NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

OF FLORIDA 

SECOND DISTRICT 

NELLY BUITRAGO and GUSTAVO ) 

ZAPATA, ) 

 ) 

 Appellants, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D14-47 

 ) 

BRIDGET FEASTER, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed December 31, 2014. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas 

County; Mark I. Shames, Judge. 

Mark D. Tinker and Charles W. Hall of 

Banker Lopez Gassler, P.A., St. Petersburg, 

for Appellants. 

Robert E. Heyman of Heyman Law Firm, 

P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee. 

VILLANTI, Judge. 

 Nelly Buitrago and Gustavo Zapata appeal from the trial court's Order on 

Motions for Additur, Remittitur, and for New Trial, in which the court granted Bridget 

Feaster's motion for a new trial on future noneconomic damages and denied Appellants' 

motions for new trial on all issues. We affirm the denial of Appellants' motions without 
- 2 -

further discussion. However, we must reverse the portion of the court's order that 

granted Feaster's motion for new trial because the court's decision was based on an 

erroneous view of the law and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. 

 Feaster was injured in a four-car collision caused by Zapata, who was 

driving Buitrago's truck. Following a lengthy trial, the jury ultimately found Buitrago and 

Zapata liable to Feaster and awarded Feaster $55,819.34 for past medical expenses, 

$450,000 in future medical damages, $442.40 for lost wages, $25,000 for past 

noneconomic damages, and nothing for future noneconomic damages. Feaster moved 

for a new trial, claiming that the evidence and verdict established that she was legally 

entitled to future noneconomic damages. In arguing her motion, Feaster relied on 

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Manasse, 681 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), for the 

proposition that the jury's finding of a permanent injury automatically entitled her to 

recover future noneconomic damages as a matter of law. After hearing the parties' 

arguments on the motion, the court apparently agreed and granted Feaster a new trial 

on the issue of future noneconomic damages. 

 Because it was the sole argument raised at the hearing and the court 

granted Feaster's motion without making any specific findings,1 we are compelled to 

conclude that the court based its ruling on the argument that the jury must award future 

noneconomic damages as a matter of law when it finds that the plaintiff suffers a 

permanent injury. However, this view of the law was expressly rejected by the Florida 

Supreme Court when it held in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Manasse, 707 So. 2d 1110 

 1The trial court's written order, devoid of any grounds for granting the new 

trial, would have required this court to remand in and of itself. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 

1.530(f); Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978). 
- 3 -

(Fla. 1998), that a verdict is not inadequate as a matter of law when the jury finds a 

plaintiff has suffered a permanent injury but does not award future intangible damages. 

 The correct standard to apply in considering a motion for new trial based 

on an allegedly inadequate award of noneconomic damages is whether the verdict was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So. 2d 669, 673 

(Fla. 1959). However, Feaster failed to argue this standard to the trial court, and the 

record makes it clear that the trial court did not consider the weight of the evidence in 

granting Feaster a new trial on noneconomic damages. The trial court then seemingly 

based its decision on an erroneous view of the law, and thus committed an abuse of 

discretion when it granted Feaster a new trial. See Tri-Pak Machinery, Inc. v. 

Hartshorn, 644 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). When, as here, "the appellate court 

cannot determine whether the trial court would have granted a new trial but for the error 

of law, . . . then the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for 

reconsideration in light of the correct legal principles." Van v. Schmidt, 122 So. 3d 243, 

260 (Fla. 2013). Accordingly, we must reverse the order granting Feaster a new trial on 

noneconomic damages. 

 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

KELLY, J., and PLEUS, ROBERT J., JR., ASSOCIATE SENIOR JUDGE, Concur.