No. 13694 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1977 

WESTERN LITHO, a Montana 

corporation, et al., 

Plaintiffs and Appellants, 

THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 

OF YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, MONTANA et al., 

Defendants and Respondents. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial 

District, 

Hon. LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. 

Counse of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Hibbs, Sweeney & Colberg, Billings, Montana 

Maurice Colberg argued, Billings, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Morrow, Nash and Sedivy, Bozeman, Montana 

Edmund P. Sedivy argued, Bozeman, Montana 

C. W. Jones argued, Deputy County Attorney, 

Billings, Montana 

Submitted: September 23, 1977 

'i ,-, p Decided: .)v 1 A 8 377 

Filed: ,LI - - : &Q-iT .+A% 
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of 

the Court, 

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the district court, 

Yellowstone County, requesting a declaratory judgment. The 

district court dismissed the complaint on the ground plaintiff 

lacked standing to bring the action and was not the real party 

in interest. Plaintiff appeals. 

Plaintiff is Western Litho, a printing establishment 

located in Billings, Montana. Defendants are the Board of 

County Commissioners of Yellowstone County and The Artcraft 

Printers, Inc., another printing firm loca ted in Bozeman, 

Montana. 

The facts as alleged in the complaint are: 

For the two year period preceding January 1, 1976, 

Campbell Calvert, d/b/a Laurel Outlook, a newspaper in 

Yellowstone County, hereinafter referred to as Calvert, had 

the contract for legal advertising, publications and printing 

for Yellowstone County, and subcontracted the printing portion 

of the work to plaintiff. Calvert also submitted a bid for 

the period commencing in 1976 and agreed again to subcontract 

the printing to plaintiff, if his bid was accepted. Plaintiff 

contends Calvert's bid was the only qualified bid on the entire 

contract, and therefore the Board of County Commissioners was 

required to accept it under sections 16-1230 through 1233, R. 

C,M. 1947. The Board, however, chose to split the contract 

and awarded the printing portion to Artcraft and the remainder 

to Calvert. 
Plaintiff instfhted a declaratory judgment action, 

naming the Board and Artcraft as defendants and requesting 

sections 16-1230, et-seq., be interpreted to mean: 

"* * * that if there is a low bid from any newspaper 

for all of the legal advertising, publications and 

printing work of the county and if that newspaper owns 

and operates a commercial printing establishment, 

then all of the county legal advertising, publications 

and printing work must be awarded to that particular 

newspaper and the contract cannot be divided into two 

parts, one for legal advertising and publications and 

the other for printing and further that the phrase 

I commercial printing establishment' as used in 516-1230 

does not contemplate that all of the printing work 

must be accomplished by the particular newspaper upon 

its premises but may be subcontracted to other qualified 

firms , 'I 

Defendants moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 

grounds that plaintiff lacked standing to sue and was not the 

real party in interest. Plaintiff subsequently moved to amend 

its complaint to add Calvert as a party plaintiff and to add 

a prayer for lost prof its. Without ruling on plaintiff' s 

motion, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. 

The threshold question here is whether plaintiff has the 

requisite standing to bring an action under Montana's Uniform 

Declaratory Judgments Act, Section 93-8902, R.C.M. 1947 

provides, so far as is pertinent here: 

"Any person * * * whose rights, status or other 

legal relations are affected by a statute * * * 

may have determined any .question of construction 

or validity arising under the * * * statute * * * 

and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other 

legal relations thereunder. " 

The complaint alleges plaintiff has a contract with 

Calvert for printing work conditioned upon the acceptance by 

the Board of County Commissioners of Calvert's entire bid. 

Further, it alleges Calvert's entire bid was not accepted 

because the Board acted in contravention of sections 16-1230, 

et seq., R.C.M. 1947, in accepting Artcraft's bid for the 

printing work. 
The United States Supreme Court stated in Flast v. 

Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942,1952, 20 L ed 2d 947, 

"* * * The 'gist of the question of standing' is 

whether the party seeking relieQ has 'alleged such a 

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 

as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens 

the presentation of issues upon which the court so 

largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 

204, 7 L Ed 2d 663, 82 S.Ct. 691 (1962)." 

Here plaintiff has alleged a substantial and personal 

economic injury that is the direct result of what it claims 

to be the unlawful action of the Board of County Commissioners. 

The "concrete adverseness" required by Baker and Flast is 

assured. 

Defendants rely on Chovanak v. Matthews, 120 Mont. 520, 

188 P.2d 582 (1948), for the proposition that plaintiff lacks 

standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Such reliance is 

misplaced. The Court in Chovanak denied standing to a citizen 

who challenged the constitutionality of a law relating to the 

licensing of slot machines for certain purposes. The Court 

noted plaintiff's only interest was that of a citizen, elector, 

resident and taxpayer, and stated: 

"It is held in Montana, as it is held by the United 

States Supreme Court, and by courts throughout the 

nation, that a showing only of such interest in the 

subject of the suit as the public generally has is 

not sufficient to warrant the exercise of judicial 

power. * * *" 120 Mont. 527. 

The instant case is clearly distinguishable. Here, plaintiff 

asserts a right of a subcontractor under the statutes governing 

the letting of bids for county printing work. Far from being 

shared with the public at large, this right is shared by, at 

most, one other person, the contractor, Calvert. Plaintiff 

has standing to bring the action for a declaratory judgment. 
Defendants concede Calvert is the real party in interest, 

but the district court dismissed the action without giving 

plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to join Calvert as a party 

plaintiff. In view of our holding, we find it unnecessary to 

discuss the other questions on appeal. 

The order of the district court is reversed. The case 

is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this 

opinion. 

We Concur: