******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
RALPH OLSZEWSKI v. JAMES F.

JORDAN III ET AL.

(SC 19215)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald,

Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued December 2, 2014—officially released March 3, 2015

Stephen F. McEleney, with whom were David J. Taylor and Emily Peterson, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eric H. Rothauser, with whom, on the brief, were

John L. Bonee III and Lee B. Ross, for the appellees

(defendant Carlo Forzani et al.).
Opinion

ZARELLA, J. The principal issue in this appeal is

whether attorneys are entitled by operation of law to

equitable charging liens against marital assets for fees

and expenses incurred in obtaining judgments for their

clients in marital dissolution actions. The plaintiff,

Ralph Olszewski, challenges the Appellate Court’s conclusion that equitable charging liens are permissible in

marital dissolution actions in Connecticut. He claims

that they are barred by the Rules of Professional Conduct, they are not supported by Connecticut precedent,

and the public policy considerations that justify equitable charging liens in other contexts do not apply in

marital dissolution actions. The defendants Carlo Forzani and Carlo Forzani, LLC,1

respond that equitable

charging liens against marital assets are permissible in

Connecticut because the Rules of Professional Conduct

specifically provide for charging liens, the rules do not

preclude the use of charging liens in marital dissolution

actions, and public policy considerations support their

use in domestic relations matters. We agree with the

plaintiff and reverse the judgment of the Appellate

Court.

The following facts and procedural history are set

forth in the Appellate Court’s opinion. ‘‘In August, 2009,

the [dissolution] court rendered a judgment dissolving

the marriage of [James Jordan and Diana Jordan].

James Jordan had been represented by . . . Carlos

Forzani, an attorney of the . . . law firm, Carlo Forzani, LLC, in that proceeding. At the time of the dissolution of marriage judgment, James Jordan and Diana

Jordan jointly owned, among other assets, an account

at Northwestern Mutual (account), from which the dissolution court ordered that 50 percent of the attorney’s

fees (fees) of the defendants be paid and, after payment

of certain other obligations, that the balance remaining

in that account be divided equally between James Jordan and Diana Jordan.

‘‘While an appeal to this court from the judgment of

dissolution was pending, in October, 2009, [the plaintiff], who is the father of Diana Jordan, brought this

action against James Jordan to collect the outstanding

balance on James Jordan’s promissory note to him. In

November, 2009, the plaintiff obtained a prejudgment

remedy, which authorized the attachment of the proceeds of the account. In April, 2011, the [trial] court

[found] in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of

$128,135.04. The plaintiff, thereafter, applied for a property execution. Subsequently, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-356c, James Jordan filed a claim for a

determination of interests in the account. He asserted

that by virtue of the 2009 dissolution judgment, he had

a claim to proceeds in that account that was prior in

right to that of the plaintiff. The defendants filed a

separate claim for [a] determination of interests in the
account, alleging that ‘Carlo Forzani, LLC ha[d] a claim

prior in right’ to the plaintiff’s claim by virtue of the

dissolution judgment and the ‘charging lien arising by

operation of law’ in the dissolution of marriage action.

‘‘The court held a hearing to determine the competing

claims in the account and, subsequently, concluded that

the defendants had no superior interest in the account

by virtue of either an [attorney’s] charging lien or the

dissolution judgment. Specifically, the court held, inter

alia, that a charging lien in connection with a dissolution

action would be prohibited by rule 1.5 (d) (1) of the

Rules of Professional Conduct, that an attorney must

create a new asset for the client before a charging lien

can be recognized and that the recognition of a charging

lien in a dissolution action would violate public policy.’’

(Footnotes omitted.) Olszewski v. Jordan, 144 Conn.

App. 144, 146–48, 71 A.3d 1276 (2013). The defendants

appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the

trial court’s judgment. Id., 148, 160.

The Appellate Court explained that it could ‘‘discern

no viable reason why a charging lien should be absolutely prohibited as a matter of law in a marital dissolution action.’’ Id., 151. The court stated that ‘‘recognizing

a charging lien in a dissolution of marriage action would

not implicate rule 1.5 (d) (1)’’; id.; and ‘‘that rule 1.8

(i) (1) permits a charging lien in connection with a

dissolution action.’’ Id., 152. The court further stated

that an attorney need not create a new asset before a

charging lien can be acquired; id.; and that this state’s

equitable lien jurisprudence supports the view that equitable charging liens may arise by operation of law in

marital dissolution actions ‘‘when the arrangement

between the attorney and client intends that a lien exist

on the proceeds of the action.’’ Id., 156. The court thus

concluded that, ‘‘under some circumstances an attorney

may acquire a charging lien in a dissolution of marriage

action and that the trial court erred in holding otherwise

as a matter of law.’’ Id., 160. The court thereafter

remanded the case to the trial court to consider whether

the agreement between James Jordan and the defendants established that the defendants intended to look

specifically to the funds in the jointly owned account

as the source of future payment of their fees. Id., 160.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Espinosa concluded that

an attorney may not acquire an equitable charging lien

in a marital dissolution action and that the trial court’s

judgment should be affirmed. Id., 161, 165 (Espinosa,

J., dissenting). This appeal followed.2

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of

review. ‘‘When . . . the trial court draws conclusions

of law, our review is plenary and we must decide

whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct

and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) D’Urso v. Lyons,

97 Conn. App. 253, 255–56, 903 A.2d 697, cert. denied,
280 Conn. 928, 909 A.2d 523 (2006). Accordingly,

whether the plaintiff in the present case is entitled by

operation of law to an equitable charging lien against

James Jordan’s marital assets for fees and expenses

incurred in obtaining the judgment of dissolution is

a question of law subject to our plenary review. See

id., 255.

The concept of an attorney’s charging lien is rooted

in common law and is ‘‘founded on the equitable right

of an attorney to recover . . . fees and costs due . . .

for . . . services out of the judgment . . . obtained.

Thus, an attorney’s charging lien does not merely give

the attorney an enforceable right against the property

of another, but rather it gives the attorney an equitable

ownership interest in the client’s cause of action, and

the client’s property right in his or her own cause of

action is only whatremains aftertransferto the attorney

of the attorney’s agreed-on share.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

7 Am. Jur. 2d 352, Attorneys at Law § 317 (2007). An

attorney’s charging lien is distinguishable from an attorney’s retaining lien, which is ‘‘a possessory lien on a

client’s papers and files that the attorney holds until

his fee has been paid.’’ Marsh, Day & Calhoun v. Solomon, 204 Conn. 639, 643, 529 A.2d 702 (1987).

Although there is no statutory basis for an attorney’s

charging lien in Connecticut, as there is in many states;

see 7 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 318, p. 353 (authority for

charging lien in many states rests entirely on statutes);

see also W. Hairston, comment, ‘‘The Ranking of Attorney’s Liens Against Other Liens in the United States,’’

7 J. Legal Prof. 193, 193–95 (1982) (attorney’s liens are

creatures of statute in thirty-two states); this court

expressly recognized the common-law basis for an

attorney’s charging lien nearly 180 years ago in Gager

v. Watson, 11 Conn. 168, 173 (1836).3

In Gager, we

established the principle that ‘‘[a]n attorney, as against

his client, has a lien upon all papers in his possession

for his fees and services performed in his professional

capacity, as well as upon judgments received by him.’’

Id. This principle was affirmed in Andrews v. Morse,

12 Conn. 444 (1838), in which we reiterated that ‘‘attorneys . . . have, in certain cases . . . a claim upon [the

judgments and papers of their clients] as courts of law

and equity will protect and enforce, until their lawful

fees and disbursements are paid . . . .’’ Id., 446.

Almost one-half century later, we concluded, without

reference to Gager and Andrews, that, ‘‘[i]f an attorney

has rendered services and expended money in instituting and conducting a suit and the plaintiff orally agrees

that he may retain so much of the avails thereof as will

pay him for his services and expenses therein and for

previous services in other matters, and he thereafter

conducts the suit to a favorable conclusion, he has, as

against such plaintiff, an equitable lien upon the avails

for the services and expenses in the suit, and for the
previous services embraced in the agreement . . . .’’

Cooke v. Thresher, 51 Conn. 105, 107 (1883). Cooke thus

added to Gager and Andrews that an equitable charging

lien also may arise when a client orally agrees to pay

attorney’s fees and expenses from the newly acquired

proceeds of a favorable judgment.4 See id.; see also

DeWandelaer v. Sawdey, 78 Conn. 654, 655, 658, 63 A.

446 (1906) (relying on Cooke for principle that attorney,

by ‘‘ ‘taking up a case’ with the understanding that he

must look to the judgment to be obtained for compensation for his services and disbursements,’’ had, by virtue

of oral agreement, ‘‘equitable lien for his services and

expenses upon the judgment afterward obtained’’).

Since Cooke and DeWandelaer, issues involving

charging liens rarely have been litigated in Connecticut.

In two relatively recent cases, however, the Appellate

Court relied on the principles articulated in Gager and

Cooke in concluding that equitable charging liens are

permissible. In Perlmutter v. Johnson, 6 Conn. App.

292, 505 A.2d 13, cert. denied, 200 Conn. 801, 509 A.2d

517 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035, 107 S. Ct. 886,

93 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1987), in which the plaintiff attorney

was paid only a portion of his hourly fees in connection

with two separate actions that he had brought on his

client’s behalf, the attorney placed the funds recovered

from a judgment in one of the actions in escrow and

commenced an action against his client for the fees

allegedly due. Id., 293, 298. Relying on Cooke, the Appellate Court concluded that ‘‘the [trial] court was correct

in permitting [the attorney] to keep these funds as an

offset. It has long been held that an attorney has ‘an

equitable lien upon the avails [of his actions for a client]

for the services and expenses in the suit.’ Cooke v.

Thresher, [supra, 51 Conn. 107]. . . . [The attorney’s]

undisputed testimony was that he obtained the funds

on [his client’s] behalf as a result of an action which

he undertook as [his] attorney. He, therefore, had a lien

upon those funds.’’ Perlmutter v. Johnson, supra, 298.

In D’Urso v. Lyons, supra, 97 Conn. App. 253, in which

the attorney’s fees also were calculated on the basis of

an hourly rate and the written fee agreement between

the attorney and the client was silent as to whether the

fees would be paid from the proceeds of any recovery;

id., 254; the Appellate Court relied on Cooke and Perlmutter in concluding that, because the attorney had

obtained a judgment as a result of the litigation and

had not been paid for his services at that time, his

retention of the funds and claim for attorney’s fees

in Probate Court was proper because he ‘‘had a valid

charging lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure action

in the amount of the attorney’s fees to which he was

owed pursuant to the fee agreement signed by [the

client].’’ Id., 257.

Significantly, none of the foregoing cases involved a

marital dissolution action. Thus, none of the judgments
in those cases involved a division of assets in the parties’

possession before the action was commenced. Accordingly, Connecticut precedent provides no explicit guidance as to whether dissolution actions are distinguishable from general civil actions for purposes of determining whether an attorney may acquire an equitable charging lien against marital assets. Nevertheless, we conclude that the facts of the foregoing cases, the theoretical underpinnings of charging liens, the public policies

implicit in Connecticut’s Rules of Professional Conduct,

and the unique character of divorce proceedings militate against a conclusion that attorneys are entitled to

equitable charging liens in marital dissolution actions

in Connecticut.

We first note that every case in which this court or

the Appellate Court has considered or referred to an

equitable charging lien involved newly created assets

that the client received, or hoped to receive, from a

judgment in the client’s favor as a result of the attorney’s

efforts. See DeWandelaer v. Sawdey, supra, 78 Conn.

655 (attorney sought payment from out-of-court settlement that client received in action seeking damages

for libel); Cooke v. Thresher, supra, 51 Conn. 106–107

(attorneys sought payment from proceeds of judgment

awarded to client in settlement of claim); Benjamin v.

Benjamin, 17 Conn. 110, 113 (1845) (attorney sought

payment from proceeds of judgment awarding client

damages and costs); Andrews v. Morse, supra, 12 Conn.

445–47 (attorney sought payment from proceeds of

judgment for client); Gager v. Watson, supra, 11 Conn.

170 (attorney sought payment from proceeds of judgment for client); Rumrill v. Huntington, 5 Day (Conn.)

163, 165 (1811) (attorney sought payment from proceeds of judgment awarding damages and costs to client); D’Urso v. Lyons, supra, 97 Conn. App. 254–55

(attorney sought payment from proceeds obtained for

client in foreclosure action); Perlmutter v. Johnson,

supra, 6 Conn. App. 293, 298 (attorney sought payment

from proceeds obtained for client). Moreover, we stated

in Cooke that, pursuant to an agreement with the client,

an attorney may have an equitable lien ‘‘upon the avails

for the services and expenses in the suit, and for the

previous services embraced in the agreement.’’(Emphasis added.) Cooke v. Thresher, supra, 51 Conn. 107. The

common and ordinary meaning of the term ‘‘avails’’

is ‘‘profits or proceeds . . . .’’ Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (2002) p. 150. Thus, equitable

charging liens in Connecticut have been recognized by

reviewing courts only when applied to proceeds the

client has received as a result of the litigation, there

being no cases in which an attorney sought to obtain

such a lien against assets in the client’s possession

before the attorney became involved, such as assets

acquired by the parties during their marriage. Although

this does not mean that Connecticut precedent precludes recognition of equitable charging liens in marital
dissolution actions, it does mean, at the very least, that

there is no clear precedent on which we may rely in

deciding whether equitable charging liens should apply

in this context.

We thus turn for guidance to the theoretical underpinnings of equitable charging liens. It is generally understood that a charging lien ‘‘gives the attorney an equitable ownership interest in the client’s cause of action,

and the client’s property right in his or her own cause

of action is only what remains after transfer to the

attorney of the attorney’s agreed-on share.’’ 7 Am. Jur.

2d, supra, § 317, p. 352; see alsoR. Lee, comment, ‘‘Priority of theAttorney’sCharging Lien,’’ 24 J. Legal Prof. 477,

477–78 (2000). Thus, permitting an attorney to obtain an

equitable charging lien against marital assets would give

the attorney a property right in assets that were in the

client’s possession before the attorney was hired and

that the attorney expended no effort in obtaining. This

is not only incompatible with the idea that an attorney

has a property right in ‘‘the judgment or settlement the

attorney has obtained for the client’’; (emphasis added)

7 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 317, p. 351; which authorities

generally treat as a property right that the client did

not previously possess;5

see, e.g., R. Lee, supra, 477–78

(referring to judgment proceeds from insurance settlements, damage awards and real or personal property

recovered through attorney’s efforts); butit would interfere with the ‘‘carefully crafted mosaic’’ created by the

balancing and distribution of the parties’ financial

assets in marital dissolution actions.(Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297

Conn. 358, 378, 999 A.2d 721 (2010); see also Tuckman

v. Tuckman, 308 Conn. 194, 214, 61 A.3d 449 (2013)

(characterizing financial orders in dissolution proceedings as resembling mosaic, in which various financial

components are carefully interwoven with one

another). Indeed, one of the chief risks of allowing an

equitable charging lien in a marital dissolution action

is that a lien could deplete the parties’ financial assets

to such an extent that there would be little or nothing

left for the other purposes the mosaic was intended to

advance, such as a child’s support or future educational

expenses. Accordingly, permitting equitable charging

liens against preexisting assets available for distribution

to the parties in marital dissolution actions is inconsistent with the general understanding of a charging lien

as an equitable ownership interest in the client’s cause

of action, which arises out of a property right the attorney is hired to assist the client in obtaining through the

process of litigation.

There also is no direct support in the Connecticut

Rules of Professional Conduct for equitable charging

liens in marital dissolution actions. Rule 1.8 (i) provides

in relevant part: ‘‘A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of

litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except
that the lawyer may: (1) [a]cquire a lien granted by

law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses . . . .’’ The

commentary adds: ‘‘[S]ubsection (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s

fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which

liens are authorized by law. These may include liens

granted by statute, liens originating in common law and

liens acquired by contract with the client.’’ Rules of

Professional Conduct 1.8, commentary.

Although rule 1.8 (i) (1) provides that an attorney

may acquire a lien ‘‘granted by law’’ to secure attorney’s

fees and expenses and does not prohibit an equitable

charging lien in a domestic relations matter, the official

commentary emphasizes that the ‘‘law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized . . . .’’

Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8, commentary. The

rule and commentary thus suggest that the rule, standing alone, cannot be construed to mean that all liens

are authorized because it leaves the question of which

liens are authorized to the legislature, the courts, and

the contract between the attorney and the client.

Rule 1.5 (d) also fails to provide clear guidance on

the matter. Thatrule provides in relevant part: ‘‘Alawyer

shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect: (1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the

payment or amount of which is contingent upon the

securing of a dissolution of marriage or civil union or

upon the amount of alimony or support, or property

settlement in lieu thereof . . . .’’ Rules of Professional

Conduct 1.5 (d) (1). The official commentary to rule

1.5 explains that ‘‘[s]ubsection (d) prohibits a lawyer

from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations

matter when payment is contingent upon the securing

of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support

or property settlement to be obtained.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5, commentary.

Unlike in rule 1.8, there is no reference to charging

liens in rule 1.5 or in the commentary to that rule.

Accordingly, we conclude that rule 1.5 does not apply

to charging liens. To the extent the parties parse the

language of rule 1.5 to demonstrate why the rule may

or may not refer to charging liens, we observe that, in

addition to the fact that charging liens are specifically

discussed in rule 1.8, a charging lien is not a fee, contingent or otherwise. Rather, it has been defined in Connecticut as security forthe nonpayment of an attorney’s

expenses and fees, usually calculated on an hourly basis

and incurred in representing the client. See, e.g., Gager

v. Watson, supra, 11 Conn. 173 (attorney has lien on

judgment for‘‘fees and services performed in his professional capacity’’). As such, it is a legal tool employed

to obtain the payment of attorney’s fees and expenses

that arise from the litigation process. Although a charging lien does not take effect until a judgment is rendered
and thus might seem to fall within the prohibitions

described in rule 1.5, the amount and collection of the

underlying fees and expenses that are subject to such

a lien, unlike contingency fees, do not depend on the

outcome of the litigation but are owed to the attorney

regardless of whether payment is obtained by way of

a charging lien or by some other method. Rule 1.5 thus

provides no guidance as to whether attorneys may

acquire equitable charging liens in Connecticut.

We nonetheless conclude that the same public policy

considerations on which rule 1.5 (d) (1) is founded

counsel against our recognition of equitable charging

liens in marital dissolution actions. In Gil v. Gil, 110

Conn. App. 798, 956 A.2d 593 (2008), the Appellate Court

stated that ‘‘[t]he main policy concern behind rule 1.5

(d) is that contingency agreements for a dissolution

action would discourage lawyers from advocating for

an amicable settlement because the lawyers would have

a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the dissolution

action.’’ Id., 804–805. An equitable charging lien for an

attorney’s expenses and fees based on hourly rates

could have a similarly harmful effect. For example, the

satisfactory resolution of a dissolution proceeding ordinarily requires a weighing and balancing of many nonmonetary factors in addition to the parties’ liquid and

other financial assets. These nonmonetary factors

include, at one extreme, potential reconciliation of the

parties, and, at the other, child custody, visitation rights

and possession of the marital home for continued occupation by the parent who has physical custody of the

children. If an equitable charging lien is permitted in

this context, the attorney may be tempted or inclined to

negotiate a settlement that would sacrifice or diminish

some of the client’s important nonmonetary interests

in favor of liquid assets to which an equitable charging

lien could attach. See W. Gamble, comment, ‘‘Cash Conflicts: Reconciling Conflicts of Interest Between Attorneys’ Fees and the Needs of the Client,’’ 23 J. Legal Prof.

347, 354 (1999) (‘‘[A]n attorney [may have] a personal,

pecuniary interest in preventing a reconciliation

between husband and wife. In addition, the [attorney]

might also have a conflict of interest with the client by

seeking greater monetary awards in lieu of intangible

interests such as child custody.’’ [Footnote omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.]). An equitable charging lien therefore could interfere with significant personal interests of the parties, encumber existing assets

intended for other purposes, and undermine the mosaic

crafted by the court. Accordingly, public policy considerations do not weigh in favor of recognizing equitable

charging liens in marital dissolution actions.

We finally note that the unique character of marital

dissolution actions and the difficultissues that equitable

charging liens raise in this context are not easily

addressed by piecemeal judicial decisions arising from

serendipitous appeals brought over a lengthy period of
time. In the past 180 years, the subject has been

addressed in this state in only a handful of cases, none

of which, until now, has involved a marital dissolution

action. Thus, even though, in the present case, we

decline to recognize equitable charging liens in this

context, we do not conclude that charging liens are

altogether impermissible. Rather, we conclude that

whether, and to what extent, charging liens should be

permitted in marital dissolution actions are questions

that the legislature is in a far better position to resolve

than the courts. Among the questions that deserve a

more in-depth examination and analysis are (1) the

type of marital assets subject to, or exempted from, a

charging lien, (2) notice requirements, (3) perfection

procedures, (4) the priority of an attorney’s charging

lien relative to the claims of other creditors, and (5)

enforcement proceedings. The complex nature of

charging liens explains why they are regulated by statute in at least thirty-two states; W. Hairston, supra, 7

J. Legal Prof. 193–95; and why Connecticut should follow the lead of these states and rely on the legislature

for guidance, at least with respect to the propriety of

charging liens in marital dissolution actions. In New

York, for example, attorney’s charging liens are permitted in domestic relations matters pursuant to N.Y.

Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 1400.5 (2015), only

when ‘‘(1) the retainer agreement provides that a security interest may be sought; (2) notice of an application

for a security interest has been given to the other

spouse; and (3) the court grants approval for the security interest after submission of an application for counsel fees.’’ Connecticut would benefit from similar

legislative direction that places reasonable restrictions

on these liens, if deemed permissible, in light of the

unique characteristics of marital dissolution proceedings.

The defendants argue that equitable charging liens

should be recognized in Connecticut because there is

no valid distinction between the assets purportedly

‘‘create[d]’’ by the judgment in a general civil action

and the preexisting assets in a marital dissolution action

that would justify precluding equitable charging liens

in divorce proceedings. The defendants contend that

attorneys do not manufacture or create assets but

merely ‘‘litigate causes of action that belong to clients

and are, if successful, reduced to monetary compensation,’’ regardless of the type of action. The defendants

further contend that ‘‘Connecticut case law is clear that

a charging lien attaches to a judgment obtained through

the avails of the lawyer’’ and that no Connecticut court

has held that a valid equitable charging lien applies only

to newly created assets.

The principal case on which the defendants rely in

arguing that a cause of action is a property right that

already belongs to a client and that, if successful, is

merely reduced to monetary compensation, Sherman
v. Ronco, 294 Conn. 548, 985 A.2d 1042 (2010), does not

support the defendants’ claim. In the passage to which

the defendants refer, the court initially observes that a

cause of action arises from the existence of a primary

right in the plaintiff that the defendant allegedly

invaded. Id., 555. It then considers whether additional

facts in an amended complaint may relate back to the

original pleading if the cause of action remains substantially the same. Id. Nothing in Sherman concerning the

relation back doctrine supports the conclusion that the

proceeds of a judgment are never newly created

because a successful cause of action is a property right

that is merely reduced by the judgment to monetary

compensation. The defendants also disregard the fact

that, although Connecticut reviewing courts never have

explicitly stated that an equitable charging lien applies

only to newly created assets, all prior equitable charging

lien cases in Connecticut have involved judgment proceeds that the clientreceived as a result of the litigation.

Accordingly, the principle recognized in Cooke and

D’Urso that an equitable charging lien may attach to a

judgment obtained by the client’s attorney cannot apply,

without further judicial or legislative review, in cases

involving preexisting assets already in the client’s possession because marital dissolution proceedings raise

special concerns that do not arise in other civil actions.

See Cooke v. Thresher, supra, 51 Conn. 106–107; D’Urso

v. Lyons, supra, 97 Conn. App. 256–58.

The defendants also argue that allowing attorneys to

acquire equitable charging liens will have no effect on

the distribution of marital assets and will not discourage

attorneys from advocating for amicable settlements, but

will merely ensure that they have priority with respect

to their clients’ property in relation to other creditors.

We disagree. Although the effect of an equitable charging lien may be to grant first priority to the client’s

attorney over other creditors, it is not necessarily true,

as the defendants claim, that an amicable settlement

eliminates any potential risk that the trial court would

award a judgment insufficient to cover a client’s attorney’s fees and costs. In cases that involve limited financial assets, an amicable settlement might afford the

client generous child custody terms and the marital

home in exchange for assignment of the bulk of the

financial assets to the other party, leaving the client to

pay the attorney from future income or other unidentified sources, and setting the stage for a possible future

conflict between them.6

The defendants finally argue that ‘‘[n]umerous states

thatrecognize the validity of an [equitable] charging lien

have decided cases involving family relations matters,’’

thus suggesting that such states also recognize the validity of equitable charging liens in marital dissolution

proceedings. This, however, is not the case. The defendants cite to twelve jurisdictions that explicitly have

held or expressed the view that a lien for attorney’s
fees cannot be enforced against awards of alimony and/

or child support, and eight that explicitly have held or

expressed the view that a lien for attorney’s fees can

be enforced against an award of alimony and/or child

support.7 See G. Garrison, annot., ‘‘Alimony or ChildSupport Awards As Subject to Attorneys’ Liens,’’ 49

A.L.R.5th 595, 607–17, §§ 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b (1997)(listing

cases from jurisdictions that fall within foregoing categories). Moreover, in the eight jurisdictions in which the

court explicitly held or determined that an attorney’s

charging lien could be enforced against an award of

alimony and/or child support, the courts in five jurisdictions based their holdings on statutory authority rather

than the common law. Id., §§ 4a and 4b, pp. 613–17. We

therefore conclude that attorneys are not entitled by

operation of law to equitable charging liens on marital

assets for fees and expenses incurred in obtaining judgments for their clients in marital dissolution proceedings in Connecticut.8

The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed and

the case is remanded to that court with direction to

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The named defendant, James F. Jordan III, and the third-party defendant,

Diana M. Jordan, also were parties to the present action but not to this

appeal. We hereinafter refer to James F. Jordan III as James Jordan and

Diana M. Jordan as Diana Jordan. We hereinafter refer to Forzani and Carlo

Forzani, LLC, collectively as the defendants.

2 We granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification to appeal, limited to

the following issues: ‘‘1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the

[defendants] were entitled to an equitable charging lien on marital assets

for their attorneys’ fees that arose by operation of law when they obtained

a judgment for their client in the underlying marital dissolution action?

‘‘2. If the answerto the first question is in the affirmative, does the charging

lien attach as of the date of the commencement of the action and take

priority over any creditors subsequently securing an interest in the marital

asset in which the attorneys claim an interest?’’ Olszewski v. Jordan, 310

Conn. 930, 78 A.3d 857 (2013).

3 An attorney’s charging lien also was sought in Rumrill v. Huntington,

5 Day (Conn.) 163 (1811). In Rumrill, we concluded that ‘‘an attorney has

no lien upon a judgment obtained in favor of his client, which can vary or

affect the rights of a stranger. No such lien is created, either at common

law, or by principles of chancery.’’ Id., 165. We thereby implied that an

attorney could recoverfees and expenses from a client by way of an equitable

charging lien when there were no other claims by a third party. See id.; see

also Benjamin v. Benjamin, 17 Conn. 110, 113–14 (1845) (affirming holding

in Rumrill). In Rumrill, the attorney ultimately recovered his fees because

he had obtained a written assignment of the judgment proceeds prior to

a third party’s assertion of a similar claim. See Rumrill v. Huntington,

supra, 165.

4

In Cooke, we characterized the oral agreement as an ‘‘assignment’’ to

the attorneys of the proceeds from the judgment. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Cooke v. Thresher, supra, 51 Conn. 106. We need not determine

at this point in our analysis, however, whether an equitable charging lien

that does not arise from an oral agreement, such as the liens at issue in

Gager and Andrews, is distinguishable from the type of charging lien at

issue in Cooke.

5 An attorney’s assistance in obtaining sole possession of a portion of the

marital assets is distinguishable from an attorney’s assistance in obtaining

a newly created asset, such as a damage award.

6 We dismiss outright the defendants’ speculative claim thatthe prohibition

of equitable charging liens in domestic relations matters would create disincentives for attorneys to take these cases, thus increasing the number of

self-represented litigants, there being no evidence of such an effect.
7 One of these jurisdictions, South Dakota, concluded that liens for attorney’s fees can be enforced against an award of alimony but not against an

award of child support; see Jasper v. Smith, 540 N.W.2d 399, 404–405 and

n.4 (S.D. 1995); and, therefore, is counted in both categories.

8 We thus need not reach the second certified question. See footnote 2

of this opinion.