*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10, 2006*

Decided February 14, 2006

Before

 Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

 Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 05-2412

ROBERT J. CARROLL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JOSHUA BARNACK, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

No. 04-C-535

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Wisconsin probation agents searched Robert Carroll’s home after he violated

a condition of his probation. Carroll later challenged the search in a civil action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that it violated the Fourth Amendment. The

district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and Carroll appeals. 

We affirm the district court’s decision. 

The following facts are undisputed. Carroll was serving a 10-year term of

probation imposed on his Wisconsin conviction for sexually assaulting a child. The

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-2412 Page 2

rules of that probation are detailed in a document signed by Carroll. Rule 6 reads:

“You shall make yourself available for searches or tests ordered by your agent

including but not limited to . . . search of residence or any property under your

control.” Other rules prohibited Carroll from having sexual contact with a mentally

impaired individual or establishing a “dating, intimate, sexual relationship” with

any person unless approved in advance by probation officials. Carroll was allowed

to own a computer, but was not allowed to have internet access.

In July 2002, a mentally impaired woman reported to Carroll’s probation

agent, Joshua Barnack, that Carroll had engaged in sexual contact with her. The

woman, whom Carroll had met at a center for the mentally impaired, explained

that she visited Carroll’s home and was given a key to his house. During her visit,

she alleged, Carroll told her that she was meant to marry his son, and pressured

her to promise that she would be with his son forever. Carroll then kissed her,

touched her breasts, removed her shirt, pulled down her pants, and tried to remove

her clothing completely. The woman, who reported that she was very

uncomfortable and scared, told Carroll no and put her clothes back on. Carroll then

attempted to put a vibrating massager between her legs. 

Based on this information, officers from the Ashland, Wisconsin, police

department took Carroll into custody. Barnack then completed an application for

supervisory approval in which he sought permission to search Carroll’s residence to

determine whether Carroll had been complying with the rules of his probation. 

Barnack’s supervisor, Terry Schemenauer, orally approved the search, but, for

reasons unclear from the record, did not sign the application. Nonetheless,

Barnack, along with fellow agents Kevin Seefeldt and Randy Ruffi, searched

Carroll’s residence. They were accompanied by Ashland officers Michael Brennan,

Michelle Tutor, and Scott Harnisch. 

Barnack and the other probation agents seized several items including two

guns, a buck knife, a sword, and a laptop computer that had been used to visit over

150 pornographic websites. The agents then presented this evidence before an

Administrative Law Judge, who found that the weapons had not come into the

house until after Carroll’s arrest and that there was no evidence linking Carroll to

what he said was his son’s laptop. But because the judge found the testimony

regarding Carroll’s sexual encounter with the mentally impaired woman credible,

he revoked Carroll’s probation and remanded him to the trial court. The court

sentenced him to prison, although the record does not indicate the date of his

sentencing or the length of his term.

Carroll then filed a complaint in federal court in June 2004, claiming under

§ 1983 that the probation agents and Ashland police officers violated the Fourth

Amendment by searching his home without a warrant. The district court granted
No. 05-2412 Page 3

1

 Carroll additionally contends that, if the search of his home was lawful, the

search of his son’s computer was not. We point out, as did the district court, that as

a pro se litigant Carroll may not represent the interests of a third party, see 28

U.S.C. § 1654; Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 1986), even

if that third party is his son, see Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1147,

(continued...)

summary judgment for the defendants. Our review of that decision is de novo. 

Green v. Butler, 420 F.3d 689, 694 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Carroll principally argues that the search of his home violated the Fourth

Amendment because it was conducted without a warrant and was therefore

unreasonable. The Supreme Court has explained that a warantless search of a

probationer’s home is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as it is

authorized by a condition of probation and supported by reasonable suspicion. 

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). We have gone further and held

that a blanket waiver of Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation

justifies searching a probationer’s home even without any individualized suspicion. 

United States v. Hagenow, 423 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691-93 (7th Cir. 2005). Underlying these decisions is the

recognition that a probationer does not enjoy “‘the absolute liberty to which every

citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly dependent on observance

of special [probation] conditions.’” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)

(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)); accord Knights, 534 U.S. at

119 (“[A] court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive

the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”); Barnett, 415 F.3d

at 692 (explaining that probationer is free to waive constitutional rights in

exchange for privilege of living outside prison so long as waiver is knowing and

intelligent).

Here, as in Knights and its progeny, Carroll explicitly agreed to “make

[himself] available for searches” while on probation, which is all that the law

required to render a search of his home by probation agents reasonable; no warrant

was needed. Nor was it necessary for Barnack’s supervisor to sign the search

application, contrary to Carroll’s assertion. Under Wisconsin law, a probation agent

who wishes to search a probationer’s living quarters must obtain “[a]pproval of the

supervisor . . . unless exigent circumstances . . . require search without approval.” 

WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 328.21 (2005). There is no statutory requirement that the

supervisor also document his approval in writing. The defendants here presented

evidence that a supervisor orally agreed to the search, and Carroll presented no

contrary evidence. Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted in favor

of the defendants.1

 
No. 05-2412 Page 4

1

(...continued)

1149 (7th Cir. 2001); Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581

(11th Cir. 1997); Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Penn., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir.

1991). 

Given this conclusion, Carroll’s remaining arguments require little

discussion. First, his argument that the district court failed to compel discovery is 

contradicted by the record. The court did compel discovery, but simply declined to

grant Carroll’s later motion to extend the discovery deadline because he did not

allege that documents he requested had not been received. We cannot conclude that

the court abused its discretion in not prolonging discovery, especially since it is

clear to us that no amount of further discovery could have overcome the waiver of

Fourth Amendment rights that Carroll accepted as a condition of his probation. 

Nor do we discern any abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to grant Carroll’s

motion to strike the answer of the probation-agent defendants. See Winfrey v. City

of Chi., 259 F.3d 610, 618-19 (7th Cir. 2001). And, finally, we agree with the

defendants that the additional arguments that Carroll raises in this court for the

first time are waived. See King v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 410 F.3d 404, 424 (7th

Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.