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“Achieving impartiality in 

dealing with atrocities carried 

out during the post-election 

crisis is a balancing act for 

Ouattara. The Ivorian president only has limited influence 

on those of his supporters 

who were mainly responsible for these crimes.”

February 1, 2013

Justice in Côte d’Ivoire

Ouattara’s Dilemma

Summary

•	 Recently, the Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara has been criticized for failing to ensure

impartial justice for crimes committed during the 2010/2011 post-election crisis.

•	 During the crisis, both forcessupportive of ex-president Laurent Gbagbo as well asthose

forces who brought Ouattara to power were responsible for war crimes, butso far only former

Gbagbo loyalists have been tried for the atrocitiesthey carried out.

•	 The international community isright in criticizing Ouattara for hisfailure to bring his own

supportersto court, which constitutes a majorstumbling block for the political reconciliation

processthat remainsstalled since Gbagbo’s party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), boycotted

the December 2011 parliamentary elections.

•	 However, pressure on Ouattara hasto be exerted with care because the Ivorian president is

facing the difficult challenge of bringing the influential zone commanders(Com’zones) to

justice; they were responsible for most of the crimes committed by pro-Ouattara forces during

the post-election crisis but continue to hold key positionsin the Ivorian security forces.

Introduction

After Alassane Ouattara was sworn in as Ivorian President in May 2011 following the violent

post-election crisis between December 2010 and April 2011, he benefitted from unconditional

international support. Under Ouattara’s leadership, Côte d’Ivoire managed to quickly recover

economically, attaining an estimated growth rate of 8.6 percent for the year 2012.1 To push

the recovery of West Africa’s second-biggest economy that had suffered severely during the

2010/2011 crisis, the donor community cancelled a large part of the country’s debt and provided the Ivorian government with further loans. This was done very quickly and with almost no

strings attached.

Recently however, international pressure on Ouattara has been slowly mounting, mainly due to

the Ivorian President’s controversial handling of the issue of transitional justice. In contradiction

to promises Ouattara originally made, the Ivorian judiciary hasso far only prosecuted atrocities

committed by pro-Gbagbo forces during the post-election crisis but not those crimes Ouattara’s

own forces were responsible for. This has proven to be a majorstumbling block to the political

reconciliation process and spurred increasing international criticism in recent months. In

early December 2012, for example, U.S. Ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire Phillip Carter III openly

expressed worries about this practice and called for an“equitable justice,”arguing that all those

Tobias Koepf

E-mail: tobias_koepf@gmx.de

peaceBrieF140
© USIP 2013 • All rights reserved.

Justice in Côte d’Ivoire

page 2 • PB 140 • February 1, 2013

who committed crimes during the crisis have to be judged.2 Thisfollowed statements by various

human rights organizations, which have accused the Ivorian government of practicing“victor’s

justice.”3

Allegations of “Victor’s Justice”

Shortly after Alassane Ouattara took office, he pledged to ensure impartial justice for war crimes

committed during the post-election crisis. In July 2011, a national commission of inquiry was

created to investigate wrongdoings by all conflict parties, including the pro-Ouattara camp. In its

final report, published in July 2012, the commission concluded that a great number of the killings

during the post-election crisis were carried out by forcesloyal to Ouattara.4 However, in contradiction to the commission’sresults, the Ivorian judiciary hasso far only tried Gbagbo loyalistsfor their

crimes and spared members of the pro-Ouattara forcesfrom prosecution. In October 2012, the

first trial of a leading military officer loyal to Gbagbo led to the sentencing of ex-Republican Guard

general Brunot Dogbo Blé to 15 yearsin prison. This marked the beginning of a series of trialsin

which about 40 ex-members of Gbagbo-loyalist forces will be judged.

The unfulfilled promise of impartial justice has proven to be a seriousstumbling block to

reviving the reconciliation processin Côte d’Ivoire that hasstalled since Gbagbo’s party, the Front

Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), boycotted the parliamentary elections held in December 2011. The FPI,

which hasn’t participated in the regular political process eversince, remains hostile to any dialogue

with the Ivorian government and has made impartial justice an important condition for itsreturn

to the negotiating table. The absence of impartial justice also complicatesthe establishment of

unified security forces, which is essential to bring stability to the country in the long term. The

Ivorian security forces continue to be heavily dominated by leading members of the former Forces

Armées des Forces Nouvelles(FAFN) thatsupported Ouattara during the post-election crisis. The

fact thatsome of the leading figuresin the country’ssecurity forces are accused of being responsible for killing Gbagbo supporters makesthe integration of the remaining armed Gbagbo loyalists

highly difficult.5

Combined, the existence of an anti-Ouattara opposition refusing dialogue, FAFN-dominated

security forces and a large number of active pro-Gbagbo fighters outside of the newly-established

security forcesrecently fueled an upsurge in violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Between June and October

2012, Gbagbo loyalists carried out a number of attacks on security installations on the borders with

neighboring Ghana and Liberia as well asin Abidjan, the economic capital of Côte d’Ivoire. These

attacks were presumably orchestrated and financed by pro-Gbagbo hardliners who are based in

Ghana,since they fled Côte d’Ivoire after Gbagbo was arrested in April 2011.6

The Challenge of Dealing with the Com’zones

Achieving impartiality in dealing with atrocities carried out during the post-election crisisis a balancing act for Ouattara. The Ivorian president only haslimited influence on those of hissupporters

who were mainly responsible for these crimes. Thisis especially true with regard to the powerful

zone commanders(Com’zones), who played a decisive role in the FAFN and hold central positions

in the Ivorian security forces. If Ouattara triesto strip them of their positions and power too quickly,

there is a risk that they will turn their back against him, which could worsen the security situation

instead of improving it.

Four Com’zones (Eddie Médi, Fofana Losséni, Chérif Ousmane, and Ousmane Coulibaly) were

explicitly identified as“key leaders”in the killings committed by pro-Ouattara forces.7 But none

of them has been held accountable so far. Fofana Losséni, who wasinvolved in the massacre
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Justice in Côte d’Ivoire

page 3 • PB 140 • February 1, 2013

in the city of Duékoué (March 2011) during which several hundred largely Gbagbo supporters

were killed, was even charged with commanding a surge on pro-Gbagbo fightersin the west of

the country in June 2012. Ousmane Coulibaly has been, until September 2012, in command of a

military camp in Abidjan’s Yopougon neighborhood, where supposed Gbagbo supporters were

unlawfully detained and even tortured in reaction to the attacks during summer 2012. In August

2012, he headed a counter-offensive in the city of Dabou, where one of the attacks on the Ivorian

security forces was carried out. The offensive was characterized by a great number of arbitrary

arrests.8

What makes dealing with the Com’zones even more delicate for Ouattara isthat their loyalty

to the president has been limited eversince Ouattara won the presidential election in December

2010. Between 2002 and then, their commander-in-chief was not Ouattara, but Guillaume Soro,

former head of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) and prime minister under Laurent Gbagbo between 2007

and 2010. Only when Ouattara appointed Soro as his prime and defense minister in March 2011

did the Com’zones pledge their fullsupport to Ouattara.9 As of today, Guillaume Soro’s position on

how to deal with the Com’zones remains opaque. Soro, who since March 2012 has been president

of the National Assembly and remains one of the most powerful political figuresin the country,

continuesto be influential among hisformer military leaders. It isthus only in close cooperation

with him that Ouattara will be able to diminish their prominent position. However, it is not known

whether Soro (who asthe former FN leader runsthe risk of also being targeted by the Ivorian

judiciary or the International Criminal Court in the future) may seek to distance himself from the

Com’zones and support Ouattara in sidelining them. He might instead see it as more beneficial to

keep the Com’zones in power to maintain hisinfluence inside the security forces.

The Way Ahead 

The international community isright in criticizing Ouattara for hisfailure to ensure impartial justice. Making a real effort to bring the Com’zones to Ivorian courts and trying them for crimesthey

were responsible for during the 2010/2011 post-election crisisremains an importantstep to find a

way out of the deadlocked reconciliation process. Only if Ouattara makes convincing movesin this

direction will it be possible to bring the FPI into the peace processin the medium term. It remains

to be seen whether the FPI dropsits main precondition to returning to the negotiating table: the

liberation of Gbagbo, who wastransferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in November

2011. But thisis probably unrealistic and there is a chance that the FPI might change course if the

Ivorian governmentshowsitself willing to end its practice of“victor’sjustice.”

However, patience is needed in thisregard and pressure on Ouattara should only be exerted

with extreme care. Recently, there have been signsthat Ouattara might finally start taking on

the Com’zones’influence. In August 2012, he moved some of the Com’zones’to other postsinside

the security forces, which could be seen as a demotion (and possibly a firststep towardstheir

isolation).

At the same time, others(such as Ousmane Coulibaly for example) were named prefects

(regional administrators) ofseveral key provinces of the country, which putsthem in even more

powerful positionsthan before. It isthusstill not clear which direction Ouattara is heading. But

given his very limited room for maneuver, thisis hardly surprising.

Notes

1.	 IMF Raises Growth Forecast for Ivory Coast to 8.6 Pct in 2012, Reuters, October 3, 2012, http://

www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/03/ozabs-imf-ivorycoast-idAFJOE89200920121003.
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Justice in Côte d’Ivoire

page 4 • PB 140 • February 1, 2013

About This Brief

Tobias Koepf was a Transatlantic 

post-doc fellow for International 

Relations and Security (TAPIR) at 

the U.S. Institute of Peace from 

June 2012 through January 2013. 

He is now a TAPIR fellow at the 

EU Institute for Security Studies 

(EUISS) in Paris. This brief is based 

on research he is conducting on 

the post-conflict reconciliation 

process in Côte d’Ivoire.

2.	 Christophe Boisbouvier, Interview avec Philippe Carter, ambassadeur des EtatsUnis à Abidjan, Radio France internationale (RFI), December 6, 2012, http://www.rfi.fr/

emission/20121206-philippe-carter-ambassadeur-etats-unis-abidjan.

3.	 Matt Wells, The Fundamental Need for Impartial Justice, NewYork: Human Rights Watch, July

9, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/09/fundamental-need-impartial-justice.

4.	 Commission nationale d’enquête, Rapport d’enquête sur les violations des droits de l’homme

et du droit international humanitaire survenues dansla période du 31 octobre 2010 au 15 mai

2011, July 2012, http://news.abidjan.net/h/438749.html.

5.	 International Crisis Group (ICG), Côte d’Ivoire: Faire baisser la pression (Rapport Afrique no.

143), Dakar/Brussels: ICG, November 26, 2012, p. 5.

6.	 United Nations Security Council, Midterm Report of the Group of Experts Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 16 of Security Council Resolution 2045 (2012), Doc. No. S/2012/766, New

York, October 15, 2012, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/766.

7.	 Human Rights Watch (HRW),“They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing”: The Need for Justice for

Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-Election Crimes, NewYork: HRW, October 2011, p. 8. http://www.hrw.org/sites/

default/files/reports/cdi1011WebUpload.pdf.

8.	 Human Rights Watch (HRW),“A Long Way from Reconciliation”: Abusive Military Crackdown

in Response to Security Threatsin Côte d’Ivoire, NewYork: HRW, November 19, 2012, pp. 49-50,

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/18/long-way-reconciliation.

9.	 Arthur Boutellis, Côte d’Ivoire: State Security Versus Security Sector Reform, in: Global Observatory, October 11, 2012, http://theglobalobservatory.org/analysis/367-cote-divoire-state-securityversus-security-sector-reform.html.