[Cite as Greene v. Durrani, 2023-Ohio-3069.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

GLORIA GREENE,

 Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

 VS.

ABUBAKAR ATIQ DURRANI, M.D.,

 and 

CENTER FOR ADVANCED SPINE 

TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

 Defendants-Appellants/Cross-

 Appellees.

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APPEAL NOS. C-220023

 C-220037

TRIAL NO. A-1706467

 

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 1, 2023

Robert A. Winter, Jr., James F. Maus and Benjamin M. Maraan, II, for PlaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant,

Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Russell S. Sayre, Aaron M. Herzig, Philip D. 

Williamson, Anna M. Greve, Lindhorst & Dreidame Co., L.P.A., Michael F. Lyon, 

James F. Brockman and Paul J. Vollman for Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Judge.

{¶1} This medical malpractice case brought by plaintiff-appellee/crossappellant Gloria Greene involves allegations of medical negligence relating to a 

surgery performed by Dr. Abubakar Durrani. Ms. Greene subsequently filed suit 

against defendants-appellants/cross-appellees Dr. Durrani and the Center for 

Advanced Spine Technologies, Inc., (“CAST”) (collectively, “Defendants”), along 

with other defendants not parties to this appeal. The case proceeded to a jury trial, 

which returned verdicts in favor of Ms. Greene, concluding that Dr. Durrani was 

negligent in his care and treatment of Ms. Greene. Our review of the trial record 

demonstrates that the trial court abused its discretion in various evidentiary and trialrelated rulings that, when viewed collectively, we cannot consider harmless. We 

accordingly must reverse the judgment and remand this matter for a new trial. 

I.

{¶2} Ms. Greene first saw Dr. Durrani in June 2012, presenting a chief 

complaint of lower back pain since at least 2006 and severe pain radiating down her 

right leg for at least a year prior—Defendants insist that Ms. Greene’s excruciating leg 

pain is known as radiculopathy. She also complained of numbness and tingling in 

these areas that had gone on for some time and were getting progressively worse: she

rated her leg pain as a ten out of ten and her back pain a five out of ten. Ms. Greene 

experienced a decreased range of motion, encountering significant pain while trying 

to bend forward and while walking, standing, and sitting. She was sixty-six years old 

at the time, was morbidly obese, and had diabetes. 

{¶3} Ms. Greene and Defendants differ in how they characterize her 

conditions when she first went to see Dr. Durrani. Ms. Greene alleges that while she 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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did have pain in her back and significant pain in her right leg, she was able to work, 

did not need assistance with fifteen different areas of life, was functioning at a 

reasonable level, and had a reasonable ability to enjoy life. Defendants highlight that 

she indicated that medication and physical therapy provided her with no relief, that 

her leg pain impacted how she walked, and basic activities, such as sitting, standing, 

and walking, exacerbated her pain. Further, Defendants allege that Ms. Greene had 

no interest in epidural steroid injections—which seemingly would have only provided 

temporary relief. 

{¶4} To address these issues, Dr. Durrani performed an L4-L5 fusion surgery 

on Ms. Greene in December 2012. From the surgery, she suffered a nerve injury—

according to Dr. Durrani, apparently a known complication. Further, Ms. Greene 

suffered a post-operative infection, which opened her incision and which required 

aggressive medications and efforts to eradicate. Ms. Greene was readmitted to the 

hospital in January 2013 and stayed until February 2013, extending her post-surgical 

pain.

{¶5} Most significantly, Ms. Greene alleges that Dr. Durrani stretched her 

femoral nerve on her right side, injuring her knee and hip joints and causing her 

difficulty in walking. Although she experienced some numbness, her weakness 

apparently requires her to seek assistance while walking, created instability in her leg, 

required her to be fitted for a knee brace, purchase a walker, undergo extensive 

physical therapy, and rotate in and out of nursing homes due to the permanent femoral 

nerve damage. While Ms. Greene insists that her back pain never abated, Dr. Durrani 

and CAST highlight that it appears that Ms. Greene did mention at an emergency room 

visit that her pain had improved somewhat. 
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{¶6} In April 2013, Ms. Greene commenced this litigation. She asserted 

claims against Dr. Durrani for negligence, battery, lack of informed consent, 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and spoliation of evidence. Against 

CAST, she asserted claims of vicarious liability, negligent hiring, retention, and 

supervision, fraud, violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, and spoliation 

of evidence. 

{¶7} After dismissing her action in November 2015, Ms. Greene refiled her 

claims in August 2016. The case proceeded to trial before a jury in January 2020. The 

jury returned a verdict in her favor on her claim for negligence, finding that Dr. 

Durrani had deviated from the standard of care. The jury further found that Ms. 

Greene suffered from a permanent physical functional injury. 

{¶8} In turn, the jury awarded Ms. Greene $418,468.62 in economic 

damages and $1,350,000 in non-economic damages. The trial court later reduced her

noneconomic damages to $500,000, and then granted Defendants a set-off because 

she settled with other defendants, producing a total compensatory award of

$873,361.79. Ms. Greene was also awarded prejudgment interest in the amount of 

$91,879.65 and court costs of $1,212.22. This timely appeal followed.

II.

{¶9} Defendants’ first assignment of error implicates a variety of evidentiary 

issues that arose during trial, which they claim entitle them to a new trial. Defendants

attack the playing of excerpts of various depositions of Dr. Durrani (which the parties 

call the “collage”) as irrelevant, highly prejudicial, and violative of several evidentiary 

rules. Further, the Defendants allege that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury 

to hear about Dr. Durrani’s medical license revocations, both during trial and during
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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the collage. Finally, Defendants argue that the trial court improperly allowed Ms. 

Greene’s counsel to reference Dr. Durrani’s absence. 

{¶10} “A court may grant a motion for a new trial for, among other things, an 

irregularity in the proceedings of the court, if the judgment is not sustained by the 

weight of the evidence, or any reason ‘for good cause shown.’ ” Adams v. Durrani,

2022-Ohio-60, 183 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 20 (1st Dist.), quoting Civ.R. 59(A). Upon a trial 

court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, “we ‘construe the evidence in a light favorable 

to the trial court’s action,’ ” while applying an abuse of discretion standard of review. 

Id., quoting Kreller Group, Inc. v. WFS Fin., Inc., 155 Ohio App.3d 14, 2003-Ohio5393, 798 N.E.2d 1179, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.). 

{¶11} “An abuse of discretion connotes more than a mere error of judgment; 

rather, ‘it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 

unconscionable.’ ” Hayes v. Durrani, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190617, 2021-Ohio725, ¶ 8, quoting Boolchand v. Boolchand, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200111 and C200120, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion occurs when “a court exercis[es] 

its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has 

discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 

187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

A.

{¶12} We first consider Defendants’ argument regarding Dr. Durrani’s 

medical license revocations. Counsel for Ms. Greene emphasized the license 

revocations three times during the trial: once during opening statements, and twice 

while cross-examining Dr. Marx, a radiologist testifying for Defendants. Beyond those 

occurrences, this point emerged frequently during the playing of the collage. See 
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Stephenson v. Durrani, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220020 and C-220036, 2023-Ohio2500, ¶ 44.

{¶13} We have previously held that featuring Dr. Durrani’s license revocations 

at trial constitutes an abuse of discretion. Setters v. Durrani, 2020-Ohio-6859, 164 

N.E.3d 1159, ¶ 19-21 (1st Dist.) (“Setters I”) (“[T]he mere fact that Durrani’s medical 

licenses were revoked is not probative of his truthfulness. * * * [T]he admission of such 

evidence * * * did little more than prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * * Because the 

evidence could influence the case on an improper basis, we find that the trial court 

abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Durrani’s medical licenses being 

revoked under Evid.R. 403.”). We reemphasized this point more recently in 

Stephenson at ¶ 46.

{¶14} In Setters I, we found the limited references to the license revocations

to be harmless error when measured against the complete evidentiary record at trial.

Setters I at ¶ 24, 26. By contrast, in Stephenson, where the license revocations 

emerged more extensively, we could not dismiss the error as harmless. Stephenson at 

¶ 40 (“[U]nlike in Setters I, the license revocation point in this case emerged much 

more frequently * * *. [W]e cannot conclude that the admission of evidence of Dr. 

Durrani’s medical license revocations is harmless on this record.”).

{¶15} The record here aligns with that at issue in Stephenson. In other words, 

the references to the license revocations were not limited as in Setters I, but much 

more extensive. We will consider whether this error is harmless is section D below. 

B.

{¶16} In addition to the license revocations, Defendants maintain that the 

collage as a whole runs afoul of various evidentiary rules. This court addressed the 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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collage extensively in Stephenson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220020 and C-220036, 

2023-Ohio-2500, at ¶ 41-65, and we incorporate by reference that analysis. For 

similar reasons, we find here that “the overall impact of the collage requires us to find 

that the trial court abused its discretion in connection with the collage’s admission in 

this case.” Id. at ¶ 65.

C.

{¶17} Next, Defendants argue that the trial court improperly allowed Ms. 

Greene’s counsel to reference Dr. Durrani’s absence, culminating in a jury instruction 

that provided: “you are allowed to consider as part of your deliberations the fact that 

Dr. Durrani did not attend the trial and testify to specific facts about the case in his 

defense and you may make whatever inference and conclusion you choose from that 

fact.”

{¶18} This court also addressed this point recently in Hounchell v. Durrani, 

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220021, 2023-Ohio-2501, ¶ 61-70. While we found that 

comments limited to Dr. Durrani’s absence and its impact on legal proceedings did not 

constitute error, id. at ¶ 64, citing Pierce v. Durrani, 2015-Ohio-2835, 35 N.E.3d 594, 

¶ 19 (1st Dist.), the overly broad jury instruction concerning Dr. Durrani’s absence did 

constitute an abuse of discretion. Hounchell at ¶ 70 (“Because this instruction was so 

broadly worded that it allowed the jury to draw impermissible inferences from 

Durrani’s absence, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in providing the 

instruction.”). Because the jury instruction in this case is identical to the erroneous 

one in Hounchell, we also find that its inclusion by the trial court here constituted an 

abuse of discretion. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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D.

{¶19} After reviewing the alleged errors at trial, we conclude that the license 

revocation points, aspects of the collage, and the jury instruction concerning Dr. 

Durrani’s absence discussed above all represented errors. We must now evaluate 

whether those errors are harmless or warrant a new trial.

{¶20} “ ‘An improper evidentiary ruling constitutes reversible error only when 

the error affects the substantial rights of the adverse party or the ruling is inconsistent 

with substantial justice.’ ” Setters I, 2020-Ohio-6859, 164 N.E.3d 1159, at ¶ 22, 

quoting Beard v. Meridia Huron Hosp., 106 Ohio St.3d 237, 2005-Ohio-4787, 834 

N.E.2d 323, ¶ 35. “In determining whether substantial justice has been done, a 

reviewing court must weigh the prejudicial effect of the errors and determine whether 

the trier of fact would have reached the same conclusion had the errors not occurred.” 

Id., citing O’Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio St.2d 159, 164-165, 407 N.E.2d 490 (1980). 

Given that multiple errors occurred here, we must consider the cumulative effect of 

these errors.

{¶21} Similar to Stephenson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220020 and C220036, 2023-Ohio-2500, at ¶ 82, we see another closely contested case concerning 

Dr. Durrani’s care and treatment of Ms. Greene. Ms. Greene, who was morbidly obese 

and had diabetes, came to Dr. Durrani suffering from pre-existing leg and back pain. 

The experts on both sides vigorously disputed the recommended course of care given 

her symptoms. 

{¶22} Dr. Mario Ammirati, the main defense expert, reviewed the relevant 

medical records and concluded that: (1) surgery was medically necessary given her 

conditions; (2) Dr. Durrani was correct in his decision to perform the surgery; and (3) 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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that he performed the surgery successfully. Dr. Ammirati went further, describing the 

relief that Dr. Durrani provided to Ms. Greene’s spinal compression as, “one of the 

best decompressions I have ever seen.”

{¶23} Plaintiff’s experts, however, had difficulty agreeing on the optimal 

course of treatment. Dr. Bloomfield indicated that instead of surgery, all Ms. Greene 

needed to do was lose weight to solve her back and leg pain. Dr. Saini, by contrast,

insisted that losing weight would have done nothing to help her. Regardless, they 

concluded that surgery should not have been performed on Ms. Greene, and Dr. 

Bloomfield further opined that Dr. Durrani botched the surgery. 

{¶24} Both sides agreed that a complication arose during the surgery that 

would generate substantial pain for Ms. Greene. To the defense team, this is exactly 

what informed consent is all about—and they believe that she was adequately apprised 

of the risk. Plaintiff’s experts counter that Dr. Durrani exaggerated or misrepresented 

the need for surgery, which precludes any effective informed consent, and that the risk 

occasioned by such complications dwarfed any potential benefit of the (in their eyes, 

unnecessary) surgery. 

{¶25} With that backdrop, one other piece of evidence that might have helped 

illuminate the expert debate was the medical records of Ms. Greene’s post-surgical 

care. But neither the experts nor the jury had access to any of her medical records 

after 2014, creating nearly a six-year gap in medical data. 

{¶26} Perhaps because of the intensity of the expert duel, the lack of medical 

records, or some combination thereof, the jury arrived at a split verdict. It rendered 

defense verdicts on the claims of battery, failure to acquire informed consent, and 

fraudulent misrepresentation. Six jurors agreed that Dr. Durrani did not commit 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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battery by performing the surgery and that he appropriately acquired informed 

consent. They also rejected the notion that Dr. Durrani “fraudulently misrepresented 

the necessity of Plaintiff’s surgery.” In other words, these jurors rejected several 

theories core to Ms. Greene’s presentation of the case and to her experts’ opinions. A 

different coalition of six jurors, however, determined that Ms. Greene prevailed on her 

negligence claim against Dr. Durrani because he “deviated from the standard of care.” 

This aspect of the verdict represented a rejection of certain opinions made by Dr. 

Ammirati. The shifting juror coalitions reflect a compromised verdict and divergent 

interpretations of the evidence. 

{¶27} Based on the evidentiary record at hand, the jury interrogatories, and 

the jury’s verdict, we find that all of these factors “renders the evidentiary record a 

much closer call on Dr. Durrani’s liability than in some other cases that we have seen.” 

See Stephenson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220020 and C-220036, 2023-Ohio-2500, 

at ¶ 84, citing Setters I, 2020-Ohio-6859, 164 N.E.3d 1159, at ¶ 25-26. This was a 

quintessential close case that easily could have gone either way. 

{¶28} Thus, we cannot dismiss the evidentiary issues as harmless—they were 

highly prejudicial, and we carry doubts as to whether the jury would have reached the 

same conclusion but for these errors. Defendants are accordingly entitled to a new 

trial in which the jury can consider the case anew, without the prejudicial evidence 

that intruded into the first trial. The first assignment of error is sustained in part—

Defendants’ first assignment of error also implicates various issues with the awarding 

of damages to Ms. Greene which we discuss in section IV below.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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III.

{¶29} In their second assignment of error, Defendants argue that the trial 

court erred in denying their motion in limine as to Dr. Saini’s testimony. This court 

has drawn the boundaries for what is permissible for Dr. Saini to testify to in Adams, 

2022-Ohio-60, 183 N.E.3d 560, at ¶ 55, and Stephenson at ¶ 73. We find that Dr. 

Saini’s testimony is very similar to what was offered in Stephenson—we therefore find 

no abuse of discretion by the trial court in allowing his testimony in this case. 

Defendants’ second assignment of error is overruled.

IV.

{¶30} Defendants also present a myriad of alleged damages-related errors by 

the trial court. As part of their first assignment of error, Defendants also call into 

question the jury’s finding that Ms. Greene sustained a catastrophic injury, the award 

of future damages, and her entitlement to past medical damages. In their third 

assignment of error, Defendants also argue that she should not have been granted 

prejudgment interest. Lastly, Defendants’ fourth assignment of error relates to how 

the trial court awarded a set-off in damages due to the settlement of some claims with 

other defendants—Ms. Greene in turn pursues a cross-assignment of error, arguing 

that Defendants should not have received any set-off.

{¶31} Because we are reversing for a new trial on the trial-related errors,

discussed above in section II, any consideration of potential errors with respect to 

damages is rendered moot. We therefore do not consider Defendants’ third and fourth 

assignments of error and Ms. Greene’s first cross-assignment of error.

* * *
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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{¶32} In light of the foregoing analysis, we sustain Defendants’ first 

assignment of error in part and decline to address it in part, overrule the second 

assignment of error, and determine that the third and fourth assignments of error and 

the cross-assignment of error are moot, and we therefore do not address them. We 

remand this case for a new trial consistent with this opinion and the law. 

 

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

CROUSE, P.J., and KINSLEY, J., concur.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.