 (2011) (holding that, while the defendant’s pro se

petition for a writ of actual innocence explicitly did not ask for a hearing, the petition 

nevertheless “indicated [the defendant’s] desire” for one and “recited” pertinent provisions 

of the statute at issue). Given that Appellant’s theory of the case at trial was self-defense, 

and the State introduced the picture of Appellant and the clothing in support of its firstdegree assault charge, the logical reading of the Petition is that Appellant believes the 

testing of the stains could support his self-defense claim by demonstrating that the blood 

is his, and not Lt. Fletcher’s. Appellant’s Petition, thus, satisfied the requirement that he 

plead the existence of a reasonable probability that testing has the scientific potential to 

produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.12 Thus, a liberal review of the Petition shows 

12 At this stage, we do not evaluate the merits of the statement, just whether 

Appellant complied with the pleading requirements of Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B).
15

that it complies with the requirements set out in Maryland Rule 4-704.

13 We now turn to 

the merits. 

C. Appellant’s Substantive Claims

1. Appellant’s entitlement to relief under CP § 8-201

Appellant believes that a proper analysis of the evidence he seeks to have tested will 

reveal that he is at least entitled to a hearing in the circuit court about his right to testing. 

He claims that his initial pro se pleading makes a prima facie showing that, for two reasons,

there is a reasonable probability that DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce 

exculpatory or mitigating evidence. First, Appellant argues that testimony about a mutual 

exchange of blows lends credence to the possibility that the stain on the clothing is his 

blood, contrary to the State’s claim that it was Lt. Fletcher’s blood. If DNA testing of the 

stain confirms that it is Appellant’s blood, then Appellant claims it would corroborate his 

account of a mutual exchange of blows and that his resulting injury was incurred while 

acting in self-defense. Accordingly, Appellant avers that because complete self-defense 

acquits a defendant of all charges, an outcome where the stain was Appellant’s blood would 

tend to be exculpatory or mitigating. 

13 While a petition for DNA testing also must provide a description of the DNA 

testing sought and that testing’s general acceptance within the relevant scientific 

community, we are mindful that such information is required, “to the extent known[.]” Md. 

Rule 4-704(a)(2)(C). The Petition does not request or mention any specific form of DNA 

testing. We assume that Appellant is not requesting anything beyond routine DNA testing 

used to determine whether the stain is in fact blood and, if so, whose blood. Therefore, 

Rule 4-704(a)(2)(C) poses no impediment to the Petition’s adequacy.
16

Second, Appellant contends that “the State argued that the untested substance was 

[Lt.] Fletcher’s blood and therefore demonstrative of [Lt.] Fletcher’s serious physical 

injury.” So, Appellant claims, if the stains are either Appellant’s blood or something other 

than blood, either outcome “tend[s] to negate” the serious bodily injury that the State 

claimed Lt. Fletcher suffered, mitigating Appellant’s guilt.

For its part, the State puts forth two reasons that we should affirm the circuit court. 

First, the State contends that there is not “a fair likelihood” that testing has the scientific 

potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The State maintains that the 

circuit court’s analysis is not an example of “clear error” because the record is clear that 

the stains are not Appellant’s blood. The State relies on the absence of any evidence

offered at trial tying Appellant’s injuries, if he suffered any, to the stains and on evidence 

that the only medical attention Appellant sought was to wash the mace out of his eyes, 

which he also suggested at trial was the source of the stain. In support, the State points out 

that the photo of Appellant taken after the incident demonstrates an absence of any cuts or 

blood, and that Appellant, in his closing argument, implies that he was uninjured. This, 

the State contends, stands in contrast to the testimony that described Lt. Fletcher’s 

extensive bleeding and other injuries.

Second, and more directly challenging testing of the stain, the State contends that 

under Appellant’s version of events, DNA testing would not advance his self-defense 

claim. It notes that Appellant’s own testimony was that he responded to a grab of the arm 

by punching Lt. Fletcher in the face. To the State, that use of force was unreasonable in 

the context of “an exceedingly minor provocation.” Although Appellant claims that a prior 
17

history of assault by Lt. Fletcher made him fear the same would occur on this occasion, 

Appellant’s fear here was not reasonable given that Lt. Fletcher only “grabbed” or “pulled 

on” Appellant’s arm. As a result, the self-defense claim “would necessarily fail regardless 

of the nature or source of the substance on” Appellant’s clothing. 

As to the severity of Lt. Fletcher’s injuries, the State contends that Appellant’s 

position is likewise unavailing because of the overwhelming evidence of the nature of Lt. 

Fletcher’s injuries. Relying on the “attempt” prong of first-degree assault, the State argues 

that the testimony that Appellant repeatedly punched Lt. Fletcher in the face demonstrates 

an attempt to cause serious physical injury.

Evaluating these arguments in light of the record below, we hold that the circuit 

court did not err in denying Appellant’s Petition. Appellant did not satisfy his burden to 

identify that there may be a reasonable probability that DNA testing has the scientific 

potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence and, therefore, he is not entitled to 

a hearing on his Petition.

A petitioner for DNA testing must show that, “more than [a] mere possibility,” there 

is a “fair likelihood” that testing would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. 

Satterfield, 483 Md. at 467 (quoting Givens, 459 Md. at 707). Appellant must “demonstrate 

that the testing he seeks has the scientific potential to produce evidence that would tend to 

show that he did not commit the crime, or that he is innocent.” Givens, 459 Md. at 708. 

The crime of first-degree assault, CR § 3-202, for purposes of this case, prohibits a person 
18

from intentionally causing or attempting to cause serious physical injury to another.14 In 

other words, Appellant must show that testing the stain on his shirt would tend to show that 

he did not commit first-degree assault. See Givens, 459 Md. at 708; Satterfield, 483 Md. 

at 467 (“Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the testing 

of the cigarette butt ‘has the scientific potential’ to produce exculpatory or mitigating 

evidence ‘that would tend to show that he did not commit the crime[.]’” (alteration in 

original) (citation omitted)). We do not find that to be true here.

By his own admission, Appellant struck Lt. Fletcher multiple times. Because 

Appellant believes his conduct was justified and, in the alternative, contests the severity 

thereof, we will “examine the facts of the crime, . . . the petitioner’s assertions[,]” as well 

as the evidence the jury heard regarding Appellant’s stained shirt. Givens, 459 Md. at 714 

(citations omitted).15

14 The crime of first-degree assault has remained unchanged since the time of 

Appellant’s original conviction. See CR § 3-202 (2002) (prohibiting one from 

“intentionally causing or attempting to cause serious physical injury to another”).

15 In previous opinions, we have identified multiple factors, in addition to the ones 

noted above, for courts to consider when determining whether DNA testing has the 

potential to mitigate conduct or exculpate the petitioner. If relevant, a court may also assess 

(1) the nature of the item (e.g., whether it is an instrumentality of the crime), (2) the 

physical proximity between where the item was located and where the crime occurred, (3) 

the temporal proximity between when the perpetrator touched the item and when the crime 

occurred, (4) the temporal proximity between the crime and the discovery of the item, and 

(5) the condition of the item. Edwards, 453 Md. at 199 (discussing factors (1)–(3)); Givens, 

459 Md. at 714 (discussing factors (4)–(5)). Because these factors are aimed primarily at 

determining who committed a crime, they are inapplicable in this case. See Satterfield, 483 

Md. at 464 (“[The petitioner] believes that the DNA testing could ‘implicate’ . . . [two other 

persons] before the jury.”); Givens, 459 Md. at 702 (“[The petitioner] denied that he killed 

[victim].”); Beaman, 453 Md. at 411 (“Defense counsel explained to the jury during closing 
19

Recall that Appellant’s theory of the case was that he punched Lt. Fletcher in selfdefense. Appellant now contends that a DNA test showing that the blood on his clothing 

was his own would be exculpatory because it would support his self-defense claim. As its 

name suggests, perfect self-defense is a total defense to murder—and all lesser included

offenses including first-degree assault—and, “if credited by the trier of fact, results in an 

acquittal.” Porter v. State, 455 Md. 220, 235 (2017) (quoting State v. Smullen, 380 Md. 

233, 251 (2004)). Perfect self-defense requires a showing of the following:

(1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself in 

apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily harm 

from his assailant or potential assailant;

(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger;

(3) The accused claiming the right of self-defense must not have been the 

aggressor or provoked the conflict; and

(4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, that is, 

the force must not have been more force than the exigency demanded.

arguments [the petitioner’s] theory of misidentification[.]”); Edwards, 453 Md. at 182 

(“[The petitioner] denied having any contact with [victim] on the night in question.”).

Appellant, however, argues that the circuit court’s Order had to rely on these factors 

and that the failure to do so was an error. We reiterate, however, that using these factors 

is not a requirement. A circuit court may consider none, some, or all of the factors,

depending on whether they are relevant in a particular case, and, as discussed, here they 

are not. See Edwards, 453 Md. at 199 (“[A] court may take into account factors such as . . 

. .” (emphasis added)); Givens, 459 Md. at 714 (“We consider that some of the factors set 

forth in Edwards are relevant here[.]” (emphasis added)).
20

Id. at 234–35 (quoting Smullen, 380 Md. at 252). Thus, Appellant must demonstrate that 

DNA testing of his clothing has a reasonable probability of producing evidence that tends 

to show he acted in self-defense. See Givens, 459 Md. at 708; Satterfield, 483 Md. at 467.

16

But using DNA testing to determine the source of the “blood-like” stains is 

irrelevant to the merits of Appellant’s perfect self-defense claim. An analysis of perfect

self-defense requires ascertaining the defendant’s subjective beliefs at the time of the 

confrontation, and then determining whether, objectively, those beliefs were reasonable. 

Porter, 455 Md. at 235. Perfect self-defense in Maryland requires “that the defendant’s 

belief of imminent death or serious bodily harm and the need to respond with the amount 

of force used ‘coincide with that which would have been entertained under the same 

circumstances by a person of average prudence.’” State v. Marr, 362 Md. 467, 480 (2001)

(quoting Guerriero v. State, 213 Md. 545, 549 (1957)). Whether a “reasonable person” 

would be in fear and reach the same conclusions as a defendant, i.e., that using force is 

necessary, is a fact-specific inquiry examining the circumstances as they existed in the 

moments before the defendant used force. See Smullen, 380 Md. at 270 (“[I]f the 

defendant is confronted by a person with a gun, he may reasonably, even if incorrectly, 

believe that the gun is loaded and presents an imminent danger and shoot the person in 

self-defense.”); Marr, 362 Md. at 480 (“In making that determination, the facts or 

16 In Jones v. State, we stated that if a defendant successfully argues perfect selfdefense, then that individual is “legally exonerated from the criminal liability his or her 

actions may create[.]” 357 Md. 408, 425 (2000) (emphasis added). As we have discussed 

above, exoneration is narrower than exculpation. See Givens, 459 Md. at 707–08. It stands 

to reason then that if DNA testing has a reasonable probability of exonerating Appellant, 

such testing automatically will have a reasonable probability of exculpating him.
21

circumstances must be taken as perceived by the defendant, even if they were not the true 

facts or circumstances, so long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s position could 

also reasonably perceive the facts or circumstances in that way.”); State v. Martin, 329 

Md. 351, 365 (1993) (“Since it is the defendant’s subjective belief at the moment that the 

fatal shot is fired that is relevant and probative, evidence of a prior mental state will not 

suffice.”).

Appellant testified that it was his “instinct[]” to punch Lt. Fletcher because the 

lieutenant grabbed his arm while he was trying to walk away. Appellant also testified about 

two previous confrontations with Lt. Fletcher one year to 18 months before the events of 

this case. On those two occasions, Appellant stated that Lt. Fletcher “would go out of his 

way just to say little things just to irritate [Appellant].” Appellant further testified that 

when Lt. Fletcher confronted him about calling CO Cook a profane name with Lt. Fletcher

“st[i]ck[ing] his finger in [Appellant’s] face,” Appellant stated: “he’s not going to treat me 

like a child.”

Even under Appellant’s version of the facts, self-defense, as articulated in Porter, 

is legally unavailable to Appellant. First, there are no grounds, reasonable or otherwise, to 

believe that Appellant was in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious 

bodily harm from Lt. Fletcher. See Porter, 455 Md. at 234–35. In his previous 

“confrontations” with Lt. Fletcher, Appellant indicated that Lt. Fletcher only “used to say 

things to irritate [him].” Second, there are no facts to show that Appellant believed himself 

“in this [apparent imminent or immediate] danger [of death or serious bodily harm].” Id. 

at 235. A finger in his face hardly demonstrates apparent imminent or immediate danger, 
22

serious bodily harm, or death. See id. Third, Appellant was the aggressor here. He knew 

that Lt. Fletcher had directed him to “lock in[,]” and, based on his previous interactions 

with Lt. Fletcher, Appellant had no reason to believe that the grabbing of his arm was the 

start of a physical confrontation. Additionally, Appellant’s testimony that he was not going 

to allow Lt. Fletcher “to treat [him] like a child”—belie any supposed fear.17 Finally, 

turning and punching Lt. Fletcher, first on “instinct[]” and then repeatedly, was 

unreasonable and excessive force. Id. at 235 (“The force used must have not been 

unreasonable and excessive, that is, the force must not have been more force than the 

exigency demanded.”) (quoting Smullen, 380 Md. at 252)). Therefore, no reasonable 

person could take or perceive the facts or circumstances as perceived by Appellant as 

evidence of self-defense. See Marr, 362 Md. at 480 (“In making that determination, the 

facts or circumstances must be taken as perceived by the defendant, even if they were not 

the true facts or circumstances, so long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 

could also reasonably perceive the facts or circumstances in that way.”).

Hence, identifying the source of the stains as Appellant’s blood would provide no 

potential support for Appellant’s self-defense claim. Simply put, Appellant has failed to 

demonstrate that DNA testing would tend to show that he acted in self-defense. See 

Satterfield, 483 Md. at 470 (“There are several ‘logical explanations’ for why DNA testing 

17 The unrefuted testimony of Lt. Fletcher also shows that after he asked the 

Appellant if he called CO Cook a profane name, Appellant “got very belligerent[,] started 

throwing his arms around in the air saying he doesn’t have to listen to this [expletive,] and 

started to walk back on to the tier where he came from.”
23

. . . would not produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.” (quoting Givens, 459 Md. at 

717)).

Appellant alternatively argues, like he did before the circuit court, that Lt. Fletcher 

was not seriously injured within the meaning of CR § 3-202. With respect to this argument, 

Appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that DNA testing has the 

scientific potential to produce evidence tending to show that he neither caused, nor 

attempted to cause, serious bodily injury. Satterfield, 483 Md. at 467; Givens, 459 Md. at 

707–08.

First-degree assault prohibits intentionally causing or attempting to cause serious 

physical injury. CR § 3-202(b)(1). A “serious physical injury” is one that “creates a 

substantial risk of death” or “causes permanent or protracted serious[] . . . impairment of 

the function of any bodily member or organ.” CR § 3-201(d)(1), (d)(2)(iii).18 The record 

below shows substantial evidence of the severity of Lt. Fletcher’s injuries. The circuit 

court appropriately instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree assault, reflecting the 

State’s theory that Appellant committed first-degree assault by both actually causing 

serious injury to Lt. Fletcher and intending to cause serious injury to Lt. Fletcher.

Proving whether the stain on Appellant’s shirt was Lt. Fletcher’s blood, Appellant’s 

blood, or some substance other than blood does little in the way of proving or disproving

the severity of Lt. Fletcher’s injuries. Appellant’s theory would have us assume that Lt. 

18 As with the statutory elements of first-degree assault itself, the definition of 

“serious physical injury” has remained virtually unchanged since the time of Appellant’s 

2004 conviction. See CR § 3-201(c) (2002).
24

Fletcher’s injuries could be serious, as contemplated by CR § 3-202(b)(1), only if blood 

from Lt. Fletcher spattered onto Appellant’s shirt. While such an occurrence surely would 

support the notion that Lt. Fletcher’s injuries were serious, the inverse is not true. That is, 

if the stain on Appellant’s shirt is not Lt. Fletcher’s blood, then it does not tend to prove 

that Lt. Fletcher’s injuries were not serious.

Neither would the results of DNA testing tend to show that Appellant did not

attempt to cause serious physical injury. As discussed earlier, a perpetrator can commit 

first-degree assault, no matter the result of their actions, by attempting to cause serious 

physical injury. Here, the record irrefutably demonstrates that Appellant delivered a series 

of strikes to Lt. Fletcher’s head. Whatever result DNA testing would show, it would have 

no bearing on the number of strikes to the target area and, therefore, Appellant’s attempt

to commit serious injury against Lt. Fletcher.

We hold, therefore, that the circuit court did not err in determining, as a matter of 

law, that there is not a reasonable probability that DNA testing has the scientific potential 

to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. See Satterfield, 483 Md. at 470 (“[T]here 

is enough other incriminating evidence and an explanation for the DNA result[] to establish 

Petitioner’s guilt.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Because any hypothetical test results would (1) have no bearing on Appellant’s claim of 

self-defense and (2) provide nothing more than conjecture as to the seriousness of Lt.

Fletcher’s injuries, testing would only serve to “maintain[] the status quo.” Givens, 459 

Md. at 716. For that reason, there is not a reasonable probability that the DNA testing 

requested by Appellant has the scientific potential of producing exculpatory or mitigating 
25

evidence.19 Therefore, the circuit court correctly denied the Appellant’s Petition for DNA 

testing without a hearing. 

2. The circuit court’s standard of review

Finally, Appellant contends that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of 

review in its Order denying the Petition. Appellant argues that the circuit court erroneously 

used a more stringent standard to determine his entitlement to testing under the DNA 

Testing Statute. Appellant takes issue with the Order’s statement that “the circuit court 

was not persuaded the DNA [t]esting would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence 

of wrongful conviction or sentencing.” Appellant also asserts that “overwhelming and 

persuasive evidence” of guilt is an improper basis for the circuit court to deny the Petition. 

On the other hand, the State, while acknowledging that some introductory language in the 

Order appears to state the incorrect standard, urges us to construe the Order in its entirety 

and hold that the Order’s direct use of the language from the DNA Testing Statute and 

Rules is demonstrative of the circuit court’s use of the proper standard. 

We have consistently stated that the DNA Testing Statute does not require a 

petitioner to establish that testing would produce a different outcome. Givens, 459 Md. at

707–08; Edwards, 453 Md. at 187; Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 720 (2009). Instead, the 

Statute “only requires a showing that the desired testing has a reasonable probability . . . to 

19 Because Appellant does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that testing has 

the scientific potential to produce mitigating or exculpatory evidence, CP § 8-201(d)(1)(i)

is not satisfied, and we do not address the manner of testing requested under § 8-

201(d)(1)(ii).
26

produce relevant exculpatory or mitigating evidence[.] Gregg, 409 Md. at 720. It is upon 

this showing that a circuit court must order a hearing. Rule 4-709(a)(1).

While the introduction to the circuit court’s Order was inaccurately worded, that

does not doom its substance because the court later stated, and then applied, the correct 

standard. The circuit court clarified in the conclusion of the Order that it was “not 

persuaded . . . that DNA testing in [Appellant’s] case has the scientific potential to produce 

exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing 

and, therefore, that the Petition . . . should be denied without a hearing.” Effectively, the 

circuit court’s Order references the testimony and evidence used at trial, noting that it was 

overwhelmingly in favor of the State’s theory of the case, and based on the arguments in 

Appellant’s Petition, as referenced against the evidence heard at trial, concludes that there 

was no probability that testing would produce the requisite evidence. The conclusion’s 

language controls the disposition of the Petition and overcomes any controversy in the 

introductory language of the order.

Further, the Order’s conclusion is nearly identical to the language in the DNA 

Testing Statute and the Maryland Rules. See CP § 8-201(a)(5)(iii) (“[A] reasonable 

probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory 

or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing[.]”

(emphasis added)); Md. Rule 4-704(a)(2)(B)(iii) (“[A] reasonable probability exists that 

the requested DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating 

evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing[.]” (emphasis added)). 

Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that DNA testing had no scientific potential to 
27

produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence, let alone the “reasonable probability” that 

Appellant needed to demonstrate. So, the circuit court made the requisite statutory findings

and appropriately denied Appellant’s Petition.

D. Appellant’s Procedural Claims

Appellant lodges two procedural challenges. First, he alleges that he should have 

been afforded the opportunity to respond to the State’s answer to his Petition. From his 

point of view, the timing of the circuit court’s order is an error because Rule 4-708 gives 

him the right to file a response to the State’s answer. We resolved this issue in Satterfield 

where we held that the circuit court need not consider a petitioner’s response, nor wait for 

the petitioner’s window to file a response to close before ruling on a pending petition. 483 

Md. at 481. Because there is not a reasonable probability that DNA testing has the 

scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence, the circuit court was 

within its discretion to deny Appellant’s Petition after the State filed its answer but before 

the submission of a response. See id.; Md. Rule 4-709(b)(1)(B).

Second, Appellant alleges that he was not provided with a copy of the circuit court’s 

October 19, 2023, Order in violation of Maryland Rule 4-709(e), thereby denying him the 

ability to brief or argue in this Court. This allegation of error has no merit. Even if 

Appellant did not receive the circuit court’s order, his counsel later filed supplemental 

briefing on the merits. Thus, we discern no prejudice from the circuit court’s alleged

procedural noncompliance, which did not impact Appellant’s ability to proceed with this 

appeal.
28

V

CONCLUSION

We hold that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists 

that DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. 

In this case, even if testing could determine that the source of the substance on Appellant’s 

shirt was not Lt. Fletcher’s blood, it would not negate the seriousness of the injuries that 

Lt. Fletcher suffered nor positively affect the merits of Appellant’s self-defense argument. 

In other words, DNA testing of the Appellant’s shirt has no probability of producing 

exculpatory or mitigating evidence for his first-degree assault. Thus, the circuit court’s 

Order satisfied the relevant statutory requirements in denying Appellant’s Petition without 

a hearing.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT FOR SOMERSET COUNTY

AFFIRMED. APPELLANT TO PAY 

COSTS.