area handbook series

Pakistan

a country study


If

at;
Pakistan

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Peter R. Blood

Research Completed

April 1994
On the cover: Marble screen with tendril and geometric

design in Shish Mahal (Palace of Mirrors), Lahore

Fort, Punjab

Sixth Edition, First Printing, 1995.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Pakistan: a country study / Federal Research Division,

Library of Congress ; edited by Peter R. Blood. — 6th ed.

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294)

(DA Pam ; 550-48)

"Supersedes the 1984 edition of Pakistan: a country

study, edited by Richard F. Nyrop"—T.p. verso. "Research completed April 1994." Includes bibliographical references (pp. 333-361) and

index.

ISBN 0-8444-0834-4

1. Pakistan. I. Blood, Peter R., 1952- . II. Library of

Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV.

Series: DA Pam ; 550-48.

DS376.9.P376 1995 94-17247

954.91—dc20 CIP

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-48

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared

by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this

book list the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and

national security systems and institutions, and examining the

interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins,

dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the

issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their

involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes

toward each other and toward their social system and political

order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should

not be construed as an expression of an official United States

government position, policy, or decision. The authors have

sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity.

Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, DC 20540-5220

iii

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the

writers of the 1984 edition of Pakistan: A Country Study, edited

by Richard F. Nyrop. Portions of their work were incorporated

into this volume.

The authors are also grateful to individuals in various United

States government agencies and diplomatic and private institutions who shared their time, research materials, and expertise

about Pakistan. Special thanks are owed to the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington; to Anne T. Sweetser for her helpful comments on Pakistani society and culture; and to Mustapha Kamal

Pasha at the American University and Barbara Leitch LePoer at the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, for

their insightful comments on various parts of the manuscript.

Thanks are also given to Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the

Country Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department

of the Army.

The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal

Research Division staff who contributed directly to the preparation of the manuscript. These people include Sandra W. Meditz, who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the

sponsoring agency; Robert L. Worden and Andrea M. Savada,

who reviewed each chapter and made numerous suggestions

and points of clarification; Ilona Peterson, who provided cur- rent information about AIDS in Pakistan; David P. Cabitto, who

provided graphics support; Marilyn L. Majeska, who managed

editing and edited portions of the manuscript; Alberta J. King,

who provided bibliographic assistance; Andrea T. Merrill, who

managed production; and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who did the word processing.

Also involved in preparing the text were Sheila Ross, who

edited the chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed

the final prepublication editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who

compiled the index; and Janie L. Gilchrist, David P. Cabitto,

and Stephen C. Cranton, who prepared the camera-ready copy.

Harriett R. Blood prepared the topography and drainage

map; other maps and charts were prepared by Maryland Mapping and Graphics. Meg Blood designed the illustrations for

the cover and the title page of each chapter.

v
Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the individuals and the public and private agencies who allowed their

photographs to be used in this study.

vi
Contents

Page

Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv Country Profile xxi

Introduction xxix

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Craig Baxter

EARLY CIVILIZATIONS 4

ISLAM IN INDIA 8

THE MUGHAL PERIOD 11 COMPANYRULE 16

THE BRITISH RAJ 18

The Forward Policy 20

The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism 21

Beginnings of Self-Government 24

The Two Nations Theory 28

Toward Partition 30

INDEPENDENT PAKISTAN 33

Problems at Independence 33

Constitutional Beginnings 37

Early Foreign Policy 43

Collapse of the Parliamentary System 43

THE AYUB KHAN ERA 44

Basic Democracies 47

The 1962 Constitution 49

Ayub Khan's Foreign Policy and the 1965 War

with India 50

YAHY\ KHAN AND BANGLADESH 54

ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO AND A NEW

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 58

vii
ZIA UL-HAQAND MILITARY

DOMINATION, 1977-88 63

PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD DURING

THE ZIA REGIME 69

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 75

Anita M. Weiss

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 79

Boundaries 79

Topography and Drainage 82

Climate 87

Pollution and Environmental Issues 88

National Conservation Goals 90

POPULATION 91

Population Distribution and Density 92

Population Planning Policies and Problems 92

Migration and Growth of Major Cities 95

Impact of Migration to the Persian

Gulf Countries 97

Repercussions of the War in Afghanistan 98

SOCIAL STRUCTURE 100

Traditional Kinship Patterns 100

Linguistic and Ethnic Groups 103

Men, Women, and the Division of Space 118

The Status of Women and the

Women's Movement 120

RELIGIOUS LIFE 124

Basic Tenets of Islam 1 25

Islam in Pakistani Society 127

Politicized Islam 128

Non-Muslim Minorities 130

EDUCATION 131

Structure of the System 132

Female Education 133

Reform Efforts 134

HEALTH AND WELFARE 135

Maternal and Child Health 136

Health Care Policies and Developments 137

Special Problems: Smoking, Drugs, and AIDS .... 139

Zakat as a Welfare System 141

PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL COHESION 142

viii
Chapter 3. The Economy 147

John D. Rogers

STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 150

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 152

Policy Developments since Independence 152

Development Planning 158

FINANCE 160

Budget 160

Fiscal Administration 161

Monetary Process 161

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1 65

Foreign Aid 165

Foreign Trade 166

External Debt 168

LABOR 170

AGRICULTURE 172

Land Use 172

Irrigation 173

Drainage 176

Farm Ownership and Land Reform 177

Cropping Patterns and Production 179

Livestock 181

Forestry 181

Fishing 182

INDUSTRY 182

Manufacturing 183

Construction 184

Energy 184

Mining and Quarrying 189

SERVICES 189

Transportation 189

Telecommunications 194

Tourism 195

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 197

Mary Louise Becker

CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL

INHERITANCE 200

Independence 200

Role of Islam 201

Regional and Ethnic Factors 201

ix
The Civil Service 202

The Military 203

EARLYPOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 203

Early Constitution Building, 1947-58 203

Ayub Khan, 1958-69 204

Yahya Khan, 1969-71 206

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77 207

Ziaul-Haq, 1977-88 207

CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE .... 210

President 210

Parliament and Federal Government 210

Provincial Governments 213

Judiciary 213

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 214

Muslim League 215

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad 216

Jamaat-i-Islami 217

Pakistan People's Party 218

Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz 221

Awami National Party 222

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam 222

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal 223

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ZIA 223

The First Government of Benazir Bhutto 223

The Caretaker Government of Ghulam

MustafaJatoi 227

The Government of Nawaz Sharif 229

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as Power Broker 235

The "Silent Revolution": A Year of

Political Struggle 236

The Caretaker Government of

Moeen Qureshi 237

Benazir Bhutto Returns 238

THE MEDIA 241

FOREIGN POLICY 243

India 244

Other South Asian Countries 246

The Former Soviet Union 248

China 248

x
Middle East 249

The United States and the West 250

International Organizations 253

Chapter 5. National Security 255

Thomas Perry Thornton

THE ARMED SERVICES: A HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE 257

The Colonial Background 257

The Formation of Pakistan 260

PAKISTAN'S EVOLVING SECURITY DILEMMA 263

Survival in a Harsh Environment 263

The United States Alliance 264

The Army Assumes Control 267

Collapse of Pakistan's Security System 268

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 269

The Military Reasserts Itself 274

Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State 276

The Armed Forces in a New World Order 280

THE ARMED SERVICES 285

Constitutional Basis and Missions 285

Defense Strategy 286

Ministry of Defence 287

Army and Paramilitary Forces 288

Navy 290

Air Force 291

Personnel and Training 292

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 295

Military Production 295

Budget 299

MilitaryJustice 299

Foreign Security Relationships 300

The Role of Islam 302

INTERNAL SECURITY 304

Role and Structure of the Security Forces 304

Character of the Security Forces 306

Crime 308

Narcotics 308

Courts and Criminal Procedure 309

Prisons 310

Islamic Provisions 311

xi
Emergency Provisions 313

Subversion and Civil Unrest 314

Appendix. Tables 319

Bibliography 333

Glossary 363

Index 367

Contributors 395

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Pakistan, 1994 xxviii 2 Indus Valley Culture Sites, ca. 2500-1600 B.C 6

3 Kushan Empire, ca. A.D. 150 10

4 Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century 12

5 Topography and Drainage 84

6 Population by Age and Gender, 1993 94

7 Principal Ethnic Groups 108

8 Transportation System: Roads, 1994 190

9 Transportation System: Railroads, Airports, and

Ports, 1994 191

10 Structure of the Government, 1994 212

11 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1994 296

12 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1994 297

xii
Preface

This edition supersedes the 1984 edition of Pakistan: A

Country Study, edited by Richard F. Nyrop. Like its predecessor,

the present book is an attempt to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects of contemporary Pakistan.

Sources of information included scholarly books, journals, and

monographs; official reports and documents of governments

and international organizations; foreign and domestic newspapers and periodicals; and interviews with individuals with special competence in South Asian affairs. Relatively up-to-date

economic data were available from several sources, but the

sources were not always in agreement. Most demographic data

should be viewed as well-informed estimates.

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief

comments on some of the more valuable sources for further

reading appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with the metric system (see

table 1, Appendix). For the convenience of the reader, a brief

chronology of the major eras and events of South Asian and

Pakistani history is included (see table A).

The transliteration of various words and phrases posed a problem. For many words of Arabic origin—such as Muslim,

Quran, and zakat—the authors followed a modified version of

the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic

Names. In numerous instances, however, the authors adhered

to the spelling used by the government and people of Pakistan.

There is thus some variance in spellings: for example, the

Prophet Muhammad, but Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The reader

should also note that the term Khan, which appears with

numerous names (for example, Ayub Khan, Ghaffar Khan, and

Yahya Khan), is an honorific and is almost never a surname. The body of the text reflects information available as of

April 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however, have

been updated. The Introduction discusses significant events

that have occurred since the completion of research, and the

Chronology and Country Profile include updated information

as available.

xiii

Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description ANCIENT EMPIRES

ca. 2500-1600 B.C.

ca. 1500-500 B.C.

ca. 563-483 B.C.

ca. 321-180 B.C.

ca. 180B.C.-A.D. 150

ca. A.D. 78-ca. 200

ca. A.D. 319-ca. 600 COMING OF ISLAM

711

1001-1030

1192 1206-1526

1398 MUGHAL PERIOD

1526

1556 1556-1605

1605-27

1628-58 1658-1707

1707-1858 BRITISH PERIOD

1757

1799-1839

1830s 1838-42

1843 1845-50

1857-58

1858

1878-80

1885

1893

1905

1906

Indus Valley culture. Migrations of Indo-Aryan-speaking tribes; the Vedic Age.

Life of Siddhartha Gautama—the Buddha; founding of Buddhism. Mauryan Empire; reign of Ashoka (ca. 274-236 B.C.); spread of Buddhism.

Saka dynasties in Indus Valley. Kushan Empire; Gandharan art flourishes. Gupta Empire; classical age in northern India.

Muhammad bin Qasim, an Arab general, conquers Sindh and incor- porates it into Umayyad Caliphate. Mahmud of Ghazni raids Indian subcontinent from Afghanistan. Muhammad of Ghor defeats Rajputs. Delhi Sultanate. Timur destroys Delhi.

Babur defeats last Lodhi sultan in first Battle of Panipat, thus laying foundation of Mughal Empire. Akbar victorious in second Battle of Panipat. Reign of Akbar. Reign of Jahangir; in 1612 East India Company opens first trading post (factory). Reign of Shah Jahan, builder of Taj Mahal. Reign of Aurangzeb, last great Mughal ruler. Lesser emperors; decline of Mughal Empire.

Battle of Plassey and British victory over Mughal forces in Bengal;

conventional date for beginning of British rule in India. Sikh kingdom established in Punjab under Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

Introduction of British education and other reform measures.

First Anglo-Afghan War.

British annex Sindh, Hyderabad, and Khairpur. Sikh Wars; British annex Punjab; Kashmir sold to Dogra Dynasty,

to be ruled under British paramountcy.

Uprising, variously known as Indian Mutiny, Sepoy Rebellion, and

by Indian nationalists as First War of Independence.

East India Company dissolved; rule of India under British crown

(the British Raj) begins; marks formal end of Mughal Empire. Second Anglo-Afghan War.

Indian National Congress formed. Durand Line established as boundary between Afghanistan and

British India. Partition of Bengal.

All-India Muslim League founded.

XV
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

1909

1911 1916

1919

1935 1940

1946 August

1947 June

INDEPENDENT PAKISTAN

1947 August

October

1948 September

1949 January

1951 October

1955 August

October

1956 March

1958 October

1965 August

1969 March

1970 July

December

1971 March

April

Morley-Minto Reforms establish separate electorates for Muslims.

Partition of Bengal annulled. Congress-Muslim League Pact (often referred to as Lucknow Pact) signed. Montague-Chelmsford Reforms; Third Anglo-Afghan War. Government of India Act of 1935. Muslim League adopts "Pakistan Resolution" demanding separate nation for Muslims of India. "Two Nations Theory" articulated by Muslim League leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah and others. Muslim League observes "Direct Action Day." Widespread communal rioting spreads to many parts of India. Legislation introduced in British Parliament calling for indepen- dence and partition of India; communal rioting and mass movements of population begin, resulting in next months in 250,000

deaths and up to 24 million refugees.

Partition of British India; India achieves independence and incorporates West Bengal and Assam; Pakistan is created and incorporates East Bengal (East Wing, or East Pakistan) and territory in the northwest (West Wing, or West Pakistan); Jinnah becomes

governor general of Pakistan; Liaquat Ali Khan becomes prime

minister.

Start of first Indo-Pakistani War over sovereignty of Kashmir.

Jinnah dies; Khwaja Nazimuddin becomes governor general. United Nations-arranged cease-fire between Pakistan and India

takes effect, ending first Indo-Pakistani War.

Liaquat assassinated; Nazimuddin becomes prime minister; Ghulam Mohammad becomes governor general. Ghulam Mohammad resigns; succeeded by Iskander Mirza. "One Unit Plan" establishes the four provinces of West Pakistan as one administrative unit. Constitution adopted; Mirza becomes president. Mirza abrogates constitution and declares martial law; Mirza sent

into exile; General Mohammad Ayub Khan, chief martial law

administrator (CMLA), assumes presidency.

Start of second Indo-Pakistani War over Kashmir.

Martial law declared; Ayub Khan resigns; CMLA General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan assumes presidency. One Unit Plan abolished; four provinces reestablished in West Pakistan.

First general elections; Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rah- man (Mujib) secures absolute majority in new National Assembly; West Pakistan-dominated government declines to convene

assembly.

East Pakistan attempts to secede, beginning civil war; Mujib

imprisoned in West Pakistan; the "independent, sovereign republic of Bangladesh" first proclaimed from captured radio station in Chittagong. Formal declaration of independence of Bangladesh issued; government-in-exile formed in Calcutta.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

December

1972 July

1973 August

1976 January 1977 March

July

1978 September

1979 February

April November

December

1980 January

1983 August

1985 January February March

July 1986 August

December

1988 May

August

India invades East Pakistan; India first nation to recognize Bangladesh; Pakistani military surrenders to Indian armed forces, marking Bangladeshi independence; Yahya Khan resigns; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto becomes CMLA and president of Pakistan. Bhutto and India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi, conclude Simla

Agreement, adjusting 1949 cease-fire line between Pakistan and

India and creating new Line of Control. New constitution goes into effect; Bhutto becomes prime minister. Diplomatic relations established between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

General elections; massive victory by Bhutto's party evokes widespread rioting and protest. General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, appoints himself CMLA and proclaims martial law. Zia ul-Haq becomes nation's sixth president, replacing Fazal Elahi Chaudhry.

Islamic penal code introduced.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto hanged. Mob storms and burns down United States Embassy in Islamabad,

killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees; United

States cultural centers in Rawalpindi and Lahore also torched;

attacks in response to Iranian-inspired rumors that United States

citizens responsible for November 20 attack on Grand Mosque in Mecca.

Large-scale movements of Soviet troops and military equipment

into Afghanistan. United States president Jimmy Carter pledges military assistance to help Pakistan defend itself against Soviet threat; Carter offers US$400 million, rejected by Zia as "peanuts." President Zia ul-Haq announces that martial law will be lifted in 1985 but warns that army will retain key role in future governments. Non-Islamic banking abolished. General elections held for National Assembly. Mohammad Khan Junejo invited by Zia to form civilian cabinet. Economy declared to be in conformity with Islam. Movement for the Restoration of Democracy launches campaign

against government, demanding new general elections; Benazir Bhutto arrested in Karachi. New federal cabinet sworn into office by President Zia with Junejo

continuing as prime minister. Prime Minister Junejo expands federal government to include five new ministers and three new ministers of state; President Zia dis- misses Junejo government, dissolves national and provincial assemblies, and orders new elections to be held within ninety

days.

Zia, the United States ambassador to Pakistan, and top army offi- cials killed in mysterious airplane crash near Bahawalpur in Punjab; Ghulam Ishaq Khan, chairman of Senate, sworn in as acting

president; General Mirza Aslam Beg becomes chief of the army

staff.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

October November

December

1989 February June

September

October

1990 May-June

August

October

November

1991 February

May

July

1992 December

1993 January

April

June

Joint United States-Pakistani investigatory committee concludes

that Zia's death was caused by "criminal act of sabotage."

Elections held for National Assembly; Pakistan People's Party (PPP) wins ninety-three out of 207 seats contested. Benazir Bhutto sworn in as first female prime minister of a Muslim

nation; PPP and MQM parties sign "Karachi Declaration," an

accord to restore peace in Sindh; Pakistan and India sign accords

at South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

summit in Islamabad, including agreement not to attack each

other's nuclear facilities. Soviet Union completes withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Combined Opposition Parties, consisting of most opposition

groups, formed in National Assembly, with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi as leader. Pakistan's largest ever military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of

the Faithful), commences.

Pakistan rejoins Commonwealth of Nations (withdrew in 1972 to protest recognition of Bangladesh by member states). Ethnic troubles mount in Sindh; rift develops between PPP and coalition partners. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismisses Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto, her cabinet, and National Assembly; orders new elections

for October 24, 1990; Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi becomes caretaker prime minister. United States president George Bush unable to deliver annual certi- fication that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons as condition of continued assistance and arms and technology transfers, leading to cutoff of most aid. National elections held; Benazir

Bhutto's PPP loses to coalition of rightist parties. Mian Nawaz Sharif elected prime minister. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif liberalizes economy, lifts controls on

foreign currency entering country, and announces policies to encourage new investment; numerous pro-Iraq demonstrations and widespread public opposition to Nawaz Sharifs support of Desert Storm, but pro-United Nations stance reiterated. Shariat Bill adopted by National Assembly.

Opposition members call upon president to dismiss government

because of deteriorating law and order situation, particularly in Sindh. Babri Mosque in Ayodya, India, destroyed by Hindu fundamentalists seeking to build Hindu temple on contested site; communal

violence mounts over incident; Pakistan asks Indian government

to protect Muslims in India. General Asif Nawaz Janjua, chief of the army staff, dies of a heart

attack and is replaced with Lieutenant General Abdul Waheed;

Aimal Kansi, a Pakistani, shoots two Central Intelligence Agency

employees to death and wounds three others in Washington,

before fleeing the country. President Ishaq Khan dismisses government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, citing corruption. Twenty-two Pakistani troops are killed while undertaking peace- keeping duties in Somalia.
Table A. Chronology ofImportant Events

Period Description

July

October November

1994 January August

1995 March

July

President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resign under pressure from military; World Bank officer Moeen Qureshi named caretaker prime minister pending elections in October. Wassim Sajjad becomes acting president; India rejects Pakistan's proposal to sign regional nuclear test ban treaty. Benazir Bhutto's PPP wins slim margin in national elections and

builds coalition government; Benazir appointed prime minister. PPP stalwart, Farooq Leghari, defeats acting president, Wassim Sajjad, and becomes president. Benazir opens first all-female police station in Rawalpindi.

Pakistan places its troops on high alert along the Line of Control

after India deploys two more army divisions in Kashmir; former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif makes public statement claiming

that Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons.

Terrorist attack on streets of Karachi kills two American employees

of United States consulate and draws international attention to mounting law and order problems in Pakistan. United States press carries allegations by United States intelligence

officials that Pakistan has surreptitiously received fully operable medium-range M-ll ballistic missiles from China.

xix

Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Short Form: Pakistan.

Term for Citizens: Pakistani(s).

Capital: Islamabad (Islamabad Capital Territory)

.

Date of Independence: August 14, 1947, from Britain.

NOTE—The Country Profile contains updated information as available.

xxi
Geography

Size: Total land area estimated to be 796,095 square

kilometers.

Topography: Three major geographic areas: northern

highlands, Indus River plain, and Balochistan Plateau.

Climate: Generally arid; hot summers, cool or cold winters;

wide variations of temperature in given locale and between

coastal area on Arabian Sea and glacial regions of northern

highlands; little rainfall. Society

Population: 1994 (July) estimated at 129 million; annual

growth rate officially estimated at 3.1 percent.

Ethnic Groups: In general, percentages of population similar

to linguistic groups: Punjabis 66 percent, Sindhis 13 percent,

Pakhtuns 9 percent, Baloch 3 percent, muhajirs (immigrants

from India and their descendants) 8 percent, and other ethnic

groups 1 percent.

Language: Urdu official language, but English in general use in

government, military, business, and higher education. Urdu

spoken as native tongue by only 8 percent of population,

Punjabi by 48 percent, Punjabi variant Siraiki by 10 percent,

Sindhi by 12 percent, Pakhtu or Pashto by 8 percent, Balochi

by 3 percent, Hindko by 2 percent, and Brahui by 1 percent.

Native speakers of other languages, including English and

Burushaski, account for 8 percent of population.

Religion: About 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim, 77

percent of whom are Sunni and 20 percent Shia; remaining 3

percent of population divided equally among Christian,

Hindu, and other religions.

Education and Literacy: In 1992 overall literacy rate estimated

at more than 36 percent for adult population. Literacy rates

substantially lower for women. In 1990 only forty-five educated

women for every 100 educated men. Education organized into

five levels: primary (grades one through five); middle (grades

six through eight); high (grades nine and ten); intermediate

(grades eleven and twelve); and university undergraduate and

graduate programs. Preparatory classes (kachi, or nursery)

xxii
formally incorporated into system in 1988.

Health and Welfare: Substandard housing, inadequate

sanitation and water supply, and widespread malnutrition

contribute to spread of disease and to high infant, childhood,

and maternal mortality. In the mid-1990s, leading causes of

death gastroenteritis, respiratory infections, congenital

abnormalities, tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid fever. Economy

Salient Features: Low-income country with promising growth,

but transition to middle-income nation held back by chronic

problems, including rapidly rising population, sizable

government deficits, heavy dependence on foreign aid, large

military expenditures, and recurrent governmental instability.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): In FY 1993, equivalent of

US$50.8 billion, or about US$408 per capita; GDP growth rate averaged 5.3 percent a year between 1950 and 1993.

Agriculture: Declined over the past four decades from 53

percent of GDP in 1950 to 25 percent of GDP in FY 1993, but

still employs 48 percent of labor force. Pakistan notable for

having world's largest continuous irrigation canal system.

Industry: Leading growth component of economy, industry

(including mining, manufacturing, and utilities) accounted for

21.7 percent of GDP in FY 1993, up from 8 percent in FY 1950,

and employed 13 percent of labor force.

Services: Services (including construction, trade,

transportation and communications, and other services)

accounted for 53.3 percent of GDP in FY 1993 and employed

39 percent of labor force. About 7 percent of civilian work

force employed in construction, 13 percent in trade, 5 percent

in transportation, and 14 percent in other services.

Energy: Firewood, bagasse, and dung major energy sources. Small crude oil production; over 90 percent of petroleum

requirements imported. Natural gas, oil, and hydroelectric

power major domestic commercial energy sources. Substantial

deposits of poor-quality coal. Energy supplies constrain

industrialization.

Foreign Trade: United States and Japan largest trading

partners. In FY 1993 United States accounted for 13.7 percent

xxiii
of Pakistan's exports and 11.2 percent of its imports. Japan

accounted for 6.6 percent of exports and 14.2 percent of

imports. Germany, Britain, and Saudi Arabia important trading

partners. Hong Kong important export market. China

significant supplier of imports. Trade with India negligible.

Cotton and rice major exports; petrochemicals, chemicals,

machinery, and transportation equipment major imports.

Balance of Payments and External Debt: Negative balance of

trade in early and mid-1990s. In FY 1992, exports US$6.9

billion and imports US$9.3 billion, resulting in trade deficit of

approximately US$2.4 billion. Trade deficit expected to

increase to US$2.5 billion in 1993. World Bank estimated

US$24.1 billion external debt in 1992.

Foreign Aid: Dependent on foreign aid for development

efforts and balancing debt payments. United States largest

donor of aid since independence, but all United States military

aid and all new civilian commitments ended October 1990.

Currency and Exchange Rate: Rupee (Rs) divided into 100

paisa. US$1 = Rs30.30 in February 1994.

Fiscal Year: July 1 to June 30.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads: Road system approximately 180,000 kilometers in 1992;

asphalt roads about 51 percent of total. Work on four-lane 339-

kilometer highway between Lahore and Islamabad began

January 1993. Number of motor vehicles estimated at nearly 2

million in 1992, including 932,000 motorcycles, 454,000

automobiles, 220,000 tractors, 157,000 trucks and vans/and

37,000 buses.

Railroads: 8,775 kilometers total; 7,718 kilometers broad

gauge, 445 kilometers meter gauge, and 610 kilometers less than meter gauge; 1,037 kilometers broad-gauge double track;

286 kilometers electrified; most government owned.

Civil Aviation: International airports at Karachi, Islamabad,

Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. Pakistan International Airlines

national carrier.

Ports: Major ports at Karachi, Port Muhammad bin Qasim,

Gwadar, and Pasni.

Telecommunications: Telegraph and telephone systems

xxiv
government owned; more than 1.6 million telephone

connections in March 1993. Radio and telephone dominated

by government corporations; Pakistan Broadcasting

Corporation had monopoly on radio broadcasting, with home

service of 270 hours daily in twenty languages and world

service of ten hours daily in two languages in 1995; nineteen

AM and eight FM broadcasting stations. Governmentcontrolled Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) transmits

daily; privately owned People's Television Network transmits on

eight channels; twenty-nine television broadcast stations; more

than 2 million television sets in use in 1995.

Government and Politics

Government: Has shifted among various forms of

parliamentary, military, and presidential governments in

pursuit of political stability. The 1973 constitution, as amended

in 1985, provides for parliamentary system with president as head of state and popularly elected prime minister as head of

government. Bicameral legislature, Majlis-i-Shoora (Council of

Advisers), consists of Senate (upper house) and National

Assembly (lower house).

Politics: Return of democracy and open political debate after

death of General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in 1988; politics

characterized by varied and volatile mix of ethnic and regional

alliances. Provincialism and ethnic rivalries continue to impede

progress toward national integration. Major political parties

include Pakistan People's Party, Pakistan Muslim League

(Nawaz Sharif faction), Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz, Awami

National Party, Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, and

Solidarity Movement (Tehrik-i-Istiqlal).

Judicial System: Supreme Court, provincial high courts, and

other lesser courts exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction.

Federal Shariat Court decides if a civil law is repugnant to injunctions of Islam.

Administrative Divisions: Four provinces—Balochistan,

North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, and Sindh; one

territory—Federally Administered Tribal Areas; one capital

territory—Islamabad Capital Territory; and Pakistaniadministered portion of disputed Jammu and Kashmir

region—Azad (Free) Kashmir and the Northern Areas.

Foreign Relations: Member of United Nations, Commonwealth

xxv
of Nations, Economic Cooperation Organization, South Asian

Association for Regional Cooperation, and numerous other

international organizations. Relations with United States

historically close but turbulent. Acrimonious relations with

India and fallout from Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-

89) have been defining factors in recent foreign policy.

National Security

Armed forces: Active army strength in 1994 was 520,000, with

300,000 reserve personnel; navy, 22,000, with 5,000 reserve personnel; air force, 45,000, with 8,000 reserve personnel;

paramilitary forces—including National Guard, Frontier

Corps, Pakistan Rangers, Mehran Force, Coast Guard, and

Maritime Security Agency—exceeded 300,000.

Major Military Units: Army organized in nine corps. Under

corps headquarters, twenty-one divisions. Navy organized in

four commands, COMPAK—the fleet; COMLOG—logistics;

COMFORNAV—naval installations in the north of Pakistan;

and COMKAR—naval headquarters at Karachi. Air force

organized in eighteen squadrons to defend three air defense

districts—north, central, and south.

Military Equipment: Army equipment includes tanks, mostly of

Chinese manufacture but some United States-made armored

personnel carriers, artillery pieces, motorized rocket

launchers, mortars, air defense guns, TOW antitank guided

weapons, surface-to-surface missiles, ship-to-surface missiles,

and surface-to-air missiles. Navy equipment includes

submarines with United States Harpoon missiles, destroyers,

guided missile frigates, frigates, surface-to-air missiles, torpedo

craft, minehunters, combat aircraft, and armed helicopters. Air

force equipment includes F-16 fighters (mainstay of force),

Chinese J-6s and J-5s, French Mirages, and C-130 Hercules

transport aircraft. Defense Budget: US$3.5 billion in FY 1994, representing 26

percent of government spending and about 9 percent of gross

national product.

Foreign Military Relations: Principal military tie with United

States, but relationship periodically strained. China, a steady

source of military equipment, has joined Pakistan in

cooperative ventures in weapons production. Security

relationships also with Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf states, Iran,

xxvi
and Turkey.

International Security Forces: Pakistani troops contributed to various international security initiatives, including United

States-led alliance in Persian Gulf War and United Nations

peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Bosnia. Pakistan has sent

peacekeeping observers to Croatia, Iraq-Kuwait border zones,

Liberia, Mozambique, and Western Sahara.

Internal Security and Police: Internal security occasionally

threatened by regional interests, particularly by sectarian

violence in Sindh in early 1990s. Police often perceived as abusers of civil rights. Widespread violent crime and narcoticsrelated incidents constitute potential threats to domestic

security.

xxvii
xxviii
Introduction

PAKISTAN BECAME AN INDEPENDENT STATE in 1947, the

realization of a yearning by India's Muslims, who feared domination by the Hindu majority in a postcolonial India. As the

British made their final plans to surrender the "Jewel in the

Crown" of their empire, the earlier, elite "Two Nations Theory," premised on the notion of a separate homeland for the

subcontinent's Muslim minority, had broadened its popular

appeal and evolved into a collective vision championed by Muslims of all backgrounds. After independence, a debate commenced among contending groups over further refinement of

that vision. Agreement on what system of government the new

nation should adopt—a critical aspect of the debate—was

never fully reached. Indeed, few nations have in so short a period undergone as many successive political and constitutional experiments as has Pakistan. This irresolution contributed, in the decades following independence, to a recurrent

pattern of crisis: repeated coups and extended periods in

which martial law replaced civilian government, violent deaths

of several national leaders, periodic strife among ethnic

groups, and, most traumatically, a civil war that divided the

country in two. The struggle over the character and soul of Pakistan continues. Although democracy returned to Pakistan in 1988 after a long lapse, it is on trial daily, its continuation by no means certain. Definition of the vision of what Pakistan represents is still being contested from many opposing quarters.

Pakistan's status in the world has changed dramatically in the

nearly one-half century of its existence as an independent

state. In the twilight years of the Cold War, it achieved international stature as a "frontline" state during the Soviet occupation

of neighboring Afghanistan. With the Soviet departure from

Afghanistan in the late 1980s and the end of the Cold War,

Pakistan's role in the world arena has become less visible, and

its voice has diminished to the level of many other developing

states competing in the new world order. Yet, during the years

it spent in support of the Afghan struggle against Soviet domination, Pakistan impressed upon the world community a new

appreciation of its standing among Islamic nations and of its ideological commitment to causes it champions.

xxix
In terms of its military and economic development, Pakistan

is a "threshold" state. The world's first Islamic "de facto"

nuclear-weapons state, it has long been at loggerheads with its larger and more powerful neighbor, India, which, like Pakistan, denies having built nuclear weapons but not its ability to do so at the "turn of a screw." A nation well positioned to serve

as an economic model for other developing countries in the

post-Cold War era—especially the Islamic states of the former

Soviet Union—Pakistan has shown steady and impressive

long-term economic growth and is successfully making the

transition from an overwhelmingly agricultural to an industrial

economy. Yet, despite its considerable achievements in technology and commerce, Pakistan confronts many of the same problems it faced at its birth. The nation has one of the world's

highest population growth rates, making it difficult for the government to address the problems of poverty and attendant ills that affect so many in its society. Indeed, social development

has lagged behind economic gains. Quality of life indicators

literacy rates, especially among women, human rights, and universal access to heath care—have shown Pakistan to be a country with serious deficiencies.

Throughout history, Pakistan has been strongly affected by

its geostrategic placement as a South Asian frontier located at the juncture of South Asia, West Asia, and Central Asia. Scholars have called Pakistan the "fulcrum of Asia" because since

antiquity invaders have traversed this frontier carrying with

them the seeds of great civilizations. The armies of Islam came

to South Asia through the same mountain passes in the northwest of Pakistan that the Indo-Aryans, Alexander the Great, the

Kushans, and others had earlier entered.

Present-day Pakistan has been shaped by its rich history, preIslamic as well as Islamic, but colored in particular by the exigencies of its troubled and bloody birth as a nation in 1947.

The partitioning of British India into India and Pakistan was preceded and accompanied by communal riots of unprecedented violence and scope that forced millions of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh refugees to flee across the new international

borders.

The partition plan that led to the separate states of India and

Pakistan was drawn up in an atmosphere of urgency as a swell

of religious and ethnic unrest shook India. Under guidelines

established with the help of Britain's last viceroy in India, Lord

Louis Mountbatten, the perplexing task of establishing the new

xxx
boundaries of Pakistan was accomplished. Most Indian Muslims lived either on the dusty plains of Punjab or in the humid

delta of Bengal. Contiguous Muslim-majority districts in Punjab

and Bengal were awarded to Pakistan under the plan's guidelines. The additional task of deciding the status of the more

than 500 semiautonomous princely states of India still remained. All but three of these quickly acceded to either Pakistan or India. But the two largest princely states, Jammu and

Kashmir (usually just called Kashmir) and Hyderabad, and one

small state, Junagadh, posed special problems. Hyderabad and

Junagadh were located within territory awarded to India but were both Hindu majority states ruled by a Muslim leader.

These states hesitated but were quickly incorporated by force

into India.

The status of the third state, Kashmir, which had borders

with both India and Pakistan, proved especially problematic.

Unlike Hyderabad and Junagadh, Kashmir had a Muslim

majority and was ruled by a Hindu. Kashmir's maharaja was

reluctant to accede to either Pakistan or India, but when

threatened by a Muslim uprising (with outside support from

Pakistani tribesmen) against his unpopular rule, he hurriedly

signed the documents of accession, in October 1947, required

by India before it would provide aid. Pakistan then launched

an active military and diplomatic campaign to undo the accession, which it maintained was secured by fraud. Kashmir was

subsequently divided by the occupying armies of both nations,

the Indians holding two-thirds of the state, including the Muslim-dominated Vale of Kashmir and the Hindu-majority region

ofJammu to the south, while the Pakistanis controlled the west- ern third, which they called Azad (Free) Kashmir. India and

Pakistan fought two major wars to maintain or seize control over this state: in 1947-48 and in 1965. Kashmir's contested

and indeterminate status continues dangerously to complicate

relations between South Asia's two most powerful states. The bifurcated Pakistan that existed from August 1947 to December 1971 was composed of two parts, or wings, known as East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by 1,600 kilometers

of Indian territory. Observers pointed out, however, that the

people of the two wings were estranged from each other in language and cultural traditions: that the Bengali "monsoon

Islam" of the East Wing was alien to the "desert Islam" of the

West Wing. The East Wing, notable for its Bengali ethnic

homogeneity and its collective Bangla cultural and linguistic

xxxi
heritage, contained over half of the population of Pakistan and

sharply contrasted with the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the

West Wing. The West Wing consisted of four major ethnic

groups—Punjabis, Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and Baloch. The muhajirs

(see Glossary) constituted a fifth important group. The political leaders of Pakistan, however—particularly those of West

Pakistan—asserted that the Islamic faith and a shared fear of

"Hindu India" provided an indestructible bond joining the two

societies into one nation. This assertion proved flawed. A culture of distrust grew between the two wings, fueled by imbal- ances of representation in the government and military.

Furthermore, Bengali politicians argued that the economic

"underdevelopment" of East Pakistan was a result of the "internal colonialism" of the rapacious capitalist class of West Pakistan. In the final analysis, real and perceived inequities would

fray this "indestructible" bond holding the country together.

Less than a quarter century after the country's founding, Paki- stan would fission, the eastern wing becoming the independent

nation of Bangladesh.

It was neither Pakistan's precarious security nor its cultural

and ethnic diversity, but rather characteristics deeply rooted in

the nation's polity that most impeded its early democratic

development. The essentials for such a process—disciplined

political parties and a participatory mass electorate—were

missing in Pakistan's first years as an independent state. The

All-India Muslim League, the party that led the struggle for

Pakistan, failed to mature into a stable democratic party with a national following capable of holding together the nation's

diverse ethnic and cultural groups. Instead, it disintegrated

into rival factions soon after independence. Lack of a consensus over prospective Islamic provisions for the nation's governance, Bengali resentment over the West Pakistanis' initial

imposition of Urdu as the national language, and the reluctance of West Pakistani politicians to share power with politicians of the East Wing—all were factors that delayed the

acceptance of Pakistan's first constitution until nine years after

independence. The nation was also dealt a severe psychological

blow when in September 1948, only thirteen months after independence, Mohammad Ali Jinnah—known reverentially as the

Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) —died. Jinnah's role in the cre- ation of Pakistan had been so dominant that it has been

observed that he had neither peers nor associates, only lieutenants and aides. Jinnah's primary lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan,

xxxii
the nation's first prime minister, was assassinated in October

1951.

Jinnah's and Liaquat's leadership, so critical to the nation in

its infancy, was replaced in the early and mid-1950s by the generally lackluster, often inept performances of the nation's politicians. Those few politicians who were effective were all too

willing to play upon the emotions of an electorate as yet unac- customed to open democratic debate. The ethnic and provincial causes championed by these politicians too often took

precedence over national concerns. The government was weak

and unable to quell the violence and ethnic unrest that distracted it from building strong parliamentary institutions.

Believing that Pakistan's first attempt at establishing a parliamentary system of government failed, in the late 1950s the military ousted the "inefficient and rascally" politicians. During

this period, however, the belief that democracy was the "natural

state" of Pakistan and an important political goal was not

entirely abandoned. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first "soldier-statesman," regarded himself as more of a reformer

than an autocrat and, as chief martial law administrator, early on acknowledged the need to relinquish some military control.

In his unique governmental system called the "Basic Democracies," Ayub Khan became the "civilian" head of a military

regime. Ayub Khan's "democracy from above" allowed for controlled participation of the electorate and was supposed to capture the peculiar "genius" of Pakistan. To his critics, however,

Ayub Khan's political system was better characterized as a form

of "representational dictatorship." In 1969 an ailing Ayub Khan

was forced to resign following nationwide rioting against his

regime's perceived corruption, spent economic policies, and

responsibility for Pakistan's defeat in the 1965 Indo-Pakistani

War over Kashmir. Ayub Khan was briefly succeeded by his

army commander in chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya

Khan, who would best be remembered for presiding over the

two most traumatic and psychologically devastating events in

the country's history: the humiliating defeat of Pakistan's

armed forces by India and the secession of East Pakistan.

The East Wing of Pakistan had not benefited greatly from

Ayub Khan's "Decade of Progress," with its gains in agricultural

production and trade. Bengali politicians wanted to improve

what they considered to be the second-class political and eco- nomic status of their province vis-a-vis West Pakistan, just as they had earlier agitated for greater cultural and linguistic recxxxiii
ognition. The country's first nationwide direct elections were held in December 1970. The East Pakistan-based Awami

League, campaigning on a platform calling for almost total

provincial autonomy, won virtually all the seats allotted to the

East Wing and was thereby assured a majority in the national

legislature.

The results of Pakistan's first nationwide experiment in

democracy were not honored. Fearing Bengali dominance in

the nation's political affairs, West Pakistani politicians, led by

Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and

supported by senior army officers, most of whom were Punjabis, pressured Yahya Khan to postpone the convening of the

National Assembly. When the Bengalis of East Pakistan revolted

openly at this turn of events, the Pakistani military banned the

Awami League, arrested its leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,

and began a massive military crackdown. In the savage civil war

that followed, tens of thousands of Bengalis were killed, and an

estimated 10 million people took refuge in India. In early

December 1971, India entered the war and within weeks decisively defeated the Pakistani military. From the aftermath of

the war and the dismemberment of Pakistan came the birth of

a new nation: Bangladesh.

To most Pakistanis, the news of Pakistan's defeat came as a numbing shock—their military was both disgraced and con- demned for its brutal crackdown in East Pakistan. Literally

overnight, the country had lost its status as the largest Muslim

nation in the world. Gone, too, were any illusions of military

parity with India.

Pakistan soon recovered under the charismatic leadership of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who launched a forceful campaign to restore the people's self-confidence and to repair Pakistan's tar- nished image abroad. Initially, Bhutto was sworn in as president and chief martial law administrator, the two positions he

took over from Yahya Khan. Although he soon revoked formal

martial law, he governed autocratically until he was overthrown

in 1977.

A man of contradictions, and a product of a privileged feudal background, the Western-educated Bhutto nonetheless

expounded populist themes of shared wealth, national unity,

and the need to restore political democracy under the slogan

"Islam our Faith, Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Economy." Bhutto nationalized a large number of the most important manufacturing, insurance, and domestically owned

xxxiv
banking industries—actions that substantially slowed economic

growth.

By the mid-1970s, Bhutto's autocratic tendencies were interfering with his ability to govern. His determination to crush

any and all potential opposition had become obsessive. Bhutto

purged his party of real or imagined opponents, created a praetorian security force answerable only to himself, brought the

prestigious civil service under his personal control, and sacked

military officers who possessed what he described as "Bonapartist tendencies." Fatefully, Bhutto then named General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq—a relatively junior and obscure general—to hold the top army post. Most observers had predicted that

Bhutto's PPP would retain control of the National Assembly in

the elections of March 1977, but the margin of the PPP's vic- tory was so overwhelming that charges of fraud were immediately made, and riots erupted throughout the country. General

Zia was well positioned to act against Bhutto. He abruptly

informed the nation that he had taken over as the chief martial

law administrator but assured the people that the military

desired only to supervise fair elections, which he said would be

held in ninety days. This was the first of many promises Zia did

not keep. As the elections approached, Zia announced that

criminal charges were being brought against Bhutto and postponed the elections until after Bhutto had been tried in court. Bhutto was found guilty of complicity in the murder of a political opponent, and later hanged. The memory of Bhutto and

the circumstances surrounding his fall became a rallying cry

for his daughter, Benazir, who, during the 1980s, sought

revenge as she began her political ascent in steadfast opposition to Zia and martial law. Zia ul-Haq's eleven years of rule left a profound—and controversial—legacy on Pakistani society. Zia's military junta dif- fered in important aspects from the earlier military regime of

Ayub Khan. Like Zia, Ayub Khan had been contemptuous of

politicians; his style of governing was autocratic in the tradition

of the British Raj and its Mughal predecessors. Nevertheless,

Ayub Khan welcomed Western influences in his quest for eco- nomic development, and he introduced various reform measures, such as the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which

provided protection for women within their families. Moreover, early in his rule, Ayub Khan isolated the army from the

governmental decision-making process and instead relied

xxxv
heavily on senior civil servants and a few conservative politicians.

Zia's rule, by contrast, was notable for the high visibility of a

small number of army officers and for his fervent advocacy of a more stringent version of Islamic orthodoxy. Zia made clear his

desire to supplant the prevailing legal system with Islamic law,

the sharia (see Glossary) , and championed a role for Islam that was more state directed and less a matter of personal choice.

He proclaimed that all laws had to conform with Islamic tenets and values and charged the military with protecting the

nation's ideology as well as its territorial integrity. His establishment of the Federal Shariat Court to examine laws in light of

the injunctions of Islam further involved the state in religious

affairs. The crucial and perplexing question of the role Islam

should play in Pakistan existed before the creation of the

nation and remains unresolved today. Jinnah supplied a historical reference to the dilemma, stating in his inaugural address,

"You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be

Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the reli- gious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State." Although

each of Pakistan's indigenous constitutions has defined Pakistan as an Islamic state, determining what this means in practice has usually been left open to individual preference. Zia

elevated the tempo of the debate over the role of Islam in Pakistani society by directly involving the state with religion.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and its nine-year occupation of that country not only had a direct

impact on Pakistani society in general but also held vital importance for Zia's leadership, influencing his domestic and international image as well as the survival of his regime. From the

beginning of his rule, Zia was regarded by much of the world

community as a usurper of power and as something of an international pariah. He furthered his isolation by deciding, early in

his regime, to pursue the development of nuclear weapons, a program begun earlier by Bhutto. Building on the long and

close relationship between the United States and Pakistan dating from the early years of the Cold War, United States presidentJimmy Carter and his administration worked energetically

but unsuccessfully to discourage Pakistan's nuclear program

and finally suspended all economic and military aid on April 6, 1979. The execution of Bhutto two days earlier had added to

xxxvi
United States displeasure with the Zia regime and Pakistan.

Relations with the United States soured further when a Pakistani mob burned down the United States Embassy in November 1979.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan abruptly ended Pakistan's estrangement from the United States. Within days, Paki- stan once again became Washington's indispensable frontline

ally against Soviet expansionism. Massive military and eco- nomic assistance flowed into Pakistan despite Zia's continued

pursuit of nuclear weapons technology. Pakistan's nuclear program made major advances in the 1980s. Moreover, the change

in geostrategic circumstances following the occupation of

neighboring Afghanistan allowed Zia to postpone the promised elections repeatedly while he consolidated his position.

Foreign assistance provided a stimulus to the economy and

became an important means by which Zia neutralized his opponents. The war, depicted by Zia and the Afghan resistance as a holy war of believers versus nonbelievers, facilitated Zia's

efforts to transform Pakistan into a state governed by Islamic

law.The war in Afghanistan had many profound and disturbing

residual effects on Pakistani society. Pakistan absorbed more

than 3.2 million Afghan refugees into its North-West Frontier

Province and Balochistan. The influx of so many displaced

people threatened to overwhelm the local economies as refugees competed with Pakistanis for resources. With the refugees

came an arsenal of weapons. Domestic violence increased dramatically during the war years, and observers spoke dismally of

a "Kalashnikov culture" asserting itself in Pakistani society.

By the time of Zia's death in an airplane explosion in August

1988, an agreement had been signed signaling the end of

Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and the Soviet pullout had already begun. Domestic politics in Pakistan were sur- prisingly tranquil as Pakistan prepared for a transition of power

and elections to the National Assembly, which Zia had earlier

dissolved. An era seemed to have ended and a new, more promising one to have begun. The prospect for genuine democracy

in Pakistan appeared to have dramatically improved, and Pakistan appeared to have reached a watershed in its political development.

After her party won a plurality of seats in the parliamentary

elections of November 1988, Benazir Bhutto formed a fragile

coalition government and assumed the position of prime minxxxvii
ister. She became the first freely elected leader in Pakistan

since her father was deposed and the first woman to hold such

a high position in a Muslim country. Confronted by severe dis- advantages from the start, Benazir soon discovered that the art of governance was considerably more difficult than orchestrating opposition politics. An experienced politician but an inexperienced head of government, she was outmaneuvered by her

political opposition, intimidated by the military, and diverted

from her reform program. Benazir was also frustrated by her

inability to control the spreading social disorder, the widespread banditry, and the mounting ethnic violence between

Sindhis and muhajirs in her home province of Sindh. A prolonged struggle between Bhutto and the provincial government of Mian Nawaz Sharif in Punjab culminated in

bureaucrat-turned-president Ghulam Ishaq Khan's siding with

Nawaz Sharif against Benazir. Empowered by the Eighth

Amendment provisions of the constitution—a direct legacy of

the Zia ul-Haq regime, which strengthened the powers of the

president at the expense of the prime minister—Ishaq Khan

dismissed Benazir in August 1990 for alleged corruption and

her inability to maintain law and order. He also dismissed her

cabinet and dissolved the National Assembly as well as the

Sindh and North-West Frontier Province provincial assemblies

and ordered new elections for October.

The elections brought Nawaz Sharifs Islamic Democratic

Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad—IJI) coalition to power, and

for a brief period there appeared to be a workable relationship

between the new prime minister and the president. Yet this alli- ance soon unraveled over policy differences, specifically over

the question of who had the power to appoint the top army

commander. In charges similar to those Ishaq Khan had before

brought against Benazir, Nawaz Sharif was accused in early

1993 of "corruption and mismanagement." Nawaz Sharif, like

Benazir before him, was dismissed and parliament dissolved

without a vote of confidence ever having been taken in the legislature. This time, however, the Supreme Court overturned

the president's action, declaring it unconstitutional. The court

restored both the prime minister and parliament. The

Supreme Court's ruling, which served as a stunning rebuke to Ishaq Khan, succeeded in defusing his presidentially engineered crisis and, more important, allowed Ishaq Khan's opponents to boldly challenge the legitimacy of the civil-military

xxxviii
bureaucracy that had so often interrupted the process of democratic nation building.

The crisis in government continued as Ishaq Khan, still resolved to undermine the prime minister, brazenly manipulated provincial politics, dissolving the provincial assemblies in

Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province. Fears of military

intervention and the reimposition of martial law loomed as the

ongoing feud between the president and prime minister

threatened to bring effective government to a standstill.

Although the army ultimately intervened in mid-1993 to break

the stalemate and convinced both men to step down, fears of a

military takeover were unfounded. The army proved sensitive

to the spirit of the times and exercised admirable restraint as it assumed a new and benign role as arbiter rather than manipulator of the nation's politics.

A caretaker government led by World Bank official Moeen

Qureshi was installed in July 1993, with the mandate to preside over new elections for the national and provincial assemblies.

The caretaker government surprised everyone with its vigor

and impressed Pakistanis and international observers alike.

During his three-month tenure, Qureshi earned the accolade

"Mr. Clean" by initiating an impressive number of reform measures. Qureshi published lists of unpaid debts and prevented

debtor-politicians from running for office. He also devalued

the currency and cut farm subsidies and public-service expenditures. Because the Qureshi caretaker government was temporary and not much constrained by the realpolitik of Pakistani

society, observers doubted that any succeeding government

would be able to match its record and boldness of action.

In October 1993, Qureshi fulfilled his primary mandate of

holding new elections for the national and provincial assemblies. The contest was now between two staunch adversaries

Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto—and their respective parties.

Although Benazir's PPP received less of the popular vote than

Nawaz Sharifs Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), it won a nar- row plurality of seats in the National Assembly, enabling Benazir to form a government. Presidential elections were held in

November, and Farooq Leghari, a member of Benazir's party,

won, thereby strengthening her position.

In a political culture that traditionally placed great emphasis

on the personal characteristics of its leaders and considerably

less on the development of its democratic institutions, the personality of these leaders has always been of paramount, and

xxxix
many would argue exaggerated, importance. The case of Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's prime minister in mid-1995, is no exception. Benazir's return to the pinnacle of Pakistani politics in

October 1993 was portrayed with great theater as a redemptive

second coming for the country's self-proclaimed "Daughter of

Destiny." Benazir pledged this time to fulfill some of the promises she had failed to keep during her first tenure as prime minister. These included calming the potentially explosive ethnic

problems in the country, strengthening a treasury overburdened with debt, reconstructing a financial system weakened

by corruption, managing a burgeoning population with inadequate access to social services and one making heavy demands

on the country's fragile ecology, enforcing women's rights in a decidedly male-dominated society, and forging a consensus on

the role of Islam in contemporary Pakistani society. Above all, Benazir promised to steer Pakistan further along the road to democracy—a difficult and sensitive task in a country whose

power structure has traditionally been authoritarian and whose

politics have been socially divisive and confrontational.

As before, Benazir faces a continual challenge from Nawaz

Sharif, who appears to be pursuing the same destabilizing political strategies that succeeded in paralyzing her first government. For a short while, following Benazir's return to power,

her public rhetoric and that of her opponent seemed less confrontational than before and tended to stress themes of political stability, cooperation, and accommodation. This period of

detente was short-lived, however, as a familiar pattern in Pakistani politics soon reasserted itself, with vigorous opposition

attempts to bring down Benazir's government. Unrestrained

and sometimes chimerical criticism fueled opposition-orchestrated general strikes, which continued unabated throughout

1994 and into 1995. In response, Benazir branded her opposition as traitorous and "antistate." By the end of the first half of

1995, relations had become so vitriolic between Benazir and

Nawaz Sharif that in June, Nawaz Sharif accused Benazir of

being "part of the problem" of the escalating violence in Karachi, and Benazir, for her part, leveled an accusation of treason

against the former prime minister and chief rival, only months

after her government had arrested Nawaz Sharifs father for

alleged financial crimes.

Promising to be true to her reform agenda, Benazir unveiled

a government budget in June 1994 that called for lowering

import duties, making the rupee convertible on the current

xl
account, broadening the tax base, and holding down defense

spending. These measures will be strengthened by Pakistan's

receipt of most of the US$2.5 billion in aid requested at a meeting of international donors in 1994. In order to receive US$1.4

billion in preferential International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) credits, Pakistan agreed to a three-year structural

adjustment program of fiscal austerity and deficit cutting.

Under guidelines set by the IMF, Pakistan hopes to raise its gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) growth to an

average of 6.5 percent per year while eventually lowering inflation to 5 percent. Whether this goal can be reached depends

largely on raising Pakistan's export earnings, which suffered in

the past few years primarily as a result of a drought, a major

flood, and a plant virus "leaf curl" that has devastated cotton

production.

Most observers believe that Pakistan's greatest economic

advantage is its people: the country possesses a reservoir of

entrepreneurial and technical skills necessary for rapid eco- nomic growth and development. The textile industry is especially critical to Pakistan's development. This dynamic sector in

the economy—a major producer of cotton cloth and yarn

should benefit from the phaseout of textile import quotas

under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

By late 1994, Pakistan's official foreign-exchange reserves had

risen from below US$300 million the previous year to more

than US$3 billion. The government's continuing strategy of

privatizing state-owned enterprises appears to be invigorating

the economy and attracting substantial foreign investment in

the country's stock exchanges. An optimistic Benazir stated

that "Pakistan is poised for an economic takeoff and noted

that in the "new world of today, trade had replaced aid."

Although Pakistan's recent economic gains are encouraging,

the country faces a number of long-term impediments to growth. The most serious of these are rapid population growth,

governmental neglect of social development, continued high

inflation and unemployment, a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy, widespread tax evasion and corruption, a weak infrastructure, and defense expenditures that consume more than

25 percent (some estimates are as high as 40 percent) of government spending.

Benazir will also need to address Pakistan's most pressing

social problems if her reform program is to have a lasting

effect. Many of these problems are caused by the skewed distrixli
bution of resources in Pakistan. Although the middle class is growing, wealth has remained largely in the control of the

nation's elite. Agitation caused by the unfulfilled promise of ris- ing expectations is fueled by sophisticated media, which extend

a glimpse of a better life to every village and basti (barrio)

.

Pakistan must also work to protect its international image. In mid-1995 human rights violations continued to be widely

reported, including arbitrary arrest and detention, torture of

prisoners, and incidents of extrajudicial killings by overzealous

police, most often in connection with government efforts to restore law and order to troubled Sindh. The government,

faced with unprecedented levels of societal violence, has been

forced to take strong action. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

pledged to use "ruthlessness" where necessary to confront and

to root out ethnic and religious militants. Pakistan is also challenged by pervasive narcotics syndicates, which wield great

influence in Karachi, as well as in Peshawar in the North-West

Frontier Province. Pakistan has become one of the world's leading producers of heroin, supplying a reported 20 to 40 percent

of the heroin consumed in the United States and 70 percent of

that consumed in Europe. Pakistan also has an expanding

domestic market for illicit drugs—a scourge that is having a devastating effect on Pakistani society. The Pakistan government estimates that there are 2.5 million drug addicts in the

country—1.7 million of them addicted to heroin.

A particularly worrisome problem is Pakistan's unwanted

role as a base for Islamic militants. These militants come from a wide range of Arab countries, including Algeria, Tunisia,

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, as well as nations

in Central Asia and the Far East, and are mostly based in the

North-West Frontier Province. Many of these militants participated in the war in Afghanistan but now serve other, often

extremist, causes. An attack that killed two American employees of the United States consulate in Karachi in March 1995

has drawn international attention to the growing terrorist activity in Pakistan.

Pakistan's most pressing foreign relations problem is still Kashmir. India routinely accuses Pakistan of supporting a Kashmiri "intifadah"—a Muslim uprising in Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir. The rebellion, which is centered in the Vale of

Kashmir, a scenic intermontane valley with a Muslim majority,

has claimed 20,000 lives since 1990. Pakistan claims only to have lent moral and political support to Muslim and Sikh sepaxlii
ratist sentiments in Kashmir and the Indian state of Punjab,

respectively, while it accuses India of creating dissension in

Pakistan's province of Sindh. The Kashmir issue has now broadened in scope and has taken on a new and ominous dimension.

In February 1993, then Central Intelligence Agency director

James Woolsey testified before Congress that the arms race between India and Pakistan represented the "most probable

prospect" for the future use of nuclear weapons. These sentiments were echoed the following year by United Nations secre- tary general Boutros-Ghali, who cautioned that an escalation of

hostilities between Pakistan and India could lead to an accident, with "disastrous repercussions." Tensions on the military

Line of Control between Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir

and Indian-held Kashmir remained high in mid-1995.

In August 1994, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif made

an announcement calculated to showcase his hard-line stance

on Kashmir, embarrass Benazir's government, and further

complicate its relations with the United States over the two

countries' most sensitive bilateral issue—Pakistan's clandestine

nuclear weapons program. He stated, "If India dares to attack

Azad Kashmir, it will have to face the Pakistani atom bomb. I declare that Pakistan is in possession of an atom bomb."

Nawaz Sharif s statement fortified the position of United

States supporters of the Pressler Amendment of the Foreign

Assistance Act, which has suspended United States aid and

most military arms sales to Pakistan since October 1990. Under

the amendment, the president must make the required annual

certification to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. The last certification had been given—guardedly—by President George Bush in November 1989.

The timing of Nawaz Sharif s statement also threatened to undermine President William J. Clinton's earlier South Asian

nonproliferation initiative: a proposal to Congress to authorize

the release to Pakistan of twenty-eight F—16 fighter airplanes

(purchased before the aid cutoff) in return for a verifiable cap

on Pakistan's production of fissile nuclear material. In mid1995, following a visit to the United States by Benazir Bhutto,

the Clinton administration and Congress appeared to be moving toward agreement to significantly relax the Pressler

Amendment and other "country specific" sanctions that Pakistanis believe unfairly penalize their country for its nuclear program while overlooking India's program. Relaxation of the

sanctions could yet be derailed as new accusations by United

xliii
States intelligence officials surfaced in the United States press

in early July 1995 alleging that Pakistan had surreptitiously

received fully operable medium-range M-ll ballistic missiles

from China. The Clinton administration, however, maintains

that there is no conclusive proof that the missiles have been

delivered, and until there is, there will be no change regarding

sanctions.

Events in Pakistan point to a nation undergoing profound

and accelerated change but one very much indebted to its past.

Change in Pakistan is perhaps most turbulent in the metropolis

of Karachi—Pakistan's economic hub and a city whose wellbeing may offer a glimpse of the future prospects of the nation.

In mid-1995 Karachi continued to be plagued by a volatile combination of sectarian, ethnic, political, and economic unrest. The city of more than 12 million seems, in the words of one

Pakistan watcher, to have fallen almost into a Hobbesian state of "all against all," as religious, political, and criminal gangs

many well armed—wage a battle for control. In a city that is growing by more than 400,000 people a year and has an unemployment rate as high as 14 percent, recruits for feuding reli- gious and political factions are easily found. The violence left as many as 1,000 dead in 1994 and snowed little sign of abating

in 1995. The army, ordered to provide a measure of security for

the city, pulled out in December 1994 after a two- and one-halfyear presence, tiring of its police role and mindful that Karachi's streets were becoming too dangerous for its troops.

There are many explanations for the lawlessness and disorder in Karachi. Economists cite rampant economic growth.

Sociologists cite problems arising from Sunni (see Glossary)

and Shia (see Glossary) divisions in Islam and from linguistic

and ethnic competition, primarily between Urdu-speaking

muhajirs and native Sindhis. The government complains of

unruly political parties that are sometimes too willing to include criminal and drug-trafficking elements in their ranks,

and it even raises the specter of the "hidden hand" of Indian

agents provocateurs intent on destabilizing Pakistan.

In the final analysis, Karachi may present the greatest risk as well as the greatest potential for the nation's future. Some

observers are predicting that the success or failure of Benazir's

leadership will ultimately rest on whether she succeeds in managing the crisis in Karachi. On the one hand, if the city contin- ues to be mired in anarchy and violence, its reputation as a cosmopolitan symbol of the new Pakistan will be tarnished. If

xliv
security does not improve, foreign investors are likely to stay

away, delaying Pakistan's much-anticipated economic takeoff.

On the other hand, if the situation in Pakistan's largest "urban

laboratory" improves, the lessons learned can be applied else- where in the nation.

Benazir's father, former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,

wrote in 1977, "Politics is not the conversion of a flowering society into a wasteland. Politics is the soul of life. It is my eternal

romance with the people. Only the people can break this eter- nal bond." These words highlighted his philosophy of bringing

politics to the street and deriving strength from the masses. This philosophy served his daughter well during her years as an

opposition figure but considerably less so during her first term

as prime minister. Whether or not Benazir can keep the alle- giance of the people while presiding over the maturation of

Pakistan's democratic institutions will largely depend on her

understanding of her nation's complex political legacy.

July 1 0, 1 995 Peter R. Blood

xlv

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
Artist's rendition of tile mosaic ofhorsemen and soldiers from the Pictured

Wall, Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tessellated

tile work of the Mughal period.
WHEN BRITISH ARCHAEOLOGIST Sir Mortimer Wheeler

was commissioned in 1947 by the government of Pakistan to give a historical account of the new country, he entitled his

work Five Thousand Years ofPakistan. Indeed, Pakistan has a his- tory that can be dated back to the Indus Valley civilization (ca.

2500-1600 B.C.), the principal sites of which lay in present-day

Sindh and Punjab provinces. Pakistan was later the entryway

for the migrating pastoral tribes known as Indo-Aryans, or simply Aryans, who brought with them and developed the rudiments of the broad and evolutionary religio-philosophical

system later recognized as Hinduism. They also brought an

early version of Sanskrit, the base of Urdu, Punjabi, and Sindhi,

languages that are spoken in much of Pakistan today.

Hindu rulers were eventually displaced by Muslim invaders,

who, in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, entered

northwestern India through the same passes in the mountains

used earlier by the Aryans. The culmination of Muslim rule in

the Mughal Empire (1526-1858, with effective rule between

1560 and 1707) encompassed much of the area that is today

Pakistan. Sikhism, another religious movement that arose partially on the soil of present-day Pakistan, was briefly dominant

in the Punjab and in the northwest in the early nineteenth century. These regimes subsequently fell to the expanding power

of the British, whose empire lasted from the eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, until they too left the scene,

yielding power to the successor states of India and Pakistan.

The departure of the British was a goal of the Muslim move- ment championed by the All-India Muslim League (created in

1906 to counter the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress) , which strove for both political independence and cultural separation from the Hindu-majority regions of British

India. These objectives were reached in 1947, when British

India received its independence as two new sovereign states. The Muslim-majority areas in northwestern and eastern India were separated and became Pakistan, divided into the West

Wing and East Wing, respectively. The placement of two widely

separated regions within a single state did not last, and in 1971

the East Wing broke away and achieved independence as Bangladesh.

3
Pakistan: A Country Study

The pride that Pakistan displayed after independence in its long and multicultural history has disappeared in many of its officially sponsored textbooks and other material used for

teaching history (although the Indus Valley sites remain high

on the list of the directors of tourism). As noted anthropologist

Akbar S. Ahmed has written in History Today, "In Pakistan the

Hindu past simply does not exist. History only begins in the

seventh century after the advent of Islam and the Muslim invasion of Sindh."

Early Civilizations

From the earliest times, the Indus Valley region has been

both a transmitter of cultures and a receptacle of different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Indus Valley civilization

appeared around 2500 B.C. along the Indus River valley in

Punjab and Sindh. This civilization, which had a writing system,

urban centers, and a diversified social and economic system, was discovered in the 1920s at its two most important sites: Mohenjo-daro, in Sindh near Sukkur, and Harappa, in Punjab

south of Lahore (see fig. 2). A number of other lesser sites

stretching from the Himalayan foothills in Indian Punjab to Gujarat east of the Indus River and to Balochistan to the west

have also been discovered and studied. How closely these

places were connected to Mohenjo-daro and Harappa is not

clearly known, but evidence indicates that there was some link

and that the people inhabiting these places were probably

related.

An abundance of artifacts have been found at Harappa—in

fact, the archaeological yield there has been so rich that the

name of that city has often been equated with the Indus Valley

civilization (Harappan culture) it represents. Yet the site was damaged in the latter part of the nineteenth century when

engineers constructing the Lahore-Multan railroad used brick

from the ancient city for ballast. Fortunately, the site at Mohenjo-daro has been less disturbed in modern times and

shows a well-planned and well-constructed city of brick.

Indus Valley civilization was essentially a city culture sus- tained by surplus agricultural produce and extensive commerce, which included trade with Sumer in southern

Mesopotamia in what is today Iraq. Copper and bronze were in use, but not iron. Mohenjo-daro and Harappa were cities built

on similar plans of well-laid-out streets, elaborate drainage sys- tems, public baths, differentiated residential areas, flat-roofed

4
Historical Setting

brick houses, and fortified administrative and religious centers

enclosing meeting halls and granaries. Weights and measures

were standardized. Distinctive engraved stamp seals were used,

perhaps to identify property. Cotton was spun, woven, and dyed

for clothing. Wheat, rice, and other food crops were cultivated,

and a variety of animals were domesticated. Wheel-made pottery—some of it adorned with animal and geometric motifs

has been found in profusion at all the major Indus Valley sites. A centralized administration has been inferred from the cultural uniformity revealed, but it remains uncertain whether

authority lay with a priestly or a commercial oligarchy.

By far the most exquisite but most obscure artifacts

unearthed to date are the small, square steatite seals engraved

with human or animal motifs. Large numbers of the seals have

been found at Mohenjo-daro, many bearing pictographic

inscriptions generally thought to be a kind of script. Despite

the efforts of philologists from all parts of the world, however,

and despite the use of computers, the script remains undeciphered, and it is unknown if it is proto-Dravidian or proto-Sanskrit. Nevertheless, extensive research on the Indus Valley sites,

which has led to speculations on both the archaeological and

the linguistic contributions of the pre-Aryan population to Hinduism's subsequent development, has offered new insights

into the cultural heritage of the Dravidian population still dominant in southern India. Artifacts with motifs relating to asceticism and fertility rites suggest that these concepts entered

Hinduism from the earlier civilization. Although historians

agree that the civilization ceased abruptly, at least in Mohenjodaro and Harappa, there is disagreement on the possible

causes for its end. Conquering hordes of Aryan invaders from

central and western Asia have long been thought by historians

to have been the "destroyers" of Indus Valley civilization, but

this view is increasingly open to scientific scrutiny and reinterpretation. Other, perhaps more plausible explanations include

recurrent floods caused by tectonic earth movement, soil salinity, and desertification.

Until the entry of the Europeans by sea in the late fifteenth

century, and with the exception of the Arab conquests of

Muhammad bin Qasim in the early eighth century, the route

taken by peoples who migrated to India has been through the

mountain passes, most notably the Khyber Pass, in northwest- ern Pakistan. Although unrecorded migrations may have taken

place earlier, it is certain that migrations increased in the sec5
Pakistan: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler, Early India and

Pakistan: To Ashoka, New York, 1968, 95; and Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., A

Historical Atlas of South Asia, New York, 1992, 9. Figure 2. Indus Valley Culture Sites, ca. 2500-1 600 B. C

ond millennium B.C. The records of these people—who spoke an Indo-European language—are literary, not archaeological,

and were preserved in the Vedas, collections of orally transmitted hymns. In the greatest of these, the "Rig Veda," the Aryan

speakers appear as a tribally organized, pastoral, and pantheistic people. The later Vedas and other Sanskritic sources, such

as the Puranas (literally, "old writings"—an encyclopedic collection of Hindu legends, myths, and genealogy) , indicate an east- ward movement from the Indus Valley into the Ganges Valley

(called Ganga in Asia) and southward at least as far as the

Vindhya Range, in central India. A social and political system

evolved in which the Aryans dominated, but various indige- nous peoples and ideas were accommodated and absorbed.

The caste system that remained characteristic of Hinduism also

evolved. One theory is that the three highest castes—Brah6
Historical Setting

mins, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas—were composed of Aryans,

while a lower caste—the Sudras—came from the indigenous

peoples.

By the sixth century B.C., knowledge of Indian history

becomes more focused because of the available Buddhist and

Jain sources of a later period. Northern India was populated by

a number of small princely states that rose and fell in the sixth

century B.C. In this milieu, a phenomenon arose that affected

the history of the region for several centuries—Buddhism. Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, or "Enlightened One" (ca.

563-483 B.C.), was born in the Ganges Valley. His teachings were spread in all directions by monks, missionaries, and merchants. The Buddha's teachings proved enormously popular

when considered against the more obscure and highly complicated rituals and philosophy of Vedic Hinduism. The original

doctrines of the Buddha also constituted a protest against the

inequities of the caste system, thereby attracting large numbers

of followers.

At about the same time, the semi-independent kingdom of

Gandhara, roughly located in northern Pakistan and centered

in the region of Peshawar, stood between the expanding kingdoms of the Ganges Valley to the east and the Achaemenid

Empire of Persia to the west. Gandhara probably came under

the influence of Persia during the reign of Cyrus the Great

(559-530 B.C.). The Persian Empire fell to Alexander the

Great in 330 B.C., and he continued his march eastward

through Afghanistan and into India. Alexander defeated

Porus, the Gandharan ruler of Taxila, in 326 B.C. and marched

on to the Ravi River before turning back. The return march

through Sindh and Balochistan ended with Alexander's death

at Babylon in 323 B.C.

Greek rule did not survive in northwestern India, although a school of art known as Indo-Greek developed and influenced

art as far as Central Asia. The region of Gandhara was con- quered by Chandragupta (r. ca. 321-ca. 297 B.C.), the founder

of the Mauryan Empire, the first universal state of northern

India, with its capital at present-day Patna in Bihar. His grandson, Ashoka (r. ca. 274-ca. 236 B.C.), became a Buddhist. Taxila became a leading center of Buddhist learning. Successors to Alexander at times controlled the northwestern region of

present-day Pakistan and even the Punjab after Mauryan power

waned in the region.

7
Pakistan: A Country Study

The northern regions of Pakistan came under the rule of

the Sakas, who originated in Central Asia in the second century

B.C. They were soon driven eastward by Pahlavas (Parthians

related to the Scythians), who in turn were displaced by the

Kushans (also known as the Yueh-Chih in Chinese chronicles)

.

The Kushans had earlier moved into territory in the north- ern part of present-day Afghanistan and had taken control of

Bactria. Kanishka, the greatest of the Kushan rulers (r. ca. A.D.

120-60), extended his empire from Patna in the east to Bukhara in the west and from the Pamirs in the north to central India, with the capital at Peshawar (then Purushapura)

(see fig. 3). Kushan territories were eventually overrun by the

Huns in the north and taken over by the Guptas in the east and

the Sassanians of Persia in the west. The age of the imperial Guptas in northern India (fourth to seventh centuries A.D.) is regarded as the classical age of

Hindu civilization. Sanskrit literature was of a high standard;

extensive knowledge in astronomy, mathematics, and medicine was gained; and artistic expression flowered. Society became

more settled and more hierarchical, and rigid social codes

emerged that separated castes and occupations. The Guptas

maintained loose control over the upper Indus Valley.

Northern India suffered a sharp decline after the seventh

century. As a result, Islam came to a disunited India through

the same passes that Aryans, Alexander, Kushans, and others

had entered.

Islam in India

The initial entry of Islam into India came in the first century

after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (see Basic Tenets of

Islam, ch. 2). The Umayyad caliph in Damascus sent an expedition to Balochistan and Sindh in 711 led by Muhammad bin

Qasim (for whom Karachi's second port is named). The expedition went as far north as Multan but was not able to retain

that region and was not successful in expanding Islamic rule to other parts of India. Coastal trade and the presence of a Muslim colony in Sindh, however, permitted significant cultural

exchanges and the introduction into the subcontinent of

saintly teachers (Sufi—see Glossary). Muslim influence grew

with conversions.

Almost three centuries later, the Turks and the Afghans

spearheaded the Islamic conquest in India through the traditional invasion routes of the northwest. Mahmud of Ghazni

8
Dhyani Buddha, secondcentury Buddha statuefrom

the historic site of Taxila

Courtesy Prints and

Photographs Division,

Library of Congress

(979-1030) led a series of raids against Rajput kingdoms and

rich Hindu temples and established a base in the Punjab for

future incursions. Mahmud's tactics originated the legend of

idol-smashing Muslims bent on plunder and forced conversions, a reputation that persists in India to the present day.

During the last quarter of the twelfth century, Muhammad

of Ghor invaded the Indo-Gangetic Plain, conquering in suc- cession Ghazni, Multan, Sindh, Lahore, and Delhi. His succes- sors established the first dynasty of the Delhi Sultanate, the

Mamluk Dynasty (mamluk means "slave") in 1211 (however, the

Delhi Sultanate is traditionally held to have been founded in

1206). The territory under control of the Muslim rulers in

Delhi expanded rapidly. By mid-century, Bengal and much of

central India were under the Delhi Sultanate. Several TurkoAfghan dynasties ruled from Delhi: the Mamluk (1211-90), the

Khalji (1290-1320), the Tughlaq (1320-1413), the Sayyid

(1414-51), and the Lodhi (1451-1526). As Muslims extended

their rule into southern India, only the Hindu kingdom of

Vijayanagar remained immune, until it too fell in 1565. There

were also kingdoms independent of Delhi in the Deccan,

Gujarat, Malwa (central India), and Bengal. Nevertheless,

almost all of the area in present-day Pakistan remained generally under the rule of Delhi.

9
Pakistan: A Country Study

Probable boundary of ©mpir© or kinQdom • Populated place Maru Geopolitical region

100 200 400 Kilometers

I '—H—

100 200 400 Miles

> 'Bay of Bengal

Source: Based on information from William C. Brice, ed., An Historical Atlas ofIslam, Leiden, 1981, 47-53; and C. Collin Davies, An Historical Atlas of the Indian

Peninsula, London, 1959, 15. Figure 3. Kushan Empire, ca. A.D. 150

The sultans of Delhi enjoyed cordial, if superficial, relations

with Muslim rulers in the Near East but owed them no alle- giance. The sultans based their laws on the Quran and the

sharia (see Glossary) and permitted non-Muslim subjects to

10
Historical Setting

practice their religion only if they paid jizya (see Glossary), or head tax. The sultans ruled from urban centers—while military

camps and trading posts provided the nuclei for towns that

sprang up in the countryside. Perhaps the greatest contribution of the sultanate was its temporary success in insulating the

subcontinent from the potential devastation of the Mongol

invasion from Central Asia in the thirteenth century. The sul- tanate ushered in a period of Indian cultural renaissance

resulting from the stimulation of Islam by Hinduism. The

resulting "Indo-Muslim" fusion left lasting monuments in architecture, music, literature, and religion. The sultanate suffered

from the sacking of Delhi in 1398 by Timur (Tamerlane) but

revived briefly under the Lodhis before it was conquered by the

Mughals.

The Mughal Period

India in the sixteenth century presented a fragmented picture of rulers, both Muslim and Hindu, who lacked concern

for their subjects and who failed to create a common body of

laws or institutions. Outside developments also played a role in

shaping events. The circumnavigation of Africa by the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama in 1498 allowed Europeans to challenge Arab control of the trading routes between Europe

and Asia. In Central Asia and Afghanistan, shifts in power

pushed Babur of Ferghana (in present-day Uzbekistan) southward, first to Kabul and then to India. The dynasty he founded

endured for more than three centuries.

Claiming descent from both Chinggis Khan (Genghis Khan)

and Timur, Babur combined strength and courage with a love

of beauty, and military ability with cultivation. Babur concentrated on gaining control of northwestern India. He did so in

1526 by defeating the last Lodhi sultan on the field of Panipat, a town just northwest of Delhi. Babur then turned to the tasks

of persuading his Central Asian followers to stay on in India

and of overcoming other contenders for power, mainly the

Rajputs and the Afghans. He succeeded in both tasks but died

shortly thereafter in 1530. The Mughal Empire was one of the

largest centralized states in premodern history and was the pre- cursor to the British Indian Empire (see fig. 4).

The perennial question of who was the greatest of the six

"Great Mughals" receives varying answers in present-day Paki- stan and India. Some favor Babur the pioneer and others his

great-grandson, Shahjahan (r. 1628-58), builder of the Taj

11
Pakistan: A Country Study

Approximate limit of Mughal Empire

Source: Based on information from Joseph E. Schwartzberg, ed., A Historical Atlas of South Asia, New York, 1992, 46. Figure 4. Mughal Empire, Late Seventeenth Century

Mahal and other magnificent buildings. The other two towering figures of the era by general consensus were Akbar (r. 1556-1605) and Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707). Both rulers

expanded the empire greatly and were able administrators.

Akbar was known for his religious tolerance and administrative

12
Historical Setting

genius, while Aurangzeb was a pious Muslim and fierce protector of orthodox Islam in an alien and heterodox environment.

Akbar succeeded his father, Humayun (r. 1530-40 and 1555-

56), whose rule was interrupted by the Afghan Sur Dynasty,

which rebelled against him. It was only just before his death

that Humayun was able to regain the empire and leave it to his son. In restoring and expanding Mughal rule, Akbar based his

authority on the ability and loyalty of his followers, irrespective

of their religion. In 1564 the jizya on non-Muslims was abolished, and bans on temple building and Hindu pilgrimages were lifted. Akbar's methods of administration reinforced his power

against two possible sources of challenge—the Afghan-Turkish

aristocracy and the traditional interpreters of Islamic law, the

ulama (see Glossary). He created a ranked imperial service

based on ability rather than birth, whose members were

obliged to serve wherever required. They were remunerated

with cash rather than land and were kept away from their

inherited estates, thus centralizing the imperial power base and

ensuring its supremacy. The military and political functions of

the imperial service were separate from those of revenue collection, which was supervised by the imperial treasury. This sys- tem of administration, known as the mansabdari, was based on

loyal service and cash payments and was the backbone of the

Mughal Empire; its effectiveness depended on personal loyalty

to the emperor and his ability and willingness to choose, remunerate, and supervise.

Akbar declared himself the final arbiter in all disputes of law

derived from the Quran and the sharia. He backed his religious

authority primarily with his authority in the state. In 1580 he

also initiated a syncretic court religion called the Din-i-Ilahi

(Divine Faith). In theory, the new faith was compatible with

any other, provided that the devotee was loyal to the emperor.

In practice, however, its ritual and content profoundly

offended orthodox Muslims. The ulama found their influence

undermined. The concept of Islam as a superior religion with a

historic mission in the world appeared to be compromised.

The syncretism of the court and its tolerance of both Hindus

and unorthodox Shia (see Glossary) sects among Muslims triggered a reaction among Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims. In the

fratricidal war of succession that closed the reign of Akbar's

grandson Shah Jahan in 1658, the aristocracy supported the

austere military commander Aurangzeb against his learned

13
Pakistan: A Country Study

and eclectic brother Dara Shikoh, whom Aurangzeb defeated

in battle and later had decapitated in 1662.

Aurangzeb's reign ushered in the decline of the Mughal

Empire. Aurangzeb, who in the latter half of his long rule

assumed the title "Alamgir," or "world-seizer," was known for

aggressively expanding the empire's frontiers and for his militant enforcement of orthodox Sunni Islam. During his reign,

the Mughal Empire reached its greatest geographical extent,

yet his policies also led to its dissolution. Although he was an

outstanding general and a rigorous administrator, his reign was

characterized by a decline in fiscal and military standards as security and luxury increased. Land rather than cash became

the usual means of remunerating high-ranking officials, and

divisive tendencies in his large empire further undermined

central authority.

In 1679 Aurangzeb reimposed the hated jizya on Hindus.

Coming after a series of other taxes and also discriminatory measures favoring Sunni Muslims, this action by the "prayermonger," as he was called, incited rebellion among Hindus and

others in many parts of the empire—Jat, Sikh, and Rajput

forces in the north and Maratha forces in the Deccan. The

emperor managed to crush the rebellions in the north, but at a high cost to agricultural productivity and to the legitimacy of

Mughal rule. Aurangzeb was compelled to move his headquarters to Daulatabad in the Deccan to mount a costly campaign

against Maratha guerrilla fighters, which lasted twenty-six years

until he died in 1707 at the age of ninety. Aurangzeb,

oppressed by a sense of failure, isolation, and impending

doom, lamented that in life he "came alone" and would "go as a stranger."

In the century and one-half that followed, effective control

by Aurangzeb's successors weakened. Succession to imperial

and even provincial power, which had often become hereditary, was subject to intrigue and force. The mansabdari system

gave way to the zamindari system, in which high-ranking offi- cials took on the appearance of hereditary landed aristocracy

with powers of collecting rents. As Delhi's control waned, other

contenders for power emerged and clashed, thus preparing the

way for the eventual British takeover.

Vasco da Gama led the first documented European expedition to India, sailing into Calicut on the southwest coast in

1498. In 1510 the Portuguese captured Goa, which became the

seat of their activity. Under Admiral Alfonso de Albuquerque,

14
Mughal painting of

Aurangzeb, the last of the Great Mughals

Courtesy Prints and

Photographs Division,

Library of Congress

Portugal successfully challenged Arab power in the Indian

Ocean and dominated the sea routes for a century. Jesuits

came to "convert, to converse, and to record" observations of

India. The Protestant countries of the Netherlands and

England, upset by the Portuguese monopoly, formed private

trading companies at the turn of the seventeenth century to challenge the Portuguese.

Mughal officials permitted the new carriers of India's considerable export trade to establish trading posts (factories) in

India. The Dutch East India Company concentrated mainly on

the spice trade from present-day Indonesia. Britain's East India

Company carried on trade with India. The French East India

Company also set up factories.

During the wars of the eighteenth century, the factories

served not only as collection and transshipment points for

trade but also increasingly as fortified centers of refuge for

both foreigners and Indians. British factories gradually began

to apply British law to disputes arising within their jurisdiction.

The posts also began to grow in area and population. Armed

company servants were effective protectors of trade. As rival

contenders for power called for armed assistance and as individual European adventurers found permanent homes in

India, British and French companies found themselves more

15
Pakistan: A Country Study

and more involved in local politics in the south and in Bengal.

Plots and counterplots climaxed when British East India Company forces, led by Robert Clive, decisively defeated the larger

but divided forces of Nawab Siraj-ud-Dawlah at Plassey (Pilasi)

in Bengal in 1757.

Company Rule

It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that

almost all of the territory that constitutes Pakistan and India

came under the rule of the British East India Company. The

patterns of territorial acquisition and rule as applied by the

company in Sindh and Punjab and the manner of governance

became the basis for direct British rule in the British Indian

Empire and indirect rule in the princely states under the paramountcy of the crown. Although the British had earlier ruled in the factory areas, the beginning of British rule is often dated from the Battle of

Plassey. Give's victory was consolidated in 1764 at the Battle of

Buxar (in Bihar), where the emperor, Shah Alam II, was

defeated. As a result, Shah Alam was coerced to appoint the

company to be the diwan (collector of revenue) for the areas of

Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa (this pretense of Mughal control was abandoned in 1827). The company thus became the supreme,

but not the titular, power in much of the Ganges Valley, and

company agents continued to trade on terms highly favorable

to them.

The area controlled by the company expanded during the

first three decades of the nineteenth century by two methods.

The first was the use of subsidiary agreements (sanad) between

the British and the local rulers, under which control of foreign

affairs, defense, and communications was transferred from the

ruler to the company and the rulers were allowed to rule as they wished (up to a limit) on other matters. This development

created what came to be called the Native States, or Princely

India, that is, the world of the maharaja and his Muslim counterpart, the nawab. The second method was outright military

conquest or direct annexation of territories; it was these areas

that were properly called British India. Most of northern India was annexed by the British.

At the start of the nineteenth century, most of present-day

Pakistan was under independent rulers. Sindh was ruled by the

Muslim Talpur mirs (chiefs) in three small states that were annexed by the British in 1843. In the Punjab, the decline of

16
Historical Setting

the Mughal Empire allowed the rise of the Sikhs, first as a military force and later as a political administration in Lahore. The

kingdom of Lahore was at its most powerful and expansive during the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, when Sikh control was extended beyond Peshawar, and Kashmir was added to his

dominions in 1819. After Ranjit Singh died in 1839, political

conditions in the Punjab deteriorated, and the British fought

two wars with the Sikhs. The second of these wars, in 1849, saw

the annexation of the Punjab, including the present-day NorthWest Frontier Province, to the company's territories. Kashmir

was transferred by sale in the Treaty of Amritsar in 1850 to the

Dogra Dynasty, which ruled the area under British paramountcy until 1947.

As the British increased their territory in India, so did Russia

expand in Central Asia. The East India Company signed treaties with a number of Afghan rulers and with Ranjit Singh. Russia backed Persian ambitions in western Afghanistan. In 1838

the company's actions brought about the First Anglo-Afghan

War (1838-42). Assisted by Sikh allies, the company took Kandahar and Kabul and made its own candidate amir. The amir

proved unpopular with the Afghans, however, and the British

garrison's position became untenable. The retreat of the British from Kabul in January 1842 was one of the worst disasters in

British military history, as a column of more than 16,000

(about one-third soldiers, the rest camp followers) was annihilated by Afghan tribesmen as they struggled through the snow- bound passes on their way back to India. The British later sent a punitive expedition to Kabul, which it burned in retribution,

but made no attempt to reoccupy Afghanistan.

In the Punjab, annexed in 1849, a group of extraordinarily

able British officers, serving first the company and then the

British crown, governed the area. They avoided the administrative mistakes made earlier in Bengal. A number of reforms

were introduced, although local customs were generally

respected. Irrigation projects later in the century helped the

Punjab become the granary of northern India (see Irrigation,

ch. 3). The respect gained by the new administration could be

gauged by the fact that within ten years Punjabi troops were

fighting for the British elsewhere in India to subdue the uprising of 1857-58 (see the British Raj, this ch.). The Punjab was to become the major recruiting area for the British Indian Army,

recruiting both Sikhs and Muslims.

17
Pakistan: A Country Study

The British Raj

The uprising of 1857-58 became the great divide in nineteenth-century South Asian history. Understated by British his- torians as the Indian Mutiny or Sepoy Rebellion and referred

to with some exaggeration by later Indian nationalists as the

First War of Independence, the uprising nevertheless heralded

the formal end of the Mughal Empire and marked the end of

company rule in India as well. In general, the uprising was a

reaction to British expansionism and the outcome of the policies of modernization and annexation of Governor General

Lord Dalhousie (1848-56), especially in Oudh (Avadh, now

part of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh) in 1856. The immediate spark for mutiny by the sepoys (Indian soldiers employed

by the East India Company) was the introduction of the new

Enfield rifle, which had cartridges, allegedly greased with cow

or pig fat, the tips of which had to be bitten off before loading.

Both Muslim and Hindu soldiers were outraged at this offense

to their religious scruples and refused to comply. British offic- ers responded by summarily dismissing regiment after regiment from the Bengal Army for refusing to load their weapons.

The mutiny was ignited at the cantonment at Meerut, north of

Delhi, when all three of the sepoy regiments rose in revolt

against the British, killing some British officers before heading

for Delhi to restore Bahadur Shah II to imperial glory.

Although the area of fighting was limited to northern and central India and participation was limited to sepoys of the Bengal

army and some princely states, the uprisings lasted a year and

were a severe blow to British confidence. In putting down the

rebellion, British troops were aided substantially by their

recently recruited troops from the Punjab.

The uprising of 1857-58 heralded the formal end of the

Mughal Empire and marked as well the end of company rule in

India. The British Parliament passed the Government of India

Act of 1858, which transferred authority to the British crown,

represented in India by the governor general, who thereafter

also had the title of viceroy. Queen Victoria was proclaimed

empress of India in 1877.

The Victorian model of administration in British India

became the standard reference point for law, order, and probity in Pakistan. At the apex of the administration stood the

governor general, almost always a British peer. The governor

general held supreme legislative and executive powers and was

responsible directly to the secretary of state for India, a mem18
Historical Setting

ber of the British cabinet. British India was divided into provinces (suba) for administrative purposes, each headed,

depending on size and importance, by a governor or lieutenant governor. Provinces were divided into divisions, and these

in turn were divided into districts (zilla), the basic administrative units, encompassing substantial territory and population.

In many cases, the provinces and districts followed the lines of

those created by the Mughals.

The district officer was the linchpin of the system. The offi- cer was revenue collector as well as dispenser ofjustice and was

called district collector, district magistrate, and, in some areas, deputy commissioner (the DC) with equal validity. District

officers were usually drawn from the prestigious meritocracy,

the Indian Civil Service. Recruitment to the Indian Civil Service was competitive, based on examination of young men with

a British classical education. Exclusively British at its beginning,

the Indian Civil Service was forced to open its doors slightly to successful Indian candidates. After 1871 district boards and

municipal committees were established to assist the district

officers in their administrative functions. Thus elective politics,

in however limited a form, was introduced to the subcontinent.

The governor general was also known as the viceroy and crown

representative when dealing with Indian princes. Relations

between the British crown and Indian princes were set out in an elusive doctrine of "paramountcy." The princes promised

loyalty and surrendered all rights to conduct foreign or

defense policy; the crown promised noninterference in internal affairs (except in cases of gross maladministration or injustice) and protection from external and internal enemies.

The British Raj was socially and politically conservative, but

it brought profound economic change to the subcontinent.

For strategic, administrative, and commercial reasons, the British improved transportation and communications and kept

them in good repair. Coal mines were opened in Bihar and

Bengal, and irrigation canals were laid out in the Yamuna (also seen as Jumna), Ganges, and Indus valleys; the Indus Valley

became the largest irrigated area in the world. The expansion

of irrigation in the Punjab led to the development of canal col- onies, settled mainly by Sikhs and Muslims, and the designation of the Punjab as the granary of India. Law and order

guaranteed a high rate of return on British, and later Indian,

investment in these enterprises.

19
Pakistan: A Country Study

Racial criteria were also used in a dramatic overhaul of the

British Indian Army. The number of British soldiers was

increased relative to the Indians, and Indians were excluded

from artillery and technical services. A theory of "martial

races" was used to accelerate recruitment from among "loyal"

Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims, Dogras, Gurkas, and Pakhtuns

(Pathans—see Glossary) and to discourage enlistment of "dis- loyal" Bengalis and high-caste Hindus.

The Forward Policy

British policy toward the tribal peoples on the northwest

frontier vacillated between caution and adventurism during

the latter half of the nineteenth century. Some viceroys

opposed extending direct administration or defense beyond

the Indus River. Others favored a more assertive posture, or "forward policy." The latter's view prevailed, partly because

Russian advances in Central Asia gave their arguments cre- dence. In 1874 Sir Robert Sandeman was sent to improve British relations with the Baloch tribes and the khan of Kalat. In

1876 Sandeman concluded a treaty with the khan that brought

his territories—including Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela

under British suzerainty. The Second Anglo-Afghan War was fought in 1878-80, sparked by the Afghan amir's refusal to accept a British diplomatic mission to Kabal. When British

forces subsequently occupied much of Afghanistan, a treaty

(Treaty of Gandamak) was concluded in May 1879, which

forced Afghanistan to accept Britain's control of its foreign

affairs and to cede to the British various frontier areas, including the districts of Pishin, Sibi, Harnai, and Thai Chotiali. During succeeding years, other tribal areas were forcibly occupied

by the British. In 1883 the British leased the Bolan Pass, southeast of Quetta, from the khan of Kalat on a permanent basis,

and in 1887 some areas of Balochistan were declared British

territory.

A similar forward policy was pursued farther north. A British

political agent was stationed in Gilgit in 1876 to report on Russian activities as well as on developments in the nearby states of

Hunza and Nagar. In 1889 the Gilgit Agency was made permanent. A British expedition was sent against Hunza and Nagar,

which submitted to British control. A new mirirom the ruling

family of Hunza was appointed by the British. British garrisons were established in Hunza and Chitral in 1892. A formal protectorate was declared over Chitral and Gilgit in 1893.

20
Historical Setting

Also in 1893, Sir Mortimer Durand negotiated an agreement

with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan of Afghanistan to fix an only

partially surveyed line (the Durand Line) running from Chitral

to Balochistan to designate the areas of influence for the

Afghans and the British. Each party pledged not to interfere in

the other's lands. This agreement brought under British domination territory and peoples that had not yet been conquered

and would become the source of much difficulty between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the future (see Boundaries, ch. 2; For- eign Policy, ch. 4)

.

The establishment of British hegemony in the northwest

frontier regions did not lead to direct administration similar to that in other parts of India. Local customary law continued, as did the traditional lines of authority and social customs upheld

by the maliks (tribal chiefs). To a large extent, the frontier was

little more than a vast buffer zone with Afghanistan between

the British and Russian empires in Asia and a training ground

for the British Indian Army.

The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism

The uprising of 1857-58 was the last fitful assertion of an all but moribund Mughal Empire. Mutinous sepoys had marched

from Meerut, the site of the first outbreak, to Delhi proclaiming their intention to restore the poet-emperor Bahadur Shah

II to power. British forces with Punjabi sepoys recaptured Delhi

and banished the emperor to Burma, where he died in penury

in 1862. British distrust of Muslim aristocracy resulted from the

rebellious sepoys' attempt to restore the power of the emperor.

Muslim leaders were alleged to have had a major role in planning and leading the revolt, although the revolt itself was a

series of badly planned and uncoordinated uprisings and the

principal leaders, Nana Sahib and Tantia Topi, were Hindus. In

the eyes of British rulers, Muslim leaders had been discredited.

As a consequence, the landed Muslim upper classes in the

north Indian heartland retreated into cultural and political iso- lation, while fellow Muslims in the Punjab were rewarded for

assisting the British. The former failed to reemerge economically and produced no large group comparable to the upwardly

mobile British-educated Hindu middle class. They did not

revise the doctrines of Islam to meet the challenges posed by

alien rule, Christian missionaries, and revivalist Hindu sects,

such as the Arya Samaj, attempting reconversion to Hinduism.

The former Muslim rulers of India were in danger of becoming

21
Pakistan: A Country Study

a permanent noncompetitive class in the British Raj at the very

time the forces of Indian nationalism were gathering strength.

One response to British rule came to be known as the

Deoband Movement, which was led by the ulama, who were expanding traditional Islamic education. The ulama also

sought to reform the teaching of Islamic law and to promote its application in contemporary Muslim society. They promoted

publications in Urdu, established fund-raising drives, and

undertook other modern organizational work on an all-India

basis. While most Deobandis eventually were to support the

Indian National Congress and a united India, a group that

favored the creation of Pakistan later emerged as the core of

the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam party (see Political Dynamics, ch.

4).

Another response was led by Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-98,

known as Sir Syed) and was called the Aligarh Movement after

the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh Muslim University), which he founded in 1875 at Aligarh in northcentral India (see Education, ch. 2) . Sir Syed considered access

to British education as the best means of social mobility for the sons of the Muslim gentry under colonial rule.

Meanwhile, the beginnings of the Indian nationalist move- ment were to be discerned in the increasing tendency to form

all-India associations representing various interests. Englishspeaking Indians, predominantly middle-class but from different parts of the country, were discovering the efficacy of associations and public meetings in propagating their views to a wider audience and in winning the attention of the British government. In 1885 the Indian National Congress (also referred

to as Congress) was founded to formulate proposals and

demands to present to the British.

A national, all-India forum, Congress was an umbrella organization. Many of its members envisioned a long British period

of tutelage and advocated strictly constitutionalist and gradualist reforms, but after World War I, Congress argued for a speedy end to alien rule. The idea of the territorial integrity of

India and opposition to any sectarian division of India, however, always remained sacrosanct to Congress.

Although Sir Syed often voiced demands similar to those

made by the founders of Congress—local self-government,

Indian representation on the viceroy's and the governors'

councils, and equal duties for Indian members of the Indian

Civil Service and the judicial service—he remained aloof when

22
Historical Setting

Congress was founded and advised his followers not to join it, because he thought the organization would be dominated by

Hindus and would inevitably become antigovernment. It has

been argued that Sir Syed's fear of Hindu domination sowed

the seeds for the "Two Nations Theory" later espoused by the

All-India Muslim League (also referred to as the Muslim

League), founded in 1906, and led to its demand for a separate

state for the Muslims of India—reinforcing his view that the

British were the only guarantors of the rights of the Muslims.

Sir Syed argued that education and not politics was the key to Muslim advancement. Graduates of Aligarh generally made

their careers initially in administration, not politics, and thus were not greatly affected by the introduction of representative

institutions at the provincial level by the India Councils Act of

1892.

Events in Bengal proved that agitation was as useful as politics. Lord Curzon (George Nathaniel Curzon), the viceroy, par- titioned the large province of Bengal (which then included

Bihar and Orissa) in 1905. Although the province was

unwieldy, Curzon's plan divided the Bengali speakers by creat- ing the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam and reducing the original province to western Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.

The eastern province had a Muslim majority.

A massive antipartition campaign was launched against the

British by Hindus in Bengal, using constitutional methods as well as terrorism spearheaded by revolutionaries. The partition

of Bengal was annulled in 1911. The province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was dissolved, Bengal proper was reunited,

Assam was separated, and a new province of Bihar and Orissa was created. Although the reunited Bengal province had a

small Muslim majority, ambitious Muslims in the province were

disgruntled and looked to the Muslim League for better prospects.

The All-India Muslim League had been founded in Dhaka to promote loyalty to the British and "to protect and advance the

political rights of the Muslims of India and respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the Government." It was

also stated that there was no intention to affect the rights of

other religious groups. Earlier that same year, a group of Muslims—the Simla Delegation—led by Aga Khan III, met the viceroy and put forward the concept of "separate electorates." If the proposal were accepted, Muslim members of elected bodies would be chosen from electorates composed of Muslims

23
Pakistan: A Country Study

only, and the number of seats in the elected bodies allotted to Muslims would be at least proportional to the Muslim share of

the population, but preferably "weighted" to give Muslims a share in seats somewhat higher than their proportion of the

population. The principles of communal representation, separate electorates, and weightage were included in the Government of India Act of 1909 and were expanded to include such

other groups as Sikhs and Christians in later constitutional

enactments.

Beginnings of Self-Government

The Government of India Act of 1909—also known as the

Morley-Minto Reforms (John Morley was the secretary of state for India, and Gilbert Elliot, fourth earl of Minto, was viceroy) —gave Indians limited roles in the central and provincial

legislatures, known as legislative councils. Indians had previously been appointed to legislative councils, but after the

reforms some were elected to them. At the center, the majority

of council members continued to be government-appointed

officials, and the viceroy was in no way responsible to the legislature. At the provincial level, the elected members, together

with unofficial appointees, outnumbered the appointed officials, but responsibility of the governor to the legislature was

not contemplated. Morley made it clear in introducing the legislation to the British Parliament that parliamentary self-government was not the goal of the British government.

The granting of separate electorates and communal representation was welcomed by Muslims but opposed by Congress.

The Muslim League was pleased by the apparent British intention to support and safeguard Muslim interests in the subcontinent. Separate electorates remained a part of the Muslim

League platform even after the independence of Pakistan.

Congress opposition was understandable. As the majority community in most provinces, Hindus stood to lose from weighted

minority representation. Congress also presented itself as a national secular party and could not support identification of

voters with a particular community.

The Morley-Minto Reforms were a milestone. Step by step,

the elective principle was introduced for membership in

Indian legislative councils. The "electorate" was limited, however, to a small group of upper-class Indians. These elected

members increasingly became an "opposition" to the "official

government." Communal electorates were later extended to

24
Historical Setting

other communities and made a political factor of the Indian

tendency toward group identification through religion. The

practice created certain vital questions for all concerned. The

intentions of the British were questioned. How humanitarian

was their concern for the minorities? Were separate electorates a manifestation of "divide and rule?"

For Muslims it was important both to gain a place in all-India

politics and to retain their Muslim identity, objectives that

required varying responses according to circumstances, as the

example of Mohammad Ali Jinnah illustrates. Jinnah, who was born in 1876, studied law in England and began his career as an enthusiastic liberal in Congress on returning to India. In

1913 he joined the Muslim League, which had been shocked

by the 1911 annulment of the partition of Bengal into cooperating with Congress to make demands on the British. Jinnah

continued his membership in Congress until 1919. During this

dual membership period, he was described by a leading Congress spokesperson as the "ambassador of Hindu-Muslim

unity."

India's important contributions to the efforts of the British

Empire in World War I stimulated further demands by Indians

and further response from the British. Congress and the Muslim League met in joint session in December 1916. Under the

leadership ofJinnah and Pandit Motilal Nehru (father ofJawalharlal Nehru) , unity was preached, and a proposal for constitutional reform was made that included the concept of separate

electorates. The resulting Congress-Muslim League Pact (often

referred to as the Lucknow Pact) was a sincere effort to com- promise. Congress accepted the separate electorates

demanded by the Muslim League, and the Muslim League

joined with Congress in demanding self-government. The pact was expected to lead to permanent and constitutional united

action.

In August 1917, the British government formally announced

a policy of "increasing association of Indians in every branch of

the administration and the gradual development of

self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of

the British Empire." Constitutional reforms were embodied in

the Government of India Act of 1919—also known as the

Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (Edwin Samuel Montagu was

Britain's secretary of state for India; the Marquess of Chelmsford was viceroy) . These reforms represented the maximum

25
Pakistan: A Country Study

concessions the British were prepared to make at that time.

The franchise was extended, and increased authority was given

to central and provincial legislative councils, but the viceroy

remained responsible only to London.

The changes at the provincial level were significant, as the

provincial legislative councils contained a considerable majority of elected members. In a system called "dyarchy," the nationbuilding departments of government—agriculture, education,

public works, and the like—were placed under ministers who

were individually responsible to the legislature. The departments that made up the "steel frame" of British rule—finance,

revenue, and home affairs—were retained by executive councillors, who were often, but not always, British and who were

responsible to the governor.

The 1919 reforms did not satisfy political demands in India.

The British repressed opposition, and restrictions on the press

and on movement were reenacted. An apparently unwitting

example of violation of rules against the gathering of people

led to the massacre at Jalianwala Bagh in Amritsar in April

1919. This tragedy galvanized such political leaders as Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi

(1869-1948) and the masses who followed them to press for

further action.

The Allies' post-World War I peace settlement with Turkey

provided an additional stimulus to the grievances of the Muslims, who feared that one goal of the Allies was to end the

caliphate of the Ottoman sultan. After the end of the Mughal

Empire, the Ottoman caliph had become the symbol of Islamic

authority and unity to Indian Sunni Muslims. A pan-Islamic

movement, known as the Khilafat Movement, spread in India.

It was a mass repudiation of Muslim loyalty to British rule and

thus legitimated Muslim participation in the Indian nationalist

movement. The leaders of the Khilafat Movement used Islamic

symbols to unite the diverse but assertive Muslim community

on an all-India basis and bargain with both Congress leaders

and the British for recognition of minority rights and political

concessions.

Muslim leaders from the Deoband and Aligarh movements

joined Gandhi in mobilizing the masses for the 1920 and 1921

demonstrations of civil disobedience and noncooperation in

response to the massacre at Amritsar. At the same time, Gandhi

endorsed the Khilafat Movement, thereby placing many Hindus behind what had been solely a Muslim demand.

26
Historical Setting

Despite impressive achievements, however, the Khilafat

Movement failed. Turkey rejected the caliphate and became a

secular state. Furthermore, the religious, mass-based aspects of

the movement alienated such Western-oriented constitutional

politicians as Jinnah, who resigned from Congress. Other Muslims also were uncomfortable with Gandhi's leadership. British

historian Sir Percival Spear wrote that "a mass appeal in his

[Gandhi's] hands could not be other than a Hindu one. He

could transcend caste but not community. The [Hindu]

devices he used went sour in the mouths of Muslims." In the

final analysis, the movement failed to lay a lasting foundation

of Indian unity and served only to aggravate Hindu-Muslim dif- ferences among masses that were being politicized. Indeed, as India moved closer to the self-government implied in the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, rivalry over what might be called

the spoils of independence sharpened the differences between

the communities.

The political picture in India was not at all clear when the

mandated decennial review of the Government of India Act of

1919 became due in 1929. Prospects of further constitutional

reforms spurred greater agitation and a frenzy of demands

from different groups. The commission in charge of the review was headed by SirJohn Simon, who recommended further constitutional change, but it was not until 1935 that a new Government of India Act was passed. Three consecutive roundtable

conferences were held in London in 1930, 1931, and 1932, at which a wide variety of interests from India were represented.

The major disagreement concerned the continuation of separate electorates, which Gandhi and Congress strongly opposed.

As a result, the decision was forced on the British government.

Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald issued his "communal

award," which continued the system of separate electorates at both the central and the provincial level. The principal result of the act was "provincial autonomy."

The dyarchical system was discontinued, and all subjects were

placed under ministers who were individually and collectively

responsible to the former legislative councils, which were renamed legislative assemblies. (In a few provinces, including

Bengal, a bicameral system was established; the upper house

continued to be called a legislative council.) Almost all assembly members were elected, with the exception of some special

and otherwise unrepresented groups. After the elections, provincial chief ministers and cabinets took office, although the

27
Pakistan: A Country Study

governors had limited "emergency powers." Sindh was separated from Bombay and became a province. The 1919 reforms

had earlier been introduced in the North-West Frontier Province. Balochistan, however, retained special status; it had no

legislature and was governed by an "agent general to the gover- nor general." At the center, the act essentially provided for the

establishment of dyarchy, but it also provided for a federal sys- tem that included the princes. The princes refused to join a sys- tem that might force them to accept decisions made by elected

politicians. Thus, the full provisions of the 1935 act did not

come into force at the center. The Two Nations Theory

Events in the late 1920s and 1930s led Muslims to begin to think that their destiny might be in a separate state, a concept

that developed into the demand for partition. Motilal Nehru

convened an "all-party" conference in 1929 to suggest changes

that would lead to independence when the British took up the

report of the Simon Commission. The majority of the delegates

demanded the end of the system of separate electorates. Jinnah, in turn, put forward fifteen points that would satisfy Muslim interests—in particular, the retention of separate

electorates or the creation of "safeguards" to prevent a Hindu-controlled legislature. Jinnah's proposals were rejected,

and from then on cooperation between Hindus and Muslims in

the independence movement was rare. In his presidential address to the Muslim League session at Allahabad in 1930, the leading modern Muslim philosopher in

South Asia, Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), described India

as Asia in miniature, in which a unitary form of government

was inconceivable and religious community rather than terri- tory was the basis for identification. To him, communalism in

its highest sense was the key to the formation of a harmonious

whole in India. Therefore, he demanded the establishment of

a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of

Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Balochistan.

In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal reiterated the

claims of Muslims to be considered a nation "based on unity of

language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic

interests."

Iqbal gave no name to his projected state. That was done by

a group of students at Cambridge in Britain who issued a pamphlet in 1933 entitled Now or Never. They opposed the idea of

28
Historical Setting

federation, denied that India was a single country, and

demanded partition into regions, the northwest receiving

national status as a "Pakistan." They explained the term as fol- lows: "Pakistan . . . is . . . composed of letters taken from the

names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [NorthWest Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan,

Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks,

the spiritually pure and clean."

In 1934Jinnah returned to the leadership of the Muslim

League after a period of residence in London, but found it divided and without a sense of mission. He set about restoring a sense of purpose to Muslims, and he emphasized the Two

Nations Theory.

The 1937-40 period was critical in the growth of the Two

Nations Theory. Under the 1935 Government of India Act,

elections to the provincial legislative assemblies were held in

1937. Congress gained majorities in seven of the eleven provinces. Congress took a strictly legalistic stand on the formation

of provincial ministries and refused to form coalition governments with the Muslim League, even in the United Provinces

(Uttar Pradesh in contemporary India), which had a substantial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the Muslim

League's claim to be the only true representative of Indian

Muslims. This claim, however, was not substantiated because

the Muslim League had done poorly in the elections, especially

in the Muslim-majority provinces such as Punjab and the

North-West Frontier Province. The conduct of Congress governments in the Muslim-minority provinces permanently alienated the Muslim League.

By the late 1930s, Jinnah was convinced of the need for a unifying issue among Muslims, and Pakistan was the obvious

answer. At its annual session in Lahore on March 23, 1940, the

Muslim League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in

northwestern and eastern India should be grouped together to constitute independent states—autonomous and sovereign

and that any independence plan without this provision was

unacceptable to Muslims. Federation was rejected. The Lahore

Resolution was often referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution";

however, the word Pakistan did not appear in it. An interesting aspect of the Pakistan movement was that it received its greatest support from areas in which Muslims were

a minority. In those areas, the main issue was finding an alter29
Pakistan: A Country Study

native to replacing British rule with Congress, that is, Hindu,

rule.

Toward Partition

Congress predictably opposed all proposals for partition and

advocated a united India with a strong center and a fully

responsible parliamentary government. To many, notably to Jawaharlal Nehru, the idea of a sovereign state based on a com- mon religion seemed a historical anachronism and a denial of

democracy. From 1940 on, reconciliation between Congress

and the Muslim League became increasingly difficult, if not

impossible.

During World War II, the Muslim League and Congress

adopted different attitudes toward British rule. British priorities were driven by the expediencies of defense, and war was

declared abruptly without any prior consultation with Indian

politicians. Congress ministers in the provinces resigned in

protest. As a consequence, Congress, with most of its leaders in

jail for opposition to the Raj, lost its political leverage over the

British. The Muslim League, however, followed a course of

cooperation, gaining time to consolidate. The British appreciated the loyalty and valor of the British Indian Army, many of

whose members were Punjabi Muslims. The Muslim League's

success could be gauged from its sweep of 90 percent of the

Muslim seats in the 1946 election, compared with only 4.5 percent in the 1937 elections. The 1946 election was, in effect, a

plebiscite among Muslims on Pakistan. In London it became

clear that there were three parties in any discussion on the

future of India: the British, Congress, and the Muslim League.

Spurred by the Japanese advance in Asia and forceful persuasion from Washington, British prime minister Winston

Churchill's coalition war government in 1942 had dispatched

Sir Stafford Cripps to India with a proposal for settlement. The

plan provided for dominion status after the war for an Indian

union of British Indian provinces and princely states wishing to accede to it, a separate dominion for those who did not, and

firm defense links between Britain and an Indian union.

Cripps himself was sympathetic to Indian nationalism. However, his mission failed, and Gandhi described it as "a postdated check on a crashing bank."

In August 1942, Gandhi launched the "Quit India Movement" against the British. Jinnah condemned the movement.

The government retaliated by arresting about 60,000 individu30
Historical Setting

als and outlawing Congress. Communal riots increased. Talks

between Jinnah and Gandhi in 1944 proved as futile as negotiations between Gandhi and the viceroy. In July 1945, the Labour Party came to power in Britain with

a large majority. Its choices in India were limited by the decline

of British power and the necessity of retaining Indian links in

imperial defense. General unrest in India spread, and, when a

naval mutiny in Bombay broke out in 1945, British officials

came to the conclusion that independence was the only alter- native to forcible retention of control over an unwilling dependency. The viceroy, Lord Wavell, met with Indian leaders in

Simla in 1945 to decide what form of interim government

would be acceptable. No agreement was reached.

New elections to the provincial and central legislatures were

ordered, and a three-man team came to India from Britain to discuss plans for self-government. The Cabinet Mission Plan,

proposed by Cripps, represented Britain's last, desperate

attempt to transfer the power it retained over India to a single

union. The mission put forward a three-tier federal form of

government in which the central government would be limited

to power over defense, foreign relations, currency, and communications; significant other powers would be delegated to the provinces. The plan also prescribed the zones that would

be created: northeastern Bengal and Assam would be joined to form a zone with a slight Muslim majority; in the northwest,

Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province, and Balochistan

would be joined for a clear Muslim majority; and the remainder of the country would be the third zone, with a clear Hindu

majority. The approximation of the boundaries of a new Pakistan was clear from the delineation of the zones. The mission

also suggested the right of veto on legislation by communities

that saw their interests adversely affected. Finally, the mission

proposed that an interim government be established immediately and that new elections be held.

Congress and the Muslim League emerged from the 1946

elections as the two dominant parties, although the Muslim

League again was unable to capture a majority of the Muslim

seats in the North-West Frontier Province. At first, both parties

seemed to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan, despite many reser- vations, but the subsequent behavior of the leaders soon led to bitterness and mistrust. Nehru effectively quashed any prospect of the plan's success when he announced that Congress

would not be "fettered" by agreements with the British, thereby

31
Pakistan: A Country Study

making it clear that Congress would use its majority in the

newly created Constituent Assembly to write a constitution that

conformed to its ideas. The formation of an interim government was also controversial. Jinnah demanded equality

between the Muslim League and Congress, a proposal rejected

by the viceroy. The Muslim League boycotted the interim government, and each party disputed the right of the other to appoint Muslim ministers, a prerogative Jinnah claimed

belonged solely to the Muslim League.

When the viceroy proceeded to form an interim government

without the Muslim League, Jinnah called for demonstrations, or "Direct Action," on August 16, 1946. Communal rioting

broke out on an unprecedented scale, especially in Bengal and

Bihar. The massacre of Muslims in Calcutta brought Gandhi to the scene, where he worked with the Muslim League provincial

chief minister, Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy. Gandhi's and

Suhrawardy's efforts calmed fears in Bengal, but rioting quickly

spread elsewhere and continued well into 1947. Jinnah permitted the Muslim League to enter the interim government in an

effort to stem further communal violence. Disagreements

among the ministers paralyzed the government, already

haunted by the specter of civil war. In February 1947, Lord Mountbatten was appointed viceroy

with specific instructions to arrange for a transfer of power by

June 1948. Mountbatten assessed the situation and became

convinced that Congress was willing to accept partition as the

price for independence, that Jinnah would accept a smaller

Pakistan than the one he demanded (that is, all of Punjab and

Bengal) , and that Sikhs would learn to accept a division of Punjab. Mountbatten was convinced by the rising temperature of

communal emotions that the June 1948 date for partition was

too distant and persuaded most Indian leaders that immediate

acceptance of his plan was imperative.

On June 3, 1947, British prime minister Clement Attlee

introduced a bill in the House of Commons calling for the

independence and partition of India. On July 14, the House of

Commons passed the India Independence Act, by which two

independent dominions were created on the subcontinent; the

princely states were left to accede to either. The partition plan

stated that contiguous Muslim-majority districts in Punjab and

Bengal would go to Pakistan, provided that the legislatures of

the two provinces agreed that the provinces should be partitioned—they did. Sindh's legislature and Balochistan's jirga

32
Historical Setting

(council of tribal leaders) agreed to join Pakistan. A plebiscite was held in the Sylhet District of Assam, and, as a result, part of

the district was transferred to Pakistan. A plebiscite was also

held in the North-West Frontier Province. Despite a boycott by

Congress, the province was deemed to have chosen Pakistan.

The princely states, however, presented a more difficult problem. All but three of the more than 500 states quickly acceded

to Pakistan or India under guidelines established with the aid

of Mountbatten. The states made their decisions after giving

consideration to the geographic location of their respective

areas and to their religious majority. Two states hesitated but were quickly absorbed into India: Hyderabad, the most populated of the princely states, whose Muslim ruler desired independence; and Junagadh, a small state with a Muslim prince

that tried to accede to Pakistan despite its majority Hindu population. The accession of the third state, Jammu and Kashmir,

also could not be resolved peacefully, and its indeterminate sta- tus has poisoned relations between India and Pakistan ever

since (see Survival in a Harsh Environment, ch. 5).

Throughout the summer of 1947, as communal violence

mounted, preparations for partition proceeded in Delhi. Assets were divided, boundary commissions were set up to demarcate

frontiers, and British troops were evacuated. The military was

restructured into two forces. Law and order broke down in dif- ferent parts of the country. Civil servants were given the choice

ofjoining either country; British officers could retire with compensation if not invited to stay on. Jinnah and Nehru tried

unsuccessfully to quell the passions of communal fury that neither fully understood. On August 14, 1947, Pakistan and India

achieved independence. Jinnah became the first governor general of the Dominion of Pakistan.

Independent Pakistan

Problems at Independence

In August 1947, Pakistan was faced with a number of problems, some immediate but others long term. The most important of these concerns was the role played by Islam. Was

Pakistan to be a secular state serving as a homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent, or was it to be an Islamic state governed by the sharia, in which non-Muslims would be

second-class citizens? The second question concerned the dis- tribution of power between the center and the provincial gov33
Pakistan: A Country Study

ernments, a question that eventually led to the dissolution of

the country with the painful loss of the East Wing (East Bengal,

later East Pakistan, now Bangladesh) in 1971, an issue that

remained unresolved in the early 1990s.

The territory of Pakistan was divided into two parts at independence, separated by about 1,600 kilometers of Indian terri- tory. The 1940 Lahore Resolution had called for independent

"states" in the northwest and the northeast. This objective was

changed, by a 1946 meeting of Muslim League legislators, to a

call for a single state (the acronym Pakistan had no letter for

Bengal) . Pakistan lacked the machinery, personnel, and equipment for a new government. Even its capital, Karachi, was a sec- ond choice—Lahore was rejected because it was too close to the Indian border. Pakistan's economy seemed unviable after

severing ties with India, the major market for its commodities.

And, much of Punjab's electricity was imported from Indian

power stations.

Above all other concerns were the violence and the refugee

problem: Muslims were fleeing India; Hindus and Sikhs were

fleeing Pakistan. Jinnah's plea to regard religion as a personal

matter, not a state matter, was ignored. No one was prepared

for the communal rioting and the mass movements of population that followed the June 3, 1947, London announcement of

imminent independence and partition. The most conservative

estimates of the casualties were 250,000 dead and 12 million to 24 million refugees. The actual boundaries of the two new

states were not even known until August 17, when they were announced by a commission headed by a British judge. The

boundaries—unacceptable to both India and Pakistan—have

remained.

West Pakistan lost its Hindus and Sikhs. These communities

had managed much of the commercial activity of West Pakistan. The Sikhs were especially prominent in agricultural colonies. They were replaced largely by Muslims from India, mostly

Urdu speakers from the United Provinces. Although some people, especially Muslims from eastern Punjab (in India) , settled

in western Punjab (in Pakistan), many headed for Karachi and

other cities in Sindh, where they took the jobs vacated by

departing Hindus. In 1951 close to half of the population of

Pakistan's major cities were immigrants (muhajirs—refugees

from India and their descendants)

.

The aspirations for Pakistan that had been so important to Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces and the goals for the

34
Historical Setting

new state these urban refugees supported were not always compatible with those of the traditional rural people already inhabiting Pakistan, whose support for the concept of Pakistan came

much later. Pakistani society was polarized from its inception.

The land and people west of the Indus River continued to pose problems. The most immediate problem was the continued presence of a Congress government in the North-West

Frontier Province, a government effective at the grassroots

level and popular despite the loss in the plebiscite. Led by

Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Servants of God, a Congress faction) , this group was often referred

to as the Red Shirts after its members' attire. Ghaffar Khan

asked his followers not to participate in the July 1947 plebiscite.

Pakistan also had to establish its legitimacy against a possible

challenge from Afghanistan. Irredentist claims from Kabul

were based on the ethnic unity of tribes straddling the border;

the emotional appeal of "Pakhtunistan," homeland of the

Pakhtuns, was undeniable. However, Pakistan upheld the treaties Britain had signed with Afghanistan and refused to discuss

the validity of the Durand Line as the international border (see

The Forward Policy, this ch.). Relations with Afghanistan were

hostile, resulting in the rupture of diplomatic and commercial

relations and leading Afghanistan to cast the only vote against

Pakistan's admission to the United Nations (UN) in 1947.

The India Independence Act left the princes theoretically

free to accede to either dominion. The frontier princely states of Dir, Chitral, Amb, and Hunza acceded quickly to Pakistan

while retaining substantial autonomy in internal administration and customary law. The khan of Kalat in Baiochistan

declared independence on August 15, 1947, but offered to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan. Other Baloch

sardar (tribal chiefs) also expressed their preference for a separate identity. Pakistan took military action against them and the

khan and brought about their accession in 1948. The state of

Bahawalpur, with a Muslim ruler and a Muslim population,

acceded to Pakistan, as did Khairpur.

The maharaja ofJammu and Kashmir, unpopular among his

subjects, was reluctant to decide on accession to either dominion. He first signed agreements with both Pakistan and India

that would provide for the continued flow of people and goods

to Kashmir—as it is usually called—from both dominions.

Alarmed by reports of oppression of fellow Muslims in Kashmir, armed groups from the North-West Frontier Province

35
Pakistan: A Country Study

entered the maharaja's territory. The ruler requested military

assistance from India but had to sign documents acceding to India before that country would provide aid in October 1947.

The government of Pakistan refused to recognize the acces- sion and denounced it as a fraud even though the Indian government announced that it would require an expression of the

people's will through a plebiscite after the invaders were driven

back. Pakistan launched an active military and diplomatic campaign to undo the accession. The UN Security Council eventually brought about a cease-fire between Pakistani and Indian

troops, which took place on January 1, 1949, thus ending the

first Indo-Pakistani War, and directed that a plebiscite be held.

The cease-fire agreement formalized the military status quo,

leaving about 30 percent of Kashmir under Pakistani control

(see India, ch. 4; The Formation of Pakistan, ch. 5).

Partition and its accompanying confusion also brought

severe economic challenges to the two newly created and

antagonistic countries. The partition plan ignored the principles of complementarity. West Pakistan, for example, traditionally produced more wheat than it consumed and had supplied

the deficit areas in India. Cotton grown in West Pakistan was

used in mills in Bombay and other west Indian cities. Commodities such as coal and sugar were in short supply in Pakistan

they had traditionally come from areas now part of India. Furthermore, Pakistan faced logistic problems for its commercial

transportation because of the four major ports in British India,

it was awarded only Karachi. But the problem that proved most

intractable was defining relations between the two wings of

Pakistan, which had had little economic exchange before partition.

The two dominions decided to allow free movement of

goods, persons, and capital for one year after independence,

but this agreement broke down. In November 1947, Pakistan

levied export duties on jute; India retaliated with export duties

of its own. The trade war reached a crisis in September 1949

when Britain devalued the pound, to which both the Pakistani

rupee and the Indian rupee were pegged. India followed Britain's lead, but Pakistan did not, so India severed trade relations

with Pakistan. The outbreak of the Korean War (1950-53), and

the consequent price rises in jute, leather, cotton, and wool as a

result of wartime needs, saved the economy of Pakistan. New

trading relationships were formed, and the construction of cot- ton and jute mills in Pakistan was quickly undertaken.

36
Historical Setting

Although India and Pakistan resumed trade in 1951, both the

volume and the value of trade steadily declined; the two countries ignored bilateral trade for the most part and developed

the new international trade links they had made.

The assets of British India were divided in the ratio of seven- teen for India to five for Pakistan by decision of the Viceroy's

Council in June 1947. Division was difficult to implement, however, and Pakistan complained of nondeliveries. A financial

agreement was reached in December 1948, but the actual set- tlement of financial and other disputes continued until 1960

(see Structure of the Economy, ch. 3).

Division of the all-India services of the Indian Civil Service

and the Indian Police Service was also difficult. Only 101 out of

a total of 1,157 Indian officers were Muslim. Among these Muslim officers, ninety-five officers opted for Pakistan; they were

joined by one Christian, eleven Muslim military officers trans- ferring to civilian service, and fifty Britons, for a total of 157.

But only twenty of them had had more than fifteen years of ser- vice, and more than half had had fewer than ten years. These

men formed the core of the Civil Service of Pakistan, which

became one of the most elite and privileged bureaucracies in

the world. Members of the Civil Service of Pakistan were the

architects of the administrative, judicial, and diplomatic services. They proved indispensable in running the government

machinery during Pakistan's first two decades, and their contributions to government policy and economics were profound

during the era of Mohammad Ayub Khan. The government of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s precipitated a major reorganization and reorientation of the bureaucracy, however, which

resulted in a noticeable decline in both the morale and the

standards of the bureaucracy (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System, this ch; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-

77, ch. 4).

Constitutional Beginnings

At independence Jinnah was the supreme authority. An

accomplished politician, he won independence for Pakistan

within seven years of the Lahore Resolution and was hailed by

his followers as the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader). As governor

general, he assumed the ceremonial functions of head of state while taking on effective power as head of government, dominating his prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan (the Quaid-i-Millet, or Leader of the Nation). To these roles, he added the leader37
Pakistan: A Country Study

ship of the Muslim League and the office of president of the

Constituent Assembly.

Although Jinnah had led the movement for Pakistan as a separate Muslim nation, he was appalled by the communal

riots and urged equal rights for all citizens irrespective of reli- gion. Jinnah died in September 1948—only thirteen months

after independence—leaving his successors to tackle the problems of Pakistan's identity.

Jinnah's acknowledged lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan,

assumed leadership and continued in the position of prime

minister. Born to a Punjabi landed family, Liaquat used his

experience in law to attempt to frame a constitution along the

lines of the British Westminster system of parliamentary

democracy. He failed in large part because neither the Muslim

League nor the Constituent Assembly was equipped to resolve

in a parliamentary manner the problems and conflicts of the

role of Islam and the degree of autonomy for the provinces.

Liaquat's term of office ended when he was assassinated in

Rawalpindi in October 1951. He was replaced by Khwaja Nazimuddin, who stepped down as governor general; Nazimuddin

was replaced as governor general by Ghulam Mohammad, the

former minister of finance.

The Muslim League, unlike Congress, had not prepared

itself for a postindependence role. Congress had constitutional, economic, social, and even foreign policy plans in place

before independence and was ready to put them into effect

when the time came. The Muslim League was so preoccupied

with the struggle for Pakistan that it was poorly prepared for

effective government. Its leaders were largely urban professionals whose political base was mainly in areas that were in India.

In the areas that had become Pakistan, its base was weak. Landlords with ascriptive and inherited privileges were uncomfortable with procedures of decision making through debate,

discussion, compromise, and majority vote. The Muslim

League was a party with little grassroots support, a weak organizational structure, powerful factional leaders, and decisions

made at the top. Although Ghulam Mohammad tried to exercise the "viceregal" power thatJinnah had used so powerfully as governor general, concern for office and the fruits of power

were more important to most of the politicians than the evolution of ideology or the implementation of mass programs. The

effect of this lack of direction was shown most clearly when the

Muslim League was routed in the 1954 election in East Pakistan

38
Mohammad Alijinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

Liaquat Ali Khan, the Quaid-i-Millet

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

by the United Front—mainly a coalition of the Awami League

and the Krishak Sramik Party, led by two one-time Muslim

League members, Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq,

who ran on an autonomist platform. Other parties established

during this period included the leftist National Awami Party (a

breakaway from the Awami League) , which also supported provincial autonomy. Islamic parties also made their appearance

on the electoral scene, most notably the Jamaat-i-Islami.

The Muslim League was held responsible for the deterioration of politics and society after independence and had to answer for its failure to fulfill people's high expectations. There

was a rising level of opposition and frustration and an increasing use of repressive laws inherited from the British or enacted

by Pakistan that included preventive detention and rules prohibiting the gathering of more than five persons. In 1949 the

Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act

39
Pakistan: A Country Study

(PRODA) allowed the government to disqualify persons found

guilty of "misconduct," a term that acquired a broad definition.

In 1952 the Security of Pakistan Act expanded the powers of

the government in the interests of public order.

The armed forces also posed a threat to Liaquat's government, which was less hostile toward India than some officers

wished. In March 1951, Major General Mohammad Akbar

Khan, chief of the general staff, was arrested along with fourteen other officers on charges of plotting a coup d'etat. The

authors of what became known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy were tried in secret, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment. All were subsequently released.

Pakistan's first Constituent Assembly was made up of members of the preparation Indian Constituent Assembly who represented areas that had gone to Pakistan. The body's eighty

members functioned as the legislature of Pakistan. As a

constitution-making body, the assembly's only achievement was

the Objectives Resolution of March 1949, which specified that

Pakistan would be Islamic, democratic, and federal. But the

assembly could not reach agreement on how these objectives

would take form, raising fears among minorities and concern among East Bengalis. Other important matters remained

equally problematic—the division of executive power between

the governor general and the prime minister; the distribution

of power between the center and the provinces; the balance of

power, especially electoral, between the two wings; and the role

of Islam in the government. With the 1951 assassination of

Liaquat, resolution of these issues became unlikely.

During the years after Liaquat's assassination, none of these

problems were resolved, and a major confrontation occurred

between the governor general, Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi

from the civil service, and the prime minister, Nazimuddin, a former chief minister of united Bengal and now chief minister

of East Bengal. Ghulam Mohammad, who relished the trappings of dominance earlier held by Jinnah, asserted his power

by declaring martial law in 1953 in Punjab during disturbances

involving the Ahmadiyyas, a small but influential sect considered heterodox by orthodox Muslims. A year later, he imposed

governor's rule after the Muslim League defeat in East Bengal,

not permitting the United Front to take office. When Nazimuddin attempted to limit the power of the governor general

through amendments to the Government of India Act of

1935—then still the basic law for Pakistan, as altered by the

40
Historical Setting

India Independence Act of 1947—Ghulam Mohammad uncer- emoniously dismissed him in April 1953, and then the following year appointed his own "cabinet of talents," dismissing the

Constituent Assembly.

The so-called cabinet of talents was headed by Mohammad

Ali Bogra, a minor political figure from East Bengal who had

previously been Pakistan's ambassador to the United States.

Significantly, the cabinet also included both military and civil officials. Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, who had been head of the

Civil Service of Pakistan, became minister of finance. General

Mohammad Ayub Khan became minister of defense while

retaining his post as commander in chief of the army. Major

General Iskander Mirza, a military officer who was seconded to civilian posts, including becoming governor of East Bengal

when Ghulam Mohammad imposed governor's rule on that

province, became minister of home affairs. The cabinet thus

provided an opportunity for the military to take a direct role in

politics. Ghulam Mohammad was successful in subordinating

the prime minister because of the support of military and civil officers as well as the backing of the strong landed interests in

Punjab. The facade of parliamentary government crumbled,

exposing the military's role in Pakistan's political system to public view.

The revived Constituent Assembly convened in 1955. It dif- fered in composition from the first such assembly because of

the notable reduction of Muslim League members and the

presence of a United Front coalition from East Bengal. Provincial autonomy was the main plank of the United Front. Also in

1955, failing health and the ascendancy of General Mirza

forced Ghulam Mohammad to resign as governor general. He

died the following year. In 1956 the Constituent Assembly adopted a constitution

that proclaimed Pakistan an Islamic republic and contained

directives for the establishment of an Islamic state. It also

renamed the Constituent Assembly the Legislative Assembly

and changed the name of the head of state from governor general to president. The lawyer-politicians who led the Pakistan

movement used the principles and legal precedents of a nonreligious British parliamentary tradition even while they

advanced the idea of Muslim nationhood as an axiom. Many of

them represented a liberal movement in Islam, in which their

personal religion was compatible with Western technology and

political institutions. They saw the basis for democratic pro41
Pakistan: A Country Study

cesses and tolerance in the Islamic tradition of ijma (consensus

of the community) and ijtihad (the concept of continuing

interpretations of Islamic law). Most of Pakistan's intelligentsia

and Westernized elites belonged to the group of ijma modernists (see Religious Life, ch. 2).

In contrast stood the traditionalist ulama, whose position was a legalistic one based on the unity of religion and politics

in Islam. The ulama asserted that the Quran, the sunna (see

Glossary) , and the sharia provided the general principles for

all aspects of life if correctly interpreted and applied. The government's duty, therefore, was to recognize the role of the

ulama in the interpretation of the law. Because the ulama and

the less-learned mullahs (Muslim clerics) enjoyed influence

among the masses, especially in urban areas, and because no

politician could afford to be denounced as anti-Islamic, none

dared publicly to ignore them. Nevertheless, they were not

given powers of legal interpretation until the Muhammad Zia

ul-Haq regime of 1977-88 (see Zia ul-Haq and Military Domination, 1977-88, this ch; Early Political Development, ch. 4).

The lawyer-politicians making decisions in the 1950s almost

without exception preferred the courts and legal institutions

they inherited from the British.

Another interpretation of Islam was provided by an Islamist

movement in Pakistan, regarded in some quarters as fundamentalist. Its most significant organization was the

Jamaat-i-Islami, which gradually built up support among the

refugees, the urban lower middle class, and students (see

Jamaat-i-Islami, ch. 4) . Unlike the traditional ulama, the Islamist movement was the outcome of modern Islamic idealism.

Crucial in the constitutional and political development of Pakistan, it forced politicians to face the question of Islamic identity. On occasion, definitions of Islamic identity resulted in

violent controversy, as in Punjab during the early 1950s when

agitation was directed against the Ahmadiyyas. In the

mid-1970s, the Ahmadiyyas were declared non-Muslims by the

government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), based injiddah, Saudi

Arabia.

During the 1950s, however, the fundamentalist movement

led by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, the founder and leader of

the Jamaat-i-Islami, succeeded only in introducing Islamic principles into the 1956 constitution. A nonjudiciable section

called the Directive Principles of State Policy attempted to

42
Historical Setting

define ways in which the Islamic way of life and Islamic moral

standards could be pursued. The principles contained injunctions against the consumption of alcohol and the practice of

usury. The substance of the 1956 clauses reappeared in the

1962 constitution, but the Islamist cause was undefeated.

Sharia courts were established under Zia, and under Prime

Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif in the early 1990s the sharia was

proclaimed the basic law of the land.

Early Foreign Policy

Pakistan's early foreign policy espoused nonalignment.

Despite disputes with India, the policies of the two countries were similar: membership in the Commonwealth of Nations;

no commitment to either the United States or the Soviet

Union; and a role in the UN.

Pakistan's foreign policy stance shifted significantly in 1953

when it accepted the United States offer of military and eco- nomic assistance in return for membership in an alliance sys- tem designed to contain international communism. When the

administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought a series of alli- ances in the "Northern Tier"—Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey

and in East Asia, Pakistan became a candidate for membership

in each. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance

Agreement with the United States and became a member of

the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The following year, Pakistan joined Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in the Baghdad

Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)

after Iraq's withdrawal in 1959. Pakistan also leased bases to the

United States for intelligence-gathering and communications

facilities. Pakistan saw these agreements not as bulwarks against

Soviet or Chinese aggression, but as a means to bolster itself

against India.

Collapse of the Parliamentary System

The parliamentary system outlined in the 1956 constitution

required disciplined political parties, which did not exist. The

Muslim League—the one political party that had appeared

capable of developing into a national democratic party—con- tinued to decline in prestige. In West Pakistan, Sindh and the

North-West Frontier Province resented the political and eco- nomic dominance accorded Punjab and were hostile to the

"One Unit Plan" introduced by the Constituent Assembly the

year before. The One Unit Plan merged the western provinces

43
Pakistan: A Country Study

of Balochistan, the North-West Frontier Province, Punjab, and

Sindh into a single administrative unit named West Pakistan,

which in the new Legislative Assembly was to have parity with

the more populous province of East Pakistan.

In 1956 Suhrawardy formed a coalition cabinet at the center

that included the Awami League and the newly formed Republican Party of the West Wing, which had broken off from the

Muslim League. Suhrawardy was highly respected in East Pakistan, but he had no measurable political strength in West Pakistan. By taking a strong position in favor of the One Unit Plan,

he lost support in Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province,

and Balochistan.

Societal violence and ethnic unrest further complicated the

growth and functioning of parliamentary government. In West

Pakistan, chief minister Khan Sahib was assassinated. In the

North-West Frontier Province, Khan Sahib's brother, Khan

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, of the National Awami Party, turned his

back on national politics and said he would work for the attainment of a separate homeland for the Pakhtuns. And in

Balochistan, the khan of Kalat again declared his independence, but the Pakistan Army restored Pakistani control.

On October 7, 1958, President Mirza, with the support of

the army, suspended the 1956 constitution, imposed martial

law, and canceled the elections scheduled for January 1959.

Mirza was supported by the civil service bureaucracy, which

harbored deep suspicions of politicians. Nonetheless, on October 27 Mirza was ousted and sent into lifetime exile in London.

General Ayub Khan, the army commander in chief, assumed

control of a military government.

The Ayub Khan Era

In January 1951, Ayub Khan succeeded General Sir Douglas

Gracey as commander in chief of the Pakistan Army, becoming

the first Pakistani in that position. Although Ayub's military career was not particularly brilliant and although he had not

previously held a combat command, he was promoted over sev- eral senior officers with distinguished careers. Ayub Khan probably was selected because of his reputation as an able

administrator, his presumed lack of political ambition, and his

lack of powerful group backing. Coming from a humble family

of an obscure Pakhtun tribe, Ayub also lacked affiliation with

major internal power blocks and was, therefore, acceptable to

all elements.

44
Historical Setting

Within a short time of his promotion, however, Ayub Khan

had become a powerful political figure. Perhaps more than any

other Pakistani, Ayub was responsible for seeking and securing

military and economic assistance from the United States and

for aligning Pakistan with it in international affairs. As army

commander in chief and for a time as minister of defense in

1954, Ayub Khan was empowered to veto virtually any government policy that he felt was inimical to the interests of the

armed forces.

By 1958 Ayub Khan and his fellow officers decided to turn

out the "inefficient and rascally" politicians—a task easily

accomplished without bloodshed. Ayub's philosophy was

indebted to the Mughal and viceregal traditions; his rule was

similarly highly personalized. Ayub justified his assumption of

power by citing the nation's need for stability and the necessity

for the army to play a central role. When internal stability

broke down in the 1960s, he remained contemptuous of lawyer-politicians and handed over power to his fellow army officers.Ayub Khan used two main approaches to governing in his

first few years. He concentrated on consolidating power and

intimidating the opposition. He also aimed to establish the

groundwork for future stability through altering the economic,

legal, and constitutional institutions.

The imposition of martial law in 1958 targeted "antisocial"

practices such as abducting women and children, black marketeering, smuggling, and hoarding. Many in the Civil Service of

Pakistan and the Police Service of Pakistan were investigated

and punished for corruption, misconduct, inefficiency, or subversive activities. Ayub Khan's message was clear: he, not the

civil servants, was in control.

Sterner measures were used against the politicians. The

PRODA prescribed fifteen years' exclusion from public office

for those found guilty of corruption. The Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) authorized special tribunals to try

former politicians for "misconduct," an infraction not clearly

defined. Prosecution could be avoided if the accused agreed

not to be a candidate for any elective body for a period of seven

years. About 7,000 individuals were "EBDOed." Some people,

including Suhrawardy, who was arrested, fought prosecution.

The Press and Publications Ordinance was amended in 1960

to specify broad conditions under which newspapers and other

publications could be commandeered or closed down. Trade

45
Pakistan: A Country Study

organizations, unions, and student groups were closely monitored and cautioned to avoid political activity, and imams (see

Glossary) at mosques were warned against including political

matters in sermons. On the whole, however, the martial law years were not

severe. The army maintained low visibility and was content to uphold the traditional social order. By early 1959, most army

units had resumed their regular duties. Ayub Khan generally

left administration in the hands of the civil bureaucracy, with

some exceptions.

Efforts were made to popularize the regime while the opposition was muzzled. Ayub Khan maintained a high public profile, often taking trips expressly to "meet the people." He was

also aware of the need to address some of the acute grievances

of East Pakistan. To the extent possible, only Bengali members

of the civil service were posted in the East Wing; previously,

many of the officers had been from the West Wing and knew

neither the region nor the language. Dhaka was designated the

legislative capital of Pakistan, while the newly created Islamabad became the administrative capital. Central government

bodies, such as the Planning Commission, were now instructed

to hold regular sessions in Dhaka. Public investment in East

Pakistan increased, although private investment remained

heavily skewed in favor of West Pakistan. The Ayub Khan

regime was so highly centralized, however, that, in the absence

of democratic institutions, densely populated and politicized

Bengal continued to feel it was being slighted.

Between 1958 and 1962, Ayub Khan used martial law to ini- tiate a number of reforms that reduced the power of groups

opposing him. One such group was the landed aristocracy. The

Land Reform Commission was set up in 1958, and in 1959 the

government imposed a ceiling of 200 hectares of irrigated land

and 400 hectares of unirrigated land in the West Wing for a sin- gle holding. In the East Wing, the landholding ceiling was

raised from thirty-three hectares to forty-eight hectares (see

Farm Ownership and Land Reform, ch. 3). Landholders

retained their dominant positions in the social hierarchy and

their political influence but heeded Ayub's warnings against

political assertiveness. Moreover, some 4 million hectares of

land in West Pakistan, much of it in Sindh, were released for

public acquisition between 1959 and 1969 and sold mainly to

civil and military officers, thus creating a new class of farmers

having medium-sized holdings. These farms became

46
Historical Setting

immensely important for future agricultural development, but

the peasants benefited scarcely at all. In 1955 a legal commission was set up to suggest reforms of

the family and marriage laws. Ayub Khan examined its report

and in 1961 issued the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. Among

other things, it restricted polygyny and "regulated" marriage

and divorce, giving women more equal treatment under the

law than they had had before. It was a humane measure supported by women's organizations in Pakistan, but the ordinance could not have been promulgated if the vehement

opposition to it from the ulama and the fundamentalist Muslim groups had been allowed free expression. However, this

law, which was similar to the one passed on family planning, was relatively mild and did not seriously transform the patriarchal pattern of society.

Ayub Khan adopted an energetic approach toward eco- nomic development that soon bore fruit in a rising rate of eco- nomic growth. Land reform, consolidation of holdings, and

stern measures against hoarding were combined with rural

credit programs and work programs, higher procurement

prices, augmented allocations for agriculture, and, especially,

improved seeds to put the country on the road to

self-sufficiency in food grains in the process described as the

Green Revolution.

The Export Bonus Vouchers Scheme (1959) and tax incentives stimulated new industrial entrepreneurs and exporters.

Bonus vouchers facilitated access to foreign exchange for

imports of industrial machinery and raw materials. Tax conces- sions were offered for investment in less-developed areas. These measures had important consequences in bringing

industry to Punjab and gave rise to a new class of small industrialists. Basic Democracies

Ayub Khan's martial law regime, critics observed, was a form

of "representational dictatorship," but the new political system,

introduced in 1959 as the "Basic Democracies" system, was an

apt expression of what Ayub called the particular "genius" of

Pakistan. In 1962 a new constitution was promulgated as a product of that indirect elective system. Ayub did not believe

that a sophisticated parliamentary democracy was suitable for

Pakistan. Instead, the Basic Democracies, as the individual

administrative units were called, were intended to initiate and

47
Pakistan: A Country Study

educate a largely illiterate population in the working of government by giving them limited representation and associating

them with decision making at a "level commensurate with their

ability." Basic Democracies were concerned with no more than

local government and rural development. They were meant to provide a two-way channel of communication between the

Ayub Khan regime and the common people and allow social

change to move slowly.

The Basic Democracies system set up a multi-tiered system of

institutions. The lowest but most important tier was composed

of union councils, one each for groups of villages having an approximate total population of 10,000. Each union council

comprised ten directly elected members and five appointed

members, all called Basic Democrats. Union councils were

responsible for local agricultural and community development

and for rural law and order maintenance; they were empowered to impose local taxes for local projects. These powers,

however, were more than balanced at the local level by the fact

that the controlling authority for the union councils was the

deputy commissioner, whose high status and traditionally

paternalistic attitudes often elicited obedient cooperation

rather than demands.

The next tier consisted of the tehsil (subdistrict) councils,

which performed coordination functions. Above them, the zilla (district) councils, chaired by the deputy commissioners, were composed of nominated official and nonofficial members,

including the chairmen of union councils. The district councils were assigned both compulsory and optional functions pertaining to education, sanitation, local culture, and social welfare.

Above them, the divisional advisory councils coordinated the

activities with representatives of government departments. The

highest tier consisted of one development advisory council for

each province, chaired by the governor and appointed by the

president. The urban areas had a similar arrangement, under

which the smaller union councils were grouped together into

municipal committees to perform similar duties. In 1960 the

elected members of the union councils voted to confirm Ayub

Khan's presidency, and under the 1962 constitution they

formed an electoral college to elect the president, the National

Assembly (as the Legislative Assembly was renamed under the

1962 constitution), and the provincial assemblies.

The system of Basic Democracies did not have time to take

root or to fulfill Ayub Khan's intentions before he and the sys48
Historical Setting

tern fell in 1969. Whether or not a new class of political leaders

equipped with some administrative experience could have

emerged to replace those trained in British constitutional law was never discovered. And the system did not provide for the

mobilization of the rural population around institutions of

national integration. Its emphasis was on economic development and social welfare alone. The authority of the civil service was augmented in the Basic Democracies, and the power of the

landlords and the big industrialists in the West Wing went

unchallenged.

The 1 962 Constitution

In 1958 Ayub Khan had promised a speedy return to constitutional government. In February 1960, an eleven-member

constitutional commission was established. The commission's

recommendations for direct elections, strong legislative and

judicial organs, free political parties, and defined limitations

on presidential authority went against Ayub's philosophy of

government, so he ordered other committees to make revisions.

The 1962 constitution retained some aspects of the Islamic

nature of the republic but omitted the word Islamic in its original version; amid protests, Ayub Khan added that word later. The president would be a Muslim, and the Advisory Council of

Islamic Ideology and the Islamic Research Institute were established to assist the government in reconciling all legislation

with the tenets of the Quran and the sunna. Their functions were advisory and their members appointed by the president,

so the ulama had no real power base.

Ayub Khan sought to retain certain aspects of his dominant

authority in the 1962 constitution, which ended the period of

martial law. The document created a presidential system in

which the traditional powers of the chief executive were augmented by control of the legislature, the power to issue ordinances, the right of appeal to referendum, protection from

impeachment, control over the budget, and special emergency

powers, which included the power to suspend civil rights. As

the 1965 elections showed, the presidential system of government was opposed by those who equated constitutional government with parliamentary democracy. The 1962 constitution

relaxed martial law limitations on personal freedom and made

fundamental rights justiciable. The courts continued their tra- ditional function of protecting the rights of individual citizens

49
Pakistan: A Country Study

against encroachment by the government, but the government

made it clear that the exercise of claims based on fundamental

rights would not be permitted to nullify its previous progressive

legislation on land reform and family laws.

The National Assembly, consisting of 156 members (including six women) and elected by an electoral college of 80,000

Basic Democrats, was established as the federal legislature. Legislative powers were divided between the National Assembly

and the provincial legislative assemblies. The National Assembly was to hold sessions alternatively in Islamabad and Dhaka;

the Supreme Court would also hold sessions in Dhaka. The ban

on political parties was operational at the time of the first elections to the National Assembly and the provincial legislative

assemblies in January 1960, as was the prohibition on

"EBDOed" politicians. Many of those elected were new and

merged into factions formed on the basis of personal or provincial loyalties. Despite the ban, political parties functioned

outside the legislative bodies as vehicles of criticism and formers of opinion. In late 1962, political parties were again legalized, and factions crystallized into government and opposition

groups. Ayub Khan combined fragments of the old Muslim

League and created the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) as the

official government party.

The presidential election ofJanuary 1965 resulted in a victory for Ayub Khan but also demonstrated the appeal of the

opposition. Four political parties joined to form the Combined

Opposition Parties (COP). These parties were the Council

Muslim League, strongest in Punjab and Karachi; the Awami

League, strongest in East Pakistan; the National Awami Party,

strongest in the North-West Frontier Province, where it stood

for dissolving the One Unit Plan; and the Jamaat-i-Islami, sur- prisingly supporting the candidacy of a woman. The COP nominated FatimaJinnah (sister of the Quaid-i-Azam and known as Madar-i-Millet, the Mother of the Nation) as their presidential

candidate. The nine-point program put forward by the COP

emphasized the restoration of parliamentary democracy. Ayub

won 63.3 percent of the electoral college vote. His majority was

larger in West Pakistan (73.6 percent) than in East Pakistan

(53.1 percent).

Ayub Khan's Foreign Policy and the 1965 War with India

Ayub Khan articulated his foreign policy on several occasions, particularly in his autobiography, Friends not Masters. His

50
Historical Setting

objectives were the security and development of Pakistan and

the preservation of its ideology as he saw it. Toward these ends,

he sought to improve, or normalize, relations with Pakistan's

immediate and looming neighbors—India, China, and the

Soviet Union. While retaining and renewing the alliance with

the United States, Ayub emphasized his preference for friendship, not subordination, and bargained hard for higher returns

to Pakistan.

Other than ideology and Kashmir, the main source of fric- tion between Pakistan and India was the distribution of the

waters of the Indus River system. As the upper riparian power,

India controlled the headworks of the prepartition irrigation

canals. After independence India had, in addition, constructed

several multipurpose projects on the eastern tributaries of the

Indus. Pakistan feared that India might repeat a 1948 incident

that curtailed the water supply as a means of coercion. A compromise that appeared to meet the needs of both countries was

reached during the 1950s, but it was not until 1960 that a solution finally found favor with Ayub Khan andJawaharlal Nehru.

The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was backed by the World

Bank (see Glossary) and the United States. Broadly speaking,

the agreement allocated use of the three western Indus rivers

(the Indus itself and its tributaries, the Jhelum and the

Chenab) to Pakistan, and the three eastern Indus tributaries

(the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India. The basis of the plan was

that irrigation canals in Pakistan that had been supplied by the

eastern rivers would begin to draw water from the western

Indus rivers through a system of barrages and link canals. The

agreement also detailed transitional arrangements, new irrigation and hydroelectric power works, and the waterlogging and

salinity problems in Pakistan's Punjab. The Indus Basin Development Fund was established and financed by the World Bank,

the major contributors to the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, and

India (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3)

.

Pakistan's tentative approaches to China intensified in 1959

when China's occupation of Tibet and the flight of the Dalai

Lama to India ended five years of Chinese-Indian friendship.

An entente between Pakistan and China evolved in step with

the growth of Sino-Indian hostility, which climaxed in a border war in 1962. This informal alliance became a keystone of Pakistan's foreign policy and grew to include a border agreement in

March 1963, highway construction connecting the two countries at the Karakoram Pass, agreements on trade, and Chinese

51
Pakistan: A Country Study

economic assistance and grants of military equipment, which

was later thought to have included exchanges in nuclear technology. China's diplomatic support and transfer of military

equipment was important to Pakistan during the 1965 IndoPakistani War over Kashmir. China's new diplomatic influence

in the UN was also exerted on Pakistan's behalf after the IndoPakistani War of 1971. Ayub Khan's foreign minister, Zulfiqar

Ali Bhutto, is often credited for this China policy, which gave

Pakistan new flexibility in its international relationships. The

entente deepened during the Zia regime (1977-88).

The Soviet Union strongly disapproved of Pakistan's alliance

with the United States, but Moscow was interested in keeping

doors open to both Pakistan and India. Ayub Khan was able to secure Soviet neutrality during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War.

Ayub Khan was the architect of Pakistan's policy of close

alignment with the United States, and his first major foreign

policy act was to sign bilateral economic and military agreements with the United States in 1959 (see The United States

Alliance, ch. 5). Nevertheless, Ayub expected more from these

agreements than the United States was willing to offer and thus

remained critical of the role the United States played in South

Asia. He was vehemently opposed to simultaneous United

States support, direct or indirect, for India's military, especially

when this assistance was augmented in the wake of the SinoIndian War of 1962. Ayub maintained, as did many Pakistanis,

that in return for the use of Pakistani military facilities, the

United States owed Pakistan security allegiance in all cases, not

merely in response to communist aggression. Especially trou- blesome to Pakistan was United States neutrality during the

1965 Indo-Pakistani War. The United States stance at this time was a contributing factor to Pakistan's closing of United States communications and intelligence facilities near Peshawar. Paki- stan did not extend the ten-year agreement signed in 1959.

The 1965 war began as a series of border flare-ups along

undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast

in April and soon after along the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

The Rann of Kutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent

and British sponsorship and arbitration, but the Kashmir conflict proved more dangerous and widespread. In the early

spring of 1965, UN observers and India reported increased

activity by infiltrators from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir.

Pakistan hoped to support an uprising by Kashmiris against

India. No such uprising took place, and by August India had

52
Historical Setting

retaken Pakistani-held positions in the north while Pakistan

attacked in the Chamb sector in southwestern Kashmir in September. Each country had limited objectives, and neither was

economically capable of sustaining a long war because military

supplies were cut to both countries by the United States and

Britain.

On September 23, a cease-fire was arranged through the UN

Security Council. In January 1966, Ayub Khan and India's

prime minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri, signed the Tashkent Declaration, which formally ended hostilities and called for a mutual withdrawal of forces. This objectively statesmanlike act

elicited an adverse reaction in West Pakistan. Students as well

as politicians demonstrated in urban areas, and many were

arrested. The Tashkent Declaration was the turning point in

the political fortunes of the Ayub Khan administration.

In February 1966, a national conference was held in Lahore,

where all the opposition parties convened to discuss their dif- ferences and their common interests. The central issue discussed was the Tashkent Declaration, which most of the

assembled politicians characterized as Ayub Khan's unnecessary capitulation to India. More significant, perhaps, was the

noticeable underrepresentation of politicians from the East

Wing. About 700 persons attended the conference, but only

twenty-one were from the East Wing. They were led by Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman (known as Mujib) of the Awami League, who

presented his controversial six-point political and economic

program for East Pakistani provincial autonomy. The six points

consisted of the following demands: that the government be

federal and parliamentary in nature, its members elected by

universal adult suffrage with legislative representation on the

basis of distribution of population; that the federal government

have principal responsibility for foreign affairs and defense

only; that each wing have its own currency and separate fiscal accounts; that taxation occur at the provincial level, with a federal government funded by constitutionally guaranteed grants;

that each federal unit control its own earnings of foreign

exchange; and that each unit raise its own militia or paramilitary forces.

Ayub Khan also lost the services of Minister of Foreign

Affairs Bhutto, who resigned, became a vocal opposition

leader, and founded the Pakistan People's Party (PPP—see Pakistan People's Party, ch. 4). By 1968 it was obvious that

except for the military and the civil service, Ayub had lost most

53
Pakistan: A Country Study

of his support. Ayub's illness in February 1968 and the alleged

corruption of members of his family further weakened his position. In West Pakistan, Bhutto's PPP called for a "revolution"; in

the east, the Awami League's six points became the rallying cry

of the opposition.

In October 1968, the government sponsored a celebration

called the Decade of Development. Instead of reminding people of the achievements of the Ayub Khan regime, the festivi- ties highlighted the frustrations of the urban poor afflicted by

inflation and the costs of the 1965 war. For the masses, x\yub

Khan had become the symbol of inequality. Bhutto capitalized

on this and challenged Ayub at the ballot box. In East Pakistan,

dissatisfaction with the system went deeper than opposition to Ayub Khan. In January 1969, several opposition parties formed

the Democratic Action Committee with the declared aim of

restoring democracy through a mass movement.

Ayub Khan reacted by alternating conciliation and repression. Disorder spread. The army moved into Karachi, Lahore,

Peshawar, Dhaka, and Khulna to restore order. In rural areas of

East Pakistan, a curfew was ineffective; local officials sensed

government control ebbing and began retreating from the

incipient peasant revolt. In February, Ayub released political

prisoners, invited the Democratic Action Committee and others to meet him in Rawalpindi, promised a new constitution,

and said he would not stand for reelection in 1970. Still in poor

health and lacking the confidence of his generals, Ayub Khan

sought a political settlement as violence continued.

On March 25, 1969, martial law was again proclaimed; General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, the army commander in

chief, was designated chief martial law administrator. The 1962

constitution was abrogated, Ayub Khan announced his resignation, and Yahya Khan assumed the presidency. Yahya soon promised elections on the basis of adult franchise to the

National Assembly, which would draw up a new constitution.

He also entered into discussions with leaders of political parties. Yahya Khan and Bangladesh

The new administration formed a committee of deputy and

provincial martial law administrators that functioned above the

civil machinery of government. The generals held power and

were no longer the supporting arm of the civilians—elected or

bureaucratic—as they had been throughout much of the coun54
Historical Setting

try's history. In the past, every significant change of government had relied, in large part, on the allegiance of the military.

However, Yahya Khan and his military advisers proved no more

capable of overcoming the nation's problems than their predecessors. The attempt to establish a military hierarchy running

parallel to and supplanting the authority of the civilian administration inevitably ruptured the bureaucratic-military alliance,

on which efficiency and stability depended. Little effort was made to promote a national program.

These weaknesses were not immediately apparent but

became so as events moved quickly toward a crisis in East Pakistan. On November 28, 1969, Yahya Khan made a nationwide

broadcast announcing his proposals for a return to constitutional government. General elections for the National Assembly were set for October 5, 1970, but were postponed to December as the result of a severe cyclone that hit the coast of

East Pakistan. The National Assembly was obliged within 120

days to draw up a new constitution, which would permit maximum provincial autonomy. Yahya, however, made it clear that

the federal government would require powers of taxation well

beyond those contemplated by the six points of the Awami

League. He also reserved the right to "authenticate" the constitution. On July 1, 1970, the One Unit Plan was dissolved into

the four original provinces. Yahya Khan also determined that

the parity of representation in the National Assembly between

the East Wing and the West Wing that had existed under the

1956 and 1962 constitutions would end and that representation would be based on population. This arrangement gave

East Pakistan 162 seats (plus seven reserved for women) versus 138 seats (plus six for women) for the new provinces of the

West Wing.

An intense election campaign took place in 1970 as restrictions on press, speech, and assembly were removed. Bhutto

campaigned in the West Wing on a strongly nationalist and left- ist platform. The slogan of his party was "Islam our Faith,

Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Economy." He said that

the PPP would provide "roti, kapra, aur makhan (bread, clothing, and shelter) to all. He also proclaimed a "thousand year

war with India," although this pronouncement was played

down later in the campaign. In the East Wing, the Awami

League gained widespread support for the six-point program.

Its cause was further strengthened because West Pakistani poli55
Pakistan: A Country Study

ticians were perceived as callously indifferent to the Bengali

victims of the October cyclone and slow to come to their aid.

The first general election conducted in Pakistan on the basis

of one person, one vote, was held on December 7, 1970; elections to provincial legislative assemblies followed three days

later. The voting was heavy. Yahya Khan kept his promise of

free and fair elections. The Awami League won a colossal vic- tory in East Pakistan, for it was directly elected to 160 of the

162 seats in the east and thus gained a majority of the 300

directly elected seats in the National Assembly (plus the thir- teen indirectly elected seats for women, bringing the total to 313 members) without winning a seat in the West Wing (see

Yahya Khan, 1969-71, ch. 4). The PPP won a large majority in

the West Wing, especially in Punjab and Sindh, but no seats in

the East Wing. In the North-West Frontier Province and

Balochistan, the National Awami Party won a plurality of the

seats. The Muslim League and the Islamic parties did poorly in

the west and were not represented in the east. Any constitutional agreement clearly depended on the consent of three persons: Mujib of the East Wing, Bhutto of the

West Wing, and Yahya Khan as the ultimate authenticator representing the military government. In his role as intermediary

and head of state, Yahya tried to persuade Bhutto and Mujib to come to some kind of accommodation. This effort proved

unsuccessful as Mujib insisted on his right as leader of the

majority to form a government—a stand at variance with

Bhutto, who claimed there were "two majorities" in Pakistan.

Bhutto declared that the PPP would not attend the inaugural

session of the assembly, thereby making the establishment of

civilian government impossible. On March 1, 1971, Yahya

Khan, who earlier had referred to Mujib as the "future prime

minister of Pakistan," dissolved his civilian cabinet and

declared an indefinite postponement of the National Assembly.

In East Pakistan, the reaction was immediate. Strikes, demonstrations, and civil disobedience increased in tempo until there was open revolt. Prodded by Mujib, Bengalis declared they

would pay no taxes and would ignore martial law regulations

on press and radio censorship. The writ of the central government all but ceased to exist in East Pakistan.

Mujib, Bhutto, and Yahya Khan held negotiations in Dhaka

in late March in a last-ditch attempt to defuse the growing crisis; simultaneously, General Tikka Khan, who commanded the

Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, prepared a contingency plan

56
Historical Setting

for a military takeover and called for troop reinforcements to be flown in via Sri Lanka. In an atmosphere of distrust and sus- picion, the talks broke down, and on March 25 Yahya Khan and

Bhutto flew back to West Pakistan.

Tikka Khan's emergency plan went into operation. Roadblocks and barriers appeared all over Dhaka. Mujib was taken

into custody and flown to the West Wing to stand trial for trea- son. Universities were attacked, and the first of many deaths

occurred. The tempo of violence of the military crackdown

during these first days soon accelerated into a full-blown and

brutal civil war. On March 26, Yahya Khan outlawed the Awami League,

banned political activity, and reimposed press censorship in

both wings. Because of these strictures, people in the West

Wing remained uninformed about the crackdown in the east and tended to discount reports appearing in the international

press as an Indian conspiracy.

Major Ziaur Rahman, a political unknown at the time, proclaimed the independence of Bangladesh from Chittagong, a

city in the southeast of the new country. He would become

president of Bangladesh in April 1977. A Bangladeshi government-in-exile was formed in Calcutta.

Ziaur Rahman and others organized Bengali troops to form

the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) to resist the Pakistan

Army. The East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary force, mutinied

and joined the revolutionary forces. Nevertheless, the Pakistan

Army pressed its heavy offensive and in early April controlled

most of East Pakistan. More than 250,000 refugees crossed into

India in the first few days of the war. The influx continued over

the next six months and reached a total of about 10 million.

No accurate estimate can be made of the numbers of people

killed or wounded or the numbers of women raped, but the

assessment of international human rights organizations is that

the Pakistani crackdown was particularly alarming in its ferocity.Relations between Pakistan and India, already tense, deteriorated sharply as a result of the crisis. On March 31, the Indian

parliament passed a resolution in support of the "people of

Bengal." The Mukti Bahini, formed around regular and paramilitary forces, received equipment, training, and other assis- tance from India. Superpower rivalries further complicated the

situation, impinged on Pakistan's war, and possibly impeded its political resolution.

57
Pakistan: A Country Study

In the fall, military and guerrilla operations increased, and

Pakistan and India reported escalation of border shelling. On

the western border of East Pakistan, military preparations were

also in evidence. On November 21, the Mukti Bahini launched an offensive onjessore, southwest of Dhaka. Yahya Khan

declared a state of emergency in all of Pakistan on November

23 and asked his people to prepare for war. In response to Indian military movements along and across the Indian-East

Pakistani border, the Pakistan Air Force attacked military tar- gets in northern India on December 3, and on December 4

India began an integrated ground, naval, and air invasion of

East Pakistan. The Indian army launched a five-pronged attack

and began converging on Dhaka. Indian forces closed in

around Dhaka and received the surrender of Pakistani forces

on December 16. Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi proclaimed a unilateral cease-fire on December 17. Violent demonstrations against the military government

soon broke out at the news of Pakistan's defeat. Yahya Khan

resigned on December 20. Bhutto assumed power as president

and chief martial law administrator of a disgraced military, a

shattered government, and a bewildered and demoralized population. Formal relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh

were not established until 1976.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System

On assuming power on December 20, 1971, Bhutto promised to make a new Pakistan out of the West Wing and to restore national confidence. He conveniently laid the entire

blame for the 1971 war and Pakistan's defeat on Yahya Khan

and his junta. Asserting the principle of civilian leadership,

Bhutto introduced a new constitution with a modified parliamentary and federal system. He attempted to control and

reform the civil service and took steps to revitalize a stagnant

economy and ameliorate conditions for the poor under the

banner of Islamic socialism. Bhutto's most visible success, however, was in the international arena, where he employed his

diplomatic skills. He negotiated a satisfactory peace settlement

with India in 1972, built new links between Pakistan and the

oil-exporting Islamic countries to the west, and generally was

effective in repairing Pakistan's image in the aftermath of the

war.Bhutto's program appeared to be laudable but fell short in

performance. His near-monopoly of decision-making power

58
Historical Setting

prevented democratic institutions from taking root, and his

overreaching ambitions managed in time to antagonize all but

his closest friends.

The PPP manifesto was couched in socialist terms. When

Bhutto issued the Economic Reform Order on January 3, 1972,

banking and insurance institutions were nationalized, and sev- enty other industrial enterprises were taken over by the government. The Ministry of Production, which incorporated the

Board of Industrial Management, was established to oversee

industry. Investment in the public sector increased substantially, and Bhutto maneuvered to break the power of the

approximately twenty elite families who had dominated the

nation's economy during the Ayub Khan period. Trade unions

were strengthened, and welfare measures for labor were

announced. Although Bhutto's initial zeal diminished as he

came face-to-face with economic realities and the shortage of

capital, he tried to refurbish his populist image with another

spate of nationalizations in 1976.

Bhutto purged the military ranks of about 1 ,400 officers. He

also created a paramilitary force called the Federal Security

Force (which functioned almost as his personal bodyguard), a watchdog on the armed forces, and an internal security force.

A white paper on defense issued in 1976 firmly subordinated

the armed forces to civilian control and gave Bhutto, then also

prime minister, the decisive voice in all matters relating to national security. In that role, Bhutto took credit for bringing

home more than 90,000 prisoners of war without allowing any

of them to come to trial in Bangladesh for war crimes. In 1976

Bhutto replaced Tikka Khan, whose term had expired, with

General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq as chief of staff of the army.

Like Ayub Khan, Zia was appointed over several more senior

generals. Also like Ayub, Zia came from a community not

heavily represented in the armed forces (the Arains from Punjab) and was thought to be without political ambition.

In April 1972, Bhutto lifted martial law and convened the

National Assembly, which consisted of members elected from

the West Wing in December 1970 (plus two from the East Wing

who decided their loyalties were with a united Pakistan) . The

standing controversies about the role of Islam, provincial

autonomy, and the form of government—presidential or parliamentary—remained on the agenda. There was muchjostling

for position among the three major political groups: the PPP,

most powerful in Punjab and Sindh, and the National Awami

59
Pakistan: A Country Study

Party (NAP) and the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), both based

in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. The provincial assemblies were constituted from those elected in

December 1970. There was much tension during the process of

drafting a new constitution, especially from members from the

North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. Bhutto reached

some accommodation with opposition leaders from those two

provinces on the matter of gubernatorial appointment and

constitutional principle.

Pakistan's third indigenous constitution was formally submitted on December 31, 1972, approved on April 10, 1973, and

promulgated on independence day, August 14, 1973. Although

Bhutto campaigned in 1970 for the restoration of a parliamentary system, by 1972 he preferred a presidential system with

himself as president. However, in deference to the wishes of the

opposition and some in his own cabinet, Bhutto accepted a for- mal parliamentary system in which the executive was responsible to the legislature. The unicameral parliament was changed

to a bicameral legislature, consisting of the Senate, or upper

house, and the National Assembly, or lower house. Purportedly

in the interests of government stability, provisions were also

included that made it almost impossible for the National

Assembly to remove the prime minister. The 1973 constitution

provided for a federal structure in which residuary powers were

reserved for the provinces. However, Bhutto dismissed the coalition NAP-JUI ministries in Balochistan and the North-West

Frontier Province, revealing his preference for a powerful center without opposition in the provinces.

Bhutto's power derived less from the 1973 constitution than

from his charismatic appeal to the people and from the vigor

of the PPP. Its socialist program and Bhutto's oratory had done

much to radicalize the urban sectors in the late 1960s and were

responsible for the popular optimism accompanying the resto- ration of democracy. The ideological appeal of the PPP to the masses sat uneasily with the compromises Bhutto reached with

the holders of economic and political influence—the landlords

and commercial elites. Factionalism and patrimonialism

became rife in the PPP, especially in Punjab. The internal cohesion of the PPP and its standing in public esteem were affected

adversely by the ubiquitous political and bureaucratic corruption that accompanied state intervention in the economy and,

equally, by the rising incidence of political violence, which

included beating, arresting, and even murdering opponents.

60
Historical Setting

The PPP had started as a movement mobilizing people to over- throw a military regime, but in Bhutto's lifetime it failed to change into a political party organized for peaceful functioning in an open polity.

Bhutto's predilection for a strong center and for provincial

governments in the hands of the PPP inevitably aroused opposition in provinces where regional and ethnic identity was

strong. Feelings of Sindhi solidarity were maintained by

Bhutto's personal connections with the feudal leaders (wadera)

of Sindh and his ability to manipulate offices and officeholders. He did not enjoy the same leverage in the North-West

Frontier Province or Balochistan.

A long-dormant crisis erupted in Balochistan in 1973 into an

insurgency that lasted four years and became increasingly bitter. The insurgency was put down by the Pakistan Army, which

employed brutal methods and equipment, including

Huey-Cobra helicopter gunships, provided by Iran and flown

by Iranian pilots. The deep-seated Baloch nationalism based on

tribal identity had international as well as domestic aspects.

Divided in the nineteenth century among Iran, Afghanistan,

and British India, the Baloch found their aspirations and traditional nomadic life frustrated by the presence of national

boundaries and the extension of central administration over

their lands. Moreover, many of the most militant Baloch

nationalists were also vaguely Marxist-Leninist and willing to

risk Soviet protection for an autonomous Balochistan. As the

insurgency wore on, the influence of a relatively small but disci- plined liberation front seemed to increase.

Bhutto was able to mobilize domestic support for his drive

against the Baloch. Punjab's support was most tangibly represented in the use of the army to put down the insurgency. One

of the main Baloch grievances was the influx of Punjabi settlers, miners, and traders into their resource-rich but sparsely

populated lands. Bhutto could also invoke the idea of national

integration with effect in the aftermath of Bengali secession.

External assistance to Bhutto was generously given by the shah

of Iran, who feared a spread of the insurrection among the Ira- nian Baloch. Some foreign governments feared that an independent or autonomous Balochistan might allow the Soviet

Union to develop and use the port at Gwadar, and no outside

power was willing to assist the Baloch openly or to sponsor the cause of Baloch autonomy. During the mid-1970s, Afghanistan was preoccupied with its own internal problems and seemingly

61
Pakistan: A Country Study

anxious to normalize relations with Pakistan. India was fearful

of further balkanization of the subcontinent after Bangladesh,

and the Soviet Union did not wish to jeopardize the leverage it was gaining with Pakistan. However, during the Bhutto regime

hostilities in Balochistan were protracted. The succeeding Zia

ul-Haq government took a more moderate approach, relying

more on economic development to placate the Baloch.

Bhutto proceeded cautiously in the field of land reform and

did not fulfill earlier promises of distributing land to the landless on the scale he had promised, as he was forced to recognize and to cultivate the sociopolitical influence of landowners.

However, he did not impede the process of consolidation of

tenancy rights and acquisition of mid-sized holdings by servicemen. Punjab was the vital agricultural region of Pakistan; it remained a bastion of support for the government.

Bhutto specifically targeted the powerful and privileged Civil

Service of Pakistan (CSP) and introduced measures of administrative reform with the declared purpose of limiting the paternalistic power of the bureaucracy. The CSP, however, had

played the role of guardian alongside the army since independence. Many of its members reacted badly to Bhutto's politicizing appointments, for which patronage seemed a more

important criterion than merit or seniority.

Relations with India were, at best, uneven during the Bhutto

period. He accomplished the return of the prisoners of war

through the Simla Agreement of 1972, but no settlement of the

key problem of Kashmir was possible beyond an agreement

that any settlement should be peaceful. Bhutto reacted strongly

to the detonation of a nuclear device by India in 1974 and

pledged that Pakistan would match that development even if Pakistanis had to "eat grass" to cover the cost. Bhutto claimed success for his economic policies. The gross

national product (GNP—see Glossary) and the rate of eco- nomic growth climbed. Inflation fell from 25 percent in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1972 to 6 percent in FY 1976, although

other economic measures he introduced did not perform as

well.Bhutto pointed out that his foreign policy had brought Paki- stan prestige in the Islamic world, peace if not friendship with

India, and self-respect in dealings with the great powers. He felt assured of victory in any election. Therefore, with the commitment to a constitutional order at stake, in January 1977 he

62
Historical Setting

announced he would hold national and provincial assembly

elections in March.

The response of the opposition to this news was vigorous.

Nine political parties ranging across the ideological spectrum

formed a united front—the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)

.

Fundamentalist Muslims were satisfied by the adoption of

Nizam-i-Mustafa (see Glossary), meaning "Rule of the

Prophet," as the front's slogan. Modern secular elements, however, respected the association of Air Marshal Asghar Khan.

The PNA ran candidates for almost all national and provincial

seats. As curbs on the press and political activity were relaxed

for the election campaign, an apparently strong wave of support for the PNA swept Pakistan's cities. This prompted a whirlwind tour of the country by Bhutto, with all his winning charm

in the forefront. In the background lurked indirect curbs on

free expression as well as political gangsterism.

National Assembly election results were announced on

March 7, proclaiming the PPP the winner with 155 seats versus

thirty-six seats for the PNA. Expecting trouble, Bhutto invoked

Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which

restricted assembly for political reasons. The PNA immediately

challenged the election results as rigged and demanded a new

election—not a recount. Bhutto refused, and a mass protest

movement was launched against him. Religious symbols were

used by both sides to mobilize agitation; for example, Bhutto

imposed prohibitions on the consumption of alcoholic beverages and on gambling. Despite talks between Bhutto and opposition leaders, the disorders persisted as a multitude of

frustrations were vented. The army intervened on July 5 and

took all political leaders, including Bhutto, into custody.

Zia ul-Haq and Military Domination, 1977-88

General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, took

control of Pakistan by proclaiming martial law, beginning the

longest period of rule by a single leader in Pakistan's history. It ended only with his death in a still-unexplained aircraft crash on August 17, 1988. President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry remained

in office until his term expired in September 1978, when Zia

assumed that office in addition to his role as chief martial law

administrator.

In announcing his takeover of the government, Zia stated

that he had taken action only in order to hold new elections for

national and provincial assemblies within ninety days. Political

63
Pakistan: A Country Study

parties were not banned, and nominations were filed for seats. The country expected that a new "free and fair" poll would

take place. It did not. Zia canceled the elections because, he

said, it was his responsibility first to carry out a program of

"accountability"; he had "unexpectedly" found "irregularities"

in the previous regime. As a result, a number of "white papers"

on topics ranging from fraud in the 1977 elections, to abuses

by the Federal Security Force, and to Bhutto's manipulation of

the press were generated. The attacks on the Bhutto administration increased as time passed and culminated in the trial and the hanging in April 1979 of Bhutto for complicity in the

murder of a political opponent.

After elections were canceled by decree on March 1, 1978,

Zia banned all political activity, although political parties were not banned. The same month, some 200 journalists were

arrested, and a number of newspapers were shut down. Zia,

however, maintained that there would be elections sometime in

1979. Members of some of the PNA parties, including the

Jamaat-i-Islami and the Pakistan Muslim League, joined Zia's

cabinet as he tried to give a civilian cast to his government. But

suppression of the PPP continued, and at times Bhutto's widow,

Nusrat, and his daughter, Benazir, were placed under house

arrest or jailed. Elections for local bodies were held in September 1979 on a nonparty basis, a system Zia continued in the

1985 national and provincial elections. Many of those elected

locally identified themselves as Awami Dost (Friends of the

People) , a designation well known as a synonym for the PPP.

Zia announced national and provincial elections for November

17 and 20, 1979, respectively, but these, too, were canceled.

Many thought that the showing of the Awami Dost made him

fear that a substantial number of PPP sympathizers would be

elected. As further restrictions were placed on political activity,

parties were also banned.

On February 6, 1981, the PPP—officially "defunct," as were

the other parties—and several other parties joined to form the

Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. Its demands were

simple: an end to martial law and a call to hold elections under

the suspended 1973 constitution. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy demonstrated from time to time against

Zia's government, especially in August 1983, but Zia was able to withstand its demands. Many of the leaders spent time in jail.

Nusrat Bhutto brought a suit protesting the martial law takeover. The Supreme Court ruled against her and invoked once

64
Historical Setting

again the "doctrine of necessity," permitting the regime to "perform all such acts and promulgate all measures, which [fall] within the scope of the law of necessity, including the power to amend the Constitution." After this ruling, Zia issued the Provisional Constitutional Order of 1980, which excluded all martial

law actions from the jurisdiction of the courts. When the

Quetta High Court ruled that this order was beyond the power

of the martial law regime, the Provisional Constitutional Order

of 1981 was issued. This order required all judges of the

Supreme Court and high courts to take new oaths in which

they swore to act in accordance with the orders. Several judges

refused to do so and resigned.

In February 1982, in an unsatisfactory response to the

demand for elections, Zia created an appointed Majlis-i-Shoora

(Council of Advisers), claiming that this was the pattern of

Islamic law. The body was clearly unrepresentative and had no

powers of legislation. It served merely as a tame debating body.

The Islamization of Pakistan was another of Zia's goals. In

1978 he announced that Pakistani law would be based on

Nizam-i-Mustafa, one of the demands of the PNA in the 1977

election. This requirement meant that any laws passed by legislative bodies had to conform to Islamic law and any passed previously would be nullified if they were repugnant to Islamic law. Nizam-i-Mustafa raised several problems. Most Pakistanis are Sunni, but there is a substantial minority of Shia whose interpretation of Islamic law differs in some important aspects from

that of the Sunnis. Zia's introduction of state collection of zakat

(see Glossary) was strongly protested by the Shia, and after they

demonstrated in Islamabad, the rules were modified in 1981

for Shia adherents. There were also major differences in the

views held by the ulama in the interpretation of what constituted nonconformity and repugnance in Islam (see Islam in

Pakistani Society, ch. 2)

.

In 1979 Zia decreed the establishment of shariat courts to try cases under Islamic law. A year later, Islamic punishments were

assigned to various violations (hudood—see Glossary), including drinking alcoholic beverages, theft, prostitution, fornication, adultery, and bearing false witness. Zia also began a process for the eventual Islamization of the financial system

aimed at "eliminating that which is forbidden and establishing

that which is enjoined by Islam." Of special concern to Zia was

the Islamic prohibition on interest, or riba (sometimes trans- lated as usury) (see Monetary Process, ch. 3)

.

65
Pakistan: A Country Study

Women's groups feared that Zia would repeal the Muslim

Family Laws Ordinance of 1961, but he did not. The ordinance

provided women critical access to basic legal protection,

including, among other things, the right to divorce, support,

and inheritance, and it placed limitations on polygyny. Still,

women found unfair the rules of evidence under Islamic law by

which women frequently were found guilty of adultery or fornication when in fact they had been raped. They also opposed

rules that in some cases equated the testimony of two women

with that of one man.

After the 1985 election, two members of the Senate from the

Jamaat-i-Islami introduced legislation to make the sharia the

basic law of Pakistan, placing it above the constitution and

other legislation. The bill also would have added the ulama to the sharia courts and would have prohibited appeals from

these courts from going to the Supreme Court. The bill did not

pass in 1985, but after the dismissal of Prime Minister Junejo

and the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies in

1988, Zia enacted the bill by ordinance. The ordinance died

when it was not approved by the parliament during the first prime ministership of Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August

1990), but a revised Shariat Bill was passed by the government

of Mian Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July 1993) in May 1991.

Provincialism increased during Zia's tenure. He handled the

problem of unrest in Balochistan more successfully than had

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Zia used various schemes of economic

development to assuage the Baloch and was successful to a high degree. The North-West Frontier Province, alarmed at the

presence of Soviet troops next door after the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in December 1979, remained relatively quiet. But

the long-festering division between Sindhis and non-Sindhis

exploded into violence in Sindh. The muhajirs formed new

organizations, the most significant being the Refugee People's

Movement (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz). The incendiary tensions

resulted not only from Sindhi-muhajir opposition but also from

Sindhi fear of others who had moved into the province, including Baloch, Pakhtuns, and Punjabis. The fact that Sindhi was becoming the mother tongue of fewer and fewer people of

Sindh was also resented. The violence escalated in the late

1980s to the extent that some compared Karachi and Hyderabad to the Beirut of that period. The growth of the illicit drug

industry also added to the ethnic problem.

66
The Badshahi Mosque, built by the Mughals in the seventeenth century, as seen from Lahore Fort

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

Pressure on Zia to hold elections mounted, and some of it came from overseas, including from the United States. In 1984

Zia announced that elections to legislative bodies would be

held in 1985, and this time the schedule held.

Zia decided to restore the separate electorates, abandoned

under Ayub Khan. In the National Assembly, ten of the 217

directly elected seats were set aside for minorities: four each for

Hindus and Christians and one each for Ahmadiyyas and "others," including Parsis, Sikhs, and Buddhists. There were also

twenty indirectly elected seats reserved for women, although

women could run for directly elected seats. Zia decided that

parties would not be permitted to participate. Each candidate,

therefore, would be an "independent."

Before the general elections, Zia held a national referendum

ostensibly seeking a mandate to continue in office as president.

67
Pakistan: A Country Study

The referendum, on December 19, 1984, focused on Pakistan's

Islamization program. The electorate was asked simply if it felt the government was doing a good job of Islamizing the various

social institutions of the state. Zia interpreted the positive

results (98 percent voting "yes") to mean that he had received

the right to a new five-year term as head of state. There was, however, little doubt that the vote was rigged.

After the "election," which most PPP supporters boycotted,

Zia announced the appointment of Mohammad Khan Junejo

as prime minister, subject to a vote of confidence in the

National Assembly. Junejo, a Sindhi, took office on March 23,

1985. Zia issued the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order,

which was a misnomer. The constitution was so vastiy changed

by various decrees that it was much different from the one

enacted by the Bhutto regime. In the 1973 document, power

had been in the hands of the prime minister; by 1985 it was in

the hands of the president.

Zia promised to end martial law by the end of 1985, but he

exacted a high price for this. The Eighth Amendment to the

constitution confirmed and legalized all acts taken under martial law, including changes to the constitution. It affirmed the

right of the president to appoint and dismiss the prime minister. With the amendment passed, Zia ended martial law in late 1985. Political parties were revived. In 1986 Junejo became

president of a reconstituted Pakistan Muslim League. The PPP,

although self-excluded from the National Assembly, also

resumed activity under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto.

Junejo, however, was not able to accomplish all of Zia's

agenda. For example, his government did not pass the Shariat

Bill. It allowed the resumption of political parties, a step not

welcomed by Zia, who saw parties as divisive in what should be a united Islamic community. Nonetheless, the dismissal ofJunejo

on May 29, 1988, and the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies the next day, came as a surprise. In explaining his action, Zia pointed to the failure to carry Islamization

forward and also to corruption, deterioration of law and order,

and mismanagement of the economy. Another important rea- son for Junejo's dismissal was his interference in army promotions and his call for an investigation into an arsenal explosion near Islamabad; civilians were not expected to meddle in military affairs. Zia procrastinated on calling new elections, which even his

own version of the constitution required within ninety days. He

68
Historical Setting

finally set November 17, 1988, as the polling date for the

National Assembly, with provincial elections three days later. His reasons for the delay were the holy month of Muharram,

which fell in August during the hot weather, and the lack of

current electoral registrations (a point he blamed on Junejo).

Despite the open operation of political parties, Zia indicated

that elections would again be on a nonparty basis. Before elections took place, Zia was killed in an explosion aboard his air- plane near Bahawalpur, in Punjab, on August 17, 1988, along

with the chairman of the joint chiefs committee, the United

States ambassador, and twenty-seven others. Ajoint United

States-Pakistani committee investigating the accident later

established that the crash was caused by "a criminal act of sabotage perpetrated in the aircraft." Court actions ended the nonparty basis for the elections,

and parties were permitted to participate. A technicality—the

failure to register as a political party—that would have prohibited the PPP from taking part was also voided. The election

gave a plurality, not a majority, to the PPP. Its leader, Benazir

Bhutto, was able to gain the assistance of other groups, and she was sworn in as prime minister on December 1, 1988, by acting

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He in turn was elected to a

five-year term as president by the National Assembly and the

Senate.

Pakistan and the World During the Zia Regime

When Zia assumed power in mid-1977, Pakistan was out of

the limelight and indeed was considered by some observers to be a political backwater. By the time of Zia's death in 1988,

however, it had, because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

in 1979, become an important actor occupying a central position in the world arena. Although Zulifqar Ali Bhutto had tried to redirect Pakistan's

regional orientation toward West Asia and Zia continued this

trend, the nation's geostrategic interests dictated a concentration on South Asia. Pakistan's foreign policy was very much

centered on India. Less than two years after Zia's assumption of

power, Congress, led by Indira Gandhi, was voted out of office

and replaced by the Janata Party, whose foreign minister was

Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jana Sangh, long seen as

anti-Pakistan. Nonetheless, relations between Pakistan and

India may have reached their most cordial level during the

almost three years Janata was in power. Vajpayee visited Paki69
Pakistan: A Country Study

stan in February 1978. There were exchanges on many issues,

and agreements were signed on trade, cultural exchanges, and

communications—but not on such key issues as Kashmir and

nuclear development.

The nuclear issue was of critical importance to both Pakistan

and India. In 1974 India successfully tested a nuclear "device."

Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said Pakistan must

develop its own "Islamic bomb." Zia thus inherited a pledge

that for domestic reasons he could not discard, and he continued the development program. He asked India to agree to sev- eral steps to end this potential nuclear arms race on the

subcontinent. One of these measures was the simultaneous

signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The second

step was a joint agreement for inspection of all nuclear sites by

the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan also proposed a pact between the two countries to allow for mutual

inspection of sites. And, finally, Pakistan proposed a South

Asian nuclear-free zone. It appeared that Zia was looking for a way to terminate the costly Pakistani program. But in order to

sell this idea in Pakistan, he required some concessions from

India. Termination would also get him out of difficulties the

program was causing with the United States, including the cur- tailment of aid in 1979. These proposals were still on the table

in the early 1990s and were supplemented by then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs call for a roundtable discussion among Pakistan, India, the United States, Russia, and China on nuclear

weapons in South Asia (see The Armed Forces in a New World

Order, ch. 5).

Not all relations within South Asia were negative. President

Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh proposed an organization for

South Asian cooperation. Pakistan was at first reluctant, fearing

Indian domination, but eventually agreed to join the group,

along with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri

Lanka. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC—see Glossary) was formally inaugurated at a summit

meeting in Dhaka in 1985. There have been some positive steps

toward cooperation, and regular rotating summits are held,

although often with some delays.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India (1984-89) came to Islamabad in 1988 to attend a SAARC summit, the first visit of an Indian prime minister since 1960, when Nehru signed the

Indus Waters Treaty. Zia stopped briefly in New Delhi in

December 1985, and in February 1987 he visited again, having

70
Historical Setting

invited himself to see a cricket match between the two countries. Zia's estimation was that he and Rajiv could meet quite

cordially but could not agree on substantive issues.

Active and potential conflict continued to be a constant fac- tor in Pakistan's relations with India. The dispute over the precise demarcation of the Line of Control, confirmed under the

1972 Simla Agreement, in Kashmir at the Siachen Glacier

heated up periodically and over time caused substantial casualties on both sides because of numerous small skirmishes and

the extreme cold in the remote area. Also, in the winter of

1986-87 the Indian army conducted Operation Brass Tacks,

maneuvers close to the Pakistan border, and Pakistan mobilized its forces. However, the dangerous situation was defused,

and no hostilities took place. India accused Pakistan of aiding

Sikh insurgents in India's state of Punjab. Pakistan denied this

accusation, but some people thought that Operation Brass

Tacks might have been a means to strike at alleged bases in

Pakistan's Punjab Province. Zia skillfully handled the diplomacy during the period of tension (see Pakistan Becomes a

Frontline State, ch. 5).

Zia continued the process, begun by Bhutto, of opening

Pakistan to the West and drew on Pakistan's Islamic, trade, and

military ties to the Middle East. Military ties included stationing Pakistani troops in Saudi Arabia and training missions in

several other countries. Remittances from Pakistanis employed

as migrant workers in the Middle East, especially in the Persian

Gulf area, increased during the Zia years and became an

important factor in Pakistan's foreign-exchange holdings (see

Labor, ch. 3).

Zia played a prominent role in the Organization of the

Islamic Conference (OIC) . A Pakistani was secretary general of

the OIC, and Zia served on committees concerning the status ofJerusalem and the settlement of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-

88), neither of which were successful. At the 1984 summit at Casablanca, Zia played a key role in the readmission of Egypt to the OIC and, in doing so, reminded his fellow heads of government that the organization was one for the entire Muslim community and not only for Arab states. The United States under the administration ofJimmy Carter

did not welcome the displacement of Bhutto by Zia; representative government, human rights, and nuclear nonproliferation were also of concern to Carter. The execution of Bhutto

71
Pakistan: A Country Study

only added to the United States displeasure with Zia and Pakistan. A number of United States laws—amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 —applied to Pakistan and its program of nuclear weapons development. The 1976 Symington

Amendment stipulated that economic assistance be terminated

to any country that imported uranium enrichment technology.

The Glenn Amendment of 1977 similarly called for an end to aid to countries that imported reprocessing technology—Pakistan had from France. United States economic assistance,

except for food aid, was terminated under the Symington

Amendment in April 1979. In 1985 the Solarz Amendment was added to prohibit aid to countries that attempt to import

nuclear commodities from the United States. In the same year, the Pressler Amendment was passed; referring specifically to Pakistan, it said that if that nation possessed a nuclear device,

aid would be suspended. Many of these amendments could be

waived if the president declared that it was in the national

interests of the United States to continue assistance.

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979,

causing a sudden reversal of United States policy. Carter, who

had described Pakistan as a "frontline state" in the Cold War,

offered US$400 million in military and economic aid to Pakistan—an amount that Zia spurned and contemptuously

termed "peanuts."

When Ronald Reagan took office in January 1981, the level

of assistance increased substantially. Presidential waivers for

several of the amendments were required. The initial package

from the United States was for US$3.2 billion over six years,

equally divided between economic and military assistance. A

separate arrangement was made for the purchase of forty F-16

fighter aircraft. In 1986 a follow-on program of assistance over

a further period of six years was announced at a total of more

than US$4 billion, of which 57 percent was economic aid and

the rest military aid.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, under its new leader, Mikhail

S. Gorbachev, was reassessing its role in Afghanistan. Indirect

"proximity" negotiations in Geneva under the auspices of the

UN were going on between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the

United States and the Soviet Union as observers. In April 1988, a series of agreements were signed among the United States,

the Soviet Union, Pakistan, and Afghanistan that called for the

72
Historical Setting

withdrawal of Soviet forces by mid-February 1989. The withdrawal was completed on time.

Throughout the years of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan,

relations between the United States and Pakistan were best

characterized by close cooperation. Still, United States policy

makers became increasingly concerned that Zia and his associ- ates appeared to give preferential treatment to the Islamic fundamentalists, especially mujahidin leader Gulbaddin Hikmatyar.

Other disagreements persisted, particularly over the failure of

the Zia regime to convert to representative government. Documented Pakistani violations of human rights were another

major issue; Pakistani involvement in narcotics trafficking was

yet another. But the issue that after Zia's death led to another

cutoff of aid was Pakistan's persistent drive toward nuclear

development.

The events of the Zia period brought Pakistan to a leading

position in world affairs. However, Pakistan's new visibility was

closely connected to the supportive role it played for the antiSoviet mujahidin in Afghanistan—and this decreased when the

Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. In the 1990s, Pakistan faced some major domestic problems—mounting ethnic

and sectarian strife as well as widespread civil disorder. Pakistan

will need to address these problems as it strives to improve its international standing as a maturing democratic nation and

one aspiring to be the industrial and technological leader of

the Muslim world.

* * *

For the study of the area of present-day Pakistan in the preindependence period, one must generally look to histories of

India. The most recent survey is Stanley Wolpert's A New History

of India. Published earlier, Percival Spear's Volume 1 and Romila Thapar's Volume 2 of A History ofIndia also provide valuable

information. Vincent Arthur Smith's The Oxford History of India

gives a detailed account of the preindependence period. Two

dictionaries that are difficult to obtain are helpful in looking

up specific places and people: Sachchidananda Bhattacharya's

A Dictionary of Indian History and Parshotam Mehra's A Dictionary of Modern Indian History, 1707-1947. Particularly valuable

is the monumental A Historical Atlas of South Asia, edited by

Joseph E. Schwartzberg. Two classic works on the Mughal

period are Bamber Gascoigne's The Great Moghuls and Percival

73
Pakistan: A Country Study

Spear's Twilight of the Mughals. A more recent, standard work on

the Mughals is The Mughal Empire by John F. Richards. Books

that illuminate the Muslim movement include Peter Hardy's

The Muslims of British India; Choudhry Khaliquzzaman's Pathway to Pakistan; Chaudri Muhammad Ali's The Emergence ofPakistan; Gail Minault's The Khilafat Movement; David Lelyveld's

Aligarh's First Generation; and R.J. Moore's The Crisis of Indian

Unity, 1917-1940. There is little biographic material except on

Jinnah: the best sources are Stanley Wolpert's Jinnah ofPakistan

and AyeshaJalal's The Sole Spokesman.

Concerning independent Pakistan during the parliamentary

period, Keith Callard's Pakistan: A Political Study and Richard S. Wheeler's The Politics ofPakistan are recommended. On Ayub

Khan, Lawrence Ziring's The Ayub Khan Era is good. Bangladesh:

A Country Study, edited by James Heitzman and Robert L. Worden, provides an analysis of the history of the East Wing of

Pakistan (1947-71). The civil war is discussed in Craig Baxter's Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting. Bhutto's tenure is described in Shahidjaved Burki's Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-

1977 and Stanley Wolpert's Zulfi Bhutto ofPakistan: His Life and

Times. The Zia ul-Haq period is discussed in Shahidjaved Burki

and Craig Baxter's Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia

ul-Haq. (For further information and complete citations, see

Bibliography.)

74
Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Artist's rendition ofa tile mosaic composite ofa man sitting, men with a

camel, and geometric designs from the Pictured Wall, Lahore Fort, Punjab.

Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work of the Mughal period.
PAKISTANI SOCIETY IS ETHNICALLY DIVERSE yet over- whelmingly Muslim. It is largely rural yet beset by the problems

of hyperurbanization. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan

has enjoyed a robust and expanding economy—the average

per capita income in the early 1990s approached the transition

line separating low-income from middle-income countries

but wealth is poorly distributed. A middle class is emerging, but

a narrow stratum of elite families maintains extremely disproportionate control over the nation's wealth, and almost onethird of all Pakistanis live in poverty. It is a male-dominated

society in which social development has lagged considerably

behind economic change, as revealed by such critical indicators as sanitation, access to health care, and literacy, especially

among females. Increasing population pressure on limited

resources, together with this pattern of social and economic

inequity, was causing increased disquietude within the society

in the early 1990s.

Pakistan was created in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims in

South Asia, and about 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim. The

founders of Pakistan hoped that religion would provide a coherent focus for national identity, a focus that would supersede the country's considerable ethnic and linguistic differ- ences. Although this aspiration has not been completely

fulfilled, Islam has been a pervasive presence in Pakistani society, and debate continues about its appropriate role in national

civic life. During the 1990s, Islamic discourse has been less

prominent in political controversy, but the role that Islamic law

should play in the country's affairs and governance remains an

important issue.

There is immense regional diversity in Pakistan. Pakhtuns,

Baloch, Punjabis, and Sindhis are all Muslim, yet they have

diverse cultural traditions and speak different languages. Ethnic, regional, and—above all—family loyalties figure far more

prominently for the average individual than do national loyalties. Punjabis, the largest ethnic group, predominate in the

central government and the military. Baloch, Pakhtuns, and

Sindhis find the Punjabi preponderance at odds with their own

aspirations for provincial autonomy. Ethnic mixing within each

province further complicates social and political relations.

77
Pakistan: A Country Study

Expectations had been raised by the return of democracy to Pakistan in 1988 after the death of Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, by

the continued economic expansion in the early 1990s, and by

some observable improvement in the volatile relations among

ethnic groups that had so divided the country in years past.

Also in the early 1990s, previously peripheralized social movements, particularly those concerning women and the environment, assumed a more central role in public life. As bilateral

and multilateral development assistance has dwindled, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) committed to economic and

social development have emerged and have begun to take on

important responsibilities (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3). Nonetheless, the problems that confront Pakistan pose a significant

threat to its cohesion and future.

Sociologists speak of a loss of a sense of social contract

among Pakistanis that has adversely affected the country's

infrastructure: the economy, the education system, the government bureaucracy, and even the arts. As population pressure

increases, the failure of the populace to develop a sense of publicly committed citizenship becomes more and more significant. The self-centeredness about which educator Ishtiaq

Husain Qureshi complained soon after independence is increasingly noticeable in many areas of social life. Although

many people once imagined that economic development

would by itself improve the quality of life, few still believe this to be true. Family or personal interest and status take precedence over

public good in Pakistan. Thus traffic laws are often enforced

solely according to a person's political clout rather than due

process, and admission to school depends more upon connections or wealth than on ability. Salaries, as compared with

bribes, are so inconsequential a privilege of employment that

people often plead to be given appointments without pay. Failure to develop chic-minded citizenship is also evident in

public administration and imbalanced government spending.

Military expenditures, for example, dwarf combined expenditures on health and education. Meanwhile, the bureaucracy—

a

legacy of the British colonial period—has not modernized suf- ficiently to incorporate new technologies and innovations

despite efforts by the government staff colleges.

Although in the mid-1980s the World Bank (see Glossary)

forecast the advancement of Pakistan to the ranks of middleincome countries, the nation had not quite achieved this tran78
The Society and Its Environment

sition in the early 1990s. Many blame this fact on Pakistan's fail- ure to make significant progress in human development

despite consistently high rates of economic growth. The annual

population growth rate, which hovered between 3.1 and 3.3

percent in the early 1990s, threatens to precipitate increased

social unrest as greater numbers of people compete for diminishing resources. An anonymous Pakistani writer has said that three things

symbolized Pakistan's material culture in the 1990s: videocassette recorders (for playing Hindi films) , locally manufactured

Japanese Suzuki cars, and Kalashnikov rifles. Although the

majority of the people still reside in villages, they increasingly

take social cues from cities. Videocassette tapes can be rented

in many small villages, where residents also watch Cable News

Network (CNN)—censored through Islamabad—on televisions

that are as numerous as radios were in the 1970s. In many

areas, tiny Suzuki automobiles have replaced the bicycles and

motorcycles that were in great demand merely a decade earlier. Whereas urban violence was traditionally related to blood

feuds, it has become more random and has escalated dramatically.

Physical Environment

Located in the northwestern part of the South Asian subcontinent, Pakistan became a state as a result of the partition of

British India on August 14, 1947. Pakistan annexed Azad

(Free) Kashmir after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48. Initially, Pakistan also included the northeastern sector of the subcontinent, where Muslims are also in the majority. The East

Wing and West Wing of Pakistan were, however, separated by

1,600 kilometers of hostile Indian territory. The country's East

Wing, or East Pakistan, became the independent state of Bangladesh in December 1971 (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch.

1).

Boundaries

Pakistan occupies a position of great geostrategic importance, bordered by Iran on the west, Afghanistan on the northwest, China on the northeast, India on the east, and the

Arabian Sea on the south (see fig. 1) . The total land area is esti- mated at 796,095 square kilometers.

79
Pakistan: A Country Study

The boundary with Iran, some 800 kilometers in length, was

first delimited by a British commission in 1893, separating Iran

from what was then British Indian Balochistan. In 1957 Pakistan signed a frontier agreement with Iran, and since then the

border between the two countries has not been a subject of

serious dispute.

Pakistan's boundary with Afghanistan is about 2,250 kilometers long. In the north, it runs along the ridges of the Hindu

Kush (meaning Hindu Killer) mountains and the Pamirs,

where a narrow strip of Afghan territory called the Wakhan

Corridor extends between Pakistan and Tajikistan. The Hindu

Kush was traditionally regarded as the last northwestern out- post beyond which Hindus could not venture in safety. The

boundary line with Afghanistan was drawn in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand, then foreign secretary in British India, and was acceded to by the amir of Afghanistan that same year. This

boundary, called the Durand Line, was not in doubt when Paki- stan became independent in 1947, although its legitimacy was

in later years disputed periodically by the Afghan government

as well as by Pakhtun tribes straddling the Pakistan-Afghanistan

border. On the one hand, Afghanistan claimed that the

Durand Line had been imposed by a stronger power upon a weaker one, and it favored the establishment of still another

state to be called Pashtunistan or Pakhtunistan (see Independent Pakistan, ch. 1; Foreign Policy, ch. 4). On the other hand,

Pakistan, as the legatee of the British in the region, insisted on

the legality and permanence of the boundary. The Durand

Line remained in effect in 1994.

In the northeastern tip of the country, Pakistan controls

about 84,159 square kilometers of the former princely state of

Jammu and Kashmir. This area, consisting of Azad Kashmir

(11,639 square kilometers) and most of the Northern Areas

(72,520 square kilometers), which includes Gilgit and Baltistan, is the most visually stunning of Pakistan. The Northern

Areas has five of the world's seventeen highest mountains. It also has such extensive glaciers that it has sometimes been

called the "third pole." The boundary line has been a matter of

pivotal dispute between Pakistan and India since 1947, and the

Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir has been an important

arena for fighting between the two sides since 1984, although

far more soldiers have died of exposure to the cold than from

any skirmishes in the conflict.

80
The Swat River valley in the North-West Frontier Province

Courtesy Sheila Ross

From the eastern end of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, a boundary of about 520 kilometers runs generally southeast

between China and Pakistan, ending near the Karakoram Pass. This line was determined from 1961 to 1965 in a series of

agreements between China and Pakistan. By mutual agreement, a new boundary treaty is to be negotiated between China

and Pakistan when the dispute over Kashmir is finally resolved

between India and Pakistan.

The Pakistan-India cease-fire line runs from the Karakoram

Pass west-southwest to a point about 130 kilometers northeast

of Lahore. This line, about 770 kilometers long, was arranged

with United Nations (UN) assistance at the end of the IndoPakistani War of 1947-48. The cease-fire line came into effect

on January 1, 1949, after eighteen months of fighting and was

last adjusted and agreed upon by the two countries in the Simla

81
Pakistan: A Country Study

Agreement of July 1972. Since then, it has been generally

known as the Line of Control.

The Pakistan-India boundary continues irregularly southward for about 1,280 kilometers, following the line of the 1947

Radcliffe Award, named for Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the head of the

British boundary commission on the partition of Punjab and

Bengal in 1947. Although this boundary with India is not for- mally disputed, passions still run high on both sides of the border. Many Indians had expected the original boundary line to run farther to the west, thereby ceding Lahore to India; Pakistanis had expected the line to run much farther east, possibly

granting them control of Delhi, the imperial capital of the

Mughal Empire.

The southern borders are far less contentious than those in

the north. The Thar Desert in the province of Sindh is separated from the desolate salt flats of the Rann of Kutch by a boundary that was first delineated in 1923-24. After partition,

Pakistan contested this southeastern boundary. In early 1965, a

series of border flare-ups and skirmishes occurred along the

undemarcated territory of the Rann of Kutch. They were less dangerous and less widespread, however, than the conflict that

erupted in Kashmir in the Indo-Pakistani War of August 1965.

The Rann of Kutch dispute was ended by British mediation,

and both sides accepted the award of the Indo-Pakistani West- ern Boundary Case Tribunal designated by the UN secretary

general. The tribunal made its award on February 19, 1968,

delimiting a line of 403 kilometers that was later demarcated by

joint survey teams. Of its original claim of some 9,100 square

kilometers, Pakistan was awarded only about 780 square kilometers. Beyond the western terminus of the tribunal's award,

the final stretch of Pakistan's border with India is about eighty

kilometers long, running west and southwest to an inlet of the

Arabian Sea.

Topography and Drainage

Pakistan is divided into three major geographic areas: the

northern highlands; the Indus River plain, with two major subdivisions corresponding roughly to the provinces of Punjab

and Sindh; and the Balochistan Plateau. Some geographers

designate additional major regions. For example, the mountain ranges along the western border with Afghanistan are sometimes described separately from the Balochistan Plateau,

and on the eastern border with India, south of the Sutlej River,

82
The Society and Its Environment

the Thar Desert may be considered separately from the Indus

River plain. Nevertheless, the country may conveniently be

visualized in general terms as divided in three by an imaginary

line drawn eastward from the Khyber Pass and another drawn

southwest from Islamabad down the middle of the country.

Roughly, then, the northern highlands are north of the imaginary east-west line; the Balochistan Plateau is to the west of the

imaginary southwest line; and the Indus River plain lies to the

east of that line (see fig. 5).

The northern highlands include parts of the Hindu Kush,

the Karakoram Range, and the Himalayas. This area includes

such famous peaks as K2 (Mount Godwin Austen; 8,611

meters) , the second highest peak in the world, and Nanga Par- bat (8,126 meters), the twelfth highest. More than one-half of

the summits are over 4,500 meters, and more than fifty peaks

reach above 6,500 meters. Travel through the area is difficult

and dangerous, although the government is attempting to develop certain areas into tourist and trekking sites. Because of

their rugged topography and the rigors of the climate, the

northern highlands and the Himalayas to the east have been

formidable barriers to movement into Pakistan throughout his- tory.

South of the northern highlands and west of the Indus River

plain are the Safed Koh Range along the Afghanistan border

and the Sulaiman Range and Kirthar Range, which define the

western extent of the province of Sindh and reach almost to the southern coast. The lower reaches are far more arid than

those in the north, and they branch into ranges that run generally to the southwest across the province of Balochistan. Northsouth valleys in Balochistan and Sindh have restricted the

migration of peoples along the Makran coast on the Arabian

Sea east toward the plains.

Several large passes cut through the ranges along the border

with Afghanistan. Among them are the Khojak Pass, about

eighty kilometers northwest of Quetta in Balochistan; the Khyber Pass, forty kilometers west of Peshawar and leading to Kabul; and the Baroghil Pass in the far north, providing access

to the Wakhan Corridor.

Less than one-fifth of Pakistan's land area has the potential

for intensive agricultural use. Nearly all of the arable land is actively cultivated, but outputs are low by world standards (see

Agriculture, ch. 3). Cultivation is sparse in the northern mountains, the southern deserts, and the western plateaus, but the

83
Pakistan: A Country Study
The Society and Its Environment

85
Pakistan: A Country Study

Indus River basin in Punjab and northern Sindh has fertile soil that enables Pakistan to feed its population under usual cli- matic conditions.

The name Indus comes from the Sanskrit word sindhu, meaning ocean, from which also come the words Sindh, Hindu, and

India. The Indus, one of the great rivers of the world, rises in

southwestern Tibet only about 160 kilometers west of the

source of the Sutlej River, which joins the Indus in Punjab, and

the Brahmaputra, which runs eastward before turning southwest and flowing through Bangladesh. The catchment area of

the Indus is estimated at almost 1 million square kilometers,

and all of Pakistan's major rivers—the Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab,

Ravi, and Sutlej—flow into it. The Indus River basin is a large,

fertile alluvial plain formed by silt from the Indus. This area

has been inhabited by agricultural civilizations for at least 5,000

years (see Early Civilizations, ch. 1).

The upper Indus River basin includes Punjab; the lower

Indus River basin begins at the Panjnad River (the confluence

of the eastern tributaries of the Indus) and extends south to the coast. In Punjab (meaning the "land of five waters") are the

Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej rivers. The Sutlej, however, is mostly on the Indian side of the border. In the southern

part of the province of Punjab, the British attempted to har- ness the irrigation power of the water over 100 years ago when

they established what came to be known as the canal colonies.

The irrigation project, which facilitated the emergence of

intensive cultivation despite arid conditions, resulted in important social and political transformations (see The British Raj,

ch. 1).

Pakistan has two great river dams: the Tarbela Dam on the

Indus, near the early Buddhist site at Taxila, and the Mangla

Dam on the Jhelum, where Punjab borders Azad Kashmir. The

Warsak Dam on the Kabul River near Peshawar is smaller.

These dams, along with a series of headworks and barrages

built by the British and expanded since independence, are of

vital importance to the national economy and played an important role in calming the raging floodwaters of 1992, which devastated large areas in the northern highlands and the Punjab

plains (see Irrigation, ch. 3).

Pakistan is subject to frequent seismic disturbances because

the tectonic plate under the subcontinent hits the plate under

Asia as it continues to move northward and to push the Himalayas ever higher. The region surrounding Quetta in Balochi86
The Society and Its Environment

stan is highly prone to earthquakes. A severe quake in 1931 was

followed by one of more destructive force in 1935. The small

city of Quetta was almost completely destroyed, and the adjacent military cantonment was heavily damaged. At least 20,000

people were killed. Tremors continue in the vicinity of Quetta;

the most recent major quake occurred in January 1991. Far

fewer people were killed in the 1991 quake than died in 1935,

although entire villages in the North-West Frontier Province were destroyed. A major earthquake centered in the NorthWest Frontier Province's Kohistan District in 1965 also caused

heavy damage.

Climate

Pakistan lies in the temperate zone. The climate is generally

arid, characterized by hot summers and cool or cold winters,

and wide variations between extremes of temperature at given

locations. There is little rainfall. These generalizations should

not, however, obscure the distinct differences existing among

particular locations. For example, the coastal area along the

Arabian Sea is usually warm, whereas the frozen snow-covered

ridges of the Karakoram Range and of other mountains of the

far north are so cold year round that they are only accessible by

world-class climbers for a few weeks in May and June of each

year.Pakistan has four seasons: a cool, dry winter from December

through February; a hot, dry spring from March through May;

the summer rainy season, or southwest monsoon period, from

June through September; and the retreating monsoon period

of October and November. The onset and duration of these

seasons vary somewhat according to location.

The climate in the capital city of Islamabad varies from an

average daily low of 2°C in January to an average daily high of

40°C in June. Half of the annual rainfall occurs in July and

August, averaging about 255 millimeters in each of those two

months. The remainder of the year has significantly less rain,

amounting to about fifty millimeters per month. Hailstorms

are common in the spring.

Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, which is also the country's

industrial center, is more humid than Islamabad but gets less rain. OnlyJuly and August average more than twenty-five milli- meters of rain in the Karachi area; the remaining months are exceedingly dry. The temperature is also more uniform in

Karachi than in Islamabad, ranging from an average daily low

87
Pakistan: A Country Study

of 13°C during winter evenings to an average daily high of 34°C

on summer days. Although the summer temperatures do not

get as high as those in Punjab, the high humidity causes the res- idents a great deal of discomfort.

Most areas in Punjab experience fairly cool winters, often

accompanied by rain. Woolen shawls are worn by women and

men for warmth because few homes are heated. By mid-February, the temperature begins to rise; springtime weather contin- ues until mid-April, when the summer heat sets in. The onset of

the southwest monsoon is anticipated to reach Punjab by May,

but since the early 1970s, the weather pattern has been irregular. The spring monsoon has either skipped over the area or

has caused it to rain so hard that floods have resulted. June and

July are oppressively hot. Although official estimates rarely

place the temperature above 46°C, newspaper sources claim

that it reaches 51 °C and regularly carry reports about people

who have succumbed to the heat. Heat records were broken in

Multan in June 1993, when the mercury was reported to have

risen to 54°C. In August the oppressive heat is punctuated by

the rainy season, referred to as barsat, which brings relief in its wake. The hardest part of the summer is then over, but cooler

weather does not come until late October.

Pollution and Environmental Issues

Little attention was paid to pollution and environmental

issues in Pakistan until the early 1990s. Related concerns, such

as sanitation and potable water, received earlier scrutiny. In

1987 only about 6 percent of rural residents and 51 percent of

urban residents had access to sanitary facilities; in 1990 a total of 97.6 million Pakistanis, or approximately 80 percent of the

population, had no access to flush toilets. Greater success has

been achieved in bringing potable water within reach of the

people; nearly half the population enjoyed such access by 1990.

However, researchers at the Pakistan Medical Research Council, recognizing that a large proportion of diseases in Pakistan are caused by the consumption of polluted water, have been

questioning the "safe" classification in use in the 1990s. Even

the 38 percent of the population that receives its water through

pipelines runs the risk of consuming seriously contaminated

water, although the problem varies by area. In Punjab, for

example, as much as 90 percent of drinking water comes from

groundwater, as compared with only 9 percent in Sindh.

88
The Society and Its Environment

The central government's Perspective Plan (1988-2003) and

previous five-year plans do not mention sustainable development strategies (see Development Planning, ch. 3). Further,

there have been no overarching policies focused on sustainable

development and conservation. The state has focused on

achieving self-sufficiency in food production, meeting energy

demands, and containing the high rate of population growth,

not on curtailing pollution or other environmental hazards.

In 1992 Pakistan's National Conservation Strategy Report

attempted to redress the previous inattention to the nation's

mounting environmental problem. Drawing on the expertise

of more than 3,000 people from a wide array of political affilia- tions, the government produced a document outlining the cur- rent state of environmental health, its sustainable goals, and

viable program options for the future (see National Conservation Goals, this ch.).

Of special concern to environmentalists is the diminishing

forest cover in watershed regions of the northern highlands,

which has only recently come under close scrutiny. Forest areas have been thoughtlessly denuded. Deforestation, which

occurred at an annual rate of 0.4 percent in 1989-90, has contributed directly to the severity of the flooding problem faced

by the nation in the early 1990s.

As industry has expanded, factories have emitted more and

more toxic effluents into the air and water. The number of textile- and food-processing mills in rural Punjab has grown

greatly since the mid-1970s, resulting in pollution of its rivers

and irrigation canals. Groundwater quality throughout the

country has also suffered from rapidly increasing use of pesticides and fertilizers aimed at promoting more intensive cropping and facilitating self-sufficiency in food production.

The National Conservation Strategy Report has documented

how solid and liquid excreta are the major source of water pollution in the country and the cause of widespread waterborne

diseases. Because only just over half of urban residents have

access to sanitation, the remaining urban excreta are deposited

on roadsides, into waterways, or incorporated into solid waste.

Additionally, only three major sewage treatment plants exist in

the country; two of them operate intermittently. Much of the

untreated sewage goes into irrigation systems, where the waste- water is reused, and into streams and rivers, which become sew- age carriers at low-flow periods. Consequently, the vegetables

grown from such wastewater have serious bacteriological con89
Pakistan: A Country Study

tamination. Gastroenteritis, widely considered in medical cir- cles to be the leading cause of death in Pakistan, is transmitted

through waterborne pollutants (see Health and Welfare, this

ch.).

Low-lying land is generally used for solid waste disposal,

without the benefit of sanitary landfill methods. The National

Conservation Strategy has raised concerns about industrial

toxic wastes also being dumped in municipal disposal areas without any record of their location, quantity, or toxic composition. Another important issue is the contamination of shallow

groundwater near urban industries that discharge wastes

directly into the ground.

Water in Karachi is so contaminated that almost all residents

boil it before consumption. Because sewerage and water lines

have been laid side by side in most parts of the city, leakage is the main cause of contamination. High levels of lead also have

been found in water in Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

Air pollution has also become a major problem in most cit- ies. There are no controls on vehicular emissions, which

account for 90 percent of pollutants. The National Conservation

Strategy Report claims that the average Pakistani vehicle emits

twenty-five times as much carbon monoxide, twenty times as many hydrocarbons, and more than three and one-half times

as much nitrous oxide in grams per kilometer as the average

vehicle in the United States. Another major source of pollution, not mentioned in the

National Conservation Strategy Report, is noise. The hyperurbanization experienced by Pakistan since the 1960s has resulted in

loose controls for heavy equipment operation in densely populated areas, as well as in crowded streets filled with buses,

trucks, automobiles, and motorcycles, which often honk at each other and at the horse-drawn tongas (used for transporting people) and the horse-drawn rehras (used for transporting

goods).

National Conservation Goals

The National Conservation Strategy Report has three explicit

objectives: conservation of natural resources, promotion of sus- tainable development, and improvement of efficiency in the use and management of resources. It sees itself as a "call for

action" addressed to central and provincial governments, busi- nesses, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , local communities, and individuals. The sustainable development of

90
The Society and Its Environment

Pakistan is viewed as a multigenerational enterprise. In seeking

to transform attitudes and practices, the National Conservation

Strategy recognizes that two key changes in values are needed:

the restoration of the conservation ethic derived from Islamic

moral values, called qanaat, and the revival of community spirit

and responsibility, haquq-ul-abad.

The National Conservation Strategy Report recommends fourteen program areas for priority implementation: maintaining

soils in croplands, increasing efficiency of irrigation, protecting watersheds, supporting forestry and plantations, restoring

rangelands and improving livestock, protecting water bodies

and sustaining fisheries, conserving biodiversity, increasing

energy efficiency, developing and deploying renewable

resources, preventing or decreasing pollution, managing

urban wastes, supporting institutions to manage common

resources, integrating population and environmental programs, and preserving the cultural heritage. It identifies sixtyeight specific programs in these areas, each with a long-term

goal and expected outputs and physical investments required

within ten years. Special attention has been paid to the potential roles of environmental NGOs, women's organizations, and

international NGOs in working with the government in its conservation efforts. Recommendations from the National Conser- vation Strategy Report are incorporated in the Eighth Five-Year

Plan (1993-98).

Population

In early 1994, the population of Pakistan was estimated to be

126 million, making it the ninth most populous country in the

world. Its land area, however, ranks thirty-second among

nations. Thus Pakistan has about 2 percent of the world's population living on less than 0.7 percent of the world's land. The

population growth rate is among the world's highest, officially

estimated at 3.1 percent per year, but privately thought to be

closer to 3.3 percent per year by many planners involved in

population programs. Pakistan's population is expected to reach 150 million by 2000 and to account for 4 percent of the

world's population growth between 1994 and 2004. Pakistan's

population is expected to double between 1994 and 2022.

These figures are estimates, however, because ethnic unrest

led the government to postpone its decennial census in 1991.

The government felt that tensions among Punjabis, Sindhis,

muhajirs (immigrants or descendants of immigrants from

91
Pakistan: A Country Study

India), and Pakhtuns and between the Sunni Muslim majority

and religious minorities were such that taking the census might

provoke violent reactions from groups who felt they had been

undercounted. The 1991 census had still not been carried out

as of early 1994. The 1981 census enumerated 84.2 million per- sons (see table 2, Appendix).

Population Distribution and Density

Pakistan's people are not evenly distributed throughout the

country. There is an average of 146 persons per square kilometer, but the density varies dramatically, ranging from scarcely

populated arid areas, especially in Balochistan, to some of the

highest urban densities in the world in Karachi and Lahore.

About 68 percent of the population lived in rural areas in

1994, a decrease of 7 percent since 1970. In contrast, the number of people living in urban areas has risen substantially,

resulting in an urban growth rate of 4.6 percent between 1980

and 1991.

More than half of Pakistan's population is below the age of

fifteen; nearly a third is below the age of nine (see fig. 6). For

cultural reasons, enumerating the precise number of females

has been difficult—and estimates of the percentage of females

in the population range from 47.5 percent in the 1981 census

to 48.3 percent in the 1987-88 Labour Force Survey. Pakistan is one of the few countries in the world with an inverse sex ratio: official sources claim there are 111 men for every 100 women.

The discrepancy is particularly obvious among people over

fifty: men in that age-group account for 7.1 percent of the

country's total population and women for less than 5 percent.

This figure reflects the secondary status of females in Pakistani

society, especially their lack of access to quality medical care. Population Planning Policies and Problems

Pakistan's extremely high rate of population growth is caused by a falling death rate combined with a continuing high

birth rate. In 1950 the mortality rate was twenty-seven per 1,000

population; by 1990 the rate had dropped to twelve (estimated) per 1,000. Yet throughout this period, the birth rate was forty-four per 1,000 population. On average, in 1990 each

family had 6.2 children, and only 11 percent of couples were

regularly practicing contraception.

In 1952 the Family Planning Association of Pakistan, an NGO, initiated efforts to contain population growth. Three

92
The Society and Its Environment

years later, the government began to fund the association and

noted the need to reduce population growth in its First FiveYear Plan (1955-60). The government soon combined its population planning efforts in hospitals and clinics into a single program. Thus population planning was a dual effort led by the

Family Planning Association and the public sector. In the mid-1960s, the Ministry of Health initiated a program

in which intrauterine devices (IUDs) were promoted. Payments were offered to hospitals and clinics as incentives, and midwives were trained to treat patients. The government was able

to attract funding from many international donors, but the

program lost support because the targets were overly ambitious

and because doctors and clinics allegedly overreported their

services to claim incentive payments.

The population planning program was suspended and substantively reorganized after the fall of Mohammad Ayub Khan's

government in 1969. In late December 1971, the population was estimated at 65.2 million. In an attempt to control the population problem, the government introduced several new programs. First, the Continuous Motivation System Programme,

which employed young urban women to visit rural areas, was

initiated. In 1975 the Inundation Programme was added. Based

on the premise that greater availability would increase use, shopkeepers throughout the country stocked birth control

pills and condoms. Both programs failed, however. The unmarried urban women had little understanding of the lives of the

rural women they were to motivate, and shopkeepers kept the

contraceptives out of sight because it was considered tasteless to display them in an obvious way.

Following Zia ul-Haq's coup d'etat in 1977, government population planning efforts were almost halted. In 1980 the Population Division, formerly under the direction of a minister of

state, was renamed the Population Welfare Division and trans- ferred to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. This agency was charged with the delivery of both family

planning services and maternal and child health care. This

reorganized structure corresponded with the new population

planning strategy, which was based on a multifaceted community-based "cafeteria" approach, in cooperation with Family

Welfare Centres (essentially clinics) and Reproductive Health

Centres (mostly engaged in sterilizations) . Community participation had finally became a cornerstone of the government's

93
Pakistan: A Country Study

AGE-GROUP

70 and over 60-69

50-59 40-49

30-39

20-29

10-19

1993 Population = 123.4 million

0-9

UUU

a

MAL ES FEMi \LES

^

^/////

\ zzy//////////A1 1 zz

20 15 10 5 5 10 15 PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION

20

Source: Based on information from PC Globe 5.0: The New World Order, 1992, Tempe,

Arizona, 1992. Figure 6. Population by Age and Gender, 1993

policy, and it was hoped that contraceptive use would rise dramatically. The population by 1980 had exceeded 84 million.

In preparing the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88), the government projected a national population of 147 million in the year

2000 if the growth rate were to remain at 2.8 percent per year, and of 134 million if the rate were to decline to the desired 2.1 percent per year by then. By the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-

93) period, the multipronged approach initiated in the 1980s

had increased international donor assistance and had begun to enlist local NGOs. Efforts to improve maternal and child

health were coupled with education campaigns. Because of

local mores concerning modesty, the government avoided

explicit reference to contraceptive devices and instead focused

its public education efforts on encouraging couples to limit

their family size to two children.

The key to controlling population growth, according to

activists in the women's movement, lies in raising the socioeconomic status of women. Until a woman's status is determined

94
The Society and Its Environment

by something other than her reproductive capabilities, and

especially by the number of sons she bears, severe impediments

to lowering population growth rates will persist.

Migration and Growth of Major Cities

Pakistan's cities are expanding much faster than the overall

population. At independence in 1947, many refugees from

India settled in urban areas. In the 1950s, more than one-half

of the residents of several cities in Sindh and Punjab were

muhajirs. Some refugee colonies were eventually recognized as

cities in their own right.

Between 1951 and 1981, the urban population quadrupled.

The annual urban growth rate during the 1950s and 1960s was more than 5 percent. This figure dropped slightly in the 1970s

to 4.4 percent. Between 1980 and early 1994, it averaged about

4.6 percent. By early 1994, about 32 percent of all Pakistanis

lived in urban areas, with 13 percent of the total population liv- ing in three cities, each of which had over 1 million inhabitants—Karachi, Lahore, and Faisalabad.

The key reason for migration to urban areas has been the

limited opportunity for economic advancement and mobility

in rural areas. The economic and political control that local

landlords exercise in much of the countryside has led to this

situation.

The urban migrant is almost invariably a male. He retains his

ties with his village, and his rights there are acknowledged long

after his departure. At first, migration is frequently seen as a temporary expedient, a way to purchase land or pay off a debt.

Typically, the migrant sends part of his earnings to the family

he left behind and returns to the village to work at peak agricultural seasons. Even married migrants usually leave their

families in the village when they first migrate. The decision to bring a wife and children to the city is thus a milestone in the

migration process.

As cities have grown, they have engulfed surrounding vil- lages, bringing agriculturists into the urban population. Many

of these farmers commute to urban jobs from their original

homes. The focus of these individuals' lives remains their family and fellow villagers. Similarly, migrants from rural areas who

have moved to the cities stay in close touch with relatives and

friends who have also moved, so their loyalties reflect earlier

patterns. The Pakistani city tends to recreate the close ties of

the rural community.

95
Pakistan: A Country Study

Pakistani cities are diverse in nature. The urban topology

reflects the varied political history within the region. Some cit- ies dating from the medieval era, such as Lahore and Multan,

served as capitals of kingdoms or small principalities, or they were fortified border towns prior to colonial rule. Other precolonial cities, such as Peshawar, were trading centers located at strategic points along the caravan route. Some cities in Sindh

and Punjab centered on cottage industries, and their trade

rivaled the premier European cities of the eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries.

Under colonial rule, many of the older administrative cities declined. Where the British located a trading post (factory) near an existing administrative center, the city was typically

divided into old and new, or European, sections. New towns

and cities also emerged, especially in the expanding canal colonies; Faisalabad (formerly Lyallpur) is such a city. The town of

Karachi expanded rapidly to become a center of rail and sea transport as a consequence of British rule and as a conse- quence of the opening of massive irrigation projects and the

increase in agricultural exports. Pakistan's two largest cities,

Karachi and Lahore, illustrate how differing regional and

sociocultural histories have shaped the variations among Pakistan's cities. Karachi absorbed tens of thousands of muhajirs following

independence in 1947, grew nearly two and one-half times

from 1941 to 1951, and nearly doubled again in the following

decade. Karachi is by far Pakistan's largest city and is still rapidly growing. In the early 1990s, the population exceeded 10

million.

Karachi's rapid growth has been directly related to the overall economic growth in the country. The partition of British

India into the independent states of Pakistan and India

prompted an influx into Pakistan of Muslim merchants from

various parts of the new, Hindu-majority India. These merchants, whom sociologist Hamza Alavi refers to as salariat, had

money to invest and received unusual encouragement from the

government, which wanted to promote the growth of the new

state. Karachi at first developed in isolation. Relatively few people

from outlying areas were engaged in running its factories, and

the city had little impact on Pakistan's cultural fabric. But when

the economies of southern Sindh and parts of Punjab began to expand, large numbers of migrants flooded the city in search

96
The Society and Its Environment

of work (generally low-paying jobs), and Karachi became the

hub of the nation's commerce. The city, however, also has seri- ous problems. It has the poorest slums in the country, and it suffers from serious interethnic conflict as a consequence of

the influx of many competing groups. It was the site of considerable violence in the 1980s as muhajirs solidified their local

power base vis-a-vis the Pakhtuns and native Sindhis (see Subversion and Civil Unrest, ch. 5).

Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, contrasts markedly

with Karachi. With just under half the population of Karachi, it is regarded as the cultural nucleus of Punjab. Residents of

Lahore take special pride in their city's physical beauty, especially in its Mughal architecture, which includes the Badshahi

Mosque, Shalimar Gardens, Lahore Fort, and the Mughal

emperorJahangir's tomb. In the earliest extant historical refer- ence to the city, in A.D. 630 the Chinese traveler Xuan Zang

described it as a large Brahmanical city. A center of learning by

the twelfth century, Lahore reached its peak in the sixteenth

century, when it became the quintessential Mughal city—the

"grand resort of people of all nations and a center of extensive

commerce."

The economy and the population expanded greatly in the

1980s in a number of other cities. The most important of these are Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Wazirabad, and Sialkot in Punjab;

Hyderabad in Sindh; and Peshawar and Mardan in the

North-West Frontier Province.

The nation's capital was situated in Karachi at independence. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, who assumed power

in 1958, aspired, however, to build a new capital that would be

better protected from possible attack by India and would

reflect the greatness of the new country. In 1959 Ayub Khan

decided to move the capital to the shadow of the Margalla Hills near Pakistan's third largest city, Rawalpindi. The move was

completed in 1963, and the new capital was named Islamabad

(abode of Islam). The population of Islamabad continues to increase rapidly, and the official 1991 estimate ofjust over

200,000 has probably been much exceeded.

Impact of Migration to the Persian Gulf Countries

Pakistan had a severe balance of payments deficit in the

1970s. To deal with this deficit, as well as to strengthen ties with

the Islamic states in the Middle East, the government of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto encouraged both skilled and unskilled men

97
Pakistan: A Country Study

to work in the Persian Gulf countries. The government set up a program under the Ministry of Labour, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis to regulate this migration and also seconded

military troops to many of the Gulf states. By the mid-1980s, when this temporary migration was at its height, there were estimated to be more than 2 million Pakistanis in the Persian Gulf states remitting more than US$3 bil- lion every year. At the peak, the remittances accounted for

almost half of the country's foreign-exchange earnings. By

1990 new employment opportunities were decreasing, and the

1990-91 Persian Gulf War forced many workers to return

quickly to Pakistan. Workers have only slowly returned to the

Gulf since the war ended.

The majority of the emigrants are working-class men, who

travel alone, leaving their wives and children behind with their

extended families in Pakistan. These men are willing to sacrifice years with their families for what they see as their only

chance to escape poverty in a society with limited upward

mobility. A study in the old quarter (the inner walled city) of

Lahore in 1987 suggested that half of all working-class families

had at least one close relative working in the Gulf. Families

generally use the remittances for consumer goods, rather than

investing in industry. The wage earner typically returns after

five to ten years to live at home.

Although this migration has had little effect on Pakistan

demographically, it has affected its social fabric. While a man is away from his family, his wife often assumes responsibility for

many day-to-day business transactions that are considered the

province of men in this traditional male-dominated society.

Thus for the women involved, there is a significant change in

social role. Among the men, psychologists have identified a syn- drome referred to as "Dubai chalo ("let's go to Dubai"). This

syndrome, which manifests itself as disorientation, appears to result from social isolation, culture shock, harsh working conditions, and the sudden acquisition of relative wealth. Men

often feel isolated and guilty for leaving their families, and the

resultant sociopsychological stress can be considerable.

Repercussions of the War in Afghanistan

The presence of large numbers Afghan refugees has had a weighty impact on the demographics of Pakistan. After the

Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, refugees

began streaming over the borders into Pakistan. By 1990

98
Street scene outside Lohari Gate, Lahore

Various forms of transportation as found in Lahore—tonga, rickshaw,

automobiles, and carts Courtesy Anita M. Weiss

99
Pakistan: A Country Study

approximately 3.2 million refugees had settled there, a decrease of about 90,000 from 1989. Previously uninhabited

areas of the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan had

been setded by refugees during the 1980s. The United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that in

1990 there were 345 Afghan refugee villages. Of these, 68.5

percent were in the North-West Frontier Province, 26.0 percent

in Balochistan, and 5.5 percent in Punjab. Each village housed

an average of 10,000 people, and women and children

accounted for 75 percent of the refugee population.

The influx of refugees has had profound social consequences, and the refugee population in desert areas has placed

a heavy burden on the environment. Initially, Pakistanis wanted

to help their neighbors in a time of need, but difficulties slowly

led many to think that their friendship had gone far enough.

Among the problems were inflation, a dearth of low-paying

jobs because these were taken by refugees, and a proliferation

of weapons, especially in urban areas. The escalation of animosity between refugees and Pakistanis, particularly in Punjab,

caused the government to restrict the refugees' free movement

in the country in the mid-1980s.

To assist Pakistan in preventing conflict by keeping the refugees separate from the local population, the UNHCR placed

restrictions on disbursements of food and other goods in its refugee camps in the North-West Frontier Province and in

Balochistan. Since the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in February 1989, the UNHCR, the Pakistan government,

and an array of NGOs have encouraged the refugees to return

home, but until internecine fighting in Afghanistan stops,

many will elect to remain in Pakistan. In early 1994, the number of Afghan refugees still residing in Pakistan was estimated

at 1.4 million, according to Amnesty International.

Social Structure

Traditional Kinship Patterns

Pakistani social life revolves around family and kin. Even

among members of the most Westernized elite, family retains

its overarching significance. The family is the basis of social

organization, providing its members with both identity and

protection. Rarely does an individual live apart from relatives; even male urban migrants usually live with relatives or friends

of kin. Children live with their parents until marriage, and sons

100
The Society and Its Environment

often stay with their parents after marriage, forming a joint

family.

The household is the primary kinship unit. In its ideal, or extended, form, it includes a married couple, their sons, their

sons' wives and children, and unmarried offspring. Sons establish separate households upon their father's death. Whether or not an extended household endures depends on the prefer- ences of the individuals involved. Quarrels and divisiveness,

particularly among the women (mother-in-law and daughtersin-law), can lead to the premature dissolution of a joint household.

Descent is reckoned patrilineally, so only those related

through male ancestors are considered relatives. The biradari, or group of male kin (the patrilineage), plays a significant role

in social relations. Its members neither hold movable property

in common nor share earnings, but the honor or shame of

individual members affects the general standing of the biradari

within the community. A common proverb expresses this view:

"One does not share the bread, but one shares the shame."

In theory, members of a biradari are coresidents of a single

village. In some areas, however, land fragmentation and generations of out-migration have led to the dispersal of many members of the biradari among various villages, regions, and cities. Patrilineal kin continue to maintain ties with their natal village

and enjoy the legal right of first refusal in any biradari land sale. Members of a biradari celebrate the major life events

together. Patrilineal kin are expected to contribute food and to help with guests in the ceremonies accompanying birth, marriage, death, and major religious holidays. The biradari has tra- ditionally served as a combined mutual aid society and welfare

agency, arranging loans to members, assisting in finding

employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer families.There is considerable pressure for patrilineal kin to maintain good relations with one another. Biradari members who

quarrel will try to resolve their differences before major social

occasions so that the patrilineage can present a united front to the village. People with sons and daughters of marriageable

age keenly feel the necessity to maintain good relations

because a person whose family is at odds with his or her biradari

is considered a poor marriage prospect.

Although descent is reckoned patrilineally, women maintain

relations with their natal families throughout life. The degree

101
Pakistan: A Country Study

of involvement with maternal kin varies among ethnic groups

and among regions of the country. The tie between brother

and sister is typically strong and affectionate; a woman looks to her brothers for support in case of divorce or widowhood early

in her marriage. In those regions where families maintain considerable contact with maternal kin, children, even though

they are members of their father's patrilineage, are indulged by

their mother's kin. Just as a family's relations with its biradari are considered in evaluating a potential spouse, so too are the

mother's kin.

Marriage is a means of allying two extended families; romantic attachments have little role to play. The husband and wife are primarily representatives of their respective families in a contractual arrangement, which is typically negotiated between

two male heads of household. It is fundamentally the parents'

responsibility to arrange marriages for their children, but older

siblings may be actively involved if the parents die early or if they have been particularly successful in business or politics.

The terms are worked out in detail and are noted, by law, at the

local marriage registry.

Marriage is a process of acquiring new relatives or reinforcing the ties one has with others. To participate fully in society, a person must be married and have children, preferably sons.

Social ties are cemented by giving away daughters in marriage

and receiving daughters-in-law. Marriage with one's father's

brother's child is preferred, in part because property

exchanged at marriage then stays within the patrilineage. The

relationship between in-laws extends beyond the couple and

well past the marriage event. Families related by marriage

exchange gifts on important occasions in each others' lives. If a marriage is successful, it will be followed by others between the

two families. The links thus formed persist and are reinforced

through the generations. The pattern of continued intermarriage coupled with the occasional marriage of nonrelatives cre- ates a convoluted web of interlocking ties of descent and

marriage.

A woman's life is difficult during the early years of marriage.

A young bride has very little status in her husband's household;

she is subservient to her mother-in-law and must negotiate rela- tions with her sisters-in-law. Her situation is made easier if she

has married a cousin and her mother-in-law is also her aunt.

The proper performance of all the elaborate marriage ceremonies and the accompanying exchange of gifts also serve to

102
The Society and Its Environment

enhance the new bride's status. Likewise, a rich dowry serves as a trousseau; the household goods, clothing, jewelry, and furniture included remain the property of the bride after she has

married.

Marriage also involves a dower, called haq mehr (see Glossary) , established under Islamic law, the sharia (see Glossary)

.

Although some families set a symbolic haq mehr of Rs32 (for

value of the rupee—see Glossary) in accordance with the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, others may demand hundreds of thousands of rupees.

A wife gains status and power as she bears sons. Sons will

bring wives for her to supervise and provide for her in her old

age. Daughters are a liability, to be given away in an expensive

marriage with their virginity intact. Therefore, mothers favor

their sons. In later life, the relationship between a mother and

her son remains intimate, in all likelihood with the mother

retaining far more influence over her son than his wife.

Linguistic and Ethnic Groups

Language is an important marker of ethnic identity. Among

the more than twenty spoken languages in Pakistan, the most

common ones—Punjabi, Sindhi, and Urdu—as well as Pakhtu

or Pashto, Balochi, and others, belong to the Indo-Aryan

branch of the Indo-European language family. Additional languages, such as Shina and other northern-area languages, are

related to the Dardic branch of Indo-European and the early

Dravidian language family. Brahui is one such language; it is spoken by a group in Balochistan.

The Indo-Aryan vernaculars stretch across the northern half

of the Indian subcontinent in a vast range of related local dialects that change slightly from one village to the next. Residents of fairly distant communities typically cannot understand

one another. Superimposed on this continuum are several

types of more standardized literary or commercial languages.

Although based on the vernaculars of their representative

regions, these standardized languages are nonetheless distinct.

Nearly half of all Pakistanis (48 percent) speak Punjabi. The

next most commonly spoken language is Sindhi (12 percent),

followed by the Punjabi variant Siraiki (10 percent), Pakhtu or Pashto (8 percent), Urdu (8 percent), Balochi (3 percent),

Hindko (2 percent), and Brahui (1 percent). Native speakers

of other languages, including English, Burushaski, and various

other tongues, account for 8 percent.

103
Pakistan: A Country Study

Although Urdu is the official national language, it is spoken

as a native tongue by only 8 percent of the population. People

who speak Urdu as their native language generally identify

themselves as muhajirs. A large number of people from educated backgrounds (and those who aspire to upward mobility)

speak Urdu, as opposed to their natal languages, in their

homes, usually to help their children master it. The Punjabi

elite in urban centers, for example, favor Urdu, although villag- ers in the Punjab speak a plethora of similar dialects.

The Urdu language originated during the Mughal period

(1526-1858). It literally means "a camp language," for it was spoken by the imperial Mughal troops from Central Asia as they mixed with speakers of local dialects of northern India.

Increasingly, elements of Persian, the official language of the

Mughal administration, were incorporated until Urdu attained

its stylized, literary form in the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries. The Devanagari script (used for Sanskrit and con- temporary Hindi) was never adopted; instead, Urdu has always

been written using the Persian script. These two literary languages, Urdu and Hindi, can be said to be dialects of colloquial

Hindustani, the lingua franca of modern India before partition.

South Asian Muslims have long felt that Urdu symbolizes

their shared identity. It has served as a link among educated

Muslims and was stressed in the Pakistan independence movement. Christopher Schackle writes that "Urdu was the main lit- erary vehicle of the Muslim elite of India." At independence,

the Muslim League (as the All-India Muslim League was usually

referred to) promoted Urdu as the national language to help

the new Pakistani state develop an identity, even though few

people actually spoke it. However, because many of the elite were fluent in English, English became the de facto national

language. The push to elevate Urdu was unpopular in East

Pakistan, where most of the population speaks Bengali (officially referred to as Bangla in Bangladesh since 1971) and

identifies with its literary heritage. Language riots in Dhaka

occurred in the early 1950s, leading to the elevation of Bengali

as a second national language with Urdu until the secession of

East Pakistan in 1971; when Bangladesh became independent,

Bangla was designated the official language.

Instruction in the best schools continued to be in English

until the early 1980s. Mastery of English was highly desirable

because it facilitated admission to good universities in Britain,

104
The Society and Its Environment

the United States, and Australia. Then, in a move to promote

nationalism, the government of Zia ul-Haq declared Urdu to be the medium of instruction in government schools. Urdu was

aggressively promoted via television, radio, and the education

system. Private schools in urban centers (attended by children

of the elite) were allowed to retain English, while smaller rural

schools could continue to teach in the provincial languages

(see Education, this ch.).

Punjabi, spoken by nearly half of the population, is an old,

literary language whose early writings consist chiefly of folk

tales and romances, the most famous being the eighteenth-century Punjabi poet Waris Shah's version of Heer Ranjha (the love

story of Heer and Ranjha). Although Punjabi was originally

written in the Gurmulki script, in the twentieth century it has

been written in the Urdu script. Punjabi has a long history of

being mixed with Urdu among Muslims, especially in urban

areas. Numerous dialects exist, some associated with the Sikhs

in India and others associated with regions in Pakistan. An

example of the latter is the variant of Punjabi spoken in Sar- godha in central Punjab.

The ethnic composition of Pakistan in the early 1990s

roughly corresponded to the linguistic distribution of the population, at least among the largest groups: 66 percent of Pakistanis identify themselves as Punjabis, 13 percent as Sindhis, 9

percent as Pakhtuns, 8 percent as muhajirs, 3 percent as Baloch,

and 1 percent as members of other ethnic groups. Each group

is primarily concentrated in its home province, with most

muhajirs residing in urban Sindh (see fig. 7)

.

Punjabis

Most Punjabis trace their ancestry to pre-Islamic Jat and

Rajput castes. However, as they intermarried with other ethnic

groups who came to the area, certain qaums (clan or tribal

groups) came to predominate, especially Gujjars, Awans,

Arains, and Khokkars in northern Punjab, and Gilanis, Gardezis, Qureshis, and Abbasis in the south. Other Punjabis trace

their heritage to Arabia, Persia, Balochistan, Afghanistan, and

Kashmir. Thus, in contrast with many other areas, where people often remained isolated, Punjabis had very diverse origins.

The extent of this diversity facilitated their coalescence into a coherent ethnic community that has historically placed great

emphasis both on farming and on fighting.

105
Pakistan: A Country Study

In censuses taken in British India, Punjabis were typically

divided into "functional castes" or "agricultural tribes." The

word caste, however, is grounded in the Hindu notions of reincarnation and karma; Muslims totally reject these religious con- notations and use the term qaum instead. Tribal affiliation,

based on descent and occupational specialization, tends to merge in Punjab into a qaum identity. An occupational group

typically claims descent from a single ancestor, and many tribes

traditionally followed a single occupation. The traditional

occupation gives the group its name as well as its general position in the social hierarchy.

An important aspect of Punjabi ethnicity is reciprocity at the

village level. A man's brother is his friend, his friend is his

brother, and both enjoy equal access to his resources. Traditionally, a person has virtually free access to a kinsman's

resources without foreseeable payback. This situation results in

social networks founded on local (kinship-based) group needs

as opposed to individual wants. These networks in turn perpetuate not only friendly relations but also the structure of the

community itself. There is great social pressure on an individual to share and pool such resources as income, political influence, and personal connections. Kinship obligations continue

to be central to a Punjabi's identity and concerns. Distinctions

based on qaum remain significant social markers, particularly

in rural areas. Punjab, a region of fertile agricultural lands, is Pakistan's

most populous province. Its landed elite remains a favored

social stratum. Moreover, given the province's overwhelming

importance, its landowners (in tandem with influential

muhajirs) continue to predominate in the upper echelons of

the military and civil service and in large part run the central

government. This situation is resented by many Pakhtuns,

Baloch, and, particularly, Sindhis, whose numbers and wealth

are comparatively small and who are proportionately underrepresented in government and the military. Many Sindhis,

alienated from the Punjabi-dominated central government,

still resent the fact that the capital was moved from Karachi (in

Sindh) to Islamabad (in northern Punjab). Sindhis also have

bitter memories of the death of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a champion of Sindhi regionalism, who was not only ousted but

hanged. Of the three most prominent national politicians in

the 1980s and early 1990s, two were Punjabis: President Zia ul- Haq and Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif. Only Benazir

106
I

The Society and Its Environment

Bhutto, Pakistan People's Party leader and prime minister from

October 1993, is Sindhi.

Pakhtuns

The North-West Frontier Province is closely identified with

Pakhtuns, one of the largest tribal groups in the world. The

Pakhtuns predominate in Balochistan and are also the major

ethnic group in southern Afghanistan. The West has long been

fascinated with the Pakhtuns, one of the few peoples able to defeat the advances of British imperialism. Authors as diverse

as Rudyard Kipling and contemporary Pakistani anthropologist

Akbar S. Ahmed wrote about them. More is written about Pakhtun norms, values, and social organization than any other ethnic group in Pakistan.

Central to identity as a Pakhtun is adherence to the malecentered code of conduct, the pakhtunwali. Foremost in this

code is the notion of honor, nang, which is articulated in a

starkly black-and-white, all-or-nothing manner. Without honor,

life for a Pakhtun is not worth living. Honor demands the

maintenance of sexual propriety. Complete chastity among

female relatives is of the essence; only with the purity and good

repute of his mother, daughters, sisters, and wife (or wives)

does a man ensure his honor. Thus women are restricted to private, family compounds in much of the North-West Frontier

Province. Census takers, invariably male, are constrained not to ask about the women in another man's home, and the number

of men in a household is often overstated because sons and

brothers are a source of strength. Hence, accurate enumeration of the population is not possible.

Closely related to the notion of honor is the principle of

revenge, or badal Offenses to one's honor must be avenged, or

there is no honor. Although minor problems may be settled by

negotiation, murder demands blood revenge, and partners in

illicit sexual liaisons are killed if discovered. Even making lewd

innuendos or, in the case of women, having one's reputation

maligned may mean death. The men involved sometimes

escape to other regions, where they may well be tracked down

by the woman's kin. When a woman is killed, the assailant is, almost without exception, a close male relative. Killings associated with sexual misconduct are the only ones that do not

demand revenge. Even the courts are accustomed to dealing

leniently in such cases. Vendettas and feuds are an endemic

109
Figure 7. Principal Ethnic Groups

108

Pakistan: A Country Study

feature of social relations and an index of individual and group

identity.

Another major dimension of pakhtunwali is hospitality, or

melmastia. Commensalism is a means of showing respect,

friendship, and alliance. A complex etiquette surrounds the

serving of guests, in which the host or his sons, when serving,

refuse to sit with those they entertain as a mark of courtesy.

Closely related to melmastia is the requirement of giving refuge

to anyone, even one's enemy, for as long as the person is within

the precincts of one's home. These codes, too, are related to the concept of honor, for the host gains honor by serving his

guest, and the person who places himself under another's protection is weak, a supplicant. Refuge must extend to the point

of being willing to sacrifice one's own life to defend one's guest,

but a person who demeans himself so much as to plead for

mercy should be spared.

Observers credit the relatively minimal tension that initially

existed between Pakistani Pakhtuns and the large number of

Pakhtun refugees from Afghanistan to the deeply felt obligation of Pakhtuns to obey the customary dictates of hospitality.

However, Pakistani Pakhtuns' frustration with the refugees

escalated after the Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan in

1989. Many Pakistani Pakhtuns were upset that the internecine

violence resulting from warring clans in conflict in Afghanistan was overflowing into Pakistan. In 1994 Pakistani Pakhtuns were

as eager as other Pakistanis to see the refugees return to Afghanistan.

Pakhtuns are organized into segmentary clans (called khels),

each named for a first migrant to their area to whom they trace their ancestry. Membership is tied to landownership as well as

to descent. A person who loses his land is no longer treated as a

full (adult) member of the community. He no longer mayjoin or speak in the tribal jirga, or council of tribal leaders, at which

issues of common interest are debated. But because brothers

divide property among themselves, rivalry builds among the

children of brothers who may need to subdivide increasingly

unequal portions of an original estate. Hence, a man's greatest

rival for women, money, and land (zan, zar, and zamin, respectively) is his first cousin—his father's brother's son—even though the same man may be his staunchest ally in the event of

attack from the outside. Lineages themselves have a notable

tendency to fragment; this tendency has contributed to the

existence of a number of well-established clans among the

110
The Society and Its Environment

Pakhtuns. At every level of Pakhtun social organization, groups

are split into a complex and shifting pattern of alliance and

enmity.

Most Pakhtuns are pious Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims, and

effective religious leaders often acquire a substantial following.

However, there is a basic ambivalence on the whole toward

mullahs (see Glossary), who have a formal role in leading

prayers and in taking care of the mosque.

An intensely egalitarian ethos exists among Pakhtun men in a clan; the tribal leader is considered the first among equals.

No man willingly admits himself less than any other's equal.

Nor will he, unless driven by the most dire circumstances, put

himself in a position of subservience or admit dependency on

another. This sense of equality is evident in the structure of the

men's council, composed of lineage elders who deal with matters ranging from disputes between local lineage sections to relations with other tribes or with the national government.

Although the council can make and enforce binding decisions,

within the body itself all are considered equals. To attempt or

to appear to coerce another is to give grave insult and to risk

initiating a feud.

To facilitate relations with Pakhtuns, the British appointed

maliks, or minor chiefs. Agreements in which Pakhtuns have

acceded to an external authority—whether the British or the

Pakistani government—have been tenuous. The British

resorted to a "divide and conquer" policy of playing various

feuding factions against one another. British hegemony was fre- quently precarious: in 1937 Pakhtuns wiped out an entire Brit- ish brigade. Throughout the 1930s, there were more troops

stationed in Waziristan (homeland of the Wazirs, among the

most independent of Pakhtun tribes) in the southern part of

the North-West Frontier Province than in the rest of the subcontinent.

In tribal areas, where the level of wealth is generally limited,

perennial feuding acts as a leveler. The killing, pillaging, and

destruction keep any one lineage from amassing too much

more than any other. In settled areas, the intensity of feuds has

declined, although everyone continues to be loyal to the ideals

of pakhtunwali. Government control only erratically contains

violence—depending on whether a given government official

has any relationship to the disputants. The proliferation of

guns—including clones of Uzis and Kalashnikovs—has exacer- bated much of the violence.

Ill
Pakistan: A Country Study

Since the 1980s, many Pakhtuns have entered the police

force, civil service, and military and have virtually taken over

the country's transportation network. A former president of

Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-93), is a Pakhtun, as are many high-ranking military officers. The government of Paki- stan has established numerous schools in the North-West Frontier Province—including ones devoted exclusively to girls—in an effort to imbue Pakhtuns with a sense of Pakistani nationalism.

A growing number of development projects in the NorthWest Frontier Province have provided diverse employment

opportunities for Pakhtuns. Notably, the government has set up comprehensive projects such as building roads and schools

as a substitution for cultivating opium poppies. Incentives for

industrial investment have also been provided. However, the

government lost much credibility when it proposed in 1991 (a

proposal soon withdrawn) to build up the local infrastructure

in the Gadoon-Amazai area of the North-West Frontier Province and to encourage it as a target for tax-free investment.

Observers attributed the government's withdrawal of the incentive package to local unrest. Sindhis

During the British Raj, Sindh, situated south of Punjab, was

the neglected hinterland of Bombay. The society was dominated by a small number of major landholders (waderas). Most

people were tenant farmers facing terms of contract that were

a scant improvement over outright servitude; a middle class

barely existed. The social landscape consisted largely of unremitting poverty, and feudal landlords ruled with little concern

for any outside interference. A series of irrigation projects in

the 1930s merely served to increase the wealth of large land- owners when their wastelands were made more productive.

Reformist legislation in the 1940s that was intended to improve

the lot of the poor had little success. At the time of independence, the province had entrenched extremes of wealth and

poverty.

There was considerable upheaval in Sindh in the years fol- lowing partition. Millions of Hindus and Sikhs left for India

and were replaced by roughly 7 million muhajirs, who took the

places of the fairly well-educated emigrant Hindus and Sikhs in

the commercial life of the province. Later, the muhajirs provided the political basis of the Refugee People's Movement

112
The Society and Its Environment

(Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz—MQM). As Karachi became increasingly identified as a muhajir city, other cities in Sindh, notably

Thatta, Hyderabad, and Larkana, became the headquarters for

Sindhi resistance. In 1994 Sindh continued to be an ethnic battlefield within

Pakistan. During the 1980s, there were repeated kidnappings

in the province, some with political provocation. Fear of dacoits (bandits) gave rise to the perception that the interior of

Sindh was unsafe for road and rail travel. Sectarian violence

against Hindus erupted in the interior in 1992 in the wake of

the destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, India, by

Hindu extremists who sought to rebuild a Hindu temple on the

contested site. A travel advisory recommending that foreigners

avoid the interior of the province remained in effect in early

1994.

Baloch

The final major ethnic group in Pakistan is the Baloch. A

comparatively small group, the Baloch, like the Pakhtuns, are a

tribal population whose original territory extends beyond the

national borders. Over 70 percent of the Baloch live in Pakistan, with the remainder in Iran and Afghanistan. The Baloch

trace their roots to tribes migrating eastward from around

Aleppo, in Syria, before the Christian era. Sometime between

the sixth century and the fourteenth century, they migrated to the region of present-day Balochistan.

Baloch speak Balochi, part of the Iranian group of IndoEuropean languages. Linguistic evidence indicates the origin

of Balochi to be in the pre-Christian Medean or Parthian civili- zations. The modern form has incorporated elements from

Persian, Sindhi, Arabic, and a number of other languages.

Beginning in the early nineteenth century, Baloch intellectuals

used Persian and Urdu scripts to transcribe Balochi into written form. Since Pakistan's independence, and with the rise of

Baloch nationalism, Baloch have favored the Nastaliq script, an

adaptation of Arabic script.

The land of Balochistan is exceedingly inhospitable; geologists have even compared the landscape with Mars. A Pakhtu

expression, reflecting on ethnic relations as well as on geography, describes Balochistan as "the dump where Allah shot the

rubbish of creation." Subsistence is hard in this environment

and is achieved by pastoral nomadism, dryland and irrigated

agriculture, and fishing. Dryland farming is marginal, although

113
Pakistan: A Country Study

it is a mainstay for many seminomadic herders. The Baloch

plant drought-resistant grains in earthen embankments where

scanty rainfall has accumulated.

Irrigated farming is concentrated near oases in two kinds of

systems: open channels that bring water from a few riverbeds,

and subsurface drains (karez) that channel groundwater downward to planted fields. However, such irrigation and cultivation are extremely limited, forcing most Baloch to eke out a living

by herding or farming in the marginal hinterland.

Sheep and goats are the main herd animals. The herder typically consumes the dairy products these animals produce and

sells the meat and wool. Pastoralists organize themselves

around water sources; wells are the property of specific camps.

Kinship and social relations reflect the exigencies of dealing

with the harsh physical environment. Like other Pakistanis,

Baloch reckon descent patrilineally. Lineages, however, play a minimal role in the lives of most Baloch. They are notably flex- ible in arrangements with both family and friends. Ideally, a man should maintain close ties with relatives in his father's line,

but in practice most relations are left to the discretion of the

individual, and there is wide variation. It is typical for lineages

to split and fragment, often because of disputes with close kin over matters such as inheritance and bad relations within marriages. Most Baloch treat both mother's and father's kin as a pool of potential assistance to be called on as the occasion

demands. Again, the precariousness of subsistence favors having the widest possible circle of friends and relatives.

Marriage patterns embody this kind of flexibility. As in many

parts of West Asia, Baloch say that they prefer to marry their

cousins. Actually, however, marriage choices are dictated by

pragmatic considerations. Residence, the complex means of

access to agricultural land, and the centrality of water rights,

coupled with uncertain water supply, all favor flexibility in the

choice of in-laws. The plethora of land tenure arrangements

tends to limit the value of marrying one's cousin, a marriage

pattern that functions to keep land in the family in other parts

of Pakistan.

The majority of Baloch are Hanafi Sunnis, but there is a community of an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Zikri Baloch,

who live in the coastal Makran area and in Karachi. The Zikris

believe in the fifteenth-century teachings of a madhi, an Islamic

messiah, named Nur Pak. These teachings, they believe, supersede those of the Prophet Muhammad—a violation of one of

114
Girlfrom Chitral

Courtesy Harvey Follender

Women and children in

Ziarat, Balochistan

Courtesy Anita M. Weiss

Islam's central tenets (see Basic Tenets of Islam, this ch.). Zikris

have their own daily prayers and do not fast during Ramadan

(known as Ramazan in Pakistan). By the Zikris' own self-estimation, they are devout Muslims. To the Sunni majority, however,

their beliefs are heretical.

Only among the coastal Baloch is marriage between cousins

common; there, nearly two-thirds of married couples are first cousins. The coastal Baloch are in greater contact with non- Baloch and manifest a concomitantly greater sense of group

solidarity. For them, being "unified amongst ourselves" is a particularly potent cultural ideal. Because they are Zikris, they

have a limited pool of eligible mates and do not generally

marry outside of the group of Zikri Baloch.

Baloch society is stratified and has been characterized as "feudal militarism." The significant social tie is that between a

leader, the hakim, and his retinue, consisting of pastoralists,

agriculturists, lower-level leaders, and lower-level tenant farmers and descendants of former slaves (hizmatkar) . Suprafamily

groups formed through patrilineal descent are significant

115
Pakistan: A Country Study

mostly for the elite hakim, whose concern for rivalry and politics is not shared by other groups.

The basic exchange traditionally underlying this elaborate

system was the hakims offer of booty or property rights in

return for support in battle. In more modern times, various

favors are generally traded for votes, but the structure of the

system—the participation of the lower-level leaders and the hiz- matkar through patron-client ties—remains much the same.

In common with the neighboring Pakhtuns, Baloch are deeply committed to maintaining their personal honor, showing generous hospitality to guests, and giving protection to those who seek it of them. However, the prototypical relationship is that between the leader and his minions. A Baloch suf- fers no loss of status in submitting to another. Although

competition for scarce water and land resources characterizes

social relations between minor leaders and hizmatkar, competition coexists with a deeply held belief in the virtues of sharing

and cooperation. Sharing creates networks of obligation

among herders, mutual aid being an insurance policy in the

face of a precarious livelihood.

Baloch tribal structure concentrates power in the hands of

local tribal leaders. The British played local rivals against each

other in a policy of indirect rule, as they did with the Pakhtun

tribes to the north—and virtually throughout the subcontinent. In essence, the British offered local autonomy and subsidies to rulers in exchange for access to the border with

Afghanistan. In the early 1990s, local leaders maintained this

policy to a large extent, continuing to exploit the endemic

anarchy, whether local, provincial, or national.

There have been sporadic separatist movements in

Balochistan since independence. Baloch have long been accus- tomed to indirect rule, a policy that leaves local elites with a

substantial measure of autonomy. The 1970s saw a precipitous

deterioration in relations between Balochistan and the central

government, however. The violent confrontation between

Baloch insurgents and the Pakistani military in the mid-1970s was particularly brutal (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System, ch. 1). The conflict touched the lives of

most Baloch and politicized those long accustomed to accepting the status quo. Original demands for greater regional

autonomy escalated into a full-scale movement aimed at restructuring the government along confederal lines. By the

mid-1980s, traditional cleavages among hakim, minor leaders,

116
The Society and Its Environment

and hizmatkar had declined in importance as the Baloch

increasingly thought of themselves as a unified group in opposition to Pakistani, or Punjabi, hegemony.

Zia ul-Haq's overthrow of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977 was welcomed by many in Balochistan, in contrast to popular sentiment in the rest of the country, which was appalled by the

extraconstitutional act. As relations with the central government began to smooth out, however, the Soviet Union invaded

Afghanistan in December 1979, placing nearly the entire

northern border of Balochistan on alert as a frontline area. Balochistan's landscape in the 1980s changed markedly as Afghan refugee camps were established throughout the north- ern parts of the province. In many instances, temporary mud

housing eventually became transformed into concrete structures. The refugees also caused the demographic balance to change as ethnic Pakhtuns—many refugees from Afghanistan—came to settle in Balochistan.

Although social conditions in rural areas have changed little for most Baloch, two scandals in the early 1990s caused the

region to receive much attention. The first grew out of reports

that some owners of brick kilns in remote parts of the province

had labor practices that resembled slavery, complete with

indenturing workers to loans that were passed down through

generations. The second was the charge that young boys were

being recruited from the most remote parts of the province to be "camel boys" in races in the Persian Gulf states. The screaming of the young boys, who are tied to the backs of racing camels, supposedly scares the animals into running faster. The

young boys often are maimed or killed in the process. Impoverished parents unwittingly accepted payment on the promise

that their sons would be employed as apprentices.

Because of the area's limited population and its low population density levels, there has been little development in

Balochistan except in Quetta, the capital of the province. The

rural programs that exist stem mostly from the efforts of the

Agha Khan Rural Support Development Project, an NGO that

has expanded into rural Balochistan on the basis of its successes in the mountains around Gilgit, in the far north of the

country. This project works on organizing disparate communities into local support groups and has had particular success in

reaching women in remote areas of Balochistan.

117
Pakistan: A Country Study

Men, Women, and the Division of Space

Gender relations in Pakistan rest on two basic perceptions:

that women are subordinate to men, and that a man's honor

resides in the actions of the women of his family. Thus, as in

other orthodox Muslim societies, women are responsible for

maintaining the family honor. To ensure that they do not dis- honor their families, society limits women's mobility, places

restrictions on their behavior and activities, and permits them

only limited contact with the opposite sex. Space is allocated to and used differently by men and

women. For their protection and respectability, women have

traditionally been expected to live under the constraints of purdah (purdah is Persian for curtain), most obvious in veiling. By

separating women from the activities of men, both physically

and symbolically, purdah creates differentiated male and

female spheres. Most women spend the major part of their lives physically within their homes and courtyards and go out only

for serious and approved reasons. Outside the home, social life generally revolves around the activities of men. In most parts of

the country, except perhaps in Islamabad, Karachi, and wealthier parts of a few other cities, people consider a woman—and

her family—to be shameless if no restrictions are placed on her

mobility.

Purdah is practiced in various ways, depending on family tra- dition, region, class, and rural or urban residence, but

nowhere do unrelated men and women mix freely. The most

extreme restraints are found in parts of the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan, where women almost never

leave their homes except when they marry and almost never meet unrelated men. They may not be allowed contact with

male cousins on their mother's side, for these men are not

classed as relatives in a strongly patrilineal society. Similarly,

they have only very formal relations with those men they are allowed to meet, such as the father-in-law, paternal uncles, and

brothers-in-law.

Poor rural women, especially in Punjab and Sindh, where

gender relations are generally somewhat more relaxed, have

greater mobility because they are responsible for transplanting

rice seedlings, weeding crops, raising chickens and selling eggs,

and stuffing wool or cotton into comforters (razais). When a family becomes more prosperous and begins to aspire to higher status, it commonly requires stricter purdah among its women as a first social change.

118
The Society and Its Environment

Poor urban women in close-knit communities, such as the

old cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi, generally wear either a burqa (fitted body veil) or a chador (loosely draped cotton

cloth used as a head covering and body veil) when they leave

their homes. In these localities, multistory dwellings (havelis) were constructed to accommodate large extended families.

Many havelis have now been sectioned off into smaller living

units to economize. It is common for one nuclear family (with an average of seven members) to live in one or two rooms on

each small floor. In less densely populated areas, where people

generally do not know their neighbors, there are fewer restrictions on women's mobility.

The shared understanding that women should remain

within their homes so neighbors do not gossip about their

respectability has important implications for their productive

activities. As with public life in general, work appears to be the

domain of men. Rural women work for consumption or for

exchange at the subsistence level. Others, both rural and

urban, do piecework for very low wages in their homes. Their

earnings are generally recorded as part of the family income

that is credited to men. Census data and other accounts of eco- nomic activity in urban areas support such conclusions. For

example, the 1981 census reported that 5.6 percent of all women were employed, as opposed to 72.4 percent of men; less than 4 percent of all urban women were engaged in some form

of salaried work. By 1988 this figure had increased significantly,

but still only 10.2 percent of women were reported as participating in the labor force.

Among wealthier Pakistanis, urban or rural residence is less important than family tradition in influencing whether women

observe strict purdah and in determining the type of veil they

wear. In some areas, women simply observe "eye purdah": they

tend not to mix with men, but when they do, they avert their

eyes when interacting with them. Bazaars in wealthier areas of

Punjabi cities differ from those in poorer areas by having a greater proportion of unveiled women. In cities throughout

the North-West Frontier Province, Balochistan, and the interior

of Sindh, bazaars are markedly devoid of women, and when a woman does venture forth, she always wears some sort of veil. The traditional division of space between the sexes is perpetuated in the broadcast media. Women's subservience is consistently shown on television and in films. And, although popular

television dramas raise controversial issues such as women

119
Pakistan: A Country Study

working, seeking divorce, or even having a say in family politics,

the programs often suggest that the woman who strays from tra- ditional norms faces insurmountable problems and becomes

alienated from her family.

The Status of Women and the Women's Movement

Four important challenges confronted women in Pakistan in

the early 1990s: increasing practical literacy, gaining access to employment opportunities at all levels in the economy, promoting change in the perception of women's roles and status,

and gaining a public voice both within and outside of the political process.

There have been various attempts at social and legal reform

aimed at improving Muslim women's lives in the subcontinent

during the twentieth century. These attempts generally have

been related to two broader, intertwined movements: the social

reform movement in British India and the growing Muslim

nationalist movement. Since partition, the changing status of

women in Pakistan largely has been linked with discourse

about the role of Islam in a modern state. This debate concerns the extent to which civil rights common in most Western

democracies are appropriate in an Islamic society and the way

these rights should be reconciled with Islamic family law. Muslim reformers in the nineteenth century struggled to introduce female education, to ease some of the restrictions on women's activities, to limit polygyny, and to ensure women's

rights under Islamic law. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan convened the

Mohammedan Educational Conference in the 1870s to promote modern education for Muslims, and he founded the

Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College. Among the predominantly male participants were many of the earliest proponents

of education and improved social status for women. They advocated cooking and sewing classes conducted in a religious

framework to advance women's knowledge and skills and to reinforce Islamic values. But progress in women's literacy was

slow: by 1921 only four out of every 1,000 Muslim females were

literate. Promoting the education of women was a first step in moving beyond the constraints imposed by purdah. The nationalist

struggle helped fray the threads in that socially imposed curtain. Simultaneously, women's roles were questioned, and their

empowerment was linked to the larger issues of nationalism

and independence. In 1937 the Muslim Personal Law restored

120
People sleeping on rooftops, Lohari Gate, Lahore

Courtesy Anita M. Weiss

rights (such as inheritance of property) that had been lost by

women under the Anglicization of certain civil laws. As independence neared, it appeared that the state would give priority

to empowering women. Pakistan's founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, said in a speech in 1944:

No nation can rise to the height of glory unless your

women are side by side with you; we are victims of

evil customs. It is a crime against humanity that our women are shut up within the four walls of the

houses as prisoners. There is no sanction anywhere

for the deplorable condition in which our women

have to live. After independence, elite Muslim women in Pakistan continued to advocate women's political empowerment through legal

reforms. They mobilized support that led to passage of the

Muslim Personal Law of Sharia in 1948, which recognized a woman's right to inherit all forms of property. They were also

121
Pakistan: A Country Study

behind the futile attempt to have the government include a Charter of Women's Rights in the 1956 constitution. The 1961

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance covering marriage and divorce,

the most important sociolegal reform that they supported, is

still widely regarded as empowering to women.

Two issues—promotion of women's political representation

and accommodation between Muslim family law and democratic civil rights—came to dominate discourse about women

and sociolegal reform. The second issue gained considerable

attention during the regime of Zia ul-Haq (1977-88). Urban

women formed groups to protect their rights against apparent

discrimination under Zia's Islamization program. It was in the

highly visible realm of law that women were able to articulate

their objections to the Islamization program initiated by the

government in 1979. Protests against the 1979 Enforcement of

Hudood Ordinances focused on the failure of hudood (see

Glossary) ordinances to distinguish between adultery (zina)

and rape (zina-bil-jabr) . A man could be convicted of zina only if he were actually observed committing the offense by other

men, but a woman could be convicted simply because she

became pregnant.

The Women's Action Forum was formed in 1981 to respond

to the implementation of the penal code and to strengthen

women's position in society generally. The women in the

forum, most of whom came from elite families, perceived that

many of the laws proposed by the Zia government were discriminatory and would compromise their civil status. In Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad the group agreed on collective

leadership and formulated policy statements and engaged in

political action to safeguard women's legal position.

The Women's Action Forum has played a central role in

heightening the controversy regarding various interpretations

of Islamic law and its role in a modern state, and in publicizing

ways in which women can play a more active role in politics. Its members led public protests in the mid-1980s against the promulgation of the Law of Evidence. Although the final version

was substantially modified, the Women's Action Forum

objected to the legislation because it gave unequal weight to testimony by men and women in financial cases. Fundamentally, they objected to the assertion that women and men can- not participate as legal equals in economic affairs. Beginning in August 1986, the Women's Action Forum

members and their supporters led a debate over passage of the

122
The Society and Its Environment

Shariat Bill, which decreed that all laws in Pakistan should con- form to Islamic law. They argued that the law would undermine the principles ofjustice, democracy, and fundamental

rights of citizens, and they pointed out that Islamic law would

become identified solely with the conservative interpretation

supported by Zia's government. Most activists felt that the Shariat Bill had the potential to negate many of the rights women

had won. In May 1991, a compromise version of the Shariat Bill was adopted, but the debate over whether civil law or Islamic

law should prevail in the country continued in the early 1990s.

Discourse about the position of women in Islam and

women's roles in a modern Islamic state was sparked by the

government's attempts to formalize a specific interpretation of

Islamic law. Although the issue of evidence became central to the concern for women's legal status, more mundane matters

such as mandatory dress codes for women and whether females

could compete in international sports competitions were also

being argued.

Another of the challenges faced by Pakistani women concerns their integration into the labor force. Because of eco- nomic pressures and the dissolution of extended families in

urban areas, many more women are working for wages than in

the past. But by 1990 females officially made up only 13 percent of the labor force. Restrictions on their mobility limit their

opportunities, and traditional notions of propriety lead families to conceal the extent of work performed by women.

Usually, only the poorest women engage in work—often as midwives, sweepers, or nannies—for compensation outside the

home. More often, poor urban women remain at home and

sell manufactured goods to a middleman for compensation.

More and more urban women have engaged in such activities

during the 1990s, although to avoid being shamed, few families

willingly admit that women contribute to the family economically. Hence, there is little information about the work women

do. On the basis of the predominant fiction that most women

do no work other than their domestic chores, the government

has been hesitant to adopt overt policies to increase women's

employment options and to provide legal support for women's

labor-force participation.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) commissioned a national study in 1992 on women's economic activity to enable policy planners and donor agencies to cut through

the existing myths on female labor-force participation. The

123
Pakistan: A Country Study

study addresses the specific reasons that the assessment of

women's work in Pakistan is rilled with discrepancies and

underenumeration and provides a comprehensive discussion

of the range of informal-sector work performed by women

throughout the country. Information from this study was also

incorporated into the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98).

A melding of the traditional social welfare activities of the

women's movement and its newly revised political activism

appears to have occurred. Diverse groups, including the

Women's Action Forum, the All-Pakistan Women's Association,

the Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association, and the Business

and Professional Women's Association, are supporting smallscale projects throughout the country that focus on empowering women. They have been involved in such activities as insti- tuting legal aid for indigent women, opposing the gendered

segregation of universities, and publicizing and condemning

the growing incidents of violence against women. The Pakistan

Women Lawyers' Association has released a series of films educating women about their legal rights; the Business and Professional Women's Association is supporting a comprehensive

project inside Yakki Gate, a poor area inside the walled old city

of Lahore; and the Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi has promoted networks among women who work at home so they

need not be dependent on middlemen to acquire raw materials and to market the clothes they produce.

The women's movement has shifted from reacting to government legislation to focusing on three primary goals: securing

women's political representation in the National Assembly;

working to raise women's consciousness, particularly about

family planning; and countering suppression of women's rights

by defining and articulating positions on events as they occur

in order to raise public awareness. An as yet unresolved issue concerns the perpetuation of a set number of seats for women

in the National Assembly. Many women activists whose expectations were raised during the brief tenure of Benazir Bhutto's

first government (December 1988-August 1990) now believe

that, with her return to power in October 1993, they can seize

the initiative to bring about a shift in women's personal and

public access to power

Religious Life

About 97 percent of all Pakistanis are Muslims. Official documentation states that Sunni Muslims constitute 77 percent of

124
The Society and Its Environment

the population and that adherents of Shia (see Glossary) Islam

make up an additional 20 percent. Christians, Hindus, and

members of other religions each account for about 1 percent

of the population.

Basic Tenets of Islam

The central belief in Islam is that there is only one God,

Allah, and that the Prophet Muhammad was his final messenger. Muhammad is held to be the "seal of the prophets." Islam

is derived from the Judeo-Christian tradition and regards Abraham (Ibrahim) and Jesus (Isa) as prophets and recognizes the

validity of the Old Testament and New Testament.

Islam is held to be the blueprint for humanity that God has

created. The word Islam comes from aslama (to submit), and

the one who submits—a Muslim—is a believer who achieves

peace, or salaam. God, the creator, is invisible and omnipresent; to represent God in any form is a sin. The Prophet was born in A.D. 570 and became a merchant

in the Arabian town of Mecca. At the age of forty, he began to receive a series of revelations from God transmitted through

the angel Gabriel. His monotheistic message, which disdained

the idolatry that was popularly practiced at the Kaaba (now in

the Great Mosque and venerated as a shrine of Muslim pilgrimage) in Mecca at that time, was ridiculed by the town's leaders.

Muhammad and his followers were forced to emigrate in 622 to the nearby town of Yathrib, later known as Medina, or "the

city." This move, the hijra, marks the beginning of the Islamic

era. In the ten years before his death in 632, the Prophet con- tinued preaching and receiving revelations, ultimately consolidating both the temporal and the spiritual leadership of

Arabia.

The Quran, the holy scripture of Islam, plays a pivotal role in

Muslim social organization and values. The Quran, which liter- ally means "reciting," is recognized by believers as truly the

word of God, and as such it is eternal, absolute, and irrevocable. The fact that Muhammad was the last of the prophets and

that no further additions to "the word" are allowed is signifi- cant; it closes the door to new revelations.

That there can be no authorized translation of the Quran in

any language other than the original, Arabic, is crucial to its unifying importance. Cultural differences such as those that

exist among various Muslim groups throughout the world can- not compromise the unifying role that the religion plays.

125
Pakistan: A Country Study

The Prophet's life is considered exemplary. His active

engagement in worldly activities established precedents for

Muslims to follow. These precedents, referred to as the hadith,

include the statements, actions, and moods or feelings of the

Prophet. Although many hadith are popularly accepted by

most Muslims, there is no one canon accepted by all. Such

things as the way in which Muhammad ran the state in Medina

and the priority he placed on education remain important

guidelines. The Quran and the hadith together form the sunna

(see Glossary) , a comprehensive guide to spiritual, ethical, and

social living.

The five pillars of Islam consist of certain beliefs and acts to which a Muslim must adhere to affirm membership in the community. The first is the shahada (testimony), the affirmation of

the faith, which succinctly states the central belief of Islam:

"There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his

Prophet." To become a Muslim, one needs only to recite this

statement. Second is salat, the obligation for a Muslim to pray

at five set times during the day. Muslims value prayers recited

communally, especially the midday prayers on Friday, the Muslim sabbath. Mosques have emerged as important social and

political centers as a by-product of this unifying value. The

third pillar of Islam is zakat, the obligation to provide alms for

the poor and disadvantaged (see Zakat as a Welfare System, this

ch.). The fourth is sawm, the obligation to fast from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan, in commemoration

of the beginning of the Prophet's revelations from Allah. The

final pillar is the expectation that every adult Muslim physically

and financially able to do so perform the hajj, the pilgrimage

to Mecca, at least once in his or her lifetime. The pilgrimage

occurs during the last month of the Muslim lunar calendar, just over a month after the end of Ramadan. Its social importance

as a unifier of the greater Muslim umma (community of believers) has led to the establishment of hajj committees for its regulation in every Muslim country. The pilgrimage of a Muslim to the sacred places at any other time of the year is referred to as umra (visitation). At various times of political crisis in Pakistan,

almost every major leader has left for Saudi Arabia to perform

umra. Performing umra may or may not increase the politician's

reputation for moral standing.

A number of other elements contribute to a sense of social

membership whereby Muslims see themselves as distinct from

non-Muslims, including prohibition on the consumption of

126
The Society and Its Environment

pork and alcohol, the requirement that animals be slaughtered

in a ritual manner, and the obligation to circumcise sons. Another element is jihad, the "striving." Jihad is often misunderstood in the West, where people think of it as a fanatical

holy war. There are two kinds ofjihad: the far more important

inner one is the battle each Muslim wages with his or her lower

self; the outer one is the battle that each Muslim must wage to preserve the faith and its followers. People who fight the outer

jihad are mujahidin. The Afghan rebels waging an insurrection

against the Soviet-backed government in the 1980s deftly used

this term to identify themselves and hence infused their struggle with a moral dimension.

The concept of predestination in Islam is different from that

in Christianity. Islam posits the existence of an all-powerful

force (Allah) who rules the universe and knows all things.

Something will happeninshaallah—if it is God's will. The concept is not purely fatalistic, for although people are responsible

to God for their actions, these actions are not predestined.

Instead, God has shown the world the right way to live as revealed through the Quran; then it is up to individual believ- ers to choose how to live. There are two major sects in Islam—the Sunnis and the Shia.

They are differentiated by Sunni acceptance of the temporal

authority of the Rashudin Caliphate (Abu Bakr, Omar, Usman,

and Ali) after the death of the Prophet and the Shia acceptance solely of Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his

daughter, Fatima, and his descendants. Over time, the Sunni

sect divided into four major schools ofjurisprudence; of these,

the Hanafi school is predominant in Pakistan. The Shia sect

split over the matter of succession, resulting in two major

groups: the majority Twelve Imam Shia believe that there are

twelve rightful imams, Ali and his eleven direct descendants. A

second Shia group, the numerically smaller Ismaili community,

known also as Seveners, follows a line of imams that originally

challenged the Seventh Imam and supported a younger

brother, Ismail. The Ismaili line of leaders has been continuous

down to the present day. The current leader, Sadr ad Din Agha

Khan, who is active in international humanitarian efforts, is a

direct descendant of Ali. Islam in Pakistani Society

Islam was brought to the South Asian subcontinent in the

eighth century by wandering Sufi (see Glossary) mystics known

127
Pakistan: A Country Study

as pir (see Glossary). As in other areas where it was introduced

by Sufis, Islam to some extent syncretized with pre-Islamic

influences, resulting in a religion traditionally more flexible

than in the Arab world. Two Sufis whose shrines receive much

national attention are Data Ganj Baksh in Lahore (ca. eleventh

century) and Shahbaz Qalander in Sehwan, Sindh (ca. twelfth

century).

The Muslim poet-philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal first proposed the idea of a Muslim state in the subcontinent in his

address to the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930. His proposal referred to the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh,

Balochistan, and the North-West Frontier Province—essentially

what would became post-1971 Pakistan. Iqbal's idea gave concrete form to the "Two Nations Theory" of two distinct nations

in the subcontinent based on religion (Islam and Hinduism)

and with different historical backgrounds, social customs, cultures, and social mores.

Islam was thus the basis for the creation and the unification

of a separate state, but it was not expected to serve as the

model of government. Mohammad Ali Jinnah made his com- mitment to secularism in Pakistan clear in his inaugural

address when he said, "You will find that in the course of time

Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citi- zens of the State." This vision of a Muslim majority state in

which religious minorities would share equally in its development was questioned shortly after independence. The debate

continued into the 1990s amid questions of the rights of

Ahmadiyyas (a small but influential sect considered by orthodox Muslims to be outside the pale of Islam), issuance of identity cards denoting religious affiliation, and government

intervention in the personal practice of Islam (see Constitutional Beginnings, ch. 1; Islamic Provisions, ch. 5).

Politicized Islam

From the outset, politics and religion have been intertwined

both conceptually and practically in Islam. Because the

Prophet established a government in Medina, precedents of

governance and taxation exist. Through the history of Islam,

from the Ummayyad (661-750) and Abbasid empires (750-

1258) to the Mughals (1526-1858) and the Ottomans (1300-

1923), religion and statehood have been treated as one.

128
The Society and Its Environment

Indeed, one of the beliefs of Islam is that the purpose of the

state is to provide an environment where Muslims can properly

practice their religion. If a leader fails in this, the people have a

right to depose him.

In 1977 the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto outlawed

alcohol and changed the "day off from Sunday to Friday, but

no substantive Islamic reform program was implemented prior

to General Zia's Islamization program. Starting in February

1979, new penal measures based on Islamic principles ofjustice

went into effect. These carried considerably greater implications for women than for men. A welfare and taxation system

based on zakat and a profit-and-loss banking system were also

established in accordance with Islamic prohibitions against

usury (see Policy Developments since Independence, ch. 3).

Zia's Islamization program was pursued within a rather complicated ideological framework. His stance was in contrast to the popular culture, in which most people are "personally" very

religious but not "publicly" religious. An unexpected outcome

was that by relying on a policy grounded in Islam, the state fomented factionalism: by legislating what is Islamic and what

is not, Islam itself could no longer provide unity because it was

then being defined to exclude previously included groups. Disputes between Sunnis and Shia, ethnic disturbances in Karachi

among Pakhtuns, Sindhis, and muhajirs, increased animosity

toward Ahmadiyyas, and the revival of Punjab-Sindh tensions can all be traced to the loss of Islam as a common vocabulary of

public morality. More profoundly, in a move that reached into

every home, the state had attempted to dictate a specific ideal

image of women in Islamic society, an ideal that was largely

antithetical to that existing in popular sentiment and in everyday life. A major component of the Islamization program, the Shariat

Bill, was passed in May 1991. This bill required that all laws in

the country conform to Islam. Women's groups in particular were concerned that the reforms in the Muslim Family Laws

Ordinance of 1961 could be jeopardized by the new bill. A controversial law, Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal

Code, drew a great deal of attention from critics associated with

the Human Rights Commission in 1993-94. Introduced in

1986 by Zia, the law, referred to as "the blasphemy trap," states that "whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible

representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation,

directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Prophet

129
Pakistan: A Country Study

Muhammad shall be punished with death or imprisoned for

life and shall be liable to fine." The law extends to Muslims and

non-Muslims alike, but it has been indiscriminately used

against members of minorities. According to Amnesty International, several dozen people had been charged under Pakistan's blasphemy laws by early 1994. In all cases, these charges

appear to have been arbitrarily brought and to have been

based on an individual's minority religious beliefs or on malicious accusations. The current government of Benazir Bhutto,

sensitive to Pakistan's image in the world community, has

attempted to approve changes in the blasphemy law in order to "curb abuses of the law"—especially those involving false accusations and fabricated cases. Critics claim, however, that Benazir, constantly under attack for being too liberal by the religious

right, has been overly cautious and slow to introduce amendments to the law. Non-Muslim Minorities

The most visible groups of non-Muslim minorities are Hindus and Christians. Hindus are found largely in the interior of

Sindh and in the vicinity of Quetta in Balochistan. Christians,

representing almost all West European dominations, are found

throughout the country; many are engaged in menial work.

Other minorities include Zoroastrians (also called Parsis),

largely concentrated in Karachi, and members of groups relatively recently designated as non-Muslim, notably the Ahmadiyyas.The Ahmadiyyas are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (ca.

1840-1908), who founded the sect in Qadian, India, in 1901.

Ahmad's adherents are often called Qadianis. Mirza Ghulam

Ahmad claimed to have received a revelation from God, and

such a claim, argue orthodox Muslims, violates a central tenet

of Islam that Muhammad is the final prophet. Orthodox ulama

therefore consider the Ahmadiyyas apostates.

As a group, the Ahmadiyyas are highly organized and have a marked degree of community spirit. They are characteristically

ascetic in their personal lives; they bring to their vision of Islam

the reforming zeal of some of the fundamentalists. They seek

to re-create the glories of the early caliphs. Ahmadiyyas strictly

adhere to purdah. They are accustomed to running their own

schools and welfare institutions.

The Ahmadiyyas' high literacy rate, as well as their general

industriousness, has won them a substantial measure of eco130
The Society and Its Environment

nomic success and public prominence. As a result, they frequently have been the object of envy. In 1953 there were antiAhmadiyya riots, which resulted in the first imposition of martial law, albeit local and temporary. Sunnis called for the firing

of prominent Ahmadiyya officeholders and demanded that the

sect be declared non-Muslim. Anti-Ahmadiyya sentiment

stirred again in the mid-1970s. Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto capitulated to popular demands, and the sect was

declared non-Muslim. In 1984 President Zia ul-Haq, reacting to

calls for violence against the Ahmadiyyas by disaffected ulama,

placed additional legal restrictions on the community. The

Ahmadiyya question is likely to persist in the Islamic state of

Pakistan, where the question of who is a Muslim is of such crucial importance.

The various religious minority groups have secured separate

representation in national and provincial assemblies but still have limited influence on national policy. They finally united

around a common issue in October 1992 when the government of Mian Nawaz Sharif decreed that religious affiliation

would be indicated on identity cards. These cards were needed

for a range of activities, including attending school, opening a bank account, registering to vote, casting a vote, and obtaining

a passport. Members of minority groups organized demonstrations to protest this discrimination, which they argued would

demote them to the ranks of second-class citizens. They argued

that safeguards existed for them both within Islamic law and in

the promises that had been made to them in 1947 at independence. The government soon rescinded the decree.

Education

At independence, Pakistan had a poorly educated population and few schools or universities. Although the education

system has expanded greatly since then, debate continues

about the curriculum, and, except in a few elite institutions,

quality remained a crucial concern of educators in the early

1990s.

Adult literacy is low, but improving. In 1992 more than 36

percent of adults over fifteen were literate, compared with 21

percent in 1970. The rate of improvement is highlighted by the

50 percent literacy achieved among those aged fifteen to nineteen in 1990. School enrollment also increased, from 19 percent of those aged six to twenty-three in 1980 to 24 percent in

1990. However, by 1992 the population over twenty-five had a

131
Pakistan: A Country Study

mean of only 1.9 years of schooling. This fact explains the minimal criteria for being considered literate: having the ability to both read and write (with understanding) a short, simple state- ment on everyday life. Relatively limited resources have been allocated to education, although there has been improvement in recent decades.

In 1960 public expenditure on education was only 1.1 percent

of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary); by 1990

the figure had risen to 3.4 percent. This amount compared

poorly with the more than 30 percent being spent on defense

in 1993. In 1990 Pakistan was tied for fourth place in the world

in its ratio of military expenditures to health and education

expenditures. Although the government enlisted the assistance

of various international donors in the education efforts out- lined in its Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93), the results did

not measure up to expectations.

Structure of the System

Education is organized into five levels: primary (grades one

through five); middle (grades six through eight); high (grades

nine and ten, culminating in matriculation); intermediate

(grades eleven and twelve, leading to an F.A. diploma in arts or an F.S. in science); and university programs leading to undergraduate and advanced degrees. Preparatory classes (kachi, or

nursery) were formally incorporated into the system in 1988

with the Seventh Five-Year Plan.

Academic and technical education institutions are the

responsibility of the federal Ministry of Education, which coor- dinates instruction through the intermediate level. Above that

level, a designated university in each province is responsible for

coordination of instruction and examinations. In certain cases, a different ministry may oversee specialized programs. Universities enjoy limited autonomy; their finances are overseen by a

University Grants Commission, as in Britain.

Teacher-training workshops are overseen by the respective

provincial education ministries in order to improve teaching

skills. However, incentives are severely lacking, and, perhaps

because of the shortage of financial support to education, few

teachers participate. Rates of absenteeism among teachers are high in general, inducing support for community-coordinated

efforts promoted in the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-98).

In 1991 there were 87,545 primary schools, 189,200 primary

school teachers, and 7,768,000 students enrolled at the pri132
The Society and Its Environment

mary level, with a student-to-teacher ratio of forty-one to one.

Just over one-third of all children of primary school age were

enrolled in a school in 1989. There were 11,978 secondary

schools, 154,802 secondary school teachers, and 2,995,000 stu- dents enrolled at the secondary level, with a student-to-teacher

ratio of nineteen to one. Primary school dropout rates remained fairly consistent in

the 1970s and 1980s, at just over 50 percent for boys and 60

percent for girls. The middle school dropout rates for boys and

girls rose from 22 percent in 1976 to about 33 percent in 1983.

However, a noticeable shift occurred in the beginning of the

1980s regarding the postprimary dropout rate: whereas boys

and girls had relatively equal rates (14 percent) in 1975, by

1979—-just as Zia initiated his government's Islamization program—the dropout rate for boys was 25 percent while for girls

it was only 16 percent. By 1993 this trend had dramatically

reversed, and boys had a dropout rate of only 7 percent compared with the girls' rate of 15 percent.

The Seventh Five-Year Plan envisioned that every child five years old and above would have access to either a primary

school or a comparable, but less comprehensive, mosque

school. However, because of financial constraints, this goal was

not achieved.

In drafting the Eighth Five-Year Plan in 1992, the government therefore reiterated the need to mobilize a large share of

national resources to finance education. To improve access to schools, especially at the primary level, the government sought

to decentralize and democratize the design and implementation of its education strategy. To give parents a greater voice in

running schools, it planned to transfer control of primary and

secondary schools to NGOs. The government also intended to gradually make all high schools, colleges, and universities

autonomous, although no schedule was specified for achieving

this ambitious goal.

Female Education

Comparison of data for men and women reveals a significant

disparity in educational attainment. By 1992, among people

older than fifteen years of age, 22 percent of women were liter- ate, compared with 49 percent of men. The comparatively slow

rate of improvement for women is reflected in the fact that

between 1980 and 1989, among women aged fifteen to twentyfour, 25 percent were literate. United Nations sources say that

133
Pakistan: A Country Study

in 1990 for every 100 girls of primary school age there were

only thirty in school; among girls of secondary school age, only

thirteen out of 100 were in school; and among girls of the third

level, grades nine and ten, only 1.5 out of 100 were in school.

Slightly higher estimates by the National Education Council for

1990 stated that 2.5 percent of students—3 percent of men and

2 percent of women—between the ages of seventeen and

twenty-one were enrolled at the degree level. Among all people

over twenty-five in 1992, women averaged a mere 0.7 year of

schooling compared with an average of 2.9 years for men. The discrepancy between rural and urban areas is even more

marked. In 1981 only 7 percent of women in rural areas were

literate, compared with 35 percent in urban areas. Among

men, these rates were 27 and 57 percent, respectively. Pakistan's low female literacy rates are particularly confounding

because these rates are analogous to those of some of the poorest countries in the world.

Pakistan has never had a systematic, nationally coordinated

effort to improve female primary education, despite its poor

standing. It was once assumed that the reasons behind low

female school enrollments were cultural, but research con- ducted by the Ministry for Women's Development and a number of international donor agencies in the 1980s revealed that

danger to a woman's honor was parents' most crucial concern. Indeed, reluctance to accept schooling for women turned to enthusiasm when parents in rural Punjab and rural

Balochistan could be guaranteed their daughters' safety and,

hence, their honor.

Reform Efforts

Three initiatives characterized reform efforts in education

in the late 1980s and early 1990s: privatization of schools that

had been nationalized in the 1970s; a return to English as the

medium of instruction in the more elite of these privatized

schools, reversing the imposition of Urdu in the 1970s; and

continuing emphasis on Pakistan studies and Islamic studies in

the curriculum.

Until the late 1970s, a disproportionate amount of educational spending went to the middle and higher levels. Education in the colonial era had been geared to staffing the civil service and producing an educated elite that shared the values

of and was loyal to the British. It was unabashedly elitist, and

contemporary education—reforms and commissions on

134
The Society and Its Environment

reform notwithstanding—has retained the same quality. This

fact is evident in the glaring gap in educational attainment

between the country's public schools and the private schools,

which were nationalized in the late 1970s in a move intended

to facilitate equal access. Whereas students from lower-class

backgrounds did gain increased access to these private schools

in the 1980s and 1990s, teachers and school principals alike

bemoaned the decline in the quality of education. Meanwhile,

it appears that a greater proportion of children of the elites are

traveling abroad not only for university education but also for

their high school diplomas.

The extension of literacy to greater numbers of people has

spurred the working class to aspire to middle-class goals such as owning an automobile, taking summer vacations, and providing a daughter with a once-inconceivable dowry at the time of

marriage. In the past, Pakistan was a country that the landlords

owned, the army ruled, and the bureaucrats governed, and it drew most of its elite from these three groups. In the 1990s,

however, the army and the civil service were drawing a greater

proportion of educated members from poor backgrounds than

ever before.

One of the education reforms of the 1980s was an increase

in the number of technical schools throughout the country.

Those schools that were designated for females included hostels nearby to provide secure housing for female students.

Increasing the number of technical schools was a response to the high rate of underemployment that had been evident since

the early 1970s. The Seventh Five-Year Plan aimed to increase

the share of students going to technical and vocational institutions to over 33 percent by increasing the number of polytechnics, commercial colleges, and vocational training centers.

Although the numbers of such institutions did increase, a compelling need to expand vocational training persisted in early

1994.

Health and Welfare

In 1992 some 35 million Pakistanis, or about 30 percent of

the population, were unable to afford nutritionally adequate

food or to afford any nonfood items at all. Of these, 24.3 million lived in rural areas, where they constituted 29 percent of

the population. Urban areas, with one-third of the national

population, had a poverty rate of 26 percent.

135
Pakistan: A Country Study

Between 1985 and 1991, about 85 percent of rural residents

and 100 percent of urban dwellers had access to some kind of

Western or biomedical health care; but 12.9 million people

had no access to health services. Only 45 percent of rural people had safe water, as compared with 80 percent of urbanites,

leaving 55 million without potable water. Also in the same

period, only 10 percent of rural residents had access to modern sanitation while 55 percent of city residents did; a total of

94.9 million people hence were without sanitary facilities. In the early 1990s, the leading causes of death remained gas- troenteritis, respiratory infections, congenital abnormalities,

tuberculosis, malaria, and typhoid. Gastrointestinal, parasitic,

and respiratory ailments, as well as malnutrition, contributed

substantially to morbidity. The incidence of communicable

childhood diseases was high; measles, diphtheria, and pertussis

took a substantial toll among children under five years of age.

Although the urban poor also suffered from these diseases,

those in rural areas were the principal victims.

Despite these discouraging facts, there has been significant

improvement in some health indicators. For example, in 1960

only 25 percent of the population had purportedly safe water

(compared with 56 percent in 1992). In addition, average life expectancy at birth was 43.1 years in 1960; in 1992 it had

reached 58.3 years. Maternal and Child Health

The average age of marriage for women was 19.8 between

1980 and 1990, and, with the rate of contraception use reaching only 12 percent in 1992, many women delivered their first child about one year later. Thus, nearly half of Pakistani

women have at least one child before they complete their twentieth year. In 1988-90 only 70 percent of pregnant women

received any prenatal care; the same proportion of births was

attended by health workers. A study covering the years 1975 to 1990 found that 57 percent of pregnant women were anemic

and that many suffered from vitamin deficiencies. In 1988

some 600 of every 100,000 deliveries resulted in the death of

the mother. Among women who die between ages fifteen and

forty-five, a significant portion of deaths are related to childbearing.

The inadequate health care and the malnutrition suffered

by women are reflected in infant and child health statistics. About 30 percent of babies born between 1985 and 1990 were

136
The Society and Its Environment

of low birth weight. During 1992 ninety-nine of every 1,000

infants died in their first year of life. Mothers breast-feed for a median of twenty months, according to a 1986-90 survey, but

generally withhold necessary supplementary foods until weaning. In 1990 approximately 42 percent of children under five

years of age were underweight. In 1992 there were 3.7 million

malnourished children, and 652,000 died. Poor nutrition contributes significantly to childhood morbidity and mortality.

Progress has been made despite these rather dismal data.

The infant mortality rate dropped from 163 per 1,000 live

births in 1960 to ninety-nine per 1,000 in 1992. Immunization

has also expanded rapidly in the recent past; 81 percent of

infants had received the recommended vaccines in 1992. A net- work of immunization clinics—virtually free in most places

exists in urban areas and ensures that health workers are notified of a child's birth. Word of mouth and media attention,

coupled with rural health clinics, seem to be responsible for

the rapid increase in immunization rates in rural areas. By

1992 about 85 percent of the population had access to oral

rehydration salts, and oral rehydration therapy was expected to reduce child mortality.

Health Care Policies and Developments

National public health is a recent innovation in Pakistan. In

prepartition India, the British provided health care for government employees but rarely attended to the health needs of the

population at large, except for establishing a few major hospitals, such as Mayo Hospital in Lahore, which has King Edward

Medical College nearby. Improvements in health care have

been hampered by scarce resources and are difficult to coordinate nationally because health care remains a provincial

responsibility rather than a central government one. Until the

early 1970s, local governing bodies were in charge of health

services.

National health planning began with the Second Five-Year

Plan (1960-65) and continued through the Eighth Five-Year

Plan (1993-98). Provision of health care for the rural populace

has long been a stated priority, but efforts to provide such care continue to be hampered by administrative problems and diffi- culties in staffing rural clinics. In the early 1970s, a decentralized system was developed in which basic health units provided

primary care for a surrounding population of 6,000 to 10,000

people, rural health centers offered support and more com137
Pakistan: A Country Study

prehensive services to local units, and both the basic units and

the health centers could refer patients to larger urban hospitals.In the early 1990s, the orientation of the country's medical

system, including medical education, favored the elite. There

has been a marked boom in private clinics and hospitals since

the late 1980s and a corresponding, unfortunate deterioration

in services provided by nationalized hospitals. In 1992 there was only one physician for every 2,127 persons, one nurse for

every 6,626 persons, and only one hospital for every 131,274

persons. There was only one dentist for every 67,757 persons.

Medical schools have come under a great deal of criticism

from women's groups for discriminating against females. In

some cities, females seeking admission to medical school have even held demonstrations against separate gender quotas.

Males can often gain admission to medical schools with lower

test scores than females because the absolute number for males

in the separate quotas is much greater than that for females.

The quota exists despite the pressing need for more physicians

available to treat women.

The government has embarked on a major health initiative

with substantial donor assistance. The initial phase of an esti- mated US$140 million family health project, which would eventually aid all four provinces, was approved in July 1991 by the

government of Pakistan and the World Bank, the latter's first such project in Pakistan. The program is aimed at improving

maternal health care and controlling epidemic diseases in

Sindh and the North-West Frontier Province. It will provide

help for staff development, particularly in training female paramedics, and will also strengthen the management and organization of provincial health departments. The estimated

completion date is 1999. The second stage of the project will

include Punjab and Balochistan.

In addition to public- and private-sector biomedicine, there are indigenous forms of treatment. Unani-Tibb (Arabic for

Greek medicine), also called Islami-Tibb, is Galenic medicine

resystematized and augmented by Muslim scholars. Herbal

treatments are used to balance bodily humors. Practitioners,

hakims, are trained in medical colleges or learn the skill from

family members who pass it down the generations. Some manufactured remedies are also available in certain pharmacies.

Homeopathy, thought by some to be "poor man's Western

medicine," is also taught and practiced in Pakistan. Several

138
The Society and Its Environment

forms of religious healing are common too. Prophetic healing

is based largely on the hadith of the Prophet pertaining to hygiene and moral and physical health, and simple treatments

are used, such as honey, a few herbs, and prayer. Some religious

conservatives argue that reliance on anything but prayer suggests lack of faith, while others point out that the Prophet

remarked that Allah had created medicines in order that

humans should avail themselves of their benefits. Popular

forms of religious healing, at least protection from malign

influences, are common in most of the country. The use of

tawiz, amulets containing Quranic verses, or the intervention

of a pir, living or dead, is generally relied upon to direct the

healing force of Allah's blessing to anyone confronted with

uncertainty or distress. Special Problems: Smoking, Drugs, and AIDS

Smoking is primarily a health threat for men. Nearly half of

all men smoked in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas only 5 percent

of women smoked. Twenty-five percent of all adults were esti- mated to be smokers in 1985, with a marked increase among

women (who still generally smoke only at home). The national

airline, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), instituted a no- smoking policy on all its domestic flights in the late 1980s. In an unusual departure from global trends, PIA reversed this policy in mid-1992, claiming public pressure—despite no evident

public outcry in newspapers or other media (see Transportation, ch. 3) . Men also take neswar, a tobacco-based ground mixture including lime that is placed under the tongue. Both men

and women chew pan, betel nut plus herbs and sometimes

tobacco wrapped in betel leaf; the dark red juice damages teeth

and gums. Both neswar and pan may engender mild dependency and may contribute to oral cancers or other serious

problems.

Opium smuggling and cultivation, as well as heroin production, became major problems after the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan in 1979. The war interrupted the opium pipeline

from Afghanistan to the West, and Ayatollah Ruhollah

Khomeini's crackdown on drug smuggling made shipment

through Iran difficult. Pakistan was an attractive route because

corrupt officials could easily be bribed. Although the government cooperated with international agencies, most notably the

United States Agency for International Development, in their

opium poppy substitution programs, Pakistan became a major

139
Pakistan: A Country Study

center for heroin production and a transshipment point for

the international drug market.

Opium poppy cultivation, already established in remote

highland areas of the North-West Frontier Province by the late nineteenth century, increased after World War II and

expanded again to become the basis of some local economies

in the mid-1980s. Harvesting requires intensive labor, but profits are great, and storage and marketing are easy. The annual

yield from an entire village can be transported from an isolated area on a few donkeys. Opium poppy yields, estimated at 800

tons in 1979, dropped to between forty and forty-five tons by

1985 but dramatically rose to 130 tons in 1989 and then 180

tons in 1990. Yields then declined slowly to 175 tons in 1992

and 140 tons in 1993. The area under opium poppy cultivation

followed the same pattern, from 5,850 hectares in 1989 to 8,215 hectares in 1990. It reached 9,147 hectares in 1992 but

dropped to 6,280 the following year. The caretaker government of Moeen Qureshi (July to mid-October 1993) was

responsible for the reductions in production and area under

cultivation; the succeeding government of Benazir Bhutto has

perpetuated his policies and declared its intent to augment

them.

Use of heroin within Pakistan has expanded significantly.

The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board estimates that although

there were no known heroin addicts in Pakistan in 1980, the

figure had reached 1.2 million by 1989; there were more than 2

million drug addicts of all types in the country in 1991. This

dramatic increase is attributed to the ready availability of drugs.

There were only thirty drug treatment centers in Pakistan in

1991, with a reported cure rate of about 20 percent.

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) has not yet

been much of a problem in Pakistan, probably as a result of cul- tural mores opposing premarital, extramarital, and openly

homosexual relations. The effect of poor quality control on

blood supplies and needle sharing among addicts is undetermined. The government has been slow to respond to the threat

posed by AIDS. Cultural and religious restrictions prevent offi- cial policies encouraging "safe-sex" or other programs that

would prevent the spread of the disease. State-run radio and

television stations have made no attempt to educate the public

about AIDS. In fact, the government has minimized the problem of AIDS in the same way that it has dealt with potentially

widespread alcoholism by labeling it as a "foreigners' disease."

140
The Society and Its Environment

The Ministry of Health, however, has established the

National AIDS Control Programme to monitor the disease and

to try to prevent its spread. During 1993 twenty-five AIDS

screening centers were established at various hospitals, including the Agha Khan University Hospital in Karachi, the National

Institute of Health in Islamabad, and thejinnah Postgraduate

Medical Centre. AIDS screening kits and materials are provided free at these facilities. By early 1994, approximately

300,000 people in Pakistan had been tested.

A center for AIDS testing has also been established at the

Port Health Office in Keamari Harbor in Karachi. Another is expected to open during 1994 at Quaid-i-Azam Karachi Inter- national Airport. Beginning in 1994, all foreigners and sailors

arriving in Pakistan are required to have certificates stating that

they are AIDS-free. Certificates of inspection are already

required of Pakistani sailors. All imported blood, blood products, and vaccines must also be certified.

Zakat as a Welfare System

Social security plans were first introduced in the 1960s but

have never achieved much success. Traditionally, the family

and bimdari have functioned as a welfare system that can be

relied on in times of need based on reciprocal obligations.

In 1980, as a part of his Islamization program, Zia introduced a welfare system, known as the Zakat and Ushr Ordi- nance. Based on the Islamic notion of zakat, the aim was to forge a national system to help those without kin. The Zakat

and Ushr Ordinance combined elements of the traditional

Islamic welfare institution with those of a modern public welfare system. The ordinance's moral imperative and much of its institutional structure were directly based on the Quran and

the sharia.

As a traditional religious institution, zakat involves both the

payment and the distribution of an alms tax given by Muslims

who enjoy some surplus to certain kinds of deserving poor

Muslims (mustahaqeen—see Glossary). The traditional interpretation by the Hanafi school of religious law stipulates that zakat

is to be paid once a year on wealth held more than one year. The rate varies, although it is generally 2.5 percent. Ushr is another form of almsgiving, a 5 percent tax paid on the produce of land, not on the value of the land itself. Both zakat and

ushr are paid to groups as specified in the Quran, such as the

141
Pakistan: A Country Study

poor, the needy, recent converts to Islam, people who do the

good works of God, and those who collect and disburse zakat. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance set broad parameters for eli- gibility for zakat, which is determined by local zakat committees. Priority is given to widows, orphans, the disabled, and

students in traditional religious schools. Eligibility is broad and

flexible and presumes great trust in the integrity, fairness, and

good sense of the local zakat committees. Although the program initially focused on providing cash payments, it gradually

has moved into establishing training centers, especially sewing

centers for women. By 1983 the zakat program had disbursed

more than Rs2.5 billion to some 4 million people. The program, however, has come under a great deal of criticism for the uneven manner in which funds are disbursed.

Shia have vociferously criticized the program on the basis

that its innate structure is built around Sunni jurisprudence.

Shia leaders have successfully championed the right to collect

zakat payments from members of their community and to dis- tribute them only among Shia mustahaqeen.

Prospects for Social Cohesion

Pakistan has been struggling to develop an all-encompassing

identity since the founding of the state in 1947. The nation was

created by Western-oriented professionals and bureaucrats as a homeland for Muslims, a place where they would no longer be

a minority community in the Hindu-majority state of India.

Enthusiasm and a sense of profound moral renaissance for

Muslims in South Asia accompanied independence. Expectations were high that Pakistan would flourish and that its citi- zens would be unified by their sense of social contract. It was hoped that Pakistanis would freely and vigorously engage in

parliamentary debate, while creating new industries, all under

the umbrella of Islam.

This vision of promise and unity soon encountered the realities of state building. Islamists and secularists disputed the centrality of Islam in the government. Pakhtun and Baloch tribes

resisted relinquishing their autonomy to the new centralized

state, which they regarded as an outside power. Partition also

created new ethnic communities. The Urdu-speaking entrepre- neurs and industrialists who migrated to Karachi created a new

self-identifying group, the muhajirs. Unlike the majority of Pakistanis, who are tied emotionally and politically to a specific

locality in the country, muhajirs did not have these ties. When

142
The Society and Its Environment

the new state granted housing and land to the muhajirs to compensate them for what they had left behind in India, indige- nous Punjabis and Sindhis clashed with the newcomers. Also

during the 1950s, language riots in East Pakistan and antiAhmadiyya protests in Punjab cast doubt on the unity of Pakistanis under the rubric of Muslim brotherhood.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan emphasized building its industrial base to ensure both economic and political survival.

Western-educated professionals and industrialists, as well as for- ward-looking feudal landlords who valued education, were

increasingly influential; more traditional leaders saw their

power deteriorate. A fairly liberal interpretation of Islam was

supported by the state, resulting in the passage of the Muslim

Family Laws Ordinance in 1961.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promoted "Islamic Socialism" in his 1971

electoral campaign, raising the material expectations of the masses to an unprecedented level. Many people believed that

life would improve significantly under Bhutto and the Pakistan

People's Party (PPP), but from 1971 to 1977 there was little change in the standard of living.

Intergroup tensions grew as members of the lower and middle classes became disillusioned, as upper-class industrialists were alienated by the government's nationalization policies,

and as wealthy landlords were threatened by Bhutto's land

reform program.

Ethnic groups in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier

Province pressed for increased autonomy, while muhajirs, not

yet organized as a political group, ran the city of Karachi and as non-Muslim minorities worried about the state's increasingly

formal identification with Islam.

Bhutto restructured the civil bureaucracy while increasing

his personal authority, alienating many people at the highest

echelons of power while creating opportunities for others.

Under the first democratically elected government in twenty

years, Bhutto made full use of his power by giving jobs and privileges to supporters of the PPP.

Under Zia ul-Haq, who governed from 1977 to 1988, nepotism continued: who one knew was much more important than

what one knew. The leadership gave jobs, contracts, and privileges to its allies as it sought to undermine the PPP Traditional

markers of ascribed identity, such as mother tongue, area of

family origin, and kinship ties, increasingly dictated individuals' opportunities as competition continued to block the devel143
Pakistan: A Country Study

opment of citizenship based on shared, nationwide concerns. The common expression in Urdu and Punjabi, "the whole

world knows (or believes) that . . .," reflects the small (usually

family or neighborhood) social reference group of many Pakistanis. This way of constructing a social world is not conducive

to setting aside one's own kinship identity and ties in favor of a more abstract national one based on citizenship.

In February 1979, Zia decreed that Islam—or, rather, a cer- tain interpretation of Islam—was to be the basis of Pakistan's

legal system. Fearing discrimination, some non-Muslim minorities, especially Zoroastrians, began to emigrate from Karachi in

unprecedented numbers. Shia Muslims marched on Islamabad

in 1982 to protect their right to maintain their own system of

social welfare.

Zia employed his rhetoric of Islamic state building to disguise his political opportunism. He also exploited the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan to build his arsenal of weapons by

diverting some that were shipped through Pakistan for the

Afghans. Some experts have even argued that the massive

explosion at the Ojhri munitions camp on the outskirts of Rawalpindi in April 1988 was deliberately planned to justify

"replacement" purchases in excess of the quantity actually lost. In the 1980s, Pakistan continued to place little emphasis on

social programming despite growing problems, including a rapid rise in heroin addiction. The country has been criticized

by international development organizations for ignoring social

and human development. In the 1980s, the government's priorities were instead political, and it strengthened those

regional political leaders who could contain the PPP in their

localities. In addition, the central government declared that

democratic principles would have to remain in abeyance while

the state searched for the right Islamic guidelines. The government's decision allowed local officials to continue corrupt

practices, such as hiring and firing people within the bureaucracy at will and making significant commissions from contracts on projects they approved.

To many Pakistanis already disillusioned with the economic

and political functioning of the state, the fundamental social

weaknesses of the nation came to the fore in the early 1990s.

The most obvious of these—uneven distribution of wealth; the

self-centeredness, nepotism, and greed of the privileged; and

rapid population growth among the nation's poorest people

made the institutionalization of a nationwide concept of citi144
The Society and Its Environment

zenship problematic. The failure to forge a widely understood

social contract is reflected in increased tensions among ethnic

groups, social classes, extended families, and religious factions.

The way people interrelate with one another, the way they

perceive national issues and their role in affecting them, and

the priority they assign to personal ties and group identification are all parts of the matrix of a society and indicators of its social cohesion. Until Pakistanis can come up with an inner

commitment to a cause—which in Pakistan's history has been

fairly rare outside of kinship circles—little can be done or will

be done to serve the wider society impartially, be it a national

conservation strategy, education reform, opium poppy substitution programs, or the promotion of industrial growth.

* * * General works pertaining to social change in Pakistan

include Sabeeha Hafeez's The Changing Pakistan Society, Akbar S. Ahmed's Discovering Islam, Anita M. Weiss's Culture, Class, and

Development in Pakistan, Hastings Donnan and Pnina Werbner's

Economy and Culture in Pakistan, and Myron Weiner and Ali Banuazizi's The State and the Restructuring of Society in Afghanistan,

Iran, and Pakistan. Shahidjaved Burki examines Pakistan's

social development in Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, and

Naseem Jaffer Quddus addresses education issues in Problems of

Education in Pakistan.

Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed's Women of Pakistan

gives an overview of the Pakistan women's movement. The controversial report by the Pakistan Commission on the Status of

Women became available in 1991, five years after it was published. For a composite of statistical information on women

based on all four of Pakistan's official censuses, the Pakistan

government's Federal Bureau of Statistics' Women's Division's

Women in Pakistan: A Statistical Profile and Ann Duncan's Women

in Pakistan: An Economic and Social Strategy are helpful. A recent

study of women's lives, drawing on women's own words and

views in the context of wider social changes, is Anita M. Weiss's

Walls Within Walls. Islamic issues in Pakistan are analyzed in

Anita M. Weiss's Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan and John L.

Esposito's Islam and Politics. Environmental issues are addressed in the Pakistan government's National Conservation Strategy Report. Geographic information can be found in Ashok K. Dutt and M.M. Geib's Atlas of

South Asia and in K.U. Kureshy's A Geography of Pakistan. The

works of Frederick Barth and Akbar S. Ahmed analyze Pakhtun

145
Pakistan: A Country Study

society, and an in-depth look at the Baloch is provided in A.H.

Siddiqi's Baluchistan.

The most important English-language magazines providing

useful accounts of current social issues are the Herald and

Newsline, both based in Karachi. Travel narratives that capture

cultural features of Pakistani life include Geoffrey Moorhouse's

To the Frontier, Richard Reeves's Passage to Peshawar, and Christina Lamb's controversial Waitingfor Allah. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

146
Chapter 3. The Economy
Artist's rendition of tile mosaic of lion chasing deerfrom the Pictured Wall,

Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work of the Mughal period.
PAKISTAN'S CULTIVATION of the rich alluvial soil of the

Indus River basin is its single most important economic activity.

Because of extensions and improvements of the irrigation sys- tem, waters of the Indus River and its tributaries flow to the

fields, a necessity because of scant rainfall. The Indus irrigation

system is the world's largest, but there are many problems

because of inadequate water management and use. Farmers

continue to employ traditional cultivation practices, and support services, such as research and development, are inadequate, although high-yield seeds and fertilizers are fairly widely

used. Yields of most crops, with the significant exception of cot- ton, are low by international standards and substantially below

the area's potential. Many farms are too small to support a family using existing agricultural practices. The landless often

sharecrop or work as agricultural laborers. A flood in September 1992 temporarily displaced as many as 3 million people

and destroyed many irrigation networks. Its effects are expected to limit agricultural production, particularly cotton,

in the 1990s.

Since Pakistan became independent in 1947, its leaders have

generally sought to increase the role of industry in the nation's

economy. They have achieved a remarkable degree of success toward this end. A broad industrial base is now in place, producing a wide range of products for both consumer and industrial use. Industrialization, however, has failed to create

sufficient jobs for the rapidly expanding urban population.

Construction and service-sector activities, especially in trade,

transportation, and government, have expanded and now provide more employment than industry. Nonetheless, underemployment remains prevalent throughout the economy. An

outdated infrastructure is another problem facing the econ- omy. Frequent electricity shortages, for example, hamper

industrial development and production.

Most central government administrations have sought to raise the majority of the population's low standard of living

through economic growth rather than through the redistribution of wealth. The gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary) in constant prices increased an average of 5.3 percent per

year between 1950 and 1993, roughly 2 percent per year more

than population growth. In fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1993,

149
Pakistan: A Country Study

GDP amounted to the equivalent of US$50.8 billion, or roughly US$408 on a per capita basis. Income, however, has never been evenly distributed. Furthermore, the unequal

income distribution pattern has been a political issue since the

late 1960s and is expected to remain controversial throughout

the 1990s. Social development indicators reflect long-standing

problems in providing basic health and education services.

Only just over-one third of all children of primary school age

attended school in 1989, a rate well below the average for

low-income countries (see Education, ch. 2). It was estimated

in 1992 that 28 percent of the population lived below the offi- cial poverty line, which is based on the government's estimate

of an income sufficient to provide basic minimum needs.

A pressing problem facing the economy is the government's

chronically high budget deficit, which has adverse implications

for the nation's balance of payments, inflation and exchange

rates, capital formation, and overall financial stability. The government has been attempting to restore fiscal balance through

a multiyear structural adjustment program designed to increase revenues, control spending, and stabilize monetary

growth. In addition, the government has privatized public-sec- tor industrial enterprises, financial institutions, and utilities; eliminated state monopolies in banking, insurance, shipping,

telecommunications, airlines, and power generation; and liberalized investment and foreign-exchange regulations. As of early

1994, not all these programs had been implemented as quickly

as planned, however, and the deficit and the associated structural problems persisted.

Structure of the Economy

Pakistan attained nationhood under difficult circumstances

(see Problems at Independence, ch. 1). At the partition of British India in 1947 resulting in the creation of the independent

nations of India and Pakistan, Pakistan was an agrarian econ- omy in which a small number of powerful landowners with

large holdings dominated the countryside. The majority of the

population consisted of tenant farmers who cultivated small

plots for a meager existence. Scant rainfall in West Pakistan

(present-day Pakistan) forced farmers to rely on the extensive

irrigation system developed by the British. The headwaters of

the Indus River and its main tributaries, however, were under

Indian control. Disputes arose between the two nations and

150
The Economy

were not settled until the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was

signed (see Irrigation, this ch.).

At partition Pakistan had almost no industry. Under British

rule, the area had supplied agricultural products for processing to the territory that became independent India. Energy

sources were rudimentary, with wood and animal dung furnishing the bulk of the energy consumed. Ports, transportation,

and other services, such as banking and government, were

underdeveloped. More than 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory separated the East Wing and West Wing of Pakistan until

the former became independent Bangladesh in 1971 (see

Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1). In 1949 a dispute over exchange rates halted the flow of goods between Pakistan and

India, disrupting the complementary nature of their economies that had developed under British colonial rule.

Despite formidable problems, Pakistan achieved rapid eco- nomic expansion. From FY 1951 to FY 1986, the GDP growth

rate measured at a constant FY 1960 factor averaged 5.2 percent. Rates of growth averaged 3.1 percent in the 1950s—when

agriculture stagnated—but rose to 6.8 percent in the 1960s.

They fell to 3.8 percent between FY 1971 and FY 1977 but

rebounded to 6.8 percent between FY 1978 and FY 1986. From

FY 1987 to FY 1991, growth averaged 5.8 percent, and a rate of

7.8 percent was achieved in FY 1992. Provisional data indicate

that GDP grew only 2.6 percent in FY 1993. This decline is mainly a result of the floods in September 1992, which reduced

agricultural output.

Rapid growth substantially altered the structure of the econ- omy. Agriculture's share (including forestry and fishing)

declined from 53 percent of GDP in FY 1950 to 25 percent in

FY 1993 (see table 3, Appendix). A substantial industrial base was added as industry (including mining, manufacturing, and

utilities) became the fastest growing sector of the economy.

Industry's share of GDP rose from 8 percent in FY 1950 to 21.7

percent in FY 1993. Various services (including construction,

trade, transportation and communications, and other services)

accounted for the rest of GDP.

Pakistan has an important "parallel," or "alternative," eco- nomic sector, but it is not well documented in official reports or most academic studies. This sector includes a thriving black

market, a large illicit drug industry, and illegal payments to politicians and government officials to ensure state contracts. Corruption rose in the 1980s, partly as a result of the difficulty in

151
Pakistan: A Country Study

monitoring the massive infusion of United States aid that

flowed to Pakistan as a result of the Soviet occupation of neighboring Afghanistan. Some aid went to the Pakistani government to help defray the costs of supporting several million

Afghan refugees. Other aid bolstered Pakistan's military capability, necessary because Pakistan had become a "frontline"

state. Finally, large amounts of aid were also funneled directly

to Afghan resistance movements based in Pakistan. It was much

of this money that reportedly was delivered illegally and

invested in arms and drug enterprises.

General allegations of corruption are routinely made in the

Pakistani press, and politicians often accuse their opponents of

corrupt practices. Asif Ali Zardari, the husband of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was accused of corruption after the fall of

Benazir's first government in 1990, and former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan accused the government of former Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and especially its privatization program

of corruption when dismissing his government in April 1993.

In 1994 allegations of corruption were routinely traded

between Benazir's government and the opposition headed by

Nawaz Sharif. Political maneuvering aside, corruption has an

altogether real and pervasive effect on Pakistani society. Industrialists consider bribery and other handouts a routine cost of

production, and contractors and businessmen interviewed on

television openly state that a significant percentage of their rev- enue is paid to government officers who allocate their contracts. Corruption is alleged to be prevalent in almost all official institutions, including the police, the judiciary, the rev- enue department, the passport office, customs and excise

offices, telecommunications organizations, and electricity and

gas boards. In each of these departments, the personnel

involved range from low-level employees to top management.

Some scholars believe that the low salaries of civil servants,

compared with earnings from jobs of similar status in business

and industry, explain the magnitude of corruption. In the mid1980s, Mahbubul Haq, a former minister of finance, estimated

that illegal payments to government officials were equivalent to about 60 percent of the total taxes collected by the government.

The Role of Government

Policy Developments since Independence

Since 1947 Pakistani officials have sought a high rate of eco152
Quaid-i-Azam Karachi International Airport

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

nomic growth in an effort to lift the population out of poverty.

Rapid industrialization was viewed as a basic necessity and as a

vehicle for economic growth. For more than two decades, eco- nomic expansion was substantial, and growth of industrial out- put was striking. In the 1960s, the country was considered a model for other developing countries. The rapid expansion of

the Pakistani economy, however, did not alleviate the widespread poverty. In the 1970s and 1980s, although a high rate of

growth was sought, greater attention was given to income distri- bution. In the early 1990s, a more equitable distribution of

income remained an important but elusive goal of government

policy.

At partition in 1947, the new government lacked the personnel, institutions, and resources to play a large role in developing the economy. Exclusive public ownership was reserved for

military armaments, generation of hydroelectric power, and

153
Pakistan: A Country Study

manufacture and operation of railroad, telephone, telegraph,

and wireless equipment—fields that were unattractive, at least

in the early years of independence, to private investors. The

rest of the economy was open to private-sector development,

although the government used many direct and indirect measures to stimulate, guide, or retard private-sector activities. The disruptions caused by partition, the cessation of trade

with India, the strict control of imports, and the overvalued

exchange rate necessitated the stimulation of private industry.

Government policies afforded liberal incentives to industrialization, while public development of the infrastructure com- plemented private investment. Some public manufacturing

plants were established by government holding companies.

Manufacturing proved highly profitable, attracting increasing

private investments and reinvestment of profits. Except for

large government investments in the Indus irrigation system,

agriculture was left largely alone, and output stagnated in the

1950s. The broad outline of government policy in the 1950s

and early 1960s involved squeezing the peasants and workers to finance industrial development.

Much of the economy, and particularly industry, was eventually dominated by a small group of people, the muhajirs (see

Glossary), who were largely traders who migrated to Pakistan's

cities, especially Karachi, at partition. These refugees brought

modest capital, which they initially used to start trading firms.

Many of these firms moved into industry in the 1950s as a response to government policies. Largely using their own

resources, they accounted for the major part of investment and

ownership in manufacturing during the first two decades after

independence.

By the late 1960s, there was growing popular dissatisfaction

with economic conditions and considerable debate about the

inequitable distribution of income, wealth, and economic

power—problems that had always plagued the country. Studies

by economists in the 1960s indicated that the forty big industrial groups owned around 42 percent of the nation's industrial assets and more than 50 percent of private domestic assets. Eight of the nine major commercial banks were also controlled

by these same industrial groups. Concern over the concentration of wealth was dramatically articulated in a 1968 speech by

Mahbubul Haq, then chief economist of the Planning Commission. Haq claimed that Pakistan's economic growth had done

little to improve the standard of living of the common person

154
The Economy

and that the "trickle-down approach to development" had only

concentrated wealth in the hands of "twenty-two industrial families." He argued that the government needed to intervene in

the economy to correct the natural tendency of free markets to concentrate wealth in the hands of those who already possessed

substantial assets. Although Haq exaggerated the extent of the concentration

of wealth, his speech struck a chord with public opinion. In

response, the government enacted piecemeal measures

between 1968 and 1971 to set minimum wages, promote collective bargaining for labor, reform the tax structure toward

greater equity, and rationalize salary structures. However,

implementation was weak or nonexistent, and it was only when

the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (father of Benazir)

came to power in 1971 that there was a major shift in government policy.

Bhutto promised a new development strategy more equitable than previous policies. Yet he downplayed economic analysis and planning and relied instead on ad hoc decisions that

created many inconsistencies. In May 1972, he promulgated a major act that devalued the rupee (R or Re, pi., Rs; for value of

the rupee—see Glossary) by 57 percent and abolished the multiple exchange-rate system. This act greatly stimulated exports

and indicated that the removal of price distortions could spur

the economy. But devaluation also completely altered the cost

and price structure for industry and affected the level and

composition of industrial investment and the terms of trade

between the industrial and agricultural sectors. Devaluation

helped agriculture, particularly larger farms that had marketable surpluses. Mechanization increased but had the adverse

side effect of displacing farm laborers and tenants, many of

whom migrated to cities seeking industrial jobs.

In 1972 Bhutto's government nationalized thirty-two large

manufacturing plants in eight major industries. The industries

affected included iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, motor vehicle and tractor assembly and manufacture,

chemicals, petrochemicals, cement, and public utilities. Subsequently, domestically owned life insurance companies, privately

owned banks, domestic shipping companies, and firms

engaged in oil distribution, vegetable oil processing, grain milling, and cotton ginning were nationalized. The result was a drop of nearly 50 percent in private investment in large-scale

manufacturing between FY 1970 and FY 1973. By FY 1978 such

155
Pakistan: A Country Study

investments were little more than one-third (in constant

prices) of those in FY 1970. Private capital fled the country or went into small-scale manufacturing and real estate. Between

1970 and 1977, industrial output slowed considerably.

The public sector expanded greatly under the Bhutto government. In addition to the nationalization of companies,

plants were built by the government and additional public

companies were created for various functions, such as the

export of cotton and rice. Able managers and technicians were

scarce, a situation that became worse after 1974, when many

persons left to seek higher salaries in Middle East oil-producing

states. Labor legislation set high minimum wages and fringe

benefits, which boosted payroll costs for both public and private firms. Efficiency and profits in public-sector enterprises

fell. Public industrial investment rose, surpassing private industrial investment in FY 1976.

Many of the other economic measures undertaken by the

Bhutto government were largely ineffective because of the

power of vested interests and the inefficiency of the civil

administration. Ceilings on the size of landholdings were lowered, tenants were given greater security of tenure, and measures were enacted to tax farm income (see Agriculture, this

ch.). Bhutto also supported large, but inadequately planned,

long-term projects that tied up the country's development

resources for long periods. The largest projects were an integrated iron and steel plant, a major highway on the west bank

of the Indus River, and a highway tunnel in the mountainous

north.

After 1977 the government of Mohammad Zia ul-Haq

(1977-88) began a policy of greater reliance on private enter- prise to achieve economic goals, and successive governments

continued this policy throughout the late 1980s and early

1990s. Soon after Zia came to power, the government instituted

constitutional measures to assure private investors that nationalization would occur only under limited and exceptional cir- cumstances and with fair compensation. A demarcation of

exclusive public ownership was made that excluded the private

sector from only a few activities. Yet government continued to play a large economic role in the 1980s. Public-sector enterprises accounted for a significant portion of large-scale manufacturing. In FY 1991, it was estimated that these enterprises

produced about 40 percent of industrial output.

156
The Economy

Islamization of the economy was another policy innovation

of the Zia government. In 1977 Zia asked a group of Islamic

scholars to recommend measures for an Islamic economic sys- tem. In June 1980, the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance was promulgated. Zakat is a traditional annual levy, usually 2.5 percent, on

wealth to help the needy (see Zakat as a Welfare System, ch. 2).

Ushr is a 5 percent tax on the produce of land, allowing some

deductions for the costs of production, to be paid in cash by

the landowner or leaseholder. Ushr replaced the former land

tax levied by the provinces. Self-assessment by farmers is checked by local groups if a farmer fails to file or makes a very

low estimate. Proceeds of ushr go to zakat committees to help

local needy people.

The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1990-93)

introduced a program of privatization, deregulation, and eco- nomic reform aimed at reducing structural impediments to sound economic development. Top priority was given to denationalizing some 115 public industrial enterprises, abolishing

the government's monopoly in the financial sector, and selling

utilities to private interests. Despite resistance from officials

and labor unions and criticism that the government was moving too quickly, by March 1992, control of twenty industrial

units and two banks had been sold to private investors, and

plans were under way to begin denationalizing several utilities. As of early 1994, proposals to end state monopolies in insurance, telecommunications, shipping, port operations, airlines,

power generation, and road construction were also in various

stages of implementation. Private investment no longer

requires government authorization, except in sensitive industries. Investment reforms eliminated government sanction

requirements, eased restrictions on repatriable direct and portfolio investment from abroad, enabled foreign firms to issue

shares in enterprises in Pakistan, and authorized foreign banks

to underwrite securities on the same basis as Pakistani banks.

Although the Nawaz Sharif government made considerable

progress in liberalizing the economy, it failed to address the

problem of a growing budget deficit, which in turn led to a loss of confidence in the government on the part of foreign aid

donors. The caretaker government ofJuly-October 1993 led by

Moeen Qureshi, a former World Bank (see Glossary) vice president, asserted that the nation was near insolvency and would

require a number of measures to impose fiscal discipline. The

caretaker government thus responded with sharp increases in

157
Pakistan: A Country Study

utility prices, new taxes, stiffer enforcement of existing taxes,

and reductions in government spending. In early 1994, the

government of Benazir Bhutto, elected in October 1993,

announced its intention to continue the policies of both deregulation and liberalization carried out by Nawaz Sharif and the

tighter fiscal policies put in place by Qureshi. The government

also said it intended to devote a greater proportion of the

nation's resources to health and education, especially for

women (see The Status of Women and the Women's Movement, ch. 2; Benazir Bhutto Returns, ch. 4)

Development Planning

Pakistan's economic development planning began in 1948.

By 1950 a six-year plan had been drafted to guide government

investment in developing the infrastructure. But the initial

effort was unsystematic, partly because of inadequate staffing.

More formal planning—incorporating overall targets, assessing resource availability, and assigning priorities—started in 1953

with the drafting of the First Five-Year Plan (1955-60). In practice, this plan was not implemented, however, mainly because

political instability led to a neglect of economic policy, but in

1958 the government renewed its commitment to planning by

establishing the Planning Commission.

The Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) surpassed its major

goals when all sectors showed substantial growth. The plan

encouraged private entrepreneurs to participate in those activi- ties in which a great deal of profit could be made, while the

government acted in those sectors of the economy where private business was reluctant to operate. This mix of private

enterprise and social responsibility was hailed as a model that

other developing countries could follow. Pakistan's success, however, partially depended on generous infusions of foreign

aid, particularly from the United States. After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 over Kashmir, the level of foreign assistance

declined. More resources than had been intended also were

diverted to defense. As a result, the Third Five-Year Plan (1965-

70), designed along the lines of its immediate predecessor, produced only modest growth.

When the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power

in 1971, planning was virtually bypassed. The Fourth Five-Year

Plan (1970-75) was abandoned as East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh. Under Bhutto, only annual plans were

prepared, and they were largely ignored.

158
The Economy

The Zia government accorded more importance to planning. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978-83) was an attempt to sta- bilize the economy and improve the standard of living of the

poorest segment of the population. Increased defense expenditures and a flood of refugees to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, as well as the sharp

increase in international oil prices in 1979-80, drew resources away from planned investments (see Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State, ch. 5). Nevertheless, some of the plan's goals were

attained. Many of the controls on industry were liberalized or

abolished, the balance of payments deficit was kept under control, and Pakistan became self-sufficient in all basic foodstuffs

with the exception of edible oils. Yet the plan failed to stimulate substantial private industrial investment and to raise significantly the expenditure on rural infrastructure development.

The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88) represented a significant

shift toward the private sector. It was designed to tackle some of

the major problems of the economy: low investment and sav- ings ratios; low agricultural productivity; heavy reliance on

imported energy; and low spending on health and education.

The economy grew at the targeted average of 6.5 percent during the plan period and would have exceeded the target if it had not been for severe droughts in 1986 and 1987.

The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93) provided for total

public-sector spending of Rs350 billion. Of this total, 38 percent was designated for energy, 18 percent for transportation

and communications, 9 percent for water, 8 percent for physical infrastructure and housing, 7 percent for education, 5 percent for industry and minerals, 4 percent for health, and 11

percent for other sectors. The plan gave much greater emphasis than before to private investment in all sectors of the econ- omy. Total planned private investment was Rs292 billion, and

the private-to-public ratio of investment was expected to rise

from 42:58 in FY 1988 to 48:52 in FY 1993. It was also intended

that public-sector corporations finance most of their own

investment programs through profits and borrowing.

In August 1991, the government established a working

group on private investment for the Eighth Five-Year Plan

(1993-98). This group, which included leading industrialists,

presidents of chambers of commerce, and senior civil servants,

submitted its report in late 1992. However, in early 1994 the

eighth plan had not yet been announced, mainly because the

successive changes of government in 1993 forced ministers to

159
Pakistan: A Country Study

focus on short-term issues. Instead, economic policy for FY

1994 was being guided by an annual plan.

Finance

Budget

The federal budget has two main parts: the ordinary budget,

which covers current expenditures, and the development budget (Public-Sector Development Programme), which covers

capital investment and development programs (see table 4,

Appendix) . Current expenditures accounted for 78 percent of

planned spending in the FY 1994 budget. Defense accounted

for 26 percent of all expenditures, and debt service took up

another 36 percent. About 25 percent of federal income was earmarked to be transferred to the provinces as statutory and

discretionary grants. The provinces have their own budgets

and limited powers to impose taxes. In 1991 the National

Finance Commission, which includes the prime minister and

the four provincial chief ministers, agreed to raise the proportion of funds going to the provinces. In return, the federal government is no longer responsible for financing provincial

budget deficits. Tax collections historically have constituted a smaller proportion of GDP than that of many other countries—between

FY 1984 and FY 1992, they averaged 13.8 percent. The 1993

budget estimates called for an increase to 15.1 percent, up

from 13.9 percent in FY 1992. Income and corporation taxes

provided 12.9 percent of tax revenues in FY 1993. Tax evasion,

however, is thought to be widespread. The agricultural sector was exempt from income tax until 1993, when a temporary levy

on large landowners was introduced by the Qureshi government. In early 1994, it appeared unlikely that this tax would be

reimposed by the new government led by Benazir, herself a

large landowner in Sindh.

Indirect taxes are the main source of revenue. They provided 84 percent of tax revenues in FY 1991 and an estimated

83 percent in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Customs duties were

expected to account for 35.0 percent of all government taxes

in FY 1993. Excise duties made up 17 percent of revenues, and

sales taxes made up 10 percent. Potential foreign aid donors

consider the heavy reliance on indirect taxes regressive and

inflationary and an impediment to the general policy of trade

liberalization. Under pressure from the International Mone160
The Economy

tary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), the government reduced

import duty rates in the FY 1992 and FY 1993 budgets.

In a three-year (FY 1992-94) policy statement made in agreement with the World Bank and IMF in December 1991, the government committed itself to important changes in the fiscal

system. New measures extended the narrow base of both direct

and indirect taxes, and administrative steps were taken to increase receipts of income and wealth taxes as well as general

sales and federal excise taxes as a proportion of GDP. In FY

1993, however, the Nawaz Sharif government failed to meet its fiscal targets, and relations with the World Bank and IMF

became strained. After the Qureshi caretaker government

came to power in July 1993, fiscal discipline was restored, and

in November 1993, the World Bank and IMF made substantial

aid commitments to the new government of Benazir Bhutto.

Fiscal Administration

Government tax and nontax receipts fell far short of total

expenditures in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many economists

believe that the increasing government debt is a growing threat

to Pakistan's future economic growth. The overall deficit, as a percentage of GDP, was around 5.3 percent in the early 1980s

and averaged 7.5 percent between FY 1984 and FY 1990. It reached 8.8 percent in FY 1991, but the provisional figure for

FY 1992 was 6.5 percent. The FY 1993 budget forecast a deficit

of 4.8 percent of GDP, but spending was higher and revenues

lower than anticipated, and provisional data indicate that the

deficit exceeded 9 percent. The continued gap between government revenues and spending is a major concern to potential donors of foreign aid, and in 1993 Qureshi's caretaker

government raised taxes and cut spending. In 1994 the Benazir

Bhutto government aimed to reduce the budget deficit to 4.5

percent of GDP by FY 1996. The government relies on bond

sales and on borrowing from the banking system to finance its deficit. Internal public debt was estimated at 49.9 percent of

GDP in FY 1992. By contrast, in FY 1981 internal public debt

had constituted 20.9 percent of GDP.

Monetary Process

The State Bank of Pakistan was established in 1948 and

remains the country's central bank and financial adviser. It is the sole bank of issue, holder of gold and currency reserves, banker to the government, lender of last resort to other banks,

161
Pakistan: A Country Study

supervisor of other banks, and overseer of national credit policy. In October 1993, legislation reduced government control

of the bank, but without giving it complete autonomy.

From 1974, when all Pakistani banks were nationalized, until

1991, all local banks were in the state sector. In 1991, as part of

the government's general program of economic liberalization

and the privatization of state enterprises, two small banks—the

Muslim Commercial Bank and the Allied Bank—were privatized. In 1991 the government also instructed the State Bank of

Pakistan to approve proposals for new private commercial

banks. In early 1994, there were twenty-four commercial banks,

including ten private banks that had opened since 1991, two

privatized banks, and twelve banks that remained in the state

sector. One of the new private banks, Mehran Bank, was closed

in early 1994 amidst allegations of massive fraud. The number

of new private banks was expected to increase in 1994. In

March 1993, the total assets of all Pakistani banks amounted to Rsl,090 billion. Pakistani banks had 119 foreign branches and

operated joint banking ventures in Malaysia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Twenty-one foreign banks operated in Pakistan in early

1994. They had sixty-one branches, most of which were located

in Karachi. United States banks with branches in Pakistan

included Citibank, Chase Manhattan Bank, American Express

Bank, and Bank of America.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Bank of Credit and Commerce

International (BCCI) was an important foreign bank in Pakistan. The bank had many close links with the Pakistani political

and commercial elite. It was founded in 1972 by Agha Hasan

Abedi, a leading Pakistani banker. Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharifs family company, Ittefaq Industries, was a major borrower. BCCI's international operations were run from London,

but there were three important branches in Pakistan. Abedi

resigned as president of BCCI in 1990, when the ruling Al

Nuhayyan family of Abu Dhabi obtained a majority share in the

company. BCCI collapsed in July 1991 when the Bank of

England closed BCCI's operations amid allegations of massive

losses, fraud, racketeering, and laundering of drug money. The

Pakistani branches continued to operate for some time after

BCCI had been closed elsewhere, and there were many allegations that Pakistani businessmen and politicians had profited

from the bank's illegal activities. Abedi was later indicted in the

162
The Economy

United States for fraud and racketeering. In 1992 Pakistani

operations of BCCI were amalgamated with Habib Bank.

In 1991 four Punjab-based financial cooperatives, together

known as the Pakistan Cooperative Societies, failed amidst alle- gations of misappropriation of public funds. Estimates of

money lost by depositors ranged from RslO billion to Rs23 bil- lion, with up to 2.6 million accounts affected. Two of the four

cooperatives were owned by relatives of then Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif, but an official inquiry cleared him and his family

of any wrongdoing.

From independence until the mid-1970s, the commercial

banks were poor providers of long-term capital because the

interest rate structure favored short-term over long-term

financing and long-term deposits over long-term loans. As a

result, the government encouraged the growth of nonbanking

financial institutions to act as sources of long-term credit and

equity finance. These institutions continued to play an important role in the early 1990s.

The Industrial Development Bank, established in 1961, provides medium- and long-term credit, primarily to small and

medium-sized firms in the private sector, while the Pakistan

Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation provides

long-term assistance in local or foreign currency to private

companies in the industrial sector, arranging foreign loans for

large projects. The National Development Finance Corporation, founded in 1973, provides similar services for the public

sector and in the early 1990s also began to provide financing

for the private sector. The Agricultural Development Bank

gives credit to agriculture and to cottage industries, while the

House Building Finance Corporation provides interest-free

housing finance, taking a percentage of the property's rental

income. Other specialized financial institutions include the

Investment Corporation of Pakistan, the Small Business

Finance Corporation, the National Investment Trust, and

Bankers Equity. All these organizations, with the exception of

the Pakistan Industrial Credit Corporation, which is 35 percent

foreign owned, are government owned, although they often act

as channels for foreign aid.

In the 1980s, three new financing corporations

Pakistan-Libya Holding, Pakistan-Kuwait Investment, and

Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural Investment—were established. These three institutions are jointly owned by the Paki163
Pakistan: A Country Study

stan government and the respective foreign governments; most

of their funding comes from the foreign governments.

The adoption of Zia's policy of Islamization led to changes in

the practices of financial institutions because of the Islamic

prohibition against usury. In July 1979, the Investment Corporation of Pakistan, the National Investment Trust, and the

House Building Finance Corporation opened interest-free

accounts that operate on a profit-and-loss-sharing basis. In 1981

the commercial banks followed suit. Under this system, profits

and losses on projects financed with deposit sums are shared in an agreed-on proportion between lender and borrower. In

1985 regulations prohibited new interest-bearing loans and

interest-bearing rupee deposits. These regulations cover rupee

deposits in foreign banks but not deposits made in foreign cur- rencies. In 1990 more than 63 percent of funds on deposit were held in profit-and-loss-sharing schemes.

In addition to the profit-and-loss-sharing system, lending

takes two other forms. Banks make interest-free loans but assess service charges at rates determined by the State Bank of Pakistan. Banks also provide financing for the purchase of goods or

real estate according to a system whereby the bank purchases

the item and agrees to resell it to the client at an increased

price. All these modes of finance are subject to criticism by

some advocates of Islamization on the grounds that they contain a provision for a guaranteed rate of return that can be construed as the equivalent of interest.

In November 1991, the Federal Shariat Court declared all laws pertaining to the payment or receipt of interest and

markup contrary to Islam. It also ruled against the indexation

of financial assets for inflation. The federal and provincial governments were ordered to amend all relevant laws by June 30,

1992, but appeals by banks and the central government ren- dered the deadline inoperative. As of early 1994, no higher

court decision had been announced (see Politicized Islam, ch.

2).

The National Credit Consultative Council formulates annual

credit plans. The council includes members from government,

financial institutions, and the private sector. The credit plan

sets a limit on the expansion of the money supply, taking into

account the targets of the development plan and the government's fiscal objectives, as well as prevailing rates of growth and

projections for GDP. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, money

growth tended to run well ahead of plan targets.

164
The Economy

Rapid expansion of the money supply, coupled with the

impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War on domestic energy

prices, pushed up the consumer price index by 13 percent during FY 1991. Although energy prices fell in FY 1992, heavy government borrowing from the central bank kept inflation

relatively high in FY 1992 and FY 1993, at around 9 percent.

Some independent observers, including the World Bank,

believed that the official inflation statistics understated the real rate in FY 1993, which they put at about 13 percent.

The principal stock market is the Karachi Stock Exchange,

although there are also small stock markets in Lahore and

Islamabad. The stock market expanded greatly during the

1980s. In 1991 there were almost 550 companies listed, with a market capitalization of US$4.3 billion. The turnover ratio was

12.6 percent, which represented a traded value of US$542 million. In 1991, as part of the government's deregulation policies,

restrictions on foreign investment in shares of listed Pakistani

companies were lifted, as were constraints on the repatriation

of investment proceeds, gains, and dividends. Initially, most

foreign investment was carried out by portfolio managers and

institutional investors based in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Foreign Economic Relations

Foreign Aid

Since independence Pakistan has had to depend on foreign

assistance in its development efforts and to balance its international debt payments. In 1960 the World Bank organized the

Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium to facilitate coordination among

the major providers of international assistance. The consor- tium held 92 percent of Pakistan's outstanding disbursed debt

at the end ofJune 1991. The consortium's members include

the United States, Canada, Japan, Britain, Germany, France,

and international organizations such as the World Bank and

the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The World Bank

accounted for 26 percent of the outstanding debt, and the

ADB, which was the largest lender in the early 1990s,

accounted for 15 percent. Most nonconsortium funding comes

from Saudi Arabia and other oil-producing Middle Eastern

countries. Most aid is in the form of loans, although the proportion of grants increased from around 12 percent in the late 1970s to around 25 percent in the 1980s, mainly because of

food aid and other funds directed toward Afghan refugees.

165
Pakistan: A Country Study

With the decline in this aid after 1988, the proportion of grants

decreased to 16 percent in FY 1992.

The United States has been a major provider of aid since

independence and was the largest donor in the 1980s (see For- eign Policy, ch. 4) . All United States military aid and all new

civilian commitments, however, ended in October 1990 after

the United States Congress failed to receive the required

annual presidential certification that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear bomb. As of early 1994, United States aid had not

resumed, but Agency for International Development projects

already under way in October 1990 continued to receive funds

(see The Armed Forces in a New World Order, ch. 5)

Foreign Trade

Foreign trade is important to the economy because of the

country's need to import a variety of products. Imports have

exceeded exports in almost every year since 1950, and Pakistan

had a deficit in its balance of trade each year from FY 1973

through FY 1992 (see table 5, Appendix). In FY 1991, exports were US$5.9 billion, compared with imports of US$8.4 billion,

which resulted in a deficit of US$2.5 billion. In FY 1992,

exports rose to an estimated US$6.9 billion, but imports

reached an estimated US$9.3 billion, resulting in a trade deficit

of US$2.4 billion. Economists forecast a trade deficit of around

US$2.5 billion for FY 1993. Pakistan's terms of trade, expressed

in an index set at 100 in FY 1981, were 78.0 in FY 1991 and 82.7

in FY 1992.

Crude oil and refined products are significant imports (see

table 6, Appendix) . Their value varies with internal demand

and changes in the world oil price. In FY 1982, oil products

accounted for around 30 percent of Pakistan's imports, falling to an annual average of 15 percent from FY 1987 to FY 1990,

rising to over 21 percent in FY 1991, but dropping back to 15

percent in FY 1992. Other important categories of imports in

FY 1992 included nonelectrical machinery (24 percent), chemicals (10 percent), transportation equipment (9 percent), and

edible oils (4 percent).

Although import-substitution industrialization policies

favored domestic manufacturing of substitutes for imports, offi- cials also encouraged manufactured exports in the 1950s and

1960s. In the early 1980s, incentives were again provided to

industrialists to increase manufactured exports. Nonetheless,

in the early 1990s the export base remained primarily depen166
The Economy

dent on two agricultural products, cotton and rice, which are

subject to great variations in output and demand. In FY 1992,

raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton cloth, and cotton waste

accounted for 37 percent of all exports (see table 7, Appendix). Other important exports were ready-made garments (15

percent), synthetic textiles (6 percent), and rice (6 percent).

There was some diversification during the late 1980s as the

share of manufactured goods rose. The share of primary goods

fell from 35 percent to 16 percent between FY 1986 and FY

1993. During the same period, the share of semimanufactures

rose from 16 percent to 20 percent, and that of manufactured

goods rose from 49 percent to 64 percent.

In the early 1990s, Pakistan's balance of trade remained particularly vulnerable to changes in the world economy and bad

weather. Sharp increases in crude oil prices, such as those of

1979-81 and 1990, raised the nation's import bill significantly. Total exports, on the other hand, are more sensitive to agricultural production. The decline in cotton production in

FY 1993, for instance, seriously affected the export level. Sources for imports and markets for exports are widely scat- tered, and they fluctuate from year to year. In the early 1990s,

the United States and Japan were Pakistan's most important

trading partners. In FY 1993, the United States accounted for

13.7 percent of Pakistan's exports and 11.2 percent of its imports. Japan accounted for 6.6 percent of exports and 14.2

percent of imports. Germany, Britain, and Saudi Arabia are

also important trading partners. Hong Kong is an important

export market and China a significant supplier of imports.

Trade with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Malaysia

is small but not unimportant. Trade with India is negligible.

Because of Pakistani fears of protectionism in developed

countries and the increasing importance of regional blocs in

international trade, the government in the 1980s and early

1990s placed new importance on developing trade links with

nearby nations. In the early 1990s, new trading initiatives were

being pursued through membership in two regional organizations, the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO) and

the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC—see Glossary).

The ECO was formed in 1985 with Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as its only members, but Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joined in

1992. Some politicians in the member nations see the ECO as a

167
Pakistan: A Country Study

potential Muslim common market, but political rivalries, especially between Iran and Turkey, limit its effectiveness. In 1994

most of the concrete measures being taken by the ECO con- cerned the improvement of transportation and communications among the member nations, including the construction

of a highway from Turkey to Pakistan through Iran. SAARC was founded in the mid-1980s, primarily as a vehicle

to increase trade within South Asia by delinking the region's

political conflicts from economic cooperation. Its seven member states—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—adopted the principle of unanimity in

selecting multilateral questions for debate. Despite frequent

consultative committee meetings, progress toward increased

trade remained limited in 1994. At the annual SAARC summit

in April 1993, members agreed to negotiate a South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement by 1996 that would lower or abolish

tariffs among members.

During the first four decades after independence, controls

on imports were used to ensure priority use of foreign

exchange and to assist industrialization. In the 1980s, the government maintained lists of permissible imports and also used

quantitative restrictions and regulations on foreign exchange

to control imports. The most extensive list covers consumer

goods as well as raw materials and capital goods that can be

imported by commercial and industrial users. A second list, mostly of raw materials, can only be imported by industrial

users. A third list covers commodities only the public sector can

import.

In 1991 and 1992, the government announced various measures to liberalize trade. Import licensing was ended for most

goods, many products were removed from the lists of restricted

imports, and import duties were cut. In addition, foreign companies were allowed into the export trade. The government

also promised to convert the remaining nontariff barriers into

tariffs, incorporate various ad hoc import taxes into customs

duties, and reduce the numerous exemptions and concessions on duties.

External Debt

Pakistan frequentiy encounters balance of payments difficulties, requiring emergency funding and rescheduling of debt

payments (see table 8, Appendix). The main reason for the

negative balance of payments is the chronic trade deficit. How168
Cinema in Karachi

Courtesy Sheila Ross

craftsman creating beautiful patterns on Namdas

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

169
Pakistan: A Country Study

ever, remittances from Pakistanis employed overseas have compensated for a portion of the trade deficit. Remittances sent

home from these workers increased from US$339 million in FY

1976 to US$2.9 billion in FY 1983, when they exceeded total

commodity export earnings. After FY 1983, remittances gradually declined, although they averaged US$2.3 billion between

FY 1984 and FY 1990. Remittances totaled US$1.8 billion in FY

1991 but then fell to US$1.5 billion in FY 1992, in part because

of the disruption caused by the Persian Gulf War. In FY 1992,

Pakistanis in the Middle East accounted for 67.1 percent of all remittances; 45.3 percent came from Saudi Arabia alone. Workers in Kuwait provided around 9 percent in the late 1980s, but

that proportion fell to 3.6 percent in FY 1992. Pakistanis also

send significant remittances from the United States (10.2 percent) and Britain (9.3 percent).

At the end ofJune 1993, Pakistani officials estimated the

public and publicly guaranteed external debt at US$18.4 bil- lion. The World Bank, however, estimated the total external

debt at US$24.1 billion at the end of 1992, up from US$16.7

billion at the end of 1987. Total external debt was 48 percent of

the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary). Commercial

borrowing is a small proportion of debt; at the end of 1992, it accounted for only 0.4 percent of long-term debt.

Labor

Between independence and the early 1990s, the labor force

grew rapidly, reflecting the high population growth and the

subsequently burgeoning proportion of the population under

twenty years of age. The data available concerning employment

are only estimates because few concrete facts are available. Official labor force figures represent orders of magnitude and are not precise. Observers agree, however, that relatively few

women participate in the formal nonagricultural labor force.

In FY 1992, the civilian labor force was estimated at 33.8 million, compared with 26.3 million in FY 1982 and only 10.4 million in 1951 (see table 9, Appendix). In FY 1993, about 48

percent of the civilian labor force was engaged in agriculture,

13 percent in industry, 7 percent in construction, 13 percent in

trade, 5 percent in transportation and communications, and 14

percent in other services. Only about 25 percent of the official

labor force are wage earners, which reflects the high levels of

casual enterprise, family businesses, and self-employment.

170
The Economy

Agricultural employment, although increasing, has

expanded at a slower rate than the total labor force for most of

the period since independence. In the 1960s and 1970s, owners of mid-sized farms turned increasingly to managing their

own holdings, displacing former tenants. Increased mechanization displaced agricultural laborers. Industry, the major growth

sector of the economy, was unable to absorb sufficient workers.

From the early 1960s until the early 1990s, the proportion of

the labor force employed in the industrial sector remained

steady, while the proportion working in trade, construction,

and transportation rose. Official estimates placed unemployment at around 3 percent in the late 1980s, but this rate rose in

the early 1990s to around 6 percent. Underemployment is a

greater problem and is particularly evident in agriculture, construction, and trade.

Overseas employment partially compensates for the insufficient job market. Since the mid-1970s, a growing number of

Pakistanis, both skilled and unskilled men, have gone to labor-deficient, oil-exporting countries in the Middle East,

where wages are much higher than at home. By the mid-1980s,

this exodus of manpower had reached more than 2 million.

Pakistanis working in the Persian Gulf states sent back remittances of more than US$3 billion a year through official channels. An equal amount may have come in through unofficial

channels. Significantly, these remittances meant that for the

first time, wealth flowed directly to ordinary Pakistanis rather

than to bankers, landlords, or army officers.

Employment opportunities in the Persian Gulf states were

reduced in the early 1990s. The Persian Gulf War forced many

workers to return abruptly to Pakistan. Workers only slowly

returned to the Gulf after the war. Remittances, however,

although below the peak levels of the mid-1980s, nonetheless

accounted for between US$1.5 billion and US2.0 billion a year, or over 30 percent of Pakistan's foreign-currency earnings and

almost 5 percent of GNP.

Over 1 million Pakistanis (some estimates are much higher)

continued to work in the Middle East in the early 1990s, mostly

in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These workers

range from unskilled laborers to highly skilled professionals

such as engineers, accountants, teachers, physicians, and

nurses. In addition, significant numbers of Pakistanis live and

work in other countries, especially Britain and the United

States.

171
Pakistan: A Country Study

Agriculture

Farming is Pakistan's largest economic activity. In FY 1993,

agriculture and small-scale forestry and fishing contributed 25

percent of GDP and employed 48 percent of the labor force.

Agricultural products, especially cotton yarn, cotton cloth, raw

cotton, and rice, are important exports. Although there is agricultural activity in all areas of Pakistan, most crops are grown in

the Indus River plain in Punjab and Sindh. Considerable development and expansion of output have occurred since the early

1960s; however, the country is still far from realizing the large

potential yield that the well-irrigated and fertile soil from the

Indus irrigation system could produce. The floods of September 1992 showed how vulnerable agriculture is to weather; agricultural production dropped dramatically in FY 1993.

Land Use

Pakistan's total land area is about 803,940 square kilometers.

About 48 million hectares, or 60 percent, is often classified as unusable for forestry or agriculture consists mostly of deserts,

mountain slopes, and urban settlements (see Topography and

Drainage, ch. 2). Some authorities, however, include part of

this area as agricultural land on the basis that it would support

some livestock activity even though it is poor rangeland. Thus,

estimates of grazing land vary widely—between 10 percent and

70 percent of the total area. A broad interpretation, for example, categorizes almost all of arid Balochistan as rangeland for

foraging livestock. Government officials listed only 3 million

hectares, largely in the north, as forested in FY 1992. About

21.9 million hectares were cultivated in FY 1992. Around 70

percent of the cropped area was in Punjab, followed by perhaps

20 percent in Sindh, less than 10 percent in the North-West

Frontier Province, and only 1 percent in Balochistan.

Since independence, the amount of cultivated land has

increased by more than one-third. This expansion is largely the

result of improvements in the irrigation system that make water

available to additional plots. Substantial amounts of farmland

have been lost to urbanization and waterlogging, but losses are more than compensated for by the addition of new land. In the

early 1990s, more irrigation projects were needed to increase

the area of cultivated land.

The scant rainfall over most of the country makes about 80

percent of cropping dependent on irrigation (see Climate, ch.

172
The Economy

2). Fewer than 4 million hectares of land, largely in northern

Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, are totally

dependent on rainfall. An additional 2 million hectares of land

are under nonirrigated cropping, such as plantings on floodplains as the water recedes. Nonirrigated farming generally

gives low yields, and although the technology exists to boost

production substantially, it is expensive to use and not always

readily available.

Irrigation

In the early 1990s, irrigation from the Indus River and its tributaries constituted the world's largest continuous irrigation

system, capable of watering over 16 million hectares. The sys- tem includes three major storage reservoirs and numerous barrages, headworks, canals, and distribution channels. The total length of the canal system exceeds 58,000 kilometers; there are an additional 1.6 million kilometers of farm and field ditches.

Partition placed portions of the Indus River and its tributaries under India's control, leading to prolonged disputes

between India and Pakistan over the use of Indus waters. After

nine years of negotiations and technical studies, the issue was

resolved by the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. After a ten-year

transitional period, the treaty awarded India use of the waters

of the main eastern tributaries in its territory—the Ravi, Beas,

and Sutlej rivers. Pakistan received use of the waters of the

Indus River and its western tributaries, the Jhelum and Chenab

rivers. After the treaty was signed, Pakistan began an extensive and

rapid irrigation construction program, partly financed by the

Indus Basin Development Fund of US$800 million contributed

by various nations, including the United States, and administered by the World Bank. Several immense link canals were

built to transfer water from western rivers to eastern Punjab to replace flows in eastern tributaries that India began to divert in

accordance with the terms of the treaty. The Mangla Dam, on

the Jhelum River, was completed in 1967. The dam provided

the first significant water storage for the Indus irrigation sys- tem. The dam also contributes to flood control, to regulation

of flows for some of the link canals, and to the country's energy

supply. At the same time, additional construction was undertaken on barrages and canals.

A second phase of irrigation expansion began in 1968, when

a US$1.2 billion fund, also administered by the World Bank,

173
Pakistan: A Country Study

was established. The key to this phase was the Tarbela Dam on

the Indus River, which is the world's largest earth-filled dam.

The dam, completed in the 1970s, reduced the destruction of

periodic floods and in 1994 was a major hydroelectric generating source. Most important for agriculture, the dam increases

water availability, particularly during low water, which usually

comes at critical growing periods.

Despite massive expansion in the irrigation system, many

problems remain. The Indus irrigation system was designed to accommodate the availability of water in the rivers, to supply

the largest area with minimum water needs, and to achieve

these objectives at low operating costs with limited technical

staff. This system design has resulted in low yields and low cropping intensity in the Indus River plain, averaging about one

crop a year, whereas the climate and soils could reasonably permit an average of almost 1.5 crops a year if a more sophisticated irrigation network were in place. The urgent need in the

1960s and 1970s to increase crop production for domestic and

export markets led to water flows well above designed capacities. Completion of the Mangla and Tarbela reservoirs, as well

as improvements in other parts of the system, made larger

water flows possible. In addition, the government began install- ing public tube wells that usually discharge into upper levels of

the system to add to the available water. The higher water flows

in parts of the system considerably exceed design capacities,

creating stresses and risks of breaches. Nonetheless, many

farmers, particularly those with smallholdings and those

toward the end of watercourses, suffer because the supply of

water is unreliable.

The irrigation system represents a significant engineering

achievement and provides water to the fields that account for

90 percent of agricultural production. Nonetheless, serious

problems in the design of the irrigation system prevent achieving the highest potential agricultural output.

Water management is based largely on objectives and operational procedures dating back many decades and is often

inflexible and unresponsive to current needs for greater water use efficiency and high crop yields. Charges for water use do

not meet operational and maintenance costs, even though

rates more than doubled in the 1970s and were again increased

in the 1980s. Partly because of its low cost, farmers often waste

water.

174
Powerhouse of Tarbela Dam, the largest earth-filled dam in the world

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

Good water management is not practiced by government

officials, who often assume that investments in physical aspects

of the system will automatically yield higher crop production.

Government management of the system does not extend

beyond the main distribution channels. After passing through

these channels, water is directed onto the fields of individual

farmers, whose water rights are based on long-established

social and legal codes. Groups of farmers voluntarily manage

the watercourses between main distribution channels and their

fields. In effect, the efficiency and effectiveness of water management rely on the way farmers use the system.

The exact amounts of water wasted have not been determined, but studies suggest that losses are considerable and perhaps amount to one-half of the water entering the system. Part

of the waste results from seepages in the delivery system. Even

greater amounts are probably lost because farmers use water

175
Pakistan: A Country Study

whenever their turn comes even if the water application is detrimental to their crops. The attitude among almost all farmers

is that they should use water when available because it may not

be available at the next scheduled turn. Moreover, farmers

have little understanding of the most productive applications

of water during crop-growing cycles because of the lack of

research and extension services. As a result, improvements in

the irrigation system have not raised yields and output as expected. Some experts believe that drastic changes are needed in government policies and the legal and institutional

framework of water management if water use is to improve and

that effective changes can result in very large gains in agricultural output.

Drainage

The continuous expansion of the irrigation system over the

past century significantly altered the hydrological balance of

the Indus River basin. Seepage from the system and percolation from irrigated fields caused the water table to rise, reaching crisis conditions for a substantial area. Around 1900 the

water table was usually more than sixteen meters below the sur- face of the Indus Plain. A 1981 survey found the water table to be within about three meters of the surface in more than

one-half the cropped area in Sindh and more than one-third

the area in Punjab. In some locations, the water table is much

closer to the surface. Cropping is seriously affected over a wide

area by poor drainage—waterlogging—and by accumulated

salts in the soil. Although some drainage was installed before World War II, little attention was paid to the growing waterlogging and salinity problems. In 1959 a salinity control and reclamation project was started in a limited area, based on public tube wells, to draw down the water table and leach out accumulated salts near the surface, using groundwater for irrigation. By the early

1980s, some thirty such projects had been started that when

completed would irrigate nearly 6.3 million hectares. By 1993

the government had installed around 15,000 tube wells. Private

farmers, however, had installed over 200,000 mostly small tube

wells, mainly for irrigation purposes but also to lower the water

table. Private wells probably pumped more than five times as much water as public wells. Officials were aware of the need for additional spending to prevent further deterioration of the existing situation. Empha176
The Economy

sis in the 1980s and early 1990s was on rehabilitation and maintenance of existing canals and watercourses, on improvements

on the farms themselves (including some land leveling to conserve water) , and on drainage and salinity in priority areas. Emphasis was also placed on short-term projects, largely to improve the operation of the irrigation system in order to raise

yields. Part of the funding would come from steady increases in

water use fees; the intention is to gradually raise water charges

to cover operation and maintenance costs. Considerable time

and money are needed to realize the full potential of the irrigation system and bring it up to modern standards.

Farm Ownership and Land Reform

At independence Pakistan was a country with a great many

small-scale farms and a small number of very large estates. Distribution of landownership was badly skewed. Less than 1 percent of the farms consisted of more than 25 percent of the total agricultural land. Many owners of large holdings were absentee

landlords, contributing little to production but extracting as much as possible from the sharecroppers who farmed the land.

At the other extreme, about 65 percent of the farmers held

some 15 percent of the farmland in holdings of about two hectares or less. Approximately 50 percent of the farmland was cultivated by tenants, including sharecroppers, most of whom had

little security and few rights. An additional large number of

landless rural inhabitants worked as agricultural laborers. Farm

laborers and many tenants were extremely poor, uneducated,

and undernourished, in sharp contrast to the wealth, status,

and political power of the landlord elite. After independence the country's political leaders recognized the need for more equitable ownership of farmland and

security of tenancy. In the early 1950s, provincial governments

attempted to eliminate some of the absentee landlords or rent

collectors, but they had little success in the face of strong opposition. Security of tenancy was also legislated in the provinces,

but because of their dependent position, tenant farmers benefitted only slightly. In fact, the reforms created an atmosphere

of uncertainty in the countryside and intensified the animosity

between wealthy landlords and small farmers and sharecroppers. In January 1959, accepting the recommendations of a special commission on the subject, General Mohammad Ayub

Khan's government issued new land reform regulations that

177
Pakistan: A Country Study

aimed to boost agricultural output, promote social justice, and

ensure security of tenure (see The Ayub Khan Era, ch. 1). A

ceiling was placed on individual landownership; compensation was paid to owners for land surrendered. Numerous exemptions, including title transfers to family members, limited the

impact of the ceilings. Slightly fewer than 1 million hectares of

land were surrendered, of which a little more than 250,000

hectares were sold to about 50,000 tenants. The land reform

regulations made no serious attempt to break up large estates or to lessen the power or privileges of the landed elite. However, the measures attempted to provide some security of ten- ure to tenants, consolidate existing holdings, and prevent

fragmentation of farm plots. An average holding of about five hectares was considered necessary for a family's subsistence,

and a holding of about twenty to twenty-five hectares was pronounced as a desirable "economic" holding.

In March 1972, the Bhutto government announced further

land reform measures, which went into effect in 1973 (see

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System, ch. 1).

The landownership ceiling was officially lowered to about five

hectares of irrigated land and about twelve hectares of nonirrigated land; exceptions were in theory limited to an additional

20 percent of land for owners having tractors and tube wells.

The ceiling could also be extended for poor-quality land. Owners of expropriated excess land received no compensation, and

beneficiaries were not charged for land distributed. Official sta- tistics showed that by 1977 only about 520,000 hectares had

been surrendered, and nearly 285,000 hectares had been redistributed to about 71,000 farmers.

The 1973 measure required landlords to pay all taxes, water

charges, seed costs, and one-half of the cost of fertilizer and

other inputs. It prohibited eviction of tenants as long as they

cultivated the land, and it gave tenants first rights of purchase.

Other regulations increased tenants' security of tenure and

prescribed lower rent rates than had existed. In 1977 the Bhutto government further reduced ceilings on

private ownership of farmland to about four hectares of irri- gated land and about eight hectares of nonirrigated land. In an

additional measure, agricultural income became taxable,

although small farmers owning ten hectares or fewer—the

majority of the farm population—were exempted. The military

regime of Zia ul-Haq that ousted Bhutto neglected to implement these later reforms. Governments in the 1980s and early

178
The Economy

1990s avoided significant land reform measures, perhaps

because they drew much of their support from landowners in

the countryside.

Government policies designed to reduce the concentration

of landownership had some effect, but their significance was

difficult to measure because of limited data. In 1993 the most

recent agricultural census was that of 1980, which was used to compare statistics with the agricultural census of 1960. Between

1960 and 1980, the number of farms declined by 17 percent,

and farms decreased in area by 4 percent, resulting in slightly

larger farms. This decline in the number of farms was confined

to marginal farms of two hectares or fewer, which in 1980 represented 34 percent of all farms, constituting 7 percent of the

farm hectarage. At the other extreme, the number of very

large farms of sixty hectares or more was 14,000—both in 1960

and in 1980—although the average size of the biggest farms

was smaller in 1980. The number of farms between two and ten

hectares increased during this time. Greater use of higheryielding seeds requiring heavier applications of fertilizers,

installation of private tube wells, and mechanization accounted

for much of the shift away from very small farms toward

mid-sized farms, as owners of the latter undertook cultivation

instead of renting out part of their land. Observers believed

that this trend had continued in the 1980s and early 1990s.

In early 1994, land reform remained a controversial and

complex issue. Large landowners retain their power over small

farmers and tenants, especially in the interior of Sindh, which

has a feudal agricultural establishment. Tenancy continues on

a large scale: one-third of Pakistan's farmers are tenant farmers, including almost one-half of the farmers in Sindh. Tenant

farmers typically give almost 50 percent of what they produce

to landlords. Fragmented holdings remain a substantial and

widespread problem. Studies indicate that larger farms are usually less productive per hectare or unit of water than smaller

ones. Cropping Patterns and Production

In the early 1990s, most crops were grown for food (see table

10; table 11, Appendix). Wheat is by far the most important

crop in Pakistan and is the staple food for the majority of the

population. Wheat is eaten most frequently in unleavened

bread called chapati. In FY 1992, wheat was planted on 7.8 million hectares, and production amounted to 14.7 million tons.

179
Pakistan: A Country Study

Output in FY 1993 reached 16.4 million tons. Between FY 1961

and FY 1990, the area under wheat cultivation increased nearly

70 percent, while yields increased 221 percent. Wheat production is vulnerable to extreme weather, especially in nonirrigated areas. In the early and mid-1980s, Pakistan was self- sufficient in wheat, but in the early 1990s, more than 2 million

tons of wheat were imported annually.

Rice is the other major food grain. In FY 1992, about 2.1 million hectares were planted with rice, and production

amounted to 3.2 million tons, with 1 million tons exported.

Rice yields also have increased sharply since the 1960s, following the introduction of new varieties. Nonetheless, the yield

per hectare of around 1.5 tons in FY 1991 was low compared

with many other Asian countries. Pakistan has emphasized the

production of rice in order to increase exports to the Middle

East and therefore concentrates on the high-quality basmati

variety, although other grades also are exported. The government has increased procurement prices of basmati rice disproportionately to encourage exports and has allowed private

traders into the rice export business alongside the public-sector Rice Export Corporation.

Other important food grains are millet, sorghum, corn, and

barley. Corn, although a minor crop, gradually increased in area and production after independence, partly at the expense

of other minor food grains. Chick-peas, called gram in Pakistan, are the main nongrain food crop in area and production. A

number of other foods, including fruits and vegetables, are

also grown.

In the early 1990s, cotton was the most important commercial crop. The area planted in cotton increased from 1.1 million hectares in FY 1950 to 2.1 million hectares in FY 1981 and

2.8 million hectares in FY 1993. Yields increased substantially in

the 1980s, partly as a result of the use of pesticides and the

introduction in 1985 of a new high-yielding variety of seed.

During the 1980s, cotton yields moved from well below the

world average to above the world average. Production in FY

1992 was 12.8 million bales, up from 4.4 million bales ten years

earlier. Output fell sharply, however, to 9.3 million bales in FY

1993 because of the September 1992 floods and insect infestations.

Other cash crops include tobacco, rapeseed, and, most

important, sugarcane. In FY 1992, sugarcane was planted on

880,000 hectares, and production was 35.7 million tons. Except

180
The Economy

for some oil from cottonseeds, the country is dependent on

imported vegetable oil. By the 1980s, introduction and experimentation with oilseed cultivation was under way. Soybeans

and sunflower seeds appear to be suitable crops given the

country's soil and climate, but production was still negligible in

the early 1990s.

Livestock

Livestock provides the draft power available to most farmers

as well as food, fuel, manure, wool, and hides. Livestock contributed about 30 percent of the value added by agriculture in

FY 1993. In Balochistan raising sheep and goats on the arid

rangeland is an important source of cash to a considerable part

of the population, although many areas are overgrazed.

In FY 1993, the livestock population was estimated at 17.8

million cattle, 18.7 million water buffalo, 27.7 million sheep,

40.2 million goats, and 5.4 million other animals, including

camels, horses, and mules. Production of animal products in

FY 1993 was estimated to include 17 million tons of milk,

844,000 tons of beef, 763,000 tons of mutton, 50,500 tons of

wool, and 42.6 million tons of hides and skins. Despite substantial increases in livestock production in the 1980s, the country

faces shortages because of the limited amount of feed and graz- ing areas. In the 1980s, the government increased the size of

cross-breeding programs and took other measures to increase

productivity, but production still fell short of demand.

Commercial chicken farming has shown exceptional promise because production using modern methods has expanded

rapidly since the 1960s. Although many farmers raise some

poultry, the commercial chicken farms account for most of the

increased availability of eggs and poultry. Poultry meat production increased from 14,000 tons in FY 1972 to 75,000 tons in FY

1983 and 188,000 tons in FY 1993. Egg production increased

from 14 million in FY 1972, to 4.2 billion in FY 1983, and 5.4

billion in FY 1992.

Forestry

Forests cover about 3 million hectares, less than 4 percent of

the country. Many forests are in the Northern Areas and Azad

Kashmir, where coniferous trees predominate, but the management and exploitation of these forests are hampered by the

remoteness of the land. Elsewhere, most of the native forest was destroyed before independence by population pressure,

181
Pakistan: A Country Study

overcultivation, and overgrazing. The lack of tree cover contributes to many of the problems the agricultural sector has

experienced since independence, including soil erosion, the

silting of streams, flooding, and a shortage of timber and fire- wood.

In the mid-1990s, government efforts to increase the extent

of forests have had little success, but tree-planting programs

continue. Many of the nation's forests, including some irri- gated tree plantations in the Indus River basin, are under government control. These forests produced 321,000 cubic meters

of timber and 534,000 cubic meters of firewood in FY 1993, but

production was far short of demand. Imports filled part of the

requirement for timber, while cutting trees and shrubs on private land met part of the need for firewood. In October 1993,

however, the government imposed a two-year nationwide ban

on the private felling of trees. This action was taken because of concerns that Pakistan was fast losing the little tree cover that

existed (see Pollution and Environmental Issues, ch. 2).

Fishing

Fishing is a small sector of the economy, accounting for

around 0.6 percent of GDP in FY 1992. Nevertheless, fishing

had increased sharply in the 1970s and 1980s and seemed wellpositioned for further expansion in the 1990s. The fish catch was 173,000 tons in FY 1970, approximately 301,000 tons in FY

1982, and 510,000 tons in FY 1992. The bulk of the catch is taken offshore in the Arabian Sea. Much of the catch, especially prawns and shrimp, is exported to the Middle East. Fish

accounted for 1.7 percent of export earnings in FY 1992. The

country is considered to have a large potential in fishing,

reportedly as high as 14 million tons a year if sufficient investment and market expansion occur. Industry

In 1947 only 5 percent of the large-scale industrial facilities in British India were located in what became Pakistan. The

country started with virtually no industrial base and no institutional, financial, or energy resources. Three small hydroelectric power stations provided limited electricity to a few urban

areas. Firewood and dung were the main sources of energy;

commercial energy sources supplied only about 30 percent of

182
The Economy

the energy consumed. Further, there was a shortage of management personnel and skilled labor.

Manufacturing

The pace of industrialization since independence has been

rapid, although it has fluctuated in response to changes in government policy and to world economic conditions. During the

1950s, manufacturing expanded at about 16 percent annually;

during the first half of the 1960s, it expanded at around 11 percent a year. The pace slowed to under 7 percent a year in the

second half of the 1960s. Between FY 1970 and FY 1977, the

index of manufacturing output increased an average of only

2.3 percent a year. Between FY 1977 and FY 1982, the index

rose an average of 9.9 percent a year. Growth averaged 7.7 percent during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-88) and 5.4 percent

from FY 1989 through FY 1992. In FY 1993, manufacturing

accounted for 17.3 percent of GDP at current factor cost, of

which large-scale manufacturing accounted for 61 percent and

small-scale manufacturing for 39 percent. Manufactured goods

accounted for 64 percent of all exports by value in FY 1993, but

the bulk of these exports came in the relatively low-technology

areas of cotton textiles and garments.

Total fixed capital formation in manufacturing was estimated at Rs57 billion in FY 1993. During the 1980s, private

investment became much more important than public investment. In FY 1982, private investment was 53.9 percent of the

total, but in FY 1993 the proportion was 96.1 percent. Total

investment in manufacturing was 5.1 percent of GNP in FY

1993.

In the early 1990s, the manufacturing sector was dominated

by food processing and textiles (see table 12, Appendix). Provisional figures for FY 1992 indicated that sugar production was

2.1 million tons, vegetable ghee 819,000 tons, cotton yarn

862,000 tons, and cotton cloth 234 million square meters.

Other industrial products included motor tires (647,000 units),

cycle tires (2.2 million units), cement (6.1 million tons), urea

(1.4 million tons), soda ash (147,000 tons), bicycles (364,000

units), and paperboard (13,000 tons).

Pakistan has one steel mill, located near Karachi, with a production capacity of 1.1 million tons per year. A major undertaking, the mill required the bulk of public industrial investment

in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although the plant was

designed and partly financed by the Soviet Union. It produced

183
Pakistan: A Country Study

at 81 percent of capacity in FY 1993, and it was dependent on

imports of iron ore and coking coal. As of early 1994, the mill

had not achieved sustained profitability, but there were plans

to expand it. Public-sector firms produced about 40 percent of the total

manufacturing value added in FY 1991, and they absorbed

about 48 percent of gross fixed investment. The total value of

public-sector industrial output in FY 1991 was Rs36 billion (in

constant FY 1988 prices), but pretax profits were only Rsl.3 bil- lion, reflecting the inefficiencies and overstafnng prevalent in

these enterprises.

To improve the efficiency and competitiveness of public-sec- tor firms and end federal subsidies of their losses, the government launched a privatization program in FY 1991. Majority

control in nearly all public-sector enterprises will be auctioned

off to private investors, and foreign investors are eligible buyers. In March 1992, twenty units had been privatized, but by

1993 only about 30 percent of the government's target number

of firms had been sold because some of the enterprises were

unattractive for private investors. In 1994 the government led

by Benazir Bhutto was committed to continuing the policy of

privatization.

Construction

Construction is one of the more vigorous sectors of the

economy, growing at a rate of 5.9 percent in FY 1992. Construction of nouses and the associated infrastructure was a major

element in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1988-93), which proposed the provision of 650,000 urban housing sites and 2.2 million plots for the rural poor to construct their own houses. The

plan also sought to provide a rural water supply to an additional 31.2 million people and sanitation facilities for 17 million people. Total planned construction expenditure was

Rs29.7 billion over the five-year period. Much of the investment in housing came from the remittances of Pakistani workers in the Middle East. Some economists felt that this

investment distorted the market for land on which to build in

some areas and made the position of poor people more diffi- cult. Energy

From 1947 to the early 1990s, the economy made considerable progress in the transformation from a wood-burning base

184
The Pak-Arab Fertilizer Factory in Multan

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

to modern energy sources. The process remains incomplete.

Bagasse (the woody residue left over from crushed sugarcane),

dung, and firewood furnished about 32 percent of all energy in

FY 1988. Some localities had been denuded of firewood, forcing the local population to use commercial energy sources,

such as kerosene or charcoal. Domestic sources of commercial

energy accounted for 77 percent of all commercial energy in

FY 1990. The major domestic energy resources are natural gas,

oil, and hydroelectric power. The remainder of energy requirements are met by imports of oil and oil products.

Crude oil production increased sharply in the 1980s, from

almost 4.0 million barrels in FY 1982 to 22.4 million barrels in

FY 1992. This increase was the result of the discovery and development of new oil fields. Despite this expanded production,

however, about 28 million barrels of crude oil were imported

annually in the early 1990s. The production from domestic oil

185
Pakistan: A Country Study

refineries also rose in the 1980s, reaching 42 million barrels

annually in the early 1990s. However, oil products imports

accounted for about 30 percent of the value of all oil imports.

Pakistan vigorously pursued oil exploration in the 1980s and

early 1990s and made a number of new discoveries. In the early

1990s, the most productive oil field was at Dhurnal in Punjab,

accounting for 21 percent of total output in FY 1993. The

Badin area in southern Sindh was the site of a number of dis- coveries in the 1980s, and its proportion of total output has

continued to increase over the years. In the early 1990s, more

favorable terms on pricing and repatriation of profits stimulated the interest of foreign oil companies. About twenty for- eign companies are engaged in oil exploration, but poor

security for workers and property in remote areas of

Balochistan and Sindh remains a significant constraint on for- eign investment.

The large Sui natural gas field in Balochistan was discovered

after independence. Production at Sui began in 1955 and

peaked in 1985. In the early 1990s, it remained the nation's

most productive gas field, accounting for 46 percent of production in FY 1993. The second largest gas field, also located in

Balochistan at Mari, accounted for 20 percent of all production. Twenty-five gas fields were operational in FY 1993. Natural

gas recoverable reserves were estimated at 662.0 billion cubic

meters, with an extraction rate in the early 1990s of around

14.0 billion cubic meters, up from 9.3 billion cubic meters in

FY 1982 and 1.3 billion cubic meters in FY 1970.

Natural gas pipelines, in which the government owns controlling shares, link the Sui gas field and a few others to the

main population centers and the major crude oil production

areas. The southern pipeline leads from Sui to Hyderabad and

Karachi, and a spur supplies Quetta. The northern pipeline

branches at Faisalabad. One branch goes a little farther north

of Lahore; the other branch is connected to the crude oil fields

and supplies gas to Islamabad and Peshawar. There are plans

for a new gas pipeline through which Iran would export natural gas to Pakistan.

Coal reserves were boosted substantially in May 1992 when a

large coal field was discovered in the Thar Desert in Sindh. In

early 1993, these reserves were estimated at 17 billion tons. However, much of Pakistan's coal has a low calorific value and a high ash and sulfur content, which limits its value. Output was

1.3 million tons in FY 1992, down from 1.8 million tons in FY

186
The Economy

1982. The bulk of production is from small, privately owned

mines whose owners generally lack funds, expertise, and inter- est in expanding output. A public-sector firm, the Pakistan

Mineral Development Corporation, accounted for about onefifth of output in the early 1990s. The corporation has six operational mines—at Degari, Sor Range, and Sharigh in

Balochistan; Lakhra and Meting in Sindh; and the Makerwal/

Gullakhel complex straddling the border between Punjab and

the North-West Frontier Province.

Hydroelectric power is an important domestic primary

energy resource, and hydroelectric potential is estimated at around 10,000 megawatts. A large number of additional sites with major potential exist in the mountainous north, but the

difficulty of access and the high cost of transmission to the populous south make development a distant prospect. A large proportion of hydrogenerators are located at two large

multipurpose dams. The Tarbela Dam located on the Indus

River in the North-West Frontier Province has an installed

capacity of 2,164 megawatts, and the Mangla Dam situated on

the Jhelum River in Azad Kashmir has an installed capacity of

800 megawatts.

In 1965 Pakistani officials contracted with the Canadian government for the supply of a 125-megawatt pressurized,

heavy-water nuclear reactor, which in 1972 became operational near Karachi. This was Pakistan's only nuclear power plant in

1994, and its operating record is poor. In 1983 plans for a nuclear plant at Chashma, on the Indus River in Punjab, about

240 kilometers south of Islamabad, were announced. The construction of this plant was delayed, in part because of the reluctance of foreign governments to supply needed fuel and

technology because of concern over possible military use of the

atomic energy program. In 1993 Pakistani officials expected

the plant to open in 1997 with a capacity of 300 megawatts.

China is providing the necessary technology and materials for

the Chashma plant. Pakistani officials expect that fuel for the

plant will be provided by the uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta near Islamabad. Some observers, however, believe it is unlikely that the plant will be ready in 1997.

In FY 1992, the country had a total installed generating

capacity of 9,293 megawatts, of which approximately 62.7 percent was thermal, 35.9 percent hydroelectric, and 1.5 percent

nuclear. In FY 1991, industry consumed 34.2 percent of electricity, households 31.7 percent, agriculture 21.4 percent, com187
Pakistan: A Country Study

mercial businesses 4.3 percent, and other users 8.3 percent. A

rural electrification program increased the number of villages

having electricity from around 14,000 in FY 1983 to nearly

41,000 in FY 1992, leaving only about 5,000 villages without

electricity. Beginning in the 1980s, considerable improvements

were made in transmission facilities. By 1983 a grid connected

generators and urban centers of the more populous areas,

largely in Punjab and Sindh. Installations of high-voltage trans- mission lines and other facilities helped reduce power losses. Nonetheless, in 1993 the World Bank estimated that 28 percent

of electricity generated in Pakistan was diverted illegally in

transmission and distribution, and even the government puts

this figure at 12 percent.

In 1993 the government planned a rapid increase of generating capacity, in part through the expansion of existing hydroelectric and thermal units and in part through the

construction of new plants. Nonetheless, observers expected

shortages of electricity to continue in the early 1990s and probably longer. In much of 1993, both urban and rural areas experienced three power cuts a day, lasting a total of around two

hours. Industrial and commercial users are required to reduce

consumption by an even greater amount, and they risk being

disconnected if they violate "agreed-on levels." Peak demand

for electricity is estimated to exceed the supply by around 30

percent.

In 1991 the power sector was opened to private capital, both

foreign and domestic. In that year, a World Bank consortium

that included investors from Britain, Saudi Arabia, and the

United States agreed to finance a project for a new US$1.3 bil- lion, 1,292-megawatt oil-fired power station at Hub Chowki in

Balochistan, forty-eight kilometers west of Karachi. Construction began in September 1992, and the station is scheduled to go into operation in 1996. The consortium is responsible for

the construction and operation of the power station, while its output is sold to the national grid. In 1992 the government

announced plans to privatize the Water and Power Development Authority's thermal plants and area electricity boards, but

in 1994 legal and political obstacles prevented implementation

of this policy.

Some development of renewable energy sources has been

undertaken, primarily for rural areas so isolated they would not

otherwise have electricity in the foreseeable future. The aim is to upgrade village life while lowering urban migration, reduc188
The Economy

ing reliance on firewood, and providing power to pump water

for irrigation where possible. For example, a small familyowned biogas plant uses human and animal waste (from three or four water buffalo, for example) to produce around 2.8 to 4.2 cubic meters of gas a day for heating and lighting. Larger

biogas plants serve a number of homes or a village. Construction costs are too high for most villagers unless the government

underwrites installation.

Mining and Quarrying

Through the 1980s, development of mining was discouraged

by the absence of venture capital and the limited demand for

many minerals from domestic industries. The slow development of mining was due in part to the remoteness of the areas where most minerals are found, which adds greatly to the costs of exploration, production, and transportation. Moreover,

some of these areas have a poor reputation for law and order.

By the early 1990s, mining was of little importance to the econ- omy, despite the presence of fairly extensive mineral resources. Foreign companies have been invited to bid for concessions for

mineral extraction.

Minerals include antimony, bauxite, chromite, copper, gypsum, iron ore, limestone, magnesite, marble, molybdenum,

rock salt, and sulfur. Much of the mineral wealth is found in

Balochistan. In FY 1992, mineral production included 8.5 million tons of limestone, 833,000 tons of rock salt, 471,000 tons of

gypsum, and 6,333 tons of magnesite. Some iron-ore deposits

are of good enough quality for use in the country's steel plant,

but in FY 1992 production was only 937,000 tons. The Saindak Integrated Mineral Project, managed by the

state-owned Resource Development Corporation, was developed in the 1980s and early 1990s, but in 1993 there were as yet

few results. Located in Balochistan, the project area contains

three separate large deposits of copper ore, gold, iron ore, molybdenum, silver, and sulfur. Services

Transportation

The domestic transportation system was not well developed

at independence. Railroads were the main means of transportation, but the network in West Pakistan had been constructed

under the assumption that the area formed part of a larger sub189
Pakistan: A Country Study

Figure 8. Transportation System: Roads, 1 994

continental economic and political entity and was not suited to the needs of the new nation. Considerable development was

necessary to improve links between Karachi, Pakistan's first capital and the country's principal port and commercial center, and Punjab, where Islamabad was established as the new

administrative capital in 1962.

In the 1970s and 1980s, road and air networks grew considerably faster than the railroads. Between FY 1978 and FY 1992,

190
The Economy

^_ 7 '^UZBEKISTAN TURKMENISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

IRAN

AFGHANISTAN

\

/• M

hr

CHINA

Indian

\ claim

j* * * * - . .

' as? \ Cease-*** . /

Chinese C Martian Peshawar • i• _

-

'i ...

, ,. control

*> Kohat t \ Rawalpindi ^Bannu[

)

"

' Sargodha*

,<^>.y Dora * /"* n ^» S

Ismail i /. » T Lahore Zhob f Khan Faisalabad y s*j /

Multan C'

Figure 9. Transportation System: Railroads, Airports, and Ports, 1994

the volume of freight and the number of passengers carried by

rail increased only slightly, whereas road-borne freight and the

number of air passengers more than doubled. In 1994 trans- portation policy was aimed at shifting more of the traffic back

to the rail system, with a long-term goal of a rail-to-road freight

traffic ratio of 33:67 by 2000. However, it appears unlikely that

this target will be met.

In June 1992, the road system covered 179,752 kilometers, of

191
Pakistan: A Country Study

which asphalt roads made up 51.2 percent (see fig. 8). The

number of motor vehicles more than doubled during the

1980s. Their number was estimated at nearly 2 million in 1992,

including 932,000 motorcycles, 454,000 automobiles, 220,000

tractors, 157,000 trucks and vans, and 37,000 buses. In March

1992, the government approved a five-year Rs73 billion program of road construction and rehabilitation. This plan

included building a four-lane 339-kilometer highway between

Lahore and Islamabad, scheduled for completion in mid-1995.

Road transport is mostly in the private sector, but some passenger and freight services are provided by public-sector corporations.

The railroad system is government owned and covers 8,775

kilometers (see fig. 9). In FY 1992 there were 753 locomotives

and 34,851 freight wagons. The system usually runs at a loss. In

mid-1992, the most profitable route, that between Lahore and

Faisalabad, was privatized. It is expected that the government

will attempt to privatize other rail routes, but the Lahore-Faisalabad line was renationalized in September 1993 when the pri- vate operator failed to make a profit.

Shipping capacity decreased in the 1980s. The merchant

fleet, almost all operated by the Pakistan National Shipping

Corporation (PNSC), consisted in 1992 of twenty-two vessels,

down from fifty vessels in 1982. Approximately half the fleet is more than fifteen years old and is unsuited to present needs.

The PNSC handled 2.74 million tons of cargo in the last six

months of 1991, compared with 2.77 million tons during the

corresponding period in 1990. In 1992, in line with its privatization policy, the government invited applications for setting

up a private shipping sector and promised to operate the PNSC

on a commercial basis.

There are two international ports—Karachi and Port

Muhammad bin Qasim. In the early 1990s, Karachi handled

the bulk of the maritime traffic. During the nine months ending in March 1992, Karachi handled 14.7 million tons of cargo,

of which 11.0 million tons were imports and 3.7 million tons

exports. This was 4.2 percent more cargo than was handled

during the corresponding period of 1990-91. Port Qasim,

which is fifty-three kilometers south of Karachi, handled 5.8

million tons of cargo in the first nine months of FY 1992.

In early 1994, the major airline was Pakistan International

Airlines (PIA), controlled by the government. PIA had a fleet

of forty-seven aircraft in March 1993, of which fifteen were

192
Motorized rickshaw stand on Circular Road, Lahore

Courtesy Anita M. Weiss

Truck in the North-West Frontier Province

Courtesy Harvey Follender

193
Pakistan: A Country Study

wide-bodied Boeing 747s and A300-B4s. The PIA network

includes forty-five international and thirty-five domestic air- ports. There are international airports at Karachi, Islamabad,

Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. Several small private airlines

began operating domestic routes in 1993. One of these carriers, Shaheen Air International, also operates international

cargo routes and plans to provide international passenger ser- vice in 1994 or 1995.

Telecommunications

In the 1980s, considerable effort was made to upgrade the

telecommunications system. The Sixth Five-Year Plan, for

instance, called for a public-sector investment of RslO.l billion to improve and expand the telephone and telex systems. In the

mid-1990s, all overseas telecommunications used the IntelsatVI satellite of the International Telecommunications Satellite

Organization. There were also plans to launch a Pakistani satellite based on very small aperture earth stations, which would

provide nationwide coverage for domestic telecommunications. The number of telephone connections increased from

461,000 in June 1984 to 1.6 million in March 1993, when the

government announced that the Pakistan Telecommunications

Corporation would be privatized. A new entity, the National

Telecommunications Network, was planned to assume responsibility for the government's own network.

Radio and television are dominated by government corporations. The Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) has a monopoly on radio broadcasting. In March 1992, there were

705,000 licensed radios, but the actual number of radios in use was estimated at 10 million. The PBC operates twenty-four

medium-wave and three short-wave transmitters for its domestic programs and two medium-wave and eight short-wave trans- mitters for its external service. There are six networks for

domestic service—one national network and regional networks

for Balochistan, the Islamabad Capital Territory, the NorthWest Frontier Province, the Northern Areas, Punjab, and

Sindh. The external service broadcasts in fifteen languages

Arabic, Burmese, Bengali, Dari, English, Farsi, French, Gujarati, Hindi, Indonesian, Swahili, Tamil, Turkmen, Turkish, and

Urdu. An important target audience is Pakistanis working in

the Middle East. Azad Kashmir Radio, a separate government- run organization, broadcasts in Azad Kashmir.

194
The Economy

In early 1994, the government-controlled Pakistan Television

Corporation (PTV) carried programs produced in five centers—Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. Programming comes under the purview of the Ministry of

Information and Broadcasting, and goals include providing

wholesome entertainment, promoting national solidarity, and

projecting an Islamic way of life. In November 1992, PTV

began broadcasting on a second channel made possible byJap- anese financing and technology. This channel is intended

mainly for educational purposes. A commercial station was also

established in the early 1990s and competes with PTV. In 1993

it was estimated that there were over 2 million television sets, and the number is expected to climb steeply in the 1990s. The

main PTV channel is capable of reaching 87 percent of the

population, while the second channel is accessible to 56 percent of the population.

Tourism

As of early 1994, foreign tourism remained relatively undeveloped. Annual tourist arrivals averaged 442,136 for the

period 1985-89 but fell to 284,779 in 1990 because of uncertainties generated by the Persian Gulf War. The number of

tourist arrivals rose to 415,529 in 1991. Many of the arrivals are

visitors of Pakistani origin who have settled in Europe and

North America. Pakistan has considerable tourist potential, but

the generally poor law and order situation in the late 1980s and

early 1990s discouraged rapid growth. Hotels meeting international standards are concentrated in the larger cities, especially

Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi.

In early 1994, the immediate future of the economy

appeared uncertain. Although the economy is responding well

to the government's liberalization program, and many sectors appear poised to achieve healthy rates of growth, economic

prospects are constrained by the government's large budget

deficits, the continued absorption of public expenditures by

defense and interest payments, and the perception of widespread corruption. Pakistan remains heavily dependent on for- eign aid donors. The failure to address more adequately the

nation's low levels of education and health is also likely to act as a constraint on economic growth in the remainder of the

1990s.

* * *

195
Pakistan: A Country Study

Two publications from the Economist Intelligence Unit, the

annual Country Profile: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the quarterly

Country Report: Pakistan, Afghanistan, provide up-to-date information on the economy. More detailed analysis is found in two

annual publications of Pakistan's Ministry of Finance, the Eco- nomic Survey and the Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement. Two

monthly periodicals, the National Bank ofPakistan Monthly Eco- nomic Letter and the Economic Outlook are also useful. Shahid

Javed Burki deserves special mention as one of the most astute writers on the Pakistani economy, especially as it relates to the

nation's historical and social legacy. His Pakistan: A Nation in the Making and Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood

include important essays pertinent to the economy, as does

Pakistan under the Military, coauthored by Craig Baxter. Other

recent general accounts of the economy include Nadeem

Qasir's Pakistan Studies, B.M. Bhatia's Pakistan's Economic Development, 1948-88, and Anita M. Weiss's Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

196
Chapter 4. Government and Politics
Artist's rendition of tile mosaic of man withjezzil (musket) from the Pictured

Wall, Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work

art of the Mughal period.
NATION BUILDING REMAINS a difficult process in Pakistan.

But although the country has undergone a succession of trau- matic sociopolitical experiences since achieving independence

in 1947, it continues to demonstrate its resilience and its capacity to survive and adapt to changing circumstances. Joining the

community of nations as a bifurcated state, with its two wings

separated by 1,600 kilometers of foreign soil, Pakistan was

faced with the immediate task of absorbing large numbers of

refugees from India in the months immediately following partition. The new nation struggled with severe economic disadvantages made acutely painful by a shortage of both administrative

personnel and the material assets necessary to establish and

sustain its fledgling government. With the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah—the revered Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader)

only thirteen months after independence, the nation was dealt

another severe blow.

Created to provide a homeland for the Muslims of the

Indian subcontinent, Pakistan was heir to a government struc- ture and a political tradition that were essentially Western and

secular. From its inception, Pakistan has worked to synthesize

Islamic principles with the needs of a modern state. The young

nation was immediately challenged by a host of other factors

affecting national development, including ethnic and provincial tensions, political rivalries, and security considerations.

The country subsequently survived civil war and the resultant

loss of its East Wing, or East Pakistan, which became the independent nation of Bangladesh in December 1971, and has

accommodated an influx of refugees resulting from the Soviet

occupation of Afghanistan (December 1979-February 1989),

which over the course of the conflict exceeded 3.2 million people.

Pakistan has had difficulty in establishing stable, effective

political institutions. The country has experimented with a

variety of political systems, has endured periods of martial law,

and has had five constitutions, one inherited from the British

and four indigenous ones since independence. Its political parties have suffered from regionalism, factionalism, and lack of

vision. Power has shifted between the politicians and the civil- military establishment, and regional and ethnic forces have

threatened national unity. However, the impulse toward cohe199
Pakistan: A Country Study

sion has been stronger than the impetus toward division, and

the process of nation building has continued. The return to democracy in 1988, and the peaceful, constitutional transfer of

power to new governments in 1990 and 1993 testify to Pakistan's progress in the quest for political stability.

Constitutional and Political Inheritance

Independence

Pakistan, in its comparatively short history, has tried various

forms of parliamentary, military, and presidential governments

in its efforts to achieve political stability. At independence Pakistan was governed by the Government of India Act of 1935 as amended by the authority of the India Independence Act of

1947. The amended act provided at the center for a governor

general (as successor to the British viceroy) as head of state and

for a Constituent Assembly with two separate functions—to prepare a constitution and to be a federal legislature until the

constitution came into effect. At the outset, however, this structure of governor general

and parliamentary legislature took on singular characteristics

tailored to the personality, prestige, and unique position occu- pied by Jinnah, Pakistan's first governor general (see table 13,

Appendix). At independence, he was the supreme authority,

the founder of the state, and the chief political leader. As head

of the All-India Muslim League, in 1940 he mobilized the political effort that in just seven years won Pakistan's independence.

His ultimate authority came not from military power, not from

the support of the bureaucracy, and not from constitutional

prerogatives but from the political support of the people. In

these circumstances, Jinnah chose to unite in himself the functions of head of state and the power of chief executive and

party boss. In addition to his position as governor general, he

was elected president of the Constituent Assembly.

For the office of governor general to be held by an active

party politician who continued as political leader was an innovation. Initially, the arrangement may have seemed necessary

to preserve national unity after independence and to facilitate

the work of the new government. WhenJinnah died, the prime

minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, and the cabinet assumed increased

power, in more traditional roles, and Khwaja Nazimuddin, as the new governor general, became a more traditional, nonpolitical head of state. Liaquat, however, found it difficult to

200
Government and Politics

establish his political authority. Whether the transfer of effective power to Liaquat while Jinnah was still alive might have cre- ated a precedent for future political stability in Pakistan is a moot point. Liaquat's assassination, three years later in October 1951, was the catalyst for a series of constitutional and political crises that over the years seemed almost endemic.

Role of Islam

Pakistan has provided a unique setting for experiments in

synthesizing Islamic principles with the needs of a modern

state. Although Pakistan's independence movement was articulated in Western terminology and centered on the right of

national self-determination, it was also rooted in the Islamic

concept of society and of what constitutes legitimate political

authority for a Muslim. The basis of the ideal Muslim polity is the sharia (see Glossary), the sacred law of Islam as embodied

in the Quran. Efforts to apply Quranic law in a modern politi- cal context have had a direct impact on Pakistan's political his- tory and have also complicated the nation's constitutional

evolution (see Politicized Islam, ch. 2).

Regional and Ethnic Factors

Government and politics bear the imprint of Pakistan's

diversity. Despite the loss of the country's East Wing in 1971,

the body politic remains a varied and volatile mix of ethnic, lin- guistic, and regional groups, and provincialism and ethnic

rivalries continue to impede the progress of national integration. Although Islam is a unifying force, and the majority of

Pakistanis are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims, there is considerable cultural diversity within and among the country's four

provinces, and coreligionists' identification as Sindhis, Punjabis, Baloch, or Pakhtuns (see Glossary) is strong.

Added to the indigenous human mosaic are the more than 7

million muhajirs (refugees or immigrants from India and their

descendants) from various parts of India. Economic and political rivalries persist between the muhajirs and the indigenous

populations of the provinces of Pakistan. These contests often

turn violent and have contributed significantly to national

unrest and instability (see Subversion and Civil Unrest, ch. 5).

Ethnic riots have cost hundreds of lives and destroyed millions

of dollars worth of property. A further challenge to national

stability results from the approximately 1.4 million Afghan ref- ugees who in early 1994 still had not returned to their country.

201
Pakistan: A Country Study

Linguistic diversity is also a divisive force. Some twenty languages are spoken, and although Urdu is the official language,

it is not the native tongue of the majority of the population.

Islam provides a tenuous unity in relation to such diversity.

Efforts to build national consensus in the face of these obstacles remains central to effective government in Pakistan.

The Civil Service

The bureaucracy, particularly the higher civil service, has

been a continuing source of stability and leadership and a counterweight to political upheaval and government instability. This cadre originated in the prepartition Indian Civil Service, whose members were well educated, well trained, and

dedicated to a tradition of efficiency and responsibility. In

time, the British recruited indigenous people, who were

among India's best and brightest, into the Indian Civil Service

ranks.

At partition, out of more than 1,100 Indian Civil Service

officers, scarcely 100 were Muslims, and eighty-three of them

opted to go to Pakistan. Because none of them held a senior

rank equivalent to that of a secretary (and administrators were

urgently needed to staff senior posts in the new state), this initial group was augmented by quick promotions in the Civil Ser- vice of Pakistan (CSP) through ad hoc appointments from

other services and through retention, for a time, of some British officers. The CSP prided itself on being the backbone of

the nation, the "steel frame" as it was sometimes called, and

played a key role in Pakistan's survival in the difficult years fol- lowing independence. Although Jinnah commended its contribution, he also warned CSP cadres to stay out of politics and to discharge their duties as public servants. After Jinnah's death,

however, in the subsequent absence of strong political leadership, members of the CSP assumed an extraordinary role in

the country's policy-making process. When the CSP was disbanded in 1973 and the various services were amalgamated

into one administrative system, the expertise of its former

members was much valued, and they continued to hold critical positions in the country's administrative apparatus through

subsequent transitions in government. It is not surprising,

then, that a later president of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan

(1988-93) was once a member of the CSP.

202
Government and Politics

The Military

Another significant aspect of Pakistan's political legacy is its military forces and, in particular, the role of the largest of these

forces, the army (see Role and Structure of the Security Forces,

ch. 5). The military remains one of the country's most cohesive

national institutions. Since independence it has oscillated

between indirect and direct political control, remaining a major power. The military's sense of mission in defending and

preserving the Islamic state of Pakistan has always been strong.

For Muslim members of the British Indian Army, the transfer

of loyalties from the colonial to the ideological state was not

difficult. Successors to the historical legacy of the Muslim

armies of the once powerful Mughal Empire, Muslim soldiers

could relate to a new role of protecting the faith and the state embodied in Pakistan. The military also provided alternative

political leadership in times of crisis. Military regimes in Paki- stan have legitimized their actions by the doctrine of necessity,

stepping in temporarily when political crises have reached a deadlock and threatened the state (see Constitutional Basis

and Missions, ch. 5).

Early Political Development

Early Constitution Building, 1947-58

The path to the current constitution and government was

often tortuous and accompanied by successive upheavals in the

nation's political life. The years between 1947 and 1958 were marked by political chaos moderated by the administrative

power and acumen of the CSP. They were also years in which

the armed forces, especially the army, expanded its mission

and assumed political influence alongside the CSP. Initially, the

country was governed by a Constituent Assembly (see Independent Pakistan, ch. 1). The Constituent Assembly had dual functions: to draft a constitution and to enact legislation until the

constitution came into effect. It was nine years before Pakistan

adopted its first constitution in 1956. Conflicts in the Constituent Assembly included the issues of representation to be given

to major regional groups (particularly the East Wing) and reli- gious controversy over what an Islamic state should be.

The first major step in framing a constitution was the passage by the Constituent Assembly of the Objectives Resolution

of March 1949, which defined the basic principles of the new

203
Pakistan: A Country Study

state. It provided that Pakistan would be a state "wherein the

principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and

social justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed;

wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the

individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran

and Sunna; [and] wherein adequate provision shall be made

for the minorities freely to progress and practice their religions

and develop their cultures." Seven years of debate, however,

failed to produce agreement on fundamental issues such as regional representation or the structure of a constitution. This

impasse prompted Governor General Ghulam Mohammad to dismiss the Constituent Assembly in 1954. The Supreme Court

of Pakistan upheld the action of the governor general, arguing

that he had the power to disband the Constituent Assembly

and veto legislation it passed. This preeminence of the gover- nor general over the legislature has been referred to as the

viceregal tradition in Pakistan's politics.

The revived Constituent Assembly promulgated Pakistan's

first indigenous constitution in 1956 and reconstituted itself as the national legislature—the Legislative Assembly—under the

constitution it adopted. Pakistan became an Islamic republic.

The governor general was replaced by a president, but despite

efforts to create regional parity between the East Wing and the

West Wing, the regional tensions remained. Continuing

regional rivalry, ethnic dissension, religious debate, and the

weakening power of the Muslim League—the national party

that spearheaded the country's founding—exacerbated political instability and eventually led President Iskander Mirza to disband the Legislative Assembly on October 7, 1958, and

declare martial law. General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's

first indigenous army commander in chief, assisted Mirza in

abrogating the constitution of 1956 and removing the politicians he believed were bringing Pakistan to the point of collapse. Ayub Khan, as Mirza's chief martial law administrator,

then staged another coup also in October 1958, forced Mirza

out of power, and assumed the presidency, to the relief of large

segments of the population tired of the politicians' continued

machinations.

Ayub Khan, 1958-69

Although Ayub Khan viewed himself as a reformer, he was

predisposed to the benevolent authoritarianism of the Mughal

204
Field Marshal Mohammad

Ayub Khan

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

General Agha Mohammad

Yahya Khan

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

and viceregal traditions. He also relied heavily on the country's

civilian bureaucrats, who formed the majority of his advisers

and cabinet ministers. Ayub Khan initiated a plan for Basic

Democracies, a measure to create a system of local government

from the grass roots (see Basic Democracies, ch. 1). The Basic

Democracies system consisted of a mulitiered pyramidal hierarchy of interlocking tiers of legislative councils from the village to the provincial level. The lowest but most important tier was composed of union councils, one each for groups of villages

having an approximate population of 10,000. The members of

these union councils were called Basic Democrats. The union

councils were responsible for local government, including agricultural and community development, maintaining law and

order through rural police, and trying minor cases in conciliation courts. In 1960 the Basic Democrats were asked to endorse Ayub

Khan's presidency and to give him a mandate to frame a new

205
Pakistan: A Country Study

constitution. Ayub's constitution, promulgated in 1962, ended

martial law, established a presidential form of government with a weak legislature (now called the National Assembly), and

gave the president augmented executive, legislative, and financial powers. Adult franchise was limited to the election of Basic

Democrats, who constituted an electoral college for the president and members of the national and provincial assemblies.

This constitution was abrogated in 1969 when Ayub, who by

then had lost the people's confidence, resigned, handing over the responsibility for governing to the army commander in

chief, General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan (see The Ayub

Khan Era, ch. 1). Yahya Khan assumed the title of president

and also became chief martial law administrator.

Yahya Khan, 1969-71

Although Yahya Khan established a semi-military state, he

also introduced changes that led to the return of parliamentary democracy. These changes ultimately resulted in the divi- sion of the country in two. Yahya held national elections in

December 1970 for the purpose of choosing members of the

new National Assembly who were to be elected directly by the

people. However, the results of these elections, which brought

the politicians once more to the fore, led to the secession of

East Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh

in 1971.

Yahya accepted the demand of East Pakistan for representation in the new assembly on the basis of population. As a result,

Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur ("Mujib") Rahman's Awami

League won all but two of the 162 seats allotted East Pakistan

out of the 300 directly elected seats in the assembly (thirteen

indirectly elected seats for women were added), and Mujib

wanted considerable regional autonomy for East Pakistan.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

emerged as the political victors in West Pakistan in the 1970

elections. Bhutto's intransigence—he refused to participate in

the discussions to frame the new constitution—led to the continuation of martial law and the eventual political and military

confrontation between East Pakistan and West Pakistan, which

precipitated civil war and the country's dismemberment in

December 1971. With Pakistan's military in disarray, Yahya

resigned, and Bhutto was appointed president and civilian

chief martial law administrator of a truncated Pakistan.

206
Government and Politics

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77

Bhutto lifted martial law within several months, and after an

"interim constitution" granting him broad powers as president, a new constitution was promulgated in April 1973 and came

into effect on August 14 of that year, the twenty-sixth anniversary of the country's independence. This constitution represented a consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the

sharing of power between the federal government and the

provinces; and the division of responsibility between the president and the prime minister, with a greatly strengthened position for the latter. Bhutto stepped down as president and

became prime minister. In order to allay fears of the smaller

provinces concerning domination by'Punjab, the constitution

established a bicameral legislature with a Senate, providing

equal provincial representation, and a National Assembly, allo- cating seats according to population. Islam was declared the

state religion of Pakistan.

Bhutto had the opportunity to resolve many of Pakistan's

political problems. But although the country finally seemed to be on a democratic course, Bhutto lost this opportunity

because of a series of repressive actions against the political

opposition that made it appear he was working to establish a one-party state. In a final step, he suddenly called national elections in March 1977, hoping to catch the opposition unprepared and give his party total control of the National Assembly.

When Bhutto's party overwhelmingly won the election, the

opposition charged voting irregularities and launched mass

disturbances requiring action by the army to restore law and

order. Bhutto was ousted by the military, which again took control. This action resulted not solely from sheer political ambition but from the military's belief that the law and order

situation had dangerously deteriorated.

Zia ul-Haq, 1977-88

General Zia ul-Haq, chief of the army staff, became chief

martial law administrator in July 1977 and president in September 1978. He suspended the constitution, with the army's stated

objective being to create an environment in which fair elections could be held. However, Bhutto, his primary opponent,

was tried and sentenced to death in 1978 on the charge of conspiring to murder a political opponent. The Supreme Court

upheld the sentence, and Bhutto was hanged in April 1979. Zia

207
Pakistan: A Country Study

cancelled the elections that had been promised and kept the

country under martial law until 1985. During this time, Zia

pressed the policy that Pakistan's survival and progress were dependent on building an Islamic state. A number of measures were taken to implement this policy, including the introduction of the Federal Shariat Court. A referendum held in 1984

confirmed Zia's policy of Islamization. In this referendum, a

"yes" vote agreeing with Zia's Islamization policy was also interpreted as a vote for Zia to remain in office as president for

another five years. According to the results reported by the government but contested by the opposition, Zia obtained 98 percent of total votes cast. Zia's government also adapted Ayub's Basic Democracies

structure to institute a new system of local government. Local

councils were organized into tiers with union councils at the

base, tehsil (subdistrict) councils above them, and zilla (district)

councils at the apex. The system also included municipal committees and municipal corporations in the larger metropolitan

centers. Councillors were elected for four-year terms and could

stand for reelection. The councils were designed to meet a need for grass-roots expression. Elections were conducted without formal political party affiliation or involvement. The councils were to concentrate on improving local development,

including agricultural production, education, health, roads,

and water supply.

In 1985 elections were held for both the national and the

provincial assemblies, an amended version of the 1973 constitution was reinstated, and martial law was ended. Zia remained

president, and the amended constitution, including the controversial Eighth Amendment passed by the National Assembly

in November 1985, gave predominant political authority to the

president (see President, this ch.). The president could

appoint and dismiss the prime minister and the provincial gov- ernors and could dissolve both the national and the provincial

assemblies. A significant feature of the 1973 constitution as amended in 1985, insofar as the Islamization process was con- cerned, was that the Objectives Resolution, adopted by the first Constituent Assembly in 1949 and made a preamble to the

1956, 1962, and 1973 constitutions, was incorporated as a substantive part (Article 2-A) of this restored constitution. The

Objectives Resolution provided, in part, that Pakistan would be

a state "wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their

lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with

208
Zulfiqar All Bhutto

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

General Mohammad

Zia ul-Haq

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy

Quran and the Sunna."

Political parties were not allowed to participate in the 1985

elections, and the PPP, led by Benazir Bhutto (Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto's daughter), boycotted them. After the elections, Zia

picked Mohammad Khan Junejo, a politician from Sindh and a

minister in one of his earlier cabinets, as his prime minister.

The Zia-Junejo period lasted three years until Zia dismissed the

prime minister and dissolved the National Assembly and the

four provincial assemblies. Zia cited incompetence, corruption, and failure to further the Islamization process as reasons

for his actions. In addition, Zia came to regard Junejo as too

independent, and the two men clashed on a number of issues

including differences on policy relating to Afghanistan and

promotions in the armed services. Zia also announced that

new elections would be held.

209
Pakistan: A Country Study

Zia's sudden death in an airplane crash in August 1988 near Bahawalpur, a town in central Punjab, left Pakistan without a

president, prime minister, or national or provincial assemblies.

In a demonstration of the country's resilience, Ghulam Ishaq

Khan, the chairman of the Senate—which had not been dissolved by Zia—and next in the constitutional line of succession,

became interim president in December. Elections were held,

Benazir became prime minister, and Ishaq Khan was subsequently elected president.

Constitution and Government Structure

Pakistan's independence was won through a democratic and

constitutional struggle. Although the country's record with par- liamentary democracy has been mixed, Pakistan, after lapses,

has returned to this form of government. The constitution of

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan adopted in 1985 provides for a

federal parliamentary system with a president as head of state and a popularly elected prime minister as head of government.

President

The president, in keeping with the constitutional provision

that the state religion is Islam, must be a Muslim. Elected for a

five-year term by an electoral college consisting of members of

the Senate and National Assembly and members of the provincial assemblies, the president is eligible for reelection. No individual may hold the office for more than two consecutive

terms. The president may resign or be impeached and may be

removed from office for incapacity or gross misconduct by a

two-thirds vote of the members of the parliament. The president generally acts on the advice of the prime minister but has

important residual powers. One of the most important—a legacy of Zia—is contained in the Eighth Amendment, which gives

the president the power to dissolve the National Assembly "in

his discretion where, in his opinion ... a situation has arisen in

which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on

in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an

appeal to the electorate is necessary."

Parliament and Federal Government

The bicameral federal legislature is the Majlis-i-Shoora

(Council of Advisers), consisting of the Senate (upper house)

and National Assembly (lower house) (see fig. 10). Members of

210
Government and Politics

the National Assembly are elected by universal adult suffrage

(over twenty-one years of age in Pakistan). Seats are allocated

to each of the four provinces, the Federally Administered

Tribal Areas, and Islamabad Capital Territory on the basis of

population. National Assembly members serve for the parliamentary term, which is five years, unless they die or resign

sooner, or unless the National Assembly is dissolved. Although

the vast majority of the members are Muslim, about 5 percent

of the seats are reserved for minorities, including Christians,

Hindus, and Sikhs. Elections for minority seats are held on the

basis of separate electorates at the same time as the polls for

Muslim seats during the general elections.

The prime minister is appointed by the president from

among the members of the National Assembly. The prime minister is assisted by the Federal Cabinet, a council of ministers

whose members are appointed by the president on the advice

of the prime minister. The Federal Cabinet comprises the ministers, ministers of state, and advisers. As of early 1994, there were thirty-three ministerial portfolios: commerce; communications; culture; defense; defense production; education; environment; finance and economic affairs; food and agriculture;

foreign affairs; health; housing; information and broadcasting;

interior; Kashmiri affairs and Northern Areas; law and justice;

local government; minority affairs; narcotics control; parliamentary affairs; petroleum and natural resources production;

planning and development; railroads; religious affairs; science

and technology; social welfare; special education; sports; state and frontier regions; tourism; water and power; women's development; and youth affairs. The Senate is a permanent legislative body with equal representation from each of the four provinces, elected by the members of their respective provincial assemblies. There are

representatives from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas

and from Islamabad Capital Territory. The chairman of the

Senate, under the constitution, is next in line to act as president should the office become vacant and until such time as a new president can be formally elected. Both the Senate and the

National Assembly can initiate and pass legislation except for

finance bills. Only the National Assembly can approve the federal budget and all finance bills. In the case of other bills, the

president may prevent passage unless the legislature in joint sit- ting overrules the president by a majority of members of both

houses present and voting.

211
Pakistan: A Country Study

-->

CC n

i

COU So LU LU 1-

111 oc Q<

LU cc

0.

LL <

X

CO CO

« a) c >

o a "> a. 2. < Q

I

I

1

'

>

0) ii CO

LU <

<

CC z ?

IS HI o- H ° z a. o

DEPA

PUBLIC

CO

CC CO

CO LU < LU

1- CC 1- z

ERNO MINIS -> VINCI ISTRil -> RTME > ii o z < O

a CHIEI £ DEP

CO

c e & I

o

ii

< CO z <

o -c B

.1

212
Government and Politics

Other offices and bodies having important roles in the federal structure include the attorney general, the auditor general, the Federal Land Commission, the Federal Public Service

Commission, the Central Election Commission, and the Wafaqi

Mohtasib (Ombudsman).

Provincial Governments

Pakistan's four provinces enjoy considerable autonomy. Each

province has a governor, a Council of Ministers headed by a chief minister appointed by the governor, and a provincial

assembly. Members of the provincial assemblies are elected by

universal adult suffrage. Provincial assemblies also have

reserved seats for minorities. Although there is a well-defined

division of responsibilities between federal and provincial governments, there are some functions on which both can make

laws and establish departments for their execution. Most of the

services in areas such as health, education, agriculture, and

roads, for example, are provided by the provincial governments. Although the federal government can also legislate in

these areas, it only makes national policy and handles international aspects of those services.

Judiciary

The judiciary includes the Supreme Court, provincial high

courts, and other lesser courts exercising civil and criminal

jurisdiction. The chief justice of the Supreme Court is appointed by the president; the other Supreme Court judges

are appointed by the president after consultation with the chief

justice. The chiefjustice and judges of the Supreme Court may

remain in office until age sixty-five. The Supreme Court has

original, appellate, and advisory jurisdiction. Judges of the provincial high courts are appointed by the president after consultation with the chiefjustice of the Supreme Court, as well as the governor of the province and the chiefjustice of the high

court to which the appointment is being made. High courts

have original and appellate jurisdiction.

There is also a Federal Shariat Court consisting of eight Muslim judges, including a chiefjustice appointed by the president. Three of the judges are ulama, that is, Islamic Scholars,

and are well versed in Islamic law. The Federal Shariat Court

has original and appellate jurisdiction. This court decides

whether any law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. When

a law is deemed repugnant to Islam, the president, in the case

213
Pakistan: A Country Study

of a federal law, or the governor, in the case of a provincial law,

is charged with taking steps to bring the law into conformity

with the injunctions of Islam. The court also hears appeals

from decisions of criminal courts under laws relating to the

enforcement of hudood (see Glossary) laws, that is, laws pertaining to such offenses as intoxication, theft, and unlawful sexual

intercourse (see Islamic Provisions, ch. 5).

In addition, there are special courts and tribunals to deal

with specific kinds of cases, such as drug courts, commercial

courts, labor courts, traffic courts, an insurance appellate tribunal, an income tax appellate tribunal, and special courts for

bank offenses. There are also special courts to try terrorists

(see Courts and Criminal Procedure, ch. 5). Appeals from special courts go to high courts except for labor and traffic courts,

which have their own forums for appeal. Appeals from the tri- bunals go to the Supreme Court.

A further feature of the judicial system is the office of Wafaqi

Mohtasib (Ombudsman), which is provided for in the constitution. The office of Mohtasib was established in many early Muslim states to ensure that no wrongs were done to citizens.

Appointed by the president, the Mohtasib holds office for four

years; the term cannot be extended or renewed. The Mohtasib's purpose is to institutionalize a system for enforcing administrative accountability, through investigating and rectifying any

injustice done to a person through maladministration by a federal agency or a federal government official. The Mohtasib is empowered to award compensation to those who have suffered

loss or damage as a result of maladministration. Excluded from

jurisdiction, however, are personal grievances or service matters of a public servant as well as matters relating to foreign

affairs, national defense, and the armed services. This institution is designed to bridge the gap between administrator and

citizen, to improve administrative processes and procedures,

and to help curb misuse of discretionary powers.

Political Dynamics

Pakistan has had considerable difficulty developing stable,

cohesive political organizations because they have suffered

long periods of repression. Further, political parties, with few

exceptions, have been founded as vehicles for one person or a few individuals, or to achieve specifically defined goals. When

these individuals die or abandon their parties, or after party

goals have been met, many organizations have lost their raison

214
Government and Politics

d'etre and have lacked the ability to carry on. In addition, political parties have been handicapped by regional and ethnic fac- tors that have limited their national appeal and have also been

torn by personal and class rivalries. Muslim League

The Muslim League was founded in 1906 as the All-India

Muslim League to protect the interests of Muslims in British

India and to counter the political growth of the Indian

National Congress, founded in 1885. Under the leadership of

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League adopted the

Lahore Resolution (often referred to as the "Pakistan Resolution") in March 1940 and successfully spearheaded the move- ment for the creation of an independent homeland for Indian

Muslims. At independence the Muslim League was the only

major party in Pakistan and claimed the allegiance of almost

every Muslim in the country. However, with the deaths of its two principal leaders, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, shortly

after independence and its central goal of creating Pakistan

achieved, the party failed to develop a coherent, postindependence ideology. The Muslim League gradually came under the

influence of West Pakistani, and particularly Punjabi, landlords

and bureaucrats more concerned with increasing their personal influence than with building a strong national organization.

The Muslim League was further weakened by the constitutional impasse in the 1950s resulting from difficulties in resolving questions of regional representation as well as the problem

of reaching a consensus on Islamic issues. Regional loyalties were intensified during the constitutional debates over the

respective political representation of the country's west and

east wings. In addition, East Pakistan had a larger Hindu population, and some strong provincial leaders believed their power

depended on developing broad-based secular institutions. The

Muslim League, however, pressed for provisions to establish

Pakistan as an Islamic state. Two powerful Bengali leaders and former Muslim League

members, Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy and Fazlul Haq, used

their own parties, the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik

Party (Workers and Peasants), respectively, in a joint effort in

1954 to defeat the Muslim League in the first election held in

East Pakistan after partition. Fazlul Haq had made the motion

to adopt the historic "Pakistan Resolution" in 1940, and

215
Pakistan: A Country Study

Suhrawardy, subsequently the last chief minister of undivided

Bengal, had seconded it. But both men were alienated by West

Pakistani domination of the Muslim League. Suhrawardy was

elected leader of the opposition in the second Constituent

Assembly and in 1956 was appointed prime minister, a further

loss for the Muslim League because he was the first non-Muslim League politician to hold this position. By this time, the

Muslim League had lost its influence in both East Pakistan and

West Pakistan, having also lost its majority in the West Pakistan

Legislative Assembly to the Punjab-centered Republican Party.

The promulgation of martial law in 1958 and the dissolution of

all political parties finally resulted in the demise of the Muslim

League after its fifty-two-year existence.

General Ayub Khan formed a party called the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in 1962, andjunejo established a party with

the same name (PML-J) in 1986, but these two parties had little in common with the 1906-58 Muslim League in terms of their

objectives and composition. After Junejo died in March 1993,

Mian Nawaz Sharif took over the party and it became the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) for Nawaz Sharif. The death of

Junejo signified the end to an uneasy coalition that had existed

between the feudal lobby under Junejo and the representatives

of the new business and industrialist classes who, under the

guidance of Nawaz Sharif, were running the Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad—IJI) government of

1990-93.

Islami Jamhoori Ittehad

The Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) was formed in September

1988 to oppose the PPP in elections that year. The alliance

comprised nine parties, of which the major components were

the PML and the Islamic Organization (Jamaat-i-Islami—JI).

The IJI won only fifty-three seats in the National Assembly,

compared with ninety-two won by the PPP. Most IJI seats were won in Punjab. Nawaz Sharif emerged from the 1988 elections

as the most powerful politician outside the PPP. In December

1988, he succeeded in forming an IJI administration in Punjab

and became the province's chief minister. It was from this

power base that he waged the political battles that eventually

led to his becoming prime minister in 1990. In the supercharged atmosphere of the 1990 elections, the electorate sur- prised observers. Neither the IJI nor the PPP was expected to come up with a firm mandate to rule. Yet the IJI received a

216
Government and Politics

strong mandate to govern, winning 105 seats versus forty-five seats for the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) —of which

the PPP was the main component in the National Assembly.

In the 1993 national elections, the IJI coalition no longer

existed to bring together all the anti-PPP forces. The religious

parties expended most of their energies trying to form a workable electoral alliance rather than bolstering the candidacy of

Nawaz Sharif, the only person capable of challenging Benazir.

Jamaat-i-lslami

The Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the largest and most articulate of

Pakistan's religious parties, was founded in 1941 by Maulana

Abul Ala Maududi as an ideological movement to promote

Islamic values and practices in British India. It initially opposed

the Pakistan movement, arguing that Islam was a universal reli- gion not subject to national boundaries. It changed its position, however, once the decision was made to partition India

on the basis of religion. In 1947 Maududi redefined the JI's purpose as the establishment of an Islamic state in Pakistan. In

order to achieve this objective, thejl believed it was necessary

to purge the community of deviant behavior and to establish a

political system in which decision making would be undertaken

by a few pious people well versed in the meaning of Islam.

Maududi's writings also gained a wide audience. He retired as head of the party in 1972.

In order to rid the community of what it considered to be

deviant behavior, the JI waged a campaign in 1953 against the

Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan that resulted in some 2,000

deaths, brought on martial law rule in Punjab, and led Gover- nor General Ghulam Mohammad to dismiss the Federal Cabinet. The anti-Ahmadiyya movement resulted in 1974 in a bill successfully piloted through the National Assembly by then

Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto declaring the Ahmadiyyas a non-Muslim minority.

The JTs views on Islamization and limited political participation were opposed by those people who saw the party's platform as advocating religious dictatorship. The question of

whether the JI was a political party or an organization working

to subvert legitimate political processes was raised in the

courts. The Supreme Court ultimately decided in favor of the

JI as a lawful political organization. Prominent in political life since independence, the JI was the dominant voice for the

interests of the ulama in the debates leading to the adoption of

217
Pakistan: A Country Study

Pakistan's first constitution. The JI participated in opposition

politics from 1950 to 1977.

Under party chief Mian Tufail Muhammad, thejl supported

the Zia regime's Islamization program, but it clashed with him

over the 1984 decision to ban student unions because this ban

affected the party's student wing, the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam

(Islamic Society of Students). The Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam had

become increasingly militant and had been involved in clashes

with other student groups on Pakistani campuses. Aspiring stu- dent activists, supportive of religious issues, have flocked to the

Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam as a means of having an impact on

national politics. The Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam also has been a major source of new recruits for the JI; it is thought that onethird ofJI leaders come from the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam. The JI envisions a state governed by Islamic law and opposes Westernization—including capitalism, socialism, and such practices as bank interest, birth control, and relaxed social mores. The JI's influence has been far greater than its showing at the polls suggests. In 1986, for example, two JI senators successfully piloted the controversial Shariat Bill through the Senate,

although it did not become law at that time. In addition, the

movement of student recruits from the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam

into the JI has created a new bloc of Islamist voters. Through

the Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam, the JI is working to leave a permanent mark on the political orientation of the country's future

leaders. However, the Pakistani electorate has been resistant to making religion a central factor in determining statecraft. In

1990 the JI was an important component of the IJI but nevertheless won only four seats. Furthermore, in the 1993 national

elections, the Islamization factor was even more muted because

the religious parties—spearheaded by the JI—were not aligned

with the two main contenders, the PML-N and the PPP. The JI and its political umbrella group, the Pakistan Islamic Front,

captured only three seats in the National Assembly.

Pakistan People's Party

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) represents another part

of Pakistan's political spectrum. The PPP was a vehicle for the

political ambitions of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. His immediate aim

was to bring down the government of his former political mentor, Ayub Khan. The party's inaugural convention was held in

Lahore in 1967. The PPP adopted the slogan "Islam our Faith,

Democracy our Polity, Socialism our Economy." The party, like

218
Pakistan People's Party

sign in Karachi

Courtesy Sheila Ross

Former prime minister and

leading politician, Mian

Nawaz Sharif

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

219
Pakistan: A Country Study

its founder, was enigmatic and full of contradictions. A left- leaning populist movement, the PPP attempted to blend Islam

with socialism. The PPP espoused such policies as land reform

to help the peasants; nationalization of industries to weaken

the industrialists; and administrative reforms to reduce the

power of the bureaucrats. The party, however, was built on the

foundations of the wealthy, landed elite, Pakistan's traditional

ruling class. The PPP came to power in December 1971 after the loss of

East Pakistan, when Bhutto was sworn in as president and chief

martial law administrator. Bhutto lifted martial law in April

1972 and in 1973 stepped down as president and became

prime minister. The PPP did little to advance the first two

tenets of its platform, Islam and democracy, but promoted

socialism with a vengeance. Bhutto nationalized large-scale

industries, insurance companies, and commercial banks, and

he set up a number of public corporations to expand the role

of the government in commerce, construction, and transportation. The heavy hand with which Bhutto and the PPP exerted

their power aroused widespread resentment. Matters came to a head in 1977 when the PPP won 155 of the 200 seats in the

National Assembly with 58 percent of the total votes cast. The

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), a coalition of nine opposition parties and with 35 percent of the votes, won only thirty-six seats. The PNA charged widespread electoral fraud, and the

resulting PPP-PNA confrontation and the accompanying civil unrest precipitated the imposition of martial law. The survival of Bhutto's party after his execution in 1979 was

facilitated by dynastic politics. His widow Nusrat and his daughter Benazir led the party as cochairpersons. During martial law,

the PPP joined with ten other parties in the Movement for the

Restoration of Democracy (MRD) to pressure the Zia government to hold free elections under the 1973 constitution. Four

of the MRD's component parties were members of the PNA,

which had been formed to oppose the PPP in the 1977 elections. The PPP joined the MRD coalition, hoping the military

would be prepared to negotiate with the MRD if it were part of

a larger political alliance.

The MRD campaign launched in February 1981 appeared to gain momentum. In March 1981, however, a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft was hijacked by terrorists demanding the

release of political prisoners. The hijacking was the work of an

organization—Al-Zulfiqar—allegedly run by Bhutto's son, Mur220
Government and Politics

taza. Although the PPP dissociated itself from the episode, the

hijacking was a major setback for both the PPP and the MRD.

Another MRD agitation failed in 1983. After Zia's death in

1988, the MRD was dissolved, and the PPP, the largest party in

the alliance, contested the 1988 elections on its own. Although

the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the National

Assembly as a result of the 1988 elections, it won a narrow plurality, and only with the support of the Refugee People's Movement (Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz—MQM) and other parties was it able to form a government. After a troubled period in power,

the PPP government was dismissed by President Ishaq Khan in

1990. The PPP was the principal member of the PDA, which

lost the 1990 elections to the IJI. The PDA blamed its defeat on

alleged tampering with the vote. The National Democratic

Institute for International Affairs, an international observer

team, did note irregularities in the election but declared that

the ultimate outcome was in general accordance with the popular will. In the October 1993 general elections that returned Benazir

to power, the PPP won eighty-six of the 217 seats in the

National Assembly, while Nawaz Sharif's PML-N won seventytwo. The PPP was successful in forming a coalition with other

parties to control a block of 121 seats. Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz

The Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM) , a party formed to represent the interests of the muhajir community in Pakistan, had a meteoric rise in the political life of the country. Founded by

Altaf Hussain in 1984, the MQM won thirteen (out of 207)

seats in the National Assembly in the 1988 elections, making it the third largest party in the assembly after the PPP and the IJI. MQM support of the PPP made it possible for Benazir to form

a government and become prime minister. Shortly after the

election, however, the coalition between the PPP and the MQM

broke down, and the two parties' subsequently troubled relations contributed greatly to the instability of Benazir's first government. In the 1990 general elections, the MQM won fifteen seats in the National Assembly, remaining the third largest

party. The MQM boycotted the 1993 National Assembly elections but won twenty-seven seats in the provincial assembly of

Sindh.

The MQM had its origin in the All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization at Karachi University. At a large public

221
Pakistan: A Country Study

meeting in Karachi in 1986, the MQM expressed the political

and economic demands of the muhajir community. The MQM's

political strength came primarily from the urban areas of

Sindh, and its main emphasis was on securing betterjob opportunities for muhajirs. The MQM played an active role in the ethnic riots in Karachi in the winter of 1986-87. These

disturbances brought prominence and notoriety to the MQM

and its leader, Altaf Hussain. It was after these riots that the

MQM leadership converted the movement into a political

party. The MQM's full political weight was first felt in the 1988

elections.

Awami National Party

The Awami National Party (awami means "people's"), which

depends on Pakhtuns of the North-West Frontier Province and

northern Balochistan as its political base, won six seats in the

National Assembly in the 1990 elections. In the 1993 national

elections, the party won three seats in the National Assembly.

The Awami National Party was formed in 1986 by the merger of

several left-leaning parties including the Awami Tehrik and the

National Democratic Party. Khan Abdul Wali Khan was

appointed its first president. Wali Khan's political career had

been built on the tradition of intense Pakhtun nationalism

inherited from his father, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Both

men were opposed to the creation of Pakistan, and after partition they were imprisoned. In 1956 Wali Khan joined the

National Awami Party (NAP), led by a charismatic Bengali

socialist, Maulana Bhashani. In 1965 the NAP split into two fac- tions, with Wali Khan becoming president of the pro-Moscow

faction. In 1972 the party was strong enough to form coalition

provincial governments, with its partner the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-iIslam (JUI) in the North-West Frontier Province and

Balochistan. These governments were short-lived. Wali Khan

was again jailed, and his party was barred from politics when

the Supreme Court upheld the finding of Bhutto that the NAP

was conspiring against the state of Pakistan. General Zia subsequently withdrew the charges against the NAP. Wali Khan was

released, joined the National Democratic Party, and ultimately

formed the Awami National Party.

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-lslam

The Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) , led by Maulana Fazlur

Rahman, had its origins in the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH),

222
Government and Politics

founded by a group of ulama of the Deoband Movement in

prepartition India. The JUH argued that Muslims could coexist

with other religions in a society where they were not the majority. In 1945, however, a group ofJUH ulama, led by Maulana

Shabir Ahmad Usmani, split off from the JUH, formed theJUI,

and gave their support to the movement for an independent

Pakistan. Since 1947 theJUI has undergone a number of organizational and program changes. It developed strong support

in the North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan. In 1972 it joined the NAP to form governments in those two provinces. In

1977 theJUI contested the National Assembly elections as a component of the Pakistan National Alliance. TheJUI did not

sympathize with General Zia's Islamization program, and in

1981 the JUI joined the MRD to pressure Zia to hold free elections. TheJUI won six seats in the National Assembly in the

1990 elections. In the 1993 national elections, theJUI was the

main component of the Islami Jamhoori Mahaz, which won

four seats in the National Assembly.

Tehrik-i-lstiqlal

The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Solidarity Movement) was founded by

retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan in 1969. The party's aim was

to provide a vehicle, in the center of the political spectrum, for

the growing middle class. Although the party acquired sizable

support among the professional classes, including lawyers and

doctors, it did not develop significant grassroots strength. In an

effort to gain increased status, in 1981 the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal

joined a number of other parties in the MRD, but it left the

movement in 1986. The Tehrik-i-Istiqlal did not fare well in the

elections of 1988, and Asghar Khan resigned as the party's

chairman in 1989. In the elections of 1990, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal

allied itself with the PPP in the Pakistan Democratic Alliance.

In the elections of 1993, the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal did not win any

seats. Political Developments since Zia

The First Government of Benazir Bhutto

Benazir Bhutto, the first woman prime minister of a modern

Muslim state, is clearly the beneficiary of dynastic politics and

of the emotional ties of a large section of the electorate to her

charismatic family. However, this legacy as the daughter of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto has proven to be a mixed political blessing.

223
Pakistan: A Country Study

Although she inherited her father's party, the PPP, and has led

it to victory, the party won a very narrow plurality in the 1988

elections and was therefore forced to enter into a coalition with

the MQM (representing Pakistan's muhajir community) and

several other parties in order to form a government. Benazir

wanted to repeal the Eighth Amendment in order to strengthen her position as prime minister but could not muster

sufficient political support and soon abandoned the effort.

Benazir also had to address several long-standing problems:

how to cope with an intrusive and politicized military; how to resolve the power play between the central and provincial governments; and how to fashion an appropriate role for Islam in

government. In addition to these problems, Benazir had to face pressing new ones, including a large budget deficit and

growing ethnic violence.

Several early actions appeared to strengthen Benazir's ability to deal with these problems. In choosing her cabinet, for example, Benazir kept the portfolios of finance and defense for herself but appointed a seasoned bureaucrat, Wasim Jafari, as her

top adviser on finance and economic affairs. Her retention of

Zia's foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, signaled continuity in the country's policy on Afghanistan. Also, when working out their political coalition, the MQM agreed to support

the PPP government at both federal and provincial levels. The

agreement, signed by the Sindh-based MQM and the head of

the PPP in Sindh, pledged to protect and safeguard the interests of all the people of Sindh, regardless of language, religion, or origin of birth, as well as to stamp out violence and to support the rule of law. The agreement—short-lived, as it turned

out—was an effort to achieve peace and cooperation between

the indigenous population and the muhajirs in Benazir's trou- bled home province.

Benazir's assumption of office brought great expectations

from inside as well as outside Pakistan. In her first address to the nation, Benazir pledged to work for a progressive and democratic Pakistan—one guided by Islamic principles of brotherhood, equality, and tolerance. At the same time, she invoked

the Quaid-i-Azam's vision for a Pakistan that would grow as a modern state. Benazir's rhetoric promised much to an expectant nation: strengthened relations with the United States, the

Soviet Union, and China; protected minority rights; increased

provincial autonomy; improvement of education; introduction

of a comprehensive national health policy; enhanced rights for

224
Government and Politics

women, with equal pay for equal work; and so on. When faced

with the hard realities of government, however, most of Benazir's rhetoric did not translate into action. Although she was

successful in advancing the democratization process in Pakistani politics and was able to achieve warmer relations with the

United States and, for a short while, with India as well, Benazir's first term in office is usually looked upon, by both foreign

and domestic observers, as ineffectual—a period of governmental instability. Within months she had lost much of her

political support.

The scion of the feudal elite of Sindh, the Harvard- and

Oxford-educated Benazir was often described as autocratic during her first term. Although she spoke of healing wounds and

putting an end to the past, she was inexorably tied to her

father's political legacy, which included harsh repression of

political opposition. Further, her appointment of her mother,

Nusrat, as a senior minister without portfolio, followed by the

selection of her father-in-law as chairman of the parliamentary

Public Accounts Committee, was viewed in some quarters as ill- advised nepotism. Benazir's government also set up the controversial Placement Bureau, which made political appointments

to the civil bureaucracy, although the bureau was later abolished. Benazir let the political legacy of her family intrude, for

example, when able public servants, who had earlier harbored

disagreements with her father, were dismissed for reasons

other than job performance.

Benazir also had to contend with growing political opposition. As a political power broker, she was in the late 1980s no

match for her main rival, then chief minister of Punjab, Nawaz

Sharif. In the 1988 elections that brought Benazir to power, her

party had won the largest number of seats in the National

Assembly but controlled only one of the four provinces. Punjab, the most populous province, with over half of Pakistan's

population, came under the control of the opposition IJI and

of its leader, Nawaz Sharif, who was the only major political fig- ure from the Zia era to survive the reemergence of the PPP. To

maintain her power and implement her programs, Benazir

would have needed to maneuver successfully between a powerful president and the military elite and to reach a political

accommodation with Nawaz Sharif. Instead, she pursued a

course of confrontation, including unsuccessful efforts to over- throw him in the provincial assembly. In addition, the failure of

the PPP to share power and spoils with its coalition partners

225
Pakistan: A Country Study

caused further alienation, including the withdrawal of the

MQM from the government in October 1989.

The public's sense of disillusionment deepened as the government failed to deliver its promised employment and eco- nomic development programs. Inflation and unemployment

were high, and the country's burgeoning population put

increased pressure on already overburdened education and

health systems. The government also failed to deal with the

country's growing drug abuse problem, and there was opposition from religious conservatives who distrusted the degree of

Benazir's commitment to the state's Islamic principles. Despite

tensions, disagreements, and mutual misgivings, however,

Benazir continued to be supported by the armed forces. The

chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, publicly

stated his intention to maintain a politically neutral army.

Benazir narrowly survived a no-confidence motion in the

National Assembly. Her government did not compile a record

of accomplishment that might have offset her other difficulties. Instead, she found herself constrained by the military and by

the constitutional structure her government inherited. During

her tenure, no significant legislation was passed. Fewer than a dozen bills—all minor amendments to existing legislation

passed the National Assembly. Benazir complained that legislation was stymied because the Senate was dominated by her

opposition.

Benazir's problems were further accentuated in February

1990 when an MQM-directed strike in Karachi escalated into

rioting that virtually paralyzed the city. The strike had been

called to protest the alleged abduction of MQM supporters by

the PPP. The resulting loss of life and property forced Benazir

to call in the army to restore order. In addition to the violence

in Sindh and elsewhere, she had to cope with increasing

charges of corruption leveled not only at her associates, but at her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and father-in-law. On the international front, Pakistan faced heightened tensions with India over Kashmir and problems associated with the unresolved

Afghan war.

Finally, on August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan

dismissed Benazir's government, dissolved the National Assembly as well as the Sindh and North-West Frontier Province provincial assemblies, and appointed a caretaker government

headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the Combined

Opposition Parties in the National Assembly. In accordance

226
Government and Politics

with the constitution, the president scheduled national and

provincial elections for October 1990. Ishaq Khan said his

actions were justified because of corruption, incompetence,

and inaction; the release of convicted criminals under the

guise of freeing political prisoners; a failure to maintain law

and order in Sindh; and the use of official government

machinery to promote partisan interests. A nationwide state of

emergency was declared, citing both "external aggression and

internal disturbance." Benazir called her dismissal "illegal,

unconstitutional, and arbitrary" and implied that the military was responsible. She added that the PPP would not take to the

streets to avoid giving Ghulam Ishaq Khan's regime any pretext

for not holding scheduled elections. The military proclaimed

that its only interest was in maintaining order.

The Caretaker Government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi

Ironically, Benazir's successor, the caretaker prime minister, was one of Pakistan's largest landowners, also from Benazir's

Sindh Province. Jatoi had joined the PPP when Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto had founded it in the late 1960s, was in Bhutto's first cabinet, and was later chief minister of Sindh until Zia over- threw Bhutto in 1977. Jatoi had remained supportive of the

PPP during the martial law period and had spearheaded the

campaign organized by the MRD against Zia's government. Following Benazir's return to Pakistan in 1986, however, Jatoi was removed as chairman of the Sindh PPP and subsequently

formed his own political organization, the National People's

Party. Known as a moderate, Jatoi said that his party's objective was to make Pakistan a modern, democratic, and progressive

Islamic welfare state. Jatoi's caretaker government instituted accountability proceedings against persons charged with corruption and, under

the authority of laws enacted by both the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

and the Zia regimes, set up special courts to handle accountability cases. The accountability process had traditionally been

used to disqualify from public office those found guilty of cor- ruption and wrongdoing. It had also been used as a weapon by

politicians in power against their opponents. The period for

accountability defined by the Jatoi government was limited to the twenty months of Benazir's regime. The PPP demand that

Nawaz Sharifs Punjab government during that same time be

subjected to similar scrutiny was rejected. Nevertheless, the

Jatoi government defended the proceedings as fair and neu227
Pakistan: A Country Study

tral. Although several charges were brought against Benazir,

and her appearance before the accountability tribunals was

required, she remained free and was able to lead her party in

the October 1990 elections.

The Central Election Commission, consisting of three members of the senior judiciary, supervised preparation of the electoral rolls and the conduct of the 1990 elections as well as processing complaints and issuing reports. Although Pakistan

has a large number of political parties, the two main contenders in the elections were both broad-based coalitions. One con- tender was the PDA, established during the campaign by

Benazir's dominant PPP, together with the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal,

headed by Asghar Khan, and two smaller parties. Asghar Khan

had been Pakistan's first commander in chief of the air force

and later became chairman of Pakistan International Airlines,

before entering the political arena in 1969 and founding his

own party. In the 1970s, Asghar Khan was one of Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto's harshest critics. Having helped to oust Bhutto, however, he did not benefit from the Zia military government, and

in 1989 he resigned as Tehrik-i-Istiqlal's chairman. Political

observers were surprised when the party joined the PDA.

The other major contender in opposition to the PDA was

the IJI, the coalition that had also competed with the PPP in

the 1988 elections. The Pakistan Muslim League was a major

component of the IJI, as was the JI. The three chief competitors

for leadership in the IJI and specifically in the Pakistan Muslim

League were Nawaz Sharif, former Prime Minister Mohammad

Khan Junejo, and Ejaz ul-Haq, son of the late President Zia ul- Haq. These three men represented key groups in Pakistan's

political culture. Junejo belonged to a major Sindhi landowning family and represented the feudal classes. Ejaz appealed

particularly to Zia's Islamic fundamentalist supporters. His can- didacy was weakened, however, by his relative lack of political

experience. Nawaz Sharif, the ultimate victor, represented the

country's growing business classes. The caretaker prime minister also aspired to remain in power, but his party was not a member of the IJI, and so he lacked sufficient political

strength.

Other important parties included Altaf Hussain's MQM, representing the refugee community in urban Sindh, and Khan

Abdul Wali Khan's Awami National Party, based in the Northwest Frontier Province and northern Balochistan. Although in

1990 the PDA and the IJI were the major election contenders

228
Government and Politics

in Pakistan's largest provinces (Punjab, Sindh, and the NorthWest Frontier Province) , they had only a limited presence in

Balochistan, compared with regional and religious parties,

such as the JUI and the Jamhoori Watan Party.

The central campaign issue in 1990 for the IJI was the Benazir government's alleged corruption and wrongdoing in office.

The principal issue for the PDA was the alleged unconstitutionality of her dismissal from office and the subsequent treatment

of her, and her family and associates, by the caretaker government. The campaign was heated and included incidents of violence, harassment, and political kidnappings. Media coverage

played an active role. During the campaign, the government

no longer held a monopoly on television news because a sec- ond network, People's Television Network (PTN), had been

started, to compete with Pakistan Television Corporation

(PTV). The new network introduced Cable News Network

(CNN) in Pakistan. The PPP filed a complaint against PTV,

charging biased network election coverage, but the complaint was rejected by the Lahore High Court. Print media coverage

offered more variety. Although government-controlled newspapers tended to be anti-Benazir, the larger private sector of print

media provided more diversity of opinion. Both the PDA and

the IJI predicted victory, but at least one detailed public opinion poll gave the edge to the PDA.

The election results were disastrous for the PDA, as the IJI won 105 of the 207 contested seats in the National Assembly.

The PDA won only forty-five seats. The IJI attributed its success

to holding its coalition together as well as establishing electoral

alliances nationwide to ensure that PDA candidates would not run unopposed. The PDA blamed the defeat on alleged rigging of the elections. Although the elections were certainly not

free of irregularities, observation teams both from inside the

country and from outside, including a team from member

countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC—see Glossary), concluded that the elections had

been generally free and fair. Despite their problems, the 1990

elections were another step forward in the quest for political

stability and democratic government. The constitutional trans- fer of power was achieved without direct military intervention.

The Government of Nawaz Sharif

When Nawaz Sharif became prime minister in November

1990, his political coalition, the IJI, had more than a two-thirds

229
Pakistan: A Country Study

majority in the National Assembly. The IJI alliance, a grouping

of parties whose chief components were the PML and the JI, had been formed in 1988 to oppose the PPP in the elections of

that year. In the 1988 elections, the PPP emerged as the single

largest group in the National Assembly, and its leader, Benazir,

became prime minister. At the same time, however, Nawaz

Sharif emerged as the most powerful politician outside the

PPP. Just two years later, the IJI under Nawaz Sharifs leadership

achieved victory at the polls, and Nawaz Sharif took over in a

peaceful, constitutional transfer of power—the third prime

minister since Zia's death in 1988—and ushered in a return to democracy. Nawaz Sharifs ascendancy also marked a transition

in the political culture of Pakistan—a power shift from the tra- ditional feudal aristocracy to a growing class of modern entre- preneurs. This transition mirrored the socioeconomic changes

that had been at work in Pakistan, moving the country gradually from a feudal to an industrial society.

Nawaz Sharif, born in Lahore in 1949, belongs to a postindependence generation of politicians. Scion of a leading industrial family, he is a practicing Muslim, an ardent capitalist, and

a political moderate. A graduate of the Government College

Lahore, with a degree from Punjab University Law College,

also in Lahore, he rose to prominence representing an urban

constituency seeking its own political identity. His family, along

with other major industrial families, had suffered from the

nationalization of large industrial enterprises during Bhutto's

regime (1971-77). Nawaz Sharif had worked to build a political

constituency that would favor private industrial and commercial entrepreneurship. He served in Punjab, first as finance

minister and then as chief minister, before coming to national

office. As finance minister, he presented development-oriented

budgets. As chief minister, he stressed welfare and development activities and the maintenance of law and order.

In his first address to the nation after taking office as prime

minister, Nawaz Sharif announced his government's comprehensive national reconstruction plan and said that its implementation would ensure the successful march of Pakistan into

the twenty-first century. He stressed that proper use of the

country's natural resources would be made, the pace of industrialization expedited, and the best use of talented manpower

identified. Under his development policy, investment would be

encouraged, and restrictions on setting up new industries

would be lifted.

230
Government and Politics

Early assessments of Nawaz Sharif and his government noted

his initiative, youthful energy, and already proven ability and

popularity in his home province, the country's power base. The

newspaper Dawn pointed out, however, that his Punjab connection was both an asset and a liability and that "to acquire a genuinely all-Pakistan stature, he will have to have ingenuity, and

acumen, magnanimity and vision, and the strength to take bold

decisions."

Nawaz Sharifs cabinet initially included eighteen ministers:

nine from Punjab, two from the Islamabad Capital Territory,

six from Sindh, and one from Balochistan. His cabinet was later

expanded to include representation from the North-West Frontier Province. Of paramount importance to the new government was implementation of Nawaz Sharif's program for

strengthening the economy. Goals of the program included

self-reliance, deregulation and denationalization, tax reform,

foreign-exchange and payment reform, administrative and law

reform, and increases in agricultural productivity and exports.

The government's economic strategy rested on streamlining

the institutional framework for industrialization and on start- ing a new partnership with the private sector in order to promote common objectives. Nawaz Sharif regarded

unemployment as Pakistan's major problem and believed it could be solved only by rapid industrialization. He said his government was considering special incentives for rural industrialization and agro-based industries and was fully committed to a

policy of deregulation.

The IJI government was third in a line representing a dyarchical arrangement of shared power between Pakistan's civil- military and political forces. Nawaz Sharif and his predecessors, Junejo and Benazir, came to power under a constitutional

framework in which, under the controversial Eighth Amendment introduced by Zia, the president was empowered to dis- solve the parliament and dismiss the government. Both Junejo

and Benazir had earlier been unceremoniously dismissed from

office, and the constitutional framework limited Nawaz Sharifs ability to govern despite the support of a majority in the parliament. He, too, would be dismissed under the constitutional

framework in 1993.

Pakistan's emerging two-party system was strengthened by

the 1988 and 1990 elections and the constitutional transfer of

power in 1990 from Benazir to Nawaz Sharif. In these elections,

the two political alliances, the IJI and the PDA (headed by the

231
Pakistan: A Country Study

PPP), became the main contenders for power. Although both

alliances agreed on Pakistan's need for a liberal democracy and

a market economy, the PDA opposition represented a real

political challenge to the government, and Benazir conducted

a relentless campaign to oust Nawaz Sharif.

From the outset, the Nawaz Sharif government's record was

mixed. On the one hand, it achieved passage in May 1991 of

the Shariat Bill, which declared the Quran and the sunna (see

Glossary) to be the law of the land. Islamic fundamentalists, on

the other hand, did not think the bill went far enough. The

more secular-minded Pakistanis feared that a theocracy was

being established. A working group was set up to monitor and

make recommendations for enforcing Islamic laws in the country. The working group adopted a nineteen-point plan that

included calls for the implementation of all Islamic legislation,

especially the laws creating sharia courts; transformation of the

education system to reflect Islamic teaching; controls on the

print and electronic media designed to ensure Islamic moral

values; uniform and enforced prayer schedules; and the establishment of an Islamic banking system and the total abolition

of interest.

Additionally, in November 1991, the Federal Shariat Court,

Pakistan's supreme religious court, declared the provisions of

some twenty federal and provincial laws repugnant to Islam. A

particular problem was the ruling that payment of interest

( riba) was prohibited by Islam even if the loan involved was for

productive purposes. Although the government had publicly

committed itself to Islamization, its major domestic policy ini- tiative was the liberalization of the economy. If the ruling on

riba were fully implemented, this new economic policy likely

would fail. With no consensus in Pakistan regarding either the

content or the pace of Islamic reform, Nawaz Sharif sought to strike an acceptable balance to enable his government to remain in power.

The government also had to contend with rampant crime

and terrorism, which continued to be a cause for alarm in the

country, particularly in Sindh. Kidnappings, bombings, and

murders persisted despite concerted efforts by the police and

the military to stem lawlessness. Pakistanis called this state of

affairs the "Kalashnikov culture" because the flood of available

automatic weapons gave long-standing ethnic and political

rivalries a deadly new significance (see Prospects for Social

Cohesion, ch. 2). The arms were largely a legacy from the war

232
Government and Politics

in neighboring Afghanistan. The police were increasingly out- gunned, and even foreigners were not immune from attack. In

the summer of 1991, the prime minister was forced to cancel an important trip to Japan in quest of investment in order to calm a population shaken by a particularly savage string of

murders in Punjab. In an effort to stem the violence, the government decreed that Pakistanis turn in their weapons, but,

predictably, few of them did. The government also passed the

Twelfth Amendment to the constitution, which provided for

the further jurisdictional authority of Speedy Trial Courts to dispense summary justice. The opposition, however, criticized

the law as suppressing fundamental rights.

Nawaz Sharif held to his conviction that the solution to Pakistan's political problems was free-market reform and economic

growth, so he liberalized foreign-exchange regulations and

denationalized public-sector industrial enterprises and financial institutions. Furthermore, government approval was no

longer required for the establishment of new industrial enterprises (with some exceptions, particularly in relation to arms and explosives). A number of important industries such as electricity generation, shipping, airlines, highway construction,

and telecommunications were opened up to the private sector. Although there was support for liberalizing and privatizing the

economy, there was considerable criticism of the process of

implementation. Some critics feared that moving too fast could

produce turmoil, with the resultant demand for ^nationalization. Other critics asked for protection for the more vulnerable

groups in society who would not be able to compete in a free

market. The government's ability to focus effectively on and

deal with these problems was weakened by its involvement with

the Pakistan Cooperative Societies and the Bank of Credit and

Commerce International (BCCI) financial scandals (see

Finance, ch. 3).

In keeping with his goals of consolidating economic growth

and overcoming the country's regional divisions, Nawaz Sharif was convinced of the need for a modern national infrastructure, regardless of cost. As a result, he launched the construction of a US$1 billion highway project, which National

Highway Authority chairman Hidayat Niazi described as a step

toward building a nation (see Transportation, ch. 3).

Nawaz Sharifs government continued to be under pressure

from within and without, and his ruling coalition, the IJI, was plagued by internal dissention. Tensions, disagreements, and

233
Pakistan: A Country Study

political rivalries were present within the IJI's largest component, the Pakistan Muslim League. In May 1992, the fundamentalist JI, the second largest member of the coalition,

formally left the IJI. Since its inception, the IJI had been an alli- ance of varied right-of-center and Islamic parties in a marriage

of convenience to oppose the PPR However, the PML and the

JI had long been antagonists, and their disagreements

mounted over a number of issues. The JI was unhappy with the

IJI government's support of Saudi Arabia and the United States during the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), fearing that the defeat

of Iraq would transform Shia (see Glossary) Iran into a major

regional power. The JI also criticized the mainstream PML for

what it perceived to be foot-dragging on Islamization, including the matter of riba, as well as its abandonment of support for

the Afghan mujahidin in favor of efforts to establish a neutral,

United Nations-sponsored government in Kabul. The JI also

criticized the government's policy on Kashmir as not evidencing sufficient commitment to Islamic "freedom fighters" there.

The government's chief opposition, Benazir and the PPP,

criticized Nawaz Sharifs efforts at privatization, calling them

the "loot and plunder" of Pakistan and saying his plan favored

large investors and ran roughshod over labor. Benazir was also

critical of the government's Islamization policies and continued to allege that the 1990 elections, which brought Nawaz

Sharif s government to power, were fraudulent. In late 1992,

she tried to organize widespread protest marches against the

government. In response, Nawaz Sharif banned Benazir from

two of the country's largest cities and ordered police measures

against her supporters.

Benazir ultimately did not muster enough demonstrators

throughout the country to threaten the government. However,

Nawaz Sharifs actions, in the eyes of some, made him appear

too willing to espouse repressive measures rather than adhere

to democratic principles. Subsequently, relations between

Nawaz Sharif and Benazir appeared to soften somewhat. He

reportedly ceased calling her an "enemy of Pakistan," and

Benazir abandoned her demonstrations designed to topple

Nawaz Sharifs government through street power.

The ruling coalition appeared to weaken by early 1993. The

four major powers in Pakistan continued to be the president,

the military, Nawaz Sharifs IJI government, and the PPP opposition led by Benazir. Reports of a growing rift between Nawaz

Sharif and Ishaq Khan became more commonplace. The mili234
Government and Politics

tary—which never had an overt constitutional role in the government but which had historically been a key player in the

formation and dismissal of governments—was closely and ner- vously monitored by observers.

President Ghulam Ishaq Khan as Power Broker

A powerful player in the political equation was President

Ishaq Khan. The president, under the constitution, is elected

by a majority of the members of the national and provincial

assemblies. Ishaq Khan was a seasoned senior bureaucratturned politician who had been a key figure in Pakistan for

more than three decades. Born in 1915 in the North-West

Frontier Province, he was appointed to the prestigious Civil

Service of Pakistan after independence in 1947. After holding

various regional posts, including being chairman of the West

Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (1961-66),

he was appointed to several positions in the central government—first as secretary, Ministry of Finance (1966-70) and

later as governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (1971-75). In

the latter position, he questioned the wisdom of a number of

the economic policies of then Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto. He was subsequently moved from the bank and made

secretary general at the Ministry of Defence. Although an

unusual post for a senior economics expert, it proved to be for- tuitous in that it brought him into close contact with the senior

officers of the armed forces. Among them was General Zia,

who later ousted Bhutto and turned the management of the

economy over to Ishaq Khan. During the martial law period

(1977-85), Ishaq Khan's titles changed, but he was responsible

for all important economic decisions (see Zia ul-Haq and Military Domination, 1977-88, ch. 1). Among other things, he supported the Zia government's efforts to Islamize the economy

through changes in the fiscal and banking systems.

In 1985 Ishaq Khan was elected to the Senate and later

became chairman of the Senate. The death of Zia in 1988

thrust Ishaq Khan to the center of the political stage. When the

military decided to use the constitution to handle the issue of

succession, Ishaq Khan, as chairman of the Senate and therefore next in the line of succession, became acting president.

He and the emergency council he instituted decided to hold

general elections and to allow political parties to participate.

Thus, the country was guided back to democracy, Benazir

235
Pakistan: A Country Study

became prime minister, and Ishaq Khan was subsequently

elected president by the national and provincial assemblies.

Ishaq Khan's position was considerably strengthened by the

Eighth Amendment to the constitution, introduced by President Zia, which allows the president to dismiss the government

and to override the government's choice of army chief. When

the previous army chief died unexpectedly, President Ishaq

Khan reportedly turned down the government's choice and

named General Abdul Waheed to head the army. General

Waheed, who is not known to have any political ambitions, is from the same ethnic group as Ishaq Khan—the Pakhtuns of

the North-West Frontier Province (see Linguistic and Ethnic

Groups, ch. 2).

Intermittent and conflicting signals of rapprochement,

realignment, and behind-the-scenes alliances among the vari- ous political players heightened the political tension in late

1992 and early 1993. There was speculation that the opposition

and the government might join forces to muster a two-thirds

majority in the parliament to repeal the Eighth Amendment or even that they might field a candidate against the president.

However, it was also noticeable that Benazir had stopped

openly attacking the president, and some observers considered

that she might be playing for time, hoping to use the differ- ences between the president and the prime minister to her

own advantage. The army, however, always a key ingredient in

the mix, continued to support the president as well as the con- tinuation of the Eighth Amendment. Against this backdrop,

Pakistan's developing democracy continued to be tested by eco- nomic problems, persistent violence, and corruption, as well as the power struggles of its leaders.

The "Silent Revolution": A Year of Political Struggle

In 1993 a protracted power struggle between Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif and President Ishaq Khan played out as Pakistan's

two leading politicians maneuvered each other out of power.

This period of behind-the-scenes struggle was described by a

Pakistani daily as a "Silent Revolution" and was watched with

some concern by the international community, which feared

that Pakistan could once again fall under military rule.

On April 18, 1993, the power struggle seemed to be resolved

when President Ishaq Khan, exercising the extraordinary constitutional powers afforded the president by the Eighth Amendment, dismissed the government of Prime Minister Nawaz

236
Government and Politics

Sharif. Once again Ishaq Khan had invoked the Eighth Amendment to bring down an elected government. The charges of

corruption and mismanagement of the economy that he lev- eled against Nawaz Sharif were almost identical to those he had

earlier brought against Benazir in 1990. President Ishaq Khan

appointed Balakh Sher Mazari as caretaker prime minister and

announced a new timetable for elections.

On May 26, 1993, the Supreme Court voted that Ishaq

Khan's dissolution of the National Assembly and his dismissal

of the prime minister were unconstitutional. The Supreme

Court's action was a sharp rebuke of Ishaq Khan's heavyhanded exercise of presidential powers and was widely hailed

as a victory for the advocates of democratization. Yet, although

the Supreme Court was able to reinstate the Nawaz Sharif government, the status quo ante was not restored, and the struggle

between the president and the prime minister continued

unabated, making the pursuit of regular government workings

impossible. Noting the mounting impatience of the Pakistani

military with the endless machinations of the country's politicians, the United States and the European Community communicated their concern, warning against a military takeover.

The continuing political crisis in Pakistan came to an abrupt

halt when the prime minister and president both resigned after

two weeks of intense negotiations among the Nawaz Sharif government, Benazir, and the army. The resolution of the crisis was unique because for the first time in the nation's history a government had voluntarily stepped down in order to avoid a

possible military intervention. Interestingly, the negotiations

had been mediated by General Waheed, the chief of the army

staff. The resultant agreement and its implementation followed

strict constitutional procedure. Ishaq Khan was replaced by the

chairman of the Senate, Wasim Sajjad, who functioned as act- ing president until the elections. More important, Moeen

Qureshi, a former civil servant and senior World Bank (see

Glossary) official, agreed to serve as caretaker prime minister.

Qureshi, a Pakistani national, had left the World Bank in 1992,

obtained permanent residence status in the United States, and

established his own company, Emerging Markets Corporation.

The Caretaker Government of Moeen Qureshi

During his three-month tenure as caretaker prime minister,

Moeen Qureshi initiated a substantial number of strong reform

measures. He devalued the currency and cut farm subsidies,

237
Pakistan: A Country Study

while raising the prices of wheat, electricity, and gasoline

strategies to reduce Pakistan's huge budget deficit—7.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary).

Qureshi also cut public-sector expenditures by instituting austerity measures, including closing down ten embassies and

abolishing fifteen ministries. Qureshi's most daring innovation,

however, was a temporary levy on agricultural output—a measure resisted by powerful landed interests (see Farm Ownership and Land Reform, ch. 3).

Qureshi next proceeded to single out those politicians who

had outstanding loans obtained from state banks and institutions—loans received under easy terms in return for past political favors—a total estimated at US$2 billion. In a move

calculated to shame these individuals, Qureshi added their

names to a published list of 5,000 individuals who had not ful- filled their loan obligations. Approximately 15 percent of the

individuals on the list had planned to run for office in the coming elections. These candidates included Benazir, Benazir's

husband, and Nawaz Sharifs brother. Most candidates quickly

repaid their loans; those who did not were barred from contest- ing the October 1993 elections. Drug-trafficking barons, a

small but powerful group including some members of the parliament, were permanently barred from running in the elections. Anticipating a further crackdown, several of the drug

barons fled the country.

In his three months in power, Qureshi exhibited an admirable degree of technocratic efficiency tempered by dogged

determination. Yet it remained to be seen whether his achievements would be accepted without reversal by the subsequent

administration. Indeed, some argue that the Qureshi caretaker

government, because of its temporary nature, was not much

constrained by the realpolitik of Pakistani society that the suc- ceeding government would have to face. The Qureshi government had, nonetheless, set a standard—one with which past

governments and the succeeding government of Benazir would

no doubt be compared.

Benazir Bhutto Returns

In the National Assembly elections of October 6-7, 1993,

Benazir's PPP won a plurality—eighty-six seats—but not the

absolute majority needed to immediately form a government

in the 217-seat National Assembly. Nawaz Sharifs Pakistan Muslim League ran a close second in gaining seventy-two seats.

238
Women voters at poll in Pishin, Balochistan, during national elections of October 1993

Courtesy Anita M. Weiss

Over the next two weeks, Benazir was successful in mustering

the allegiance of a number of small regional parties and independent members of the assembly and on October 19, 1993, was able to reclaim power with 121 seats in her coalition government. The October elections were hailed as the fairest in

Pakistan's history and were, according to international observers, held "without hindrance or intimidation." Voter turnout,

however, was lower than usual, as only about 40 percent of reg- istered voters participated.

Benazir benefitted in the 1993 national elections from the

MQM's boycott. In the 1990 national elections, the MQM,

which had captured fifteen seats, supported Nawaz Sharifs IJI coalition. Benazir also benefitted by the poor showing of the

religious parties.

After only one month in office, Benazir was able to

strengthen her position considerably. On November 13, 1993,

Benazir's candidate for president, Farooq Leghari, an Oxfordeducated PPP stalwart, easily defeated acting President Wassim

Sajjad, who was backed by Nawaz Sharif. In a vote by the two

parliamentary chambers—the National Assembly and the Senate—and the four provincial assemblies, Leghari won 273 votes

239
Pakistan: A Country Study

to Sajjad's 167. Bhutto hailed Leghari's election as a triumph

for democracy and predicted that he would contribute to the

country's stability.

Although the new president retained the constitutional

authority vested in the Eighth Amendment to dismiss the popularly elected National Assembly as well as the prime minister,

he appeared willing to support Benazir in curbing the power of

his office. Leghari promised not only to support a constitutional amendment to annul the extraordinary presidential

powers granted by the Eighth Amendment but also to challenge restrictive laws that related to Islamic religious courts and

to women's rights. In order to amend the constitution, however, a three-quarters majority in the parliament is needed—

formidable task, considering the strength of Benazir's opposition and the unproven staying power of her coalition. Leghari's

victory, nonetheless, was expected to end the pattern of disruptive power struggles between prime minister and president that

had so undermined previous governments.

Early in her term, Benazir declared that she would end Paki- stan's isolation and, in particular, that she would strive to improve her country's troubled relations with the United

States. At the same time, however, she vowed to maintain Pakistan's nuclear program and not allow the "national interest to be sacrificed." Relations between the United States and Pakistan had deteriorated sharply during 1992 when the former

threatened to classify the latter as a terrorist state because of its aid to militants fighting in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

Although the United States withdrew its threat in mid-July

1993, the Kashmir issue still loomed large and threatened to complicate Pakistan's relations with both India and the United

States (see the United States and the West, this ch.).

Benazir faced another, personal challenge. As her administration settled into office, a bitter Bhutto family feud played

out on the front pages of the Pakistani press. The feud pitted

Benazir against her younger brother Murtaza and her mother,

Nusrat, over dynastic control of the PPP. Nusrat organized Murtaza's election campaign for the Sindh provincial assembly, in

which her son contested (in absentia) more than twenty constituencies as an anti-Benazir candidate. Although he could

only occupy one seat in the assembly, Murtaza contested multiple seats because if he had won more than one, his political stature would have risen. The electorate gave Murtaza only one

victory, however, and as he returned to Pakistan from years in

240
Prime Minister Benazir

Bhutto

Courtesy Embassy of

Pakistan, Washington

exile in Damascus, he was jailed by the government on longstanding terrorist charges. In retaliation for her mother's

championing of Murtaza's political ambitions over her own,

Benazir ousted Nusrat from her position as cochairperson of

the PPP, further deepening the family rift. These family squabbles were a distraction for the new government, but Benazir was expected to make progress on a wide variety of social, educational, and cultural issues.

The Media

The press, television, and radio are vital forces in Pakistan's

political life. The importance of the press was evident even

before independence. In prepartition India, Muslim journalism flourished until the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-58, when

many Muslim newspapers were shut down (see The Seeds of

Muslim Nationalism, ch. 1). Between 1857 and the Government of India Act of 1935, which gave a large measure of self- government to Indians, none of the major newspapers were owned or edited by Muslims. However, when Indian Muslims

began to organize and rally to the political platform of the All- India Muslim League, concerted efforts were made to develop

a strong press to support the Muslim national cause. A number

of Muslim-owned newspapers were established, including Azad,

241
Pakistan: A Country Study

a Bengali-language daily founded in Calcutta in 1936. Two

English-language newspapers, Morning News in Calcutta and

Dawn in Delhi, began publishing in 1942. In the late 1930s, the

first Indian Muslim news agency, the Orient Press of India, was

founded.

On the eve of independence, however, only four major Muslim-owned newspapers existed in the area constituting the new

state of Pakistan: Pakistan Times, Zamindar, Nawa-i-Waqt, and

Civil and Military Gazette, all located in Lahore. A number of

Muslim newspapers moved to Pakistan. Dawn began publication as a daily in Karachi, then the federal capital, on the day of

independence in 1947. Other publications were also shifted to Pakistan including the Morning News and the Urdu-language

dailies, Jang and Anjam.

In the early 1990s, there were over 1,500 newspapers and

journals in the country, including publications in Urdu,

English, and in regional languages. The major national daily

newspapers in Urdu are Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt, Jasarat, Masawat,

Mashriq, and Hurriyat. The major national dailies in English are Dawn, Pakistan Times, Muslim, Morning News, Nation, Frontier

Post, and News. Herald is an important English-language magazine.

Newspapers and periodicals are owned by either private individuals, joint-stock companies, or trusts. The National Press

Trust, a nonprofit organization that is a major newspaper publisher, was established by businessmen in 1964 and taken over by the government in 1972. There are several other large news- paper and journal publishers. The two major news agencies in

Pakistan are the Associated Press of Pakistan and Pakistan Press

International. The Associated Press of Pakistan was taken over by the government in 1960. Pakistan Press International is a

private joint-stock company.

Radio also has been an effective method of communication

because the literacy rate is low and other methods of communication are sometimes not available. The Pakistan Broadcasting

Corporation has played a key role in disseminating information and transmitting government policies as well as promoting

Islamic principles and their application. Another state-run

organization, Azad Kashmir Radio, broadcasts in Azad Kashmir. Television, although newer, has also been effective, with

coverage in the mid-1990s reaching more than 80 percent of

the population. Until August 1990, the only television channel was the government-owned Pakistan Television Corporation

242
Government and Politics

(PTV) . At that time, however, another television channel, People's Television Network was established (see Telecommunications, ch. 3) . People's Television Network brought Cable News

Network (CNN) to Pakistan.

The media played an active role in all three national elections from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. Although the government-owned radio and PTV presented a progovernment

line, the establishment of People's Television Network ended

the government monopoly of television news. In the case of the

print media, government-controlled newspapers tended to express the government's viewpoint, but the large private sec- tor of print journalism furnished a much greater variety of

opinion.

The imposition of regulations based on the sharia was also

reflected in the media. For example, the government required

all women to wear dupattas, or scarves, over their heads on

newscasts and other PTV programs. Such restrictions, for

instance, prevented the women's swimming events of the 1992

Barcelona Olympic Games from being telecast in Pakistan

because the swimsuits were regarded as immodest. Radio censors also ordered a number of controversial songs dropped

from broadcasting.

Foreign Policy

Pakistan's foreign policy has been marked by a complex balancing process—the result of its history, religious heritage, and

geographic position. The primary objective of that policy has

been to preserve Pakistan's territorial integrity and security,

which have been in jeopardy since the state's inception.

A new era began with the partition of British India in 1947

and the formation of two independent, sovereign states—India

and Pakistan. Both nations searched for their place in the

world order and aspired to leadership roles beyond the subcontinent.

India and Pakistan became adversaries at independence

and have so remained. The two countries fought each other

shortly after partition, in 1965, and in 1971, causing the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of still another new

sovereign entity—Bangladesh. India-Pakistan rivalry intensified

rather than diminished after the Cold War, and the Kashmir

territorial dispute remains dangerous and recurrent.

Pakistan sought security through outside alliances. The new

nation painstakingly worked on building a relationship with

243
Pakistan: A Country Study

the United States, in which the obligations of both sides were

clearly defined. The Western-oriented, anticommunist treaties

and alliances Pakistan joined became an important part of its foreign policy. Pakistan also saw itself as a vanguard of independent Muslim states. India

A major focus in Pakistan's foreign policy is the continuing

quest for security against India, its larger, more powerful, and

generally hostile neighbor. Pakistan was created despite the

opposition of the most powerful political party in prepartition

India, the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress, and

the suspicion remains among Pakistanis that India has never

reconciled itself to the existence of an independent Pakistan.

Several events further soured the relationship. One of these was the massive transfer of population between the two countries at partition, with its attendant bloodshed as Muslims left India and Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan. There was also bitter- ness over the distribution of financial assets left by the British,

with India initially blocking payments to Pakistan from the

joint sterling account. An even more complex issue was the sov- ereignty of Kashmir, a concern arising from the accession of

the princely states to India or Pakistan at partition. Although

almost all of these states made the choice quickly, based on

geographic location and the religious majority of their population, several delayed. One of these was Hyderabad, with a predominantly Hindu population and a Muslim ruler who did not

want to accede to India. Hyderabad was a landlocked state in

the south of India, and Indian military intervention was used

to incorporate it into India.

The princely state ofJammu and Kashmir (usually referred

to as Kashmir) , however, had a Hindu ruler and boundaries

with both Pakistan and India. Although Muslims constituted a majority of the state's population, the Hindu-Sikh community

made up the majority in the province ofJammu, and Buddhists

predominated around Ladakh. After a popular uprising

against the Hindu ruler in late 1947, supported by Pakistani

tribesmen and some military units, the ruler panicked and

acceded to India. The subsequent Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-

48 over control of Kashmir concluded with a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations (UN), which took effect on January 1, 1949. Kashmir was divided by a UN line between the

areas held by the two countries, and a 1949 UN Security Coun244
Government and Politics

cil resolution provided for a plebiscite to be held under UN

auspices to decide the issue of accession. India has refused to hold the plebiscite, and the dispute has continued. In 1965 war

broke out again between the two countries over Kashmir, ending in another cease-fire in September. The Tashkent Declaration, signed on January 10, 1966, under the auspices of the

Soviet Union, provided for restoration of the India-Pakistan

international boundary and the Kashmir cease-fire line but did

not result in a permanent solution to the problem.

Relations between the two countries reached a new low in

1971, when India intervened militarily in support of secessionist forces in East Pakistan, thus playing an instrumental role in

the creation of independent Bangladesh. Although the IndoPakistani War of 1971 was fought over East Pakistan, heavy

fighting also occurred along the Kashmir cease-fire line. Consequently, under the Simla Agreement of 1972 following the end

of that war, the cease-fire line in Kashmir was redefined (it is now usually referred to as the Line of Control) , and India and

Pakistan agreed not to use force in Kashmir. The agreement

also improved relations sufficiently for India to release some

90,000 prisoners of war taken when Pakistan's army had surren- dered in East Pakistan (see Yahya Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1)

.

The circumstances surrounding the conflict over Kashmir

have changed considerably over the years, as have the levels of

UN involvement in the dispute. The military balance between

India and Pakistan after the latter's defeat in the 1971 war

heavily favored India. Another changed circumstance is that

beginning in 1989, India has had to face a virtual "Kashmiri

intifada" in its repressive efforts to keep a sullen and predominantly Muslim Kashmiri populace under control. This insurrection, India claims, is supported by the "hidden hand" of

Pakistan. Furthermore, the situation became even more complex with a growing movement among certain factions of Kashmiri militants for an independent Kashmiri state, precluding

accession to either India or Pakistan. The volatile and potentially explosive situation in Kashmir continued to be monitored

in 1994 by a team of UN observers, who operate under significant constraints. The Kashmir dispute remains the major deterrent to improved relations between the two countries.

Pakistan's suspicions of Indian intentions were further

aroused by India's entry into the nuclear arena. India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 persuaded Pakistan to initiate

its own nuclear program. The issue has subsequently influ245
Pakistan: A Country Study

enced the direction of Pakistan's relations with the United

States and China. United States-Pakistan relations over the

nuclear issue are particularly prickly. Pakistan's relations with

China on this issue, however, have been influenced by both

countries' suspicions of India. In 1991 China called on India to accept Pakistan's proposal of a nuclear-free weapons zone in

South Asia. In the same year, Pakistan and China signed a nuclear cooperation treaty reportedly intended for peaceful

purposes. This agreement included provision by China of a nuclear power plant to Pakistan.

An added source of tension in Indo-Pakistani relations con- cerned the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 (see Other South Asian Countries, this ch.). India

refused to condemn the Soviet action, while Pakistan provided

sanctuary for Afghan refugees and was a conduit for supplying arms from the United States and others to the Afghan mujahidin. During the Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan, therefore, Pakistan felt an increased threat on both its eastern and northwestern borders. The rise of militant Hinduism in India, and the accompanying violence against Muslims

there, is a further source of uneasiness between the two countries. Other South Asian Countries

Pakistan seeks to expand its relations with other South Asian

states, particularly Bangladesh. After an initial period of understandable coolness following the civil war that created Bangladesh in 1971, relations between the two countries have

improved considerably. Although Pakistan initially refused to recognize Bangladesh, formal relations between the two countries were established in 1976. Trade revived between Pakistan

and its former East Wing, and air links were reestablished. The

presidents of the two countries have exchanged visits. Both

countries often agree on international issues, sometimes in

opposition to India's views. Pakistan also joined the South

Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which

was founded through the efforts of Bangladesh's President

Ziaur Rahman. SAARC generally avoids political issues, instead

addressing social, economic, technological, and environmental

matters. However, SAARC's annual summit meetings provide an opportunity for private discussions among the heads of government.

246
Government and Politics

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan, its Muslim neighbor to the northwest, have never been easy. When Pakistan was admitted to the UN, only Afghanistan cast a negative vote, the result

of Afghanistan's refusal to accept the Durand Line as its border

with Pakistan. This border, established in 1893, divides the

Pakhtu or Pashto-speaking people of the region. Afghanistan

promoted secessionist movements among the Pakhtuns in Pakistan, calling for the creation of an independent Pakhtunistan

or, alternatively, for Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province to join Afghanistan.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, had a profound

effect on Pakistan's geopolitical situation. Pakistan became a

frontline state in the Cold War. Altogether more than 3 million

Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan, and the country became a base for mujahidin fighting against the Soviet forces and the

Afghan communists. Pakistan also became a conduit for military assistance by the United States and others to the mujahidin.

After the Soviet Union completed its troop withdrawal from

Afghanistan in February 1989, warfare continued between the

mujahidin and the Afghan communist government in Kabul.

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War,

however, resulted in a reassessment of Pakistan's foreign policy,

particularly in light of the sweeping restructuring of central

and southwest Asia. The Afghan resistance had been unable to unseat the Kabul regime. The heavy burden of the Afghan ref- ugees continued, and Pakistan wanted to be in a position to establish linkages with the newly emerging Central Asian

republics of the former Soviet Union. Pakistan decided in early

1992 to press for a political settlement. The communist government in Kabul was ousted in May 1992 and replaced by a fragile

coalition of various mujahidin factions. But the coalition did

not include the most radical of the Islamist mujahidin leaders,

Gulbaddin Hikmatyar.

In March 1993, the government of Nawaz Sharif brokered an agreement between President Burhanuddin Rabbani of

Afghanistan and Hikmatyar, Rabbani's longtime enemy, to share power in Afghanistan for eighteen months and then hold

elections. Under the agreement, Rabbani would remain president, Hikmatyar would become prime minister, and they would

choose government ministers together. A cease-fire was also to be implemented. It remains, however, for the agreement to be

ratified by the leaders of all Muslim groups involved in the war.

247
Pakistan: A Country Study

In 1994 fighting between mujahidin groups escalated in Kabul,

and a flood of refugees moved toward the Pakistani border.

The Former Soviet Union

In November 1992, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and

the five former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan created an extended

Muslim economic block linking Asia and Europe. As a result,

the expanded Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO), in

terms of geographic territory covered, became the largest eco- nomic bloc after the European Community. Then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif noted in a speech marking the occasion that

the ECO "now corresponds to the boundaries of the ancient

area, which brought prosperity and civilization . . . through

fruitful exchanges along the historic silk route. The people of

these lands have a shared history and common spiritual and

cultural values." Nawaz Sharif added his belief that extensive

investment in infrastructure and encouragement of the private

sector were the most important immediate objectives. He

noted that Pakistan was building a major highway network to link Central Asia to the Arabian Sea and that its railroads were

"poised to link not only member states but also [the] ECO with

Europe, Russia, and South Asia." He added that "peace in

Afghanistan is essential for political harmony and fruitful cooperation in our entire region."

China

Pakistan's desire for maximum balance and diversification in

its external relations has also led to close relations with

China—a valuable geopolitical connection. In 1950 Pakistan

recognized the People's Republic of China, the third noncommunist state and the first Muslim country to do so. The deterioration in Sino-Indian relations that culminated in the 1962

border war provided new opportunities for Pakistan's relations

with China. The two countries reached agreement on the border between them, and a road was built linking China's Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region with the Northern Areas of

Pakistan. China supported Pakistan diplomatically in both its 1965 and 1971 wars with India and provided Pakistan with eco- nomic and military assistance. Pakistan's China connection

enabled it to facilitate the 1971 visit of United States secretary

of state Henry Kissinger to that country, and in the 1980s

China and the United States supplied military and economic

248
Government and Politics

assistance through Pakistan to the Afghan mujahidin fighting

the Soviet occupation forces. Pakistan's ties with China remain

strong, and friendly relations between the two countries continue to be an important factor in Pakistan's foreign policy.

Middle East Pakistan also maintains close relations with the Islamic countries of the Middle East. These ties are important for religious,

strategic, political, and economic reasons. In 1955 Pakistan,

together with Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, joined the Baghdad Pact, a security arrangement later called the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq's withdrawal. CENTO was buttressed in 1964 by a regional arrangement among Pakistan,

Iran, and Turkey called the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), and economic cooperation activities overshadowed the security aspects of the countries' relations. CENTO

was disbanded in 1979 with the overthrow of Shah Muhammad

Reza Pahlavi's government in Iran, and the RCD was dissolved.

The RCD was effectively revived in 1985 as the ECO.

Pakistan's foreign policy fostered stronger ties with the Middle East through expanded trade. In addition, Pakistani workers employed in the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and Iran

provided remittances to Pakistan that were a major source of

foreign-exchange earnings. The loss of remittances caused by

the 1991 Persian Gulf War was a serious concern to Pakistan.

During the war, Pakistani units were sent to Saudi Arabia as components of the multinational forces. Pakistan has also contributed to the defense systems of several Arab states, supplying

both officers and enlisted personnel. Pakistan has strengthened its Islamic ties by playing a leading role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and has also supported

the Palestinian cause by withholding recognition of Israel. Pakistan's ties with Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states were strained during the 1990-91 crisis in the gulf. Although a member of the United States-led international coalition, Pakistan played only a limited role, sending a force of 11,000 troops

tasked with "protecting" religious sites in Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, during the war a vocal segment of public opinion in

Pakistan supported ousting the Kuwaiti monarch and approved

of Saddam Husayn's defiance of the United States-led coalition.

The then chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg,

openly expressed support for Iraq, resulting in further embarrassment for Pakistan's government. Following the Persian Gulf

249
Pakistan: A Country Study

War, Pakistan undertook diplomatic efforts to recover its position in the region. In addition, many Pakistani expatriate workers returned to their jobs, and cooperative defense training

activities continued. As a result, Pakistan largely restored its position as an influential player in the region.

The United States and the West

Although Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by

problems with India as well as by efforts to maximize its own

external support, its relationship with the West, particularly

Britain and the United States, is of major importance. At independence in 1947, Pakistan became a member of the British

Commonwealth of Nations. After independence Pakistan

retained Britons in high administrative and military positions.

Britain also was the primary source of military supplies and

officer training. Many of Pakistan's key policy makers, including the nation's founding father, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, had

studied in Britain and had great faith in the British sense ofjustice. Over the years, however, there was disillusionment at what

Pakistanis perceived as Britain's indifference toward Pakistan

and its failure to treat Pakistan fairly in dealings where India was involved. Nevertheless, Pakistan remained in the Commonwealth even after the country became a republic under the

constitution of 1956. Pakistan withdrew its membership in the

Commonwealth in 1972 to protest the recognition of Bangladesh by Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, but rejoined in

October 1989 under Benazir's first government.

Pakistan's relations with the United States developed against

the backdrop of the Cold War. Pakistan's geostrategic position

made it a valuable partner in Western alliance systems to contain the spread of communism. In 1954 Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States

and subsequently became a member of the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO) and CENTO. These agreements

placed Pakistan in the United States sphere of influence. Pakistan was also used as a base for United States military recon- naissance flights over Soviet territory. During the Cold War

years, Pakistan was considered one of Washington's closest

allies in Asia.

Pakistan, in return, received large amounts of economic and

military assistance. The program of military assistance continued until the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War when President Lyndon

B. Johnson placed an embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan

250
Government and Politics

and India. The United States embargo on arms shipments to Pakistan remained in place during the Indo-Pakistani War of

1971 and was not lifted until 1975, during the administration of

President Gerald R. Ford.

United States-Pakistani relations preceding the 1971 war

were characterized by poor communications and much confusion. The administration of President Richard M. Nixon was

forced to formulate a public stance on the brutal crackdown

on East Pakistanis by West Pakistani troops that began in March

25, 1971, and it maintained that the crackdown was essentially an internal affair of Pakistan in which direct intervention of

outside powers was to be avoided. The Nixon administration

expressed its concern about human rights violations to Pakistan and restricted the flow of assistance—yet it stopped short

of an open condemnation.

Despite the widely publicized United States "tilt" toward

Pakistan during the 1971 war, Pakistan's new leader, Zulfiqar

Ali Bhutto, felt betrayed. In his opinion, the United States

could have prevented India from intervening in Pakistan's civil war, thereby saving his country the trauma of defeat and dismemberment. Bhutto strove to lessen Pakistan's dependence

on the United States. The foreign policy Bhutto envisioned would place Pakistan

at the forefront of Islamic nations. Issues central to the developing world would take precedence in foreign affairs over

those of the superpowers. Bhutto called this policy "bilateralism," which implied neutrality in the Cold War with equal treat- ment accorded both superpowers. Bhutto's distancing of

Islamabad from Washington and other Western links was accompanied by Pakistan's renewed bid for leadership in the

developing world.

Following the loss of the East Wing, Pakistan withdrew from

SEATO. Pakistan's military links with the West continued to decline throughout Bhutto's tenure in power and into the first years of the Zia regime. When CENTO was disbanded in March

1979, Pakistan joined the Nonaligned Movement. Zia also con- tinued Bhutto's policy of developing Pakistan's nuclear capability. This policy had originated as a defensive measure in

reaction to India's explosion of a nuclear device in 1974. In

April 1979, PresidentJimmy Carter cut off economic assistance

to Pakistan, except for food assistance, as required under the

Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

This amendment called for ceasing economic assistance to

251
Pakistan: A Country Study

nonnuclear weapon countries that imported uranium-enrichment technology. Relations between the United States and

Pakistan were further strained in November 1979 when protesters sacked the United States embassy in Islamabad, resulting in

the death of four persons. The violence had been sparked by a

false report that the United States was involved in a fire at the

Grand Mosque in Mecca.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979

revived the close relationship between Pakistan and the United

States. Initially, however, the Carter administration's offer the

following month of US$400 million in economic and military

aid to Pakistan was spurned by Zia, who termed it "peanuts."

Under President Ronald Reagan, the United States agreed in

1981 to provide US$3.2 billion to Pakistan over a period of six

years, equally divided between economic and military assis- tance. However, although the Symington Amendment was

waived, the amount was subject to the annual appropriation

process. A second economic and military assistance program

was announced in 1986, this time for over US$4.0 billion, with

57 percent for economic assistance. The continuation of the war in Afghanistan led to waivers—in the case of Pakistan—of

legislative restrictions on providing aid to countries with

nuclear programs. The Pressler Amendment of 1985 required

that if the United States president could not certify to Congress

on an annual basis that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear

weapon, United States assistance to that country would be cut

off. For several years, the United States president, with Pakistan's assurances that its nuclear program was for peaceful uses, was able to make this certification. However, with the Soviet

withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of the Cold

War, the United States took a harder position on the nuclear

weapons issue. In 1990 President George Bush refused to make

the certification required under the Pressler Amendment, and

assistance to Pakistan was subsequently terminated.

After 1990 Pakistan's retention of the nuclear option

became a defining issue in its relations with the United States. Pakistan, like India, considered the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty to be discriminatory—allowing the five acknowledged

nuclear states to keep their weapons while banning others from

joining the club. Pakistan declared that it would sign the treaty7 only in the unlikely event that India did so first. India refused

to join any regional accord as long as China possessed nuclear

weapons. Although the United States government continued

252
Government and Politics

to push both India and Pakistan for a regional solution to the

threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, Pakistan complained

that it bore the brunt of United States antiproliferation policies.The long and close security relationship between the United

States and Pakistan persisted in 1994, although the 1954

Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on which the relationship was based was increasingly regarded by some in the United

States government as outdated—and thus less pertinent to the

post-Cold War period. Moreover, despite Pakistan's differences

with the position of the United States on nuclear and other

issues, both countries were determined to maintain friendly

relations.

International Organizations

Pakistan joined the UN on September 30, 1947, and since

then has been an active participant in the UN and its specialized agencies and other bodies, as well as in various specialized

UN conferences. In 1993 Pakistan was elected to a two-year

term on the UN Security Council. In addition, Pakistani

nationals have contributed their skills within the UN itself. For

example, in 1987 Nafis Sadik, a Pakistani woman physician,

became executive director of the United Nations Population

Fund (UNFPA) with the rank of undersecretary general. Pakistan has also been the recipient of assistance from UN development organizations, including the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in a variety of fields such as agriculture, water and sanitation, national planning, and human

development. The UNDP, for example, allocated more than

US$87 million for assistance to Pakistan for the 1992-96 program period.

Pakistan's view of the UN has necessarily been conditioned

by its own needs and experience. Although recognizing the

shortcomings and powerlessness of the UN in many situations,

Pakistan has seen no alternative to the UN as a forum where

weaker countries could appeal to the world's conscience

against the actions of stronger powers. Consequently, Pakistan

has called for solutions to international problems through UN

auspices, most notably for resolution of the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan also has played a highly visible role in UN peacekeeping efforts, contributing more than 7,000 troops to the United

Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)—the largest single

253
Pakistan: A Country Study

national contingent to any peacekeeping force in 1994. Pakistan had troops serving with the United Nations Protection

Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR BH) and had

participating observers in a number of other UN missions (see

Foreign Security Relationships, ch. 5).

Pakistan's participation in other international organizations,

including SAARC and the ECO, reflects its desire to be an

influential player in the geographic region of which it is a part.

In addition, Pakistan has played a leading role in the OIC, and

President Zia was instrumental in revitalizing the OIC as a forum for periodic meetings of the heads of Islamic states. Pakistan thus appears firmly committed to the utility of broadbased international cooperation.

* # #

Political developments are examined in considerable detail

in Lawrence Ziring's Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. For studies of Islam in Pakistan, Leonard Binder's Religion

and Politics in Pakistan and Hafeez Malik's Moslem Nationalism in

India and Pakistan are useful. For Pakistan's formative period,

Richard Symonds's The Making ofPakistan, Khalid B. Sayeed's

Pakistan: The Formative Phase, and Wayne Ayres Wilcox's Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation are excellent.

Pakistan's first ten years or so are expertly covered in Keith

Callard's Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959 and G.W.

Choudhury's Constitutional Development in Pakistan. The Pakistani bureaucracy is described by Ralph Braibanti in Bureaucracy and Political Development, edited byJoseph LaPalombara.

The Pakistani army and its political role are described in

Fazal Muqeem Khan's The Story of the Pakistan Army. The dismemberment of Pakistan is investigated in G.W. Choudhury's

The Last Days of United Pakistan. Useful accounts of Pakistan's

foreign policy are Latif Ahmed Sherwani's Pakistan, China, and

America and S.M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring's Pakistan's Foreign

Policy. An overview of politics and government in Pakistan from

independence through 1990 is provided in Craig Baxter et al., Government and Politics in South Asia. An analysis of political

developments in the early 1990s is provided by Pakistan: 1992,

edited by Charles H. Kennedy. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

254
Chapter 5. National Security
Artist's rendition oftile mosaic ofhorseman with lancefrom the Pictured Wall,

Lahore Fort, Punjab. Artwork represents seventeenth-century tile work of the Mughal period.
THE ARMED FORCES OF PAKISTAN have traditionally played

a distinctive role in the life of the nation. As in many other

developing countries, they are an important modernizing force

in society and a key tool of national integration. As defenders

of the nation's interests in Pakistan's troubled and volatile geopolitical neighborhood, the armed forces are accorded a particularly high status in public opinion. Less welcome, however,

has been the repeated interference of the armed forces in the

internal affairs and politics of the country. The military has fre- quently been called in to gain control of unrest that has gone

beyond the ability of the police to cope; some of these intrusions have had a major impact and have been of fairly long

duration. The military has assumed control of the entire country three times under proclamations of martial law. Indeed,

since it became an independent state in 1947, Pakistan has

been under military control for much of its existence.

At the same time, however, democracy has always been seen

as the "natural" state of the Pakistani polity, and the military

has ultimately returned power to civilian hands. Thus,

although the armed forces have dominated the country to a

certain extent, they have not perpetuated a military dictatorship. The military has been a permanent factor in the life of

the country, but in a role that has ranged from complete control to vigilant observer. As political scientist Leonard Binder

has observed, "Even [Pakistan's] dependence upon the military does not necessarily make of it a praetorian state, because

there is little evidence that the state works in the sole interest of

the military. Rather, it was the military which intervened in

order to prevent the breakdown of the patrimonial system."

Much of the political history of Pakistan has been set in this

drama of contending influences, and the military in early 1994 was still searching for a role that would reconcile its interests

and the broader needs of a country whose politicians were

struggling to establish a credible authority of their own. The Armed Services: A Historical Perspective

The Colonial Background

At its creation in 1947, Pakistan looked back on two traditions while seeking to reject a third. One was the more than

257
Pakistan: A Country Study

100 years of British colonial rule that radically reshaped the

superstructure of the subcontinent and was the door to modernity. The other inheritance, the Muslim conquest and domi- nance from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth century,

provided the Islamic factor that led to the partition of India

and shaped modern-day Pakistan. The Muslim conquest also

offered a useful mythology of exaggerated Islamic military

prowess and dominance. The tradition that the new nation

rejected and sought to leave behind was that of largely Hindu

India. Indeed, differentiation from that heritage was the raison

d'etre of Pakistan; yet it remains important, for much of Pakistan's cultural heritage is shared with India. India also remains

the primary preoccupation of Pakistan's foreign policy and

security concerns. The country's British heritage has played the greatest role in

transforming the often amorphous military tradition of the

Muslim period into streamlined modern forces. Beginning in

the earliest days of the East India Company (chartered in

1600), native guards were hired by the British to protect trading posts. As time went by, these troops were given additional

training and were organized under British officers into the

armies of the company's presidencies at Calcutta (Fort William), Madras (Fort St. George), and Bombay. In 1748 the pres- idency armies were brought under the command of Major

Stringer Lawrence, who subsequently became known as the

father of the British Indian Army. A series of military reforms,

first undertaken by Robert Clive in the mid-eighteenth century,

continued through the first half of the nineteenth century as the British Parliament asserted increasing control over the East

India Company and its military arm. Part of the legacy that

shaped the British Indian Army was the growing understanding

that civil and military spheres of activity were distinct, that each

must respect the other, but that ultimate control rested with

the civilian power, whether in later times the governor general

or the local district magistrate. The role of the military was to give "aid-to-the-civil power."

The critical event in the evolution of the British Indian Army

was the uprising of 1857-58—known as the Indian Mutiny or Sepoy Rebellion by British historians and sometimes as the

First War of Independence by later Indian nationalists—when

troops in north-central India, Muslim and Hindu alike, rose up

against the British (see The Seeds of Muslim Nationalism, ch.

1). Some bonds of loyalty held, but many Indian troops slaugh258
National Security

tered both their British leaders and hapless civilians. With the

help of Indian troops who did not join the rebellion—especially Sikhs and Muslims from the Punjab—the mutineers were

put down with a violence that matched the atrocities that they

had committed.

The bond between Indian and Briton had been broken, and

a rethinking of British military policy in India was set in

motion. East India Company rule was abolished, and direct

British rule—the British Raj—was instituted in 1858. Emphasis

was put on recruiting in areas where disaffection was least and

where the British discerned the existence of "martial races"

(ethnic groups) noted for their military tradition, lack of political sophistication, and demonstrated loyalty. By these criteria,

the most fertile area for recruitment was in the Punjab region

of northwestern India. The Punjabization of the British Indian

Army and the assumptions that underlay it would weigh heavily on both the international and the domestic politics of Pakistan once it was created as an independent entity.

Pakistan's military structure in the early 1990s in many ways

bore a close resemblance to the British Indian Army structure

at the end of the nineteenth century. During that period,

recruitment into individual, homogeneous regiments

depended on class and caste, rather than on territory. Over

time, these regiments became sources of immense pride to the

men who served in them and to the ethnic group from which

they were frequently recruited. Service in a specific regiment

passed from father to son; the eventual shift from British to Pakistani rule went with hardly a ripple in the structure except

for the change in nationality of the senior officer corps.

The British experimented with various forms of recruitment

and of elevation to officer rank. During the period between the

two world wars (1919-39), the British trained Indian officers to command Indian troops, and training establishments were set up to produce an indigenous officer corps. A small number of

officer candidates were sent to Britain to the Royal Military

Academy at Sandhurst; after 1932 the majority of candidates were trained at the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun.

A rank that predated that of the native officer was the viceroy's commissioned officer—an Indian who had risen from the

ranks and performed officer functions (except for commanding officer), especially at the company level. The viceroy's commissioned officer came from the same social background as did

the troops in his unit and performed a dual function: for the

259
Pakistan: A Country Study

troops, he was a role model and figure of respect to whom they

could turn for advice; he was also an invaluable intermediary

between the troops and the British officer who commanded

them.

The British Indian Army came under immense stress during

both world wars, when it was rapidly expanded and deployed

abroad to wherever the British Empire appeared threatened.

During World War I, nearly 750,000 Indian troops were

recruited for service; some 36,000 were killed, and twice as many were wounded. The troops generally acquitted themselves well, and their contribution was used as an arguing point

by Indian nationalist politicians who sought greater autonomy

for their country.

The army encountered a different kind of stress during the

interwar period and beyond, when it was called on to suppress

the growing wave of nationalist resistance. This use of Indian

personnel alienated the nationalist leaders, especially those of

the Indian National Congress, who would become the leaders

of India in 1947. The problem was much less serious in what

was to become Pakistan. Indeed, during the "Quit India" move- ment during World War II, when the British sought to crush

Congress with special vigor because of its resistance to the war, the All-India Muslim League and the army supported the British cause (see Toward Partition, ch. 1).

During World War II, the British Indian Army (together with

the small Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force) grew

to meet imperial requirements, expanding from essentially a constabulary force of 175,000 to a mass army of more than 2

million. This growth meant appointing many Indians as offic- ers, who received only short training courses, and general

recruitment in areas of the country where "martial" spirit had

not been discerned before. Once again, Indian troops performed loyally and effectively, even while the country was in

political turmoil.

The Formation of Pakistan

The Indian military had no role in the relinquishment of

control by the British and the division of India into two parts

India and Pakistan. Under their British commanders, the

Indian military had resisted the nationalist tide, and then,

when London changed its course, Indian military personnel

obediently shifted their allegiance to new masters. After partition and independence, the relationship between the military

260
i "S

Soldiers on parade

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

and the new nationalist government in India was at first problematic. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, deliberately limited the expansion and modernization of his country's

armed forces, fearing that an excessive emphasis on the military would lead to the militarization of society and undermine

the nation's fledgling democratic institutions.

The Pakistani military, however, immediately became a central part of the national consciousness. Unlike their Indian

counterparts, Pakistani soldiers did not bear the stigma of

being antinational. The main base of army recruitment, Punjab, was at the heart of Pakistan, and the army was immediately

called upon to defend the interests of the nation against a perceived security threat from "Hindu India."

The Pakistani army was fortunate in its political position, but

less so in regard to the experience and technical expertise

required to field an effective military force. Muslims had been

significantly underrepresented in the Indian officer corps, and

when partition occurred, there was a severe shortage of personnel. To lead the planned army of 150,000 men, 4,000 officers were needed, but there were only 2,500, and many of those,

especially in the technical services, were underqualified. Only one major general, two brigadiers, and six colonels were avail- able, and in the middle officer ranks the situation was equally

bad. The first two commanders in chief of the army were British. The first Pakistani commander in chief—General Mohammad Ayub Khan—did not become commander in chief of the

army until 1951. In the small Pakistani navy and air force, the

situation was even worse: there were only nine regular officers

in the navy and sixty-five pilots in the air force. Both forces had

to be commanded by British officers: the navy until 1953 and

261
Pakistan: A Country Study

the air force until 1957. Overall, some 500 British officers were

retained on contract to ease the transition of the armed forces

until Pakistanis could be qualified and promoted. In the

interim, training underqualified officers for rapid promotion

was a matter of top priority.

The lack of equipment presented further problems. Most of

the depots and virtually all of the military production facilities were located in areas that became India, which was less than

forthcoming in handing over the share of military materiel

that was due Pakistan under the partition agreement. Pakistan

received little or nothing in the way of ships and only two of the

ten squadrons of the former Royal Indian Air Force. Pakistani

military historian Fazl Muqeem Khan records: "It is no exaggeration to say that for its first few months the infant state of Paki- stan was without an organized army."

Units with a majority of Muslims (as well as individual Muslims in other units who opted for Pakistan) that were located in

India had to find their way to Pakistan. These men formed new

units based on common traditions and class affiliation; the

remaining service gaps were gradually filled by recruitment.

Intercommunal violence at partition took a huge toll of lives,

and the role played by the army in protecting the citizens of

the new Pakistan created an important initial bond between

army and people.

The crucial challenge to the new Pakistani military was the

outbreak of hostilities with India over the disputed state of

Jammu and Kashmir immediately after partition (see Problems

at Independence, ch. 1). Unlike most of the rulers of the other

princely states of India, the Hindu ruler of Kashmir (as it is usually called) hesitated in declaring the allegiance of his

largely Muslim realm to one or the other of the new nations.

Bands of Muslim tribesmen from Pakistan—together with "vol- unteers" from the Pakistani army—entered the state in early

October 1947 to force the issue and, after joining up with

insurgents within Kashmir, were soon threatening to over- whelm the Kashmiri forces. As the price for protection, the

ruler acceded to India, and elements of the Indian army

arrived on October 27. They soon routed the Pakistani irregulars and moved westward to consolidate control over all of the

state. Pakistan committed regular military formations to combat in May 1948 to ensure its borders and stabilize the situation. Fighting continued until January 1, 1949, when a United

Nations (UN) -sponsored cease-fire took effect. The cease-fire

262
National Security

did not, however, settle the underlying conflict. The dispute

flared up several times again, most notably in 1965, and

remained unresolved as of early 1994. The Indian and Pakistani armies remained deployed along much the same line as they had in 1949. The Pakistani army, however, performed

credibly in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48 and won

immense admiration and support among Pakistanis, on which

it drew heavily as Pakistan began to pay the price of developing

a military capability to offset that of India.

Pakistan's Evolving Security Dilemma

Survival in a Harsh Environment

Pakistan is located in a critical and historically contentious

part of the world. At the time of independence, it was the

world's fifth largest nation. Yet three of its close neighbors

(China, India, and the Soviet Union) were larger, more populous, and not necessarily well-intentioned. Pakistan was divided

into two wings, East Pakistan (renamed Bangladesh when it became independent in 1971) and West Pakistan. It would

soon become apparent that the country, divided by 1,600 kilometers of a hostile India, was also divided by competing ethnic

groups with only Islam serving as a tenuous link. Furthermore,

West Pakistan was geographically a fairly narrow country, lacking in strategic depth—its main cities and communications

arteries lay close to the border with India and thus were vulnerable to attack. Additionally, the headwaters of Pakistan's rivers

and vital irrigation systems were largely controlled by India.

East Pakistan, except for its Bay of Bengal coast, was also virtually surrounded by India.

There were other security complications. Pakistan's borders

with India were new and hence were totally unfortified and, in

most places, were drawn in ways that made them almost indefensible. Because the borders were also undemarcated, there was ample opportunity for conflict. Although the military gave

border control over to paramilitary forces, the armed forces

remained ready for deployment in case of emergency.

Almost all of Pakistan's ethnic groups extended into neighboring countries. This situation caused particular problems

with the Afghans, who did not recognize the border as valid

and hoped that their new neighbor would be unable to assert

its interests.

263
Pakistan: A Country Study

Security concerns were not limited to the outside world.

Despite the euphoria of nationhood, Pakistan was increasingly

subject to the same kinds of internal stresses that had characterized British India—fractious tribesmen, dacoits (armed

gangs of robbers) , and restive cities—and required the army to render aid-to-the-civil power. Even the need to repress nationalist movements recurred as regional groups within Pakistan

sought greater autonomy from central control.

Although Pakistan perceived in India a threat to its security,

initially it was not able to defend itself against that perceived

threat because of limited personnel and materiel. Pakistan

therefore had to develop a comprehensive military strategy

that would offset at least some of its weaknesses. High hopes

were placed on support from other Muslim nations, some of

which could help financially and others of which would provide through alliances some of the geostrategic territorial

depth that Pakistan lacked. But the emergence of the first state created on the basis of Islam was of relatively little interest to the nations of the Arab world. Britain helped significantly in

supplying officers and equipment, but it was itself in an eco- nomic crisis and would not alienate India.

In 1951, during a period of heightened tension with India

along the frontier, Mohammad Ayub Khan was appointed the

first Pakistani commander in chief of the army. Ayub Khan

immediately concentrated on reshaping the Pakistani military,

putting special emphasis on training and operational planning,

two critical areas in which Pakistan did not depend completely

on foreign resources. These tasks, plus reorganization, occu- pied the attention of the army well into the 1950s. Critical

shortages of equipment, however, remained, requiring that

Pakistan look abroad for its provisioning. The selection of Ayub

Khan as the commander in chief of the army was of seminal

importance. Perhaps more than any other Pakistani, he was

responsible for seeking and securing military and economic

assistance from the United States and for aligning Pakistan

with the United States in international affairs. The United States Alliance

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it was natural

for Pakistan to covet the wealth and surplus military equipment

of the United States. United States-Pakistan relations were cordial, and throughout the late 1940s, Pakistan sought to nurture

264
National Security

those close relations and gain access to United States military

support; initially, these attempts were rebuffed.

As the new decade opened, however, a series of events put

new hope into the possibility of United States-Pakistan cooperation. First was the reassessment of Pakistan's military position

undertaken by Ayub Khan. The second event was the outbreak

of the Korean War (1950-53), which drew United States atten- tion toward Asia and marked the point of no return of the globalization of United States security policy. The third factor was

the advent of the Eisenhower-Dulles team, which set to work

building a ring of containment around the Sino-Soviet bloc.

India, committed to nonalignment, had come into sharp dis- agreement with the United States in the UN when it refused to censure China as an aggressor in the Korean War and thus was

viewed by the United States as a voice for communist appeasement. India's refusal to join the United States-sponsored 1951

Treaty of Peace with Japan—a pact among nations designed,

among other purposes, to recruit Japan as an ally against communist inroads in Asia—further divided the two countries.

India was not available as an ally; Pakistan was the inevitable

alternative (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4)

.

Pakistan and the United States drew closer together, highlevel visits were exchanged, and the groundwork was laid for a

security relationship that seemed to meet Pakistan's political

needs and equipment deficit. At United States prompting,

Pakistan and Turkey concluded a security treaty in 1954—the

Turko-Pakistan Pact—which immediately enabled United

States military assistance to Pakistan under the Mutual Defense

Assistance Agreement signed the same year. Pakistan also

became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO) in 1954 and joined the Baghdad Pact, later renamed

the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959. Pakistan

had little interest in SEATO and discerned no danger to its interests from China, joining mainly to oblige Washington.

Even CENTO, which offered the advantage of a new approach

to the Muslim world, was problematic because it drove a wedge

between Pakistan and the Arab countries that remained out- side it and was seen by Pakistanis as institutionally weak

because the United States was never willing to become a full member. None of these arrangements addressed Pakistan's

main concern, however—India.

At Pakistan's insistence, an additional agreement (the Agreement of Cooperation) on security was concluded with the

265
Pakistan: A Country Study

United States in March 1959, by which the United States committed itself to the "preservation of the independence and

integrity of Pakistan" and agreed to take "appropriate action,

including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed

upon ... in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request." The Agreement of Cooperation also said nothing

about India and was cast in the context of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which dealt with communist threats to the Middle East. Pakistan saw the agreement as representing a high level of

United States commitment, however, and some United States

officials apparently encouraged an interpretation that saw more in the agreement than was actually there. There was considerable self-deception on both sides—Pakistan believed that

it had secured an ally in its rivalry with India, and the United

States focused on Pakistan as an adherent to the anticommunist cause. Tangible gains to Pakistan from the relationship were substantial. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided

Pakistan with US$630 million in direct-grant assistance and

more than US$670 million in concessional sales and defensesupport assistance. The army received equipment for one additional armored division, four infantry divisions, and one

armored brigade and received support elements for two corps.

The air force received six squadrons of modern jet aircraft.

The navy received twelve ships. The ports of Karachi (in West

Pakistan) and Chittagong (in East Pakistan) were modernized.

The program did not, however, provide for the wholesale modernization of the military, much less its expansion. Forces in

Kashmir and East Pakistan were excluded, and there was a con- tinuing tug-of-war between the United States and Pakistan as Pakistan sought to extend the scope of the program and wring

more benefits out of it. The impact on the military of this new relationship was

intense. Pakistanis embraced the latest concepts in military

organization and thinking with enthusiasm and adopted

United States training and operational doctrine. The army and

the air force were transformed into fairly modern, wellequipped fighting forces. In the course of the rearmament program, the military was substantially reorganized along United

States lines, and hundreds of Pakistani officers were trained by

United States officers, either in Pakistan or in schools in the

United States. Although many British traditions remained,

266
National Security

much of the tone of the army, especially the officer corps, was

Americanized.

Pakistan's hopes for an equitable settlement of its disputes

with India, especially over Kashmir, were probably small in any

event, but by bringing the United States directly into the South

Asian security equation, rapprochement with India became vir- tually impossible. More important, India responded to Pakistan's new alignment by turning to the Soviet Union for

military and political support—and the Soviet leader at the

time, Nikita S. Khrushchev, was only too happy to oblige. As a

result, Pakistan not only incurred Soviet hostility but also ulti- mately triggered a Soviet military supply program in India that

more than offset the United States assistance to Pakistan. Soviet

displeasure was further heightened by Pakistan's decision to grant facilities at Peshawar for the United States to conduct U2 aerial reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.

The Army Assumes Control

The developing relationship with the United States was only one of the dramatic experiences that the military underwent in

the late 1950s. The political system had been performing very

poorly, especially since the assassination of Prime Minister

Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951 (see Constitutional and Political

Inheritance, ch. 4). There was increasing public disillusionment with the system and little respect for political leaders,

who were seen as incompetent and corrupt. In fact, decisionmaking power had been moving inexorably away from the lead- ers of the political parties and into the hands of the two

national institutions that were seen as competent and honest

the bureaucracy and the army.

On October 7, 1958, President Iskander Mirza annulled the

1956 constitution by proclamation, dissolved the national and

provincial assemblies, and banned political parties. Asserting

that if Pakistan were to be saved, the army would have to assume political control. Mirza then declared martial law and

appointed General Ayub Khan chief martial law administrator.

Twenty days later, Ayub moved against Mirza, sending him into

exile, and assumed the office of president himself. Thus began

the second role of the military—self-appointed guardian of

domestic affairs of state as well as defender against external

enemies. The results were mixed, both for Pakistan and for its soldiers. The military continued to enjoy preferred access to resources in Pakistan, and an elaborate system of quasi-govern267
Pakistan: A Country Study

mental bodies provided economic opportunities for military

personnel, especially after retirement. The country as a whole

welcomed army rule, which brought a period of stability and

rapid economic growth and vigorously attacked the corruption

that beset the country. The army ruled with a firm but light

hand, retaining ultimate control but working largely through

the bureaucracy.

Economic gains, however, were so badly distributed that

they seemed hollow to many Pakistanis. The involvement of

military personnel in governing detracted from their primary

mission. Although the military remained popular, it became

associated with the political divisions of the country and was no

longer solely the symbol of national unity. Opposition began to develop, especially among intellectuals and politicians.

Ayub Khan lifted martial law in 1962, replacing it with an

authoritarian constitution under which he was elected president (see Basic Democracies, ch. 1; Ayub Khan, 1958-69, ch.

4) . While the new system had some constructive features, it failed to gain public support, and even though the army was no

longer governing the country, Ayub Khan and his system were

seen as unpopular manifestations of military rule.

Collapse of Pakistan's Security System

Pakistan's tie to the United States was a product of the postWorld War II communist containment strategy and the fear of

Soviet expansionism. By the end of the 1950s, a number of fac- tors had changed—some to Pakistan's advantage, others not. The positive factor was the emergence of China as an independent international actor at odds with both the Soviet Union

and India, thereby creating new policy options for Pakistan.

Less favorable was a decline in international tensions that

reduced the United States preoccupation with containment

and, hence, Pakistan's value. At the same time, the Eisenhower

administration was seeking to reclaim some of the ground it had lost with India, and this trend was strengthened as tensions

grew between New Delhi and Beijing, Washington's principal

bete-noire of the time.

Pakistan was able to profit from Sino-Indian hostility by

securing China as an additional source of support, but ties to Beijing were anathema to Washington and caused serious problems in United States-Pakistan relations during the 1960s. Rapprochement between New Delhi and Washington also caused

deep concern to Pakistanis. Pakistan was appalled when, at the

268
National Security

time of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the United States rushed

to rearm India without meeting Pakistan's demands that assis- tance be coupled with effective pressure to force India to settle the Kashmir dispute. The United States reassured Pakistan that

India was not arming against Pakistan, but Pakistan realized

that the external equalizer it had brought into the subcontinent to make up its security deficit would now be devalued as the United States, at best, played an even-handed role or, at worst, shifted its principal attention to India.

The security situation deteriorated still further as India,

which had hitherto spent relatively little on defense, engaged

in a major buildup of forces that were primarily aimed at China

but could as readily be turned against Pakistan. In addition,

after 1964 India took a series of steps to incorporate Kashmir

more closely into the Indian union, rendering less likely any

negotiations on the matter with Pakistan. Under the circumstances, Pakistan decided that its chances of gaining Kashmir

would only deteriorate; hence, it opted for early action.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

In mid-1965, Pakistan sent guerrilla forces into the Indianheld territory of Kashmir in the hope of stirring up a rebellion

that would either oust the Indians or at least force the issue

back onto the international agenda. Pakistani forces did not

find as much support among the Kashmiri population as they

had hoped, but fighting spread by August, and a process of

escalation culminated in a full-scale Indian offensive toward

Lahore on September 6. Fighting, frequently very bitter, con- tinued until a UN-sponsored cease-fire took hold on September 23. Both sides had tacitly agreed not to let the war spread to the East Wing of Pakistan.

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners

and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks,

and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand

Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only

have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan.

Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial

prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame

their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

269
Pakistan: A Country Study

Pakistan was rudely shocked by the reaction of the United

States to the war. Judging the matter to be largely Pakistan's

fault, the United States not only refused to come to Pakistan's

aid under the terms of the Agreement of Cooperation, but

issued a statement declaring its neutrality while also cutting off

military supplies. The Pakistanis were embittered by what they

considered a friend's betrayal, and the experience taught them

to avoid relying on any single source of support. For its part,

the United States was disillusioned by a war in which both sides

used United States-supplied equipment. The war brought

other repercussions for the security relationship as well. The

United States withdrew its military assistance advisory group in

July 1967. In response to these events, Pakistan declined to renew the lease on the Peshawar military facility, which ended

in 1969. Eventually, United States-Pakistan relations grew measurably weaker as the United States became more deeply

involved in Vietnam and as its broader interest in the security

of South Asia waned.

Iran, Indonesia, and especially China gave political support

to Pakistan during the war, thus suggesting new directions in

Pakistan that might translate into support for its security concerns. Most striking was the attitude of the Soviet Union. Its post-Khrushchev leadership, rather than rallying reflexively to India's side, adopted a neutral position and ultimately provided the good offices at Tashkent, which led to the January

1966 Tashkent Declaration that restored the status quo ante. The aftermath of the 1965 war saw a dramatic shift in Pakistan's security environment. Instead of a single alignment with

the United States against China and the Soviet Union, Pakistan

found itself cut off from United States military support, on

increasingly warm terms with China, and treated equitably by

the Soviet Union. Unchanged was the enmity with which India

and Pakistan regarded each other over Kashmir. The result was

the elaboration of a new security approach, called by Ayub

Khan the "triangular tightrope"—a tricky endeavor to maintain

good ties with the United States while cultivating China and

the Soviet Union. Support from other developing nations was

also welcome. None of the new relationships carried the weight

of previous ties with the United States, but, taken together, they

at least provided Pakistan with a political counterbalance to India.

Pakistan needed other sources of military supply, most

urgently because of its wartime losses and the United States

270
National Security

embargo. After 1965 China became Pakistan's principal military supplier, providing materiel to all three services in substantial quantity and at attractive prices. Submarines and Mirage

aircraft were also purchased from France. The Soviet Union

sought to woo Pakistan with military equipment, but that program never really developed because of Moscow's concern not

to jeopardize its more important relationship with India. The

United States gradually relaxed its embargo; however, it was

only in 1973 that substantial supplies again flowed to Pakistan.

The late 1960s were politically turbulent times for Pakistan;

by 1969 conditions had deteriorated to the point where the

army once again felt called on to intervene. On March 25, an

ailing and discredited Ayub Khan transferred power to army

commander in chief General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan,

who declared himself president as well as chief martial law

administrator (CMLA) and announced that Pakistan would

have national general elections—for the first time since independence—and a new constitution. The elections in December

1970 were fair but led to the breakup of Pakistan (see Yahya

Khan and Bangladesh, ch. 1). In the process, the army and

Pakistan's security situation deteriorated still further.

The largely Punjabi army was in a politically untenable position in East Pakistan, which had voted overwhelmingly for an

autonomist party. Once it became clear that a compromise

between the civilian leaders of West Pakistan and East Pakistan was unattainable, Yahya Khan was forced to choose between

the two sides, and his actions were seen by the Bengalis of the

East Wing as favoring the interests of West Pakistan, which were

hardly distinguishable from those of the armed forces. Yahya

decided to postpone indefinitely the convening of the new

National Assembly, which would have been controlled by Bengalis. It was feared that a government dominated by East Pakistani interests would cut back sharply on military prerogatives

and roll back the dominance of Punjab in national affairs.

Within days, unrest spread throughout East Pakistan. Bengalis

went on strike and stopped paying taxes. Bengali autonomists

became separatists.

Army elements in East Pakistan were strengthened in the

spring of 1971 and were used to suppress Bengali recalcitrance.

The task was undertaken with ferocity; killing, rape, looting,

and brutality were widespread and resulted in the flight of

nearly 10 million refugees to India over six months. International outrage grew and forced the Richard M. Nixon adminis271
Pakistan: A Country Study

tration in the United States to halt its attempts to reopen

military supply lines to Pakistan.

The army was generally successful during the spring and

summer of 1971 in restoring order in East Pakistan, but

increasing Indian support of the antigovernment Bengali guerrillas known as the Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) began to shift the balance. When Indian troops finally intervened

directly in December, there was no hope of stopping them.

Even though the garrison in East Pakistan had been reinforced, national strategy was still based on the assumption that

Pakistan could not simultaneously defend both wings of the

country against an Indian attack; hence, an attack in the east would be countered in the west. On December 3, Pakistani

forces began hostilities in the west with attacks on Indian air- fields. They had little success, and within twenty-four hours

India had gained air superiority, launched attacks against West

Pakistan, and blockaded the coast. Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the Indian army on December 16, and

India offered a cease-fire. In the face of superior force on all fronts, Pakistan had little choice but to accept the breakup of

the country.

The armed forces were shattered and their equipment

destroyed; 9,000 troops were lost, and 90,000 prisoners of war

were in the hands of Indians and Bengalis in Bangladesh (the

former East Pakistan). Yahya Khan resigned in disgrace, and

the winner of the elections in West Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto, succeeded him as CMLA and president. Pakistan, a country originally created in the name of religion, lost its rai- son d'etre as the homeland of Muslims in the subcontinent and

was much reduced in size. Although the politicians were ulti- mately responsible for the events of 1971, the army and its leaders were the obvious villains. The security situation of the nation also changed. Any illu- sions of parity vis-a-vis India were demolished. Although both

China and the United States had tilted toward Pakistan politically, it was abundantly clear that neither of those superpowers was in a position to offset Indian primacy in the region, especially in view of the friendship treaty that India had signed with

the Soviet Union in August 1971, just before the outbreak of

hostilities. The Soviet Union, forced to choose sides, opted for

India, and the rapprochement that had taken place between

Pakistan and the Soviet Union evaporated. Pakistan stood

largely alone and at the mercy of India. The 1972 bilateral

272
National Security

Simla Agreement restored most of the status quo that existed

before the 1971 war in the relations between the two nations.

The agreement states that "the two countries are resolved to

settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral

negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed

upon between them." Although India maintained the more

narrow interpretation that disputes be settled bilaterally, Paki- stan in subsequent years favored a looser interpretation—one

that did not exclude a multilateral settlement of the Kashmir

dispute.

Yet the loss of East Pakistan also had positive implications for

Pakistan's security. The loss of the East Pakistani population as a recruitment pool was of only minor significance. By shedding

its most dissident and poorest province, Pakistan emerged

stronger and was able to focus its energies more effectively. A

major strategic problem—the geographic division of the country—was eliminated. The loss of East Pakistan also removed the

need for a Pakistani role in Southeast Asia. Pakistan withdrew

from SEATO, and Bhutto refocused national attention toward

Muslrn West Asia. He apparently tried to develop ways of putting the Kashmir issue to rest so that Pakistan could greatly

reduce its preoccupation with South Asia. No longer closely

tied to the United States, Bhutto sought a larger role for Pakistan among the nonaligned countries and, especially, within

the Islamic world. A brilliant diplomat, he was able in a very

few years to restore Pakistan's prestige, stake out a leading role

for Pakistan among Muslim nations, court the superpowers,

and even establish cordial relations with Bangladesh.

These triumphs were not shared with the military, as Bhutto

moved to create a "professional but docile" military. Senior

officers were dismissed, and their replacements were chosen by

Bhutto. The military establishment was reorganized so that it would be under more effective civilian control. Bhutto's 1973

constitution narrowly defined the role of the military as defending Pakistan against external aggression and "subject to law" acting in aid-to-the-civil power when called on so to do.

Any attempt to abrogate the constitution was deemed high

treason (see Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and a New Constitutional System, ch. 1).

In 1972 Bhutto established the Federal Security Force of

some 18,000 men to provide assistance to the civil administration and police and to do civic-action work. Not under military

control, the Federal Security Force was, in effect, Bhutto's pri273
Pakistan: A Country Study

vate political army. The military, beaten and demoralized, had

no choice but to accept this further setback, even as it harbored deep concerns over the impact Bhutto was having on the

integrity of the army and its ability to defend Pakistan.

In 1973 Bhutto began to focus on rebuilding the tamed military because Pakistan continued to face serious security threats

from abroad, highlighted by the Indian nuclear test in 1974,

and at home—a major insurgency from 1973 to 1977 in

Balochistan, which ultimately required the involvement of

80,000 army troops. New military production facilities and a navy air wing were established. Bhutto's diplomacy resulted in a

partial lifting of the United States embargo on military sales to Pakistan in 1973 and a complete removal of the embargo in

1977. He also used diplomacy to tap into the burgeoning oil revenues of the Middle East; still, Pakistan could not afford to buy much, and its inventories of weapons were increasingly

made up of outdated and ill-matched equipment from a variety

of sources. Nonetheless, the army's self-confidence again began

to grow. Expenditures on defense by 1974 had reattained the

1969 level—even though the gross national product (GNP

see Glossary) was little more than half of the amount that had

been produced before Bangladesh became independent. The

defense budget continued to increase over the next several

years, supporting a somewhat expanded strength—428,000

personnel in 1976. Pakistan's nuclear program was also established by Bhutto.

Bhutto's domestic position, however, eroded rapidly in the

mid-1970s, and, as his charisma waned, he turned to the army

to deal with domestic unrest. The elections of March 1977

widely thought to be rigged—resulted in mass demonstrations

demanding Bhutto's resignation. General Mohammad Zia

ul-Haq, chief of the army staff—a new title for service chiefs

replacing the former title of commander in chief—saw that the

army was unwilling to engage in the violence that would be

necessary to put down the unrest. In a stunning move, Zia

arrested Bhutto and other political leaders on July 5, 1977, and

declared Pakistan's third period of martial law. The Military Reasserts Itself General Zia asserted that this military intervention in politics would be brief and that there would be new elections

within ninety days, but he had the longest tenure of any Pakistani ruler. Although he came to power more as a spokesman

274
National Security

of military interests—a first among equals—and was thought to be a political naif, he was highly skilled in gathering power into

his own hands.

On assuming power, Zia named himself chief martial law

administrator and suspended parts of the 1973 constitution.

(Zia assumed the presidency as well in September 1978.)

Because it appeared that Bhutto, if freed and available as a candidate, might easily win the elections, Zia postponed them and

undertook a campaign to discredit his predecessor politically.

Zia's initial assumption of power was peaceful; even his subsequent decision to allow Bhutto to be hanged, after Bhutto's

conviction as an accomplice to murder a political opponent,

did not bring disturbances severe enough to threaten his

regime. There was, however, continued opposition to military

rule, and Zia was able to maintain himself in power only

through a combination of political luck, skill, and authoritarianism.

Although the military regime was often repressive, state violence was downplayed, and some observers believe that human

rights conditions were better than during the Bhutto years. Zia

also emphasized the corruption in political life and the need

for reform. Ethnic resistance in Balochistan and the NorthWest Frontier Province was dealt with adroitly; only the ethnic

Sindhis remained profoundly alienated (see Zia ul-Haq and

Military Domination, 1977-88, ch. 1). Zia also proved politically skillful in employing a strategy of continually holding out

the promise of free elections when circumstances permitted,

making political concessions that would strengthen rather than

undermine his position and, especially after 1979, co-opting

influential political groups among orthodox Muslims.

The first years of Zia's tenure marked another low point in

the security situation. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 over- threw the Shah, one of Pakistan's staunchest friends, and the

missionary zeal of its new Islamist regime did not bode well for

Pakistan-Iran relations. The Saur Revolution (April Revolution) in Afghanistan in 1978 ousted a government that had

become conciliatory in its relations with Pakistan, replacing it with a group that also preached radical change—this time,

Marxist. When the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan found itself in a security nightmare—for the

first time, the Soviet Union posed a potentially immediate

threat.

275
Pakistan: A Country Study

Relations with the United States were also at a low point. The

administration of President Jimmy Carter had adopted an

extremely hard line on Pakistan's nuclear program and sus- pended all military and economic assistance in April 1979. In

March 1979, after the Iranian Revolution, Pakistan withdrew

from a moribund CENTO. Tensions with the United States

peaked when a Pakistani mob burned the United States

embassy in Islamabad in November 1979, killing two Americans and two Pakistani employees, in response to a British

radio broadcast of Ayatollafi Ruhollah Khomeini's speech, in

which he falsely accused the United States of invading the

Grand Mosque in Mecca. Although China remained a good

friend, political scientist Robert G. Wirsing's assessment proved

accurate: "Never before had Pakistan been quite so isolated

and quite so threatened at the same time."

Pakistan Becomes a Frontline State

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made Pakistan a country

of paramount geostrategic importance. In a matter of days, the

United States declared Pakistan a "frontline state" against

Soviet aggression and offered to reopen aid and military assis- tance deliveries. For the remainder of Zia's tenure, the United

States generally ignored Pakistan's developing nuclear program. Other donors also rallied to Pakistan as it stood firm

against Soviet blustering, hospitably received over 3 million

Afghan refugees who poured across the borders, provided a conduit for weapons and other support, and gave a safe haven

to the Afghan mujahidin (see Glossary) . Pakistan's top national

security agency, the army's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelli- gence, monitored the activities of and provided advice and support to the mujahidin, and commandos from the army's Special

Services Group helped guide the operations inside Afghanistan. In the Muslim world, Pakistan increasingly assumed a leading role. As a long-term goal, Zia envisioned the emer- gence of an Islamic government in Kabul that would provide

Pakistan with geostrategic depth, facilitate access to Muslim

West Asia, and forswear a revision of the contentious PakistanAfghanistan boundary.

Pakistan paid a price for its activities. The refugee burden, even if offset in part by foreign assistance, created dangerous

pressures within Pakistani society. Afghan and Soviet forces

conducted raids against mujahidin bases inside Pakistan, and a campaign of terror bombings and sabotage in Pakistan's cities,

276
National Security

guided by Afghan intelligence agents, caused hundreds of

casualties. In 1987 some 90 percent of the 777 terrorist incidents recorded worldwide took place in Pakistan. The actual

danger to Pakistan, however, was probably never very great.

There is no concrete evidence to support the revitalized "Great

Game" argument that the Soviet invasion was a modern manifestation of Russia's historical drive to garner access to a warmwater port and that it was but a first step on a road through

Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. Nor was it likely that the Soviet

Union would have conducted major military operations against

Pakistan as long as Islamabad did not flaunt its support for the

mujahidin.

The Soviet invasion enabled Pakistan's army to present itself as the defender of the nation in times of trouble, making criti- cism of military rule almost unpatriotic. Zia used the situation to strengthen his grip on internal affairs by appealing to national unity and pointing to Pakistan's growing international

stature. In addition, the substantial amounts of aid money coming from various sources boosted the economy and, in the

short run at least, more than offset the costs of the refugees

and rearming the military. Overall, the economy grew rapidly

in the Zia years, in large part because of remittances from

many Pakistanis who worked abroad (see Impact of Migration

to the Persian Gulf Countries, ch. 2; Labor, ch. 3).

Zia's ability to obtain high levels of support and modern

weaponry strengthened his position within the military establishment and enabled Pakistan once again to build up a credible military capability. Under the United States assistance

program, Pakistan bought F-16 aircraft; upgraded M-48 tanks,

Harpoon naval missiles, helicopters, and artillery; and received

second-hand frigates on loan. In the four years after the invasion, Pakistan's armed forces grew by nearly 12 percent, from

428,000 to 478,000 persons. A substantial amount of the costs of modernization and expansion were covered by United States aid and financial contributions from Saudi Arabia and Persian

Gulf countries.

Zia was extremely skillful in protecting his base in the military. To ensure control, he was concurrently chief of the army

staff, chief martial law administrator, and president, and he

carefully juggled senior military appointments. The satisfaction

of the military was also enhanced by arrangements under

which Pakistani service personnel were seconded to the armed

forces of Persian Gulf countries, where emoluments were

277
Pakistan: A Country Study

much more generous than in Pakistan. Retiring officers

received generous benefits, sometimes including land allocations, and often found lucrative positions in government ser- vice or in parastatal economic enterprises. The assignment of

serving officers to approximately 10 percent of the senior posts

in the civilian administration also provided opportunities for

economic gain, sometimes in ways that were ultimately harmful

to the army's image of itself. For example, some military personnel reportedly participated in the rapidly growing narcotics

business.

Zia had learned well the lesson of 1965 and was careful not

to allow the nation to return to the status of a client state of the

United States. Even as Pakistan faced the Soviet Union in

Afghanistan, it kept that threat in perspective. Immediately

after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Zia

declined the Carter administration's assistance package offer of

US$400 million as "peanuts." It was not until 1981 that Pakistan

concluded an assistance agreement with the United States,

which provided for US$3.2 billion over six years, divided

equally between economic and military aid. This agreement

was extended in 1986 to provide an additional US$4.0 billion over the next six years. Zia was careful to avoid the trappings of

a formal alliance, preferring continued involvement in the

Nonaligned Movement—which Pakistan joined in 1979—and

with the Islamic nations of the Middle East through his leading

role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (see Paki- stan and the World During the Zia Regime, ch. 1).

Credit for the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan lay mainly with

the mujahidin and their Pakistani mentors, but would hardly

have come about had Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev not

decided to cut back drastically on Soviet foreign entanglements. After tedious negotiations, an agreement was reached

in April 1988, providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops by

February 15, 1989.

Zia's policies inevitably led to a worsening of relations with

India, which was disturbed by the reentry of the United States into the South Asian security equation and by what India saw as the impetus to a new arms race. India responded with largescale arms purchases of its own, primarily from the Soviet

Union, which more than matched anything that the United

States provided to Pakistan. Zia took considerable pains to reduce tensions and launched several peace initiatives, which

New Delhi, however, failed to accept. Whether Zia saw his own

278
National Security

efforts merely as diplomatic maneuvers was unclear, but they

reflected a growing realization in Pakistan that unconstrained

enmity with India was simply too dangerous and beyond Pakistan's means. There were periods of considerable tension between Pakistan and India. In November 1986, India launched its largest

maneuver ever, Operation Brass Tacks, menacingly close to the

Pakistan border. The Pakistani army responded with threatening countermovements, and in early 1987 there was serious concern that war might break out. The India-Pakistan hot line was brought into use, and Zia skillfully seized the initiative by

traveling to India to view a cricket game, using the opportunity

to meet with Indian leaders to defuse the situation.

Among the major disputes between the two countries, only

that over the Siachen Glacier, which is located in a remote area of northern Kashmir where boundaries are ill defined, has led

to fighting in recent years. The two armies had been in desultory but very costly (primarily because of exposure to the ele- ments) high-altitude combat there since 1984, when Indian

forces moved into previously unoccupied territory at the

extreme northern end of the Kashmir Line of Control.

Aside from Afghanistan, the most problematic element in

Pakistan's security policy was the nuclear question. Zia inherited an ambitious program from Bhutto and continued to develop it, out of the realization that, despite Pakistan's newly

acquired weaponry, it could never match India's conventional

power and that India either had, or shortly could develop, its own nuclear weapons. Even after the invasion of Afghanistan,

Pakistan almost exhausted United States tolerance, including

bungled attempts to illegally acquire United States nuclear-relevant technology and a virtual public admission in 1987 by the

head of Pakistan's nuclear program that the country had developed a weapon. As long as Pakistan remained vital to United

States interests in Afghanistan, however, no action was taken to cut off United States support. Pakistani attempts to handle the

problem bilaterally with India led nowhere, but a significant

step was taken with a nonformalized 1985 agreement that neither India nor Pakistan would attack the other's nuclear facilities.Zia showed a remarkable ability to keep himself in power, to promote Pakistan's international position, and to bring a modest degree of economic prosperity to Pakistan. His problem was how to devolve power. Beginning in 1985, a process of demilita279
Pakistan: A Country Study

rization of the regime was launched, and Zia was elected civil- ian president of Pakistan through some highly dubious

maneuvering (see Zia ul-Haq, 1978-88, ch. 4). In late 1985, he

ended martial law and revised the 1973 constitution in ways

that legitimized all actions taken by the martial law government since 1977 and strengthened his position as president.

Mohammad Khan Junejo, whom Zia appointed prime minister

in March 1985, managed to develop some degree of autonomy

from Zia and persuaded him to allow political parties to organize; Junejo also watered down some of Zia's constitutional proposals, notably blocking the creation of the National Security

Council, which would have institutionalized the role of the military.

The experiment in controlled democracy floundered in May

1988, when Zia abruptly dismissed the Junejo government for reasons that were not altogether clear but may have involved

Junejo's attempt to gain a voice in security matters. Zia promised new elections, but most observers assumed that he would

once again postpone them rather than take the risk that Benazir Bhutto, Zulfiqar's daughter, who had returned from exile

abroad to a tumultuous welcome in Pakistan in 1986, would

come to power. Benazir's program included revenge for her

father's death and punishment of Zia for staging the 1977

coup, which, under the 1973 constitution, rendered him liable to the death sentence. The crisis facing Pakistan resolved itself suddenly, however, when Zia was killed in a mysterious airplane

crash in August 1988. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a senior bureaucrat

who was president of the Senate, succeeded to the presidency,

and after consultations with the new chief of the army staff,

General Mirza Aslam Beg, rather surprisingly decided to let the

elections proceed as scheduled.

The Armed Forces in a New World Order

The Zia era ended as it had begun, with a Bhutto in power,

for Benazir's party emerged with a narrow victory. Her position was much different from that of her father. She became prime

minister under a constitution that left great power in the hands

of the president, her parliamentary majority was narrow, and

the army was strong, self-confident, and unwilling to renounce

its political role. As the price of power, Benazir had to negotiate an arrangement with President Ishaq Khan and General

Beg by which she reportedly promised to keep Zia's constitutional changes and to limit her involvement in military affairs,

280
Two F-16fighters on patrol

Artillery crew on duty in Siachen Glacier, close to India-Pakistan border

Courtesy Embassy ofPakistan, Washington

281
Pakistan: A Country Study

including management of the fighting in Afghanistan and

nuclear weapons policy.

Several times Benazir ineffectually challenged the armed

forces and the president on military matters. She was never

able to find a comfortable relationship with these two other

major players of the triangle of political power in Pakistan. She

showed interest in improving relations with India but had little room to take concrete steps. She skillfully cultivated her good

ties to Washington, but overall her performance as prime minister was disappointing, and when the president—with the obvi- ous backing of the army—dismissed her in August 1990 and

called for new elections, there was little opposition.

The elections brought to power the Islamic Democratic Alli- ance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad—IJI), a coalition that enjoyed

the implicit support of both the president and the armed

forces. Punjab's chief minister, Mian Nawaz Sharif, a businessman and protege of Zia, became prime minister. Although the

dismissal of Benazir had been against the spirit, if not the letter,

of the constitution, the new power arrangement seemed to offer Pakistan favorable prospects for stable representative rule

because the three power centers were all in apparent alignment, and Nawaz Sharif represented the interests of the Punjabi majority. The arrangement worked adequately for some

time, and when General Beg's time for retirement as chief of

the army staff came, he did not attempt to force an extension

of his tour of duty.

Beg's replacement, General Asif Nawaz Janjua, was a much

lower-profile leader and sought to lead the army away from cor- ruption and toward a renewed emphasis on professionalism

and a sensible adaptation to the post-Cold War realities of Pakistan's strategic position. The army, however, was drawn into

politics in May 1992 when the law-and-order situation in Sindh

deteriorated so badly that the provincial government invited

the army to restore public order under Article 147 of the constitution. Although the army could not solve Sindh's many

problems, it made significant progress in combatting the cycle

of terror, banditry, and kidnapping that had plagued the province. The army stopped short of imposing martial law, but it intervened in the politics of the province and, in the process,

moved against political allies of Nawaz Sharif, the IJI coalition

prime minister, who was already at odds with the president.

General Janjua died suddenly in January 1993, and President Ishaq Khan used his prerogative to reach well down the

282
National Security

list of lieutenant generals to appoint Abdul Waheed, a highly

regarded officer without apparent political aspirations.

Waheed seemed to fit Pakistani political scientist Mohammad

Waseem's description as "the transition from a group of conservative generals led by Zia who were inspired by Islamic ideals to a relatively liberal and modernist generation of military offic- ers who have positive attitudes toward Western-style democracy."

Waheed was quickly called upon to demonstrate his commitment to the democratic process. When a power struggle

between the president and the prime minister in April 1993

resulted in Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs ouster, the military

resisted the temptation to take charge during the ensuing

period of political turmoil. In July Waheed brokered a settle- ment in which both the prime minister and the president

resigned, a neutral caretaker government was appointed, and

new elections were scheduled for October (see "The Silent Revolution": A Year of Political Struggle, ch. 4).

There remained different points of view among officers,

almost all of whom had little respect for politicians and feared

that an incompetent civilian leader might irreparably damage

their core values—the integrity of the military and the security

of Pakistan. Some officers were politically ambitious and had

found their period of power under Zia rewarding—financially

and otherwise. Many, however, believed that any political activity, whether in the context of martial law or in the context of

helping deal with crises caused by politicians' ineptitude,

undermined discipline and morale and detracted from the

ability of the armed forces to perform military missions.

Retired General Shaukat Riza, describing an earlier period of

martial law, observed: "After a short period of hot, righteous

action, military men succumb to setting their mark on whatever is served up to them. Martial Law is disarmed, leaving in

its wake a debris of shattered dreams and wasting social order."

On balance, the army preferred to avoid direct involvement

unless the political order threatened to collapse completely.

The crucial question for Pakistan's political future was in the

shaping of the middle ground. Should the armed forces simply

be recognized as having a voice in Pakistan's politics, or should

their role be formally institutionalized? Zia's attempts to do the

latter through creation of a National Security Council had

been successfully resisted byjunejo, but the question remained

central to Pakistan's security as well as to its politics.

283
Pakistan: A Country Study

The external relations of the military deteriorated sharply in

the post-Zia period because of the collapse of Pakistan's relationship with the United States. President George Bush determined in October 1990 that he could no longer certify that

Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons and, as required by

the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, terminated all United States assistance to Pakistan that was not

already in the pipeline. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States. Washington

permitted such commercial purchases as spare parts for air- craft and the continued joint naval and special forces exercises,

but such key items as fighter aircraft on order were kept in

abeyance. Further, the United States moved to reclaim nine

ships that were on loan—about half of Pakistan's surface fleet. The impact on Pakistan's military readiness by the United

States decision to halt assistance has been described by observers as near catastrophic, but even more important than the

money and equipment involved was the strategic signal sent by

the aid cutoff. As long as Pakistan was in the front line of opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States

found ways of continuing its aid despite Pakistan's nuclear program. Once the Soviet forces left Afghanistan and the Soviet

Union itself ceased to exist, Pakistan's importance dwindled.

Whatever limited successes Pakistan may have had in salvaging

parts of the relationship with the United States, it was clear that

the end of the Cold War marked the end of Pakistan's strategic

role.

The loss of United States support came at a difficult time.

Unrest in Indian Kashmir had developed rapidly after 1989,

and Pakistan inevitably supplied moral and covert materiel support, thus raising the specter of a new conflict with India.

There were serious concerns in early 1990 that a war might

break out. At United States prompting, both sides took effective steps to reduce the danger. Neither country wanted a conflict, but Pakistan remained in a quandary because it could not

ignore events in Kashmir although it did not have substantial

international support for its position. The United States and

China made clear their unwillingness to provide political or

materiel support to Pakistan, thus increasing still further the

latter's sense of isolation.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removed a potential

threat to Pakistan, and the substantial retreat of Russia from

284
National Security

the security affairs of the subcontinent offset somewhat the

withdrawal of the United States. For the first time since 1947,

Pakistan was not concerned about a two-front threat. Further,

the emergence of five independent Muslim republics in Central Asia raised hopes that they might become allies and offer

Pakistan both the political support and the strategic depth it lacked. As long as Afghanistan was in chaos, Pakistan would

lack direct access to the new republics. However, it was still far

from certain in the early 1990s whether or not the republics

would find Pakistan a desirable political partner.

Approaching the next century, Pakistan faces yet another

reconfiguration of the forces that determine its security environment. As Russia, China, and the United States stand back

from South Asia, there are fewer constraints on India. Yet other

sweeping changes are under way in the international environment. Pakistan remains engaged in its search for outside help

to ensure its security. The end of the Cold War only changed

the parameters of the problem.

The Armed Services

Constitutional Basis and Missions

Article 243 of the 1973 constitution states that the federal

government controls the armed forces and gives the president

power to raise and maintain active and reserve forces, grant

commissions, and appoint the chiefs of staff of the three ser- vices (see President, ch. 4). Under Article 242, the president is commander in chief of the armed forces. The original intent was that the president act according to the guidance of the

prime minister. However, the Eighth Amendment to the nominally "revived" but fundamentally altered 1973 constitution,

promulgated in 1985 by President Zia, specifies in Article 90

that national executive power is vested in the president.

Article 245 prescribes the functions of the armed forces as defense of the nation against external aggression or threat of war and, subject to law, aid-to-the-civil power when called upon.

This article is intended to keep the military from acting independently of the elected political leadership in domestic

affairs. It was notably unsuccessful in protecting Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto from Zia's demand for "accountability," culminating in

Bhutto's trial, conviction, and eventual execution on a charge

of conspiring to murder one of his political opponents. Article

244 prescribes the oath taken by the armed forces, including

285
Pakistan: A Country Study

the pledge "not to engage myself in any political activities whatsoever." This requirement is not, however, meant to restrict

members of the armed forces from voting.

Article 39 enjoins the state to enable people from all parts of

Pakistan to join the armed forces. It does not, however, require

proportional representation of provinces, and only modest

progress has been made in making the military more geographically representative.

In addition to the constitutionally prescribed missions of

defending the country (including protecting the borders and

coastline) and continuing the traditional aid-to-the-civil power,

the army has an unstated, self-appointed mission of guarding

the domestic order—"guardian of the family silver," as Pakistani journalist Mushahid Hussain puts it. It is this concept of

its mission that has led the military to assume power on three

separate occasions.

The military engages in a broad range of public service and

economic activities and plays a leading role in dealing with nat- ural disasters. The armed services do not, however, have a record of participating in foreign disaster relief. The military

has engaged in civic-action work in strategically sensitive areas, especially Balochistan, but does not see itself as having a generalized role in civic action and economic development. General

Waheed even resisted a military role in antinarcotics work,

probably fearing its temptation as well as its distraction from

the military's primary role as the defender of the country.

Defense Strategy

Pakistan remains, despite its substantial military force, a nation with a gaping security deficit. India has forces sometimes almost three times as large as Pakistan's, and this disparity is only partially offset by India's need to defend its border

with China. Senior Pakistani officers are well aware of the fact

that their forces are not equal to India's, and few would will- ingly provoke a test of strength. Further, although Pakistan had

built up its fuel and ammunition reserves to forty-five days' supplies by 1992, past experience has taught the nation not to count on replenishment. War avoidance has been the primary

goal of Pakistani security policy, especially since the Zia years. At the same time, the military accepts the fact that war is possible and is determined to acquit itself well. Pakistan, like virtually every other nation, proclaims that its forces and strategy are defensive. Faced with a much superior

286
National Security

enemy, uncertain sources of supply, and little strategic depth,

Pakistan cannot expect to absorb an initial attack and to successfully fight a protracted defensive war. Thus, in terms of con- ventional strategy, Pakistan has emphasized a doctrine of

"offensive defense," which provides for quick preemptive

strikes once a war begins in order to disrupt an enemy advance

and inflict high costs. In addition, such actions are designed to gain salients in enemy territory, which can be used as trade-offs

in peace negotiations. Navy and air force roles would be mainly

defensive. The large-scale exercise Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of

the Faithful), which took place in late 1989, was held far

enough away from the border not to frighten India, and,

indeed, foreign observers were invited. Its scenario and the

publicity that attended it were, however, meant to illustrate the

offensive-defense doctrine and to make sure that India understood it. Ministry of Defence

The minister of defense is a civilian member of the cabinet,

chairs the Defence Council, and is in turn a member of the

higher-level Cabinet Defence Committee. The Ministry of

Defence has a permanent staff of civil servants headed by the

defense secretary general. Of particular importance to the

Ministry of Defence is the adviser for military finance, who

heads the Military Finance Division in the Ministry of Finance

but is attached to the Ministry of Defence. The adviser functions as the principal financial officer of the defense ministry

and the subordinate services.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deals with all problems

bearing on the military aspects of state security and is charged

with integrating and coordinating the three services. In peacetime, its principal function is planning; in time of war, its chairman is the principal staff officer to the president in the

supervision and conduct of the war. The secretariat of the committee serves as the principal link between the service headquarters and the Ministry of Defence in addition to

coordinating matters between the services. The three branches

within the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee deal with planning,

training, and logistics. Affiliated with the committee are the

offices of the engineer in chief, the director general of medical

service, the director of inter-services intelligence, and the

director of inter-services public relations. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff Committee supervises the National Defence College, the

287
Pakistan: A Country Study

Joint Services Staff College, and the Inter-Service Selection

Board.

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence is of particular importance at the joint services level. The directorate's

importance derives from two sources. First, it is the agency

charged with managing covert operations outside of Pakistan

whether in Afghanistan, Kashmir, or farther afield. Second, in

the past it was deeply involved in domestic politics and kept

track of the incumbent regime's opponents. In addition, when

the regime was unpopular with the military and the president

(as was Benazir Bhutto's first government), the agency helped

topple it by working with opposition political parties.

Army and Paramilitary Forces

The key holder of power in the armed forces and, along with

the president and the prime minister, one of the triumvirate

that runs the country is the chief of the army staff (COAS) —

formerly called the commander in chief. In 1994 this post was held by General Abdul Waheed. The COAS operates from

army headquarters in Rawalpindi, near Islamabad. From this

position, both Ayub Khan and Zia seized power. Other senior

staff positions, at the lieutenant general level, include a chief of

general staff, who supervises army intelligence and operations;

the master general of ordnance; the quartermaster general;

the adjutant general; the inspector general for evaluation and

training; and the military secretary. The headquarters function

also includes the chief of the Corps of Engineers, the judge

advocate general, and the comptroller of civilian personnel, all of whom report to the vice chief of the army staff. The army is organized into nine corps: First Corps at Mangla; Second Corps at Multan; Fourth Corps at Lahore;

Fifth Corps at Karachi; Tenth Corps at Rawalpindi; Eleventh

Corps at Peshawar; Twelfth Corps at Quetta; Thirtieth Corps at Gujranwala; and Thirty-first Corps at Bahawalpur. There is also

the Northern Area Command, headquartered at Gilgit, directly

responsible to army general headquarters.

Active army strength in 1994 was 520,000. In addition, there were 300,000 reserve personnel. Reserve status lasts for eight

years after leaving active service or until age forty-five for

enlisted men and age fifty for officers.

In 1994 major weapons included nearly 2,000 tanks (mainly

Chinese but also 120 M-47s and 280 M-48A5s of United States origin); 820 M-113 armored personnel carriers; 1,566 towed

288
National Security

artillery pieces; 240 self-propelled artillery pieces; forty-five

multiple rocket launchers; 725 mortars; 800 Cobra, TOW, and

Green Arrow antitank guided weapons; eighteen Hatf surfaceto-surface missiles; 2,000 air defense guns; and 350 Stinger and

Redeye missiles and 500 Anza surface-to-air missiles. The

army's combat aircraft inventory consisted of twenty AH-1F air- planes equipped with TOW missiles (see table 14, Appendix).

Paramilitary organizations, which are mainly of symbolic

importance, include the 185,000-member National Guard,

comprising the Janbaz Force—locally recruited militia mainly

charged with air defense—and two programs similar to the

United States Reserve Officers Training Corps, the National

Cadet Corps and the Women Guard. The Women Guard,

unlike the National Cadet Corps, includes individuals trained

in nursing, welfare, and clerical work. There are also some

women in the Janbaz Force, and a very small number of

women are recruited into the regular service in limited numbers to perform medical and educational work.

Paramilitary internal security forces are organized on the

provincial level but are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior

and are commanded by seconded army generals. These forces are in effect an extension of the army for internal security

duties. The Pakistan Rangers, headquartered in Lahore, deal

with unrest in Punjab, while the Mehran Force performs similar functions in Sindh. In 1994 their strengths were 25,000 and

24,000, respectively, divided into "wings" of approximately 800

men each. The Frontier Corps, with a strength of 65,000, is based in Peshawar and Quetta with responsibility for the NorthWest Frontier Province and Balochistan. The corps is responsible to both the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions and to army headquarters. The corps is divided into twenty-seven local

units—fourteen in the North-West Frontier Province and thir- teen in Balochistan—and includes the Chitral Scouts, the Khyber Rifles, the Kurram Militia, the Tochi Scouts, the South

Waziristan Scouts, the Zhob Militia, and the Gilgit Scouts.

There is also a Coast Guard, subordinate to the Ministry of

Interior and staffed by army personnel.

In times of natural disaster, such as the great floods of 1992,

army engineers, medical and logistics personnel, and the

armed forces play a major role in bringing relief and supplies.

The army also engages in extensive economic activities. Most of

these enterprises, such as stud and dairy farms, are for the

army's own use, but others perform functions beneficial to the

289
Pakistan: A Country Study

local civilian economy. Army factories produce such goods as sugar, fertilizer, and brass castings and sell them to civilian con- sumers. Several army organizations perform functions that are important to the civilian sector across the country. For example, the National Logistics Cell is responsible for trucking food

and other goods across the country; the Frontier Works Organization built the Karakoram Highway to China; and the Special Communication Organization maintains communications

networks in remote parts of Pakistan.

Navy

In 1994 the navy had some 22,000 personnel. The force

includes a small Naval Air Arm and the approximately 2,000-

member paramilitary Maritime Security Agency, charged primarily with protecting Pakistan's exclusive economic zone. The

naval reserve consists of about 5,000 personnel.

In 1994 the navy had four commands: COMPAK—the fleet; COMLOG—logistics; COMFORNAV—naval installations in the

north of Pakistan; and COMKAR—naval headquarters and the

only major base at Karachi. There are long-range plans to build a new naval base at Ormara, 240 kilometers west of Karachi,

and to improve harbors at Gwadar and Pasni to help alleviate

overdependence on Karachi.

The navy's principal combatants in 1994 were six submarines

of French origin equipped with United States Harpoon missiles; negotiations with the French for three additional submarines have been reported. The navy had three active old

destroyers (one of British and two of United States origin),

four United States-made guided missile frigates, six other frig- ates (two from Britain and four from the United States), and

two United States-made and one French-made mine warfare

craft. One destroyer and four frigates carried Harpoon missiles; the navy had acquired an unknown number of Mistral

close-in surface-to-air missiles from France. There were eight

missile craft, and thirteen coastal combatant and patrol craft,

all of Chinese origin. The Naval Air Ar m had four combat air- craft flown by air force personnel and armed with Exocet missiles and sixteen armed helicopters. The delivery of three P-3C

Orion long-range reconnaissance aircraft from the United

States had been suspended since 1990 (see table 15, Appendix).

290
National Security

In 1991 a naval special warfare marine commando unit, with

a strength of between 150 and 200 men, was established. Its functions, in addition to hull inspection and special operations, included operating three midget submarines.

Although the navy clearly needs to grow, its immediate

future is threatened by a reduction in equipment brought

about by the Pressler Amendment imposed in 1990 (see The

Armed Forces in a New World Order, this ch.) . The navy had to return four Brooke (Badr) -class and four Garcia (Saif) -class frigates to the United States at the end of their five-year lease.

In addition, one British-made destroyer, the Babur, was retired

in 1994. At the same time, all three United States destroyers

became fully operational, and an additional six Amazon-class

frigates purchased from Britain were to be delivered in late

1994.

Air Force

In 1994 the air force had 45,000 active personnel and 8,000

reserve personnel. Headquartered in Rawalpindi, it comprises

directorates for operations, maintenance, administration, and

electronics. There are three air defense districts—north, central, and south.

In 1994 the air force was organized into eighteen combat

squadrons, with a total of 430 combat aircraft. The mainstay of

the air force was the F-l 6 fighter. Of the forty aircraft originally

acquired, thirty-four were in service, divided among three

squadrons. Some were reportedly grounded because of a lack

of spare parts resulting from the 1990 United States suspension

of military transfers to Pakistan (see The United States and the

West, ch. 4). Pakistan had an additional seventy-one F-l 6s on

order, but delivery has been suspended since 1990. Other

interceptors included 100 Chinese J-6s (which were scheduled

to be phased out) and eighty J-7s, organized into four squad- rons and two squadrons, respectively. Air-to-air missiles

included the Sparrow, Sidewinder, and Magic (see table 16,

Appendix)

.

To fulfill its ground-attack role, the air force had three

squadrons of Chinese Q-5s (a total of fifty aircraft) as well as one squadron of eighteen Mirage Ills (EP and DP) and three

squadrons (fifty-eight aircraft) of Mirage 5s, one squadron of

which was equipped with Exocet missiles and was deployed in an antiship role. The Mirage 5s are scheduled to be upgraded

with French assistance.

291
Pakistan: A Country Study

In 1994 Pakistan also took out of storage thirty of forty-eight

Mirage III-Os that it had originally acquired from Australia.

They were grouped into a fighter squadron.

The backbone of the transport fleet was formed by twelve C130 Hercules, which had recently been upgraded; plans to acquire more were stymied by the dispute with the United

States over Pakistan's nuclear program. There were also smaller

transport aircraft and a variety of reconnaissance and training

aircraft. Personnel and Training

The manpower base of Pakistan, with its population of more

than 120 million, is more than adequate to maintain force lev- els that the country can afford. In 1994 there were an esti- mated 6.4 million men and 5.7 million women between the

ages of eighteen and twenty-two and another 10 million men

and 9 million women between the ages of twenty-three and

thirty-two. About two-thirds of the individuals in these groups were estimated to be physically fit for service. Although there is provision for conscription, it has not proven necessary because

there are more than enough volunteers for a profession that is both honored and, by Pakistani standards, financially rewarding.

Although recruitment is nationwide and the army attempts

to maintain an ethnic balance, most recruits, as in British

times, come from a few districts in northern Punjab Province

and the adjacent North-West Frontier Province. Most enlisted

personnel come from rural families, and although they must

have passed the sixth-grade level in school, many have only

rudimentary literacy skills and very limited awareness of the

modern-day skills needed in a contemporary army (see Education, ch. 2). Recruits are processed gradually through a paternalistically run regimental training center, perhaps learning to wear boots for the first time, taught the official language,

Urdu, if necessary, and given a period of elementary education

before their military training actually starts. In the thirty-sixweek training period, they develop an attachment to the regiment they will remain with through much of their careers and

begin to develop a sense of being a Pakistani rather than primarily a member of a tribe or a village. Stephen P. Cohen, a

political scientist specializing in military affairs, has noted that

the army "encourages the jawan (basic private) to regard his

regiment and his unit as his home or substitute village; and it

292
National Security

invests a great deal of time and effort into . . . 'man management,' hoping to compensate in part for generally inferior military technology by very highly disciplined and motivated

soldiers." Enlisted men usually serve for fifteen years, during

which they participate in regular training cycles and have the

opportunity to take academic courses to help them advance.

About 320 men enter the army annually through the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul (in Abbotabad) in the NorthWest Frontier Province; a small number—especially physicians

and technical specialists—are directly recruited, and these per- sons are part of the heart of the officer corps. They, too, are overwhelmingly from Punjab and the North-West Frontier

Province and of middle-class, rural backgrounds. The product

of a highly competitive selection process, members of the offi- cer corps have completed ten years of education and spend two

years at the Pakistan Military Academy, with their time divided

about equally between military training and academic work to bring them up to a baccalaureate education level, which

includes English-language skills. There are similar programs

for the navy at Rahbar (in Karachi) and for the air force at Sarghoda.

The army has twelve other training establishments, including schools concentrating on specific skills such as artillery,

intelligence, or mountain warfare. Plans are being drawn up

for the National University of Science and Technology, which

would subsume the existing colleges of engineering, signals,

and electrical engineering. At the apex of the army training sys- tem is the Command and Staff College at Quetta, one of the

few institutions inherited from the colonial period. The college

offers a ten-month course in tactics, staff duties, administration, and command functions through the division level. Students from foreign countries, including the United States, have

attended the school but reportedly have been critical of its nar- row focus and failure to encourage speculative thinking or to give adequate attention to less glamorous subjects, such as

logistics. The air force has an advanced technical training facility at Korangi Creek near Karachi for courses in aeronautical

engineering, and the navy's technical training is carried out at Karsaz Naval Station in Karachi.

The senior training institution for all service branches is the

National Defence College at Rawalpindi, which was established

in 1978 to provide training in higher military strategy for

senior officers. It also offers courses that allow civilians to

293
Pakistan: A Country Study

explore the broader aspects of national security. In a program

begun in the 1980s to upgrade the intellectual standards of the

officer corps and increase awareness of the wider world, a small

group of officers has been detailed to academic training,

achieving master's degrees and even doctorates at universities

in Pakistan and abroad.

Pakistani officers were sent abroad during the 1950s and

into the 1960s for training in Britain and other Commonwealth

countries, and especially to the United States, where trainees

numbering well in the hundreds attended a full range of insti- tutions ranging from armored and infantry schools to the

higher command and staff institutions. After 1961 this training was coordinated under the International Military Education

and Training (IMET) program, but numbers varied along with

vicissitudes in the United States-Pakistan military relationship.

Of some 200 officers sent abroad annually in the 1980s, over

two-thirds went to the United States, but the cessation of

United States aid in 1990 halted the IMET program. In 1994

virtually all foreign training was in Commonwealth countries.

Pay scales and benefits for enlisted personnel are attractive

by Pakistani standards. Officer pay is substantially higher, but

with inflation and a generally expanding economy, officers

find it harder to make do and feel that they are falling well

behind their civilian counterparts in the civil service, where sal- aries are somewhat higher and the opportunities for gain considerably greater.

Officers retire between the ages of fifty-two and sixty,

depending on their rank. The retirement age for enlisted personnel varies similarly according to grade. Retirement pay is modest, especially for enlisted men, but the armed services

find ways to make the retiree's lot easier. Especially during periods of martial law, retired senior officers have found second,

financially rewarding careers in government-controlled organizations. Land grants to retired officers have been common,

and scholarships and medical care are available on a relatively

generous basis. In the event of an officer's death on active duty,

certain provisions, including grants of free housing, are often

extended to his family.

The Fauji Foundation is a semiautonomous organization run for the benefit of active and, especially, retired military

personnel and their families. It engages in a variety of lucrative

businesses throughout Pakistan and annually produces a sur- plus of US$30 million for its beneficiaries. The Baharia Foun294
National Security

dation provides a similar service to navy families, as does the

Shaheen Foundation to those of the air force.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Pakistani military uniforms closely resemble those of the

British armed services. The principal colors are greenish

brown for the army, navy blue for the navy, and light blue for

the air force. Brown and black camouflage fatigues are com- monly worn by army troop units. Rank insignia also are similar

to those used by the British (see fig. 11; fig. 12).

The rank structure is also patterned on the British model.

Following the British Indian tradition, there are three junior

commissioned officer (JCO) grades between enlisted and offi- cer rank for those who rise by promotion from among enlisted

recruits. The junior commissioned officer is a continuation of

the former viceroy's commissioned officer rank. During the

early days of the army, there was a large cultural gap between

officers and enlisted personnel. In the early 1990s, JCOs had

wide responsibilities in the day-to-day supervision of lower

grades, but they were a group that may have outlived its useful- ness because officers have become "more Pakistani" and less dependent on British models and because the education level

of enlisted men has risen. Promotion to JCO rank, however,

remains a powerful incentive for enlisted personnel; thus, if JCO ranks are ever phased out, it will likely be a slow process.

Military Production

Pakistan began with virtually no military production capability, and, because of its limited economic means and lack of for- eign markets, there is little prospect of the country's ever developing industrial facilities that could cover its equipment

needs. However, it has taken a series of partial steps in some of

the most crucial fields and aspired to become self-sufficient, at

least in such basic areas as aircraft overhaul and modernization

and tank and helicopter sales. Symbolic of Pakistan's determination to move to a degree of self-sufficiency was the creation

of the Ministry of Defence Production in September 1991.

The Ministry of Defence Production has been responsible

for promoting and coordinating a patchwork of military production facilities that have developed since independence. The

oldest of these facilities is the Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah Cantonment, near Rawalpindi, established in 1951, to produce small arms, ammunition, and explosives. During the

295
Pakistan: A Country Study

o >

_l 2

< cc

cc <

UJ LU 2j I

< o 5: 5 < 11111

cc x cc

LU 1— O

LU Q DC LL Q

<

e5

< s 111 II

2 _i < <

Z CC

LU LU

LU O

Z —

< < Z DC <

< DC<

5 III

Z —J < < z cc LU LU

I— z 3 LU

LU O III

< z Co 4>: O DC ^ I

LU > CO < Z cc DC - LU ± < o < s I

cc $ O °= < Z 2 lu

DC <

< E

DC Q 1

y < a cc < LU (3 Z

CC "'

CD

cco

< 5

so II

cc _J

\a < Q CC H

a. —

=> ^ o 1- inn Hi

Z —

< LU z z

LU O

LU z < Hoo 111!

Z —

< LU z z

LU O 5

(o f)

zO DC DC LU Q O

< <

Z> LU O -i V) 111 LU < II-J o 111 LU <

ty o -1 o

z

I- <

I z a lu

z3

< DC 2 O

t^CC

=> o

y z

-J X)

* oc

z ,,, < 1 cc p

DC

I- LU o o

51

3* < o

< w

0.5 z m z

CC H

296
National Security

297
Pakistan: A Country Study

period of reliance on United States supply, there was little attention given to domestic production, but after the assistance

cutoffs in 1965 and 1971, Pakistan—with China's help—set about expanding its facilities, including the modernization of

Wah. The Heavy industries facility at Taxila was established in

1971 as an equipment rebuilding facility, followed in 1973 by

the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, north of Islamabad. The air force assembled Chinese F-6s and French

Mirages; produced the Mushshak trainer, which was based on

the Swedish SAAB Safari/Supporter; maintained radar and avi- onics equipment; and in the mid-1990s was in the process of

developing the Karakorum jet trainer in a joint project with

China.

The ministry also includes seven other specialized organizations devoted to research and development, production, and

administration. Total personnel strength in 1993 was more

than 50,000, including 2,600 professionals. The government

estimated annual production in the early 1990s at US$500 million including about US$30 million in exports. For example,

Mushshaks were provided to Iran as light trainers and observation aircraft. Exports ranked high among the ministry's goals.

The navy is supported mainly by a facility at the Karachi

Shipyard, which has limited production capacity and in 1994

had to its credit only an 831-ton tanker and a prototype 200-ton

coastal patrol vessel. In 1987 development of a submarine

repair and rebuild facility at Port Qasim was begun.

Pakistan's nuclear program is shrouded in secrecy, but there

is little doubt that nuclear weapons have been produced or at

least have reached the developmental stage of a final "turn of a

screw"; and, although the program is believed to have been

technically arrested in 1992, the capability to produce weapons

exists. Estimates put the inventory at between seven and fifteen

weapons, at least some of which are deliverable by airdrop from

C-130 or F-16 aircraft. Although F-16s supplied by the United

States had the electronic wiring removed (necessary for

launching nuclear weapons), some United States observers

reported that Pakistanis could easily overcome this technological obstacle.

In the early 1990s, Pakistan was also engaged in a missile

development program, for which it had received substantial

Chinese assistance. The Hatf-1 surface-to-surface missile,

which can carry a payload of up to 500 kilograms as far as eighty kilometers, was introduced in 1992; the Hatf-2, which

298
National Security

could be in service by 1995, also carries a 500-kilogram payload

but has a 300-kilometer range. In 1994 there were unconfirmed reports of a longer range Hatf-3 missile under development.

Budget

Faced with the problem of defense against a much larger

enemy from a relatively weak resource base, the military must

lay claim to a disproportionate share of the nation's resources even to maintain a minimally effective defensive capability. The

military was fortunate in that successive governments—with

the exception of the early Bhutto years—believed it necessary

to support the armed services as much as possible. This atti- tude also persisted among the public at large, who accepted

the danger from India as real and present.

From 1958 until 1973, the published defense budget

accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of total government

expenditures. After that time, the proportions were much

lower, falling to 40 and even 30 percent levels and ranging

between 5 and 7 percent of GNP. At the same time, however,

because of an expanding economy, actual expenditures—even

allowing for inflation—showed considerable increases. The

defense budget for fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1993 was set at Rs94 billion (for value of the rupee—see Glossary), or US$3.3 billion, which represented 27 percent of government

spending and almost 9 percent of the gross domestic product

(GDP—see Glossary). The published budget understated

expenditures by excluding procurement and defense-related

research and development as well as funds spent on such activities as intelligence and the nuclear program.

Military Justice

The militaryjustice system rests on three similar service laws:

the Pakistan Army Act (1952), the Pakistan Air Force Act

(1953), and the Pakistan Navy Ordinance (1961). The acts are administered by the individual services under the central

supervision of the Ministry of Defence.

The army has a four-tier system; the air force and navy, threetier systems. The top two levels of all three systems are the general courts-martial and district courts-martial; the third level

comprises the field general courts-martial in the army and air

force and the equivalent summary general courts-martial in the

299
Pakistan: A Country Study

navy. The army also has a further level, the summary courtsmartial.

The differences in court levels reflect whether their competence extends to officers or only to enlisted men and the severity of the punishment that may be imposed. Sentences of

military courts must be approved by the convening authority,

that is, the commanding general of the organization concerned. Every decision of a court-martial higher than summary

court-martial level must be concurred in by a majority of the

members of the court; where a vote is split evenly, the law provides that the "decision shall be in favor of the accused." There

is a right of appeal within the military court system, but no civil- ian court has the right to question the judgment of a military

court. In cases where a military person is alleged to have committed a crime against a civilian, the central government determines whether military or civilian courts have jurisdiction.

Double jeopardy is prohibited. Former servicemen in civilian

life who are accused of felonies committed while on active duty

are liable for prosecution under the jurisdiction of military

courts. These courts are empowered to mete out a wide range

of punishments—including death. All sentences of imprisonment are served in military prisons or detention barracks.

In contrast to the civilian court system, the introduction of

Islamic law (sharia—see Glossary) has had little effect on the

militaryjustice system. The Federal Shariat Court has, however,

ordered the military to make more liberal provisions to appeal,

to confront witnesses, and to showjust cause (see Judiciary, ch.

4). It was not clear in early 1994 what practical effect these

directives have had.

Foreign Security Relationships

Pakistan must look abroad for both material assistance and

political support. Its principal tie has been with the United

States. When relations were good, this connection meant

access to funds, sophisticated weaponry, training, and an enhanced sense of professionalism. When relations were bad, it meant bitter disillusionment and the severing of support at

critical junctures. These wide swings of fortune are something

to which Pakistanis have become accustomed, and they recognize that, whatever the provocation, the tie to the United States has too much potential benefit to be discarded lightly.

Relations with China in the early 1990s were less emotionally

intense and much more stable. China has been a steady source

300
National Security

of military equipment and has cooperated with Pakistan in set- ting up weapons production and modernization facilities.

Within months of the 1965 and 1971 wars, China began to resupply the depleted Pakistani forces. Between 1965 and 1982,

China was Pakistan's main military supplier, and materiel has

continued to be transferred. In 1989 Pakistan and China discussed the transfer of a nuclear submarine, and China was

helpful in developing Pakistan's missile and, allegedly, nuclear

weapons programs. But Chinese weaponry was inferior to that

supplied by the West and also to what India received from the

former Soviet Union and hoped to continue to receive from

Russia. The Pakistanis dispatched a military mission to Moscow

in October 1992, probably to explore the possibilities of acquiring surplus Russian and East European equipment at low

prices.

The Pakistani military's close ties to the nations of the Middle East are based on a combination of geography and shared

religion. The closest ties are with Saudi Arabia—a sporadically

generous patron; much of the equipment bought from the

United States during the 1980s, for example, was paid for by

the Saudis. The smaller Persian Gulf states also have been

sources of important financial support. The flow of benefits

has been reciprocated. Beginning in the 1960s, Pakistanis have

been detailed as instructors and trainers in Saudi Arabia, Jor- dan, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. Pakistani pilots, sailors, and technicians have played key roles in

some Persian Gulf military forces, and Arabs have been trained

both in their home countries and in military training establishments in Pakistan. After unrest in Saudi Arabia in 1979, Pakistan assigned two combat divisions there as a low-profile

security force. This unofficial arrangement ended in 1987,

however, reportedly when Pakistan refused the Saudi demand

to withdraw all Shia (see Glossary) troops. Some 500 advisers,

however, remained behind. These exchanges had built up

close contacts between the forces of Pakistan and the Arab host

countries and were profitable to Pakistan and to the individual

Pakistanis assigned abroad, who were paid at much higher

local pay scales. Pakistan has a particular interest in cooperating with neighboring Iran, with which it had occasionally difficult relations

after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In more recent years,

however, delegations have been exchanged, and Pakistan has

sold military equipment to Iran. Pakistan also has military ties

301
Pakistan: A Country Study

with Turkey and would like to use these, as well as its Iranian

connections, as a bridge to the new Muslim states of Central

Asia. When the situation in Afghanistan again becomes nor- mal, Pakistan will no doubt attempt to capitalize on the support it gave the mujahidin by forging close military links to its second-most-important neighbor to the west. Pakistan has sent troops abroad as part of United Nations

(UN) peacekeeping efforts. The first such troops served in

West Irian (as Indonesia's Irian Jaya Province was then called)

in the 1962-63 period. In early 1994, Pakistan contributed two

infantry battalions to the United Nations Protection Force in

Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR BH) and two infantry

brigades to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Pakistan's contribution of 7,150 troops to UNOSOM

was the largest single national contingent in any UN peacekeeping force as of early 1994. At the time, Pakistan also had

participating observers in a number of other UN missions in

Croatia, the Iraq-Kuwait demilitarized border zones, Liberia,

Mozambique, and Western Sahara. Pakistan also dispatched an armored brigade to Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf

War. However, it was assigned well away from the front—ostensibly to defend the holy cities of Mecca and Medina—thus

reducing the possibility that any Pakistani troops might have

somehow become involved in actual combat with Iraqi troops.

Such an eventuality could have proven explosive in Pakistan

and could have caused uncontrollable unrest. Pakistani sentiment in favor of Iraq was widespread, and even the COAS,

General Beg, spoke out in support of Saddam Husayn.

The Role of Islam

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced certain Islamic practices,

notably prohibition of alcoholic beverages, into the army, and

Zia encouraged still more, including the assignment of mullahs

(see Glossary) as chaplains, some of whom reportedly go into

combat with the troops. Modest mosques have been built in

military training areas, Islamic texts are being introduced into

training courses, mid-grade officers must take courses and

examinations on Islam, and there are serious attempts under

way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the

Western doctrines that the Pakistanis have been following.

In the early 1990s, Islamic military doctrine had not

replaced more traditional military doctrines, and it probably

never will. Stephen P. Cohen has, however, highlighted several

302
National Security

interesting points that have emerged. For instance, Islam has

traditionally been identified with the concept ofjihad, a righteous religious "striving" against unbelievers, and Islamic governments have been assiduous in describing whatever wars they

fight—even against other Muslims—as jihad. Recent thinking,

however, has emphasized that jihad is not a perpetual invitation to wage war against nonbelievers and, indeed, that it need

not necessarily entail violence. More specifically, Pakistani writ- ers have rejected as un-Islamic the idea of total war that

emerged in Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

They emphasize the Quranic injunctions to conciliation and

persuasion and see force only as a last resort. Further, these Pakistani theorists see the function of force

less as a capability for combat than as something that strikes terror into the hearts of enemies and thus can actually prevent

war. There is an obvious parallel here to the idea that the most

terrifying of all weapons, nuclear ordnance, can act as a deterrent to war. Many Western military writers have portrayed the era of United States-Soviet mutual deterrence in these terms,

and some have even applied this view as a rationale for Pakistani and Indian nuclear capabilities. Pakistani writers find this

approach a convenientjustification for their nuclear programs,

and, indeed, most of the "Islamic" thinking on war still looks

more like retroactive rationalizations for strategies already

adopted rather than guideposts to new departures. Furthermore, Pakistanis are well aware that air combat tactics or at-sea replenishment techniques are not determined by religion, and

the armed forces will continue to look for secular guidance.

At the personnel level, the generation of cosmopolitan

officers who were trained in British and United States traditions and consider religion a purely personal matter is passing

from the scene. The new generation of officers is less exposed

to foreign influences and is, increasingly, a product of a society

that has been much more influenced by "orthodox" Islam, in

which the primacy of Islam is continually emphasized and

accepted.

Relatively few Pakistanis have turned to Islamic fundamentalism, and, because of the demands of their profession, Pakistani officers and soldiers seem likely to keep at least one foot

in the modernist camp. Senior generals are reportedly con- cerned about religion looming too large in military affairs, but

unless there are major changes in society and politics, the

303
Pakistan: A Country Study

armed forces may increasingly see itself as an Islamic as well as a nationalist force.

Internal Security

Role and Structure of the Security Forces

Before independence, the security forces of British India were primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and

order but were also called on to perform duties in support of

the political interests of the government. The duties of the

police officer in a formal sense were those of police the world

over: executing orders and warrants; collecting and communicating upward intelligence concerning public order; preventing crime; and detecting, apprehending, and arresting

criminals. These duties were specified in Article 23 of the

Indian Police Act of 1861, which (together with revisions dating from 1888 and the Police Rules of 1934), is still the basic

document for police activity in Pakistan.

The overall organization of the police forces remained

much the same after partition. Except for centrally administered territories and tribal territories in the north and northwest, basic law and order responsibilities have been carried out

by the four provincial governments. The central government

has controlled a series of specialized police agencies, including

the Federal Investigative Agency, railroad and airport police

forces, an anticorruption task force, and various paramilitary

organizations such as the Rangers, constabulary forces, and the

Frontier Corps. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto established the Federal

Security Force and gave it wide-ranging powers, but the force was abolished when the military regime of Zia ul-Haq seized

power in 1977.

Under the constitution, criminal law and procedure are

listed as subjects that are the concurrent responsibility of the

central and provincial governments. The federal government,

however, has extensive power to assert its primacy, especially in

any matter relating to national security. The police forces of

the four provinces are independent, and there is no nationwide integration; nevertheless, the federal minister of interior

provides overall supervision.

Senior positions in the police are filled from the Police Ser- vice of Pakistan (PSP) . The Police Service of Pakistan is not an

operational body; rather, it is a career service similar to the

Civil Service of Pakistan, from which officers are assigned to

304
National Security

the provincial services or, on rotation, to central government

agencies where their skills are needed. Recruitment to the PSP

is through an annual national examination that is common for

several centrally recruited services, including the civil service

and the foreign and the customs services. Because the PSP is a

relatively well-paid and powerful service, it attracts students

who rank highest in the selection process. Successful candidates receive two years of training at the Police Training College in Sihala, near Islamabad, and are then assigned to duty

with one of the provincial forces.

The PSP is overwhelmingly male in composition, but the

October 1993 return of Benazir Bhutto to power may result in

some bold changes. In January 1994, Benazir announced the

opening of Pakistan's first all-female police station. About fifty

female officers of the Rawalpindi police station will supplement Punjab's provincial police force of 85,000 men. As part of

her campaign for equal rights for women, Benazir also promised to place women in 10 percent of top police posts, to appoint women to the Supreme Court, and to establish special

courts for cases against women.

The senior officer ranks in the police service are the inspector general, who heads a provincial police force, and a deputy

inspector general, who directs the work of a division or "range,"

which coordinates police work within various parts of a province. There are also assistant inspectors general in each province. The principal focus of police activity is at the district level,

which is headed by a superintendent, and the subdistrict level,

usually under the direction of an assistant or deputy superintendent. The latter is not necessarily drawn from the Police

Service of Pakistan. At each level, police officials report to the

political or civil service heads of the respective administrative

level; the inspectors general, however, have direct links to the

federal Ministry of Interior. Larger municipalities have their

own police forces, but these are responsible to the provincial

structure of police authority.

The great majority of police personnel are assigned to subdistricts and police stations and are not at the officer level. Their ranks are inspector, sergeant, subinspector, assistant subinspector, head constable, and constable. As one descends the

rank hierarchy, education levels, skills, and motivation decrease

precipitously—even dramatically at the lower levels. Although

constables are supposed to have a modest amount of education, their wages are comparable to those of an unskilled

305
Pakistan: A Country Study

laborer (about US$40 per month), and a head constable—the

height of aspiration for many policemen—is paid only at the

level of a semiskilled worker.

Police in Pakistan are generally unarmed. For crowd control,

police are trained to use a lathi, a five-foot wooden staff that

may be weighted. Lathi are used either to hold crowds back or

as clubs. Tear gas and firearms are available, and police formations hunting down armed bands of robbers, or dacoits, have

adequate firepower available.

Character of the Security Forces

Independence had little impact on the police forces, which,

like the military, simply switched their allegiance from the British to a new, indigenous regime. The great mass of police work

remained the same, and the political role of the police in supporting the British soon found a parallel in independent Pakistan, as the regime was itself beset by political disturbances and

extended the definition of crime to include such antistate activities as terrorism and subversion. Even though the forces of law

and order had become the instruments of an indigenous government, any significant advantages that had accrued from the

changeover have largely been dissipated.

Public attitudes toward the police, historically regarded with

distrust and fear, have not changed; indeed, the police are held

in low esteem. In British times, the Indian Police Service—the

predecessor of the PSP—was nearly incorruptible and was

fairly immune from political pressure that did not emanate

from London. Since independence, however, politicization of

the police has become increasingly pervasive. Corruption in

the lower ranks has proliferated and permeated the PSP; in the

frequent periods when Pakistan was under oppressive rule, the

police were as repressive as they were in British times.

Police tactics in British India were never gentle, but in con- temporary Pakistan, according to the Herald, a magazine published in Karachi, "The police have institutionalized torture to a point where it is viewed as the primary method of crime

detention. Police torture has become so commonplace that it has slowly lost the capacity to shock and disgust." These charges

were echoed by Amnesty International's especially bleak

appraisal of Pakistan's human rights situation in its June 1992

"International News Release" report. The report, reflecting the

law-and-order breakdown in Sindh and the government's reac- tion to it, stated that government opponents often are

306
National Security

harassed, placed under arrest, and detained for unspecified

periods of time. Scores of prisoners of conscience have been

held for their political activities or religious beliefs. The practice of repeatedly bringing false charges against members of

the political opposition is a widely used tactic in Pakistani politics and has been used to arrest thousands of opposition party

activists. According to the United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human Eights Practicesfor 1993, there were no

significant efforts in 1992 or 1993 to reform either the police or the judicial system, and authorities continued to be lax in

their prosecution of abuses in these areas. Pakistani and international human rights organizations have demanded that steps

be taken to reverse the trend by bringing torturers to justice

and by taking such procedural steps as reducing the time pris- oners spend in places of first arrest, where most torture takes

place.

Torture is a particularly acute problem in cases in which the

suspect is thought to have committed a political crime, but it is not uncommon in serious criminal cases. General police brutality in handling all suspects is routine. Police frequently act without warrants or other proper authorization, and individuals disappear into the criminal justice process for weeks before

they can be found and, through writs of habeas corpus, be

brought into regular judicial channels. Rape of prisoners, both

male and female, is common. Prisoners often die in detention

but are reported as killed in the course of armed encounters.

Police also are alleged to extort money from families of prison- ers under threat of ill treatment. The performance of the

police and their failure to act against political groups that run

their own torture machinery are especially bad in Sindh, but

there is no Pakistani who looks on an encounter with the police

with equanimity.

Amnesty International and other human rights groups welcomed the establishment in 1993 of a Human Rights Commission by the interim government of Moeen Qureshi and

recommended to his successor, Benazir Bhutto, that the new

government investigate past torture cases and enforce safeguards against the use of torture. Despite continued trouble in

Sindh, observers have discerned what appears to be a genuine

interest by the current government in addressing some of the

more egregious human rights problems endemic in Pakistan

today.

307
Pakistan: A Country Study

Crime

Part of the responsibility for the deterioration of police performance has been a widespread increase in the amount of

crime. New kinds of crime have developed—especially those

related to illegal drugs—and criminals have substantially

greater firepower (see Narcotics, this ch.). Since the war in

Afghanistan, Pakistan has been awash in guns. Kalashnikov

automatic weapons have become ubiquitous and may be

rented in Karachi on an hourly basis. In Karachi criminal violence, especially kidnapping for ransom and, in effect, open

warfare among political groups, rendered the city so dangerous

that in May 1992 the military had to be called in to launch

Operation Cleanup to apprehend criminals and terrorists and

to seize unauthorized weapons. Criminality extends into all lev- els of society. Known criminals have ties to political figures and

are able to frustrate legitimate attempts to enforce law and

order. In early 1994, the army was still actively involved in law

enforcement in Sindh.

Crime statistics are reported but cannot be considered reli- able. Throughout the 1980s, there appeared to be an incremental increase in the number of crimes reported each year. According to the Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991, from 8,000

to 20,000 murders or attempted murders, 3,500 to 6,000 kidnappings or abductions, 100 to 600 robberies, and 120,000 to 250,000 other crimes were reported annually between 1981

and 1990.

Narcotics

Narcotics have become a multiple challenge to law enforcement authorities. In the late 1980s, Pakistan and Afghanistan

exported nearly half the world's heroin, and, although their

relative share declined somewhat thereafter, they remain

among the world's major producers. Pakistan, especially under

United States prodding, has attempted to cut back the cultivation of poppies, but the government's influence has not

extended effectively into tribal areas. In addition, various political and economic forces have been brought to bear to keep

narcotics police from pursuing their work too assiduously. In

1991 the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board—an organization

that was supposed to have close ties to the United States Drug

Enforcement Administration—was so riddled with corruption

that its new director had to fire a majority of the staff. The vast

308
National Security

profits generated by the narcotics industry not only had cor- rupted the enforcement authorities, including, it was rumored,

some military units, but also had funded many other related

crimes.

Courts and Criminal Procedure

Pakistan has an extensive penal code of some 511 articles,

based on the Indian Penal Code of 1860, extensively amended

during both the preindependence and the postindependence

eras, and an equally extensive Code of Criminal Procedure.

Numerous other laws relating to criminal behavior have also

been enacted. Much of Pakistan's code deals with crimes

against persons and property—including the crime of dacoity

(robbery by armed gangs) and the misappropriation of property.

Pakistani courts can, and do, impose the death sentence, as well as imprisonment, forfeiture of property, and fines. Imprisonment is either "rigorous"—the equivalent of hard labor for

up to fourteen years—or "simple"—confinement without hard

labor. Another form is "banishment," which involves serving in a maximum security prison for periods of seven years to life. In

February 1979, Zia ul-Haq issued new laws that punished rape,

adultery, and the "carnal knowledge of a virgin" by stoning;

first-time theft by amputation of the right hand; and consumption of alcohol by eighty lashes. Stoning and amputation, it should be noted, had not been carried out as of early 1994—at

least not outside of the tribal area where tribal custom, rather

than the Pakistani penal code, is the law of the land.

Article 45 of the constitution bestows on the president the

right to grant a pardon or to remit, suspend, or commute any

sentence passed by any court. There are also legal provisions

for parole.

In principle, articles 9 through 13 of the constitution and

provisions of the codes guarantee most of the same protections

that are found in British and United States law. These rights

include, for example, the right to bail and to counsel, the right

of habeas corpus, the right of cross-examination, the right of

representation, the right of being informed of charges, the

right of appeal, and the right of the prevention of double jeopardy.

The code contains copious provisions for punishment of

crimes against the state or against public tranquillity. These

crimes extend to conspiracy against the government, incite309
Pakistan: A Country Study

ment of hatred, contempt or disaffection toward a lawfully constituted authority, unlawful assembly, and public disturbances.

Punishments range from terms of imprisonment to life in

prison or death.

In most instances, a person apprehended appears before a

magistrate or assistant commissioner, who decides on bail; the

magistrate may also try less serious cases. Serious cases are tried

before the sessions courts, which can award punishments up to death. The provincial high court hears appeals and automatically reviews any conviction involving the death penalty. The

highest level of appeal for criminal cases is the federal

Supreme Court.

Under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special

Courts) Act of 1975, the government established special courts

to try cases involving crimes of a "terrorist" nature (for example, murder and sabotage). In 1987 another ordinance was

passed establishing Speedy Trial Courts, which were empowered to hand down a death penalty after a three-day trial in

which almost no adjournments were permitted. The jurisdictional authority of both kinds of courts was amended in 1988,

but they have continued to operate. In 1991 the Speedy Trial

Courts were given new jurisdictional authority to try particularly heinous crimes under the constitution's Twelfth Amendment. These courts handle cases that attract widespread public

attention, especially those dealing with murder and drug

offenses and in which the government believes that justice

must be meted out rapidly. Only one appeal is permitted. In

1990 special "accountability" courts were set up to try individuals from Benazir's first administration who were charged with

corruption. In late 1993, Benazir announced that her government would stop referring new cases to the special courts and

would allow the constitutional authority for these courts to lapse in 1994.

The court system and the provisions of criminal law do not

extend into the tribal areas along the Afghan border. These

areas are administrated by political agents who work with tribal

leaders to maintain law and order according to tribal stan- dards.

Prisons

Under the 1962 West Pakistan Jail Warden Service Rules,

prisons are managed by a career prison service, which sets qualifications for wardens, but these guidelines are reportedly not

310
National Security

well observed. The service is organized by province under an

inspector general of prisons. At division level, the senior offi- cial is the director of prisons, and there are jail superintendents at district and municipal levels. Simple lockups are maintained in some villages. There are some female wardens to handle female prisoners, but more are needed.

Prisons are not salubrious places. The common criminal

from a poor background is assigned to Class C confinement,

with virtually no amenities. Abuse is common. Prisoners of

higher social status are assigned to Class B prisons, where conditions are better, and they can purchase better food and some

amenities. Class A prisons are for "prominent" offenders. Conjugal visits are not the rule but are allowed in some cases. Juveniles are handled separately in both the court system

and in confinement. The criminal code prescribes special

courts for offenders under age fifteen unless they are charged

with a particularly serious offense and a high court orders that

they be tried before a regular sessions court. There are juvenile

wards in regular jails for offenders up to age twenty-one. In

addition, a few reform institutions for boys between eleven and

twenty years of age attempt to rehabilitate young offenders.

Islamic Provisions

The process of Islamization that has taken place in Pakistan,

especially in the Zia years, has raised considerable concern

about criminal law. In February 1979, President Zia promulgated a new legal code for Pakistan based on Islamic law and

established the Federal Shariat Court to hear appeals arising

from the new code. The Federal Shariat Court also has other

extensive powers (see Role of Islam, ch. 4). It lies within the dis- cretion of the court of first instance to decide whether to try a

case under civil or sharia law. If the latter, then the appeals process goes to the Federal Shariat Court, rather than to the high

courts. Sharia law was not intended to replace the criminal code but

to bring specific parts of it into accordance with the Quran and

the sharia. Its most notable provisions are contained in the

hudood (sing., hadd) ordinances promulgated in 1979. The first ordinance deals with offenses against property, the second with

zina (adultery) and zina-bil-jabr (rape), the third with qazf (false

accusation of zina) , and the fourth with prohibition of alcoholic beverages. Under the ordinances, there are two levels of

cases: hudood cases, which have particularly strict Islamic evi311
Pakistan: A Country Study

dentiary requirements and call for specific "Islamic" punishments; and tazir cases, where the evidence requirements are

less strict and the punishments less draconian.

A later decision by the Federal Shariat Court has made defil- ing the name of the Prophet Muhammad punishable by a mandatory death penalty. This decision has raised concerns in

Pakistan's small Christian community and especially among the

badly persecuted Ahmadiyya religious minority. Orthodox

Pakistani Muslims consider Ahmadiyyas heretical, and the

group has been prohibited from asserting any claim to being

Muslim—even the use of everyday Islamic greetings (see NonMuslim Minorities, ch. 2).

As a hadd crime, rape is punishable by hanging; adultery and

fornication, as well as qazf, by stoning to death. Crimes against

property of substantial value call for amputation of hands or

feet. Public drunkenness and, in the case of Muslims, any con- sumption of alcohol, are punishable by flogging.

For the most part, Islamic punishments have not been car- ried out, the sole exception being flogging, which has been

imposed primarily for tazir crimes, as well as for narcoticsrelated crimes. In addition, alleged political crimes also

resulted in flogging during the last period of martial law

(1977-85). Hudood sentences of amputation have been passed

but either have been reversed on appeal or have not been car- ried out. Occasional stonings for adultery have always taken

place in tribal and other rural areas, but no sentence of stoning

under the 1979 hudood laws has been carried out. The Federal Shariat Court has been involved mainly with

noncriminal matters, aside from the review of hudood convictions, which in most cases the Federal Shariat Court has

reversed. In other matters, such as provision of equal treatment

under the law and requirement for a standard of evidence, its application of Islamic principles has even served as a liberalizing factor, including in the militaryjustice system. Overall, as of

early 1994 Islamic legal intrusions have had only a limited

effect on criminal law, although the potential for growth is there, especially under the more activist leadership that the

Federal Shariat Court has shown since 1990.

Among the more notable peculiarities of the new enactments is the issue of rape. On the one hand, the crime is rarely

proven because four adult Muslim males of good reputation

must appear as witness to the act. If the charge fails, then the

woman who has brought it can be punished for false accusation

312
National Security

or, more commonly, for adultery herself because through her

charge she has admitted an illicit sexual act. In 1991 two-thirds

(some 2,000) of the women imprisoned in Pakistan were being

held on such charges. This treatment, of course, has a very

chilling effect on women who are raped.

Laws passed in the 1980s give the victim of a murder or other

violence, or the victim's heirs, the right to inflict an equivalent

harm. At the same time, however, there is a legal alternative in

payment of blood money, which enables wealthy Pakistanis to avoid punishment by paying money. Under the law, only half of

the amount must be paid if the victim is female.

In 1984 parts of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 were

changed with much fanfare to meet Islamic criteria, but there was little real change. Demands by Islamic enthusiasts that the

testimony of two women be considered the equivalent of that

of one man were met only symbolically. The hudood ordinances,

however, do contain evidential provisions that discriminate

sharply against women.

In May 1991, the National Assembly passed the Shariat Bill,

intended to bring the entire justice system into accord with

Islamic norms. These norms had not yet been established, and,

as of early 1994, no serious attempt had been made to draft

and pass the laws and constitutional amendments that would

be required. Many observers believed that the act was meant as an empty sop to Islamist extremists, but it seemed likely that

there would be constant pressure to implement the act more

fully.

Emergency Provisions

The British colonial constitutional provisions and penal

codes gave the authorities ample scope for overriding regular

legal procedures in the case of persons suspected of political

agitation or threats to the public order. These provisions and

codes were perpetuated and strengthened in Pakistan. The

Security of Pakistan Act empowers authorities to move against

any person "acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence,

external affairs and security of Pakistan or the maintenance of

public order." Under the act, persons may be detained, their

business activities, employment, or movements may be

restricted, and they may be required to report regularly to a

magistrate.

Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the

government to act preventively if it perceives the danger of

313
Pakistan: A Country Study

public disorder. A magistrate may prohibit meetings of five or more persons, forbid the carrying of firearms, and impose

"preventive detention" on anybody thought likely to disturb

public order. Although a detainee is entitled to be informed of

the reason for his detention and to a fair review of the case, these restrictions are in practice easy to circumvent, and the

constitution specifically denies such detainees procedural guarantees. The government, especially in periods of martial law,

has used Section 144 frequently when feeling its position could

be threatened by demonstrations and public opposition to its policies; Section 144's provisions have also been used, however,

to contain disorder that is not political.

In 1991 Pakistan adopted the Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts) Ordinance, which extends the authority of Speedy

Trial Courts and gives the police expanded powers to use weapons. The Maintenance of Public Order Act allows detention

without trial for three months, extendable to twelve months in

some cases. This act has been used to silence political opponents of the government.

Although persons accused of crimes are entitled to bail,

there have been a number of restrictions placed on this right in cases involving alleged threats to national security. In late 1992,

the law requiring automatic bail for anyone in jail for two years

who had not yet been convicted was rescinded, and the high

courts were prohibited from hearing bail applications from

persons facing trial in the special courts set up in 1975 to try

terrorists. A Pakistani jurist commented: "The government can now arrest anyone, call him a terrorist, and keep him in prison

indefinitely."

Subversion and Civil Unrest

Internal threats to Pakistan come from several sources. The

greatest danger to the democratic constitutional structure is posed by the recurrent intervention in the government of the

Pakistani military and, since the Zia years, by the president

who, under the controversial Eighth Amendment to the constitution, is empowered to arbitrarily dismiss the prime minister

and National Assembly as well as the provisional governors. It could be argued that the military has only intervened when the

political situation has deteriorated hopelessly and that the

threat is in fact from much more deep-seated problems.

Another danger is the problem of ethnic unrest. Punjab,

with almost 60 percent of the population, dominates almost all

314
National Security

aspects of national life. This fact is resented by smaller ethnic

groups, all of whom have at one time been actively dissident.

For the most part, with the exception of Sindh, the situation was quiet in the early 1990s. Sparsely settled Balochistan

required an extensive pacification campaign by the army from

1973 to 1977 as Baloch fought an insurgency fueled by eco- nomic grievances and a desire for regional autonomy. Of special concern to Baloch dissidents was the influx of Punjabi

settlers into their resource-rich but sparsely populated lands.

Soviet assistance to Baloch dissidents was alleged. During the

government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, hostilities in Balochistan were protracted, but the succeeding regime of Zia ul-Haq

relied successfully on an economic rather than military

approach in Balochistan, and was, in large part, able to diffuse

the situation. The potential for unrest remains, however,

because Baloch feel threatened by the growing numbers of

non-Baloch moving into the province. The North-West Frontier Province has long been restive and subject to Kabul's blandishments on the basis of shared Pakhtun identity, but

Afghanistan no longer offers a feasible alternative, and the

Afghan Pakhtun tribal groups have benefitted from Pakistan's

modest prosperity. Some Kashmiris in Pakistani-held Azad

(Free) Kashmir probably envision a future independent of

Pakistan, but their attentions have been absorbed by the problems of Indian-held Kashmir.

In the early 1990s, the principal challenge came from Sindh,

Pakistan's second most populous province, where the indigenous population was under increasing pressure from

non-Sindhis who had migrated there. Based on their ethnic

identity, Sindhis have formed several political movements,

notably the Jaye Sindh, which the government perceived as threatening to Pakistan's unity. Islamabad also claimed that

these groups were receiving help from India in their quest to establish a "Sindhudesh," or independent homeland for Sindhis. The muhajir (immigrants from India and their descendants) minority in Sindh, which dominates Karachi, has been

in sharp conflict with the Sindhis and other ethnic groups. Further, large numbers of kidnapping and bombings in Sindh

the virtual breakdown of law and order—necessitated the

imposition of army rule in 1992 (see Prospects for Social Cohesion, ch. 2).

An additional source of unrest has been the rampant gun

culture and spread of narcotics-based corruption, particularly

315
Pakistan: A Country Study

since the war in Afghanistan. Pakistanis have always been well

armed, but the availability of cheap, modern weapons has

meant that criminals and private citizens have significant fire- power at their disposal. Because most violence is criminal or anomic, it does not pose a direct threat to the state, but should

the crisis of governability in Sindh spread more broadly, it could place unbearable stress on the nation.

In the early 1990s, foreign-sponsored subversion in Pakistan

appeared to be insignificant. The Afghans were too preoccupied with their own concerns to agitate along the frontier, and

the Soviet Union, which had long had adversarial relations with

Pakistan, had fragmented into a number of self-absorbed states occupied by the struggle for survival in a new postcommunist

world. India had ties to dissident groups in Sindh and perhaps

elsewhere; these, however, were probably maintained in order

to remind Pakistan that its involvement with Punjabi Sikh and

Kashmiri Muslim insurgents in India was not cost-free. In its more youthfully exuberant days, the Islamic regime in Iran was

involved in subversive support of Shia elements in Pakistan, but

such activity was no longer a significant factor. During the Zia period, a group called Al-Zulfiqar, operating

from Damascus and Kabul and seeking to destabilize the government through terrorist actions, hijacked an aircraft in 1981.

Murtaza Bhutto, a son of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was involved, and

Al-Zulfiqar claimed to have some relationship to the Pakistan

People's Party (PPP), which was totally denied by the PPP.

Although authorities have reported continued activity by AlZulfiqar, its existence is shadowy at best, and with the return of

democratic rule, its activities have been insignificant. There are no other known, organized subversive groups that threaten the

government in any serious way.

Pakistan's attitude toward terrorism is somewhat more

ambivalent than that of most other countries. On the one

hand, Al-Zulfiqar demonstrated to Pakistan the importance of

international cooperation in combatting international terror- ism as manifested in airplane hijackings and bombings. On the

other hand, however, Pakistan has had no qualms about supporting insurgents in India, some of whom are engaged in

activities that can only be described as terrorist.

In January 1993, the United States warned Pakistan that it was under "active continuing review" for possible inclusion on

the Department of State list of terrorist countries for its alleged

support of terrorist activities in India. By July, however, the

316
National Security

United States had withdrawn its threat, having determined that

Pakistan had implemented "a policy for ending official support

for terrorism in India."

As Pakistan approached the end of its first half-century of

existence, its security problems had changed, yet were in many

ways the same. The global setting had altered radically, but the

enmity with India remained a constant, although it had gained

in predictability and, probably, stability. Subversion was still a

potential rather than an active threat. Problems of law and

order were more acute, but the means of dealing with them

had not changed greatly. Rather, Pakistan's security problems

were rooted in its own polity and society. Repeated political col- lapse, corruption, inability to define its ethnic and religious

identities, and failure to meet the needs of the people—these

are challenges that could eviscerate a state even with the most

capable military machine and efficient security apparatus. Pakistan, as it considers its continuing security dilemma and the

international image it wishes to project, must energetically confront and deal with these harsh realities.

* * * The government of Pakistan goes to considerable lengths to protect dissemination of information about its armed forces,

making research on the military difficult. One of the few offi- cially sanctioned publications is Defenders ofPakistan by Brian

Tetley, essentially a coffee-table book but with useful information on the role, functions, and organization of the armed

forces. For early history, Fazl Muqeem Khan's The Story of the Pakistan Army remains an indispensable source. Research by

United States and Pakistani scholars during the 1980s has considerably enriched the understanding of the military. The his- torical picture is amplified by the two volumes of Shaukat Riza's

The Pakistan Army and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema's Pakistan's Defence

Policy, 1947-58. Hasan-Askari Rizvi has contributed two excellent studies

The Military and Politics in Pakistan and Pakistan

and the Geostrategic Environment, both of which cover the modern period, as does Robert G. Wirsing's Pakistan's Security under

Zia, 1977-1988. Foremost in the analytical field is Stephen P. Cohen's The Pakistan Army. The most current information is available from the annual International Institute for Strategic

Studies' The Military Balance and Jane's Defence Weekly, as well as several publications authored by Richard P. Cronin and Bar317
Pakistan: A Country Study

bara Leitch LePoer of the Congressional Research Service of

the Library of Congress. Of these, South Asia: U.S. Interests and

Policy Issues is particularly useful. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

318
Appendix

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population Growth, Selected Years, 1951-93

3 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Fiscal Years,

1982-93

4 Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1990-93

5 Balance of Trade, Selected Fiscal Years, 1980-92

6 Composition of Imports, Fiscal Years 1989-92

7 Composition of Exports, Fiscal Years 1989-92

8 Balance of Payments, Fiscal Years 1988-92

9 Estimated Labor Force by Sector, Fiscal Years 1981, 1991,

and 1992

10 Area of Major Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92

1 1 Production of Major Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92

12 Average Growth Rate of Selected Industrial Products,

Fiscal Years 1988-92

13 Heads of State and Heads of Government, 1947-94

14 Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Ground Forces,

1994

15 Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Naval Forces,

1994

16 Order of Battle and Major Equipment of Air Force, 1994

319

Appendix

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inches Centimeters 0.39 inches

3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles

2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet

Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds

Metric tons 0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons

2,204.0 pounds

Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit and add 32

Table 2. Population Growth, Selected Years, 1951-93

Population Average Annual

(in millions) Growth Rate

1951 33.7 n.a.

2 1961 42.9 2.3 1971 65.2 3.7 1981 84.2 3.1 1987 100.7 3.1 1992 118.0 3.1 1993 123.4 3.1 Estimated.

2 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Planning Commission, Seventh Five-Year Plan, 1988-93; and Perspective Plan, 1988-2003, Islamabad, 1988; and World

Bank, World Development Report, 1992, New York, 1992, 268.

321
Pakistan: A Country Study

Table 3. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, Selected Fiscal Years, 1982-93

(in percentages at current factor cost)

1982 1987 1 QQ9 1

o ' J* o • •

• 31.6 26.3 25.6 25.0 Mining and quarrying 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 Manufacturing 15.1 16.7 17.5 17.3

Utilities 2.2 2.3 3.3 3.7 Construction 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.2 Wholesale and retail trade 15.1 15.7 17.0 16.1 Transportation and communications 9.4 8.7 8.4 10.3 Banking and insurance 2.5 3.2 3.1 2.9 4.5 4.9 4.4 4.4

7.3 9.9 8.4 7.8 Other services 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 TOTAL* 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Provisional.

2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Pakistan, Afghanistan, 1993-94, London, 1993, 21; and Pakistan, Federal Bureau of

Statistics, Statistics Division, Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991, Karachi, 1991, 473-74.

322
Appendix

Table 4. Government Budget, Fiscal Years 1 990-931 (in billions of rupees) 2

1990 1991 1992d 19934

Revenues Tax revenues Income and corporation taxes 14.3 19.1 25.9 31.3 Property taxes 1.4 1.7 2.1 3.9 Excise duties 23.3 25.0 32.3 44.3

Sales taxes 15.6 16.9 21.5 26.9 Taxes on international trade 50.7 50.5 62.5 71.4 Other UA 16.4 22.8 26.0

Total tax revenues 119.4 129.6 167.2 203.8 Nontax revenues 39.4 34.2 55.5 58.0 Total revenues 158.8 163.9 222.6 261.9

(of which, provincial revenues) .... 6.6 7.1 15.7 18.9 Expenditures Current expenditures Defense 58.7 64.6 75.8 82.2

Interest on debt 46.7 50.0 63.6 75.5 Subsidies 9.0 10.7 10.1 7.3 Other 51.1 70.3 82.9 92.3

Total current expenditures 165.6 195.7 232.4 257.3 Development expenditures 56.1 65.3 83.2 72.3 Total expenditures 221.6 261.0 315.6 329.7 Income from autonomous agencies 6.8 7.9 14.3 3.2 Budget deficit 56.1 89.2 78.7 64.6

Deficit financed by

External (net) 22.9 22.1 21.8 17.1 Domestic nonbank 29.6 23.7 -0.6 26.2 Domestic banks 3.5 43.4 57.5 21.3

1 Includes federal aid to provincial governments. Figures may not add to totals because of

rounding.

2 For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

3 Provisional.

4 Proposed. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 162-64.

323
Pakistan: A Country Study

Table 5. Balance ofTrade, Selected Fiscal Years, 1980-92

(in billions of rupees) 1

Year Exports Imports Balance

1980 23.4 46.9 -23.5 1985 38.0 89.8 -51.8 1990 106.5 148.9 -42.4 1991 138.3 171.1 -32.8 19922 171.7 229.9 -58.2 For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

2 Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 190.

Table 6. Composition ofImports, Fiscal Years 1 989-92

(in millions of rupees) 1

Commodity 1989 1990 1991 19922

Chemicals 13,046 15,259 15,448 21,997

3,318 3,723 4,408 5,184 Dyes and colors 1,419 1,868 2,136 2,945 Chemical fertilizers 3,534 4,437 5,911 6,367

Electrical goods 4,962 4,259 4,929 7,469

Nonelectrical machinery 26,597 25,438 30,195 54,527 Transportation equipment 8,403 10,119 11,443 20,638 Paper products 2,734 2,876 3,216 4,027 Iron and steel 7,131 6,993 7,100 10,236 Nonferrous metals 2,018 2,594 2,110 2,784

Oil and oil products 18,509 24,937 37,823 34,406

Edible oils 8,576 8,262 9,020 10,025

Grains, pulses, and flour 8,598 9,241 3,855 9,979 Other 26,996 28,847 38,449 39,305 TOTAL 135,841 148,853 176,043 229,889 For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 203.

324
Appendix

Table 7. Composition ofExports, Fiscal Years 1989-92

(in millions of rupees) 1

Commodity 1989 1990 1991 19922

Fish products 2,096 2,024 2,575 2,852 Rice 5,967 5,144 7,848 10,340 Raw cotton 18,032 9,550 9,553 12,944 Cotton waste 240 597 1,255 1,482 Cotton yarn 11,645 17,917 26,675 29,170

Q f\Al 1Z,UUU lo.iyy OA 2*70 Leather 4,702 6,002 6,184 5,991

Oil and oil products 352 235 2,228 2,048

Synthetic textiles 2,240 4,556 7,807 10,430 Footwear 365 504 724 997 Ready-made garments 9,692 14,341 18,666 25,823

1,221 1,502 1,901 2,253 Carpets 4,451 4,923 5,003 5,709 Sporting goods 1,369 2,311 3,099 3,515 Other 18,864 24,863 30,792 37,829 TOTAL 90,183 106,469 139,509 171,755 For value of the rupee—see Glossary.

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 194-97.

Table 8. Balance ofPayments, Fiscal Years 1 988-92

(in millions of United States dollars at current prices)

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1

Exports 4,362 4,634 4,926 5,902 6,884 -6,919 -7,207 -7,411 -8,385 -9,095

Invisibles (net) 875 639 594 312 -325

Current account balance . . -1,682 -1,934 -1,891 -2,171 -2,536

Private capital (net) 330 328 473 506 1,730 Public capital (net) 1,242 1,659 1,840 1,737 929

Capital account balance. . . 1,572 1,987 2,313 2,243 2,659

Errors and omissions (net) . . -30 -42 -45 -66 74 Change in reserves (minus

sign indicates increase) . . . 140 -11 -377 -6 -197

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 189.

325
Pakistan: A Country Study

Table 9. Estimated LaborForce by Sector, Fiscal Years 1981, 1991,

and 1992

(in thousands)

Sector 1981 1991 1992

Agriculture 13,010 16,260 16,670 Mining and manufacturing 3,480 4,080 4,210 Construction 1,200 2,030 2,090

Electric power and gas 230 190 190

Transportation and communications 1,150 1,550 1,600 Trade ...... 2,840 3,790 3,900 Other services 2,790 3,880 4,010 Other 950 1,030 1,150 TOTAL 25,650 32,810 33,820 Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 30.

Table 10. Area ofMajor Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92

(in thousands of hectares)

Crop 1961 1981 1991 19921

Wheat 4,639 6,984 7,911 7,823 Rice 1,181 1,933 2,113 2,097 Corn 480 769 845 847

Chickpeas 1,106 843 1,092 1,021 Sugarcane 388 825 884 880 Cotton 1,293 2,108 2,662 2,836

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 63.

326
Appendix

Table 11. Production ofMajor Crops, Selected Fiscal Years, 1961-92

(in thousands of tons)

Crop 1961 1981 1991 19921

Wheat 3,8H 11,475 14,565 14,694

Rice 1,030 3,123 3,261 3,243 Corn 439 970 1,185 1,204 Chickpeas 610 337 531 499

Sugarcane 11,641 32,359 35,989 35,658 Cotton 301 715 1,637 2,181

Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 64.

Table 12. Average Growth Rate ofSelected Industrial Products, Fiscal

Years 1988-92

(in percentage change from previous year)

Product 1988 1989 1990 1991 19921

Cotton yarn 16.83 10.64 20.28 14.22 11.30 Cotton cloth 18.30 -4.18 9.26 -0.65 5.60 Jute goods -1.85 -6.82 -7.80 3.24 3.64 Vegetable ghee 14.45 28.55 7.37 3.85 10.71 Cigarettes 1.92 -22.43 2.26 -0.70 -4.98

Fertilizers -2.42 2.52 3.72 -2.70 -5.28 Cement 8.67 0.75 5.09 4.63 6.90 Soda ash 2.92 7.61 3.60 5.55 24.02

Caustic soda 11.66 8.48 11.28 6.08 4.33

1 Provisional. Source: Based on information from Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92, Islamabad, 1992, 107.

327
Pakistan: A Country Study

Table 13. Heads of State and Heads of Government, 1947-94

Leader Position Term of Office Mohammad Alijinnah .... Governor General August 1947-September 1948

Liaquat Ali Khan Prime Minister August 1947-October 1951 Khwaja Nazimuddin Governor General September 1948-October 1951 Ghulam Mohammad Governor General October 1951 -August 1955 Khwaja Nazimuddin Prime Minister October 1951 -April 1953 Mohammad Ali Bogra Prime Minister April 1953-August 1955

Iskander Mirza Governor General/Presi- August 1955-October 1958 dent Chaudhuri Mohammad

Ali Prime Minister August 1955-September 1956

H.S. Suhrawardy Prime Minister September 1956-October 1957

LI. Chundrigar Prime Minister October-December 1957

Firoz Khan Noon Prime Minister December 1957-October 1958 Mohammad Ayub Khan CMLA/President2 October 1958-March 1969 Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan CMLA/President March 1969-December 1971

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto CMLA/President/Prime December 1971-July 1977

Minister

Fazal Elahi Chaudhry President August 1973-September 1978 Mohammad Ziaul-Haq ... CMLA/President July 1977-August 1988 Mohammad Khanjunejo . . Prime Minister March 1985-May 1988 Ghulam Ishaq Khan President August 1988-July 1993

Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister December 1988-August 1990 Ghulam Mustaphajatoi .... Prime Minister (caretaker) August-November 1990 Mian Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister November 1990-April 1993

Balakh Sher Mazari Prime Minister (caretaker) April-May 1993 Mian Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister May-July 1993 Wassim Sajjad President (caretaker) July-November 1993 Moeen Qureshi Prime Minister (caretaker) July-October 1993

Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister October 1993- Farooq Leghari President November 1993-

1 When a head of state or head of government held more than one position, not all offices were for exactly the same term. Dates shown are for the longest period a leader was in power. The title of the head of state was changed from governor general to president under the 1956 constitution.

2 CMLA—chief martial law administrator.

328
Appendix

Table 14. Order of Battle and Major Equipment

of Ground Forces, 1994

Organization or Equipment

Personnel 520,000

Military units . . 9 Corps headquarters

1 Area command (division) 2 Armored divisions 19 Infantry divisions 7 Independent armored brigades 9 Independent infantry brigades

9 Corps artillery brigades (2 more forming)

1 Air defense command (3 air defense groups; 8 brigades)

7 Engineering brigades

3 Armed reconnaissance regiments

1 Special forces group (3 battalions) 7 Aircraft squadrons

8 Helicopter squadrons

1 Independent observation flight

Equipment .... 1,950+ Tanks

820 Armored personnel carriers 1,566 Towed artillery 240 Self-propelled artillery 45 Multiple rocket launchers 725 Mortars

18 Surface-to-surface missiles 800 Antitank guided weapons

850 Surface-to-air missiles Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 159-61.

329
Pakistan: A Country Study

Table 15. Order of Battle and Major Equipment of

Naval Forces, 1994

Organization or Equipment

Personnel 22.000 1 Military units . . . 4 Commands, including 1 fleet headquarters Equipment 6 Submarines

3 Destroyers 10 Frigates 13 Patrol and coastal combatant craft 4 Inshore craft 3 Mine warfare craft 3 Support and miscellaneous

4 SA-316B (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters

6 Sea King Mk 45 (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters

6 Lynx HAS MK-3 (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters

4 Atlantic aircraft (operated by air force) Includes Naval Air Arm and Maritime Security Agency. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 159-61.

Table 1 6. Order ofBattle and Major Equipment ofAirForce, 1 994

Organization or Equipment

Personnel 45,000

Military units .... 7 Fighter/ground attack squadrons

10 Fighter squadrons

1 Reconnaissance squadron

12 Transport squadrons

1 Helicopter search-and-rescue squadron

1 Helicopter transport squadron

7 Air defense surface-to-air batteries

1 Antisubmarine warfare/maritime reconnaissance squadron

Equipment

Fighter/ground

attack

aircraft 10034

80

50

30

15

J-6/JJ-6 F-16 Q-5

Mirage IH-O

Mirage III-EP

330
Appendix

Table 16. Order ofBattle and Major Equipment ofAirForce, 1994

Organization or Equipment

358

Transports 12

13

32

2

Search and

rescue 6

Reconnaissance 12

Helicopters

(transport) ... 124

12

Training 123024

6

10

44

Mirage HI-DP

Mirage -5

C-130

L-12

Boeing 707

Falcon 20 F-27-200

Beech

SA-319

Combat-capable Mirage III-RP

SA-316

SA-321 SA-315 B Lama

CJ-6 JH

Mashshaq

MiG-15UTI T-33A

T-37BC

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 159-61.

331

Bibliography

Chapter 1 Abbott, Freeland. Islam and Pakistan. Ithaca: Cornell University

Press, 1968.

Abbott, Freeland. "Pakistan and the Secular State." Pages 352-

70 in Donald E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Religion.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Adams, Charles J. "The Ideology of Mawlana Maududi." Pages

371-97 in Donald E. Smith, ed., South Asian Politics and Reli- gion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Afzal, M. Rafique. Political Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958. Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural

Research, 1976.

Ahmad, Aziz. An Intellectual History of Islam in India. Chicago:

Aldine, 1969.

Ahmad, Aziz. Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-

1964. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Ahmad, Manzooruddin, ed. Contemporary Pakistan: Politics,

Economy, and Society. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1980.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. "Pakistan." Pages 229-46 in Shireen T. Hunter, ed., The Politics of Islamic Revivalism. Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1988.

Ahmad, Mushtaq. Government and Politics in Pakistan. New York:

Praeger, 1963.

Ahmed, Akbar S. "A Third Encounter of a Close Kind," History

Today [London], 39, November 1989, 49.

Ali, Tariq. Can Pakistan Survive} New York: Penguin, 1983.

Ali, Tariq. Military Rule or People 's Power? London: Cape, 1970.

Asghar Khan, Muhammad. Generals in Politics: Pakistan, 1958-

1982. New Delhi: Vikas, 1983.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Aziz, K.K. The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism. London: Chatto and Windus, 1967.

333
Pakistan: A Country Study

Aziz, K.K. Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1958. Islamabad:

National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research,

1976.

Bahadur, Lai. The Muslim League: Its History, Activities, and

Achievements. Lahore: Book Traders, 1979.

Basham, A.L. The Wonder That Was India. New York: Grove

Press, 1954.

Baxter, Craig. Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Baxter, Craig. "India and Pakistan." Pages 267-96 in Gregory

Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger,

eds., Divided Nations in a Divided World. New York: McKay,

1974.

Baxter, Craig. "Pakistan and Bangladesh." Pages 209-62 in Fre- derick L. Shiels, ed., Ethnic Separatism and World Politics. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1984.

Baxter, Craig. "Pakistan Votes—1970," Asian Survey, 11, No. 3,

March 1971.

Baxter, Craig. "The United States and Pakistan: The Zia Era

and the Afghan Connection." Pages 479-506 in Daniel Pipes

and Adam Garfinkle, eds., Friendly Tyrants: An American

Dilemma. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Baxter, Craig. Zia 's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline

State. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985.

Baxter, Craig, and Syed Razi Wasti, eds. Pakistan Authoritarianism in the 1980s. Lahore: Vanguard, 1991.

Bhattacharya, Sachchidananda. A Dictionary of Indian History.

Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1967.

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. The Great Tragedy. Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, 1971.

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. The Myth ofIndependence. Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1969.

Binder, Leonard. Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

Bokhari, Imtiaz H., and Thomas Perry Thornton. The 1972

Simla Agreement: An Asymmetrical Negotiation. Washington: For- eign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University, 1988.

Braibanti, Ralph J. D. Evolution ofPakistan's Administrative System:

The Collected Papers ofRalph Braibanti. Ed., Jameelur Rehman

334
Bibliography

Khan. Islamabad: Pakistan Public Administration Research

Centre, 1987.

Brice, William C, ed. An Historical Atlas ofIslam. Leiden: Brill,

1981.

Burke, S.M. Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974.

Burke, S.M. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

Burki, Shahidjaved. Historical Dictionary ofPakistan. Metuchen,

NewJersey: Scarecrow Press, 1991.

Burki, Shahidjaved. Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

Burki, Shahidjaved. Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977. (2d ed.)

London: Macmillan, 1988.

Burki, Shahidjaved, and Craig Baxter. Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1991.

Callard, Keith. Pakistan: A Political Study. London: Allen and

Unwin, 1957.

Callard, Keith. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation. New

York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959.

Callard, Keith. Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959. New York:

Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959.

Case, Margaret H. South Asia History, 1 750-1950: A Guide to Peri- odicals, Dissertations, and Newspapers. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1968.

Chopra, Pran, ed. Contemporary Pakistan: New Aims and Images.

New Delhi: Vikas, 1983.

Choudhury, G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan. (2d

ed.) Vancouver: Publications Centre, University of British

Columbia, 1969.

Choudhury, G.W. The Last Days of United Pakistan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

Cohen, Stephen P. The Pakistan Army. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984.

Coupland, Reginald. The Future of India. London: Oxford University Press, 1944.

Coupland, Reginald. Indian Politics, 1936-1942. London:

Oxford University Press, 1943.

335
Pakistan: A Country Study

Coupland, Reginald. The Indian Problem, 1833-1935. London:

Oxford University Press, 1942.

Davies, C. Collin. An Historical Atlas of the Indian Peninsula. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Embree, Ainslie, ed. Pakistan's Western Borderlands. Durham,

North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1978.

Faruki, Kamal A. "Pakistan: Islamic Government and Society."

Pages 53-78 in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam in Asia. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1987.

Feldman, Herbert. The End and the Beginning: Pakistan, 1969-

1972. London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Feldman, Herbert. From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan, 1962-1969.

London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Feldman, Herbert. Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial

Law Administration. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Gascoigne, Bamber. The Great Moghuls. London: Jonathan

Cape, 1971.

Gilmartin, David. Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of

Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Gupta, Sisir. Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966.

Hamid, Abdul. Muslim Separatism in India. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Haq, M.U. Muslim Politics in Modern India. Meerut, India:

Meenakshi, 1970.

Hardy, Peter. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Hardy, Peter. Partners in Freedom and True Muslims: The Political

Thought of Some Muslim Scholars in British India, 1912-1947.

Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur, 1971.

Harrison, Selig S. In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism

and Soviet Temptations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 1981.

Hasan, K. Sarwar. The Transfer of Power. Karachi: Pakistan Insti- tute of International Affairs, 1966.

Hayes, Louis D. Politics in Pakistan: The Struggle for Legitimacy.

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

Heeger, Gerald. "After the 'Tilt': The Making of U.S. Foreign

Policy Toward Pakistan, 1972-1974." Pages 125-42 in Lloyd

I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, eds., The Regional

336
Bibliography

Imperative: U. S. Foreign Policy Towards South Asian States. New

Delhi: Concept, 1980.

Heitzman, James, and Robert L. Worden, eds. Bangladesh: A

Country Study. Washington: GPO, 1989.

Hodson, H.V. The Great Divide: Britain, India, Pakistan. London:

Hutchinson, 1969.

Hutchins, Francis G. The Illusion ofPermanence: British Imperialism in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Ikram, S.M. Modern Muslim India and the Birth of Pakistan.

Lahore: Ashraf, 1965.

Ikram, S.M., and Percival Spear, eds. The Cultural Heritage of

Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1955.

Jahan, Rounaq. "India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh." Pages 299-

339 in Gregory Henderson, Richard Ned Lebow, and John

G. Stoessinger, eds., Divided Nations in a Divided World. New

York: McKay, 1974.

Jahan, Rounaq. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New

York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and

the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1985.

Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's

Political Economy ofDefence. Lahore: Vanguard, 1991.

James, Morrice, with Peter Lyon. Pakistan Chronicle. New York:

St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Keith, Arthur B. A Constitutional History of India. Allahabad,

India: Central Book Depot, 1937.

Khaliquzzaman, Choudhry. Pathway to Pakistan. Karachi: Longman, 1961.

Korbel, Josef. Danger in Kashmir. (Rev. ed.) Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Korson,J. Henry, ed. Contemporary Problems ofPakistan. Leiden:

Brill, 1974.

Lamb, Alastair. Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990. Karachi:

Oxford University Press, 1992.

Latif, Syed Muhammad. Lahore: Its History, Architectural Remains,

and Antiquities. Lahore: New Imperial Press, 1892. Reprint.

Lahore: Syed Muhammad Minhajuddin, 1957. (First Pakistani edition, Lahore: Sandhu Printers, 1981.)

337
Pakistan: A Country Study

Lelyveld, David. Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in

British India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Low, David A. The Political Inheritance ofPakistan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Low, David A . Soundings in Modern South Asian History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Low, David A., ed. Congress and the Raj. London: Arnold-Heinemann, 1977.

Lumby, E.W.R. The Transfer of Power in India. London: George

Allen and Unwin, 1954.

Majumdar, R.C. History of the Freedom Movement in India, 3. Calcutta: Firma Mukhopadhyay, 1962-63.

Malik, Hafeez. Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963.

Malik, Hafeez, ed. Iqbal: Poet-Philosopher ofPakistan. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1971.

Mansergh, N., and E.W.R. Lumby, eds. The Transfer of Power,

1942-47. (5 vols.) London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,

1970-71.

Mason, Philip. A Matter ofHonour: An Account of the Indian Army,

Its Officers and Men. London: Cape, 1974.

Mehra, Parshotam. A Dictionary ofModern Indian History, 1 707-

1947 Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Merriam, Allen Hayes. Gandhi vs.Jinnah: The Debate over the Partition ofIndia. Calcutta: Minerva, 1980.

Metcalf, Barbara Daly. Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband,

1860-1900. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Metcalf, Thomas R. The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Michel, Aloys A. The Indus River: A Study of the Effects ofPartition.

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Minault, Gail. The Khilafat Movement. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Moon, Penderel. Divide and Quit. London: Chatto and Windus,

1962.

Moore, R.J. The Crisis of Indian Unity, 1917-1940. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

Muhammad Ali, Chaudhri. The Emergence ofPakistan. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1967.

338
Bibliography

Mujahid, Sharif ak Quaid-i-AzamJinnah: Studies in Interpretation.

Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1981.

Munir, Muhammad. From Jinnah to Zia. Lahore: Vanguard,

1980.

Muqeem Khan, Fazal. Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership. Islamabad:

National Book Foundation, 1973.

Noman, Omar. Pakistan: Political and Economic History since

1947. London: Kegan Paul, 1988.

Oldenburg, Philip. "The Breakup of Pakistan." Pages 143-69 in

Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, eds., The

Regional Imperative: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards South Asian

States. New Delhi: Concept, 1980.

Page, David. Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control, 1920-1932. Delhi: Oxford University

Press, 1982.

Philips, C.H., and Mary Doreen Wainwright, eds. The Partition

of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947. London: Allen

and Unwin, 1970.

Possehl, Gregory, ed. Ancient Cities of the Indus. New Delhi:

Vikas, 1979.

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi: University of Karachi Press, 1965.

Rajput, A.B. Muslim League: Today and Yesterday. Lahore: Ashraf,

1948.

Rajput, A.B. Religion, Politics, and Society. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Richards, John F. The Mughal Empire. New York: Cambridge

University Press, 1993.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. Internal Strife and External Intervention:

India's Role in the Civil War in East Pakistan [Bangladesh]

.

Lahore: Progressive, 1981.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-

86. (3d ed.) Lahore: Progressive, 1986.

Sayeed, Khalid B. "The Historical Origins of Some of Pakistan's

Persistent Political Problems." Pages 27-44 in A. Jayaratnam

Wilson and Dennis Dalton, eds., The States of South Asia: Problems ofNational Integration. New Delhi: Vikas, 1982.

Sayeed, Khalid B. Pakistan: The Formative Phase. Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1960.

339
Pakistan: A Country Study

Sayeed, Khalid B. The Political System of Pakistan. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

Sayeed, Khalid B. Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of

Change. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Schwartzberg, Joseph E., ed. A Historical Atlas of South Asia. New

York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Shaikh, Farzana. Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Shakir, Moin. Khilafat to Partition. New Delhi: Kalamkar Prakashan, 1970.

Sisson, Richard, and Leo E. Rose. War and Secession: Pakistan,

India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1990.

Smith, Vincent Arthur. The Oxford History ofIndia. (3d. ed.) Ed.,

Percival Spear. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Islam in Modern History. New York:

Mentor Books, 1959.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Modern Islam in India. Lahore: Ashraf,

1963.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Pakistan as an Islamic State. Lahore:

Ashraf, 1951.

Spear, Percival. A History of India, 1. Harmondsworth, United

Kingdom: Penguin, 1965.

Spear, Percival. Twilight of the Mughals. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1951.

Syed, Anwar H. The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992.

Symonds, Richard. The Making of Pakistan. London: Faber,

1951.

Tahir-Kheli, Shirin. The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution

of an Influence Relationship. New York: Praeger, 1982.

Talbot, Ian. Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Tarn, W.W. The Greeks in Bactria and India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pi ess, 1951.

Thapar, Romila. A History of India, 2. Harmondsworth, United

Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1966.

Vertzberger, Yaacov. The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960-80. New York: Praeger, 1983.

340
Bibliography

Von Vorys, Karl. Political Development in Pakistan. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1965.

Waseem, Mohammad. Pakistan under Martial Law, 1977-1985.

Lahore: Vanguard, 1987.

Weinbaum, Marvin. "The March 1977 Elections: Where Every- one Lost," Asian Survey, 17, July 1977, 7. Wheeler, Richard S. The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional

Quest. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970.

Wheeler, Robert Eric Mortimer. Early India and Pakistan: To

Ashoka. (Rev. ed.) New York: Praeger, 1968.

Wheeler, Robert Eric Mortimer. Five Thousand Years ofPakistan.

London: Johnson, 1950.

Wilcox, Wayne Ayres. Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation.

New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Wirsing, Robert G. Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988: The

Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Wolpert, Stanley. Jinnah ofPakistan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Wolpert, Stanley. A New History of India. (4th ed.) New York:

Oxford University Press, 1992.

Wolpert, Stanley. Zulfi Bhutto ofPakistan: His Life and Times. New

York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Wriggins, W. Howard, ed. Pakistan in Transition. Islamabad:

University of Islamabad Press, 1975.

Ziring, Lawrence. The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-

1969. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1971.

Ziring, Lawrence. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development.

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.

Ziring, Lawrence, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins,

eds. Pakistan: The Long View. Durham, North Carolina: Duke

University Press, 1977.

Chapter 2

Abbasi, Nasreen, and Mohammad Irfan. "Socioeconomic

Effects of International Migration on Pakistani Families Left

Behind." Pages 177-93 in Fred Arnold and Nasra Shah, eds.,

Asian Labor Migration: Pipeline to the Middle East. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

341
Pakistan: A Country Study

Ahmed, Akbar S. Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988.

Ahmed, Akbar S. Millennium and Charisma among Pathans. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.

Ahmed, Akbar S. Pakistan Society: Ethnicity and Religious Identity.

Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986.

"AIDS Cases Said Increasing," Nawa-i-Waqt [Lahore], April 14,

1991. Joint Publications Research Service, Epidemiology.

(JPRS-TEP-91-018.) August 27, 1991, 28-29.

Ali, Imran. The Punjab under Imperialism, 1885-1947. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1988.

Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner, eds. The State, Religion, and

Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse, New

York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

Barth, Frederick, ed. Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social

Organization of Culture Difference. London: Allen and Unwin,

1970.

Baxter, Craig, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and

Robert C. Oberst. Government and Politics in South Asia. (2d.

ed.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

Burki, Shahid Javed. "Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988," Asian

Survey, 28, No. 10, October 1988, 1082-1100.

Burki, Shahid Javed, and Robert LaPorte, Jr., eds. Pakistan's

Development Priorities: Choices for the Future. Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1984.

Carroll, Lucy. "Nizam-i-Islam: Processes and Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamisation, with Special Reference to the Position of Women," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 20, 1982, 57-95.

Clark, Grace. "Pakistan's Zakat and 'Ushr as a Welfare System."

Pages 79-95 in Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

Donnan, Hastings, and Pnina Werbner, eds. Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1991.

Duncan, Ann. Women in Pakistan: An Economic and Social Strategy.

Washington: World Bank, 1989.

342
Bibliography

Dutt, Ashok K., and M.M. Geib. Atlas of South Asia. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.

Esposito, John L. Islam: The Straight Path. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1988.

Esposito, John L. Islam and Politics. (3d ed.) Syracuse, New

York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.

Farmer, B.H. An Introduction to South Asia. London: Methuen,

1983.

Gellner, Ernest. Muslim Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

"Government AIDS Policy," Pakistan Times [Islamabad], April

12, 1991. Joint Publications Research Service, Epidemiology.

(JPRS-REP-91-010.) May 16, 1991, 26-27.

Hafeez, Sabeeha. The Changing Pakistan Society. Karachi: Royal

Book Company, 1991.

Johnson, Basil Leonard Clyde. Development in South Asia. Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1983.

Kureshy, K.U. A Geography ofPakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Lamb, Christina. Waitingfor Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy. New York: Viking, 1991.

Moorhouse, Geoffrey To the Frontier. New York: Holt, Rinehart,

and Winston, 1985.

Mumtaz, Khawar, and Farida Shaheed. Women ofPakistan: Two

Steps Forward, One Step Back} London: Zed Press; and Karachi:

Vanguard, 1987.

Nairn, CM., ed. Iqbal, Jinnah, and Pakistan: The Vision and the

Reality. Syracuse, New York: Maxwell School at Syracuse University, 1979.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. "Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami

Jami'at-i Tulaba in Pakistan," Middle EastJournal, 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, 59-76.

Noman, Omar. Pakistan: Political and Economic History since

1947. London: Kegan Paul, 1990.

Pakistan. National Conservation Strategy Report. Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991. Karachi: 1991.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Population Census of Pakistan, 1951. Islamabad: Population Census

Organization, 1951.

343
Pakistan: A Country Study

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Population Census ofPakistan, 1961. Islamabad: Population Census

Organization, 1961.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Population Census ofPakistan, 1972. Islamabad: Population Census

Organization, 1972.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Population Census ofPakistan, 1981. Islamabad: Population Census

Organization, 1981.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Women's Division.

Women in Pakistan: A Statistical Profile. Islamabad: 1985.

Pakistan. Ministry of Education. Pakistan Culture. Islamabad:

National Book Foundation, 1986.

Pakistan. Planning Commission. "Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993-

98) Approach Paper." Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Planning Commission. The Fifth Five-Year Plan, 1978-

1983. Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1978.

Pakistan. Planning Commission. Seventh Five-Year Plan, 1988-

93; and Perspective Plan, 1988-2003. Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1988.

Pakistan. Planning Commission. The Sixth Five-Year Plan, 1983-

1988. Karachi: Manager of Publications, 1983.

Pakistan Commission on the Status of Women. Report of the

Commission on the Status of Women in Pakistan. Islamabad:

1986.

PC Globe 5.0: The New World Order, 1992. (Computer program based on World Bank statistics, 1991.) Broderbund.

Tempe, Arizona: 1992.

Quddus, Naseem Jaffer. Problems ofEducation in Pakistan. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1990.

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. Education in Pakistan: An Inquiry into

Objectives and Achievements. Karachi: Ma'aref, 1975.

Reeves, Richard. Passage to Peshawar. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1984.

Sathar, Zeba, et al. "Women's Status and Fertility Change in

Pakistan," Population and Development Review, 14, No. 3, September 1988, 415-32.

Schackle, Christopher. "Punjabi in Lahore," Modern Asian Studies, 4, No. 3, 1970, 239-67.

344
Bibliography

Shah, Nasra M., ed. Pakistani Women: A Socioeconomic and Demographic Profile. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development

Economics; and Hawaii: East-West Population Institute,

1986.

Shaheed, Farida. "Diversification of Women's Training and

Employment in Pakistan." (Unpublished report.) Islamabad:

1987.

Shaheed, Farida, and Khawar Mumtaz. Women's Economic Participation in Pakistan. Islamabad: UNICEF Pakistan, 1992.

Siddiqi, A.H. Baluchistan: Its Society, Resources, and Development.

Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1991.

Sidhwa, Bapsi. The Bride. London: Jonathan Cape, 1983.

Sweetser, Anne T. "Healing Power and Medical Practice in Pakistani Society." Pages 95-108 in Charles Kennedy, ed., Pakistan, 1992. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Tandon, Prakash. Punjabi Century. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

United Nations Development Programme. Human Development

Report, 1991. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Human Development Report, 1992. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Statistical Yearbook, 1989. New York: 1989.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. UNHCR

Activities Financed by Voluntary Funds: Report for 1990-91 and

Proposed Programs and Budgetfor 1992. (SW Asia, North Africa,

and the Middle East. UN doc. A/AC. 96/774 part V.)

Geneva: August 28, 1991.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of International

Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report. Washington: March 1991.

United States. Embassy in Islamabad. Health and Medical Infor- mation. Washington: Department of State, January 1992.

Weiner, Myron, and Ali Banuazizi, eds. The State and the Restruc- turing of Society in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse,

New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993.

Weiss, Anita M. Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan: The

Emergence of an Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

345
Pakistan: A Country Study

Weiss, Anita M. Walls Within Walls: Life Histories of Working

Women in the Old City of Lahore. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1992.

Weiss, Anita M., ed. Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application ofIslamic Laws in a Modern State. Syracuse, New York: Syr- acuse University Press, 1986.

Women's Action Forum. "Law of Evidence: WAF (National)

Position Paper." (Lahore Chapter.) Lahore: 1983.

World Bank. Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Health Sector Study: Key

Concerns and Solutions. Washington: June 25, 1993.

World Bank. Pakistan: Family Health Project. Washington: January 25, 1993.

World Bank. World Development Report, 1 988. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1988.

World Bank. World Development Report, 1991. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1991.

World Bank. World Development Report, 1992. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1992.

World Bank. World Development Report, 1994. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1994.

World Health Organization. Evaluation of the Strategy for Health

for All by the Year 2000, 7th Report. Geneva: Global Review,

1987.

World Health Organization. World Health Organization: Annual

Statistics, 1990. Geneva: 1990.

Zia, Shehla, Hinajilani, and AsmaJahangir. Muslim Family Laws

and the Implementation in Pakistan. Islamabad: Women's Division, Government of Pakistan, 1982.

Zia ul-Haq, Mohammad. Introduction of Islamic Laws: Address to the Nation. Islamabad: February 10, 1979.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the

preparation of this chapter: Herald [Karachi]; and Newsline [Karachi]).

Chapter 3

Adams, John, and Iqbal Sabiha. Exports, Politics, and Economic

Development: Pakistan, 1970-82. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1983.

346
Bibliography

Addleton, Jonathan S. Undermining the Centre: The Gulf Migration and Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Ahmad, Masood, and Gary P. Kutcher. Irrigation Planning with

Environmental Considerations: A Case Study of Pakistan 's Indus

Basin. (World Bank Technical Paper, No. 166.) Washington:

World Bank, 1992.

Ahmed, Viqar, and Rashid Amjad. The Management ofPakistan's

Economy, 1947-1982. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Azam, K.M. Economics and Politics ofDevelopment: An Islamic Perspective. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988.

Bhatia, B.M. Pakistan 's Economic Development, 1948-78: The Fail- ure of a Strategy. New Delhi: Vikas, 1979.

Bhatia, B.M. Pakistan's Economic Development, 1948-88: Freedom

to Bondage. Delhi: Konark, 1989.

Burki, Shahid Javed. "Economic Policy after Zia ul-Haq." Pages

43-55 in Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan: 1992. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

Burki, Shahid Javed. "Pakistan's Development: An Overview,"

World Development, 9, No. 3, March 1981, 310-14.

Burki, Shahid Javed. "Pakistan's Economy in the Year 2000:

Two Possible Scenarios." Pages 1-15 in HenryJ. Korson, ed.,

Contemporary Problems of Pakistan. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Burki, Shahid Javed. Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977. (2d ed.)

London: Macmillan, 1988.

Burki, Shahid Javed, and Craig Baxter. Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1991.

Cameron, John, and Mohammad Irfan. Enabling People to Help

Themselves: An Employment and Human Resources Strategy for

Pakistan in the 1990s. Geneva: International Labour Organisation, World Employment Programme, 1991.

Ebinger, Charles K. Pakistan: Energy Planning in a Strategic Vortex. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Pakistan, Afghanistan, 1991-92. London: 1991.

347
Pakistan: A Country Study

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Pakistan, Afghanistan, 1992-93. London: 1992.

Economic Intelligence Unit. Country Profile: Pakistan, Afghanistan, 1993-94. London: 1993.

Gustafson, W. Eric. "Economic Reforms under the Bhutto

Regime," Journal of Asian and African Studies [Leiden], 8,

Nos. 3-4, October 1973, 241-58.

Institute of Policy Studies. Development Strategy for the Sixth Plan,

1 983-88. Islamabad: 1 983.

Iqbal, Munawar, ed. Pakistan: State of the Economy in a Long-run

Perspective. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1989.

Jafarey, Saqib. "Emigration and Development in Pakistan,"

South Asia Bulletin, 2, Fall 1982, 1-11.

James, William, and Subroto Roy, eds. Foundations ofPakistan's

Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1 990s. Newbury

Park, California: Sage, 1992.

Johnson, B.L.C. Development in South Asia. Harmondsworth,

United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1983.

Kennedy, Charles H., ed. Pakistan: 1992. Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press, 1993.

Khan, Mahmood Hasan. Underdevelopment and Agrarian Structure in Pakistan. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981.

Khan, Shahrukh Rufi. Profit and Loss Sharing: An Islamic Experiment in Finance and Banking. Karachi: Oxford University

Press, 1987.

Khan, Tufail Ahmad. Glimpses of Pakistan Economy, 1980-88.

Karachi: Business Research and Service Institute, 1989.

Korson,J. Henry, ed. Contemporary Problems ofPakistan. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Michel, Aloys A. The Indus Rivers. New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1987.

Mustafa, Syed Mahdi. Focus on the Pakistani Economy. Karachi:

Royal Book Company, 1989.

Nabi, Ijaz. The Quality of Life in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard,

1986.

Nabi, Ijaz, Naved Hamid, and Shahid Zahid. The Agrarian Economy ofPakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider, and Khwaja Sarmad. Pakistan's

Economy Through the Seventies. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of

Development Economics, 1984.

348
Bibliography

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider, et al. Structural Change in Pakistan's

Agriculture. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development

Economics, 1989.

Naseem, S. M. Underdevelopment, Poverty, and Inequality in Pakistan. Karachi: Vanguard, 1981.

National Bank of Pakistan. Economic Research Wing. Pakistan's Economy: Key Indicators. Karachi: 1993.

Nayak, Pandav. Pakistan: Political Economy of a Developing State. New Delhi: Patriot, 1988.

Noman, Omar. Pakistan: A Political and Economic History since

1947. London: Kegan Paul, 1990.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991. Karachi: 1991.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Demandsfor Grants and Appropriations: The Budget, 1992-93. Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Economic Survey, 1990-91. Islamabad: 1991.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Economic Survey, 1991-92. Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Economic Survey: Statistical Supplement, 1991-92. Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Estimates ofForeign Assistance,

1992-93. Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget, 1992-93. Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Federal Budget in Brief, 1992-93.

Islamabad: 1992.

Pakistan. Planning Commission. Seventh Five Year Plan, 1988-

93; and Perspective Plan, 1988-2003. Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1988.

Pakistan Year Book, 1991-92. (19th ed.) Ed., Rafique Akhtar.

Karachi: East and West, 1991.

Pakistan Year Book, 1992-93. (20th ed.) Ed., Rafique Akhtar.

Karachi: East and West, 1992.

Papanek, Gustav F. Pakistan's Economic Development: Social Goals

and Private Incentives. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1967.

Park, Keith K.H., and Antoine W. van Agtmael, eds. The World's

Emerging Stock Markets. Chicago: Probus, 1993.

349
Pakistan: A Country Study

Qasir, Nadeem. Pakistan Studies: An Investigation into the Political Economy, 1948-1988. Karachi: Oxford University Press: 1991.

Qureshi, Saleem. "Islam and Development: The Zia Regime in

Pakistan," World Development, 8, Nos. 7-8, September 1980,

563-76.

Rosen, George. Western Economists and Eastern Societies: Aspects of

Change in South Asia, 1950-1970. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1985.

Shah, Nasra M., ed. Pakistani Women: A Socioeconomic and Demographic Profile. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development

Economics; and Hawaii: East-West Population Institute,

1986.

Stanford, Richard A., ed. Rural Development in Pakistan.

Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1980.

State Bank of Pakistan. Annual Report, 1991-92. Karachi: 1992.

Tsakok, Isabelle. "The Export of Manpower from Pakistan to the Middle East, 1975-1981," World Development, 10, No. 4,

April 1982, 319-26.

United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Pakistan: Towards Industrial Liberalization and Revitalization.

Oxford: Blackwell for UNIDO, 1990.

United States. Department of Commerce. International Trade

Administration. Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications

for the United States: Pakistan. (FET 92-09.) Washington: April

1992.

Weiss, Anita M. Culture, Class, and Development in Pakistan: The

Emergence of an Industrial Bourgeoisie in Punjab. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

World Radio TV Handbook, 1994. Ed., Andrew G. Sennitt.

Amsterdam: Billboard Books, 1994.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the

preparation of this chapter: Asian Wall Street lournal [Hong Kong];

Economic Outlook [Karachi] ; Economic Review [Karachi] ; Economist [London] ; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Pakistan, Afghanistan [London]; Far Eastern Economic Review [Hong

Kong]; Financial Times [London]; International Financial Statistics', National Bank of Pakistan Monthly Economic Letter [Karachi]; and

Pakistan and GulfEconomist [Karachi].)

350
Bibliography

Chapter 4

Ahmad, Munir. The Civil Servant in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1964.

Ahmad, Mushtaq. "A Challenging Assignment," Dawn [Karachi], November 12, 1990, 7. Ahmad, Mushtaq. Government and Politics in Pakistan. New York:

Praeger, 1963.

Ahmed, Jamil-ud-din, ed. Some Recent Speeches and Writings ofMr.

Jinnah. (2 vols.) Lahore: Ashraf, 1952.

Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad. Emergence of Pakistan. New York:

Columbia University Press, 1967.

Ali, Salamat. "City under Siege," Far Eastern Economic Review

[Hong Kong], December 3, 1992, 17-18.

Amin, Tahir. "Pakistan in 1993: Some Dramatic Changes,"

Asian Survey, 34, No. 2, February 1994, 191-99.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Azfar, Kamal. "Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan." Pages 49-

85 in Shahidjaved Burki and Craig Baxter, Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

Aziz, K.K. The Making ofPakistan: A Study in Nationalism. London: Chatto and Windus, 1967.

Baxter, Craig. "Pakistan Becomes Prominent in the International Arena." Pages 137-53 in Shahidjaved Burki and Craig

Baxter, Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq.

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

Baxter, Craig, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy, and

Robert C. Oberst. Government and Politics in South Asia. (2d

ed.) Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Becker, Mary L. "The All-India Muslim League: 1906-1947."

(Ph.D. dissertation.) Cambridge: Radcliffe College, 1957.

Bhutto, Benazir. Daughter of Destiny. New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1989.

Binder, Leonard. "Islam, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistan:

An Overview." Pages 259-66 in Ali Banuazizi and Myron

Weiner, eds., The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

351
Pakistan: A Country Study

Binder, Leonard. Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.

Bolitho, Hector. Jinnah: The Creator ofPakistan. London: Murray, 1954.

Braibanti, Ralph. "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan." Pages 360-440 in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1963.

Burke, S.M., and Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An

Historical Analysis. (2d ed.) Karachi: Oxford University Press,

1990.

Burki, Shahidjaved. Historical Dictionary ofPakistan. Metuchen,

NewJersey: Scarecrow Press, 1991.

Burki, Shahidjaved. "Pakistan." Pages 201-16 in Francis Robinson, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Burki, Shahidjaved. Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

Burki, Shahidjaved. Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. Boulder,

Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.

Burki, Shahidjaved, and Craig Baxter. Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1991.

Bussey, John. "Pakistan Reform Clouded by Civil Strife," Asian

Wall StreetJournal [Hong Kong] , August 1, 1991, 1. Callard, Keith. Political Forces in Pakistan, 1947-1959. New York:

Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959.

Canfield, Robert L. "Restructuring in Greater Central Asia:

Changing Political Configurations," Asian Survey, 32, No. 10,

October 1992, 875-87.

Choudhury, G.W. Constitutional Development in Pakistan. (2d

ed.) Vancouver: Publications Centre, University of British

Columbia, 1969.

Choudhury, G.W. Democracy in Pakistan. Dacca: Green Book

House, 1963.

Choudhury, G.W. Documents and Speeches on the Constitution of

Pakistan. Dacca: Green Book House, 1967.

Choudhury, G.W. The Last Days of United Pakistan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975.

352
Bibliography

Cohen, Stephen P. The Pakistan Army. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984.

Coll, Steve. "In Bombings, Two Indias Meet," Washington Post,

March 14, 1993,A1,A22.

Coll, Steve. "Pakistan's Road to Prosperity?" Washington Post,

July 4, 1992, A15.

Desmond, Edward W. "The Undoing of Benazir," Time, January

29, 1990, 56.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Pakistan, Afghanistan [London], Nos. 1-3, 1992.

Economist Intelligence Unit. Country Report: Pakistan, Afghanistan [London], No. 4, 1993.

Epstein, Leon D. "Parliamentary Government." Pages 419-25

in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci- ences, 11. New York: Macmillan, 1968.

Feldman, Herbert. A Constitution for Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford

University Press, 1955.

Gledhill, A. Pakistan: The Development ofIts Laws and Constitution.

London: Stevens, 1957.

Hussain, Asaf. Elite Politics in an Ideological State. Folkestone,

United Kingdom: Dawson, 1979.

Hyman, Anthony. Pakistan: Toward a Modern Muslim State. (Conflict Studies Series, No. 227.) London: Research Institute for

the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990.

Iqbal, Sir Muhammed. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in

Islam. London: Oxford University Press, 1934.

Jalal, Ayesha. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and

the Demand for Pakistan. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1985.

Jennings, Sir Ivor. Constitutional Problems in Pakistan. Cambridge

University Press, 1957.

Jillani, Anees. "Judicial Activism and Islamization after Zia:

Toward the Prohibition of Riba." Pages 57-73 in Charles H.

Kennedy, ed., Pakistan: 1992. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1993.

Jillani Anees. "Pakistan and CENTO: An Historical Analysis,"

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 15, No. 1, Fall 1991, 40-53.

Kennedy, Charles H., ed. Pakistan: 1992. Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press, 1993.

353
Pakistan: A Country Study

Khan, Ata. "Chronology of Events: September 1988-April

1992." Pages 167-83 in Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan:

1992. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Khan, Fazal Muqeem. The Story of the Pakistan Army. Karachi:

Oxford University Press, 1963.

Khan, Mohammad Asghar, ed. Islam, Politics, and the State. London: Zed Books, 1985.

Khan, Rais A. "Pakistan in 1991: Light and Shadows," Asian Survey, 32, No. 2, February 1992, 197-206.

Khan, Rais A. "Pakistan in 1992: Waiting for Change," Asian

Survey, 33, No. 2, February 1993, 129-40.

LaPorte, Robert, Jr. Power and Privilege: Influence and DecisionMaking in Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press,

1975.

Mahmood, Safdar. Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan. (2d

ed.) Lahore: Jang, 1990.

Malik, Hafeez. Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963.

Malik, Hafeez. "Nationalism and the Quest for Ideology in

Pakistan." Pages 271-300 in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph

Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins, eds., Pakistan: The Long

View. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977.

Moore, Molly. "Pakistan's Fragile Democracy under Strain,"

Washington Post, January 10, 1993, A23.

Moore, Molly, and John Ward Anderson. "Islamic Law—and

Zeal—Rise to Challenge Secular Politics in Pakistan," Washington Post, October 21, 1992, A29, A33.

Munir, Muhammad. From Jinnah to Zia. Lahore: Vanguard,

1979.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. "Democracy and the Crisis of Governability in Pakistan," Asian Survey, 32, No. 6, June 1992, 521-

37.

Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. "Students, Islam, and Politics: Islami

Jami'at-i Tulaba in Pakistan," Middle EastJournal, 46, No. 1, Winter 1992, 59-76.

Pakistan. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Nawaz

Sharif: Nation's Choicefor a Leap Forward. Islamabad: 1990.

Pakistan. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Pakistan,

1991: An Official Handbook. Islamabad: 1991.

354
Bibliography

Pakistan. Ministry ofJustice and Parliamentary Affairs. The Constitution ofthe Islamic Republic ofPakistan (as Modified up to 19th

March 1985). Islamabad: Federal Judicial Academy, 1985.

Palmer, Norman D. "Pakistan: The Long Search for Foreign

Policy." Pages 403-29 in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti,

and W. Howard Wriggins, eds., Pakistan: The Long View.

Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977.

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. Pakistan: An Islamic Democracy. Lahore:

Institute of Islamic Culture, 1956.

Rajput, A.B. Muslim League: Yesterday and Today. Lahore: Ashraf,

1948.

Richter, William L. "The 1990 General Elections in Pakistan."

Pages 19-41 in Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan: 1992.

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Rose, Leo. "Pakistan and the World." Pages 249-55 in Francis

Robinson, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan,

Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Rosett, Claudia. "Pakistan's Free Marketeer," Asian Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong], July 12-13, 1991, 6. Sayeed, Khalid B. Pakistan: The Formative Phase. (2d ed.) London: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Sayeed, Khalid B. "Political Leadership and Institution-building under Jinnah, Ayub, and Bhutto." Pages 241-70 in

Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins,

eds., Pakistan: The Long View. Durham, North Carolina: Duke

University Press, 1977.

Sayeed, Khalid B. The Political System of Pakistan. Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1967.

Sayeed, Khalid B. Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of

Change. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Sehbai, Shaheen. "Emergency Lifted: Major Concessions to Industry," Dawn [Karachi], November 8, 1990, 1. Sharif, Mian Mohammad Nawaz. "Address by His Excellency

Mr. Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic

Republic of Pakistan at the Tenth Conference of heads of

State of Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Jakarta,

September 1, 1992." Washington: Embassy of Pakistan, 1992.

Sharif, Mian Mohammad Nawaz. "Text of the Inaugural

Address of the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the Extraordi355
Pakistan: A Country Study

nary Session of the ECO Council of Ministers at Islamabad

on 28th November 1992. Washington: Embassy of Pakistan,

1992.

Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. Pakistan, China, and America. Karachi:

Council for Pakistan Studies, 1980.

Smith, W.C. Modern Islam in India. London: Gollancz, 1946.

Syed, Anwar H. Pakistan: Islam, Politics, and National Solidarity.

New York: Praeger, 1982.

Syed, Anwar H. "Political Parties and the Nationality Question

in Pakistan," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies,

12, No. l,Fall 1988, 42-75.

Symonds, Richard. The Making of Pakistan. (2d ed.) London:

Faber, 1950.

United Nations. Membership ofPrincipal United Nations Organs in

1993. (ORG/1155/Rev. 1.) New York: January 4, 1993.

United Nations. Department of Public Information. States Members of the United Nations. New York: 1990.

United Nations. Food and Agriculture Organization. FAO

Annual Review. Rome: 1991.

United Nations Development Programme. 1992 UNDP Annual

Report. New York: 1992.

United Nations Population Fund. "Dr. Nafis Sadik Appointed

UNFPA Executive Director." (Press Release.) New York: April

20, 1987.

Waseem, Mohammad. "Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy,"

Asian Survey, 32, No. 7, July 1992, 617-34.

Wilcox, Wayne Ayres. Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation.

New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Wolpert, Stanley. Jinnah ofPakistan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Wriggins, W. Howard. "The Balancing Process in Pakistan's For- eign Policy." Pages 301-39 in Lawrence Ziring, Ralph

Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins, eds., Pakistan: The Long

View. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1977.

Zakaria, Nasim. Parliamentary Government in Pakistan. Lahore:

New Publishers, 1958.

Ziring, Lawrence. "Benazir Bhutto: A Political Portrait," Asian

Affairs, 18, No. 3, Fall 1991, 178-89.

356
Bibliography

Ziring, Lawrence. "Dilemma and Challenge in Nawaz Sharif s Pakistan." Pages 1-18 in Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan:

1992. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993.

Ziring, Lawrence. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development.

Folkestone, United Kingdom: Dawson, 1980.

Ziring, Lawrence. "The Second Stage in Pakistani Politics: The

1993 Elections," Asian Survey, 33, No. 12, December 1993,

1175-85.

Ziring, Lawrence, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins,

eds., Pakistan: The Long View. Durham, North Carolina: Duke

University Press, 1977.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the

preparation of this chapter: Dawn [Karachi]; Economist [London];

Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: South Asia;

New York Times; and Washington Post.)

Chapter 5

Akhtar, Hamid Saeed. A Study ofPakistan Military Law. Sialkot,

Pakistan: Modern Book Depot, 1977.

Amnesty International. Annual Report, 1992. New York: 1992.

Amnesty International. Pakistan: Human Rights Safeguards. New

York: 1990.

Askari, M.H. "Keeping Afloat?" Herald [Karachi], September

1991,79-81.

Ayub Khan, Mohammad. The Evolution offudicial Systems and

Law in the Sub Continent. Peshawar, Pakistan: n.p., n.d.

Babar, Sabihuddin. "Law and Martial Law," Newsline [Karachi]

,

July 1990, 24-25.

Banuazizi, Ali, and Myron Weiner, eds. The State, Religion, and

Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Syracuse, New

York: Syracuse University Press, 1986.

Barnds, William J. India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers. New

York: Praeger, 1972.

Bhatti, Manzoor Hussain. Crime, Punishment, Prison, andJuvenile

Delinquency. Lahore: Siraj-ud-din, 1976.

Burke, S.M., and Lawrence Ziring. Pakistan's Foreign Policy. (2d

ed., rev.) Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990.

357
Pakistan: A Country Study

Burki, Shahid Javed, and Craig Baxter. Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq. Boulder, Colorado: Westview

Press, 1991.

Buzan, Barry, and Gowher Rizvi. South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. Pakistan's Defence Policy, 1947-58. Basingstoke, United Kingdom: Macmillan, 1990.

Cohen, Stephen P. The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation. Berkeley: University of California Press,

1971.

Cohen, Stephen P. The Pakistan Army. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1984.

Cohen, Stephen P. The Security of South Asia. Urbana: University

of Illinois Press, 1987.

"Country Survey: Pakistan," Jane 's Defence Weekly [Coulsdon,

United Kingdom], 18, No. 19, November 7, 1992, 29-42.

Cronin, Richard P., and Barbara Leitch LePoer. South Asia: U.S.

Interests and Policy Issues. (No. 93-243F.) Washington: Library

of Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 12,

1993.

Eliot, Theodore, and Robert Pfaltzgraff. The Red Army on Pakistan's Borders: Implications for the United States. Washington:

Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986.

Farani, M. Police Laws Manual. Lahore: Lahore Times, 1981.

Ganguly, Sumit. The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistan

Conflicts since 1947. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.

Haqqani, Hussain. "Politics of Defence," Far Eastern Economic

Review [Hong Kong], January 9, 1986, 24-28.

Harrison, Selig S., and Geoffrey Kemp. India and America after the Cold War. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993.

Hersh, Seymour M. "On the Nuclear Edge," New Yorker, 69, No.

6, March 29, 1993, 56-73.

Husain, Noor A., and Leo Rose. Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Social,

Political, and Economic Factors. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian

Studies, 1988.

Hussain, Mushahid. "Pakistan Army: A Profile," Friday Times,

November 25, 1992, 21. Joint Publications Research Service,

Daily Report: Near East and South Asia. (JPRS-NEA-93-010.)

January 21, 1993, 21.

358
Bibliography

Ispahani, Mahnaz. Pakistan: The Dimensions of Insecurity. London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990.

Jalal, Ayesha. The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's

Political Economy ofDefense. New York: Cambridge University

Press, 1990.

Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1991-92. Alexandria, Virginia:

Jane's Information Group, 1991.

Jane's Fighting Ships, 1992-93. Ed., Richard Sharpe. Alexandria,

Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1992.

Kennedy, Charles H. "Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 1979-1989," Pacific Affairs, 63, No. 1, Spring 1990, 62-

77. Kennedy, Charles H. "Islamization in Pakistan: Implementation

of the Hudood Ordinances," Asian Survey, 28, No. 3, March

1988, 307-16.

Kennedy, Charles H. "Managing Ethnic Conflict: The Case of

Pakistan." Pages 123-1433 in John Coakley, ed., The Territorial Management ofEthnic Conflict. (Regions and Regionalism

Series, No. 2.) Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1993.

LePoer, Barbara Leitch. Pakistan-U.S. Relations. (No. IB9404.)

Washington: Library of Congress, Congressional Research

Service, June 16, 1994.

Longer, V. Red Coats to Olive Green: A History of the Indian Army

1600-1974. New Delhi: Allied, 1974.

Martindale-Hubbell International Law Digest. New Providence,

NewJersey: Reed, 1993.

Masood, Sabri. The Pakistan Police Act with Rules. Lahore: Pakistan Law, 1977.

Menezes, S.L. Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army from the Sev- enteenth to the Twenty-First Century. New Delhi: Viking, 1993.

The Military Balance, 1994-1995. London: International Insti- tute of Strategic Studies, 1994.

Muqeem Khan, Fazl. The Story of the Pakistan Army. Karachi:

Oxford University Press, 1963.

Nadeem, Azhar Hasan. The Punjab Police in a Comparative Perspective. Lahore: Progressive, 1989.

Nelson, Reginald. The Pakistan Penal Code with Commentary.

Lahore: n.p., 1985.

359
Pakistan: A Country Study

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1985. Islamabad: 1985.

Pakistan. Federal Bureau of Statistics. Statistics Division. Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991. Karachi: 1991.

Pakistan. Ministry of Finance. Pakistan Basic Facts, 1984-85.

Islamabad: 1985.

Pakistan Bar Council. Report on the Proposed Establishment of

Courts of Qazis Ordinance. Lahore: 1982.

Riza, Shaukat. The Pakistan Army, 1: War 1965. Lahore: Army

Education Press, 1984.

Riza, Shaukat. The Pakistan Army, 2: 1966-71. Lahore: Services

Book Club, 1990.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. "The Legacy of Military Rule in Pakistan,"

Survival, 31, No. 3, May-June, 1989, 255-68.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. The Military and Politics in Pakistan. Delhi:

Konark, 1988.

Rizvi, Hasan-Askari. Pakistan and the Geostrategic Environment: A

Study ofForeign Policy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Rose, Leo, and Noor A. Husain. U.S. -Pakistan Relations. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985.

Rose, Leo, and Kamal Matinuddin. Beyond Afghanistan: The

Emerging U.S. -Pakistan Relations. Berkeley: Institute of East

Asian Studies, 1989.

Sisson, Richard, and Leo Rose. War and Secession: Pakistan,

India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1990.

Spector, Leonard. Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security.

Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

1988.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Year- book: World Armaments and Disarmament. New York: Humanities Press, 1992.

The Strategic Balance, 1992-93. London: International Institute

for Strategic Studies, 1992.

Tetley, Brian. Defenders ofPakistan. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1988.

Thornton, Thomas P. "Between the Stools: U.S. Policy Towards

Pakistan in the Carter Administration," Asian Survey, 20, No.

10, October, 1982, 955-77.

Thornton, Thomas P. Pakistan: Internal Developments and the U.S.

Interest. Washington: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987.

360
Bibliography

Thornton, Thomas P. "U.S.-Pakistan Relations," Foreign Affairs,

68, No. 3, Summer, 1989, 142-59.

Tiwari, Chitra K. Security in South Asia: Internal and External

Dimensions. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America,

1989.

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1992. (Report submitted to United States

Congress, 103d, 1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign

Relations, and House of Representatives, Committee on For- eign Affairs.) Washington: GPO, 1993.

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human

Rights Practices for 1993. (Report submitted to United States

Congress, 103d, 2d Session, House, Committee on Foreign

Affairs, and Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Washington: GPO, 1994.

United States. Department of State. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washington: GPO, 1992.

Vertzberger, Yaacov. The Enduring Entente: Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960-80. New York: Praeger, 1983.

Waseem, Mohammad. "Pakistan's Lingering Crisis of Dyarchy,"

Asian Survey, 32, No. 7, July 1992, 617-34.

Wirsing, Robert G. Pakistan's Security under Zia, 1977-1988: The

Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral Asian State. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

Ziring, Lawrence. Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development.

Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980.

361

Glossary

fiscal year (FY) —-July 1 to June 30; FY 1994, for example, ran from July 1993 through June 1994.

gross domestic product (GDP) —A value measure of the flow of

domestic goods and services produced by an economy

over a period of time, usually one year. Only output values

of goods for final consumption and investment are

included because the values of primary and intermediate

production are assumed to be included in final prices.

GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices,

meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included;

when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at fac- tor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for

depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also gross national product.

gross national product (GNP) —Gross domestic product {q.v.)

plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions

with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure of the

output of goods and services of an economy. It can be cal- culated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and

subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only

transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by

removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

haq mehr—Promissory gift from the bride's in-laws at the time of

marriage. A kind of bridewealth based on Islamic traditions stipulated in the marriage contract, to be paid to the

wife in the event of divorce or her husband's early death.

hudood (sing., hadd) —The most serious kinds of crime in

Islamic law, such as those pertaining to theft and adultery.

imam—Generally, the leader of congregational prayers, implying no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- cient education to carry out this function. The word is also

used figuratively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean

the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.)

Muslims, it indicates the particular descendant of the

House of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in that

line. The identity of this individual and the means of ascer- taining his identity have been the major issues causing divi- sions among the Shia.

363
Pakistan: A Country Study

International Monetary Fund (IMF) —Established along with

the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized

agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries)

when they experience balance of payments difficulties.

These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial international economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

jizya—A tax imposed on non-Muslims in a Muslim state meant

to compensate the state for the protection given to non-Muslims who are not permitted to serve in the military.

muhajir—Immigrant or descendant of immigrants from India

who fled to Pakistan after partition in 1947.

mujahidin (sing., mujahid) —Fighters of a jihad, a Muslim holy

war; Afghan freedom fighters.

mullahs—Generic term for members of the Islamic clergy; usually refers to preachers or other low-ranking clerics who

have not earned the right to interpret religious laws. mustahaqeen-—Muslims deserving of receiving zakat (q.v.) as stipulated in the Quran, such as the poor, the needy, recent

converts to Islam, those who do the good works of God,

and those who collect and disburse zakat. Nizam-i-Mustafa—Rule of the Prophet, i.e., rule by sharia (q.v.)

law according to Zia ul-Haq's use of the term.

Pakhtuns—Term used for speakers of Pakhtu or Pashto, who

are frequently called Pathans or Pashtuns. The tribes

north of Peshawar are mostly Pahktu speaking, those south

of Peshawar mostly Pashto speaking.

pakhtunwali—Tenets of the Pakhtun code of honor.

Pathans—Pakhtuns (q.v.).

pir—Successor to the founder of a Sufi (q.v.) order or of a local

subdivision of an order; in the Sufi tradition, a religious

man considered to have mystic powers.

rupee (R or Re; pi., Rs) —The national currency, consisting of

100 paisa. From 1947 to 1972, Pakistan was a member of

the sterling area, but in 1971, when the United States dollar was devalued, the rupee was unpegged from sterling

and pegged to the dollar at the rate of Rs4.76 per US$1.

On May 12, 1972, the rupee was devalued from Rs4.76 to Rsll per US$1. In February 1973, when the dollar was

again devalued, the rupee maintained its value in terms of

364
Glossary

gold, and its value in relation to the dollar rose to Rs9.90

per US$1, where it remained until January 1982. After January 1982, the rupee was pegged to a market basket of cur- rencies important to Pakistan's trade. The rupee

subsequently depreciated steadily against the dollar, reaching Rs30.30 to US$1 at the end of February 1994. Notes

are printed in denominations of Rs 1,000, 500, 100, 50, 10,

5, 2, and 1. Coins are minted in denominations of Rsl, as well as 50, 10, 5, 2, and 1 paisa.

sharia—Islamic law. Based on the Quran and the sunna (q.v.)

with interpretations of Muslim jurisprudence. There are four major Sunni (q.v.) schools (of which the Hanafi is dominant in Pakistan) and one Shia (q.v.) school

(Jafariya)

.

Shia—The smaller of the two major subdivisions of Islam. In

Pakistan, the two principal subgroups of Shiism are the

"Twelvers" (Ithna Ashari), who follow the same system as the majority group in Iran, and the "Seveners" (Ismailis or Agha Khanis)

.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Comprises the seven nations of South Asia: Bangladesh,

Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka;

headquartered in Kathmandu. Founded as South Asia

Regional Cooperation (SARC) at a meeting for foreign

ministers in New Delhi on August 1-2, 1983; the group was renamed when the 1983 agreement was ratified at the

inaugural summit meeting at Dhaka, Bangladesh, on

December 7-8, 1985. SAARC's goal is to effect economic,

technical, and cultural cooperation and to provide a forum for discussions of South Asia's political problems.

Sufi—A follower of Sufism, or Islamic mysticism. sunna—In common usage, refers to the deeds and utterances

of Muhammad that form the basis for the practice of the

Muslim community.

Sunni—The larger of the two major subdivisions of Islam, fol- lowed by a majority of Pakistanis.

ulama (sing., alim) —Islamic scholars.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank

for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) , the International Development Association (IDA), the International

Finance Corporation (IFC) , and the Multilateral Invest- ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established

365
Pakistan: A Country Study

in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans

to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA,

a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the

poorest developing countries on much easier terms than

those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in

1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans

and assistance designed specifically to encourage the

growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign investment in developing countries against

various noncommercial risks. The president and certain

senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the

IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments

of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate

in the World Bank group, member states must first belong

to the International Monetary Fund (IMF

q.u).

zakat—Islamic system of social welfare based on an alms tax on

wealth held more than a year.

366
Index

Abdur Rahman Khan, Amir, 21 Abedi, Agha Hasan, 162-63; fraud by, 162 acquired immune deficiency syndrome

(AIDS), 140-41; government policies on, 140; testing for, 141 ADB. See Asian Development Bank

Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, 49

Afghanistan: Baloch in, 113; and Baloch

insurrection, 61-62; border with, 79,

80, 316; border disputes with, 80, 247, 263, 276; in Economic Co-operation

Organization, 167; military relations with, 302; policy on, 209; refugees

from, xxxvii, 98-100, 110, 117, 159, 165-66, 199, 201, 247, 276-77; rela- tions with, 35, 247; revolution in, 275; Soviet occupation of, xxxvi, xxxvii, 66, 69, 72, 98-100, 117, 144, 152, 159,

226, 246, 247, 249, 252, 275, 276-78;

Soviet withdrawal from, xxxvii, 72-73, 284-85; wars of, with Britain, 17, 20 Afghan resistance movement (see also mujahidin), 276; aid to, 152, 234, 247, 249

Afghan-Turkish aristocracy, 13 Aga Khan III, 23 Agha Khan, Sadr ad Din, 1 27 Agha Khan Rural Support Development

Project, 117 Agha Khan University Hospital, 141 Agreement of Cooperation, 265-66, 270

agricultural development, 205

Agricultural Development Bank, 163

agricultural prices, 238

agricultural production, 83, 149, 179-81

agricultural products (see also under indi- vidual crops): cash crops, 180; cotton,

5, 36, 149, 167, 172, 180, 183; exports

of, 180; grain, 36, 179, 180; opium,

112, 139-40; rice, 167, 172, 180; sugar, 36,183

agriculture, 149, 172-82; by Baloch, 113-

14; under Bhutto, 155; under British

Raj, 151; cropping patterns in, 179-

81; distribution of, 83-86; employ- ment in, 170, 171; export crops, 167; food crops, 5; irrigation in, 114; land used for, 172; mechanization of, 155; under Nawaz Sharif, 231; nonirrigated, 173; in North-West Frontier

Province, 173; by Pakhtuns, 112; as percentage of gross domestic product,

151, 172; problems in, 154; in Punjab,

172, 173; in Sindh, 112, 172; taxes on, 160,178,238

Ahmadiyyas, 128, 130-31; declared heretics, 40, 42, 131, 217; discrimination

against, 129, 131, 143, 217, 312; in National Assembly, 67; political

unrest by, 40; restrictions on, 131, 312 Ahmed, AkbarS.,4, 109 AID. See United States Agency for Inter- national Development

AIDS. See acquired immune deficiency

syndrome

Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 51, 165; members of, 165

air force, 291-92; aircraft of, 291-92; in

civil war, 58; exercises of, 287; insignia, 295; materiel, xliii, 72; number of per- sonnel, 291; officers, 261-62; organi- zation of, 291; ranks, 295; training,

293; uniforms, 295

airlines, 139, 192, 194; privatized, 150, 233

airports, 194; police in, 304

air transportation, 190, 192-94

Akbar, 12-13 Akbar Khan, Mohammad, 40

Alavi, Hamza, 96 Albuquerque, Alfonso de, 14-15

alcoholism, 140 Alexander the Great, 7

Algeria: Islamic militants from, xlii Aligarh Movement: activities of, 26; ori- gins of, 22; platform of, 22-23

Aligarh Muslim University, 22

Allied Bank, 162

All-India Muslim League. See Muslim

367
Pakistan: A Country Study

League

All-Pakistan Muhajir Students Organization, 221

All-Pakistan Women's Association, 124

Al Nahayan family, 1 62

Al-Zulfiqar, 220, 316 American Express Bank, 162 Amnesty International, 100, 130, 306-7 Anglo-Afghan War, First (1838-42), 17 Anglo-Afghan War, Second (1878-80),

20 Anjam, 242

April Revolution (Afghanistan), 275

archaeological research, 4-5

aristocracy: Afghan-Turkish, 13 armed forces, 203, 285-304; under Benazir, 282; British influence on, 259; under British Raj, 257-60; under

Bhutto, 273; buildup of, 277; civic- action role of, 286; under constitution of 1973, 285-86; defense strategy of, 286-87; education for, 292; ethnic bal- ance in, 286, 292; influences on, 266-

67; insignia, 295; and Islam, 302-4; length of tours in, 293; manpower

base of, 292; under martial law, 267-

68; missions of, 285-86; modernization of, 277; number of personnel in, 274, 277; oath for, 285-86; Pakhtuns

in, 112; paramilitary, 263, 289, 304; in

partition, 260-61; pay and benefits in, 293; in Persian Gulf, 98, 277-78; per- sonnel in, 292-95; political role of, 40, 203, 224, 226; popular opinion of, 257, 299; and president, 285; Punjabis

in, 77, 106, 259; purged, 59; ranks, 259-60, 295; recruitment for, 259,

292; reforms in, 258; restructuring of, 266, 274; role of, 257, 260; from rural

areas, 292; in Saudi Arabia, 71; struc- ture of, 259; training, 292-94; uni- forms, 295

army, 288-90; brutality of, 57, 61, 271-

72; chief of staff, 59, 236, 288; in civil war, 57; commander in chief, 264; in Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48, 263;

insignia, 295; Islam in, 302; materiel

of, 288-89; mission of, 289-90; number of personnel in, 261, 288; officers

in, 261; organization of, 288; political role of, xxxv, 282; ranks, 295; reserves, 288; role of, 277; social classes in, 135;

surrender in East Pakistan of, 245;

training of, 289, 293; uniforms, 295 Army Corps of Engineers, 288 Army Special Services Group, 276

art: Indo-Greek, 7 Aryan people. See Indo-Aryan people

Arya Samaj, 21 Asghar Khan, 63, 223, 228

Ashoka, 7 Asian Development Bank (ADB): out- standing debt to, 165

Associated Press of Pakistan, 242

Attlee, Clement, 32

attorney general, 213

auditor general, 213 Aurangzeb, 12-13, 14

Australia: recognition of Bangladesh by, 250 Awami Dost, 64 Awami League, 50, 215; banned, xxxiv, 57; in elections of 1965, 50; in elections of 1970, xxxiv, 56, 206; platform

of, 39; six-point program of, 53, 54, 55-56; in Suhrawardy government, 44; support for, 55-56 Awami National Party, 222; in elections of 1990, 222, 228; in elections of 1993, 222; founded, 222; political base of, 222 Awami Tehrik, 222 Ayub Khan, Mohammad, 41, 216; back- ground of, 44-45; charges of corruption against, 53; as chief martial law administrator, xxxiii, 204; as commander in chief, 44, 261, 264; coup by, 204; illness of, 54; opposition to, 49,

50, 53-54, 218, 269; power of, 45; as president, 50; resignation of, xxxiii, 54, 206, 271 Ayub Khan government, 44, 44-54, 97, 204-6; armed forces under, 265; civil service under, 37, 205; foreign policy

under, 50-54; land reform under, 46, 47, 50, 177-78; national security

under, 270; overthrown, 48-49;

reforms under, xxxv, 45-47, 268;

repression under, 54

Azad, 241 Azad Kashmir, 80; British annexation of, 17, 79; fighting over, xxxi, xliii Azad Kashmir Radio, 194, 242

Azerbaijan: in Economic Co-operation

368
Index

Organization, 167; relations with, 248

Babri Mosque: destruction of, 113 Babur of Ferghana, 1

1

Badshahi Mosque, 97 Baghdad Pact, 43, 249, 265 Bahadur Shah II, 18; attempt to restore,

21; death of, 21; exile of, 21 Baharia Foundation, 293-94

balance of payments, 150; deficit, 97; dif- ficulties, 168-70

balance of trade, 166; vulnerability of, 167

Balochi language, 103, 113; speakers of, 103 Baloch people, xxxii, 77, 113-17; British relations with, 20; geographic distribu- tion of, 113; honor of, 116; hospitality

of, 116; lineages of, 114; marriage among, 114, 115; occupations of, 113-

14; origins of, 113; percentage of, in population, 105; refugees among, 116;

religion of, 114-15; social structure of, 114-16; Zikri, 114-15

Balochistan: British annexation of, 20; under British Raj, 28, 80, 116; elections in, 56; health care in, 138; insur- rection in, 61-62, 116, 274, 275, 315; mining in, 189; minorities in, 130; Muslim invasion of, 8; under One

Unit Plan, 44; in partition, 31, 32-33;

political affiliations in, 222; Punjabis

in, 61; purdah in, 118; refugees in, xxxvii, 100, 117; separatist movement

in, 61-62, 66, 116-17, 143; slavery in, 117; topography of, 113

Balochistan Plateau, 82

Baltistan, 80

Bangladesh: armed forces of, 57; government-in-exile of, 57; languages of, 104; independence of, xxxii, xxxiv, 3, 54-

58, 79, 199, 206, 243, 245, 263; recognition of, 250; relations with, 58, 70, 246; in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; trade

with, 246 Bangla language, 104; as official lan- guage, 104; publications in, 242 Bankers Equity, 163 banking, 161-65; under British, 151;

interest rates in, 163, 164, 218, 232,

234; Islamic, 65, 129, 164, 218, 232;

nationalized, xxxv, 59, 155, 220; privatized, 150, 157 Bank of America, 162 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), 162; collapse of, 162; founded, 162; fraud by, 162, 233 Bank of England, 162

banks: assets of, 162; branches of, 162;

central, 161-62; commercial, 162, 163; development, 163; foreign, 162; Islam- ization of, 218; nationalized, 162;

privatized, 157, 233

Baroghil Pass, 83

Basic Democracies, xxxiii, 47-49, 205,

208; institutions under, 48, 205; intro- duction of, 47; purpose of, 47-48;

reforms under, 47-49; structure of, 205, 208; suffrage under, 206

Basic Democrats, 48, 50, 205; election of, 206

Battle ofBuxar (1764), 16

Battle ofPlassey (1757), 16 BCCI. See Bank of Credit and Commerce

International Beas River, 51 Beg, Mirza Aslam, 226, 249, 282, 302

Benazir. See Bhutto, Benazir Bengal (see also Bengal and Assam Prov- ince), 16; coal mines in, 19; parti- tioned, 23, 32 Bengal and Assam Province, 23; in partition, 31 Bengali language. See Bangla language

Bengali people, xxxii; British attitudes toward, 20

Bhashani, Maulana, 222 Bhutan: in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168

Bhutto, Benazir, xxxv, 209, 280; arrested, 64; background of, 225; charges

against, 228; in elections of 1988, 69;

in elections of 1993, xxix; ethnicity of, 106-9; opposition to, 225-26; and

Pakistan People's Party, 68, 220; as prime minister, xxxvii-xxxviii, xl, 66, 69, 210, 280; problems of, 238, 240;

rivalry of, with Nawaz Sharif, xxxviii,

xl, 225, 234; support for, 223, 226

Bhutto, Benazir, government, first, xxxvii-xxxviii, 66, 223-27; and armed

forces, 280-82; dismissed, xxxviii,

369
Pakistan: A Country Study

226, 282; expectations of, 224, 226; members of, 224, 226; nepotism in, 225; problems in, xxxviii, 225, 226; promises of, 224; reforms attempted

by, 224

Bhutto, Benazir, government, second, xl, 130, 238-41; aid to, 161; allegations by, of corruption, 152; budget under, xlxli; budget deficit under, 161; human

rights under, 307; privatization under,

184; promises in, xl; reforms under,

140, 158

Bhutto, Murtaza, 220-21, 240-11, 316

Bhutto, Nusrat, 220; arrested, 64; opposition of, to martial law, 64-65; prob- lems with, 240, 241 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, xxxiv; arrested, 63, 274; background of, xxxiv; as chief

martial law administrator, xxxiv, 206,

220, 272; demonstrations against, 63; diplomacy of, 273; election campaigns

of, 55; in elections of 1970, 206; in elections of 1977, 63; ethnicity of, 106; executed, xxxv, xxxvi, 64, 71-72, 207,

275, 285; and form of government, 61; opposition to, 60, 274; overthrown,

207, 274; as president, xxxiv, 58, 206,

218, 220, 272; as prime minister, 220;

resignation of, 53; support for, 60

Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, government, 58-63, 207; armed forces under, 273, 304;

attacks on, 64; civil service under, 37,

62; development under, 155-56; econ- omy under, 58, 60, 62; foreign affairs under, 62, 251, 273; guestworkers

under, 97-98; Islam under, 42, 129,

143, 217; land reform under, 62, 143, 178; nepotism under, 143; planning

under, 158; purges under, xxxv, 59; repression under, 64, 207

Bihar, 16; coal mines in, 19 Bihar and Orissa Province: created, 23

Binder, Leonard, 257

birth control. See family planning

black market, 151; crackdown on, 45 blasphemy law, 129-30 Board of Industrial Management, 59

Bogra, Mohammad Ali, 41 Bolan Pass, 20 border problems: with Afghanistan, 80, 247, 263, 276; with China, 248; with

India, 263, 279

borders, 79-82; with Afghanistan, 79, 80, 247, 316; with China, 79, 248; with

India, 79, 82, 263, 316; with Iran, 79,

80, 316 Bosnia and Herzegovina: peacekeeping

forces in, 302

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, xliii Brahui language, 103; speakers of, 103

bribery, 78, 139, 151, 152

Britain: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium,

1 65; materiel from, 250; military offic- ers from, 262, 264; military training

provided by, 250, 293, 303; recognition of Bangladesh by, 250; relations

with, 250; trade with, 167

British East India Company, 15-16, 258; armed forces of, 16, 18, 258; end of

rule by, 18, 259; mutiny against, 18

British Empire {see also British Raj) , 3

British Indian Army, 260; origins of, 258;

racial criteria for, 20; recruiting for, 17, 20, 259

British Raj, 18-33, 259; administrative

style in, 18-19; agriculture under, 151; armed forces under, 257-60; attitudes

of, toward ethnic groups, 20, 21-22;

Balochistan under, 28, 20, 116; desire for end of, 3, 30; dyarchy under, 26,

27, 28; economy under, 151; forward

policy of, 20-21; improvements in infrastructure under, 19; indirect rule

by, 116; industry under, 151; infra- structure under, 151; internal security under, 304,313; Kashmir annexed by, 17, 79; North-West Frontier Province

under, 28; Pakistanis in, 170, 171; par- amountcy doctrine of, 19; political

repression by, 30; Punjab annexed by, 17; Punjabi soldiers fighting for, 17, 30; relations of, with Indian princes,

19; resistance to, 22; suffrage under, 24-25; territory acquired under, 17,

20; wars of, with Afghanistan, 17, 20; wars of, with Sikhs, 17 Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama), 7 Buddhism, 7; origins of, 7

Buddhists: in National Assembly, 67

Burushaski: speakers of, 103

Bush, George, xliii, 252

Business and Professional Women's Association, 124

370
Index

Cabinet Defence Committee, 287

Cabinet Mission Plan, 31-32; reaction to, 31-32 Cable News Network (CNN), 79, 229, 243

Calcutta massacre (1946), 32 Canada: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium,

165

canal colonies, 19, 86, 96

capital: flight, 156; formation, 183

Carter, Jimmy, xxxvi, 71-72, 251-52, 276

caste system, 6-7, 8; origins of, 6-7

censorship: of radio, 243; of television,

79, 243; under Yahya Khan, 57

census: employment data, 119; of 1981,

92, 119; problems taking, 91-92, 109 CENTO. See Central Treaty Organization

Central Election Commission, 213, 228

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO),

43, 249, 250, 265; disbanded, 251, 276 Chandragupta, 7 Charter of Women's Rights, 122 Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 62 Chaudhry, Fazal Elahi, 63 Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali, 41 Chelmsford, Marquess of, 25 Chenab River, 86; irrigation from, 51 chief martial law administrator

(CMLA), xxxiii, xxxiv, xxxv, 54-55,

220, 271

children: abuse of, 45; family relations

of, 102; health of, 136-37; number of, per family, 92 China: aid from, 52, 248; border with,

79; materiel from, xliv, 52, 248, 271;

military relations with, 300-301; occu- pation of Tibet by, 51; relations with, 51, 81, 224, 246, 248-49, 268, 270,

272, 284; trade with, 51 , 167

Chitral Scouts, 289

Chittagong: port of, 266

Christians: geographic distribution of, 140; under Government of India Act

of 1909, 24; in National Assembly, 67, 211; percentage of, in population, 125

Churchill, Winston, 30

Citibank, 1 62

Civil and Military Gazette, 242

Civil Service of Pakistan, 37, 41, 78, 202-

3; under Ayub Khan, 37, 45, 46; under

Basic Democracies, 49; under Bhutto,

37, 62; disbanded, 202; corruption in,

45, 144; employment in, 149; ineffi- ciency in, xli, 45; under Mirza, 44; Pakhtuns in, 112; at partition, 202; and political stability, 202; politiciza- tion of, 62, 202, 203; Punjabis in, 106; reform of, 58, 220; reorganization of, 37; social classes in, 135

civil war (1971), xxix, xxxii, xxxiv, 57-58,

199, 243, 271-72; begun, 206; casualties in, 272; cease-fire in, 58; Indian

intervention in, 245, 272; Pakistan's surrender in, xxxiv, 58; security impli- cations of, 273

climate, 87-88; in Islamabad, 87; in Karachi, 87-88; monsoon, 87; rainfall, 87, 150, 172; temperature, 87

Clinton, William J., xliii Clive, Robert, 16, 258 CMLA. See chief martial law administrator CNN. See Cable News Network

coal, 19, 186-87; mines, 187; production,

186-87; reserves, 186; shortages, 36

Coast Guard, 289 Code of Criminal Procedure, 309, 313-

14 Cohen, Stephen P., 292, 302 Cold War, 265; end of, 284, 285 Combined Opposition Parties, 50, 226;

in elections of 1965, 50 Command and Staff College at Quetta, 293 Commonwealth of Nations: membership

in, 43, 250 communications. See telecommunications community development, 205 Congress, 32, 69, 260; in elections of

1946, 31; founded, 215; government,

35; Jinnah in, 25, 27; Muslims and, 23; outlawed, 31; and partition, 30, 244; platform of, 3, 22, 30; preparation of, for independence, 38; and separate

electorates, 24, 25; support for, 22 Congress-Muslim League Pact (Lucknow

Pact) (1916), 25 Constituent Assembly, 200, 216; dis- missed, 204; duties of, 203; Jinnah in, 38, 200; members of, 40; of 1946, 32,

38; of 1955, 41; One Unit Plan of, 43; problems in, 40, 203; revived, 204

constitution of 1956, 203; adopted, 41,

371
Pakistan: A Country Study

203, 204; drafted, 203; executive

under, 41, 55; Islam under, 42-43; leg- islature under, 41; suspended, 44, 267

constitution of 1962, 47, 48, 49-50, 206; abrogated, 54, 206; individual rights

under, 49-50; Islam under, 49; opposition to, 49; representation in National Assembly under, 55

constitution of 1973, 210-14; amendments to, 233; armed forces under,

285-86; Eighth Amendment to, xxxviii, 68, 208, 210, 224, 231, 236, 237, 240, 285, 314; executive under, 60; federal principle under, 210-13; gov- ernment structure under, 210-14;

Islam under, 207; judiciary under, 213-14; legislature under, 60, 207, 210-13; president under, 207, 208,

210, 235; prime minister under, 207;

prisoners' rights under, 309; promulgated, 207; provincial governments

under, 213; reinstated, 208, 280; sus- pended, 207

construction, 184; employment in, 149, 170, 171; government role in, 220; housing, 184; as percentage of gross domestic product, 151; privatized, 157 Continuous Motivation System Pro- gramme, 93

corruption, xl, xli, 78, 152, 268, 315-16;

allegations of, 64, 68, 209, 226, 275; in banking, 162-63; in civil service, 144, 308; in government, 53, 60; increase

in, 151-52; in police force, 45, 152, 306

cotton, 5, 155; export of, 36, 156, 167, 172; production of, xl, 36, 149, 180, 183 Council Muslim League, 50; in elections of 1965,50

Council of Advisers. S<?<?Majlis-i-Shoora Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1993, 307 coup d'etat, attempted: of 1951, 40 coups d'etat, xxix; of 1958, 44, 204; of

1977, 63,207

courts, 213-14, 309-10; jurisdiction of, 213; military, 299-300; provincial, 213;

special, 214, 233

courts, sharia, 213; established, 43, 65, 232; opposition to, 240; ulama in, 66, 213

crime, 232, 308

criminal justice system {see afcojudiciary;

see also under courts) , 309-10; appeals

in, 310; defendants' rights in, 309,

314; Islamic, 309, 311-13; punishment

in, 309-10, 312

Cripps, Sir Stafford, 30, 31 culture: under Basic Democracies, 48;

diversity of, 201

currency, 53; devaluation of, xxix, 155,

237; overvaluation of, 36 Curzon, George Nathaniel (Lord Curzon), 23

customs: duties, 160, 161, 168 Cyrus the Great, 7

dacoits, 264, 306, 309 da Gama, Vasco, 11, 14

Dalai Lama, 51 Dalhousie, Lord, 18 Dara Shikoh, 14 Dardic languages, 103 Data Ganj Baksh, 128 Dawn, 242

debt servicing, 160 Decade of Development, 54

Defence Council, 287 defense industry, 274, 295-99, 301; nationalization of, 153; self-suffi- ciency in, 295

defense spending, 78, 160, 274; increases

in, 159; as percentage of government

budget, xli; as percentage of gross domestic product, 299; as percentage

of gross national product, 132, 274, 299

Degari coal mine, 187

Delhi: Muslim invasion of, 9; sacking of

(1398), 11 Delhi Sultanate, 9-11; dynasty of, 9; expansion of, 9 Democratic Action Committee, 54

demonstrations. .See political demonstrations Deoband Movement, 22, 223; activities

of, 26; platform of, 22 development advisory councils, 48 development planning, 158-60 development policy, 230 Dhaka: as legislative capital, 46; political unrest in, 54

372
Index

Din-i-Ilahi, 13

Direct Action, 32

Directive Principles of State Policy, 42-

43 Directorate for Inter-Services Intelli- gence, 276, 288

district officers, 19

districts: under British rule, 19

divorce: regulation of, 47, 122; rights to, 66

diwan, 16 Dogra Dynasty, 1

7

Dogras: British attitudes toward, 20 drainage, 82-87, 176-77; maintenance

of, 176-77

Dravidian languages, 103

Dravidian people: cultural heritage of, 5 drought, xl, 159 drug addiction {see also heroin), 139-40, 226 drug addicts {see also heroin) , xlii drug syndicates, xlii drug trafficking, xliv, 73, 151, 238, 308-

9, 315-16; by armed forces personnel,

278; crackdown on, 238; growth of, 66; investment in, 152

Dulles, John Foster, 265 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 21, 80 Durand Line, 21, 35, 80, 247 Dutch East India Company, 15-16

dyarchy, 26, 27, 28, 231

earthquakes, 87

East Pakistan. See Pakistan, East

East Pakistan Rifles, 57

East Wing. See Pakistan, East EBDO. See Elective Bodies Disqualification Order

EC. See European Community

ECO. See Economic Co-operation Organization Economic Co-operation Organization

(ECO), 248, 249; founded, 167; membership in, 167, 248, 254 economic development, xxx, 78, 90-91,

117; under Bhutto, 155-56 economic growth, 97, 184; under Ayub

Khan, 47; under Bhutto, 62; under

Mirza, 268; under Zia, 277 economic planning {see also under indi- vidual plans): under Bhutto, 158; for

development, 158-60; under Zia, 159 economic policy: under Nawaz Sharif, 232 Economic Reform Order (1972), 59 economy, 78; under Benazir, 158; under

Bhutto, 58, 60, 62; informal, 151; Islamization of, 157; under Nawaz

Sharif, 157, 231, 233; problems in, xliv, 34, 36; under Qureshi, 157-58; revital- ization of, 58; role of government in, 60, 152-60; structure of, 150-52;

under Zia, 156-57

education {see also schools), 78, 131-35;

access to, 22, 150; under Basic Democracies, 48; under Benazir, 158; British, 22; curriculum in, 134; foreign, 135; government spending on, 78, 132, 134-35, 159; Islamic, 232; languages

of, 104-5; reform, 134-35, 224; in

rural areas, 134; of soldiers, 292; struc- ture of, 132-33; in urban areas, 134; of women, 112, 120, 133-34, 135, 158

Egypt: Islamic militants from, xlii; in Organization of the Islamic Conference, 71 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 43, 265 Eisenhower Doctrine, 266

Ejaz ul-Haq, 228

elections: for Basic Democrats, 206; boycotted, 239; campaigns for, 55-56,

228-29; canceled, 44, 64, 208; Congress in, 31; in East Pakistan, 38-39; fraud in, xxxv, 64, 229; introduction

of, 19, 24; to legislative councils, 24,

27, 213; local, 64, 213; Muslim League

in, 30, 31; to National Assembly, 50,

55, 69, 206, 221, 222, 238; of 1935, 27; of 1946, 30, 31; of 1954, 38-39; of

1959, 44; of 1965, 50; of 1970, 55-56,

206, 271; of 1977, xxxv, 63, 64, 207,

220, 274; of 1979, 64, 208; of 1985, 67, 208, 209, 280; of 1988, xxxvii-xxxviii,

69, 216, 221, 223, 224; of 1990, xxxviii, 227, 228-29, 282; of 1993, xxix, 217,

218, 221, 222, 223, 238, 239; observers

for, 229, 239; for parliament, xxxviixxxviii, 211; postponed, xxxvii, 275;

for president, 50, 210, 235; promised,

63-64; for provincial assemblies, 69; referendums, 67-68

Elective Bodies Disqualification Order

(EBDO), 45

373
Pakistan: A Country Study

electorates, separate, 23-24, 28; reaction

to, 24, 25, 27

electric power: capacity, 188; consumption of, 187-88; corruption in, 152;

cuts, 188; diversion of, 188; generation, development of, 187, 188; imported, 34; prices of, 238; privatized, 150, 157, 233; in Punjab, 34; shortages, 149, 188; thermal, 187, 188

elite class, 77; Baloch in, 116; languages

of, 104; modernist, 42; Punjabis in, 77, 106

Elliot, Gilbert (fourth earl of Minto), 24 employment, 170; in agriculture, 170,

171; in communications, 170; in construction, 170, 171; in industry, 149,

170, 171; of men, 119; of Pakhtuns,

112; in service sector, 170; in trade,

170, 171; in transportation, 170, 171; of women, 119, 120, 123-24, 170 energy (see also electric power; see also under individual energy sources) , 1 84—89; biogas, 189; consumption, 187-88; import of, 159; investment in, 188; renewable, 188-89; sources, 182-83, 184-85 Enforcement of Hudood Ordinance

(1979), 122

English: as language of elite, 22; as lan- guage of instruction, 104-5, 134; as language of military, 293; publications

in, 242; speakers of, 103, 104 environment (see also pollution), 78, 88-

90

ethnic diversity, 77 ethnic groups (see also under individual

groups), 103-17, 143; in armed forces, 286; distribution of, 105; at partition, 142; tensions among, 91-92, 145, 199, 201-2, 204, 263; violence among, xxix, xxxviii, xlii, xliv, 113, 129, 201, 222,

224, 314—15; in West Pakistan, xxxii ethnic identity, 113 European Community (EC): relations

with, 237 exchange rate, 150, 155; dispute over, with India, 151; overvaluation of, 154 executive branch (see also president): under constitution of 1973, 60 Export Bonus Vouchers Scheme (1959), 47 exports (see also under individual products), 166-67; of agricultural products,

180; under Bhutto, 155; of crops, 167, 172; of drugs, 308; duties on, 36; of manufactured products, 167, 183; markets for, 167; of materiel, 298; to Middle East, 180; under Mughal

Empire, 15; under Nawaz Sharif, 231; of textiles, 167, 183

external debt, 168-70; as percentage of

gross national product, 170; total, 170

Faisalabad: origins of, 96; population of, 95,97

families (see also kinship patterns): assis- tance from, 141; descent in, 101, 114; honor of, 101, 116; importance of, 95, 100, 114; siblings in, 102; size of, 92,

94; women in, 101-2

family laws: under constitution of 1962,

50; reform of, 47

family planning: contraceptives in, 93,

136, 218; government encouragement

of, 92-93, 94; laws on, 47; services, 93

Family Planning Association of Pakistan, 92-93

Family Welfare Centres, 93 FAO. See United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

farmers: sharecroppers, 177; tenant, 112,

150, 150, 155, 177, 179 farming: subsidies for, xxix, 237; taxes on, 156, 160, 238

farms: ownership of, 1 77-79; size of, 1 79

Fauji Foundation, 293 Federal Cabinet (see also government)

211; dismissed, 217; members of, 211

Federal Investigative Agency, 304

Federal Land Commission, 213

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 211

Federal Public Service Commission, 213

Federal Security Force, 59, 273-74, 304; number of personnel in, 273 Federal Shariat Court, 164, 232, 300;

established, xxxvi, 208, 311; jurisdiction of, 213-14, 311, 312

finance, 160-65; and budget, 160-61; and credit, 164; and fiscal administration, 161; and monetary process, 161-

65

financial stability, xl, 150

fishing, 182; by Balochi, 113-14; as per374
Index

centage of gross domestic product,

172, 182 Five Thousand Years of Pakistan

(Wheeler) , 3 Five-Year Plan, Eighth (1993-98), 91, 159-60; education under, 132, 133; health under, 137; women under, 124

Five-Year Plan, Fifth (1978-83), 159

Five-Year Plan, First (1955-60), 93, 158

Five-Year Plan, Fourth (1970-75), 158

Five-Year Plan, Second (1960-65), 158; health under, 137

Five-Year Plan, Seventh (1988-93), 94, 159; education under, 132, 133, 135; housing construction under, 184

Five-Year Plan, Sixth (1983-88), 94, 159; telecommunications under, 194

Five-Year Plan, Third (1965-70), 158

floods, xl, 86, 89, 149, 151, 172, 289

food: aid, 165; crops, 5; processing, 183; production, 89; self-sufficiency in, 89, 159

Ford, Gerald R., 251 foreign assistance, xxxvii, 158, 160, 165-

66, 277; for Afghan refugees, 165-66; from Aid-to-Paki stan Consortium, 165; from Britain, 165; from Canada, 165; from China, 52; from France, 165; from Germany, 165; from Japan, 165; from Middle East, 165; requested, xl; from Saudi Arabia, 165; from the United States, 43, 45, 72, 152, 158,

165, 166, 250, 251-52, 276, 278, 284; from World Bank, 165 Foreign Assistance Act (United States): Glenn Amendment, 72; Pressler Amendment, xliii, 72, 252, 284, 291; Solarz Amendment, 72; Symington

Amendment, 72, 251-52

foreign debt, xl; under Nawaz Sharif,

231; payments, 231 foreign economic relations, 165-70;

external debt, 1 68-70

foreign exchange: access to, 47; under

Ayub Khan, 47; earnings, 98, 249; under Nawaz Sharif, 231, 233; reform

of, 150, 231, 233; regulation of, 168;

reserves, xli foreign investment: restrictions on, 165;

in stock exchanges, xli foreign policy, 43, 243-54; under Ayub

Khan, 50-54; under Bhutto, 62

foreign relations, 251, 267, 272; under

Zia ul-Haq, 52, 209

forestry, 91, 172, 181-82; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 172

forests: and deforestation, 89, 181-82;

land used for, 172, 181; regeneration

of, 181 "forward policy," 20-21

France: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium,

165; materiel from, 271 French East India Company, 15-16

Friends not Masters (Ayub Khan), 50

Frontier Corps, 289, 304

Frontier Post, 242

Frontier Works Organization, 290

Gandhara kingdom, 7 Gandhi, Indira, 58, 69 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, 26;

civil disobedience by, 26, 30; and parti- tion, 30; talks of, withjinnah, 31 Gandhi, Rajiv, 70 Ganges River valley: irrigation canals in, 19

gas, natural, 185; pipelines, 186; production of, 186; reserves, 186 GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gautama, Siddhartha (Buddha) , 7 GDP. See gross domestic product

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), xli geographic areas, 82-83; Balochistan

Plateau, 82; Indus River plain, 82; northern highlands, 82

geostrategic situation, xxix, xxx, xxxvii,

69, 247, 263, 276; and Cold War, 250, 284-85; United States goals in, 43 Germany: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 165; trade with, 167

Ghaffar Khan, Khan Abdul, 35, 44, 222

Ghazni: Muslim invasion of, 9 Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza, 1 30 Ghulam Mohammad, 38, 40, 204, 217; death of, 41; resignation of, 41 Ghulam Mohammad government, 41

Gilgit, 80

Gilgit Agency, 20

Gilgit Scouts, 289 GNP. See gross national product

Goa: captured, 14

375
Pakistan: A Country Study

Gorbachev, Mikhail, 72-73, 278 government {see also self-government),

78; bribery in, 152; under British, 151; distribution of power between center and provinces, 33-34; form of, xxix,

53, 58, 61, 200, 206, 210; officers in, 278, 283; Punjabis in, 77; role of, in economy, 60, 152-60; role of Islam in, 41-42, 59, 128-29; structure of, 210-

14 government, interim (1946), 32 government, local, 213; autonomy of, 213; under Basic Democracies, 48;

elections for, 211; functions of, 213 government budget: austerity measures

in, xxix, 150, 238; under Benazir, xlxli; for defense, xli, 78, 299; for education, 78; for health, 78; as percentage

of gross domestic product, 299; as per- centage of gross national product, 299 government budget deficit, 150, 224; under Benazir, 161; efforts to limit, 157; as percentage of gross domestic

product, 161; as percentage of gross

national product, 238 Government of India Act of 1 85 8, 1

Government of India Act of 1909, 24; reaction to, 24 Government of India Act of 1919, 25-26; decennial review of, 27 Government of India Act of 1935, 27, 40-41, 200; amendments to, 40-41 government spending: reduction of, 158 governor general, 18-19, 200, 204

governor's rule, 40

Gracey, Sir Douglas, 44

Great Mughals, 11-14 Greek rule, 7 Green Revolution, 47

gross domestic product (GDP), 149-50; growth of, xl, 149, 151 gross domestic product percentages:

agriculture, 151, 172; budget deficit, 161; communications, 151; construction, 151; defense spending, 299; fish- ing, 172, 182; forestry, 172; industry,

151; manufacturing, 151, 183; mining,

151; service sector, 151; trade, 151;

transportation, 151; utilities, 151 gross national product (GNP): under

Bhutto, 62; defense spending as a per- centage of, 132, 274, 299; education

budget as a percentage of, 132; exter- nal debt as percentage of, 170; manufacturing investment as a percentage

of, 183

guestworkers, 171; encouragement of, 97-98; in Kuwait, 170; in Middle East, 71, 156, 170, 171, 194, 249; number of, 98; in Persian Gulf, 71, 97-98, 171, 249, 250; remittances from, 71, 98,

170, 171, 184, 249, 277; in Saudi Arabia, 170; stresses on, 98

Gujranwala: population of, 97 Gupta people, 8 Gurkas: British attitudes toward, 20

HabibBank, 163

hadith, 126 Haq, Fazlul, 215-16; platform of, 39 Haq, Mahbubul, 152, 154 Harappa, 4-5

health, 135-41; under Benazir, 158; and

causes of death, 136; and disease, 88, 89-90, 136; government spending on,

78, 159; malnutrition, 135, 136-37;

special problems in, 139-41

health care: access to, xxx, 77, 92, 136,

150; maternal and child, 93, 94, 136-

37, 138; policies, 137-39, 224; quality

of, 138; in rural areas, 137-38; traditional, 138-39; for women, 92

health care professionals: as guestworkers, 171; number of, 138; training for, 138

health facilities: nationalized, 138 Heavy Industries facility, 298 HeerRanjha (Waris Shah), 105

Herald, 242

heroin: production, 139-40; use of, xlii, 140, 144

Hikmatyar, Gulbaddin, 73, 247 Himalaya mountains, 83 Hindi language, 104 Hinduism: origins of, 3; sects of, 21 Hindu Kush, 80, 83 Hindu-Muslim cooperation, 25, 28 Hindus, 13; British attitudes toward, 20;

in East Pakistan, 215; etymology of, 86; fleeing Pakistan, xxx, 34, 112; geo- graphic distribution of, 130; Muslim

attitudes toward, 23; in National

Assembly, 67, 211; percentage of, in

376
Index

population, 125; tax on, 14; violence

against, 113 Hindustani language, 104

History Today (Ahmed) , 4

hoarding: crackdown on, 45, 47 Hong Kong: investment from, 1 65; trade

with, 167 House Building Finance Corporation,

163, 164

housing: construction, 184; financing

for, 163; investment in, 184; in rural

areas, 184; in urban areas, 119, 184 Hub Chowki power station, 188 human rights, xxx, 71-72; abuses, xlii, 73, 251, 306-7; in civil war, 57; under

Zia, 275 Human Rights Commission, 129, 307 Humayun, 13 Huns, 8

Hurriyat, 242 Husayn, Saddam, 302

Hussain, Altaf, 221, 222, 228

Hussain, Mushahid, 286 Hyderabad: ethnic identity in, 113; in

partition, xxxi, 33, 244; population in, 97

hydroelectric power (see also electric power; energy), 51, 182, 185; capacity, 187; generation of, 174, 187; nationalized, 153; potential, 187

identity cards, 128, 131

IJI. See Islamic Democratic Alliance

ijma (consensus), 42 imams: restrictions on, 46 IMET. See International Military Education and Training

IMF. See International Monetary Fund

imperial service, 13

imports, 166; control of, 154, 168; duties on, 161; of energy, 159, 166; sources

of, 167; of textiles, xli; of timber, 182; of vegetable oil, 180-81 income (see also wages): bribery to sup- plement, 78; per capita, 77 income distribution, xlii, 77, 144, 150,

153, 154-55 independence, xxix, 33-43, 200-201;

problems at, 33-37

India: aid from, 51; armed forces of, 261

,

286; and Baloch insurrection, 62; border with, 79, 82, 263, 279, 316; in civil war, 245, 272; control of Indus River

by, 150-51; disputes with, xlii-xliii, 50-

54, 82, 151, 173, 226, 263; disputes

with, over Kashmir, 244-45; electricity from, 34; etymology of, 86; export

duties in, 36; foreign relations of, 267, 272; imports from, 34; materiel for, 262, 267, 269, 278; migration to, 5-6; nonalignment of, 265; nuclear weapons of, 62, 70, 245-46, 274, 279; parti- tion of, 30-33, 36, 37, 262; peace

settlement with, 58; princely states in, 244; prisoners of war in, 245; refugees

from, 34, 95, 199, 201, 244; refugees

in, 34, 51, 112, 244, 271-72; relations

of, with United States, 52, 268-69;

relations with, 51, 57, 62, 69-70, 225, 243, 244-46, 278-79; as security

threat, 264; in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168;

trade with, 36, 37, 154,167

India Councils Act (1892), 23 India Independence Act (1947), 32, 35,

41, 200

Indian Civil Service, 19; division of, 37; recruiting for, 19 Indian Constituent Assembly, 40

Indian Evidence Act (1872), 313

Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun,

259

Indian Mutiny. See Sepoy Rebellion Indian National Congress. See Congress

Indian Police Act (1861), 304

Indian Police Service, 306; division of, 37

Indians: in elective office, 24

Indo-Aryan languages, 103 Indo-Aryan people, 3 Indo-European languages, 6, 103

Indo-Gangetic Plain: invasion of, 9

In do-Greek art, 7 Indo-Muslim culture, 11 Indonesia: peacekeeping forces in, 302;

relations with, 270

Indo-Pakistani War (1947-48), xxxi, 243, 262; army in, 263; cease-fire in, 36,

244, 262

Indo-Pakistani War (1965), xxxi, 50-54,

82, 243, 263, 269-74; casualties in, 269; cease-fire in, 53; origins of, 52, 82; reaction to, 270; support during, 52

377
Pakistan: A Country Study

Indo-Pakistani War (1971), 52, 243, 245, 251 Indo-Pakistani Western Boundary Case

Tribunal, 82 Indus Basin Development Fund, 173;

financing for, 51, 173 Indus River, 86; distribution of water

from, 51, 150-51, 173; etymology of, 86; hydrological balance of, 176; irri- gation from, 149, 154, 172, 173, 174

Indus River basin, 86; agriculture in, 149 Indus River plain, 4, 82; ancient artifacts

in, 4-5; agriculture in, 172; early civili- zation of, 4-5, 86; irrigation canals in, 19

Industrial Development Bank, 163

industrialization, 149; emphasis on, 153; import-substitution, 166; incentives

for, 154; under Nawaz Sharif, 230, 231 industry, 182-89; under British, 151; employment in, 149, 170, 171; imports

by, 168; investment in, 156; national- ized, 220; as percentage of gross domestic product, 151; pollution by, 89; privatized, 157, 233

Indus Waters Treaty (1960), 51 , 70, 173

inefficiency: in civil service, 45; crack- down on, 45; in police, 45

infant mortality, 137

inflation, 100, 150, 165; under Benazir,

xl, 226; under Bhutto, 62

infrastructure: improvement of, 230,

233; problems in, xli, 149

inheritance, 66 insurance services: nationalized, xxxiv,

59, 155, 220; privatized, 150, 157

intellectuals, 268

Intelsat. See International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

interest rates, 163, 164

International Atomic Energy Agency, 70

International Military Education and

Training (IMET), 293

International Monetary Fund (IMF),

161; aid from, 161; credits from, xl International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 194

Inter-Service Selection Board, 288 Inundation Programme, 93 investment: decline in, 155-56; in

energy, 188; foreign, 165; in housing,

184; liberalized, 150; under Nawaz

Sharif, 230; private, 155-56, 157, 159, 183, 188; public, 156, 159, 183, 184;

restrictions on, 165 Investment Corporation of Pakistan,

163, 164

Iqbal, Sir Muhammad, 28, 128

Iran: Baloch in, 113; border with, 79, 80, 316; in Central Treaty Organization,

43, 249; in Economic Co-operation

Organization, 167; geostrategic

importance of, 43; guestworkers in, 249; military relations with, 301; rela- tions with, 270, 301

Iranian Revolution (1979), 275, 301

Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 71

Iraq: in Baghdad Pact, 43, 249; Islamic

militants from, xlii irrigation, 91, 172, 173-76; in Balochistan, 114; under British Raj,

17, 19, 86, 112; canals, 19, 51, 86; con- struction programs, 173-74; dependence on, 150, 172; energy for, 189; from Indus River, 149, 150, 154, 172,

173; investment in, 154; maintenance

of, 176-77; pollution in, 89; problems

with, 149, 174; in Punjab, 17, 19; in Sindh, 112 Ishaq Khan, Ghulam: allegations by, of

corruption, 152; background of, 202, 235; ethnicity of, 112, 236; power

struggle of, with Nawaz Sharif, 236, 237; as president, xxxviii, xxix, 69,

210, 221, 226, 235-36, 280, 282; resig- nation of, xxix, 237, 283

Islam (see also sharia), 8-11; and armed

forces, 302-4; under Bhutto, 129; in constitution of 1956, 42-43; in consti- tution of 1962, 49; in constitution of

1973, 207; conversion to, 8; etymology

of, 125; five pillars of, 126; govern- ment intervention in, 128; interpreta- tion of, 42, 65, 142, 144; introduction

of, xxx, 8, 127-28, 258; politicized, 128-30; predestination in, 127; prohi- bitions in, 43, 65, 126-27; role of, xxxii, xxxvi, xl, 33, 41-42, 59, 77, 120, 127-29, 199, 201, 203, 208, 224; as

state religion, 207, 208, 210, 215, 217; tenets of, 125-27; under Zia, xxxvi,

129, 144

Islamabad: as administrative capital, 46,

97; airport at, 194; climate in, 87; pop378
Index

ulation of, 97; stock market in, 165 Islamabad Capital Territory, 211

Islamic conquest, 8 Islamic Democratic Alliance (Islami Jamhoori Ittehad—IJI), 216-17; in elec- tions of 1988, 216; in elections of

1990, xxxviii, 216-17, 228-29, 282; founded, 216; in Nawaz Sharif govern- ment, 229-30, 234; platform of, 229

Islamic identity, 42

Islamic militants, xlii, 73

Islamic Research Institute, 49

Islamic socialism, 58, 143, 220

Islamic Society of Students. S<eejamiat-i- Tulaba-i-Islam Islami Jamhoori Ittehad. See Islamic Democratic Alliance

Islami Jamhoori Mahaz, 223

Islamist movement, 303; interpretation of Islam by, 42; under Nawaz Sharif, 232

Islamization program, xxxvii, 122, 129,

65, 208, 218, 232, 234; banking under,

164; consequences of, 129; criminal

justice system under, 31 1-13; economy

under, 157; financial system under, 65; legal system under, 66; opposition to, 217, 223, 234; referendum on, 67-68;

welfare under, 141

Israel, 249

itjihad (interpretation of Islamic law), 42

Ittefaq Industries, 162

Jafari, Wasim, 224

Jahangir: tomb of, 97

Jainism, 7

Jalianwala Bagh massacre, 26 Jamhoori Watan Party: in elections of

1990, 229

Jamiat-i-Islami (JI), 39, 50, 217-18; in elections of 1965, 50; in elections of

1993, 218; founded, 217; members of, 42; in Nawaz Sharif government, 234; platform of, 217; in Zia government,

64

Jamiat-i-Tulaba-i-Islam (Islamic Society of Students), 218

Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind (JUH), 222-23; founded, 223; platform of, 223 Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI), 22, 60, 222-23; in elections of 1990, 229; origins of, 222 Jammu and Kashmir (see also Kashmir),

80; in partition, xxxi, 33, 35-36, 244, 262

Jana Sangh, 69-70

Janata Party, 69-70 Janbaz Force, 289

Jang, 242

Janjua, Asif Nawaz. See NawazJanjua, Asif Japan: in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium,

165; trade with, 167

Jasarat, 242

Jatoi, Ghulam Mustafa, 226; background

of, 227

Jatoi caretaker government, 226, 227-29; accountability proceedings under,

227-28

JayeSindh, 315

Jesuits, 15 Jhelum River, 86, 173; irrigation from, 51

JI. SgeJamiat-i-Islami jihad, 127, 303

Jinnah, Fatima, 50

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 25, 37-38; back- ground of, 25; in Congress, 25, 27; in Constituent Assembly, 38, 200; death

of, xxxii, 38, 215; as governor general,

33, 200; in Muslim League, 25, 29, 37-

38, 200, 215; policies of, 28, 30, 32; power of, 37-38; and religion, xxxvi,

128; roles of, 37-38; talks of, with Gandhi, 31; and women's roles, 121 Jinnah Postgraduate Medical Centre,

141

jizya (head tax), 11, 13, 14 Johnson, Lyndon B., 250

Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, 287-88

Joint Services Staff College, 288

Jordan: Islamic militants from, xlii; Pakistani military instructors in, 301

journalists: arrested, 64

judges: appointment of, 213

judiciary, 213-14; bribery in, 152 JUH. SeeJamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind

JUI. SeeJamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam Junagadh: in partition, xxxi, 33 Junejo, Mohammad Khan, 216; dis- missed, 68, 209, 280; in elections of

1990, 228; as prime minister, 68, 209, 280

jute, 36

379
Pakistan: A Country Study

Kabul: British retreat from, 17 Kabul River, 86

Kanishka, 8 Karachi, xliv-xlv, 34; airport at, 194; cli- mate in, 87-88; ethnic identity in, 113; ethnic violence in, 129; growth of, 96; minorities in, 130; muhajirs in, 96-97,

154, 315; political affiliation in, 50;

political unrest in, 54, 226; population

of, xliv, 95, 96; port of, 36, 192, 266; violence in, xliv, 308

Karachi Shipyard, 298

Karachi Stock Exchange, 165

Karachi University, 221 Karakoram Pass, 51 Karakoram Range, 83; temperatures on, 87 Kashmir {see atojammu and Kashmir):

annexed by Britain, 17; cease-fire line

in, 244, 245; fighting over, xxxi, xliixliii,7l, 80, 226, 240, 243, 269; Pakistani guerrillas in, 52-53, 245, 269,

284; policy on, 234; rebellion in, xlii—

xliii, 245, 284, 315; wars with India

over, 50-54, 82, 243

Kazakhstan: relations with, 248 Keamari Harbor, 1 41

Khalji Dynasty, 9 Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 11 khan of Kalat: independence declared

by, 35, 44; treaty with, 20 Khan Sahib: assassinated, 44

Khilafat Movement, 26-27; reaction to, 27 Khojak Pass, 83 Khomeini, Ruhollah (Ayatollah), 139 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 267

Khudai-i-Khitmagar (Red Shirts), 35 Khulna: political unrest in, 54 Khyber Pass, 83 Khyber Rifles, 289 King Edward Medical College, 137 kinship patterns, 100-103, 143-44;

households in, 101; lineages in, 101

Kipling, Rudyard, 106

Kirthar Range, 83

Kissinger, Henry, 248

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): trade

with, 167 Korean War (1950-53), 36, 265

Krishak Sramik Party, 39, 215; platform

of, 39

K2 (Mount Godwin Austen) , 83 Kurram Militia, 289 Kushans (Yueh-Chih) , 8 Kuwait: Pakistani military instructors in, 301 Kyrgyzstan: in Economic Co-operation

Organization, 167; relations with, 248

labor unions: collective bargaining for, 155 Labour Force Survey (1987-88), 92 Labour Party (Britain), 31 Lahore, 17, 96; airport at, 194; features

of, 97; Muslim invasion of, 9; political unrest in, 54; population of, 95, 97; purdah in, 119; stock market in, 165 Lahore conference (1966), 53 Lahore Fort, 97

Lahore-Multan railroad: construction of, 4 Lahore Resolution (Pakistan Resolution) (1940), 29, 34, 215 Lakhra coal mine, 187

land: arable, 83-86, 172; area, 79, 172;

ceilings on holdings of, 46; cultivated, 172; distribution of, 46-47, 150, 179;

taxes on, 157; use, 172-73

landowners, 106, 112 land reform, 176-79; avoided, 178-79; under Ayub Khan, 46, 47, 50, 177-78; under Bhutto, 62, 143, 178, 220; under constitution of 1962, 50 Land Reform Commission, 46 land tenure, 114, 178 language {see also linguistic groups; see also under individual languages) , 202;

distribution of, 103, 105; of publication, 242; riots over, 104, 143; stan- dardized, 103; vernacular, 103

Larkhana: ethnic identity in, 113 Law of Evidence, 122 Lawrence, Stringer, 258

legal system: women under, 66

Leghari, Farooq: as president, xxix, 239-

40

legislative assemblies, 27

Legislative Assembly, 204; under consti- tution of 1956, 41, 204; disbanded,

204

legislative councils: Indians in, 24; provincial, 26

380
Index

legislature (see also Legislative Assembly;

Majlis-i-Shoora; National Assembly):

under constitution of 1973, 60, 210-

13; elections for, 211; minorities in, 211 Liaquat Ali Khan, 37; assassinated, xxxiii, 38, 40, 215, 267; as prime minister,

xxxii-xxxiii, 38, 200-201

Liaquat Ali Khan government, 200-201; armed forces as threat to, 40

Liberation Force. See Mukti Bahini

Libya: Pakistani military instructors in, 301; guestworkers in, 249 Line of Control (see also Pakistan-India

cease-fire line), xliii, 71, 245, 279

linguistic groups (see also under individual

groups), 103-17

literacy, 77, 135; of men, 133; rate, xxx, 130, 131, 133, 134, 242; of women,

xxx, 120, 133

literature: Sanskrit, 8

livestock, 91, 114, 181

living standards: attempts to improve,

149, 159 Lodhi Dynasty, 9, 11 London roundtable conferences, 27 Lucknow Pact. See Congress-Muslim

League Pact

MacDonald, Ramsay, 27

maharajas, 16 Mahmud of Ghazni: raids by, 8-9 Maintenance of Public Order Act

(1991), 314

Majlis-i-Shoora (Council of Advisers) (see also legislature) , 65, 210-13 Makerwal/Gullakhel coal mine, 187

Malaysia: Pakistani banks in, 162; trade

with, 167

Maldives: in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168

maliks, 111 Mamluk Dynasty, 9 Mangla Dam, 86, 173; capacity, 187

mansabdari system (see also zamindari sys- tem), 13, 14 manufacturing, 183-84; exports by, 167, 183; growth, 183; investment in, 154,

183; nationalized, xxxiv, 154, 155, 156;

as percentage of gross domestic product, 151,183

Mardan: population in, 97

Mari gas field, 186 Maritime Security Agency, 290 marriage, 114, 115; age for, 136;

arranged, 102; with cousins, 102, 114,

115; dowry for, 103; laws, 47; regula- tion of, 47, 122; relation by, 102; women in, 102-3

martial law (see also chief martial law

administrator), xxix, 203, 206, 257, 274-76; armed forces under, 267-68;

declared in 1953, 40, 217; declared in 1958, 44, 45, 204, 267-68; declared in 1969, 54; declared in 1977, 220, 274;

in East Pakistan, 55-57; ended, xxxiv, 49, 59, 68, 206, 207, 208, 220, 268, 280; opposition to, 268; reforms

under, 45-47; suit protesting, 64—65

Masawat, 242

Mashriq, 242

materiel (see also nuclear weapons), 274, 298-99; air force, xliii, 72; from Brit- ain, 250; from China, xliv, 52, 271, 300-301; distribution of, 262; domestic, 295-99; embargo, 250-51; exports, 298; from France, 271; investment in, 152; navy, 266, 298; procurement of, 144; from Russia, 301; from the

United States, xliii, 72, 266, 270, 271,

277, 279, 284, 300 Maududi, Maulana Abdul Ala, 42-43,

217 Mauryan Empire, 7 Mayo Hospital, 137

Mazari, Balakh Sher: as caretaker prime

minister, 237

media, 241-43; censoring of, 243; gov- ernment controls on, 232; importance

of, 241; restrictions on, 241 Mehran Bank, 162 Mehran Force, 289 men: honor of, 118, 119; literacy of, 133; occupations of, 119; relations of, with women, 118, 119; roles of, 98, 118-20; tobacco use by, 139 merchant marine, 192 Meting coal mine, 187 middle class, 77; and nationalism, 22;

political affiliations of, 42 Middle East: aid from, 165; exports to, 180; guestworkers in, 71, 156, 170,

171, 194; military ties to, 71, 301; rela381
Pakistan: A Country Study

tions in, 249-50

migration, 144; to India, 5-6, 34; to Pakistan, 34-35; to Persian Gulf, 97-98

military: assistance, xxxvii, 43, 45, 152,

166, 250, 252, 265, 266, 276; cooperation, 250; development, xxx; doctrine, 302-4; justice, 299-300; policy, 59;

relations, 300-302; training, 250, 260

military officers, 261-62; background of, 293; British, 262, 264; in government,

278, 283; in narcotics trafficking, 278; number of, 261; pay and benefits, 293; purged, 59, 273; recruitment of, 259,

293; retirement, 293; training of, 260, 293-94, 303; in Zia government, xxxvi military personnel, enlisted, 292; pay and benefits, 293; retirement, 293

minerals: resources, 189

mines: under British Raj, 19; coal, 19 mining, 189

Ministry of Commerce, 211

Ministry of Communications, 211

Ministry of Culture, 211

Ministry of Defence, 211, 287-88, 299 Ministry of Defence Production, 211, 295-98

Ministry of Education, 132, 211

Ministry of Environment, 211 Ministry of Finance and Economic

Affairs, 211; Military Finance Division, 287

Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 211

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 211

Ministry of Health, 93, 141, 211

Ministry of Housing, 21

Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 195, 211

Ministry of Interior, 211, 289, 305

Ministry of Kashmiri Affairs and Northern Areas, 211 Ministry of Labour, Manpower, and

Overseas Pakistanis, 98

Ministry of Law andJustice, 211

Ministry of Local Government, 21

Ministry of Minority Affairs, 21

Ministry of Petroleum and Natural

Resources Production, 211 Ministry of Planning and Economic

Development, 93, 211

Ministry of Production, 59

Ministry of Railroads, 21

Ministry of Religious Affairs, 211

Ministry of Science and Technology, 21

Ministry of Social Welfare, 21

Ministry of Special Education, 211

Ministry of Sports, 211

Ministry of States and Frontier Regions,

211, 289

Ministry of Tourism, 211 Ministry of Water and Power, 211

Ministry of Women's Development, 134, 211

Ministry of Youth Affairs, 21

minorities, 130-31, 143

Minto, fourth earl of. See Elliot, Gilbert Mirza, Iskander, 41, 204; martial law

under, 44, 267; ousted, 44, 204

modernization, 42 Mohammedan Educational Conference

(1870s), 120 Mohenjo-daro, 4 money: growth of, 164; supply, 164-65 monsoon, 87 Montagu, Edwin Samuel, 25 Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 25-26, 27

Morley, John, 24 Morley-Minto Reforms. See Government

of India Act of 1909 Morning News, 242

mountains, 82, 83; temperatures on, 87

Mountbatten, Louis, xxx-xxxi, 32 Mount Godwin Austen (K2) , 83 Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), 220-21, 223; dis- solved, 221; formed, 64; platform of, 64 MQM. See Refugee People's Movement MRD. See Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

Mughal Empire (1526-1858), 3, 11-16; administration of, 13, 14; aristocracy under, 13; end of, 18; imperial service

of, 13; languages of, 104; legal system

of, 13; rebellions against, 14; religion

under, 13; succession in, 13, 14; taxes under, 14; trade under, 15; ulama

under, 13 Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz. See Refugee People's Movement

muhajirs {see also refugees), xxxii, 95, 96-

97, 112-13, 142-43; and ethnic tension, xliv, 66, 129, 201, 224, 315; lan- guages of, 104; percentage of, in

382
Index

population, 105; role of, in economy,

154; violence among, xxxviii, 96 Muhammad (Prophet), 125, 126 Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College,

22,120

Muhammad of Ghor, 9 mujahidin, 73, 127, 247-48, 276; assis- tance to, 249 Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh, 206; arrested,

xxxiv, 57; six-point program of, 53 Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) (Bangladesh), 57, 272

mullahs: interpretation of Islam by, 42

Multan: Muslim invasion of, 9 Muqeem Khan, Fazl, 262

Muslim, 242 Muslim Commercial Bank, 162 Muslim courts. See courts, sharia Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (1961),

xxxv, 66, 122, 129, 143 Muslim invaders, 3 Muslim League (see also Pakistan Muslim

League), 32, 215-16, 260; conferences

of, 28, 29; in Constituent Assembly, 41; created, 3, 23, 215; decline of, xxxii, 204, 215, 216; in elections of 1946, 30; in elections of 1954, 38-39; in elections of 1970, 56; Jinnah in, 25, 29, 32, 37-38, 200, 215; platform of, 3, 23, 24, 30, 215; preparation of, for independence, 38, 104; reconstituted, 50;

repression under, 39-40; and separate

electorates, 24, 25; support for, 38, 39, 43 Muslim nationalism, 21-24, 120 Muslim Personal Law (1937), 120-21 Muslim Personal Law of Sharia (1948), 121-22 Muslims (see also Islam), 124; British atti- tudes toward, 20, 21-22; in canal colo- nies, 19; fleeing India, xxx, 34; massacre of, in Calcutta, 32; percent- age of, in population, 124; reputation

of, 9 Muslims, Shia, xliv, 13, 127, 142; demands of, 144; percentage of, in population, 125 Muslims, Sunni, xliv, 13, 124, 127;

Hanafi, 114-15, 127; percentage of, in population, 124 Muslim state: desire for, 28-29 Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement,

43, 250, 253, 265

NAM. S^Nonaligned Movement

Nana Sahib, 21 Nanga Parbat, 83

narcotics. See under drugs

Nation, 242

National AIDS Control Programme, 141 National Assembly, 59, 208; dissolved,

xxxviii, 68, 209, 226, 267; elections for, 50, 55, 206; legislation by, 211; members of, 50, 55, 59, 210-11; minorities

in, 67, 211; opening postponed, xxxiv, 271; sessions of, 50; voting for, 48, 50; women in, 50,55, 56, 67, 206 National Awami Party, 39, 50, 59-60,

222; in elections of 1965, 50; in elections of 1970, 56; platform of, 39, 50

National Cadet Corps, 289

national conservation, 90-91 National Conservation Strategy Report

(1992), 89, 90, 91 National Credit Consultative Council,

164

National Defence College, 287, 293-94

National Democratic Institute for Inter- national Affairs, 221

National Democratic Party, 222

National Development Finance Corporation, 163

National Education Council, 134 National Finance Commission, 160; members of, 160

National Guard, 289

National Highway Authority, 233

National Institute of Health, 141 National Investment Trust, 163, 164

nationalism (see also Muslim nationalism): support for, 22; suppression of, 260

nationalization, xxxiv-xxxv, 156, 220; of

banking, xxxv, 59, 162; under Bhutto,

59; of defense industry, 153; of energy, 153; of hospitals, 138; of insurance

industry, xxxiv, 59; of manufacturing,

xxxiv, 155; of schools, 134, 135; of tele- communications, 153; of transportation, 153

National Logistics Cell, 290 National People's Party, 227; formed,

227

383
Pakistan: A Country Study

National Press Trust, 242

National Telecommunications Network,

194

natural resources: under Nawaz Sharif, 230

navy, 290-91; air wing, 274, 290; commands, 290; exercises of, 287; fleet of, 290; insignia, 295; marine commando

unit, 291; materiel, 266, 298; number

of personnel in, 290; officers, 261-62; organization of, 290; ranks, 295;

reserves, 290; threats to, 291; training, 293; uniforms, 295

nawabs, 16

Nawa-i-Waqt, 242 Nawaz Janjua, Asif, 282 Nawaz Sharif, Mian, xxxviii, 43, 216; assessments of, 231; background of, 230; in elections of 1988, 216; in elec- tions of 1990, xxxviii, 228, 229, 282; in elections of 1993, xxix; ethnicity of, 106; power struggle of, with Ishaq

Khan, 236, 237; as prime minister,

xxxviii, 216, 236-37, 282; resignation

of, xxix, 237, 283; rivalry of, with

Benazir, xxxviii, xl, xliii, 225, 234 Nawaz Sharif government (1990-93),

xxxviii, 229-35; accomplishments of, 232; allegations by, of corruption in, 152; assessments of, 231; cabinet of, 231; dismissal of, xxxviii, 236-37, 283; economy under, 157, 231, 233;

nuclear program under, 70; privatiza- tion under, 157; problems in, 233-34; reconstruction plan of, 230; reinstated, 237; religion under, 66, 131 Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 38, 40-41; dis- missal of, 41; as governor general, 200 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 26, 30, 70; armed

forces under, 261; and partition, 31-

32 Nehru, Motilal, 25, 28 Nepal: in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; trade

with, 167

Netherlands, 15

News, 242 newspapers (see also journalists; media):

languages of publication, 242; Muslim- owned, 241-42; restrictions on, 45,

232; shut down, 64, 241 New Zealand: recognition of Bangladesh

by, 250 NGOs. See nongovernment organizations

Niazi, Hidayat, 233 Nixon, Richard M., 251 , 271-72

Nizam-i-Mustafa, 63, 65 nomadism, 113-14 Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 278 nonalignment, 43 nongovernment organizations (NGOs),

78,91 Northern Areas, 80 northern highlands, 82, 83 North-West Frontier Province: agricul- ture in, 173; autonomy movement in, 143; under British Raj, 28; Congress

government in, 35; elections in, 31,

56; ethnic violence in, 275, 315; health care in, 138; Muslim League in, 43; under One Unit Plan, 44; opium pro- duction in, 140; in partition, 31; politi- cal affiliation in, 50, 222; provincial assemblies in, xxix; purdah in, 118; refugees in, xxxvii, 100; schools in, 112; soldiers from, 292, 293 Now or Never, 28-29

nuclear energy, 187; plans for, 187 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 70, 252-53

nuclear weapons, xxx, 70, 303; develop- ment of, xxxvi, 62, 70, 71-72, 73, 166, 240, 245-46, 251, 274, 276, 279, 284,

298, 301; India's possession of, 62, 70, 245-46, 274, 279, 303; potential use

of, xliii Nur Pak, 114-15

Objectives Resolution (1949), 40, 203-4, 208-9 occupation (see also guestworkers) : of men, 119; of Punjabis, 106; of women,

119

oil: distribution of, 155; imports of, 166, 185-86; prices, 238; production, 185-

86 Oman: Pakistani banks in, 162 One Unit Plan, 43-44; dissolved, 55; introduction of, 43 opium, 112; cultivation, 139-40; smuggling, 139-40 Orangi Pilot Project, 124

384
Index

Organization of the Islamic Conference,

42,71,249, 254, 278

Orient Press of India, 242

Orissa, 16

Pahlavas, 8

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 275 Pakhtu language (Pashto), 103 Pakhtun people, xxxii, 44, 77, 109-12,

236, 315; border dispute of, 80; British attitudes toward, 20, 111; census of, 109; clans of, 110-11; code of conduct

of, 109; education of, 112; egalitarian- ism of, 111; and ethnic tension, 129; feuds among, 109-10, 111; geographic

distribution of, 109; honor of, 109;

hospitality of, 110; occupations of, 112; percentage of, in population,

105; political affiliations of, 222; refu- gees among, 110; revenge among,

109-10; secession movement in, 80; women, 109, 112

Pakistan: British assets in, 37; etymology

of, 28; movement to establish, 28-30;

refugees from, 34; refugees in, 34

Pakistan, East: elections in, 38-39, 50, 55-56; investment in, 46; languages of, 104; military crackdown on, xxxiv, 57, 251, 271-72; minorities in, 215; in National Assembly, 55; political affilia- tion in, 50, 55-56; political unrest in, 56, 143, 271; provinces in, 34; rivalry of, with West Pakistan, xxxi-xxxii;

secession of, xxxii, xxxiii-xxxiv, 3, 206,

263; and Tashkent Declaration, 53

Pakistan, West: elections in, 50, 55, 56, 206; ethnic groups in, xxxii; Muslim

League in, 43; in National Assembly,

55; under One Unit Plan, 44; political

affiliations in, 55, 56; provinces in, 34; rivalry of, with East Pakistan, xxxixxxii; and Tashkent Declaration, 53

Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, 298

Pakistan Air Force. See air force Pakistan Air Force Act (1953) , 299

Pakistan Army. See army

Pakistan Army Act (1952), 299 Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation,

194, 242

Pakistan Cooperative Societies, 163, 233 Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA),

217, 221, 223; in elections of 1990, 228-29

Pakistan-India cease-fire line {see also Line of Control), 81-82

Pakistan Industrial Credit and Invest- ment Corporation, 163

Pakistan International Airlines, 139, 192, 228

Pakistan Islamic Front: in elections of 1993,218

Pakistan-Kuwait Investment, 163-64

Pakistan-Libya Holding, 163-64

Pakistan Medical Research Council, 88

Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, 293

Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation, 187

Pakistan Muslim League (PML), 50, 64, 216, 228, 234

Pakistan Muslim League-Junejo (PML-J),

68, 216, 228

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) , xl, 216; in elections of 1990, 228; in elections of 1993, xxix, 221,

238; formed, 216; in Nawaz Sharif gov- ernment, 230, 234

Pakistan Narcotics Board, 140, 308

Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 63, 223; in elections of 1977, 63, 220; sup- port for, 63; in Zia government, 64

Pakistan National Shipping Corporation,

192

Pakistan Navy Ordinance (1961), 299

Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah Cantonment, 295, 298

Pakistan People's Party (PPP), 54, 59,

143, 218-21; under Benazir, 68, 209,

234; in elections of 1970, xxxiv, 55, 56, 206; in elections of 1977, xxxv, 63, 220; in elections of 1988, 69, 221; in elections of 1990, 216-17; in elections of 1993, xxix, 221, 238; founded, 53; platform of, 59, 218, 220; purged,

xxxv; slogan of, xxxiv, 55, 218; suppressed, 64

Pakistan Press International, 242

Pakistan Rangers, 289, 304

Pakistan Resolution. See Lahore Resolution Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, 1991, 308

Pakistan Telecommunications Association: privatized, 194

Pakistan Television Corporation, 195,

385
Pakistan: A Country Study

229, 242

Pakistan Times, 242

Pakistan Women Lawyers' Association, 124 paramountcy, 19 parliamentary system: collapse of, 43-44

Parsis, 130; in National Assembly, 67

partition, 30-33, 150, 262; armed forces

in, 260-61; distribution of provinces

in, 31, 32-33; expectations for, 142; Mountbatten's plan for, xxx-xxxi, 32, 244; opposition to, 30; preparations

for, 33; violence during, xxx, 34, 38, 244

Pashto language. S^Pakhtu language

Pathans. S^Pakhtun people

patron-client relationship, 116 PDA. See Pakistan Democratic Alliance penal code, 309; religion under, 129

People's Television Network, 229, 243

Persian Gulf: armed forces in, 98, 277-

78; camel boys in, 117; guestworkers

in, 71, 97-98, 171, 249; migration to, 97-98; military relations with, 301;

relations in, 249

Persian Gulf War, 98, 170, 171, 234, 302

Perspective Plan (1988-2003), 89

Peshawar: airport at, 194; political unrest

in, 54; population in, 97

petroleum. See oil Planning Commission, 154, 158 PML. See Pakistan Muslim League

PML-J. See Pakistan Muslim LeagueJunejo PML-N. See Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz Sharif PNA. ^Pakistan National Alliance

Police Rules (1934), 304

Police Service of Pakistan, 304-5; arms

of, 306; attitudes toward, 306; corruption in, 45, 152, 306; education for, 305-6; human right abuses by, xlii, 306, 307; inefficiency in, 45; missions

of, 304; organization of, 304-6; Pakh- tuns in, 112; politicization of, 306; ranks in, 305-6; recruitment for, 305; women in, 305

Police Training College, 305

political activity: banned, 57, 64

political culture, 230

political demonstrations: against Bhutto,

63, 274; in East Pakistan, 56; by Gandhi, 26; by Jinnah, 32; against Yahya

Khan, 58; against Zia, 64

political opposition: to Ayub Khan, 49,

50, 53, 54; to Benazir, 225-26; against

Mughal Empire, 14; repression of, 26,

46, 207

political parties (see also under individual

parties), 214; banned, 50, 64, 209, 216, 267; problems with, 214-15; revived, 68,69

political repression, 214; under Ayub

Khan , 54; under British Raj , 1 8, 21 , 26

30; in East Pakistan, 57; under Muslim

League, 39-40

political rivalry, 199, 234

political stability, 199-200, 214, 231-32; and the civil service, 202

political unrest, 220, 271, 314-17; by the Ahmadiyyas, 40; under Ayub Khan, 54;

in Balochistan, 66; suppression of, 260

political violence, xliv; under Benazir,

226; under Bhutto, 60; under British

Raj, 31; casualties of, 34; at independence, xxx, 34, 38; over language policy, 104

politicians, 268; bribes for, 151; purged,

45, 204, 238

pollution {see also environment), 88-90,

91; of air, 90; health problems caused

by, 88, 89-90; noise, 90; of water, 88, 89-90

polygyny: restrictions on, 47, 66, 120

population, 91-100; age distribution in, 170; density, 91, 92; distribution of, 92,

95; distribution of languages in, 103, 105; ethnic distribution in, 105; of

Faisalabad, 95; of Islamabad, 97; of

Karachi, xliv, 95, 96; of Lahore, 95, 97; Muslims as percentage of, 124; in 1971, 93; in 1980, 94; in 1981, 92; in 1994, 91; planning, 92-95; poverty in, 77, 150; projected, 91, 94; rural, 92; urban, 92, 95, 97; women as percent- age of, 92

population statistics: birth rate, 92; death

rate, 92; growth rate, xxx, xl, xli, 79,

89, 91, 93, 97, 149, 226; infant mortality rate, 137

Population Welfare Division, 93

Port Health Office, 141 Port Muhammad bin Qasim, 192

ports, 36, 192; under British, 151; priva386
Index

tized, 157

Portugal: exploration of India by, 14; as sea power, 14-15

Porus, 7

poverty, xxx; attempts to alleviate, 58, 153; percentage of population in, 77, 150; rate, 135; in Sindh, 112

PPP. See Pakistan People's Party president (see also executive branch),

204; under constitution of 1956, 41; under constitution of 1962, 49; under

constitution of 1973, 208, 210, 235,

285; elections for, 50, 235; powers of, 49, 208, 210; requirements for, 210;

succession to, 211; term of, 210; voting

for, 48

press (see also journalists; media; newspapers): censorship of, 57; restrictions on, 26, 45, 232

Press and Publications Ordinance, 45

prices: of food, 238; of fuel, 238; of utilities, 158, 238 prime minister: appointment of, 211

princely states, 16; autonomy of, 28; Brit- ish doctrine of paramountcy and, 19; in India, 36, 244; in Pakistan, 35; in

partition, xxxi, 33, 35, 244

prisoners: political, 54, 307; torture of,

xlii; of war, 245, 272

prisons, 310-11; conditions in, 311;juvenile, 311

prison service, 310

privatization, 157; under Benazir, 184; of energy, 188; of industry, 157, 233; under Nawaz Sharif, 231, 233, 234; opposition to, 234; of schools, 134; of

state enterprises, xli, 150, 184; of tele- communications, 194

provinces: autonomy of, 27, 213, 224; under British rule, 19, 26, 27; legisla- tive councils in, 26, 211, 213; police forces of, 304; rivalries among, 199,

201, 224

provincial assemblies, 48, 208; dissolved,

68, 267 Provisional Constitutional Order of

1980, 65 Provisional Constitutional Order of

1981, 65 Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act (1949), 39-40, 45 publications: restrictions on, 45; in

Urdu, 22

public sector: expansion of, 156; imports

by, 168; production, 184

Public-Sector Development Programme,

160 Punjab, 3, 16-17; agriculture in, 172,

173; annexed by British, 17; British government of, 17; climate in, 88; dominance of, 43; elections in, 56;

electricity in, 34; irrigation in, 17, 19; muhajirs in, 95; under One Unit Plan,

44; in partition, 31, 32; political affilia- tion in, 50, 225; provincial assemblies

in, xxix; purdah in, 118; religious

unrest in, 143

Punjabi language, 103, 105; origins of, 3, 105; speakers of, 103, 105 Punjabi people, 77, 105-9, xxxii; in Balochistan, 61; clans of, 105, 106;

diversity among, 105; in elite class, 77, 106; health care in, 138; occupations

in, 77, 106; origins of, 105; percentage

of, in population, 105; social networks

of, 106 Punjabi soldiers, 292, 293; fighting for

British, 17, 18, 30; in Sepoy Rebellion,

18, 259

Puranas, 6 purdah, 118-20; attempts to end, 120; of

rural women, 118; types of, 119; of

urban women, 119

purges: of armed forces, 59; under Ayub

Khan, 45; under Bhutto, xxxv, 59; of

politicians, 45, 204

Qasim, Muhammad bin, 8 Quaid-i-Azam Karachi International Air- port, 141

Quetta: airport at, 194 Quetta High Court, 65 Quit India Movement, 30-31 , 260

Quran, 125, 126

Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain, 78

Qureshi, Moeen, 237 Qureshi caretaker government, xxix,

237-38, 283; economy under, xxix, 157-58; reforms under, xxix, 140,

237-38, 307; taxes under, 160, 161

Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 247

387
Pakistan: A Country Study

Radcliffe, Sir Cyril, 82

Radcliffe Award, 82

radio, 79, 194, 242; censoring of, 243; languages of broadcast, 194; networks, 194 Rahman, Maulana Fazlur, 222 Rahman, Ziaur, 57, 70

railroads, 189-90; construction of, 4; nationalization of, 154, 192; privatized, 192; security for, 304

Rajput kingdoms: Islamic raids against, 9

Ranjit Singh, Maharaja, 17 Rann of Kutch, 82; dispute over, 82

Ravi River, 51, 86

Rawalpindi: purdah in, 119 Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 40 RCD. See Regional Cooperation for Development

Reagan, Ronald, 72, 252 Red Shirts. See Khudai-i-Khitmagar

Refugee People's Movement (Muhajir

Qaumi Mahaz—MQM), 112-13, 221-

22, 226; election boycott by, 239; in elections of 1988, 221, 224; in elec- tions of 1990, 228; formed, 66, 221-

22; platform of, 222; political activities

of, 226

refugees {see also muhajirs): Afghan, xxxvii, 98-100, 110, 117, 159, 165-66, 199, 201, 247, 276; geographic distribution

of, 100; Hindu, xxx, 34; from India, xxx, 34, 95, 154, 199, 201, 244; in India, xxx, 57, 244, 271-72; Muslim,

xxx, 34; numbers of, xxxvii, 57, 100,

199, 247, 276; from Pakistan, xxx, 34, 57; political affiliations of, 42; problems caused by, 100, 117, 276-77;

restrictions on, 100; in rural areas, 34-

35; Sikh, xxx, 34; in urban areas, 35;

villages for, 100 Regional Cooperation for Development

(RCD), 249

regions: diversity of, 77; rivalries among,

199, 201-2, 204, 215

religion (see also under individual denominations) , 124-31; distribution of, in population, 114; under Mughal

Empire, 13; under Nawaz Sharif, 66, 131; syncretic, 13

religious tensions, 92, 145, 204

religious violence, xlii, xliv, 143

remittances from guestworkers, 98

Reproductive Health Centres, 93 Republican Party, 44; in Suhrawardy gov- ernment, 44, 216 Resource Development Corporation,

189 Revival of the Constitution of 1973

Order, 68

rice: export of, 156, 167, 172, 180; pro- duction of, 1 80

Rice Export Corporation, 180

rivers: pollution of, 89

Riza, Shaukat, 283

roads, 190; construction of, 51, 156, 157, 233, 290; system, 190-92

Royal Indian Air Force, 260

Royal Indian Navy, 260 Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst,

259

Royal Navy: mutiny in, 31 rural areas: under Ayub Khan, 47; education in, 134; health care in, 137-38; housing in, 184; political unrest in, 54; population in, 92; poverty in, 135; pur- dah in, 118; refugees in, 34-35; sanita- tion in, 136; soldiers from, 292; water

in, 136; women in, 118

rural development, 47; under Basic

Democracies, 48

Russia (see also Soviet Union): expansion

of, 17, 20; materiel from, 301

SAARC. See South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

Sadik, Nans, 253

Safed Koh Range, 83 Saindak Integrated Mineral Project, 189

Sajjad, Wasim, 239; as acting president, 237

Saka rule, 8 Sandeman, Sir Robert, 20

sanitation, 77, 88, 89, 136; under Basic Democracies, 48

Sanskrit: literature, 8; origins of, 3 Sassanian people, 8 Saudi Arabia: aid from, 165; guestworkers in, 171; Islamic militants from, xlii; Pakistani banks in, 162; Pakistani mili- tary in, 71, 301; relations with, 249;

trade with, 167 Saudi-Pak Industrial and Agricultural

Investment, 163-64

388
Index

Saur Revolution (Afghanistan), 275

Sayyid Dynasty, 9

Schackle, Christopher, 104

schools, 132; admission to, 78; attrition rate, 133; enrollment in, 131, 133,

134, 150; for girls, 112, 135; national- ization of, 134, 135; in North-West

Frontier Province, 112; number of, 132-33; privatization of, 134; technical, 132, 135 SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

security, internal, 264, 304-17; under

British Raj, 304; emergency provisions, 313-14; intelligence agencies,

276; preventive detention, 314

security, national, 199, 243-44; under

Ayub Khan, 270; after civil war, 273;

collapse of, 268-69; relations, 243-44;

threats to, 264

Security of Pakistan Act (1952), 40, 313

self-government, 25, 27

Senate, 210, 211 Sepoy Rebellion (1857-58), 18, 21, 258-

59; origin of, 1

8

sepoys, 18, 258

service sector, 189-95; employment in, 149, 170; as percentage of gross

domestic product, 151 ShahAlam II, 16 Shahbaz Qalander, 128 Shaheen Air International, 194 Shaheen Foundation, 295 Shahjahan, 11-12, 13 Shah, Waris, 105 Shalimar Gardens, 97

sharia {see also courts, sharia; Federal

Shariat Court; Islam), 43, 66, 201,

31 1-13; and armed forces, 300; hudood ordinances, 311-12, 313; marriage

under, 103; and media, 243; retribu- tion in, 312; women under, 312-13; under Zia, xxxvi Shariat Bill, 66, 68, 123, 129, 218, 232, 313

Sharigh coal mine, 187

Shastri, Lai Bahadur, 53 Shina language, 103

shipping: nationalized, 155; privatized,

150,157,233

shortages: of coal, 36; of food, 36 Siachen Glacier, 71, 80, 279

Sialkot: population of, 97

Sikhism: origins of, 3

Sikhs: British attitudes toward, 20; Brit- ish wars with, 17; in canal colonies, 19; fleeing Pakistan, xxx, 34, 112; under- Government of India Act of 1909, 24;

in National Assembly, 67, 211; rise of, 17 Sikh separatists, 71 Simla Agreement (1972), 24, 62, 71, 81-

82, 245, 273

Simla Delegation, 23-24 Simon, Sir John, 27 Simon Commission, 28

Sindh: agriculture in, 112, 172; elections

in, 56; etymology of, 86; health care

in, 138; land distribution in, 179; minorities in, 130; muhajirs in, 95; Muslim invasion of, 8, 9; Muslim

League in, 43; under One Unit Plan,

44; in partition, 31, 32-33; poverty in, 112; purdah in, 118; rulers of, 16; vio- lence in, xlii, 66, 226, 232-33, 282,

306-7,315

Sindhi language, 103; origins of, 3; speakers of, 66, 103 Sindhi people, xxxii, 77, 112-13; and

ethnic tension, xxxviii, xliv, 129; occupations of, 112; percentage of, in population, 105; social system of, 112-13;

solidarity of, 61 Sindh Province, 3, 28

Singapore: investment from, 165

Sino-Indian war (1962), 248, 269

Siraiki language: speakers of, 1 03

Siraj-ud-Dawlah, Nawab, 16

slavery, 117 Small Business Finance Corporation,

163 smoking, 139

smuggling: crackdown on, 45

social classes (see also under individual

classes): in army, 135; in civil service, 135

social development, xxx, 78, 142-45,

150; and citizenship, 78, 144-45;

neglect of, xli social problems, xli-xlii social welfare: under Basic Democracies,

48

Solidarity Movement. SeeTehrik-i-Istiqlal Somalia: peacekeeping forces in, 253-

389
Pakistan: A Country Study

54, 302

Sor Range coal mine, 187 South Asian Association for Regional

Cooperation (SAARC): election

observers from, 229; formed, 70, 168; members of, 70, 167, 168, 246, 254 South Asian nuclear-free zone, 70 South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement, 168 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO), 251; membership in, 43,

250; withdrawal from, 273 South Korea. See Korea, Republic of South Waziristan Scouts, 289

Soviet Union (see also Russia), 278; aid from, 183; and Baloch insurrection,

62, 117; foreign relations of, 267, 272; neutrality of, 52; occupation of

Afghanistan by, xxxvi, xxxvii, 66, 69,

72, 117, 144, 152, 159, 246, 247, 249, 252, 275, 276-78; relations with, 43, 51 , 224, 270; withdrawal from Afghanistan by, xxxvii, 72-73, 284-85

Spear, Sir Percival, 27

Special Communication Organization, 290 Speedy Trial Courts, 233, 310, 314

Sri Lanka: in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, 70, 168; trade

with, 167

State Bank of Pakistan, 161-62; established, 161; loans under, 164; role of, 161-62

state enterprises, 154, 156; investment

in, 184; privatized, xli, 150, 157, 183,

233; production by, 184

state of emergency: under Ishaq Khan,

227; under Yahya Khan, 58

steel mill, 183-84, 189

stock exchange, 165; foreign investment

in, xli strikes, xl; in East Pakistan, 56; in Karachi, 226

structural adjustment program, xl, 150 student associations, 221; under Ayub

Khan, 46; banned, 218 student demonstrations: against Tashkent Declaration, 53

students: number of, 132-33; political

affiliations of, 42, 218

subsidies: cut, xxix, 237

Sudan: Islamic militants from, xlii

suffrage, 53; under Basic Democracies,

206; under British Raj, 24-25, 26

Sufism: introduction of, 8, 127-28

sugar, 36, 183

Suhrawardy, Hussain Shahid, 32, 215-16;

arrested, 45; platform of, 39; as prime

minister, 216 Suhrawardy government, 44

Sui natural gas field, 186 Sulaiman Range, 83

sunna, 126 Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (1975), 310 Supreme Court, 213; decisions of, xxxviii, 64-65, 204, 217, 222, 237; jurisdic- tion of, 213, 310; sessions of, 50 Sur Dynasty, 13

Sutlej River, 51, 86 Sword of the Faithful. See Zarb-e-Momin

Syed Ahmad Khan, 22, 120; demands of, 22-23; and Hindus, 23

Syria: Pakistani military instructors in, 301

Tajikistan: in Economic Co-operation

Organization, 167

Taj Mahal, 11-12

Talpur mirs, 16 Tamerlane. S^Timur

Tarbela Dam, 86, 174; capacity, 187 Tashkent Declaration, 53, 245, 270

taxes, 53; under Ayub Khan, 47; collec- tion of, 160; corporation, 160; evasion

of, xli, 160; excise, 160, 161; on farm

income, 156, 160, 178, 238; income,

160, 161; indirect, 160; jizya, 11, 13, 14; on land, 157; under Mughal

Empire, 14; under Nawaz Sharif, 231;

as percentage of gross domestic product, 160; under Qureshi, 158, 161; reform of, 155, 231; sales, 161; on

wealth, 161; under Yahya Khan, 55

Taxila, 7 teachers: as guestworkers, 171; morale

of, 132; number of, 132-33; training

of, 132

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal (Solidarity Movement)

223; in elections of 1990, 228;

founded, 223; platform of, 223

tehsil councils, 48, 208

telecommunications, 194-95, 290; under

390
Index

British Raj, 19; corruption in, 152; employment in, 170; improvements

in, 194; nationalization of, 154; as per- centage of gross domestic product,

151; privatized, 150, 157, 233

telephones, 194; nationalization of, 154

television, 79, 242-43; censorship of, 79

terrorism, xlii, 232, 276-77, 306, 310, 316 Terrorist Affected Areas (Special

Courts) Ordinance (1991), 314

textiles, xli; exports of, 167, 183; import

quotas, xli Thar Desert, 82, 83; coal field in, 186

Thatta: ethnic identity in, 113

Tibet: China's occupation of, 51 Tikka Khan, 56-57, 59 Timur (Tamerlane), 11 Tochi Scouts, 289

Topi, Tantia, 21 topography, 82-87

torture, 306, 307

tourism, 195; sites for, 4

trade {see also balance of trade; exports; imports), 166-68; ancient, 4; attempts

to open, 168; with Bangladesh, 246; with China, 51; deficit, 166, 168; employment in, 149, 170; European

merchants in, 15; government role in, 220; with India, 36, 37, 151, 154; under Mughal Empire, 15; as percent- age of gross domestic product, 151 trade unions: under Ayub Khan, 46; under Bhutto, 59

trading posts (factories), 15-16, 96, 258

transportation, 189-94; air, 190, 192-94; under British Raj, 19, 151; employ- ment in, 149, 170, 171; government

role in, 220; merchant marine, 192; Pakhtuns in, 112; as percentage of

gross domestic product, 151; ports,

192; privatized, 157; railroads, 189-90,

192; roads, 190-92; vehicles, 192

treaties: with khan of Kalat, 20

Treaty of Amritsar (1850), 17

Treaty of Gandamak (1879) , 20

Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951), 265

Tufail Muhammad, Mian, 218 Tughlaq Dynasty, 9

Tunisia: Islamic militants from, xlii Turkey: Allied peace settlement with, 26, 265; in Central Treaty Organization,

43, 249; in Economic Co-operation

Organization, 167; geostrategic

importance of, 43; government of, 27; military relations with, 302 Turkmenistan: in Economic Co-operation Organization, 167; relations with, 248

Turko-Pakistan Pact (1954), 265

Turks: invasion by, 8 Two Nations Theory, xxix, 28-30, 128;

origins of, 23, 128

ulama: under constitution of 1962, 49; interpretation of Islam by, 42, 65; movements led by, 22; under Mughal

Empire, 13; political involvement of, 217, 223; in sharia courts, 66, 213 Umayyad caliph, 8 underemployment, 135, 149, 171 UNDP. See United Nations Development

Programme

unemployment, xliv, 171; under Benazir, 226; under Nawaz Sharif, 231 UNFPA. See United Nations Population

Fund

UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEE See United Nations Children's Fund

union councils, 48, 205, 208 United Arab Emirates: guestworkers in, 171; Pakistani banks in, 162; Pakistani

military instructors in, 301 United Front, 39; in Constituent Assembly, 41; platform of, 39 United Nations: admitted to, 35, 253; membership in, 43; peacekeeping missions, 253-54, 302 United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF), 123 United Nations Development Pro- gramme (UNDP), 253 United Nations Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO), 253 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 100 United Nations Operation in Somalia

(UNOSOM), 253-54, 302 United Nations Population Fund

(UNFPA), 253 United Nations Protection Force in Bos391
Pakistan: A Country Study

nia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR

BH), 254, 302 United Nations Security Council, 36 United States: aid from, 43, 45, 51, 70, 72, 152, 158, 166, 173, 248-49, 250, 251, 278; in Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 165; embassy, burned, xxxvii, 252, 276; influence on, 266-67; materiel from, xliii, 72, 250-51, 266, 270,

271, 274, 277, 279, 284, 300; military

assistance from, 43, 45, 166, 247, 248-

49, 250, 265, 266, 300; military cooperation with, 250, 264—67; military train- ing by, 266, 293, 303; and nuclear weapons, 70, 72, 246, 284; Pakistanis

in, 170, 171; relations of, with India,

52, 268-69; relations with, xxxvi-xxxvii, 43, 51, 52, 67, 71-72, 73, 224, 225, 237, 240, 246, 250-53, 268-69, 270,

272, 276, 284, 316-17; security rela- tions with, 244; trade with, 167 United States Agency for International Development (AID), 139, 166

University Grants Commission, 132 UNOSOM. See United Nations Operation in Somalia UNPROFOR BH. See United Nations

Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

uprising of 1 857-58. See Sepoy Rebellion urban areas: under Basic Democracies,

48; education in, 134; employment in, 149; growth of, 95-97; housing in, 119, 184; political affiliations in, 42; population in, 92, 95, 97; poverty in, 135; purdah in, 119; refugees in, 34-

35, 100; sanitation in, 136; topology

of, 96; violence in, xxxvii, 96, 100; water in, 136; women in, 119 urban migration, 9$-97; process, 95 Urdu, 103; as language of instruction,

105, 134; as national language, xxxii, 104, 202; originsiof, 3, 104; publications in, 22, 242; speakers of, 103, 104

ushr, 141-42, 157 Usmani, Shabir Ahmad, 223

usury: prohibitions against, 43, 65, 129, 164

utilities: as percentage of gross domestic

product, 151; prices of, 158; privatiza- tion of, 150

Uzbekistan: in Economic Co-operation

Organization, 167; relations with, 248

Vajpayee, Atal Behari, 69-70

Vale of Kashmir, xlii-xliii Vedas, 6

veiling, 119; types of, 119

Victoria, Queen, 18; proclaimed empress

of India, 18

voting. See suffrage

Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), 213, 214 wages {see also income), 78; minimum,

155, 156 Waheed, Abdul: as chief of the army staff (COAS), 236, 283, 286, 288 Wakhan Corridor, 80, 83

Wali Khan, Khan Abdul, 222, 228; back- ground of, 222 Warsak Dam, 86 Waseem, Mohammad, 283

water: charges for, 174; distribution of, from Indus River, 51, 150-51, 174-75;

pollution of, 88, 89-90; potable, 88,

1 36; wasting of, 1 75-76 Water and Power Development Authority, 188

Wavell, Lord, 31 Wazirabad: population in, 97

welfare {see alsozakat), 135, 141-42

wells, 174, 176 West Pakistan. See Pakistan, West West Pakistan Jail Warden Service Rules

(1962), 310-11 West Wing. See Pakistan, West

Wheeler, Sir Mortimer, 3 Wirsing, Robert G., 276 women, 118-24; abuse of, 45; in armed

forces, 289; under Benazir, 158; brothers of, 102; and childbearing, 94-95,

103, 136; dowry for, 103; education of, 112, 120, 135; employment of, 119,

120, 123-24, 170; and family relationships, 101-2; health care for, 92, 136-

37; health of, 136-37, 139; literacy of, xxx, 120, 133; marriage of, 102-3, 136; occupations of, 119; as percentage of

population, 92; in police force, 305; in politics, 50, 55, 56, 67, 206; popular

view of, 119-20; purdah for, 118-20;

392
Index

reputations of, 109, 118; relations of, to men, 118, 119; restrictions on, 109, 118, 120, 123, 129; rights of, xxxv, xl, 47, 66, 78, 120, 121-22, 224-25, 240;

roles of, 98, 118-20, 121, 123; under

sharia, 312-13; status of, 94-95, 120-

24; veiling of, 119 Women Guard, 289 Women's Action Forum, 122-23, 124 women's associations, 47, 66, 91, 122, 129 women's movement, 120-20, 122-23,

124; goals of, 124

Woolsey, James, xliii work force, 170-71; in agriculture, 170;

in communications, 170; in construction, 149, 170; growth of, 170; in industry, 149, 170; in service sector, 149, 170; in trade, 149, 170; in trans- portation, 149, 170; women in, 119,

120, 123-24, 170 World Bank: aid from, 161, 165, 173; development programs, 51; outstanding debt to, 165 World War I, 25; casualties in, 260; peace

settlements in, 26 World War II, 30; expanison of British Indian Army in, 260

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad, xxxiii; as chief martial law administrator, 54,

206, 271; in elections of 1970, 56, 271;

as president, 54, 206, 271; resignation

of, 58, 206, 272 Yahya Khan government, xxxiv, 54-58,

206; demonstrations against, 58; dis- solved, 56 Yamuna River valley: irrigation canals in, 19

Yaqub Khan, Sahibzada, 224

zakat (see also welfare), 126, 141-42, 157;

eligibility for, 142; legislation of, 65, 129 Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 141-42, 157

Zamindar, 242

zamindari system (see also mansabdari sys- tem), 14 Zarb-e-Momin (Sword of the Faithful), 287

Zardari, Asif Ali: allegations of corruption against, 152, 226, 238 Zhob Militia, 289

Zia ul-Haq, Mohammad: as chief of the army staff (COAS), xxxv, 59, 274, 277;

as chief martial law administrator

(CMLA) , xxxv, 207, 275, 277; death of, xxxvii, 63, 69, 210, 280; ethnicity of, 106; international opinion of, xxxvixxxvii; as president, 275, 280; state visits by, 70-71

Zia ul-Haq government, xxxvi, 63-73,

178, 207-10, 277; army officers in, xxxvi; constitution suspended under,

207, 275; economy under, 156-57;

elections postponed by, xxxvii, 275; foreign relations under, 52, 209; human rights under, 275; interpreta- tion of Islam under, xxxvi, 42, 131,

144; Islamization program of, xxxvii, 65, 66, 122, 141, 144, 218, 311; lan- guage under, 105; members of, 64; nepotism under, 143-44; nuclear pro- gram under, 70, 251; opposition to, 64; planning under, 159; women

under, 122

zilla councils, 48, 208

Zoroastrians, 130, 144

393

Contributors

Craig Baxter is Professor of Politics and History at Juniata College, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania.

Mary Louise Becker is an independent scholar and consultant

in South Asian political and economic development.

Peter R. Blood is Senior Research Specialist for Asia at the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

John D. Rogers is Lecturer on Social Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; and Visiting Research Fellow, Center of South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies,

Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts.

Thomas Perry Thornton is Adjunct Professor of Political Sci- ence and Asian Studies at the Johns Hopkins University

and Georgetown University.

Anita M. Weiss is Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of Oregon.

395

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

J JU—OJ /\lglld.IllS tall CCO, ozr J J \J—J Dominican Republic

550-98 Albania and Haiti 550-44 Algeria 550-52 Ecuador

550-59 Angola 550^3 Egypt

550-73 Argentina 550-150 El Salvador

jjU—111 Armenia, Azerbaijan, JJU—Zo Ethiopia

and Georgia 550-167 Finland

550-169 Australia 550-173 Germany, East 550-176 Austria 550-155 Germany, Fed. Rep. of

550-175 Bangladesh 550-153 Ghana

jOU—1 1Z oeiarus anu ivioioova ccn Q7 J JU—o

/

vji eece 550-170 Belgium 550-78 Guatemala

550-66 Bolivia 550-174 Guinea

550-20 Brazil 550-82 Guyana and Belize

550-168 Bulgaria 550-151 Honduras

JJU—01 Burma J JU—10J Hungary

550-50 Cambodia 550-21 India

550-166 Cameroon 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-159 Chad 550-39 Indonesia

550-77 Chile 550-68 Iran CCA Sf\ 550-60 China CCA O 1 550-31 Iraq

550-26 Colombia 550-25 Israel 550-33 Commonwealth Carib- 550-182 Italy

bean, Islands of the 550-30 Japan

550-91 Congo 550-34 Jordan

550-90 Costa Rica 550-56 Kenya

550-69 Cote d'lvoire (Ivory 550-81 Korea, North

Coast) 550-41 Korea, South

550-152 Cuba 550-58 Laos

550-22 Cyprus 550-24 Lebanon

550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-38 Liberia

397
550-85 Libya 550-184 Sincranorp

550-172 Malawi 550-86 Somalia

550^5 Malaysia 550-93 South Africa

550-161 Mauritania 550-95 Soviet Union

550-79 Mexico 550-179 Spain

A/Trvn IVlVJllgUllcl onli a 550-96 Sri T anlra 550^9 Morocco 550-27 Sudan

550-64 Mozambique 550-17 Syria

550-35 Nepal and Bhutan 550-62 Tanzania

550-88 Nicaragua 550-53 Thailand

550-157 Nigeria 550-89 Tunisia

550-94 Oceania 550-80 Turkey

550^8 Pakistan 550-74 Uganda

550-^6 Panama 550-97 Uruguay

550-156 Paraguay 550-71 Venezuela

550-185 Persian Onlf Statps 550-32 Vietnam

550^2 Peru 550-183 Yemens, The

550-72 Philippines Yugoslavia

550-162 Poland j jU— / Zaire

550-181 Portugal jjU-/j Zambia

550-160 Romania 550-171 Zimbabwe

550-37 Rwanda and Burundi

550-51 Saudi Arabia

550-70 Senegal

550-180 Sierra Leone

398
is


PIN: 004212-000