No. 02-043

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2003 MT 213

EULA MAE HIETT,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

MISSOULA COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Respondent/Insurer/Employer.

APPEAL FROM: Workers’ Compensation Court, Cause No. WCC 2001-0278

State of Montana

The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Sydney E. McKenna (argued),Tornabene & McKenna, Missoula, 

Montana

For Respondent:

Leo S. Ward (argued), Kimberly L. Towe, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry

& Hoven, Helena, Montana

For Amicus Montana Trial Lawyers’ Association:

Patrick R. Sheehy (argued), Halverson, Sheehy & Plath, Billings, Montana

 Heard: October 10, 2002

 Submitted: October 29, 2002

Decided: August 14, 2003

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk
2

Justice Patricia O. Cotter delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Eula Mae Hiett (Hiett) appeals the Workers' Compensation Court's (WCC)

determination that she was not entitled to payment for certain prescription drugs. We affirm

in part and reverse and remand in part.

¶2 Hiett presents one issue on appeal--did the WCC err when it determined that she was

not entitled to payment for prescription drugs necessary to control pain and depression

resulting from her compensable back injury?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 On March 1, 1996, Hiett, then 59 years old, had been working for sixteen years as a

custodian for the Missoula County Public Schools (School District). On this day, she lifted

a 30-gallon trash can and suffered compression fractures of her T6 and T8 thoracic vertebrae.

¶4 At the time of the injury, the School District was a member of a school self-insurance

pool known as Montana Schools Group Insurance Authority (MSGIA). MSGIA accepted

liability for Hiett's condition and paid disability and medical benefits. Hiett sought treatment

from Dr. Sable who found her to be at maximum medical improvement (MMI) in June 1996.

Hiett was permanently restricted to sedentary to light-duty work.

¶5 In July 1996, Hiett returned to work as a part-time custodian with modified duties.

This work, however, aggravated her back pain and she was forced to stop. Shortly

thereafter, Dr. Sable diagnosed her with anxiety and depression triggered by her inability to

work as a custodian because of her work-related injury. He prescribed various medications
3

to address her anxiety and depression and MSGIA accepted liability for these medications.

A psychiatrist also examined Hiett and concurred with Dr. Sable's conclusion.

¶6 In September 1996, Dr. Sable approved a number of jobs for Hiett. Based upon his

determination that Hiett had reached MMI and his approval of a number of jobs, MSGIA

terminated Hiett's temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits and tentatively calculated her

permanent partial disability (PPD) at 26%, or $17,290. 

¶7 Hiett was unable to obtain the desired School District job that had been approved by

Dr. Sable because she was not qualified. A two-hour per day job was offered but she turned

it down because it would have cost her more to get to and from work than she would have

earned. A few other approved jobs were available during the last four months of 1996 but

Hiett did not apply for them. In December 1996, the School District terminated Hiett's

employment, effective January 3, 1997. Hiett then began receiving Social Security

Disability (SSD) benefits retroactive to September 1996, and submitted her application for

retirement to the Public Employees Retirement System. 

¶8 Settlement negotiations began in January 1997, over Hiett's entitlement to PPD and

rehabilitation benefits. Negotiations terminated in July 1997, with a settlement agreement

under which Hiett received $27,930. The agreement closed rehabilitation benefits but

reserved "further medical and hospital benefits." At no time prior to the settlement did

MSGIA tell Hiett or her attorney that continued payment for medications was contingent

upon Hiett obtaining employment.
4

¶9 At the time Hiett settled her claim she was not working nor, with the exception of the

short-term modified custodial position in July 1996, had she worked since sustaining her

March 1, 1996 injury. Subsequent to the settlement, she occasionally worked selling tickets

at high school sporting events. She also worked from May 2000 to November 2000 as an

assisted-living attendant at a retirement facility. However, she had to leave that job upon

being hospitalized for drug withdrawal from medications she had been taking.

¶10 MSGIA paid for Hiett's pain medication from May 1996 until January 1999. It paid

for her anti-depressants from August 1996 until January 1999. In January 1999, a new

claims adjuster, Charles Edquest, took over Hiett's case file. Upon a review of the file, he

concluded that Hiett's medications constituted “secondary medical services,” and

discontinued payment for these medications because Hiett was not working. Edquest did not

contact Hiett to determine whether she was working at that time, nor did he notify her that

he was discontinuing her prescription benefits. She learned that insurance was not paying

for her medicine when, in the fall of 1999, she attempted to refill one of the prescriptions and

was told there was a $1,600 bill outstanding with the pharmacist. She was then told that no

insurance payment had been made for ten months.

¶11 Hiett's counsel contacted Edquest in early October 1999. Edquest then agreed to pay

for Hiett's past prescriptions, in part because he had inadvertently failed to notify her that

prescription benefits were to be discontinued. Several months passed, however, and the bills

remained unpaid so Hiett requested mediation. After the first mediation, a $1,200 payment
5

for prescriptions was made. Other bills remained outstanding and Edquest offered

administrative reasons for the delay but agreed once again to pay them. 

¶12 Hiett was ultimately notified that MSGIA contested its obligation to pay for further

medications because Hiett was not working. She requested a second mediation upon being

told benefits were to be discontinued. The second mediation was postponed pending an

opinion from Hiett's doctor that Hiett's medications were essential to her well-being and

would allow her to work. Upon receipt of a letter to this effect in September 2000, at which

time Hiett was working for the retirement facility, MSGIA agreed to pay for Hiett's

medication for as long as she worked.

¶13 Some prescription bills still remained unpaid as of December 31, 2000; therefore,

Hiett requested a third mediation. By this time, however, Hiett had left her job with the

retirement facility. As a result, the parties could not reach agreement regarding Hiett's

entitlement to further payment of prescriptions. MSGIA maintained its position that such

benefits were “secondary” benefits and would be paid only while Hiett was employed. Hiett

petitioned the Workers' Compensation Court. Pending the court's ruling, MSGIA agreed to

continue paying for Hiett's injury-related medications. 

¶14 At the trial before the WCC held on April 11, 2001, Hiett and Edquest both testified.

On September 6, 2001, the WCC issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

Judgment holding that Hiett was not entitled to payment for her prescription drugs unless the

medications would enable her to return to employment and, once employed, enable her to

continue working. The WCC also concluded that Hiett was entitled to a penalty with respect
6

to those benefits MSGIA agreed to pay but failed to pay within a reasonable time. The

court's findings and conclusions will be discussed in further detail below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15 This Court employs two standards of review for decisions of the Workers'

Compensation Court: we review the findings of fact to determine if they are supported by

substantial, credible evidence, and we review conclusions of law to determine if they are

correct. Geiger v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 2002 MT 332, ¶ 13, 313 Mont. 242, ¶ 13,

62 P.3d 259, ¶ 13 (citations omitted). In workers' compensation cases, the law in effect at

the time of the claimant's injury establishes the claimant's substantive right to benefits. State

Compensation Ins. Fund v. McMillan, 2001 MT 168, ¶ 6, 306 Mont. 155, ¶ 6, 31 P.3d 347,

¶ 6. 

DISCUSSION

¶16 Hiett advances several legal theories for her contention that the WCC erred in

reaching its conclusion that she was not entitled to the prescription benefits she seeks, one

of which is that the WCC misinterpreted and misconstrued the relevant statutory provisions.

Because we resolve this case under the court's statutory interpretation, we need not address

the other theories advanced by Hiett.

¶17 The Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), first enacted in 1915, provided for the

"protection and safety of workmen in all places of employment and for inspection and

regulation of places of employment . . . ." Chapter 96, Laws of Montana, 1915. Several

revisions later, in 1987, the Legislature revised the public policy behind the law to include:
7

It is an objective of the Montana workers' compensation system to provide,

without regard to fault, wage supplement and medical benefits to a worker

suffering from a work-related injury or disease. . . .

Section 39-71-105(1), MCA (1995).

¶18 Despite its many changes, Montana's Act, like similar workers' compensation acts

throughout the country, was primarily created to assure compensation and medical benefits

to injured workers without requiring them to sue their employers and surmount a difficult

burden of proof. We note as well that employers benefit from the Act in that it protects them

from suits by injured employees and from potentially high damage awards.

¶19 In providing medical care benefits, the Act allows for payment of "primary medical

services" and "secondary medical services." “Primary medical services” are defined as:

treatment prescribed by a treating physician, for conditions resulting from the

injury, necessary for achieving medical stability. 

Section 39-71-116(25), MCA (1995). 

“Secondary medical services” are defined as:

those medical services or appliances that are considered not medically

necessary for medical stability. The services and appliances include but are

not limited to spas or hot tubs, work hardening, physical restoration programs

and other restoration programs designed to address disability and not

impairment, or equipment offered by individuals, clinics, groups, hospitals, or

rehabilitation facilities. 

Section 39-71-116(29)(a), MCA (1995).

"Medical stability," as used in the statutes above, is synonymous with "maximum healing"

and "maximum medical healing" and means "a point in the healing process when further

material improvement would not be reasonably expected from primary medical treatment."
8

Section 39-71-116(17), MCA (1995). As will be discussed below in further detail, the WCC

concluded that medical stability was also synonymous with MMI. Such a conclusion is

supported by authority from other jurisdictions. See, for example, Dohl v. PSF Industries

(Idaho 1995), 899 P.2d 445.

¶20 The WCC was required to construe and interpret several provisions of § 39-71-704,

MCA (1995), including the following:

(1) In addition to the compensation provided under this chapter and as an

additional benefit separate and apart from compensation benefits actually

provided, the following must be furnished:

(a) After the happening of a compensable injury and subject to other

provisions of this chapter, the insurer shall furnish reasonable primary medical

services for conditions resulting from the injury for those periods as the nature

of the injury or the process of recovery requires.

(b) The insurer shall furnish secondary medical services only upon a clear

demonstration of cost-effectiveness of the services in returning the injured

worker to actual employment.

. . .

(f) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a), the insurer may not be required to

furnish, after the worker has achieved medical stability, palliative or

maintenance care except:

(i) when provided to a worker who has been determined to be permanently

totally disabled and for whom it is medically necessary to monitor

administration of prescription medication to maintain the worker in a

medically stationary condition; or 

(ii) when necessary to monitor the status of a prosthetic device.

(g) If the worker's treating physician believes that palliative or maintenance

care that would otherwise not be compensable under subsection (1)(f) is

appropriate to enable the worker to continue current employment or that there

is a clear probability of returning the worker to employment, the treating

physician shall first request approval from the insurer for the treatment. If
9

approval is not granted, the treating physician may request approval from the

department for the treatment. The department shall appoint a panel of

physicians, including at least one treating physician from the area of specialty

in which the injured worker is being treated, pursuant to rules that the

department may adopt to review the proposed treatment and determine its

appropriateness.

¶21 "Maintenance care," as used in § 39-71-704(1)(f), MCA (1995), above, is defined as

"treatment designed to provide the optimum state of health while minimizing recurrence of

the clinical status." Section 39-71-116(16), MCA (1995). "Palliative care" means "treatment

designed to reduce or ease symptoms without curing the underlying cause of the symptoms."

Section 39-17-116(20), MCA (1995).

¶22 In the case at bar, the WCC was asked to determine if Hiett, who reached maximum

medical improvement in June 1996, is entitled to ongoing payments for prescription pain and

depression medication. The court recognized in its Conclusions of Law that "the statutes

regarding medical services are poorly written and raise extremely difficult questions of

statutory interpretation." It observed that it was faced with a statutory construction dilemma

--it could construe the statutes in a manner resulting in an absurd outcome, or insert

language into the statute that was not put there by the legislature. The WCC ultimately

concluded that, while seemingly absurd, there was no statutory authority for paying Hiett's

prescriptions unless the prescriptions were either a cost-effective means of returning her to

employment under § 39-71-704(1)(b), MCA (1995), or qualified as physician-requested

palliative or maintenance care appropriate to enable her to return to work. Section 39-71-

704(1)(g), MCA (1995). 
10

¶23 Hiett maintains that this "absurd" result could have been avoided had the court

interpreted the definition of "primary medical services" to include medical services designed

to "maintain" medical stability. 

¶24 In the WCC's statutory analysis, it painstakingly worked its way through the

applicable statutes applying them to the facts in Hiett's case. The analytical path taken by

the WCC is illustrative of the conundra the various statutes present, so we trace it here.

¶25 The court deconstructed the meanings of "primary medical services" and "medical

stability," merged them into a single definition, and concluded that "medical stability" is "a

point in the healing process when further material improvement would not be reasonably

expected from treatment necessary for achieving medical stability." Recognizing that such

a definition was circuitous, the WCC nonetheless felt constrained to conclude that once

medical stability is achieved, no further medical treatment would materially improve a

claimant's condition, and therefore any further treatment could not be considered "primary

medical services." Having equated MMI with medical stability, the WCC concluded that

Hiett's continuing medications beyond MMI were not primary medical services and could

not be reimbursed as such. 

¶26 Throughout its analysis, the WCC placed recurring emphasis on the word "achieving"

as used in the statutory definition of “primary medical services” found in § 39-71-116(25),

MCA (1995) (“treatment prescribed by a treating physician, for conditions resulting from

the injury, necessary for achieving medical stability.” (emphasis added)). Although the term

“achieve” is not defined in the Act, the WCC felt constrained to conclude that once Hiett
11

reached (or “achieved”) MMI, she was not entitled to continued coverage of prescription

medications under the above provision because such primary services are defined as and

limited to services "necessary for achieving medical stability." In other words, once MMI

is reached, the “achievement” is over. 

¶27 The WCC fully realized that not all claimants who reach medical stability remain

there, and that some actually deteriorate and require further treatment to again reach stability.

The court hypothesized a situation where a claimant reaches medical stability through drug

therapy, stops the therapy, and then, upon discontinuation of the drug therapy, relapses to

non-MMI status. In this instance, the court reasoned, the drugs would once again become

a primary medical service. This analysis led the WCC to this inquiry: "Does the primarysecondary services distinction require that claimant terminate drug therapy and relapse

before the insurer is once again liable for the therapy? Applying the primary services

provision as written, it appears so, unless some other provision requires payment of

medications once the worker has reached MMI." 

¶28 The court then engaged in a detailed analysis of §§ 39-71-704(1)(b), (1)(f), (1)(g) and

39-71-116(29), MCA (1995), and concluded that none of these provisions were applicable

to Hiett's circumstances. It reasoned that § 39-71-704(1)(b), MCA (1995), requiring an

insurer to furnish cost-effective secondary medical services designed to return an injured

worker to employment, did not apply to Hiett's case "since [Hiett] has failed to demonstrate

her medications will enable her to return to actual employment." The WCC next parsed the

definition of "secondary medical services," i.e., "those medical services . . . not medically
12

necessary for medical stability" (§ 39-71-116(29), MCA), noting that the definition did not

include the word "achieving" but instead contained the phrase "medically necessary for

medical stability." The WCC opined that "medically necessary for medical stability"

incorporated both the concept of "achieving" medical stability and "maintaining" medical

stability. The WCC determined that because Hiett's medications were necessary for her to

maintain medical stability, her prescriptions were not “secondary medical services” either.

¶29 Ultimately the WCC concluded that there was simply no statutory authority

authorizing payment for an injured worker's drug therapy after a worker has reached medical

stability except "where the medications would return the claimant to employment or enable

an employed claimant to continue working. § 39-71-704(1)(b) and (1)(g), MCA." As it was

not contemplated that Hiett would return to employment, the court denied Hiett's claim.

¶30 We appreciate the WCC's in-depth analysis of the statutory scheme, and we agree

with the court’s view that the statutes are confusing and poorly written. We also agree with

the court's determination that §§ 39-71-704(1)(b), (f), and (g), MCA (1995), do not apply

to Hiett's situation. We disagree, however, with the WCC's conclusion of law that because

Hiett has reached MMI she is not entitled to prescription benefits absent a return to

employment.

¶31 Based on the definition of “medical stability” found at § 39-71-116(17), MCA (1995),

we acknowledge that MMI is reached when the underlying condition has stabilized to the

point that no further material improvement would be reasonably expected from primary

medical treatment. However, the question presented here is how or at what point does one
13

“achieve” medical stability? The statutes do not tell us. Is it through the start-stop-start

routine of medical services described by the court in its hypothetical, or is it through

reaching and maintaining a plateau of stability? Since neither the statutes or our case law

address this pivotal question, we must apply rules of statutory construction to determine what

the legislature meant when it spoke in terms of a claimant “achieving” medical stability.

¶32 We have previously noted that "[w]hen more than one interpretation is possible, in

order to promote justice, we will reject an interpretation that leads to an unreasonable result

in favor of another that will lead to a reasonable result." Rausch v. State Compensation Ins.

Fund, 2002 MT 203, ¶ 29, 311 Mont. 210, ¶ 29, 54 P.3d 25, ¶ 29. See also, Johnson v.

Marias River Elec. Co-op., Inc. (1984), 211 Mont. 518, 524, 687 P.2d 668, 671. Moreover,

"[t]his Court must attempt to discern and give effect to the intention of the Legislature, § 1-

2-102, MCA; [citation omitted], and construe each statute so as to avoid an absurd result 'and

to give effect to the purpose of the statute.'" State v. Price, 2002 MT 150, ¶ 26, 310 Mont.

320, ¶ 26, 50 P.3d 530, ¶ 26 (citations omitted). As we noted above, the intention of the act

is to provide medical benefits to a worker suffering from a work-related injury or disease.

Section 39-71-105, MCA. See also, S.L.H. v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund, 2000 MT

362, ¶ 33, 303 Mont. 364, ¶ 33, 15 P.3d 948, ¶ 33 (The legislature's objective in enacting

these statutes was to compensate workers for valid impairments resulting from injuries

suffered on the job.).

¶33 We conclude that the WCC interpreted the word "achieving," as it is used in §§ 39-

71-116(25) and 39-71-704(1)(f), MCA (1995), too narrowly. As the WCC fully conceded,
14

interpreting "achievement" of stability to encompass only the first experience of well-being,

while ignoring the inevitable relapse that will occur as soon as the medication that made that

experience possible is removed, leads to an unreasonable and unjust result. Some medical

results once achieved truly constitute an "end," an "attainment," a "completion"--the

complete healing of a fracture, or carpal tunnel surgery which resolves a claimant’s condition

can qualify as such achievements. "Achieving" a level of tolerable pain or a relatively

healthy mental attitude in the face of a chronic condition, however, is not such a discrete

"end." Rather, it is an ongoing process. Temporary freedom from pain is meaningless if

eight hours later intolerable pain and depression have returned. Reaching a level of tolerable

physical and mental health after a chronic injury can be "achieved" only when it can be

sustained.

¶34 In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the Act’s references to and definitions

of “maintenance care” and “palliative care,” as used in § 39-71-704(1)(f), MCA (1995), and

as defined in §§ 39-71-116(16) and (20), MCA (1995), respectively. “Maintenance care”

is defined as treatment designed to provide “the optimum state of health. . . .” “Palliative

care” is defined in terms of treatment designed “to reduce or ease symptoms. . . . ” These

categories of care come into play only after one has “achieved” medical stability as we

interpret the phrase here. More to the point, the ability to avoid a relapse through proper

primary care is not the Cadillac of treatments--it is not an “optimum” state of affairs, nor is

it care which will reduce symptoms below that level already reached with appropriate
15

medication. Thus, we find no tension or irreconcilability between the conclusion we reach

here and the Act’s reference to “maintenance” or “palliative” care. 

¶35 Accordingly, in order to arrive at a reasonable result that will serve the purposes for

which the Act was intended, we interpret the phrase “achieving” medical stability and

“achieved” medical stability as used in §§ 39-71-116(25) and 39-71-704(1)(f), MCA (1995),

respectively, to mean the sustainment of medical stability. Given this interpretation, a

claimant is entitled to such “primary medical services” as are necessary to permit him or her

to sustain medical stability. 

¶36 The dissent maintains that this Court has exceeded its authority by "inserting"

language into the statute and, as a result, has "made new law," and that we have disregarded

the "overriding legislative intent" of the 1993 statutory changes creating and defining the

categories of "primary" and "secondary" medical services. While we do not dispute that

"cost containment" was a principle upon which the 1993 bill revising the statutes was based,

the legislative history also states as a purpose of the revisions the intention "to provide timely

and effective medical services to injured workers." Unfortunately, as noted above, the

legislature was silent as to the meaning of "achieving" medical stability as used in the

definition of "primary medical services." Not only does the statute fail to provide guidance

concerning the very term that is critical to the case before us, but the legislative history offers

no help either. Thus we are brought back to Rausch and Price--when more than one

interpretation is possible, in order to promote justice and give effect to the purpose of the
16

statute, we will reject an interpretation that leads to an unreasonable or absurd result in favor

of another that leads to a reasonable result.

¶37 Furthermore, while recognizing the business and financial concerns presented to the

legislature, we do not find our interpretation of the statute to be in conflict with the

legislators' intent. After all, a stated purpose of the revisions was the provision of “timely

and effective” medical services. A recurring cycle of temporary provision of medicine for

a chronic condition, the withdrawal of the medicine, and its reintroduction as soon as the

claimant relapses -- which the dissent recognizes and which, in the case before us, is

inevitable -- hardly qualifies as either “timely” or “effective” medical care.

¶38 Accordingly, we conclude that Hiett is entitled to receive payment for those

prescription drugs necessary for her to sustain medical stability. 

CONCLUSION

¶39 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand this matter to the Workers'

Compensation Court for entry of judgment consistent with this Opinion. We affirm,

however, the court’s conclusion that Hiett is entitled to a penalty with respect to those

benefits MSGIA agreed to pay but failed to pay within a reasonable time.

/S/ PATRICIA COTTER

We Concur:

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
17

/S/ JIM REGNIER
18

District Judge Russell C. Fagg dissenting. 

¶40 I respectfully dissent. At the outset, I would like to state the majority opinion is

well-written and has fairly and thoroughly analyzed the WCC opinion. The majority also

makes a good argument this claimant should be entitled to on-going payments for

prescription pain and depression medication. However, simply put, the majority’s argument

should be made to the legislature. As policymaker, the legislature can consider the

arguments made and change the law which, as the WCC correctly found, is that Hiett is not

entitled to payment for her prescription drugs unless the medications would enable her to

return to employment and, once employed, enable her to continue working.

¶41 Today the majority concludes the WCC erred when failing to conclude the word

“achieve” means the same thing as “sustain.” I disagree. Hiett’s reservation of medical

benefits can only entitle her to benefits available under Montana statutes. As the majority

correctly points out, “primary medical services” are defined as “treatment . . . necessary for

achieving medical stability.” Section 39-71-116(25), MCA (1995) (emphasis added). On

the other hand, “secondary medical services” are defined as “medical services . . . that are

considered not medically necessary for medical stability.” Section 39-71-116(29)(a), MCA

(1995). The WCC concluded, as have other jurisdictions cited in the majority opinion, that

medical stability is synonymous with “maximum healing,” “maximum medical healing,” and

MMI. Thus, the WCC correctly determined there was no statutory authority for continuing

payment of Hiett’s prescriptions beyond MMI, as they were not primary medical services.

¶42 Today’s decision changes Montana law and redefines “primary medical service” as

treatment necessary for achieving and sustaining medical stability. But it is obvious the
1

This point is beyond debate. Indeed, even counsel for both Petitioner and Amicus,

in oral arguments and/or via brief, have acknowledged the legislature’s obvious cost-cutting

motives. Amicus refers to the legislature’s motive for these statutes as being, “simply to

save costs.” Brief of Amicus Curiae, dated April 18, 2002, p.19. Petitioner notes the very

distinction between primary and secondary medical services is the product of a 1993

Amendment aimed at cutting costs, and documents the legislature’s steady march away from

the WCA’s originally stated purpose in an effort to save money. “It is well known that

beginning in 1987 and continuing to the present, the Montana Legislature has tinkered with

worker’s compensation in response to a proposed business crisis in the state.” Brief of

Appellant, dated March 12, 2002, p.21.

19

1993 legislature intentionally amended the statutes noted above in an attempt to cut costs.

By its ruling, the majority has made new law. That is not this Court’s job. 

¶43 This Court has previously held that legislative intent should be determined from the

plain meaning of the language used, if possible, and that a statute should be read and applied

as a whole in order to give effect to the statute’s purpose and avoid absurd results. S.L.H.

v. State Compensation Mutual Ins. Fund, 2000 MT 362, ¶ 17, 303 Mont. 364, ¶ 17, 15 P.3d

948, ¶ 17. A plain, commonsense reading of the statutory provisions discussed in the

majority opinion yields a necessary conclusion as to a general, overriding legislative intent.

The legislature was attempting to reduce costs.1

¶44 The “plain meaning” of “achieve” is “to accomplish; carry out successfully.” Shorter

Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edition, 2002. Yet the majority arrives at an expansive

interpretation, adding “sustainment,” which widens the scope of “primary medical benefits.”

Adding language to a statute is inappropriate, particularly when doing so increases costs and

coverage the legislature specifically intended to curtail.
20

¶45 The majority reasons that denying Petitioner her pain and depression medication

would yield an “absurd” result. While I do not fault the majority for its strong distaste for

the statutory scheme as written, I cannot conclude that it constitutes an absurdity which

would permit us to change the written law.

¶46 As § 39-71-116(25), MCA (1995), is written, an injured worker will only receive

primary medical benefits up to the point they reach their maximum state of healing–or

“medical stability.” Thus, we come to unpleasant situations such as the one before us. Eula

Mae Hiett reached medical stability. As her pain and depression medication at that point no

longer fit under either the definition of primary or secondary medical services, she was no

longer entitled to her medication. But if and when she relapsed to a sub-maximum medical

improvement level, those drugs would become “primary medical services,” and would again

be covered.

¶47 Many descriptions for such an approach come to mind. Many might agree the

majority is not far off when it calls such an approach “unreasonable and unjust.” But that

is not a reason for a court to rewrite a law. A six-year-old child could be diagnosed with

leukemia tomorrow, and if no law would require anyone to pay a cent for his care, most

would think it unreasonable and unjust. However, that would not be cause for us to write

law requiring coverage. The same principle applies here. When it comes right down to it,

the basis for the majority’s holding is their sympathy for the Petitioner. I would leave

redefining or changing the law to the Montana legislature, who hears sympathetic pleas daily

during their legislative sessions, and can properly weigh those sympathies and write law

accordingly.
21

¶48 In summary, I would affirm the WCC. In a 171⁄2 page, single-spaced opinion, it

painstakingly analyzed Montana law and correctly concluded there was no statutory

authority for continuing Hiett’s prescriptions. Hiett should only receive those benefits

Montana law allows, and it is not for this Court to expand those benefits or Montana law.

/S/ RUSSELL C. FAGG

Honorable Russell C. Fagg, District

Judge, sitting in place of former Justice 

Terry N. Trieweiler

Justice Jim Rice joins in the foregoing dissent of District Judge Fagg. 

/S/ JIM RICE

Chief Justice Karla M. Gray joins in the foregoing dissent of District Judge Fagg. 

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY