DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE

Improved Guidance 

Needed for Estimating 

Alternatively Financed 

Project Liabilities

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2013

GAO-13-337

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-13-337, a report to 

congressional committees

April 2013

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

Improved Guidance Needed for Estimating 

Alternatively Financed Project Liabilities 

Why GAO Did This Study

To effectively manage facilities, DOD 

has pursued a strategy including base 

realignment and closure, privatizing

certain base assets, and leasing 

underused property. To do so, DOD 

leverages private capital using 

alternative financing agreements that 

rely at least in part on means other 

than full up-front appropriations. The 

House Armed Services Committee 

directed GAO to assess the impact of 

base closures on such agreements 

and how DOD captures costs 

associated with projects in the BRAC 

process. This report (1) describes 

existing projects on DOD’s U.S. bases, 

as of September 30, 2011; how project

legal agreements protect the 

government’s financial interests; and 

circumstances where DOD could face 

financial liabilities in the event of base 

closure; and (2) determines the extent 

to which DOD’s process for estimating 

costs and savings of base closure 

candidates captures these liabilities 

and other costs. GAO reviewed 

documents; collected information from 

DOD on projects active as September 

30, 2011; and interviewed officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends DOD modify BRAC 

data collection and cost modeling to 

better indicate possible liabilities 

arising from such projects. DOD did 

not concur, noting that “military value” 

is the primary criterion for BRAC 

decisions and liabilities will not be 

known until project negotiations. 

GAO’s recommendations do not 

preclude optimizing military value, and 

certain liabilities may be determinable

before negotiations. Thus, GAO 

continues to believe that acting on 

these recommendations would help 

improve the BRAC process. 

What GAO Found

In the event of future base closure, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) potential 

financial liabilities from alternatively financed projects will vary by project type 

and the language of its legal agreements. According to GAO’s analysis of data 

reported by DOD, it had more than 550 such projects on more than 240 U.S. 

installations, as of September 30, 2011. 56 percent of these projects have been 

put in place since the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. 

Further, according to this analysis and GAO’s case study review, liabilities will 

likely exist for renewable energy and privatized utility projects in the event of 

base closure because these projects commit the government to making future 

payments, although the liabilities may be limited by termination for convenience 

clauses in agreements. In contrast, privatized housing, privatized army lodging, 

and enhanced use lease projects are generally not expected to create a financial 

liability if bases close because DOD does not expect to terminate these types of 

agreements. 

GAO found that DOD’s use of its Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) 

model to estimate the costs and savings of base closure candidates did not 

capture all costs associated with alternatively financed projects, and identified 

three possible contributing factors. First, DOD’s collection of data on potential 

base closure costs was not consistent or comprehensive regarding alternatively 

financed projects. Second, the COBRA model does not provide users with an 

option to indicate that a cost may exist in cases where officials cannot estimate 

the costs associated with such projects within the data collection timeframes. 

Third, some COBRA instructions for entering costs associated with such projects 

into the model are not consistent or comprehensive. DOD guidance for 

determining costs and savings of BRAC actions and COBRA model instructions 

require that DOD consider all costs and savings associated with various base 

closure scenarios, and GAO has previously reported that decision makers need 

consistent and comprehensive data. Without a process for collecting consistent 

and comprehensive cost data, decision makers may face challenges in 

accurately comparing different scenarios’ net costs for future BRAC rounds.

Alternatively Financed Projects by Project Type, on U.S. Installations, As of September 30, 

2011

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. 

View GAO-13-337. For more information, 

contact James R. McTigue, Jr. at (202) 512-

3766 or mctiguej@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Letter 1 

Background 5

In the Event of Base Closure, DOD’s Potential Liabilities from 

Hundreds of Alternatively Financed Projects Vary by Project 

Type and Legal Agreement 17

Not All Costs Associated with Alternatively Financed Projects 

Were Captured in Closure Estimates for Consideration in the 

BRAC 2005 Round 26

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 41

Appendix II Alternatively Financed Projects on DOD’s U.S. Installations 

by Project Type as of September 30, 2011, as Reported by 

DOD 45

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 67

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 70

Related GAO Products 71

Tables

Table 1: Installations Closed during the 2005 Round of BRAC That 

Had an Alternatively Financed Project 28

Table 2: Army Renewable Energy Projects 45

Table 3: Navy Renewable Energy Projects 46

Table 4: Air Force Renewable Energy Projects 47

Table 5: Army Privatized Utility Projects 47

Table 6: Navy Privatized Utility Projects 51

Table 7: Air Force Privatized Utility Projects 52

Contents 
Page ii GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Table 8: Army Privatized Housing Projects 58

Table 9: Navy Privatized Housing Projects 59

Table 10: Air Force Privatized Housing Projects 62

Table 11: Army Enhanced Use Leases 64

Table 12: Navy Enhanced Use Leases 64

Table 13: Air Force Enhanced Use Leases 65

Table 14: Privatized Army Lodging 65

Figures

Figure 1: Timeline of BRAC 2005 Round 15

Figure 2: Key Inputs and Outputs of the COBRA Model 16

Figure 3: Total Number of Alternatively Financed Projects on U.S. 

Installations Reported by DOD, by Military Department, 

as of September 30, 2011 18

Figure 4: Percentage of Alternatively Financed Projects by Project 

Type, as a Portion of All Alternatively Financed Projects 

Reported by DOD on U.S. Installations, as of September 

30, 2011 19

Abbreviations

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

COBRA Cost of Base Realignment Actions

DOD Department of Defense

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

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Page 1 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 18, 2013

Congressional Committees

The Department of Defense (DOD) has faced challenges in effectively 

managing deteriorating facilities and underused and excess property in its 

real estate portfolio, which includes over 555,000 facilities with a 

replacement value of nearly $850 billion. To address these challenges, 

DOD has pursued a multipart strategy that includes base realignment and 

closure (BRAC), privatization of certain base assets, and leasing of 

underused real property. In privatizing certain base assets, DOD 

leverages private capital for improving its bases using alternative 

financing agreements—the financing of capital assets, at least in part, by 

means other than full up-front appropriations.1

The Secretary of Defense stated in August 2012 that as DOD draws 

down its forces from the wars of this last decade, it will be moving toward 

a smaller, leaner, and more agile force over the next five years. As part of 

its fiscal year 2013 budget request, DOD asked for two more rounds of 

BRAC in 2013 and 2015. Although Congress has thus far declined to 

authorize additional BRAC rounds, should it choose to do so in the future, 

the presence of alternatively financed projects on DOD installations could 

impact closure or realignment recommendations.

DOD also uses alternative 

financing arrangements to lease its underused real property. In these 

arrangements, DOD leases underused property in exchange for cash or 

in-kind consideration in the form of, among other things, maintenance and 

repair of existing facilities or the construction of new facilities.

Since the last round of BRAC in 2005, DOD has entered into an 

increasing number of agreements with private entities for five types of 

 

1

For the purposes of this report, we define appropriated funding as “up-front” when DOD 

has been appropriated sufficient funds to pay for the full cost of a project before a 

commitment is made, as opposed to appropriated funds DOD uses to make payments on 

capital borrowed through certain types of alternative financing approaches.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

projects: renewable energy,2 privatized utilities, privatized family housing, 

Army lodging, and leases for underused land. Closing additional bases in 

the future may necessitate termination or modification of some of these 

agreements before all contractual obligations between the government 

and the private entity have been fulfilled. If an installation with an 

alternatively financed project is closed through BRAC, DOD may have to 

end legal agreements associated with the project, which could result in 

financial liabilities to DOD.3

House Report 112-479, accompanying a bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (H.R. 4310), directed GAO to, 

among other things, determine the impact of base closures on 

alternatively financed projects; how DOD protects the government’s 

interests in these cases; and how DOD’s process for determining costs 

and savings of potential closures captures associated liabilities. In 

response, this report (1) describes alternatively financed projects that 

existed on DOD’s U.S. installations, as of September 30, 2011, and ways 

that associated legal agreements protect the government’s financial 

interests, as well as circumstances under which DOD could face financial 

liabilities in the event of base closure; and (2) determines the extent to 

which DOD’s process for estimating the costs and savings of base 

closure candidates captures liabilities and other costs associated with 

alternatively financed project agreements, in the event of base closure.

To describe the alternatively financed projects that existed on DOD’s U.S. 

installations, as of September 30, 2011, we collected data from DOD on 

the five types of alternatively financed projects in the scope of our review. 

We included projects if (1) they were funded—at least in part—by means 

other than up-front appropriations; (2) the project’s legal agreement was 

signed as of September 30, 2011; (3) the installation that hosted the 

project was open as of that date; and (4) the installation was located in 

 

2

For this report, we included renewable energy projects only if data submitted by the 

military departments and Defense Logistics Agency indicate that these projects were 

alternatively financed. We have previously reported that the majority of renewable energy 

projects are not alternatively financed. See GAO, Renewable Energy Project Financing: 

Improved Guidance and Information Sharing Needed for DOD Project-Level Officials, 

GAO-12-401 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2012).

3

For the purposes of this report, we use the term “liabilities” to indicate financial 

commitments that DOD has to contractors, in regard to alternatively financed projects on 

bases that could be closed. We use the term “costs” more broadly; referring to DOD 

spending that may result from base closure. 
 

Page 3 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

the United States. We met with officials from the military departments; 

Defense Logistics Agency; and the office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to discuss the project 

data we collected. In addition, we assessed the completeness and 

accuracy of this project information. To do so, we reviewed data 

submitted by the military departments and Defense Logistics Agency to 

determine if there were inconsistencies or certain data elements that were 

not provided for individual projects. In such cases, we discussed these 

data with knowledgeable agency officials, resolving the inconsistencies 

and gathering the missing data elements. In addition, we assessed the 

reliability of all computer-generated data provided by the military 

departments and Defense Logistics Agency by reviewing existing 

information about the data and the systems that produced the data and 

by interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data to 

determine the steps taken to ensure its completeness and accuracy. We 

determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

presenting the number and certain characteristics of these projects, as 

reported by the military departments and Defense Logistics Agency. We 

are confident that, based on information from the military departments 

and Defense Logistics Agency, we have collected information on the 

complete universe of alternatively financed projects as of September 30, 

2011. However, we did not validate the existence of each individual 

project. As discussed above, the military departments provided data on 

projects that were active as September 30, 2011. The military 

departments provided these project data to us in November and 

December 2012. To describe examples of ways that projects’ legal 

agreements protect the government’s financial interests, as well as 

circumstances under which DOD could face financial liability in the event 

of base closure, we chose 29 case studies from the project information 

we collected—based on variables such as military department and project 

type—for more in-depth review. For these case studies, we met with 

officials familiar with the case study projects; interviewed DOD officials; 

and collected and reviewed project legal documentation.4

 

4

For certain case studies, we met with officials from installations that hosted case study 

projects. For other case studies, we met with officials at the regional or headquarters level 

of a military department. This is because certain types of projects are typically managed at 

the installation level, while other types are typically managed at the regional or 

headquarters level. 

We also 

reviewed relevant sections of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and 

military department policy governing alternatively financed projects.
 

Page 4 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

To determine the extent to which DOD’s process for estimating the costs 

and savings of base closure candidates captures liability and other costs 

associated with alternatively financed project agreements in the event of 

base closure, we identified the requirements for capturing the data by 

reviewing BRAC 2005 implementation policy and the BRAC statute.

5 We 

then identified installations that had alternatively financed projects and 

were closed as a result of BRAC 2005, and determined the extent to 

which DOD’s process for estimating the costs and savings of base 

closure candidates captured potential liability associated with these 

projects. In each round of BRAC, DOD has estimated the costs and 

savings associated with various proposed BRAC recommendations by 

using a model known as the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA). 

To determine the extent to which this model captured liability, we 

compared costs recorded in the COBRA model for the closed installations 

with alternatively financed projects to the military departments’ reported 

closure costs. To gather information on the closure costs and reasons 

why the costs may or may not have been captured, we interviewed DOD 

officials who were involved in—or had knowledge of—the BRAC 2005 

processes and reviewed the installations’ BRAC implementation budgets 

and business plans. Furthermore, to determine whether DOD’s process 

for collecting data on potential base closure costs was comprehensive 

and consistent, we reviewed the (1) questions used to gather information 

for the COBRA model; (2) the COBRA model instructions for completing 

the portion of the model into which costs associated with alternatively 

financed projects are to be entered; and (3) the relevant data input fields 

in the model. We then compared this process to BRAC 2005 policy 

guidance for determining costs and savings of BRAC actions and best 

practices for collecting data in support of government operations.6

 

5

Congress authorized BRAC 2005 with the passage of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001). The law reauthorized the 

BRAC process by amending the authority under which the 1991, 1993, and 1995 rounds 

had been carried out, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 

No. 101-510, Title XXIX ((10 U.S.C. 2687 note). Throughout this report, we will refer to the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (as amended) as “the BRAC statute.” 

6

For the BRAC policy guidance, see Department of Defense, Transformation Through 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum Three – Selection 

Criterion 5 (Dec. 7, 2004). For the best practices for collecting data in support of 

government operations, see GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 

1996).
 

Page 5 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

We conducted this performance audit from June 2012 to April 2013 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. More detailed information on 

our scope and methodology is provided in appendix I.

As discussed previously, DOD leverages private capital for improving its 

bases using alternative financing agreements and uses alternative 

financing arrangements to privatize certain base assets and lease its 

underused real property.7 We have previously reported that DOD 

privatization efforts on its installations include renewable energy, utilities, 

family housing, enhanced use leases, and Army lodging.8

 

7

In these arrangements, DOD leases underused property in exchange for cash or in-kind 

consideration in the form of, among other things, maintenance and repair of existing 

facilities or the construction of new facilities.

The project 

types each have their own characteristics and the military departments 

have entered into privatization arrangements for different project types 

under distinct statutory authorities.

8

See for example GAO-12-401; Defense Infrastructure: The Enhanced Use Lease 

Program Requires Management Attention, GAO-11-574 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 

2011); Defense Infrastructure: Army’s Privatized Lodging Program Could Benefit from 

More Effective Planning, GAO-10-771 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010); Military Housing 

Privatization: DOD Faces New Challenges Due to Significant Growth at Some Installations 

and Recent Turmoil in the Financial Markets, GAO-09-352 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 

2009); and Defense Infrastructure: Actions Taken to Improve the Management of Utility 

Privatization, but Some Concerns Remain, GAO-06-914 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 

2006). 

Background 

DOD Privatization Efforts 

Include Several Types of 

Projects on Its 

Installations 
 

Page 6 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

To increase renewable energy production on military installations,9

• Energy Savings Performance Contracts are contracts between a 

federal agency and an energy service provider. Based on the results 

of a comprehensive energy audit, an energy service company, in 

consultation with the federal agency, designs and constructs a project 

to save energy and arranges the necessary financing. The contractor 

guarantees that the improvements will generate energy cost savings 

sufficient to pay for the project over the term of the contract. Contract 

terms for Energy Savings Performance Contracts can extend up to 25 

years.

in 

certain cases the military services have relied on agreements that 

leverage private capital, such as Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 

Utility Energy Service Contracts, and Power Purchase Agreements. Each 

of the financing approaches has its own requirements and legal 

authorities. These financing approaches are not necessarily mutually 

exclusive, and different approaches, including enhanced use leases (i.e., 

leasing available nonexcess real property to the private sector in return 

for cash or in-kind consideration), can sometimes be combined to finance 

the same project.

• Utility Energy Service Contracts are agreements in which a utility 

arranges financing to cover the capital costs of a project, which are 

repaid by the agency, generally using appropriated funds, over the 

contract term. Repayments are usually based on estimated cost 

savings generated by the energy efficiency measures, but energy 

savings are not necessarily required to be guaranteed by the 

contractor.

• Power Purchase Agreements may take several forms, but all are 

essentially agreements to purchase renewable energy from a privatesector energy producer. For example, in some of these agreements, 

the developer installs a renewable energy-system on agency property, 

and the agency pays for the system through its purchase of power 

 

9

For the purposes of this report, we are defining renewable energy as energy derived from 

any of the following fuel sources: biomass; geothermal; hydropower; solar; wind; ocean 

energy, including wave, tidal, current, and ocean thermal energy; and other sources, such 

as landfill gas and municipal solid waste. This energy can be applied in any form, 

including electricity, heating, or small-scale applications such as streetlights or trash 

compactors. Ground source heat pumps are included in our definition of renewable energy 

projects.

Renewable Energy 
 

Page 7 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

over the life of the contract. After installation, the developer owns, 

operates, and maintains the system for the life of the contract. 

Depending on the authority used, DOD can enter into Power 

Purchase Agreements for up to 32 years, excluding the period for 

construction.

At DOD’s request, Congress approved legislative authority in 1997 for 

privatizing utility systems at military installations.10 In defining a utility 

system, the authority included systems for the generation and supply of 

electric power; the treatment or supply of water; the collection or 

treatment of wastewater; the generation or supply of steam, hot water, 

and chilled water; the supply of natural gas; and the transmission of 

telecommunications.11 Included in a utility system are the associated 

equipment, fixtures, structures, and other improvements as well as real 

property, easements, and rights-of-way. The authority stated that the 

Secretary of a military department may convey a utility system to several 

different types of entities—including municipal, private, or regional 

entities—and the conveyance may consist of all rights, title, and interests 

of the United States in the utility system, or such lesser estate as the 

Secretary considers appropriate. In addition to the specific authority for 

privatizing utilities, the military departments have used other authorities 

for utility privatization. For example, the military departments have 

conveyed some systems on the basis of authorities related to the military 

housing privatization program. Under the utility privatization program, 

privatization normally involves two transactions with the entity—the 

conveyance of the utility system infrastructure and the acquisition of utility 

services for upgrades, operations, and maintenance under a long-term 

contract of up to 50 years. Normally, the conveyances do not include title 

to the land underlying the utility system infrastructures. In December 

1997, DOD issued Defense Reform Initiative Directive Number 9, which 

made utility system privatization DOD policy.12

 

10National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 2812 

(1997) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2688).

A year later, in December 

11In response to our request for information on alternatively financed projects, the military 

departments provided information on four types of privatized utility projects: the generation 

and supply of electric power; the treatment or supply of potable water; the collection or 

treatment of wastewater; and the supply of natural gas. 

12See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military 

Departments and others, Subject: Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive #9—

Privatizing Utility Systems (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., Dec. 10, 1997).

Privatized Utilities
 

Page 8 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

1998, DOD issued another directive establishing program management 

and oversight responsibilities and providing guidance for performing 

economic analyses for proposed projects, exempting systems from the 

program, and using competitive procedures to conduct the program.13

DOD’s housing policy is to rely on private sector housing in the local 

communities near military installations as the primary source of family 

housing. As a result, about two-thirds of all military families in the United 

States live in local community housing. However, Congress established 

the Military Housing Privatization Initiative in 1996 to ensure adequate 

military family housing was available when needed by renovating existing 

inadequate housing and constructing new homes on and around military 

bases more rapidly than was possible using traditional funding and 

military construction methods.

This directive also stated that it was DOD’s objective to get out of the 

business of owning, managing, and operating utility systems through 

privatization and that exemptions should be rare.

14 In a typical privatized military housing 

project, the developer is a limited liability company or partnership formed 

for the purpose of acquiring debt, leasing land, and building and 

managing a specific project or projects.15

 

13See Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military 

Departments and others, Subject: Department of Defense Reform Initiative Directive 

#49—Privatizing Utility Systems (Department of Defense: Washington, D.C., Dec. 23, 

1998).

In a typical project, a military 

department leases land to a developer for a term of 50 years. The military 

department generally conveys existing homes located on the leased land 

14The Military Housing Privatization Initiative was established in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 2801-2841 (1996) 

(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2871-2885).

15Section 2875 of Title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes the military departments to invest limited 

amounts of appropriated funds in an “eligible entity.” In this report, as in past reports 

examining the Military Housing Privatization Initiative, we use the term “developer” and 

“eligible entity” synonymously to describe the special purpose limited liability company or 

partnership that carries out a privatization project or projects. See GAO-09-352. A limited 

liability company is a company in which the liability of each shareholder or member is 

limited to the amount individually invested. A limited partnership is a partnership 

composed of one or more persons who control the business and are personally liable for 

the partnership’s debts (called general partners), and one or more persons who contribute 

capital and share profits but who cannot manage the business and are liable only for the 

amount of their contribution. 

Military Housing Privatization 

Initiative
 

Page 9 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

to the developer for the duration of the lease.16 The developer is 

responsible for constructing new homes or renovating existing houses 

and then leasing this housing, giving preference to servicemembers and 

their families.17 In addition to any government or private sector investment 

in the developer, the majority of the project financing is obtained from 

financial institutions in the form of construction loans or military housing 

bonds. The servicemembers’ basic allowance for housing serves as the 

primary security for the funds obtained through bonds.18 Service 

members use their housing allowances to pay their rent. Generally that 

rent is based on the allowance of the member tenant that occupies a 

particular house. A project’s private debt is underwritten based on the 

rental revenue stream. Although the servicemembers’ housing allowance 

is subject to the defense budget, which is supported through annual 

appropriations, we have previously reported that most bond investors 

believe it to be a highly reliable revenue stream given the history of stable 

congressional funding of servicemembers’ housing.19

An enhanced use lease allows the military departments to lease available 

nonexcess real property to the private sector in return for cash or in-kind 

consideration, subject to certain conditions. Section 2667 of Title 10 of the 

United States Code provides authority to the secretaries of the military 

DOD contributions, 

either in the form of cash investments or direct loans, are often made to 

close gaps in construction funding that materialize when the developer is 

unable to obtain adequate financing necessary for the project size.

 

16Typically, title to the houses that are conveyed and any improvements made to these 

houses during the duration of the lease automatically revert to the military department 

upon expiration or termination of the lease. 

17DOD has established a tenant “waterfall” that privatization projects can use if occupancy 

falls below a certain rate. Generally, after military families are accommodated, the order of 

the tenant waterfall is unaccompanied military personnel, active National Guard and 

Reserve, military retirees, federal government civilians, and lastly civilians. 

18This cash housing allowance, known as basic allowance for housing, helps defray the 

cost of renting or purchasing a home. Each year, DOD sets the monthly basic allowance 

for housing rates. This allowance is based on the median local monthly cost of housing, 

including current market rents, utilities, and renter’s insurance. The allowance can 

fluctuate from year to year as demand in some housing markets varies over time. The 

housing allowance is generally based on servicemembers’ pay grades and whether or not 

they have dependents.

19GAO-09-352. 

Enhanced Use Leases 
 

Page 10 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

departments to lease nonexcess real property20 under the control of the 

respective departments, subject to several provisions. Enhanced use 

leases have been used for a wide range of facility improvement projects, 

renovations, repair, or new acquisitions, to include renewable energy 

projects. The length of a contract for an enhanced use lease is subject to 

certain conditions, but there is no firm time limit. We have previously 

reported that these leases are often entered into for long periods, such as 

25- or 50-year terms.21

The military departments operate lodging rooms, similar to commercial 

hotel rooms, to accommodate authorized travelers across the United 

States. As discussed above, in 1996 Congress enacted the Military 

Housing Privatization Initiative authority, which allowed DOD to privatize 

its family housing, and, in 2002, that authority was expanded to 

specifically include transient housing, also known as lodging facilities.22

 

20Land that DOD classifies as underused or not utilized may not necessarily be 

considered excess property. Pursuant to section 102(3) of Title 40, U.S. Code, excess 

property is defined as property under control of the federal agency that the agency head 

determines is not required to meet the agency’s needs or responsibilities. Therefore a 

parcel of DOD real property could potentially be underused yet still not be excess because 

it is required to meet certain DOD needs or responsibilities.

Lodging facilities are intended to be occupied by members of the armed 

forces on temporary duty. The Army determined in 2003 that it needed to 

either replace or renovate about 80 percent of its lodging facilities due to 

the poor condition of these facilities and needed a plan to sustain and 

recapitalize the facilities for the long term. The Army determined that 

privatization, through conveying the facilities and transferring 

responsibility for the management and maintenance of those facilities to a 

private developer, would allow it to address the near-term concerns about 

the condition of the lodging facilities more quickly than under continued 

Army operation, as well as address the facilities’ long-term sustainment 

and recapitalization needs. Through this arrangement, the Army retains 

ownership of the land but conveys ownership of the buildings to the 

private developer. At the end of the lease term, the buildings, along with 

any improvements, return to the Army. According to Navy and Air Force 

officials, the other departments have not engaged in privatizing their 

lodging facilities at the time of this review.

21GAO-11-574. 

22Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-

314 § 2803 (2002). 

Privatized Army Lodging
 

Page 11 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) system was established to 

codify uniform policies and procedures for acquisition of supplies and 

services by executive agencies.23 According to DOD officials, renewable 

energy and utilities privatization contracts that we reviewed are generally 

governed by the FAR. Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, a 

contract is defined as a “mutually binding legal relationship obligating the 

seller to furnish the supplies or services (including construction) and the 

buyer to pay for them,” to include “all types of commitments that obligate 

the Government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and that, except 

as otherwise authorized, are in writing.”24

Contracts entered into under the FAR, including those for certain types of 

alternatively financed infrastructure projects, are typically required to 

acknowledge the unique position of the federal government by including a 

legal right to terminate procurement contracts for the government’s 

convenience. This right gives the government—e.g., DOD and other 

federal agencies—the option to terminate a contract for convenience prior 

to completion when circumstances, such as closing a DOD installation, 

mean termination is in the government’s interests.

Generally, the parties’ 

obligations under a contract end when the required performance is 

completed, that is, when the government has accepted the supplies or 

services and paid the contractor in full. However, if a contractor has not 

performed as agreed, the government may choose to end its obligations 

by terminating the contract for default. In other cases, even when the 

contractor is performing acceptably, it may be in the interest of the 

government to end its contractual obligations before the contract is 

completed.

25 If the government did 

not have this right to prematurely end a contract, it might instead be 

required to continue a contract that was no longer needed, or breach the 

contract and potentially pay expectation damages to the contractor, 

resulting in the unnecessary expenditure of government funds.26

 

23Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 1.101.

In 

24FAR § 2.101(b).

25Subject to certain limitations, a termination for convenience typically needs only to be in 

the government’s interest. See generally, FAR §§ 49.101(b), 52.249-2, 52.249-6.

26Expectation damages are compensation awarded for losses reasonably anticipated from 

an uncompleted transaction (such as anticipated profits on a contract), which must be 

distinguished from compensation awarded for costs that have actually been incurred at 

the time of termination of the contract. Expectation damages are not ordinarily recoverable 

when a contract is terminated for the convenience of the government.

Certain Types of 

Alternatively Financed 

Project Agreements Are 

Governed by the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation
 

Page 12 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

contrast, the contractor is not given a right to terminate for convenience, 

and this type of contractual right is rare outside the world of federal 

government contracting.

Contracts entered into under the FAR must be terminated by the 

procedures specified in the FAR.27 When the government terminates a 

contract for convenience, the contracting officer must send a written 

termination notice to the contractor indicating whether the termination is 

partial or complete.28 The written notice may also contain special 

instructions, and in some cases personnel mitigation efforts.29 Upon 

receiving the notice of termination, the contractor is required to stop all 

work immediately under the terminated portion of the contract and 

terminate all related subcontracts. When inventories exist, the contractor 

must, as directed by the contracting officer, deliver to the government a 

“termination inventory” that lists materials produced or acquired under the 

contract and government-furnished property30 and account for all 

inventory related to the terminated portion of the contract by completing 

termination inventory schedules, generally within 120 days of the effective 

date of the termination.31 The contractor must dispose of all remaining 

property, as agreed with the government.32 The contractor also begins the 

process of settling with its subcontractors.33

The contractor has one year from the effective date of the termination to 

submit a settlement proposal to the contracting officer, unless the period 

is extended by the contracting officer handling the termination.34

 

27FAR Part 49.

The 

amount of the settlement proposal reflects all of the costs for which the 

28In a complete termination for convenience, the contract ends on the date specified in the 

government’s notice of termination. In a partial termination, only the terminated portion is 

ended on the specified date.

29FAR § 49.102(a).

30FAR § 49.206-3. For commercial-item contracts, the government has no claim to any 

work in progress.

31FAR § 49.303-2.

32FAR § 49.104(i).

33FAR § 49.104(g).

34FAR §§ 49.206-1(a) and 49.303-1.
 

Page 13 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

contractor believes it is entitled to be reimbursed, including incurred costs 

for work performed, termination costs, plus, in some cases, a reasonable 

profit or fee on its completed work, minus all payments made to date and 

the value of the property the contractor retained upon termination.35 When 

the contracting officer receives the contractor’s settlement proposal, he or 

she can choose to pay the proposed amount or negotiate with the 

contractor.36 If the contractor does not submit a settlement proposal within 

one year from the effective termination date, or if the contracting officer 

cannot reach agreement with the contractor, the contracting officer may 

unilaterally decide on the amount to which the contractor is entitled, 

applying the standards that are set forth in the FAR. The FAR also 

provides the contractor the right to appeal37 the contracting officer’s 

determination of the termination settlement to the applicable Board of 

Contract Appeals38 or to the United States Court of Federal Claims, if the 

contractor has met its deadline for submission of the settlement 

proposal.39

Other types of legal agreements for alternatively financed projects are not 

generally subject to the FAR. These non-FAR agreements are governed 

by other legal requirements, depending on the authority used to execute 

the agreement and any implementing regulations and policies. For 

example, section 2667 of title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the 

secretaries of the military departments to enter into leases that do not 

contain a clause permitting revocation of the lease at any time (similar to 

a termination for convenience), if the secretary finds that omitting such a 

clause promotes the national defense or is in the public interest. 

According to DOD officials, the privatized housing, enhanced use lease, 

and Army lodging agreements that we reviewed are not governed by the 

FAR. For non-FAR agreements, the government’s termination rights and 

practices are different than those described above. In general, these 

other types of agreements represent instances in which the federal 

 

35FAR § 52.249-2 (fixed-price contracts) and FAR § 52.249-6 (cost-reimbursement 

contracts).

36FAR § 49.105.

37FAR § 49.109-7(f). 

38Appeals for contracts with the Department of Defense are filed with the Armed Services 

Board of Contract Appeals.

39FAR 52.249-2(j) and 52.249-6(j).
 

Page 14 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

government, rather than purchasing goods or services from a contractor, 

is investing federal capital or leasing a government asset. The 

consequences of base closure and potential termination in these cases 

will vary in accordance with the terms of the agreements in question.

Since 1988, DOD has relied on the BRAC process as an important 

means of reducing excess infrastructure and realigning bases to meet 

changing force structure needs. The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth 

round of base closures and realignments undertaken by DOD since 1988, 

and it was the biggest, most complex, and costliest BRAC round ever. 

The 2005 BRAC process generally followed the legislative framework of 

previous BRAC rounds, providing for an independent Defense Base 

Closure and Realignment Commission to review the Secretary of 

Defense’s realignment and closure recommendations, which were 

produced through DOD’s BRAC processes coordinated by the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment).40

 

40Congress authorized BRAC 2005 with the passage of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX (2001). The law 

reauthorized the BRAC process by amending the authority under which the 1991, 1993, 

and 1995 rounds had been carried out, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 

1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, Title XXIX ((10 U.S.C. 2687 note). Throughout this report, we 

will refer to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (as amended) as “the 

BRAC statute.” 

The 

Commission assessed the Secretary’s recommendations, under its 

authority to approve, modify, reject, or add closure or realignment 

recommendations, before reporting its own recommendations, to the 

President. The President then approved the Commission’s 

recommendations and forwarded them to Congress, and the 

recommendations became final in November 2005. Implementation of the 

recommendations was required to be complete by September 15, 2011. 

Figure 1 below displays a timeline of the 2005 BRAC round.

Base Realignment and 

Closure (BRAC)
 

Page 15 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 1: Timeline of BRAC 2005 Round

To provide a framework for promoting consistency in estimating the costs 

and savings associated with various proposed BRAC recommendations, 

DOD has used an estimation model known as COBRA in its base closure 

process since 1988, and DOD intends to use the COBRA model for future 

BRAC rounds. It provides information on cost and savings, which is one 

of eight selection criteria used in the selection process to compare 

scenarios and used by decision makers to arrive at final decisions 

regarding BRAC recommendations. The COBRA model relies to a large 

extent on standard factors and averages but,41 as we have previously 

reported, it is not intended to represent budget-quality estimates.42

 

41For example, using the latitude and longitude of base locations, the COBRA model 

automatically calculates distances between bases, and using algorithms with standard 

cost factors, estimates transportation and moving costs.

42GAO, Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and 

Closure Rounds, GAO-13-149 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2013).

BRAC Process for 

Estimating Cost and 

Savings
 

Page 16 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Specifically, we have examined the COBRA model in the past and have 

found it to be a generally reasonable estimator for comparing potential 

costs and savings among candidates for base closure. We have also 

previously reported that the COBRA model has been revised to address 

certain problems we and others have identified after each BRAC round.43

For example, according to the COBRA model’s user’s manual, 

improvements have been made to revise calculations to better account 

for the costs for construction, transfer of military students from one 

installation to another, local moves, TRICARE,44

Figure 2: Key Inputs and Outputs of the COBRA Model

homeowners’ 

assistance, and several other cost/savings factors. The model provides a 

standard quantitative approach to comparing estimated costs and savings 

across various proposed recommendations. However, it is important to 

note that as with any model, the quality of the output is dependent on the 

quality of the input. Key inputs and outputs of the COBRA model are 

shown in figure 2.

 

43GAO-13-149. 

44TRICARE is the health care program that serves uniformed service members, their 

dependents, and other covered beneficiaries.
 

Page 17 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Since 2005, we have issued over 30 reports and testimonies on BRAC 

2005 planning, implementation, costs, and savings. (For a listing of 

related reports and testimonies, see the Related GAO Products page at 

the end of this report).

In the event of future base closure, DOD’s potential financial liabilities 

from hundreds of alternatively financed projects will vary by the project 

type and the terms of each legal agreement. DOD had more than 550

alternatively financed projects on more than 240 U.S. installations, as of 

September 30, 2011. Generally, contracts that commit the government to 

make future payments are likely to result in liability, whereas agreements 

that represent an investment of federal capital or the leasing of a 

government asset—such as the lease of federal property—are less likely 

to result in liability in the event of base closure, but may pose other risks. 

Liabilities will likely exist for renewable energy and privatized utility 

projects in the event of base closure because these projects commit the 

government to making future payments, but the liabilities may be limited 

by termination for convenience or similar clauses in those agreements. 

However, in most cases, privatized housing, privatized Army lodging, and 

enhanced use lease projects are not expected to create a financial liability 

if installations close, because DOD does not expect to terminate these 

types of agreements.

Each military department had alternatively financed projects on U.S. 

installations as of September 30, 2011.45

 

45According to our analysis of project data reported by DOD, 44 percent (245 of 555) of 

these alternatively financed projects were active prior to May 1, 2005, since the last round 

of BRAC was conducted. 

A majority of these (63 percent) 

were alternatively financed renewable energy and privatized utility 

projects. Considering all five project types, the Army reported that it had 

almost 210 projects on more than 60 of its installations; the Navy reported 

that it had 130 projects on about 75 installations; and the Air Force 

reported that it had almost 220 projects on over 100 installations. The 

breakout by military department of DOD’s alternatively financed projects 

on its installations, as of September 30, 2011, is shown in figure 3.

In the Event of Base 

Closure, DOD’s 

Potential Liabilities 

from Hundreds of 

Alternatively 

Financed Projects 

Vary by Project Type 

and Legal Agreement

The Army, Navy, and Air 

Force Each Had 

Alternatively Financed 

Projects on Their U.S. 

Installations as of 

September 30, 2011
 

Page 18 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Figure 3: Total Number of Alternatively Financed Projects on U.S. Installations 

Reported by DOD, by Military Department, as of September 30, 2011

According to our analysis of project data reported by DOD, privatized 

utilities constituted 53 percent (292 projects) of the 555 alternatively 

financed projects. Examples of this type of project in our case studies 

include a contractor’s improvement, operation, and maintenance of the 

water and wastewater distribution infrastructure on an Army installation, 

and a contract for electricity distribution services and infrastructure on a 

Navy installation. Renewable energy projects accounted for 11 percent 

(60 projects) of all projects. Examples of this project type in our case 

studies include a facility that generates electricity from landfill gas on a 

Navy installation and a solar power project that generates electricity on an 

Air Force installation. Privatized housing accounted for 30 percent (166 

projects); examples in our case studies include a 670-unit project on an 

Air Force installation and a 925-unit project on a joint installation. 

Privatized Army lodging projects represented about 4 percent (21 

projects) of DOD’s reported alternatively financed projects, and 10 

percent of the Army’s 209 alternatively financed projects. An example of 

this type of project in our case studies is a 673-room lodging facility on a 

joint installation. Finally, enhanced use lease projects accounted for 3 
 

Page 19 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

percent (16 projects) of all projects. Examples in our case studies of this 

project type include a lease to a contractor developing an office park on 

an Army installation and a lease to a city that uses the land for its 

wastewater treatment facility. The distribution of alternatively financed 

projects for each of the five project types we included in this review is 

displayed in figure 4.

Figure 4: Percentage of Alternatively Financed Projects by Project Type, as a 

Portion of All Alternatively Financed Projects Reported by DOD on U.S. 

Installations, as of September 30, 2011

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

For additional information on each alternatively financed project as 

reported by DOD, see appendix II.
 

Page 20 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

DOD officials stated that—in the event of base closure—liabilities are 

likely to exist for renewable energy and privatized utility contracts that are 

terminated for convenience.46 This is because, under these contracts, the 

government has typically obligated itself to make future payments in 

return for certain goods and services provided by the contractor. Officials 

expect that about 82 percent (249 out of 303)47 of these types of projects 

would likely result in liabilities, in the event of base closure.48

DOD officials explained that most renewable energy and utility 

privatization projects are likely to result in financial liability in the event of 

base closure because these agreements commit the government to make 

future payments over a period of years. This is significant because almost 

two-thirds (63 percent) of alternatively financed projects reported by DOD 

DOD 

officials explained that—in the event of base closure—the military 

departments would probably decide to terminate certain contracts for 

convenience, because contract clauses governing these projects may 

limit the size and type of liability. DOD would then need to negotiate a 

financial settlement with the contractors to pay for certain costs, in 

accordance with the relevant contract clauses. As previously discussed, 

terminations for convenience provide certain protections for the 

government’s financial interest by limiting the amount of money DOD may 

have to provide the contractor in the event of such terminations.

 

46As discussed earlier, according to our previously published work, DOD has certain 

renewable energy projects that are funded through up-front appropriations and others that 

are alternatively financed. In this report we are focusing on the alternatively financed 

renewable energy projects reported by DOD. For our previously published work on DOD 

renewable energy, see—for example—GAO-12-401. 

47The military departments reported a total of 352 renewable energy and utilities 

privatization projects. However, they responded to our question about potential liability for 

303 projects. In certain cases, the Navy did not provide responses to our question about 

potential liability because certain utility privatization projects are privatized as “ancillary 

supporting facilities” for military housing units under the military housing privatization 

initiative, 10 U.S.C. § 2881. In these cases, DOD officials explained that both the 

privatized housing project and associated utilities would likely continue, in the event of 

base closure. We discuss these cases in more detail later in the report.

48For 11 percent of these projects, the responses indicated that DOD officials were 

uncertain whether there would be a liability. For example, according to an Army official, 

the likelihood of liability depends on when the base closure occurs. The official explained 

that, in most of these cases, if the agreement was still in force when the installation 

closed, the government would likely have a liability. In the remaining 7 percent of these 

projects, DOD officials indicated that a liability is not likely, but did not provide an 

explanation. 

Potential Liabilities Exist 

for Renewable Energy and 

Privatized Utility Projects 

in the Event of Base 

Closure, but Are Limited

In the Event of Base Closure, 

Liabilities from Renewable 

Energy and Privatized Utility 

Projects Are Likely 
 

Page 21 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

officials are either a renewable energy or privatized utility project (see 

figure 4). In addition, according to our analysis of project data reported by 

DOD, almost 70 percent of installations with an alternatively financed 

project had at least one of these two types of projects. In 11 of 12 case 

studies for these two project types, DOD officials from each military 

department stated that they expect a liability in the event of base closure.

For the renewable energy projects that we examined in detail, DOD 

officials explained that Power Purchase Agreements, Energy Savings 

Performance Contracts, and Utility Energy Service Contracts would likely 

be terminated for convenience in the event of base closure. Specifically, 

in each of four renewable energy case studies, DOD officials from each 

military department stated that they expect a liability if the base closes. 

For example, according to our review of one renewable energy project’s 

legal agreement, the Army’s termination for convenience of this 

agreement could result in a liability of up to $5.3 million, depending on the 

date of termination. Two of the four alternatively financed renewable 

agreements we reviewed contained termination clauses that established 

an amount of maximum government liability by month or year during the 

agreement.49

Similarly, for the utility privatization project case studies that we 

examined, DOD officials from each military department explained that 

they would likely decide to terminate certain privatized utility contracts if 

an installation closed. Among the privatized utility projects we discussed 

with DOD and reviewed, DOD officials explained that that those managed 

under a stand-alone agreement would likely be terminated.50

 

49Certain multi-year energy agreements are required by regulation to contain a 

“cancellation ceiling,” which, in combination with other portions of the agreement, sets a 

fixed limit to the government’s liability in the event of a termination for convenience. 10 

C.F.R. §§ 436.34(a)(4), 436.38 (citing FAR parts 17 and 49). Not all agreements we 

examined contained such a ceiling, and in those cases the extent of the government’s 

liability would be harder to assess. 

According to 

our analysis of project data reported by DOD, almost all (96 percent) 

50For the purposes of this study, we are defining “stand alone” utility privatization 

agreements as those projects entered into under the authority of 10 U.S.C. § 2688. This 

does not include utilities that were constructed or acquired as “ancillary supporting 

facilities” for military housing units under the military housing privatization initiative, 10 

U.S.C. § 2881. As discussed in this report, the leases that govern these housing 

privatization projects—and the sections of the leases that govern utility privatization—

would likely continue in the event of base closure.
 

Page 22 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

privatized utility projects were privatized under stand-alone agreements. 

In 7 of our 8 case studies for such utility privatization projects, DOD 

officials stated that they expect a liability if the base closes. For example, 

at an Army installation we visited, officials stated they would likely decide 

to terminate the installation’s privatized electric, water and wastewater 

utility contracts if the base were to close. In another instance, a Navy 

contract for privatized electricity at several installations provides that the 

contract will be terminated in the event of a base closure action. However, 

according to our discussions with military department officials, the full 

amount of the government’s financial liability resulting from these 

terminations would not be determinable until negotiations over the 

amount of the termination settlement between the government and the 

private entity are completed.

Contracts that commit the government to make future payments are likely 

to result in liability if terminated due to base closure, but the amount of 

liability may be limited by relevant contract clauses. Renewable energy 

and utility privatization projects are likely to result in a financial liability in 

the event of base closure because they typically involve government 

payments in return for various services over a period of years. As 

previously discussed, however, the termination for convenience 

provisions in the FAR limit the scope and size of the settlement amount 

that DOD is required to provide to a contractor. Termination for 

convenience settlements will ultimately vary according to the specific 

terms of each contract, but generally, settlement amounts are required to 

provide the contractor with fair compensation, based on three 

components: incurred costs for the work performed, fee or profit on that 

work, and termination costs. Settlements only include costs related to the 

terminated contract and therefore will not reflect other costs that may be a 

result of a termination, but are outside the scope of the contract, such as 

larger community effects—for instance, a contractor going out of 

business. In addition, in cases where the government terminates for 

convenience, the contractor typically will not be entitled to anticipatory 

profits or consequential damages.51

 

51These types of damages are associated with breach of contract. As we have previously 

reported, the government right to terminate for convenience prevents the government from 

having to pay these types of damages when prematurely ending a contract is in its 

interest. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Termination Costs Are Generally Not a Compelling 

Reason to Continue Programs or Contracts That Otherwise Warrant Ending, GAO-08-379 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2008). 

Contract Clauses May Limit the 

Amount and Type of Potential 

Liability
 

Page 23 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

The case studies that we reviewed in detail provide examples of how 

terminating a contract for convenience would mitigate liabilities. For 

example, in the case of a renewable energy project on a Navy installation, 

the government’s right to terminate the contract for convenience would 

likely provide the government with a less costly means to end the 

agreement. Specifically, in the absence of a termination for convenience

clause, the contract would potentially require the government to either 

pay the private entity for electrical power for many years after the 

installation closed or breach its contract with the entity, paying damages 

that likely would exceed the cost of a termination for convenience 

settlement. Although this example demonstrates a way in which 

terminating a contract for convenience may limit the size and type of 

liabilities DOD could face in the event of base closure, officials expect—

as noted above—that 82 percent of renewable energy and privatized 

utility projects would likely result in liability.

Our analysis of project data reported by DOD found that three types of 

projects—privatized housing, enhanced use leases, and privatized Army 

lodging—are generally not likely to result in financial liability for DOD in 

the event of base closure. According to our analysis of project data, more 

than 90 percent of these three types of projects—as reported by DOD—

were not likely to result in a financial liability for DOD if the project’s base 

closes. In addition, according to DOD officials from each military 

department, 15 of 17 privatized housing, privatized Army lodging, and 

enhanced use lease projects that we examined in our case studies would 

not result in liability in the event of base closure. According to our 

discussions with DOD officials and review of supporting documentation, 

this is because in most cases the leases and other agreements that 

govern these projects would likely continue even if the installation closes. 

Unlike the renewable energy and utilities privatization contracts previously 

discussed, these three types of projects typically represent an investment 

of federal capital or leasing of a government asset, as opposed to a 

contractual obligation requiring future government expenditures. They are 

therefore less likely to result in liability, although each agreement must be 

reviewed individually to determine whether it is subject to additional 

factors that could result in financial liability for DOD.

According to our analysis of project data reported by DOD, almost all (95 

percent) of the housing privatization projects are not likely to result in a 

liability in the event of base closure. This is because, for projects we 

examined in detail, military department officials explained that they do not 

plan to terminate project leases. Further, for 9 of 11 housing privatization 

In Most Cases, Privatized 

Housing, Enhanced Use 

Lease, and Privatized Army 

Lodging Projects Are Not 

Likely to Create Financial 

Liability If Installations 

Close 
 

Page 24 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

case studies, DOD officials from each military department stated that they 

do not expect a liability in the event of base closure. For example, in 

discussions with Navy officials regarding one housing privatization project 

we reviewed, they stated that they expected the privatized housing 

agreement would remain in force, and the limited liability corporation 

managing the housing would continue leasing its housing units to the 

general public even after the base closes.

However, there are two factors that may result in liability in the case of 

privatized housing. First, as of October 2012, there was a relatively small 

number of privatized housing agreements (seven, according to DOD 

officials) in which the military department has made a limited loan 

guarantee.52

According to our analysis of project data reported by DOD, officials did 

not expect that any of the enhanced use lease projects would result in a 

liability in the event of base closure. For the majority of enhanced use 

lease projects we reviewed in detail, DOD officials do not expect the 

military department to have a financial liability in the event of base closure 

because DOD does not plan to terminate the leases. Specifically, in four 

of five enhanced use lease case studies, DOD officials from each military 

In these cases, if certain conditions are met, the government 

could be required to make the loan payments on behalf of the private 

sector borrower (the limited liability corporation). For example, according 

to our discussions with Air Force officials regarding one housing 

privatization project with a limited loan guarantee, if the installation were 

to close, the loan guarantee would only go into effect if several conditions 

were met, including either (1) a drop of 30 percent or more in the number 

of eligible military personnel available to lease homes at that locale or (2) 

if the ratio of eligible military personnel to available family housing units 

becomes less than 1.5 to 1. Second, in some cases, DOD may have to 

pay certain costs as the housing contractor transitions from renting to 

DOD tenants to renting to non-DOD tenants. For example, at a Navy 

installation that closed during BRAC 2005, the Navy paid about $149,000 

to install electric and water meters for the housing units. According to 

Navy officials, the housing project’s legal agreement did not require the 

Navy to take this action, but the Navy did so to ensure that it would not be 

charged for utility usage.

 

52The military departments reported 166 privatized housing projects as of September 30, 

2011, and 7 of these projects (3 in the Army and 4 in the Air Force) included limited loan 

guarantees. 
 

Page 25 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

department stated that they do not expect a liability in the event of base 

closure because they do not plan to terminate the leases. For example, in 

discussing one Air Force enhanced use lease, officials stated the Air 

Force will continue to receive rent even if the installation is closed.53

While closing an installation with an enhanced use lease will not typically 

result in liability, it could result in forgone revenue. For example, at one 

installation, because the private entity is using only a portion of a 

government-owned building, officials believe that—in the event of base 

closure—the entire building would likely be closed, and as a result the 

military department may have to terminate the lease. In that instance, 

because the lease includes a government right to terminate the lease with 

180-day advance notice, the only likely result would be prorating rent and 

forgoing future rental income. As with most other types of projects, this 

determination of potential financial consequences requires a case-bycase examination of the underlying agreements and circumstances in 

question.

 They 

do not believe the Air Force would have other potential liabilities from this 

lease in the event of a base closure.

According to our analysis of project data reported by the Army, none of its 

privatized lodging projects are expected to result in a liability in the event 

of base closure. This is because Army officials expect that privatized 

lodges will remain in business in the event of base closure; the officials do 

not plan to terminate the project’s lease, and thus, do not expect that any 

financial liabilities would result from the lodging projects. According to 

Army officials with whom we met and documentation we reviewed, the 

privatized Army lodging master lease agreement has language that 

specifically addresses base closure. The lease states that in the event 

that the government assigns or transfers the lease in connection with 

conveying title to the site of a privatized Army lodging project, the lease 

 

53Officials explained that this is the case unless the leasehold is taken from lessee by 

eminent domain. However, officials indicated that this is an unlikely scenario. In addition, 

the lessee has a “First Right of Refusal” to purchase the property, in the event the 

installation is closed and the property is offered for sale; rather than receiving rent the 

government would receive money in one lump sum that may be more or less than the rent 

collected over the remainder of the agreement’s life.
 

Page 26 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

shall remain in full force and effect, subject to certain limitations.54

While DOD’s potential financial liability appears limited for most privatized 

housing, enhanced use lease agreements, and privatized Army lodging, 

there may be costs that occur for reasons outside of the agreements. For 

example, as mentioned earlier, in one instance the Navy paid to have 

meters installed on the privatized housing units at a closed base to 

ensure that the Navy would not be billed for utilities used by residents of 

the privatized housing it no longer used. In addition, one DOD official has 

expressed concern that contractors may seek financial compensation for 

privatized housing on closed installations, which reflects that, given the 

complex and costly nature of these projects, there is always the potential 

for unforeseen future litigation.

Therefore, no liability is likely to result.

Three of five installations that had alternatively financed projects and 

were closed in the 2005 BRAC round had closure costs associated with 

the projects that DOD did not include in its COBRA model estimates. 

BRAC 2005 policy guidance for determining costs and savings of BRAC 

actions and COBRA model instructions require that DOD consider all 

costs and savings associated with various base closure scenarios.55 We 

have identified three factors that may have contributed to the costs 

associated with alternatively financed projects not being included in 

COBRA estimates.

 

54Certain specified rights of the federal government would not succeed to the party to 

whom the government assigned or transferred its lease in certain circumstances. In 

addition, if the government were required to sever the site—so that the lessee were 

unable to develop and operate the hotel facilities as a complete and undivided whole—

certain changes to the lease could be required, at government expense.

55The specific BRAC 2005 policy guidance we discuss here is Transformation Through 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum Three – Selection 

Criterion 5 (December 7, 2004), issued by the acting Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The specific COBRA model instructions we 

discuss are the BRAC 2005 versions of the COBRA Users Manual and COBRA Analyst 

Template. 

Not All Costs 

Associated with 

Alternatively 

Financed Projects 

Were Captured in 

Closure Estimates for 

Consideration in the 

BRAC 2005 Round
 

Page 27 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Based on discussions with DOD officials who were involved in—or had 

knowledge of—the BRAC 2005 processes and our review of installations’ 

BRAC implementation budgets and other related documentation, we 

determined that for three of the five installations with alternatively 

financed projects, there were closure costs associated with their projects 

that DOD did not include in its COBRA estimates. We have previously 

reported that DOD’s process for providing the BRAC Commission with 

costs and savings estimates was hindered by inputs into COBRA that 

underestimated certain types of costs, including contract-termination 

costs.56

As can be seen in table 1 below, we found that two of the locations were 

Army installations and the third was a Navy installation. DOD has 

subsequently identified more than $24 million in costs paid out thus far for 

these projects, and as of January 2013 additional settlement costs were 

still being negotiated. As noted above, three of five closed installations 

had costs associated with an alternatively financed project. One of the 

Army locations where there were such costs is Fort Monmouth, NJ where 

DOD terminated for convenience a renewable energy contract involving 

ground source heat pumps. The Army’s reported costs included 

payments to the contractor for the contract termination and installation of 

several boilers to heat installation buildings that were to be heated by the 

heat pumps. In total, these costs came to about $24.3 million. However, 

these costs were not included in the COBRA estimates developed for this 

closure recommendation. The second Army location is Fort Monroe, VA 

where DOD terminated for convenience a privatized electrical utility 

contract. DOD terminated the contract for convenience in September 

2011, when—according to a DOD official—the installation was closed. In 

June 2012, the privatized electrical contractor submitted to DOD a 

termination for convenience settlement proposal with options for a U.S. 

government payment of either $9.9 million or $30.0 million, depending on 

the remaining work to be done by the contractor. As of January 2013, the 

final settlement had not been determined. These costs were not included 

in the COBRA estimates developed for this closure recommendation. The 

third installation is Brunswick Naval Air Station, ME. When this installation 

closed in May 2011, a privatized housing project at the installation 

remained open. As discussed earlier in this report, to ensure that utility 

companies correctly charge the Navy for utilities used on the installation, 

 

56GAO-13-149. 

Three Installations Had 

Closure Costs Not 

Included in 2005 COBRA 

Estimates
 

Page 28 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

the Navy paid for installing electric and water meters for the housing 

units. The cost of this work was about $148,800, but was not included in 

the 2005 COBRA estimates for this closure recommendation.57

Table 1: Installations Closed during the 2005 Round of BRAC That Had an Alternatively Financed Project

Military 

Department

Installation Name and 

State 

Type of Alternatively 

Financed Project(s)

Alternatively Financed 

Project Closure Cost (in 

Thousands of dollars)a Is the Cost Recorded 

in COBRA? 

Army Ft. Monmouth, NJ Renewable energy $24,275 No

Army Ft. Monroe, VA Privatized electrical, 

potable water, and 

wastewater utilities 

$9,900 or $30,000b No

Navy Naval Air Station Brunswick, 

ME

Privatized housing $149 No

Navy Naval Air Station Ingleside, 

TX

Privatized housing $0 Not applicable

Navy Marine Corps Air Station 

Kansas City, MO

Privatized housing $0 Not applicable

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information

Notes:

a

Numbers are rounded to the nearest thousand.

b

In June 2012, the privatized electrical contractor submitted to DOD a termination for convenience 

settlement proposal with options for a payment of either $9.9 million or $30.0 million depending on the 

remaining work to be done by the contractor. As of January 2013, the final settlement had not been 

determined.

We have identified three factors that may have contributed to the costs 

associated with alternatively financed projects being omitted from COBRA 

estimates. BRAC 2005 policy guidance for determining costs and savings 

of BRAC actions requires that DOD consider all costs and savings 

associated with base closure scenarios, and DOD instructions for using 

the COBRA model stress the importance of capturing all known costs and 

savings caused by a potential realignment action. We have previously 

reported that detailed requirements must be captured before comparing 

 

57The Navy’s COBRA estimates regarding NAS Brunswick were based on the Navy 

recommendation that the installation be realigned, not closed. According to DOD officials, 

in the case of realignment, the Navy would not have installed meters. The Navy’s COBRA 

estimate for realigning the installation did not include the cost of the metering work. The 

BRAC Commission recommended closure of NAS Brunswick, and the Commission’s 

COBRA estimate for closing the installation did not include the cost of the metering work.

Several Factors May Have 

Contributed to DOD Not 

Including Alternatively 

Financed Project Costs in 

COBRA Estimates
 

Page 29 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

scenarios in order to have the COBRA model produce estimates that 

more closely approximate actual implementation costs.58 Further, 

according to our work on best practices for government operations, 

ensuring that collected data are consistent and comprehensive is 

important for supporting decision-making.59 Because the gathering, 

analysis, and entry of data into COBRA for BRAC 2005 occurred in 2004 

and 2005, Army and Navy officials could not provide us with specifics on 

the steps involved in entering data into COBRA for the three submissions 

that lacked estimates of costs related to alternatively financed projects.60

Our analysis indicated three factors that may have contributed to the 

omission of costs associated with alternatively financed projects from 

COBRA estimates. First, DOD’s collection of data on potential base 

closure costs was not consistent or comprehensive regarding alternatively 

financed projects. During BRAC 2005, DOD sent questions to 

installations to gather information on installation-specific costs and 

savings. The answers to these questions were used to provide the data 

that DOD entered into the COBRA model. However, the questions did not 

directly request information on potential costs related to alternatively 

financed projects in a consistent or comprehensive manner. In some 

cases, DOD asked questions specific to potential termination costs 

associated with utility privatization contracts, as well as utility energy 

savings contracts and energy savings performance contracts, two types 

of alternatively financed contracts that may involve a renewable energy 

component. However, the questions were not asked consistently. 

Specifically, our review indicates that the questions about utility 

privatization and the energy contracts were directed specifically at Air 

Force installations. Navy installations were not asked to answer these 

questions; and Army officials could not provide evidence that such 

questions were sent to Army installations. Further, the questions were not 

However, because DOD intends to use the COBRA model for future 

BRAC rounds, we reviewed DOD’s processes for obtaining data on costs 

associated with alternatively financed projects for COBRA analyses and 

the guidance available to gain additional insight into the process.

 

58GAO-13-149. 

59GAO/GGD-96-118. 

60Officials cited several reasons, including that documents are no longer available 

following base closure; the retirement of officials involved in entering data into COBRA; 

and a lack of access to databases with relevant information.
 

Page 30 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

comprehensive, because DOD did not ask questions specific to potential 

costs associated with other types of energy contracts or with privatized 

housing, lodging, or enhanced use lease projects. As previously noted, 

these three project types are less likely to result in costs in the event of 

base closure. However, the potential for costs associated with these 

project types still exists. For example, the government agreed to limited 

loan guarantees on certain privatized housing projects and undertook 

metering for privatized housing.

Second, for cases in which DOD officials are not able to estimate the 

particular costs associated with alternatively financed projects within the 

data collection timeframes, the COBRA model does not provide users 

with a data input option to indicate that a cost may nevertheless exist. 

Estimating these particular costs may be a challenge because during the 

BRAC data collection process, officials at installations had limited time to 

answer questions, and this may have impacted their ability to develop 

estimates of costs associated with alternatively financed projects. 

According to DOD officials, in some cases officials at the installation level 

during the BRAC 2005 data call were provided with about 48 hours of 

turn-around time before answers were due. DOD officials explained that 

estimating the costs associated with alternatively financed projects in the 

event of base closure can require a substantial amount of time. This is 

because such estimation may involve the collection of a substantial 

amount of project information and analyses conducted by officials at 

multiple levels within a military department. Ultimately, these costs are 

only determinable through negotiation and resolution with the project’s 

contractor under the terms of the relevant contracts and agreements.

According to our analysis of project data reported by DOD, for 

alternatively financed projects that are likely to result in a cost in the event 

of base closure, DOD officials estimated that for almost two thirds (65 

percent) of these projects the officials would require a month or more to 

estimate the cost. For example, DOD officials stated that 48 hours may 

not be enough time to identify the location of a project’s legal 

agreements—much less review the agreements—or fully estimate those 

costs. In some cases, officials may not know the full costs associated with 

alternatively financed projects on closed bases for several years after 

they have provided information for the COBRA model. For instance, at Ft. 

Monroe, the Army decided to terminate for convenience a privatized 

electrical utility contract. Information pertaining to the potential closure of 

the installation was entered into COBRA in 2005; the installation was 

closed—according to a DOD official—in September 2011; and as of 

January 2013, DOD and the contractor had not finalized the settlement 
 

Page 31 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

cost. According to our review of the COBRA model and associated 

instructions,61 the model does not provide users with the capability to 

indicate that a cost of an uncertain amount may exist. Specifically, the 

model’s data input fields for costs and savings require the user to input 

information in the form of a specific amount of money.62

Third, while instruction is provided to COBRA users for entering costs 

associated with alternatively financed projects into the model’s Screen 5, 

there are cases in which the instructions are not consistent or 

comprehensive. The instructions provide some guidance on entering 

estimates of costs resulting from the termination of contract and lease 

agreements. For example, the COBRA Manual states that “particular 

areas of interest” include contracts and leases. As discussed earlier in 

this report, the model contains data input fields for certain types of these 

costs, and the COBRA Manual states that users should enter information 

on costs associated with “contract termination” and “lease termination” 

into Screen 5. In addition, the COBRA Template provides some guidance 

on which data fields users should use when inputting the cost of 

terminations associated with contracts, and determination of costs and 

savings associated with leases. However, in some cases, the instructions 

are not consistent or comprehensive. For example:

While the model 

provides users with the option to provide non-numerical information in 

footnotes, and instructions tell users to document the rationale of how 

costs were calculated in footnotes, the instructions do not tell users to 

indicate potential costs that are not entered into the data input fields. 

Thus, in a case where a cost is likely—but a numerical estimate cannot 

be generated in time for entry into COBRA—there is no option for 

providing non-numerical information that could help inform decision 

makers of the likelihood of such costs. The lack of such a data input

option may result in decision makers not being aware of potential 

liabilities.

 

61During BRAC 2005, DOD provided COBRA users with four instructional documents for 

use of the model: a guide to the model’s algorithms, a checklist, the COBRA Users 

Manual (COBRA manual), and COBRA Analysts Template (COBRA template). The last 

two provide the most detailed instructions for input of cost and savings data into the 

model. 

62According to our review of both COBRA estimates and DOD instructions for entering 

costs into the BRAC 2005 model’s Screen 5— the screen on which users are to input 

information on unique costs, such as contracts and leases associated with alternatively 

financed projects— is the screen in which users are instructed to enter the types of costs 

and savings associated with alternatively financed projects, in closure scenarios. 
 

Page 32 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

• By listing “lease termination” and “contract termination” as broad 

categories of potential costs, the COBRA Manual and COBRA 

Template provide some guidance to users on alternatively financed 

project costs that should be included in Screen 5. However, the 

instructions do not further illustrate other types of costs that could be 

associated with these types of projects in the event of base closure. 

For instance, costs associated with privatized housing projects in the 

event of base closure could include DOD’s payment of limited loan 

guarantees or other additional costs associated with exiting from the 

projects, such as DOD’s cost to install additional utility meters, as 

discussed earlier. Although housing privatization projects are 

governed by leases, neither the payment of limited loan guarantees 

nor additional costs such as the cost of metering are the result of 

“lease termination.” In fact, according to DOD officials, these two 

types of costs could occur even as a project’s lease continues past 

base closure. In another example, the Army paid over $1 million to 

install hot water boilers at Ft. Monmouth to heat buildings that would 

have been heated via the renewable energy contract that the Army 

terminated for convenience. As discussed earlier, these costs were 

not included in the COBRA estimates developed for the Ft. Monmouth 

closure recommendation. Thus, the instructions to include “lease 

termination” and “contract termination” costs may not be 

comprehensive enough to ensure users of the model are entering all 

potential costs associated with alternatively financed projects.

• COBRA has data input fields for entering both costs and savings, but 

the instructions are not comprehensive in their explanation of whether 

the costs should be entered as net costs or if cost and savings should 

be entered in separate data fields. In the event of base closure, it is 

possible that an alternatively financed project could result in both 

gross costs and gross savings for DOD. For instance, terminating a 

utilities privatization contract could mean that DOD no longer pays the 

contractor for the service it was providing, resulting in cost avoidance 

(a type of savings). But, for the same contract, DOD may also provide 

the contractor with a termination for convenience settlement, resulting 

in liability for DOD. The COBRA manual states that costs and savings 

“are determined by the user.” However, instructions for COBRA users 

on this issue do not state how to determine costs and savings from 

contracts and leases considered for Screen 5. Specifically, there are 

no instructions on whether to enter costs and savings from the same 

contract as a net value in a single field or as distinct values in 

separate fields. Given that the model has multiple data fields into 

which users can input costs and savings, the instructions’ lack of 
 

Page 33 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

clarity may make it difficult for decision makers to have the information 

necessary to make accurate comparisons across closure scenarios.

• The instructions do not consistently define key terms. While the 

instructions do define certain terms, there are other terms they do not 

define. For instance, the COBRA manual states that for users, it 

“might seem like” costs or savings could be entered into one of 

several data fields. The COBRA manual then instructs users to 

differentiate between different data input fields by considering whether 

the costs or savings are primarily “mission” or “support” related. 

However, because neither the COBRA manual nor COBRA template 

define either term, the user may be unclear on how to determine the 

category into which costs or savings should be placed. The lack of 

definitions could negatively affect the model’s output, since, according 

to the COBRA template, the costs will be captured differently for 

mission and support in COBRA reports.

We have previously reported that the cost estimates the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) submitted to the BRAC Commission were 

significantly lower than actual implementation costs, and 2 of the 14 

recommendations with the largest cost increases were partly due to 

existing contracts that had to be terminated or modified.63

 

63

Further, 

according to DOD’s BRAC 2005 guidance, even minor changes 

suggested by COBRA model results may reduce costs or improve long 

term savings. Such changes could, in turn, affect the estimated relative 

cost or savings of closing one installation compared to another and the 

decision of which installation to close. Since the last round of BRAC was 

conducted, there has been a substantial increase (more than125 percent) 

in the number of alternatively financed projects. According to military 

department officials with whom we discussed this increase, they stated 

that it will be important for the COBRA model to have the ability to fully 

capture information on the potential costs associated with alternatively 

financed projects, in the event of base closure. Given that DOD intends to 

use the COBRA model in future BRAC rounds, DOD and the BRAC 

Commission may not have the necessary information on potential net 

costs associated with the various options it is considering due to the lack 

of consistent and comprehensive information on costs associated with 

alternatively financed projects. As a result, DOD and the Commission 

GAO-13-149. 
 

Page 34 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

may face challenges in accurately comparing competing scenarios’ net 

costs. 

Congress has provided DOD with flexibility to manage its large inventory 

of real property through arrangements with the private sector that utilize 

funding sources other than appropriations, which has allowed the 

department to reduce its use of appropriated funds for certain key assets, 

such as utilities and family housing. This flexibility may allow DOD to shift 

resources to other requirements, but such agreements can increase the 

department’s exposure to potential financial liabilities and other costs in 

the event of base closure. Given that DOD has a substantial number of 

these alternative financing agreements and that the department is 

interested in pursuing further base closure and realignment rounds, it is 

especially important that decision makers throughout the BRAC process 

have full information on potential costs involved in proposed BRAC 

actions. With the federal government facing an extended period of fiscal 

constraint, collecting initial data on all potential costs—including those 

related to alternatively financed projects—and ensuring that decision 

makers are aware of the potential for costs even when complete data are 

not available will improve the information for decision makers during the 

BRAC process. In addition, taking these actions may reduce some of the 

uncertainty involved in estimating the overall costs and savings of 

proposed BRAC actions. Improvements to the processes for data 

collection and cost estimation and clarification of the COBRA model 

guidance would provide the military departments with a better 

understanding of the data they need to provide in order to ensure that 

DOD and Congress can make informed decisions about how to balance 

the department’s resources if further BRAC actions are taken.

To increase the overall reliability of the initial cost estimates that DOD 

submits with its recommendations to the BRAC Commission for any 

future BRAC round, we recommend the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics direct the Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Installations and Environment to take actions to enhance 

the department’s ability to identify any potential costs associated with its 

alternatively financed projects in the event of a base closure. Specifically, 

we recommend that the Under Secretary direct the Deputy Under 

Secretary to take the following three actions:

• Modify the procedures for collecting data in its BRAC data call to 

include questions that are consistent and comprehensive; directed to 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 35 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

all three military departments; and specific to the potential types of 

costs associated with alternatively financed projects.

• Modify the COBRA model to add a capability that allows users to 

indicate that a potential liability may exist, even if the amount of the 

liability cannot be estimated at the time of data entry. For example, a 

data field could be added that provides the user with a “Yes / No” 

option to indicate the possibility of such a cost. In addition, COBRA 

instructions could be modified to instruct the user to provide 

information on the likely costs, in footnotes. This would increase the 

information available to decision makers and signal that there are 

potential costs in the event that a precise estimate cannot be 

calculated at that time.

• Further, modify COBRA instructions for entering information on costs 

associated with alternatively financed projects in the model to help 

ensure costs are consistently captured and complete. For example, 

illustrate the types of costs that should be included; specify whether 

costs should be entered as net costs or if costs and savings should be 

entered separately; indicate which data entry field is the appropriate 

field into which the user should enter such costs; and define key 

terms.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment; DOD 

did not concur with our recommendations, which were offered to assist 

DOD in increasing the consistency and comprehensiveness of the initial 

cost estimates that DOD submits with its recommendations to the BRAC 

Commission. DOD stated that because (1) the statute requires DOD to 

develop base realignment and closure recommendations on the basis of 

the selection criteria with military value having primary consideration and 

(2) other liabilities will not be known until after negotiations, it believes 

adding these liabilities in the cost estimating process is unnecessary. 

While we acknowledge that military value is the primary consideration 

used to evaluate potential BRAC candidates, the statute authorizing 

BRAC 2005 also established four additional criteria including the extent 

and timing of potential costs and savings of BRAC scenarios. The focus

of our recommendations is to improve the collection of information to 

address this criterion.

Specifically, DOD did not agree with our first recommendation to modify 

the procedures for collecting data in its BRAC data call to include 

questions that are consistent and comprehensive; directed to all three 

military departments; and specific to the potential types of costs 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 36 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

associated with alternatively financed projects. DOD stated that it does 

not believe that such costs should be collected as part of the BRAC data 

call, in that it would be impossible to determine those costs in advance. 

However, as discussed in this report, BRAC 2005 policy guidance and 

COBRA model instructions require that DOD consider all costs and 

savings associated with various base closure scenarios.64 In fact, DOD 

collected some information on these costs in its BRAC 2005 data call, but 

it did not request this information consistently across all military 

departments or project types. For example, DOD asked questions specific 

to potential termination costs associated with utility privatization contracts, 

utility energy savings contracts, and energy savings performance 

contracts; and included the information in its COBRA cost estimates. 

Specifically, according to Air Force officials, during BRAC 2005, the Air 

Force took into account the cost of terminating utility energy savings 

contracts on several installations when considering realignment and 

closure scenarios, and included these costs in the COBRA cost estimates 

it developed for the scenarios.65

Further, as we reported in March 2013, detailed requirements should be 

captured before comparing scenarios in order to have the COBRA model 

produce estimates that more closely approximate actual implementation 

costs.

Certain multi-year energy agreements—

including utility energy savings contracts such as the ones at these 

installations—are required by regulation to contain a “cancellation ceiling,” 

which, in combination with other portions of the agreement, sets a fixed 

limit to the government’s liability in the event of a termination for 

convenience. As such, DOD’s statements that it does not believe that 

such costs should be collected as part of the BRAC data call and that it 

would be impossible to determine those costs in advance are inconsistent 

with its BRAC 2005 processes and actual experience.

66

 

64Specifically, see Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) 

Policy Memorandum Three – Selection Criterion 5 (December 7, 2004), issued by the 

acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, and the 

BRAC 2005 versions of the COBRA Users Manual and COBRA Analyst Template. 

DOD suggests that the primary advantage of COBRA is to 

provide real time comparison of scenarios to aid analysis and decision 

65Pope Air Force Base was realigned, and although the Air Force developed COBRA 

estimates for the closure of both Cannon and Ellsworth Air Force Bases, neither base was 

closed as a result of the BRAC 2005 process. Because the three installations were not 

closed during BRAC 2005, we did not address these COBRA estimates in this report.

66GAO-13-149. 
 

Page 37 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

maker review, not to develop budget-quality estimates. We recognize that 

COBRA is not intended to provide budget-quality estimates, but that does 

not preclude the possibility of improvements to COBRA. We believe that 

our recommendation would enhance DOD’s ability to collect data in a 

consistent and comprehensive manner and would assist DOD and the 

Commission in ensuring that scenarios involving bases with such projects 

are compared on an equivalent basis. Including these costs would 

potentially improve the cost estimates that DOD submits to the BRAC 

Commission for review. For these reasons, we continue to believe that 

this recommendation is valid.

DOD did not concur with our second recommendation to modify the 

COBRA model to add a capability that would allow users to indicate that a 

potential liability may exist, even if the amount of the liability cannot be 

estimated at the time of data entry. For example, we suggested that a 

data field could be added that provides the user with a “Yes / No” option 

to indicate the possibility of such a cost. In addition, COBRA instructions 

could be modified to instruct the user to provide information on the likely 

costs in a note field. In its response to this recommendation, DOD stated 

that noting a potential liability does not add value in the decision making

process in which recommendations are developed on the basis of the 

selection criteria with military value having primary consideration. DOD 

stated that accounting for these costs later, during the actual closure or 

implementation phase would be a better approach because the data 

would at that point be more accurate. In any future BRAC round, we 

believe that DOD should continue to include such costs in COBRA 

estimates, when possible. In cases where the amount of the liability 

cannot be estimated when data is being entered into the COBRA model, 

we continue to believe that modifying the model with a capability to note 

the existence of a potential liability would provide decision makers with 

valuable information that they may want to consider in their deliberations. 

While we agree with DOD that better and more accurate information 

would aid the implementation phase of BRAC, the intent of our 

recommendation is to improve the information provided to decision 

makers while they are comparing competing scenarios and making 

closure and realignment decisions. Because of this, we continue to 

believe our recommendation has merit.

DOD did not concur with our third recommendation to modify COBRA 

instructions for entering information into the model on costs associated 

with alternatively financed projects to help ensure costs are consistently 

captured and complete. For example, we suggested that DOD illustrate 

the types of costs that should be included; specify whether costs should 
 

Page 38 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

be entered as net costs or if costs and savings should be entered 

separately; indicate the appropriate data field to enter such costs; and 

define key terms. DOD did not provide specific reasons for its nonconcurrence with the recommendation, instead referring to its response to 

our first two recommendations. Our prior work on best practices for 

government operations found that67

After considering the points raised by DOD in its comments, we continue 

to believe that our recommendations have merit because they would 

improve the information available to decision makers in the BRAC 

process. As we have stated in prior GAO reports, DOD’s process for 

conducting its BRAC 2005 analysis was generally logical and reasoned. 

We continue to believe that the process remains fundamentally sound 

based on this review, although our analysis identified opportunities to 

improve the process for future rounds. By ensuring that all 

implementation costs are consistently collected and considered to the 

extent known during the comparison of BRAC scenarios, both DOD and 

the Commission will have greater assurance that scenarios involving 

bases with and without alternatively financed projects are compared on a 

consistent basis. Including these costs would potentially result in a more 

accurate initial cost estimates that DOD submits to the BRAC 

Commission for review.

ensuring that collected data are 

consistent and comprehensive is important for supporting decisionmaking. Further, there has been a substantial increase (more than 125 

percent) in the number of alternatively financed projects on DOD 

installations since the last round of BRAC was conducted. We continue to 

believe that modification of COBRA instructions could help DOD ensure 

that scenario costs are captured in a consistent and complete manner, 

aiding the department in meeting its requirement to treat all bases 

equally, and aiding the Commission in its decision making process.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air 

Force; the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics; the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and 

Environment; and the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency. In 

 

67GAO/GGD-96-118. 
 

Page 39 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV

James R. McTigue, Jr. 

Director

Defense Capabilities & Management
 

Page 40 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Tim Johnson

Chairman

The Honorable Mark Kirk

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans’ Affairs, 

 and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Chairman 

The Honorable Adam Smith 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives

The Honorable John Culberson

Chairman

The Honorable Sanford Bishop

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans’ Affairs, 

 and Related Agencies

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Based on our prior work on alternatively financed projects and 

congressional interest as expressed in House Report 112-479,1 we 

included five project types in the scope of our review: renewable energy,2

privatized utilities,3 privatized family housing,4

 

1

House Report 112-479, accompanying a bill for the fiscal year 2013 National Defense 

Authorization Act (H.R. 4310). 

Army lodging, and leases 

for underused land. To describe the alternatively financed projects that 

existed on DOD’s U.S. installations, as of September 30, 2011, we 

collected information from the military departments on the five types of 

alternatively financed projects within the scope of our review. We included 

projects if (1) they were funded—at least in part—by means other than 

up-front appropriations; (2) the project’s legal agreement was signed as of 

September 30, 2011; (3) the installation that hosted the project was open 

as of that date; and (4) the installation was located in the United States. In 

addition, we assessed the completeness and accuracy of these project 

data. To do so, we reviewed data submitted by the military departments 

and Defense Logistics Agency to determine if there were inconsistencies 

2

As previously reported, DOD has certain renewable energy projects that are funded 

through up-front appropriations and others that are alternatively financed. In this report we 

are focusing on the alternatively financed renewable energy projects reported by DOD. As 

previously noted, for the purposes of this report, we are defining renewable energy as 

energy derived from any of the following fuel sources: biomass; geothermal; hydropower; 

solar; wind; ocean energy, including wave, tidal, current, and ocean thermal energy; and 

other sources, such as landfill gas and municipal solid waste. This energy can be applied 

in any form, including electricity, heating, or small-scale applications such as streetlights 

or trash compactors. Ground source heat pumps are included in our definition of 

renewable energy projects. For our previously published work on DOD renewable energy, 

see—for example—GAO, Renewable Energy Project Financing: Improved Guidance and 

Information Sharing Needed for DOD Project-Level Officials, GAO-12-401 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 4, 2012). 

3

In response to our request for information on alternatively financed projects, the military 

departments provided information on four types of privatized utility projects: the generation 

and supply of electric power; the treatment or supply of potable water; the collection or 

treatment of wastewater; and the supply of natural gas.

4

The military departments have several efforts under which military housing has been 

privatized, including unaccompanied housing, family housing privatized under section 801 

of the Military Construction Authorization Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-115 (1983) (commonly 

referred to as the Section 801 housing program), and the Military Housing Privatization 

Initiative. In this report, we are focusing on Military Housing Privatization Initiative projects. 

There are relatively few unaccompanied service members living in privatized housing 

projects and many of the leases governing section 801 housing projects have ended or 

will end relatively soon. In contrast, DOD reports 166 Military Housing Privatization 

Initiative projects with leases that are typically 50 years in length.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 42 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

or certain data elements that were not provided for individual projects. In 

such cases, we discussed these data with knowledgeable agency 

officials, resolving the inconsistencies and gathering the missing data 

elements. In addition, we assessed the reliability of all computergenerated data provided by the military departments and Defense 

Logistics Agency by reviewing existing information about the data and the 

systems that produced the data and by interviewing agency officials 

knowledgeable about the data to determine the steps taken to ensure its 

completeness and accuracy. We determined that these data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting the number and certain 

characteristics of these projects, as reported by the military departments 

and Defense Logistics Agency. We are confident that, based on 

information from the military departments and Defense Logistics Agency, 

we have collected information on the complete universe of alternatively 

financed projects as of September 30, 2011. However, we did not validate 

the existence of each individual project. As discussed above, the military 

departments provided data on projects that were active as of September 

30, 2011. The military departments provided these project data to us in 

November and December 2012. 

To describe examples of ways that associated legal agreements protect 

the government’s financial interests, as well as circumstances under 

which DOD could face financial liabilities and other costs in the event of 

base closure, we chose 29 case studies for more in-depth review. To do 

so, we reviewed the project information provided by the military 

departments and Defense Logistics Agency, and selected project case 

studies based on several variables, including the military department that 

runs the installation on which the project was located; installations with 

multiple types of alternatively financed projects; the project type, ensuring 

that we included all five project types in our scope; and certain other 

project characteristics. For example, our case studies included privatized 

military housing projects with and without limited loan guarantees, and 

utilities privatized as “stand alone” privatizations and those privatized 

under a housing privatization authority. For these case studies, we visited 

installations, interviewed DOD officials, and collected and reviewed 

project documentation.5

 

5

For certain case studies, we met with officials from installations that hosted case study 

projects. For other case studies, we met with officials at the regional or headquarters level 

of a military department. This is because certain types of projects are typically managed at 

the installation level, while other types are typically managed at the regional or 

headquarters level.

We also reviewed relevant statutory authorities, 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

sections of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and military department 

policy governing alternatively financed projects. In addition to the officials 

with whom we met in the course of conducting our case studies, we met 

with officials from the military departments, the Defense Logistics Agency, 

and two directorates of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Installations and Environment: Facilities Energy and Basing.

To determine the extent to which DOD’s process for estimating the costs 

and savings of base closure candidates captures liabilities and other 

costs associated with alternatively financed project agreements—in the 

event of base closure—we identified the requirements for capturing the 

data by reviewing the BRAC 2005 implementation policy and the BRAC 

statute. We then identified installations that had alternatively financed 

projects and were closed during BRAC 2005, and determined to what 

extent DOD’s process for estimating the costs and savings of base 

closure candidates during BRAC 2005 captured potential liabilities and 

other costs associated with these projects. In each round of BRAC, DOD 

has estimated the costs and savings associated with various proposed 

BRAC recommendations by using a model known as the Cost of Base 

Realignment Actions (COBRA). To determine the extent to which this 

model captured potential project costs, we compared costs recorded in 

the COBRA model for the closed installations with alternatively financed 

projects to the military departments’ reported closure costs. To gather 

information on the closure costs and reasons why the costs may or may 

not have been captured, we interviewed DOD officials who were involved 

in—or had knowledge of—the BRAC 2005 process and individuals 

involved with closure of the bases in question; reviewed the installations’ 

BRAC implementation budgets; and reviewed additional related 

documentation, such as alternatively financed project legal agreements. 

Furthermore, to determine whether DOD’s process for collecting data on 

potential base closure costs was comprehensive and consistent, we 

reviewed the questions used to gather information for the COBRA model; 

the COBRA model instructions for completing the portion of the model 

into which costs associated with alternatively financed projects are to be 

entered; and the data input fields in this part of the model. We then 

compared the instructions and data input fields to BRAC 2005 policy 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

guidance for determining costs and savings of BRAC actions best 

practices for collecting data in support of government operations.6

 

6

For the BRAC policy guidance, see Department of Defense, Transformation Through 

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum Three – Selection 

Criterion 5 (December 7, 2004). For the best practices for collecting data in support of 

government operations, see GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 

1996).
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 45 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

According to our analysis of project data reported by DOD, renewable 

energy projects accounted for 11 percent (60 projects) of the 555 

alternatively financed projects. Privatized utilities constituted 53 percent 

(292 projects) of all projects. Privatized housing accounted for 30 percent 

(166 projects). Privatized Army lodging projects represented about 4 

percent (21 projects) of DOD’s reported alternatively financed projects, 

and 10 percent of the Army’s 209 alternatively financed projects. Finally, 

enhanced use lease projects accounted for 3 percent (16 projects) of all 

projects. In this appendix, information on alternatively financed projects 

reported by DOD is organized by project type—and within project type—

by military department.

Table 2: Army Renewable Energy Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Aberdeen Proving Ground MD Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; Energy Savings 

Performance Contract (ESPC)

Army Carlisle Barracks PA Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 

Army Fort AP Hill VA Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; ESPC

Army Fort Belvoir VA Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; ESPC

Army Fort Benning GA Renewable Energy Solar thermal hot water; ESPC 

Army Fort Bliss TX Renewable Energy Solar thermal hot water or solar power project; 

ESPC 

Army Fort Bliss TX Renewable Energy Solar thermal hot water or solar power project; 

ESPC 

Army Fort Bliss TX Renewable Energy Solar thermal hot water or solar power project; 

ESPC 

Army Fort Campbell KY Renewable Energy Geothermal; Utility Energy Service Contract 

(UESC) 

Army Fort Carson CO Renewable Energy Solar Photo Voltaic (PV); Power Purchase 

Agreement (PPA)

Army Fort Drum NY Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; ESPC 

Army Fort Hood TX Renewable Energy Solar thermal hot water; ESPC 

Army Fort Huachuca AZ Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Army Fort Huachuca AZ Renewable Energy Solar thermal hot water; 

ESPC 

Army Fort Huachuca AZ Renewable Energy Wind; ESPC 

Army Fort Knox KY Renewable Energy Biomass plant; UESC

Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects 

on DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type 

as of September 30, 2011, as Reported by 

DOD

Renewable Energy

Projects
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 46 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Fort Knox KY Renewable Energy UESC 

Army Fort Knox KY Renewable Energy UESC 

Army Fort Knox KY Renewable Energy UESC 

Army Fort Knox KY Renewable Energy UESC 

Army Fort Knox KY Renewable Energy UESC 

Army Fort Meade MD Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; ESPC 

Army Pine Bluff Arsenal AR Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; ESPC 

Army Rock Island Arsenal IL Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps and hydro electric 

generation; ESPC

Army Sierra Army Depot CA Renewable Energy Ground source heat pumps; ESPC

Army Tobyhanna Army Depot PA Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC

Army West Point NY Renewable Energy No further information available.

Army Yuma Proving Grounds AZ Renewable Energy Solar PV; UESC

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 3: Navy Renewable Energy Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Joint Base Pearl HarborHickamHI Renewable Energy On NS Pearl Harbor, solar thermal

Navy Marine Corps Air Ground 

Combat Center Twentynine 

Palms

CA Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Navy Marine Corps Air Station 

Miramar

CA Renewable Energy Biomass Plant; PPA 

Navy Marine Corps Air Station 

Beaufort

SC Renewable Energy Two Solar thermal; ESPC

Navy Marine Corps Air Station 

Beaufort

SC Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 

Navy Marine Corps Base Camp 

Pendleton 

CA Renewable Energy Seven Solar PV; UESC 

Navy Marine Corps Logistics Base 

(MCLogB) Albany

GA Renewable Energy Cogeneration ESPC using Biogas PPA

Navy MCLogB Albany GA Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC

Navy MCLogB Albany GA Renewable Energy Biogas; PPA 

Navy Marine Corps Support Facility 

(MCSF) Blount Island

FL Renewable Energy Geothermal; UESC 

Navy MCSF Blount Island FL Renewable Energy Solar PV; UESC 

Navy NAS Jacksonville, FL FL Renewable Energy Solar PV; UESC 

Navy NAS JRB Ft Worth, TX TX Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Navy NAS Oceana, VA VA Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 47 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy NAS Oceana, VA VA Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 

Navy NAS Oceana, VA VA Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 

Navy Naval Air Weapons Station 

China Lake

CA Renewable Energy Geothermal electricity; PPA 

Navy Naval Base Coronado CA Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Navy Naval Base Kitsap WA Renewable Energy Geothermal (at NUWC Keyport, WA);

ESPC 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 4: Air Force Renewable Energy Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force AF Academy CO Renewable Energy Solar PV; PPA 

Air Force Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) FL Renewable Energy Geothermal; UESC 

Air Force Hill AFB UT Renewable Energy Biomass; ESPC

Air Force Hill AFB UT Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Air Force Hurlburt Field FL Renewable Energy Geothermal; UESC 

Air Force Joint Base Charleston SC Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 

Air Force Joint Base McGuire-Dix 

Lakehurst 

NJ Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Air Force Joint Base McGuire-Dix 

Lakehurst 

NJ Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Air Force Joint Base McGuire-Dix 

Lakehurst 

NJ Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Air Force Luke AFB AZ Renewable Energy Solar PV; ESPC 

Air Force Nellis AFB NV Renewable Energy Solar PV; PPA 

Air Force Tyndall AFB FL Renewable Energy Geothermal; UESC 

Air Force Whiteman AFB MO Renewable Energy Geothermal; ESPC 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 5: Army Privatized Utility Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Aberdeen Proving Ground MD Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Aberdeen Proving Ground MD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Aberdeen Proving Ground MD Utilities Privatization Potable and waste water

Army Adelphi Laboratory Center MD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Privatized Utility Projects
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 48 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Blue Grass Army Depot KY Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Camp Parks CA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Camp Parks CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Camp Parks CA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Camp Parks CA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Detroit Arsenal MI Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort AP Hill VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort AP Hill VA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort AP Hill VA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Belvoir VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Belvoir VA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Belvoir VA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Belvoir VA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Benning GA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Benning GA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Benning GA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Benning GA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Bliss TX Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Bliss TX Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Bliss TX Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Bliss TX Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Bragg NC Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Bragg NC Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Bragg NC Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Bragg NC Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Pope AFB

Army Fort Campbell KY Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Campbell KY Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Campbell KY Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Detrick MD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Gordon GA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Gordon GA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Gordon GA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Gordon GA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Greeley AK Utilities Privatization Chilled water and steam

Army Fort Greeley AK Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Greeley AK Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Greeley AK Utilities Privatization Potable water
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 49 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Fort Greeley AK Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Hood TX Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Hood TX Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Huachuca AZ Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Irwin CA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Irwin CA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Jackson SC Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Jackson SC Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Knox KY Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Knox KY Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Knox KY Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Leavenworth KS Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Leavenworth KS Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Leavenworth KS Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Lee VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Lee VA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Lee VA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Leonard Wood MO Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Leonard Wood MO Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort McCoy WI Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort McCoy WI Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort McNair DC Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort McNair DC Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Meade MD Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Meade MD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Meade MD Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Meade MD Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Myer VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Myer VA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Pickett (National Guard 

Base)

VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Pickett (National Guard 

Base)

VA Utilities Privatization Potable water 

Army Fort Polk LA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Polk LA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Polk LA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Rucker AL Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Rucker AL Utilities Privatization Natural gas
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 50 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Fort Rucker AL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Rucker AL Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Sill OK Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Sill OK Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Sill OK Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Fort Stewart and Hunter Army 

Airfield 

GA Utilities Privatization Electricity for both Fort Stewart, GA & 

Hunter Army Airfield, GA

Army Fort Wainwright AK Utilities Privatization Chilled water and steam

Army Fort Wainwright AK Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Fort Wainwright AK Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Fort Wainwright AK Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Fort Wainwright AK Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Joint Base Lewis-McChord WA Utilities Privatization Natural gas for both Ft Lewis & Yakima 

Training Center 

Army Military Ocean Terminal Sunny 

Point

NC Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Natick Research Development 

& Engineering Center

MA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Natick Research Development 

& Engineering Center

MA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Oahu (includes Fort Shafter, 

Schofield Barracks, Wheeler 

Army Airfield)

HI Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Ord Military Community CA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Ord Military Community CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Ord Military Community CA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Ord Military Community CA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Picatinny Arsenal NJ Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Picatinny Arsenal NJ Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Presidio of Monterey CA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Presidio of Monterey CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Presidio of Monterey CA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Presidio of Monterey CA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Red River Army Depot TX Utilities Privatization Electricity

Army Red River Army Depot TX Utilities Privatization Potable water

Army Red River Army Depot TX Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Redstone Arsenal AL Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Schofield Barracks HI Utilities Privatization Waste water

Army Sierra Army Depot CA Utilities Privatization Electricity
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 51 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Sierra Army Depot CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Stewart Army Subpost NY Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Tooele Army Depot UT Utilities Privatization Natural Gas

Army Vancouver Barracks OR Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Army Walter Reed Medical Center DC Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 6: Navy Privatized Utility Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Coleville Housing Complex CA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Navy Coleville Housing Complex CA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Navy Coleville Housing Complex CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas - Propane Distribution System

Navy Joint Expeditionary Base Little 

Creek-Ft Story

VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Navy Joint Expeditionary Base Little 

Creek-Ft Story

VA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Navy Joint Expeditionary Base Little 

Creek-Ft Story

VA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Navy Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) 

Beaufort

SC Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Navy MCAS Beaufort SC Utilities Privatization Potable water

Navy MCAS Beaufort SC Utilities Privatization Waste water

Navy Marine Corps Recruit Depot 

(MCRD) Parris Island, SC

SC Utilities Privatization Potable water

Navy MCRD Parris Island, SC SC Utilities Privatization Waste water

Navy Naval Air Station (NAS) Corpus 

Christi

TX Utilities Privatization Electricity 

Navy NAS Key West FL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Navy NAS Kingsville TX Utilities Privatization Electricity

Navy NAS Meridian MS Utilities Privatization Electricity

Navy NAS Whiting Field FL Utilities Privatization Electricity

Navy NAS Whiting Field FL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Navy NAS, Patuxent River MD Utilities Privatization Electricity

Navy Naval Base Kitsap WA Utilities Privatization Kingston Housing potable water - 

privatized under privatized housing 

authority

Navy Naval Base Kitsap WA Utilities Privatization Kingston Housing waste water - privatized 

under privatized housing authority
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 52 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Naval Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Electricity – systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas - systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Potable water - systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Waste water - systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Construction Battalion 

Center Gulfport

MS Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Navy Naval Shipyard Norfolk VA Utilities Privatization Electricity - privatized through SE Public 

Service Authority of Virginia (SPSA). 

Navy Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay GA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Navy Naval Submarine Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Electricity - systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Submarine Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Natural gas - systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Submarine Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Potable water - systems at selected

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Submarine Base San Diego CA Utilities Privatization Waste water - systems at selected 

neighborhoods privatized under privatized 

housing authority

Navy Naval Support Activity Panama 

City

FL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 7: Air Force Privatized Utility Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Air Force Academy CO Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Andrews Air Force Base (AFB) MD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Andrews AFB MD Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Andrews AFB MD Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Arnold AFB TN Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Atlantic City (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

NJ Utilities Privatization Natural gas
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 53 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Atlantic City (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

NJ Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Atlantic City (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

NJ Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Atlantic City (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

NJ Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Birmingham (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

AL Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Birmingham (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

AL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Birmingham (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

AL Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Boise Air Terminal (Air Guard 

Station)

ID Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Boise Air Terminal (Air Guard 

Station)

ID Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Boise Air Terminal (Air Guard 

Station)

ID Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Boise Air Terminal (Air Guard 

Station)

ID Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Bradley IAP Air National Guard 

Base 

CT Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Bradley IAP Air National Guard 

Base 

CT Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Bradley IAP Air National Guard 

Base 

CT Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Bradley IAP Air National Guard 

Base 

CT Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Burlington (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

VT Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Capital Airport Air Guard Station IL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Charlotte/Douglas International 

Airport Air Guard Station

NC Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Cheyenne Airport Air Guard 

Station

WY Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Cheyenne Airport Air Guard 

Station

WY Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Cheyenne Mountain Air Force 

Station

CO Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Chicago O’Hare Air Reserve 

Station

IL Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Chicago O’Hare Air Reserve 

Station

IL Utilities Privatization Natural gas
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 54 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Chicago O’Hare Air Reserve 

Station

IL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Chicago O’Hare Air Reserve 

Station

IL Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Dane County Regional Airport, 

Traux Field Air Guard Station

WI Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Dane County Regional Airport, 

Traux Field Air Guard Station

WI Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Dane County Regional Airport, 

Traux Field Air Guard Station

WI Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Dobbins Air Reserve Base GA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Dover AFB DE Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Duluth (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

MN Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Eglin AFB FL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force F.E. Warren AFB WY Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force F.S. Gabreski Air National Guard 

Base 

NY Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force F.S. Gabreski Air National Guard 

Base 

NY Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Fairchild AFB WA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Forbes Field Air Guard Station KS Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Forbes Field Air Guard Station KS Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Fort Smith Airport Air Guard 

Station

AR Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Fort Smith Airport Air Guard 

Station

AR Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Fort Wayne (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

IN Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Fort Wayne (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

IN Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Fort Wayne (Air Guard Base at 

International Airport)

IN Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Goodfellow AFB TX Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Grissom Air Reserve Base IN Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Grissom Air Reserve Base IN Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Grissom Air Reserve Base IN Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Harrisburg (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

PA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Hector IAP (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

ND Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Homestead Air Reserve Base FL Utilities Privatization Electricity
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 55 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Homestead Air Reserve Base FL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Homestead Air Reserve Base FL Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Hurlburt Field FL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Jackson (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

MS Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Jackson (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

MS Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Jacksonville (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

FL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Joe Foss Field (Air National 

Guard)

SD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Joint Base Charleston SC Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Charleston AFB 

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Utilities Privatization Electricity on former Ft Richardson

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Elmendorf AFB

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Ft Richardson

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Utilities Privatization Potable water on former Ft Richardson

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Utilities Privatization Waste water on former Ft Richardson

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Utilities Privatization Electricity on former Ft Eustis

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Ft Eustis

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Langley AFB 

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Utilities Privatization Potable water- on former Ft Eustis

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Utilities Privatization Waste water- on former Ft Eustis

Air Force Joint Base McGuire-Dix 

Lakehurst 

NJ Utilities Privatization Electricity on former Ft Dix

Air Force Joint Base McGuire-Dix 

Lakehurst 

NJ Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Ft Dix

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Utilities Privatization Electricity on former Ft Sam Houston

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Utilities Privatization Electricity on Randolph Auxiliary Airfield, 

Seguin, TX

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Utilities Privatization Natural gas on former Ft Sam Houston

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Utilities Privatization Waste water on former Randolph AFB 

Air Force Key Field Air Guard Station, 

Meridian Regional Airport

MS Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Key Field Air Guard Station, 

Meridian Regional Airport

MS Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Key Field Air Guard Station, 

Meridian Regional Airport

MS Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Kingsley Field Air Guard Station, 

Klamath Falls

OR Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Kingsley Field Air Guard Station, 

Klamath Falls

OR Utilities Privatization Natural gas
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 56 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Lambert St. Louis (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

MO Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Lambert St. Louis (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

MO Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Lambert St. Louis (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

MO Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Lambert St. Louis (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

MO Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Laughlin AFB TX Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Lincoln (Municipal Airport with Air 

Guard Station)

NE Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Lincoln (Municipal Airport with Air 

Guard Station)

NE Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Lincoln (Municipal Airport with Air 

Guard Station)

NE Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Lincoln (Municipal Airport with Air 

Guard Station)

NE Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Little Rock AFB AR Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Luis Munoz Marin (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

PR Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Luis Munoz Marin (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

PR Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Luis Munoz Marin (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

PR Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force MacDill AFB FL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force MacDill AFB FL Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force March Joint Air Reserve Base CA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force March Joint Air Reserve Base CA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force March Joint Air Reserve Base CA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Martin State Airport Air Guard 

Station

MD Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Martin State Airport Air Guard 

Station

MD Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Maxwell AFB (Gunter Annex) AL Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force McGhee Tyson Air National 

Guard Station

TN Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Minneapolis/St. Paul (Air Guard 

Station at International Airport)

MN Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Minot AFB ND Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Nashville, Metropolitan Airport Air 

Guard Station

TN Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force New Castle Air Guard Station DE Utilities Privatization Natural gas
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 57 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force New Castle Air Guard Station DE Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Niagara Falls Air Reserve Station NY Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Offutt AFB NE Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Pease Air National Guard Base NH Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Quonset State Airport Air Guard 

Station

RI Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Reno-Tahoe (Air Guard Station

at International Airport)

NV Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Richmond (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

VA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Richmond (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

VA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Richmond (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

VA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Rickenbacker (Air Guard Station

at International Airport)

OH Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Rickenbacker (Air Guard Station

at International Airport)

OH Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Rickenbacker (Air Guard Station

at International Airport)

OH Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Rickenbacker (Air Guard Station

at International Airport)

OH Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Salt Lake City (Air Guard Station

w/Int. Airport)

UT Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Savannah (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

GA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Savannah (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

GA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Savannah (Air Guard Station at 

International Airport)

GA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Schenectady County Airport Air 

Guard Station

NY Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Scott AFB IL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Seymour Johnson AFB NC Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Sioux City Gateway Airport Air 

Guard Station

IA Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Sioux City Gateway Airport Air 

Guard Station

IA Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Springfield-Beckley Airport Air 

Guard Station

OH Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Tinker AFB OK Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Tyndall AFB FL Utilities Privatization Electricity
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 58 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Tyndall AFB FL Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Tyndall AFB FL Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force W. K. Kellogg Airport Air National 

Guard Base

MI Utilities Privatization Natural gas

Air Force Westover Air Reserve Base MA Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Westover Air Reserve Base MA Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Will Rogers World Airport Air 

Guard Station

OK Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Will Rogers World Airport Air 

Guard Station

OK Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Will Rogers World Airport Air 

Guard Station

OK Utilities Privatization Waste water

Air Force Wright-Patterson AFB OH Utilities Privatization Electricity

Air Force Yeager Airport Air National 

Guard Station

WV Utilities Privatization Potable water

Air Force Youngstown-Warren Regional 

Airport Air Reserve Station

OH Utilities Privatization Electricity

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 8: Army Privatized Housing Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Aberdeen Proving Ground MD Privatized Housing

Army Camp Parks CA Privatized Housing 

Army Carlisle Barracks PA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Belvoir VA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Benning GA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Bliss TX Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Bragg NC Privatized Housing Including former Pope Air Force Base

Army Fort Campbell KY Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Carson CO Privatized Housing Loan guarantee

Army Fort Detrick MD Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Drum NY Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Gordon GA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Greeley AK Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Hamilton NY Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Hood TX Privatized Housing 

Privatized Housing 

Projects
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 59 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Fort Huachuca AZ Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Irwin CA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Jackson SC Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Knox KY Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Leavenworth KS Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Lee VA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Leonard Wood MO Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Meade MD Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Polk LA Privatized Housing Loan guarantee

Army Fort Riley KS Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Rucker AL Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Sill OK Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Stewart and Hunter AAF GA Privatized Housing 

Army Fort Wainwright AK Privatized Housing Loan guarantee

Army Joint Base Lewis-McChord WA Privatized Housing 

Army Moffett Field CA Privatized Housing 

Army Naval Post Graduate School CA Privatized Housing 

Army Naval Support Activity Monterey CA Privatized Housing 

Army Oahu (includes Fort Shafter, 

Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Army 

Airfield) 

HI Privatized Housing 

Army Picatinny Arsenal NJ Privatized Housing 

Army Presidio of Monterey CA Privatized Housing 

Army Redstone Arsenal AL Privatized Housing 

Army West Point NY Privatized Housing 

Army White Sands Missile Range NM Privatized Housing 

Army Yuma Proving Grounds AZ Privatized Housing 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 9: Navy Privatized Housing Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Coleville Housing Complex CA Privatized Housing Camp Pendleton Phase II

Navy Dam Neck Annex VA Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Region Project

Navy Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling DC Privatized Housing Navy privatized housing does not include 

Bolling AFB

Navy Joint Base Charleston (includes Naval 

Support Activity Charleston and Naval 

Hospital Charleston)

SC Privatized Housing Air Force is supporting component but 

Navy is responsible for former Navy 

housing
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 60 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst NJ Privatized Housing Housing on former Naval Air Engineering 

Station Lakehurst

Navy Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam HI Privatized Housing Naval Station Pearl Harbor housing and 15 

sites on Oahu - does not include Air Force 

housing

Navy Joint Expeditionary Base Little CreekFort StoryVA Privatized Housing Part of Joint Fort Eustis-Fort Story Multibase housing project

Navy Joint Expeditionary Base Little CreekFort StoryVA Privatized Housing Part of Navy Mid Atlantic Multi-base project 

does not include Ft Story Housing

Navy Marine Corps Air Ground Combat 

Center Twentynine Palms

CA Privatized Housing Part of Camp Pendleton Phase II Multibase project

Navy Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort SC Privatized Housing Part of Camp Lejeune-Cherry Point-Stewart 

Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Pt. NC Privatized Housing Part of Camp Lejeune-Cherry Point-Stewart 

Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Air Station Miramar CA Privatized Housing Part of NC San Diego Overview Multi-base 

project

Navy Marine Corps Air Station New River NC Privatized Housing Part of Camp Lejeune-Cherry Point-Stewart 

Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Air Station Yuma AZ Privatized Housing Part of Camp Pendleton Phase II Multibase project

Navy Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune NC Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune NC Privatized Housing Part of Camp Lejeune-Cherry Point-Stewart 

Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 

and MCAS Camp Pendleton

CA Privatized Housing Camp Pendleton Phase I

Navy Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 

and MCAS Camp Pendleton

CA Privatized Housing Camp Pendleton Phase II; Different owner 

from Phase I

Navy Marine Corps Base Hawaii HI Privatized Housing Part of Navy/MC Hawaii Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Base Quantico VA Privatized Housing Part of Camp Pendleton Phase II Multibase project

Navy Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany GA Privatized Housing Part of Camp Pendleton Phase II Multibase project

Navy Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris 

Island

SC Privatized Housing Part of Camp Lejeune-Cherry Point-Stewart 

Multi-base project

Navy Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego CA Privatized Housing Part of Camp Pendleton Phase II Multibase project

Navy Marine Forces Reserve Kansas City MO Privatized Housing Part of Camp Pendleton Phase II Multibase project

Navy Naval Air Facility El Centro CA Privatized Housing Part of San Diego Multi-base housing 

Phase IV

Navy Naval Air Station (NAS) Corpus Christi TX Privatized Housing South Texas project – includes Windy 

Shores housing, Aransas Pass, TX near 

former Naval Station Ingelside
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 61 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy NAS Fallon NV Privatized Housing Part of San Diego Multi-base housing 

Phase IV

Navy NAS Jacksonville FL Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy NAS Joint Reserve Base (JRB) Fort 

Worth

TX Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy NAS JRB New Orleans LA Privatized Housing

Navy NAS Key West FL Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy NAS Kingsville TX Privatized Housing Kingsville I – includes Bridge Pointe 

housing, Portland, TX near NAS Corpus 

Christi and former Naval Station Ingleside 

Navy NAS Kingsville TX Privatized Housing Kingsville II

Navy NAS Lemoore CA Privatized Housing Part of San Diego Multi-base housing 

Phase IV

Navy NAS Meridian MS Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy NAS Oceana VA Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Multi-base project

Navy NAS, Patuxent River MD Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Multi-base project

Navy NAS Pensacola, FL (includes Navy 

Technical Training Center Corry)

FL Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy NAS Whidbey Island WA Privatized Housing Part of NC Northwest Region Multi-base 

project

Navy NAS Whiting Field FL Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake CA Privatized Housing Part of San Diego Multi-base housing 

Phase IV

Navy Naval Base Kitsap WA Privatized Housing Part of Naval Complex (NC) Northwest 

Region Multi-base project includes Bangor, 

Bremerton and Keyport

Navy Naval Base Ventura County CA Privatized Housing Part of San Diego Multi-base housing 

Phase IV

Navy Naval Complex San Diego CA Privatized Housing San Diego Metro Area: 59 of about 70 

neighborhoods are not on a base. 

Navy Naval Construction Battalion Center 

Gulfport

MS Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy Naval Information Operations 

Command Sugar Grove

WV Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Multi-base project

Navy Naval Shipyard Norfolk VA Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Multi-base project

Navy Naval Shipyard Portsmouth ME Privatized Housing Part of NC Northeast Region Multi-base 

project

Navy Naval Station (NS) Everett WA Privatized Housing Part of NC Northwest Region Multi-base 

project
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 62 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy NS Everett WA Privatized Housing Everett II

Navy NS Great Lakes IL Privatized Housing Part of Midwest Region Multi-base project

Navy NS Mayport FL Privatized Housing Part of Southeast Region Multi-base 

housing group

Navy NS Newport RI Privatized Housing Part of NC Northeast Region Multi-base 

project

Navy NS Norfolk VA Privatized Housing Part of Mid Atlantic Multi-base project

Navy Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay GA Privatized Housing 

Navy Naval Submarine Base New London CT Privatized Housing Part of NC Northeast Region Multi-base 

project

Navy Naval Support Activity (NSA) 

Annapolis

MD Privatized Housing Includes the US Naval Academy

Navy NSA Bethesda MD Privatized Housing 

Navy NSA Center Crane IN Privatized Housing Part of Midwest Region Multi-base project

Navy NSA Hampton Roads VA Privatized Housing 

Navy NSA Mechanicsburg PA Privatized Housing Phase II

Navy NSA Mid-South, South Millington TN Privatized Housing 

Navy NSA Northwest Annex VA Privatized Housing 

Navy NSA Panama City FL Privatized Housing 

Navy NSA Washington DC Privatized Housing 

Navy Naval Support Facility (NSF) Dahlgren VA Privatized Housing 

Navy NSF Indian Head MD Privatized Housing 

Navy NSF Thurmont MD Privatized Housing 

Navy Naval Weapons Station Earle NJ Privatized Housing Part of NC Northeast Region Multi-base 

project

Navy Naval Weapons Station Seal 

Beach/Fallbrook

CA Privatized Housing 

Navy Naval Weapons Station Yorktown VA Privatized Housing 

Navy Pacific Missile Range Facility Barking 

Sands, Kauai

HI Privatized Housing 

Navy Stewart Air Reserve Base NY Privatized Housing Terrace Housing

Navy Westover Air Reserve Base MA Privatized Housing 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD data.

Table 10: Air Force Privatized Housing Projects

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Air Force Academy CO Privatized Housing 

Air Force Altus Air Force Base (AFB) OK Privatized Housing 

Air Force Andrews AFB MD Privatized Housing 
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 63 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Arnold AFB TN Privatized Housing 

Air Force Barksdale AFB LA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Buckley AFB CO Privatized Housing 

Air Force Columbus AFB MS Privatized Housing 

Air Force Davis-Monthan AFB AZ Privatized Housing 

Air Force Dover AFB DE Privatized Housing 

Air Force Dyess AFB TX Privatized Housing 

Air Force Fairchild AFB WA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Goodfellow AFB TX Privatized Housing 

Air Force Hanscom AFB MA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Hill AFB UT Privatized Housing 

Air Force Holloman AFB NM Privatized Housing 

Air Force Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling AFB DC Privatized Housing On former Bolling AFB

Air Force Joint Base Charleston SC Privatized Housing On former Charleston AFB

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Privatized Housing Elmendorf Phase I - Loan Guarantee

Air Force Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson AK Privatized Housing Elmendorf Phase II

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Privatized Housing On former Langley AFB 

Air Force Joint Base Langley-Eustis VA Privatized Housing Part of Ft Story-Ft Eustis Multi-base housing 

project

Air Force Joint Base McGuire Dix Lakehurst NJ Privatized Housing Excluding Navy housing on former 

Lakehurst

Air Force Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam HI Privatized Housing Air Force housing on former Hickam AFB 

only

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Privatized Housing On former Lackland AFB Phase I 

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Privatized Housing On former Lackland AFB Phase II

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Privatized Housing On former Randolph AFB 

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX Privatized Housing On former Ft Sam Houston

Air Force Keesler AFB MS Privatized Housing 

Air Force Kirtland AFB NM Privatized Housing Loan guarantee

Air Force Laughlin AFB TX Privatized Housing 

Air Force Little Rock AFB AR Privatized Housing 

Air Force Los Angeles AFB CA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Luke AFB AZ Privatized Housing 

Air Force MacDill AFB FL Privatized Housing 

Air Force Maxwell AFB AL Privatized Housing Gunter Annex

Air Force Moody AFB GA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Nellis AFB NV Privatized Housing 

Air Force Offutt AFB NE Privatized Housing 
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 64 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Patrick AFB FL Privatized Housing 

Air Force Peterson AFB CO Privatized Housing 

Air Force Robins AFB GA Privatized Housing Phase I - Loan guarantee

Air Force Robins AFB GA Privatized Housing Phase II

Air Force Schriever AFB CO Privatized Housing 

Air Force Scott AFB IL Privatized Housing 

Air Force Shaw AFB SC Privatized Housing 

Air Force Sheppard AFB TX Privatized Housing 

Air Force Tinker AFB OK Privatized Housing 

Air Force Travis AFB CA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Tyndall AFB FL Privatized Housing 

Air Force Vance AFB OK Privatized Housing 

Air Force Vandenberg AFB CA Privatized Housing 

Air Force Wright-Patterson AFB OH Privatized Housing 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD information

Table 11: Army Enhanced Use Leases

Military 

Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Aberdeen Proving Ground MD Enhanced Use 

Lease (EUL)

50 year term; office park

Army Fort Detrick MD EUL 36.5 year term; utility plant construction

Army Fort Leonard Wood MO EUL 33 year term; business center development

Army Picatinny Arsenal NJ EUL 50+ year term; renovation of office space and 

research park development

Army Redstone Arsenal AL EUL 50 year term; office research and development site

Army Yuma Proving Grounds AZ EUL 50 year term; vehicle Test Track Site

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD information

Table 12: Navy Enhanced Use Leases

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam HI Enhanced Use 

Lease (EUL)

At Moanalua - 40 year term; commercial center 

development site

Navy Naval Air Station Key West FL EUL 5 year term; ship docking pier

Enhanced Use Leases
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 65 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Navy Naval Base Point Loma CA EUL 5 year term; industrial space for assembly of rocket 

propulsion fuel tanks

Navy Naval Base San Diego CA EUL 30 year term; industrial space to aid ship 

construction

Navy Naval Base Ventura County CA EUL 5 year term; site to off-load cars

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD information

Table 13: Air Force Enhanced Use Leases

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Air Force Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) FL Enhanced Use 

Lease (EUL) 

25 year term; airport terminal / rental car

Air Force Eglin AFB FL EUL 30 year term; waste water treatment

Air Force Hill AFB UT EUL 50 year term; office / commercial space 

Air Force Joint Base San Antonio TX EUL 50-55 year term; office space 

renovation and construction on former Fort Sam 

Houston

Air Force Nellis AFB NV EUL 50 year term; waste water treatment

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD information

Table 14: Privatized Army Lodging 

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Fort Belvoir VA Privatized Army Lodging (PAL) 

Army Fort Bliss TX PAL 

Army Fort Buchanan PR PAL 

Army Fort Campbell KY PAL 

Army Fort Gordon GA PAL 

Army Fort Hamilton NY PAL 

Army Fort Hood TX PAL 

Army Fort Huachuca AZ PAL 

Army Fort Knox KY PAL 

Army Fort Leavenworth KS PAL 

Army Fort Leonard Wood MO PAL 

Army Fort Myer VA PAL 

Army Fort Polk LA PAL 

Army Fort Riley KS PAL 

Army Fort Rucker AL PAL 

Privatized Army Lodging
Appendix II: Alternatively Financed Projects on 

DOD’s U.S. Installations by Project Type as of 

September 30, 2011, as Reported by DOD

Page 66 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Dept. Installation State Project Type General Information, if available

Army Fort Shafter and Tripler Army 

Medical Center

HI PAL 

Army Fort Sill OK PAL 

Army Fort Wainwright AK PAL 

Army Joint Base San Antonio TX PAL on former Fort Sam Houston

Army White Sands Missile Range NM PAL 

Army Yuma Proving Grounds AZ PAL 

Source: GAO Analysis of DOD information
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 67 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 68 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 69 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 70 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

James R. McTigue, Jr., (202) 512-7968 or mctiguej@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland (Assistant 

Director); David Hubbell; Gregory Marchand; Richard Meeks; Charles 

Perdue; Carol Petersen; Steven Putansu; Christopher Ralphs; Chris 

Turner; Michael Willems; and Erik Wilkins McKee made key contributions 

to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 71 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment 

and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2013.

DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve 

Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 

2012.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National GeospatialIntelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project.

GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings 

Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2012.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to 

BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012.

Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy 

to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.: 

September 19, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan 

Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 

2011.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is 

Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the 

Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to 

Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs.

GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning 

Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth. 

GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 72 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 

2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of 

Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are 

Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings 

Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating SupplyRelated Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support 

Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of 

Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently 

Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January 

30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 

Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 

GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 73 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. 

Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 

2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.
Related GAO Products

Page 74 GAO-13-337 Defense Infrastructure

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property.

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need 

for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2004.

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