U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

79–948 2013

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–6] 

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: 

PROCESS, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2013 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

CHRISTOPHER BRIGHT, Professional Staff Member 

PAUL LEWIS, Counsel 

ARTHUR MILIKH, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2013 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, February 26, 2013, The Quadrennial Defense Review: Process, Policy, and Perspectives ............................................................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, February 26, 2013 ................................................................................... 23 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2013 

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: PROCESS, POLICY, AND 

PERSPECTIVES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Roby, Hon. Martha, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ...................................................... 1 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations ................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Brimley, Shawn, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for a New 

American Security ................................................................................................ 4 

Dueck, Dr. Colin, Professor, George Mason University ........................................ 6 

Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for Strategic 

and Budgetary Assessments ............................................................................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Brimley, Shawn ................................................................................................ 31 

Dueck, Dr. Colin ............................................................................................... 43 

Roby, Hon. Martha ........................................................................................... 27 

Thomas, Jim ...................................................................................................... 51 

Tsongas, Hon. Niki ........................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 67 

(1) 

THE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: PROCESS, 

POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 26, 2013. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Martha Roby (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTHA ROBY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Mrs. ROBY. Welcome. And I am delighted to gavel to order the 

first hearing for the 113th Congress of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. And 

I am pleased to have as ranking member my colleague, Ms. Tsongas from Massachusetts. She and I have worked together in the 

past on other important matters, and I am really looking forward 

to her guidance and collaboration in her new leadership role in this 

subcommittee. So it is a pleasure to be working with you. 

And as members know, this subcommittee plays an important 

role, a very special role with the Armed Services Committee. And 

Ms. Tsongas and I have received comments from many of our members, and we have met to discuss the subcommittee’s prospective 

activities. Ms. Tsongas and I also have both met with the bipartisan subcommittee staff to review all of our shared goals. And as 

you know, pursuant to established procedures, the chairman of the 

full committee works with the full committee ranking member to 

determine issues and subject matter appropriate for consideration 

and investigation by the subcommittee. The chairman, in coordination with the ranking member, also provides approval authority for 

investigations. 

So soon we will receive our guidance for the coming months. And 

I intend to work with Ms. Tsongas and other members and staff 

to establish a plan to fulfill not only Chairman McKeon’s directive 

but also address other pressing matters requiring this subcommittee’s attention. And I look forward to working with all members 

and staff to exercise our responsibility in a close and collaborative 

fashion. 

Let me now turn to the important topic of today’s hearing. The 

Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], which the Pentagon undertakes every 4 years, is an extraordinary effort. It is a very important mechanism for our defense leaders to consider our Nation’s 
2 

long-term military strategy. It is a way to attempt to match our defenses to the likely threats of the future. 

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a clear articulation of 

the U.S. defense strategy has become more challenging, which I 

know all of you, our witnesses, certainly understand. And the 

threats to the United States have become more varied and unpredictable. And clearly describing our national defense posture in an 

unstable world is a difficult task of the QDR. 

The QDR process is just now beginning. And over the next year, 

the Department of Defense [DOD] will carefully consider how to 

approach the world and determine what resources and force structure are consequently needed. The Department has committed to 

come before us in the coming months to learn more about how that 

effort is proceeding. Today, we will hear from three distinguished 

witnesses who are knowledgeable about the past QDRs and defense 

strategy in general. And they will testify about how the QDR process might be shaped and about broader strategic issues they believe the coming QDR should consider. 

I hope this panel can help clarify the principles on which a National Defense Strategy should be based and how those involved in 

the current effort might approach their task. 

In 2 months, we will mark the 33rd anniversary of the historic 

testimony before this subcommittee; in May of 1980, the chief of 

staff of the Army, General Edward ‘‘Shy’’ Meyer coined the phrase 

‘‘hollow Army’’ in describing the conditions of Army units deployed 

across the globe to members of this subcommittee. The world has 

changed tremendously in the intervening years, but it remains 

dangerous. This 2014 QDR is meant to guide our planning as we 

anticipate the threats to our Nation and the forces that we must 

maintain in response to those threats. We cannot return to the 

days of a hollow Army. 

I thank the witnesses for their attendance today, and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

I now turn to my distinguished ranking member for any remarks 

that Ms. Tsongas may wish to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Roby can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, thank you, Chairman Roby. And I, like you, 

look forward to working with you on this most important of committees. 

And good afternoon to all of you, Mr. Brimley, Mr. Thomas, and 

Mr. Dueck. Great. 

I want to thank you for appearing before our subcommittee 

today, and I look forward to your testimony. 

As Martha, Chairwoman Roby, said, this is the first hearing of 

the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the 113th Congress. And I want to congratulate Representative Roby on her selection as chairman. I am glad that we have already been able to 

meet personally. And I know the staff has been meeting regularly 
3 

as well. And I look forward to working with you and all of your colleagues on the subcommittee. 

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my Democratic colleagues, Representative Rob Andrews, Representative 

Tammy Duckworth, and Representative Speier, who will also be 

serving with us. 

I know we are going to meet soon to discuss the issues and agenda for this subcommittee. This subcommittee has the ability to dive 

deeply into some of the long-term issues facing the Department of 

Defense, its service men, service women, and their families. And I 

look forward to doing so in the bipartisan spirit of the Armed Services Committee. We have much to do. 

Turning to the QDR, I think it is always important to have a regular, thoughtful, and reflective review of both the long-term and 

short-term issues confronting the Department of Defense. Having 

this regular review of the review, so to speak, is also critical. As 

with all that we do, we can always do it better. If we did it right 

the first time, we would be out of a job. This is even more so with 

the unsettled environment we are dealing with fiscally, and with 

the new and evolving threats to our national security. 

We are well past the Cold War and a decade past 9/11. We all 

have very difficult decisions to make regarding the best way to protect our Nation in the future. And I look forward to hearing our 

panelists’ views. As of now, we have the QDR, an independent review of the QDR, a GAO review of the sufficiency of the QDR, a 

military strategy assessment by the Joint Chiefs, as well as a recent National Security Strategy by the White House and the joint 

DOD–Joint Staff Defense Strategic Review. We need to make sure 

all of these reviews are consistent and don’t contradict each other. 

I want to make sure we get this right. And I am pleased we have 

such an experienced panel here today. 

With sequestration set to take effect just 3 days from now, I believe that this hearing is also quite timely. Our defense strategy, 

after all, does not exist in an intellectual void. It must reflect the 

resources that we extend to our armed services. I am curious to 

hear all of your thoughts on how we can evolve our strategy to 

meet 21st century threats in a period of fiscal austerity. I look forward to our discussion today with our distinguished panel. I hope 

you can help us with these difficult decisions we have ahead. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsongas can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Ms. Tsongas. 

I will introduce our witnesses and review how we will proceed. 

All of the witnesses have provided written statements to the subcommittee. These were circulated to members in advance of today’s 

hearing, along with full witness biographies. 

The statements will be entered into the hearing record as received. Therefore, I invite each of you to summarize your written 

statements within 5 minutes. 

Then we will have rounds of questions, with each member allotted 5 minutes. 

Our witnesses today are Mr. Shawn Brimley, who is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for New American Secu-
4 

rity. From February 2009 to October 2010, Mr. Brimley served in 

the Obama administration, including as Special Advisor to the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, where he focused on the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

Mr. Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in the department of 

health—excuse me, the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. He has published two books on 

American foreign and national security policies. He studied politics 

at Princeton University and international relations at Oxford under 

a Rhodes Scholarship. 

Mr. Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at the 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Among previous 

positions, Mr. Thomas served for 13 years in a variety of policy, 

planning, and resource analysis posts in the Department of Defense, including spearheading the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review. 

So, Mr. Brimley, I will start with you. 

STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Thank you, Chairman Roby, Ranking Member 

Tsongas, and members of the subcommittee. 

I am honored to testify on the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review. 

I had the privilege of serving as the lead drafter for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, but I wanted to be clear up front that I 

was not a senior decisionmaker, just one of many, many action officers working in that year-long process. 

I would like to quickly highlight a few items from my written 

statement. The principal challenge with QDRs as I see them is that 

they generally have attempted to satisfy multiple audiences for 

multiple purposes. QDRs are often judged by their ability to do five 

things: One, be a reasonable response to specific congressional legislation; two, an enterprise-wide strategy document for the Department; three, an important near-term lever for the current budget 

cycle; four, a vehicle for the Secretary of Defense to advance particularly important initiatives; and five, a critical public relations 

and strategic communications document. 

I believe the 2014 QDR should deprioritize the perceived need to 

be a big public relations document and strategic communications 

approach and focus on providing Congress the 20-year vision for 

the Department of Defense and then, coupled with that, a detailed 

examination of how that vision can best be applied given constrained resources. The essence of good strategy, after all, is aligning ends, ways and means. 

I have some thoughts on some recommended areas of focus for 

the 2014 QDR. And a core challenge for any defense review is 

avoiding the powerful gravitational pull toward the perceived need 

to cover everything. The QDR cannot afford at this time to be a 

mile wide and an inch deep, and it not need not be. This will be 

a second term QDR that has a highly detailed predecessor and, 

more importantly, a recently concluded strategic review closely 

overseen by the Commander in Chief. 
5 

The 2014 QDR should therefore use the 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance as the baseline strategy, and focus on how best to implement that strategy over 20 years at various plausible levels of resources and risk. I believe the 2014 QDR could best achieve this 

by focusing in part on a few strategic issues. First, we need to preserve investment in game-changing technologies. One of the biggest 

challenges in this environment will be to ensure that investments 

in generation-after-next technologies continue. And Congress 

should really focus on this area. A good example of this is the ongoing attempt to develop a carrier-based long-range unmanned combat aerial vehicle, or UCAV, that can provide real capability in an 

anti-access environment. 

And we should think about how to preserve and protect these investments over—even in the face of continued budget pressure. 

And we should remember we have done this before in very constrained budget environments. In the so-called interwar years of 

the 1920s and 1930s, America and other nations developed and 

fielded tanks, long-range bombers, radar, submarines and aircraft 

carriers. And if these kinds of investments could be preserved in 

that kind of economic environment—remember it was the Great 

Depression—surely we can find a way to prioritize game-changing 

technology investments today. 

Second, I think the QDR should focus on reversing the declining 

value of the defense dollar. I think the 2014 QDR must deal forthrightly with the ballooning cost of military personnel accounts. The 

2014 QDR cannot be confined to defense strategy and force structure alone. To be truly meaningful, it must tackle head-on the challenge of identifying specific ways to put personnel, health care, 

benefits, and retirement spending on a more sustainable trajectory 

for the Department. And this will require elements of DOD that 

are not historically involved in the year-long minutiae of the QDR 

to be structurally integrated into that process from the very beginning. 

On the important role of Congress and you all play in the QDR, 

I have a couple recommendations. First, really try to leverage the 

QDR independent panel. I think you should carefully consider all 

appointments to the panel, biasing toward former policymakers 

with Pentagon experience, and also those with a bipartisan pedigree. Also important will be a key supporting staff of people who 

have had previous QDR experience, also hopefully with a bipartisan ethos. I think the Department should provide the QDR independent panel with all the materials necessary—all the materials 

they need to succeed; for instance, the QDR terms of reference, all 

the scenarios that involve force size and shaping that the Department will use to assess force structure over 20 years. And I think 

they should also consider providing the QDR independent panel 

with a dedicated space in the Pentagon and some reasonable level 

of administrative support to make sure they get the briefings that 

they need. 

Second, I think you should consider requiring the QDR to have 

some classified components of the review. One of the big problems 

with these documents is they do a lot of work in the classified domain, and they then translate that into an unclassified report. And 

I think oftentimes a lot of the important details get lost. Sometimes 
6 

they use classified annexes, but I think it would be interesting to 

consider mandating the Department to classify certain sections of 

the QDR into the actual report itself and not just a series of annexes. 

And finally, I think the QDR should really try to be resource informed. Now, I know the legislation specifies specifically that it is 

a 20-year time frame unconstrained. But I think the problem potentially is that the QDR will go and skew toward fantasy rather 

than reality. But it can’t simply be a near-term budget drill. A reasonable approach would be for Congress to make sure the 2014 

QDR outlines the size and shape of the force structure required 

over 20 years and then also a series of alternative force structures, 

given the plausible and increasingly constrained budget environment. 

I think, with that, my time is up. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. 

Dr. Dueck. 

STATEMENT OF DR. COLIN DUECK, PROFESSOR, GEORGE 

MASON UNIVERSITY 

Dr. DUECK. Thank you. I would like to thank the members of the 

subcommittee for inviting me to speak with you. The overpowering 

consideration with defense strategy in some ways has been—can 

you hear me? The overpowering consideration for some time now 

has been budget cuts to defense. And unfortunately, this trend 

looks likely to continue. The temptation has been to let budget cuts 

drive strategic thinking rather than the other way around. 

The QDR is supposed to help outline national defense strategy. 

A strategy begins by identifying certain vital national interests. It 

then identifies threats to those interests arising from specific realworld adversaries. Finally, it recommends the development of specific policy instruments, including military capabilities, to meet 

those threats. It is sometimes said that we live in an age of austerity, so inevitably budgetary constraints drive the strategy. But 

resources are always limited, and strategy is always about developing a coherent approach toward specific threats under conditions 

of limited resources. 

So if we simply let declining budgets dictate how we identify 

threats to our national interests, then we are not really engaging 

in strategy at all. Strategy is about facing trade-offs. It is about 

matching up commitments and capabilities so the two are in some 

kind of reasonable balance. And the truth is that right now there 

is a wide and growing gap, or imbalance between America’s declared international security objectives on the one hand and its 

military capabilities on the other. 

Just a couple of examples: The United States has adopted a policy of pivoting or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. At the same 

time, however, we have continued to cut back the number of ships 

in the Navy. The two opposing directions don’t really add up. If one 

of the purposes of the pivot is to reassure our Asian allies and remind China that the United States is in East Asia to stay, then 
7 

how can we bolster that impression while at the same time cutting 

back on our maritime capabilities? 

The overall trend, which is growing worse, is that we have broad 

international commitments that are under-resourced militarily. 

Under such circumstances, basically only a few options exist. Either the country can boost its military capabilities to match existing commitments or it can scale back dramatically on existing commitments to match reduced capabilities. There is, of course, a third 

option, which is to claim that we will do more with less while denying that any real trade-offs exist. I would call this strategic denial. 

But this is not a true option. We can do more with more. We can 

do less with less. But when it comes to national defense, we can’t 

actually do more with less. Assuming we now add on additional defense cuts of some $500 

billion over the next decade, then it has to be emphasized that even 

the downscaled national defense strategy implied in the 2012 Strategic Guidance will no longer be coherent or sustainable. Perhaps 

the only good thing about this dire prospect is that it might force 

a genuine debate and assessment of some of the basic assumptions 

surrounding U.S. defense strategy. The relative emphasis today on 

long-range strike capacity, Special Operations, drone strikes, cyber 

war, area denial, and light-footed approaches rather than on heavy 

ground forces, stability operations, counterinsurgency or major regional war contingencies, is a move in the direction of what some 

call offshore balancing. And such a strategy has a certain appeal. 

But it carries risks or downsides as well. 

For many years, America’s overarching forward presence abroad, 

including its related bases, its alliance system, and clear U.S. military superiority, have played a crucial role in deterring authoritarian powers, reassuring democratic allies, and upholding a particular international order that, for all its discontents, is remarkably prosperous and free by historical standards. If this strategic 

presence becomes detached or uncertain, there is no reason to expect that the benefits of that order for the United States will continue. And if we give up on that presence, we can’t assume it will 

be easy or cheap to buy back. It never has been before. 

So if you ask me to make policy recommendations related to the 

coming QDR without regard to the immediate political climate, the 

first thing I would say is we do have to stop cutting national defense. Because if we don’t, we will soon be left with no honest strategic options other than some form of offshore balancing. And as 

I have indicated, there are multiple reasons to believe that such a 

choice could have negative international consequences on a scale 

we can barely foresee today. 

But the second thing I would say is let’s at least not engage in 

strategic denial. Let’s not pretend we can maintain existing commitments while continually cutting military capabilities. Let’s have 

the debate. And this is where I believe you can play a vital role 

in relation to the coming QDR. You can help ensure that it reflects 

the original and stated intention of Congress to produce a longterm reflection on international security trends and a serious strategy from start to finish, rather than denying or glossing over the 

growing gap between our capabilities and our commitments. 

Thank you. 
8 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Dueck can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Thomas. 

STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS 

Mr. THOMAS. Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for your invitation to testify today on the QDR. As you know, one of the QDR’s major tasks 

is to develop a defense strategy which is supposed to be the foundation for determining the Department’s priorities, where it should 

invest and what activities it should undertake. 

It is difficult, however, to imagine a process less suited to developing good strategy than a QDR, a highly bureaucratic process involving thousands of people that results in an unclassified report 

that is read by our foes and our friends alike. In trying to capture 

everything the Department does and address every challenge it 

faces, previous QDRs have often delivered simplistic, lowestcommon-denominator results. Challenges as diverse as transnational terrorism, long-term strategic competitions with other great 

powers and weapons of mass destruction each demands their own 

strategy, rather than a single unclassified strategy intended to address them all. 

Such challenges do, however, share one common trait. They will 

require U.S. forces in the future to operate in far less permissive 

environments than in the recent past. Increasingly, terrorists will 

be pursued outside of designated war zones in places like Africa, 

with more restrictive rules of engagement, more surveillance requirements, but less logistical support. Frequently, they will require working indirectly, through foreign forces, to pursue common 

objectives. 

Unlike Afghanistan, we should also expect that future adversaries will contest the air domain more vigorously with sophisticated air defenses and communications jamming. Future adversaries, moreover, could hold regional ports and airfields, the key 

choke points through which many of our forces arrive in theaters 

and from which they operate, at risk with precision-guided missiles 

and weapons of mass destruction. They could threaten large surface naval combatants that operate close to their shores with missiles and mines specifically designed to target them. And they are 

more likely to threaten our global space, logistics, and information 

systems, as well as critical infrastructure at home, with antisatellite weapons and cyber attacks. 

Given such nonpermissive environments, the next QDR should 

emphasize highly distributed, autonomous, and low-signature 

forces capable of operating independently far forward in denied 

areas. This isn’t a recipe for offshore balancing, but this is a recipe 

for how we maintain viable power projection and how we stay forward as a nation. These forces and capabilities include Special Operations Forces for both surgical strike and working by, with, and 

through foreign partners; submarines with greater strike capacity, 

and unmanned underwater vehicles with greater endurance; land- 
9 

and sea-based long-range, air-refuelable, unmanned stealth aircraft 

for surveillance, strike, and electronic attack; deeper inventories of 

stand-off munitions that can overcome modern air defenses and 

electronic countermeasures, as well as more powerful air-delivered 

conventional weapons for holding deep underground facilities at 

risk; more survivable and/or resilient space-based systems; and finally, nonkinetic cyber, electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities to achieve both lethal and nonlethal effects. 

Combinations of such access and sensitive forces are likely to be 

the spearhead of future campaigns against terrorists, WMD [weapons of mass destruction] powers, and adversaries possessing robust 

anti-access networks. Moreover, these conventional and Special Operations crown jewel capabilities, coupled with a robust nuclear deterrent, should become more central in U.S. military planning, especially in an era of declining resources. Beyond external challenges, strategy development also has to take explicitly into account available resources. None of us want a strategy that is simply budget driven, but neither can we responsibly craft a strategy 

that is unconstrained by our resources. 

One of the tricky risk balances that the next QDR needs to get 

right is the balance between America’s sustained economic health 

and maintaining a strong national defense. Failing to take measures now to reduce our national debt as a percentage of GDP will 

only compound our fiscal problems that our children will face and 

will leave only fewer resources for our future defense. While DOD 

leaders should rightly fight for every penny they can get to maintain a strong defense, there also needs to be a recognition that putting the United States on a path back to strong economic growth 

and fiscal rectitude is essential to sustaining the country’s longterm military predominance. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. That concludes my opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the Appendix on page 51.] 

Mrs. ROBY. Again, I appreciate you all being here today. 

And we will now start our questions. Each member will have 5 

minutes, and we will see how far we get. 

My questions are for any of you, so please feel free to jump in. 

But I want to start with the issues that we have in this current 

budgetary environment. And I want to know how can the Department better address the mismatch between defense strategy and 

resources. And I want to kind of dig down on this a little bit. 

But Mr. Thomas outlined some suggestions, and I think what I 

will do is try to shift it to the other two panelists and ask you if 

have you a better way in mind to set defense priorities than the 

existing QDR process, beyond what Mr. Thomas has already outlined. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. If I could, Madam Chairwoman, I think—and I 

think Jim and I had very similar comments. You know, one of the 

challenges is to satisfy the congressional legislation for a true 20- 

year strategic vision for the Department of Defense that is unconstrained in terms of the immediate budget picture. But at the same 

time, that is really only half of the question. 
10 

I think the QDR can really, you know, with the support of this 

subcommittee and Congress, really take that other view of translating that unconstrained picture and translating that back into 

the near- to mid-term environment where the budget environment 

is pretty fraught. And I think part of the way you can do that is 

take the Defense Strategic Guidance that the President spent a lot 

of time with in 2011 and early 2012 and use that as the baseline 

approach. And, you know, through your oversight, require the Department of Defense to submit to you a series of alternative force 

structures that outline plausible levels of budget funding over the 

near- to mid-term and require them to assess those alternative 

force structures in terms of the overall risk that poses to the defense strategy. 

No strategy is without risks. There is no such thing as an unconstrained strategy. It is all about aligning ends, ways, and means. 

So if we think the budget environment is going to continue to be 

fraught, I think one way you get around that is you require the Department to assess along different plausible lines of activity and 

lines of funding what kinds of risk could we as a nation take 

against the defense strategy over time? And there will be a point 

where the risk is too much, that it requires a fundamental relook 

about defense strategy. I personally am not there. I think that the 

Defense Strategic Guidance as outlined in early 2012 is—I would 

guess is fairly sufficient in terms of articulating the overall strategic thrust for defense policy, i.e. the focus on Asia and the Middle 

East, for instance. But I think if you require the Department to 

take an educated view as to what levels of risk they could incur 

in different alternative force structures, that would go a long way 

I think to address for Congress and the Nation the kinds of defense 

strategy choices we might not have to face. 

Mrs. ROBY. Dr. Dueck. 

Dr. DUECK. Thank you. Do I have this right now? Can you hear 

me? 

Mrs. ROBY. I think so. 

Dr. DUECK. Okay. Yeah, the 2012 Strategic Guidance in some 

ways was a significant change from the 2010 QDR. It moved away 

from the traditional two-war standard. So that was, in a way, an 

accommodation of the fact that the budget has been cut already. 

Now, I actually think if you are going to ask me in the abstract 

is that a good idea, I would say no, because you are raising the risk 

that one rogue state or another is going to engage in more aggressive behavior because it judges the U.S. can only handle one crisis 

at a time; so, for example, North Korea versus Iran. 

However, having said that, if what you are looking for is just a 

more internally coherent strategic document, given where defense 

cuts are headed, I mean, it has to be said, we can’t really sustain 

the two-war standard right now. So as you probably could tell from 

my opening statement, I would prefer to maintain the two-war 

standard and then fund it. But if we are not going to, it has to be 

said the 2012 Strategic Guidance is more internally coherent. I 

think it raises risks very high. But if the question is internal coherence, it does that. 

Now, just one good point that Mr. Brimley made in his statement 

was personnel costs. If you wanted a practical suggestion, it is not 
11 

always the case of, as all of you well know, simply whether expenditures are higher or lower. I think that he is exactly right to say 

that the ballooning level of personnel costs would be an area to 

tackle. In other areas, though, really, the U.S. should spend more. 

I mentioned shipbuilding. So if you could redirect in that way, have 

an effect in that sense, it would help close the gap between capabilities and commitments. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. 

And we will circle back on those. But I think probably in light 

of what you have said, the dangers associated with that are inherent in what our future security threats look like. And we don’t necessarily know that, although we can have that conversation. 

My time has expired. And in the interests of setting a good example, Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all for your testimony. 

We do live in a very dynamic time, as I said, both on our fiscal 

situation and sort of the resources that allows us to work with but 

also in a very changing world. 

And it was interesting, Dr. Dueck, when you talk about a change 

from being able to conduct two wars simultaneously. In essence, 

even currently, we had to divert our efforts in Afghanistan, kind 

of sort of put them on the back burner, as we went to Iraq because 

we really didn’t even—didn’t even have the resources then to fully 

engage in two wars at the same time. So to change to kind of deal 

with the change that that is dictated by more apparent fiscal constraints I think kind of reinforces or kind of highlights the fact that 

we actually haven’t done that in recent times, haven’t been able to 

do that. So I think the issue of what we have, the resources we 

have, the fiscal resources we have is very real. 

I am curious, since you all have been involved in the QDR process and obviously studied it very carefully, it is why you are here 

today, but if each of you could give one thing, what is the most important thing for the QDR to do, what that would be. And how 

would that help both the Defense Department and Congress as it 

wrestles with some very difficult decisions? And you can—— 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Congresswoman Tsongas. All I would 

say is that there are really two things that really have to occur in 

tandem. One is getting the strategic diagnosis of the problem right. 

What are the core challenges? And how, and this is really I would 

underscore the word how, how are you going to address them? And 

then the second part of that, which really goes in tandem, is aligning the program and the efforts of the Department with that strategic direction. 

Dr. DUECK. Well, I would echo that. I think that is exactly right. 

The task is one of—although Mr. Thomas has pointed out that it 

is—in some ways, it is a strange process because it is public, I 

think it would be helpful to try as far as possible to truly align interests, threats, resources within that document. And as difficult as 

it is with a public document, let’s not shy away from mentioning 

and describing intentions and capabilities of real world adversaries. 

I understand there are arguments against it because it is a strategic communication document. But, at least for our own conceptual clarity, it might be worthwhile to have that discussion and 

clarify it. 
12 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I think there are two things I would say. One, and 

I mentioned in my opening statement, you know, when budgets 

start to collapse or decline, and they will, military services historically have tended to sort of get into a bunker mentality. And so a 

lot of what I would call game-changing technologies—Jim talked 

long-range unmanned submersible vehicles and likely aerial vehicles—a lot of these capabilities that have been fully funded in 

times of plenty, when the budget starts to decline, they may be perceived as threats to other things, like manned fighter aircraft, for 

instance. 

I would encourage Congress to really pay attention to, you know, 

we have to invest in these game-changing technologies now. Take 

the Asia-Pacific, for instance. There is a lot of talk about how the 

anti-access area-denial environment in East Asia is rather fraught. 

Well, you think it is bad now, wait 12, 15, 20 years in the future. 

And so we need to make sure that as we go through this pretty 

austere environment, that we focus on preserving our pretty substantial investments in these game-changing technologies so we 

can lock in some comparative advantages when that environment 

is really going to get rather challenging in 10 or 12 years. 

And finally, I do think elements of the QDR should employ the 

classified realm more aggressively. I think a lot tends to get lost 

in translation. And then the QDR gets published, and then we turn 

around in the Pentagon, and we reargue first principles because 

now we are rearguing an unclassified document. I think it would 

be helpful for Congress, frankly, to use the classified realm to get 

more out of the Pentagon in terms of its actual strategies and scenarios and plans. But it also would really help the Pentagon to 

make sure that it has a document, parts of which are classified, 

that it can then go right into implementation documents that the 

Department does as part of its annual budget cycle. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

I am almost out of time, so I will yield back. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, Madam Chairman, out of respect for my colleagues who have been here the whole time, I will defer to the end, 

since I just got here. Chairing the Ethics Committee, so I was on 

official business. But it is fairer for the other folks who have been 

here the whole time to go first. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Thank the witnesses for their preparation. I was looking at a 

document today that identified the security environment for the 

United States. And the document highlighted cross-border aggression, particularly in the Middle East and in the Korean Peninsula; 

civil wars within failed states, such as the former Yugoslavia and 

Somalia; and then what the report identified as transnational dangers, which they identified three in this order: Drug trafficking; 

flows of immigrants that could cause threats to United States citizens; and one sentence, increasingly violent and capable terrorists 

will continue to directly threaten the lives of United States citizens 

and try to undermine U.S. interests and alliances. This was the 

1997 QDR; one sentence devoted to the asymmetric threat of terrorism 4 years prior to 9/11. 
13 

What are we missing this time? Are we geared up to begin thinking outside the box and thinking about threats and issues that 

threaten our citizens and our country that we so—we didn’t miss 

it in 1997, but I mean, one sentence out of about four pages on the 

international security environment. It is human nature to always 

be fighting the most recent war. But what mechanism do we have 

within our defense structure to think about what we might be 

missing today that would cause the country great peril down the 

road? 

Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Andrews. 

You know, every QDR is going to get it wrong as we look out, 

just given the mandate in looking out over a 20-year period. It is 

going to miss things. So I think a critical part has to be what sort 

of agility or adaptability or resilience are we building into our posture so that we are in a better position to respond to those surprises if and when they emerge? That said, I think there are three 

enduring challenges. And we talk about preparing for the near 

term versus preparing for the long term. I think if you think about 

the dangers and the threat posed by Al Qaeda and associated 

movements, if you think about the rise of great powers in the Middle East and Eurasia and elsewhere, and also the growing specter 

of, not only the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but 

their use, whether it is against our homeland or it is overseas, 

those challenges are with us today. And I don’t see them falling off 

the table anytime in the next 20 years. And I would say those are 

three of probably the most pressing that I can imagine. 

Mr. ANDREWS. But I would say that to look for new problems 

doesn’t mean you ignore the existing ones. Let me use this example 

that he is not with us now on the committee, but Mr. Bartlett in 

these kind of hearings occasionally would ask questions that would 

kind of furrow people’s brows, and he would talk about electric 

pulse shock and things of that nature. And I admire him for that 

because he was thinking in a way that someone who might want 

to do harm to our country would be thinking, which is what bag 

of tricks do they have? What weapons do they have? What incentives do they have? 

And again, I am so troubled when I read the—I was here for the 

1997 QDR, so I have my own share of blame and responsibility. 

But if you would have said to this committee in 1997 that we 

would be at war in Afghanistan for a decade in the next decade, 

I think people would have probably ordered a saliva test for you. 

So what are we missing? What aren’t we thinking about? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. If I could, Congressman, I think you are onto one 

of the perennial challenges with these documents. You know, 

Fareed Zakaria, in 2003, wrote a book called ‘‘The Future of Freedom,’’ where he talked about the democratization of violence, essentially. We obviously saw that on 9/11, and we saw that, as you allude to, years before that. 

But when we think about things like 3D manufacturing, the ability to literally print out weapons perhaps, nanotechnology, proliferation of very advanced cyber tools, you know, the democratization of violence, the lowering entry barriers, where previously these 

technologies would be available only to states, now they are being 

increasingly pushed down farther and farther down. You know, 
14 

Hezbollah is now using very rudimentary drones, for instance. It 

is this area that I think we should focus on. Partly that is why I 

am talking about preserving investments in these game-changing 

technologies, both to take advantage of them on behalf of our defense strategy but also to make sure that we understand what 

these game-changing technologies are, investing in them, and also 

investing in potential defenses. But that is an area where I think 

certainly the 2014 QDR should spend some time looking. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I thank you, and I thank the chair. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. 

Ms. Duckworth. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

So, you know, I think this hearing is timely because of the impending threat of sequestration and continuing resolution will be 

devastating to our country’s current National Security Strategy and 

readiness. You know, in the face of a Middle East that is roiled by 

the Arab Spring, in the face of North Korea and Iran continuing 

to pursue a nuclear program, I am concerned that we are balancing 

budgetary requirements and the mounting costs of our current 

forces with what we need to do to project into the future with these 

new threats that are emerging. 

So, you know, Mr. Thomas, I sort of looked at your testimony, 

and in your written testimony, you said that none of us wants a 

strategy that is simply budget driven, but neither can we responsibly craft a strategy that is unconstrained by resources. So, in 

looking at the QDR process, do you have any best practices? Do you 

have any recommendations in terms of the cost monitoring portion 

of it? For example, would you recommend having an individual, 

such as an IG [inspector general] or a comptroller, with a very specific expertise who would be in charge of looking at budgetary impacts on proposed initiatives? Or how do we pay for some of the 

new emerging technologies if we are going to balance the threats 

versus what we are capable of doing so that we are not wasting 

money on programs that are no longer effective or programs that 

are no longer relevant to the emerging threat, so that we can indeed pay for those unmanned submersibles and aircraft? And while 

we are maintaining and, you know, making sure that our forces get 

the equipment that they need? And also modernizing the existing 

force. I am a member of the National Guard. And over half of the 

Blackhawks in the National Guard are still alpha model Blackhawks. When are we going to upgrade those? So can you talk about 

that comptroller-IG part? Would that be something that would be 

a best practice or something that you would recommend as part of 

the QDR process? 

Mr. THOMAS. I think that is an interesting idea. I mean, ultimately, as I was thinking about it, it is really Congress that has 

the power of the purse. And so, you know, one possibility might actually be closer consultation between the executive and legislative 

branches at the start of a QDR to think about what the fiscal outlook is. And I don’t think we are trying to get it down to the penny, 

but just to have some idea of rough order of magnitude what 

should we anticipate? Is the slope going to be straight-lined? Is it 

up? Is it down? But what should we plan on? And I am really reminded, historically, in the 1930s, it was a time of severe austerity, 
15 

especially for the U.S. Army. And you had folks who they weren’t 

sure if they were going to get their next paycheck. They were really 

living on a shoestring. The senior leadership of the Army never 

questioned the resources that were provided to them by the Nation. 

They just said we will do the best we can with what we are given. 

And that is still the attitude of our U.S. military today. 

But I think the other element of this is that before we get into 

a lot of the meat, how we project power abroad, there is a lot of 

overhead and backroom office functions, there are a lot of reforms 

that we can make, whether it is reducing headquarters’ staffs, it 

is thinking about how we better manage personnel costs and tailor 

personnel benefits that are most suitable for the people we have 

got in our service today, those sorts of steps we can take. And I 

think we can preserve a lot of our ability to project power overseas. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. Brimley, do you have similar types of best practices you can 

perhaps talk to? You know, I think about, for example, the increasing privatization of—well, moving a lot of military services to contractors. When I was in Iraq, our food was provided under contract 

at $38 per meal, three meals a day, per soldier. And that was in 

2004. 

So, Mr. Brimley, can you talk a little bit about best practices and 

how you feel about a person that could provide that oversight of 

the budgetary aspect of the QDR? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I think it would be interesting to go back and look 

at—for instance, in my written statement, I say that the 2014 QDR 

could be the most important since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. The 

Bottom-Up Review was interesting because it basically presented 

three alternative force structures, with all the underlying implications that would be associated with that. It would be interesting to 

think about whether the 2014 QDR could do something similar, to 

come up with three or more alternative force structures that potentially bias in certain strategic ways. What does an Asia-Pacific focused strategy really look like? And what would a force structure 

look there? Should we invest much more in the Navy? What would 

a force structure look like where we can maintain the abilities to 

do long-term stability operations in the Middle East? That would 

be an interesting exercise. And I think it would be tough. But if 

you mandated something like that and the associated cost implications thereof, that could be something that I think could be pretty 

useful. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. I am out of time. 

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mrs. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Brimley, you just said, ‘‘interesting exercise.’’ And I am sitting here beginning to wonder if this whole QDR process is just an 

interesting exercise. All three of you have been critical on one level 

or another, calling it a, you know, these conflicting goals, being a 

PR [public relations] exercise. Supposedly, it is supposed to help us 

guide us in terms of the budget. If you were to grade how the 

QDRs have helped us, or how it has been reflected in strategy, 

what grade would you give the military and Congress? 

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, the military. 
16 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I will go first and give my panelists a chance to 

think. I mean, my first inclination would be to say, you know, F. 

But I think when you look at each individual QDR as a snapshot 

in time, and you look at all the QDRs all the way from the base 

force that Chairman Colin Powell did in 1991 and the Bottom-Up 

Review, and the four QDRs, and the next one, and the Defense 

Strategic Guidance, if you look at all of those that provide sort of 

an arc or a narrative arc of U.S. defense strategy, or really even 

U.S. grand strategy over the entire post-Cold War period, I think 

we have done a pretty good job as a nation, as a Department, as 

a congressional branch, grappling with the question of what is the 

role of the United States in the post-Cold War world? What is the 

role of the United States in the post-9/11 world? So I wouldn’t say 

I am bullish on QDRs, but I think they are useful exercises because 

it is a really good forcing mechanism for the Secretary of Defense, 

but also for Congress to really engage on these issues. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Dr. Dueck. 

Dr. DUECK. I think I am known as a relatively easy grader, 

maybe a gentleman’s C or something like that for the grade. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. 

Dr. DUECK. I mean, I think the United States, in terms of its 

overall ability to adjust, in spite of initial hiccups and failures, has 

been much more impressive than the QDR process itself. Put it 

that way. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. I would just say that, just picking up on Shawn’s 

comment earlier, I mean, there has been an awful lot of consistency 

across the last four Quadrennial Defense Reviews in terms of the 

challenges that they have highlighted and the steps that need to 

be taken. I think where they all have fallen down is the lack of 

alignment, their inability to align the program. It is not going to 

happen overnight, but we are still running on the force structure 

and the program that was essentially laid out in the 1993 BottomUp Review. We really haven’t moved beyond that. We talk a good 

game about changing the force planning construct, getting beyond 

the two major theater war construct, but we still aren’t there. And 

I think we have a long way to go. 

The last point I would just say, ma’am, is I think there is a danger that the QDRs have just gotten too big. It has gone from being 

an innovative practice to being institutionalized, where you have a 

bureaucracy that is working this. Tons of contractors, lots of folks, 

each service has its own QDR office that is already established. It 

just gets to a point where I think it has gone too far. And I think 

simplifying that process and getting it down to where it is not all 

things to all people would be a step in the right direction. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Maybe we need a separate hearing in 

which you can come back and suggest to us how it should be reconstructed. I have a question on energy costs that are eating the Defense Department up. But I think you, Mr. Brimley, actually referred to it in your testimony. For every 25-cent increase in the 

price of a gallon of oil it costs the Department of Defense a billion 

dollars. That is staggering. And the idea that somehow we are not 

going to engage in alternative energy would be deeply troubling to 
17 

me. Do you have any comments that you would make on that in 

terms of strategy? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I would say one thing, Congresswoman. It is regarding overseas posture. One of the things I did when I was at 

the Pentagon was I was a member of the team that convinced Secretary Gates to make investments in forward architecture in 

Southeast Asia in places like Darwin, Australia, or pushing forward the deployment of littoral combat ships to Singapore. I think 

there is a key strategic need for us to remain engaged overseas. 

But part of it is a cost issue. I think if you look at in the very near 

term, yes, it costs money. But if you look at our forward presence 

over the long term, say 15 to 20 years, you know, the ability to forward station in particular naval assets in Asia I think is a very 

real cost saver over the long term, because you are not paying for 

the fuel to go back and forth, back and forth across the Pacific for 

20 years. I think there is real cost savings associated with overseas 

basing and forward posture. And I know that is not a popular issue 

on the Hill, but I think it is one we should look at. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman. It is some interesting comments. Kind of playing off of some of the things that 

have already been said, the role of the national strategy, which was 

developed by the White House and, in 2011, just kind of rolled out 

there, I have been in the process during that time frame, and I 

didn’t see a lot of transparency, a lot of discussion as to why we 

made that change or what was the analysis done. What would be 

the role of the QDR at creating the National Security Strategy? It 

is a chicken or egg kind of thing, I guess. But should as a part of 

this QDR process say that that National Security Strategy is valid 

and we ought to plan against that? Or where is the interplay between the two? And you got one group working for the White 

House who kicked it out. And I understand the tension there. But 

where in the system does the White House get graded on changes 

to the National Security Strategy? 

Mr. THOMAS. Well, just, sir, I think normally Quadrennial Defense Reviews don’t take on the issue of evaluating the National 

Security Strategy. And perhaps they should. And I think you are 

raising an interesting point. The other thing is that a lot of Quadrennial Defense Reviews have ended up rolling out a year or so before the National Security Strategy comes out. So there is kind of 

a disconnect in terms of the sequencing of events; that normally it 

is the top-level strategy that drives the defense strategy and so 

forth. 

The other thing I would say that is really missing is we have a 

Quadrennial Defense Review, the State Department now has its 

own Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review that it does, 

and other departments are doing this as well. But it seems to me 

there is a crying need for some sort of a national security review 

that occurs across departments. And I think one of the goals should 

be to take on this issue of informing or crafting what a National 

Security Strategy should be at the grand strategy level. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Kind of playing off what Ms. Speier talked about, 

we brag on the 1993 QDR. Can you give us an example of how 

2011 and 10 or 11 years in Afghanistan and a big fight in Iraq, 
18 

what happened out of the 1993 QDR that made us better prepared 

and more nimble? 

Mr. Dueck, you made the comment that made the most sense, 

and that is we are incredibly adaptive. And we will take, if you 

watch our military, we will take folks who are trained to do a lot 

of things and ask them to do totally out-of-their-lane things, and 

they get it done. So what happened out of the 1993 QDR that 

helped us in this decade that we ought to brag on? 

Dr. DUECK. Well, I think Mr. Brimley was right initially when 

he said that that in some ways was probably the most impressive, 

over the years, of the QDRs. It necessarily adapted to a post-Cold 

War world. So there was a pressure of necessity. 

And but, you know, over the years, the trend has been this gap 

between capabilities and commitments. One point I would just 

make, going back to an earlier comment, was that it is true, as Mr. 

Andrews said, that we never can predict exactly what the future 

will hold, which in a way is an argument for simply being very 

strong. I mean, you can make the case to say there is a risk that 

if we try to get too far ahead, that we could give up on existing 

capabilities. For example, if we now plan on the premise that we 

won’t face anything like Iraq or Afghanistan, and it is safe to say 

we won’t, I mean, the historical pattern has been since the 1940s 

we never get it right in terms of predicting what the next conflict 

is going to be. So, in a sense, it is not simply a matter of predicting 

some very futuristic wave; it is actually a sense of being strong 

across the board. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess the point would be that the reason that 

our team is so good at doing whatever it is we ask them to do, and 

many times it is nothing they have been trained to do, is it is about 

personnel. So as we try to deal with that tension between the costs 

of personnel, which are huge, and a big deal, versus the capacity 

to do other kinds of things, you know, we have never been really 

good at making those—you know, I hate to use the word hollow out 

the force, but it has been used an awful lot. We have not seemed 

to be able to learn our lessons and protecting that American mindset that wears our uniforms that gets things done no matter what 

the odds, no matter what the resources available. Whether it is in 

the 1930s when they just took what they got or the folks who have 

been in this fight for 12 years now. You know, undervaluing that 

I think is probably the biggest danger to the system, and not being 

able to have folks in place who can adapt, who can take a tool that 

is used for one thing and use it for something else. 

Madam Chairman, I yield back. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. 

And I have a few more questions, and Ms. Speier has a few more 

questions. So we are just going to—and then, Mr. Conaway, if you 

have any follow-up. We are just going to plow through this. I know 

we are expecting votes soon. But then we will be able to wrap it 

up. 

And I want to also echo the sentiments, as I said in my previous 

questions, that what our enemies look like in the future and what 

Mr. Andrews makes an excellent point in being prepared for that. 

And I hear, Dr. Dueck, what you are saying as well. 
19 

But I really think in light of this balance between, you know, unconstrained by resources, but the budgetary constraints, we have 

got to be realistic in making sure that we are prepared. And I 

think this is an opportunity to do that. And so I hope that we will 

take into consideration our evolving relationships with places like 

India and China and Iran, but also those that may be unanticipated in other parts of the world as well. 

We talked about the grade for QDR, not Congress. If it is an F, 

and we have an opportunity right now to improve upon it, I want 

to spend a little bit of time and hear your comments, because it 

hasn’t come up yet, about the role that the independent panel is 

going to play in this QDR as opposed to the previous. By having 

them involved, a smaller panel involved ongoing throughout the 

process, as opposed to them reviewing it at the end and telling us 

this document is worthless and doesn’t mean anything. So maybe 

they didn’t say it like that, but essentially that is what they told 

us. So how is this, the independent panel’s involvement throughout 

going to improve? Because a lot of the suggestions that have been 

made, and these are very valid questions about the process, may 

be too late for the 2014. This is an opportunity to improve upon the 

final document. So if you could just explain to us about that. 

Mr. BRIMLEY. If I could, I spent some time in my written testimony looking at this. I mean, I was in the Pentagon when the first 

independent panel started up, and I thought it was very useful, but 

it was handicapped in a sense because it started when—we were 

probably 75 percent of the way done, and then it was really this 

dynamic of them grading the homework, which I think was a useful thing to do, but I think, as you allude to, Madam Chairwoman, 

you know, standing up the independent panel now and giving them 

the documents they need to succeed, to include, I think, a lot of 

classified material, maybe secure space at the Pentagon with some 

administrative support, with a support staff that maybe is parttime, maybe some full-time that have, you know, full clearances 

that have—you know, that have a background in this stuff could 

be extremely useful. 

I remember when we were doing the 2010 QDR, we had internal 

red teams, and we brought in external folks from the think tank 

community, so there was a lot—there was a willingness, I think, 

on the part of the Pentagon, the folks crafting the QDR to really 

use these sorts of mechanisms. And I think you are right, if you 

stand up the independent panel now, staff it the right way, select 

panelists who have a background and interest in this stuff, I think 

it could be a very, very powerful mechanism to track all the way 

through. 

The final thing I would say is to structure in, you know, on and 

off ramps throughout the process where the panelists come back 

and brief this committee and others but also brief the Secretary of 

Defense. I think this could be a useful process, not just for Congress but also for the Secretary of Defense and the executive 

branch. 

Mrs. ROBY. Absolutely. 

Does anybody want to add anything? 

Okay. I will forego the rest of my time. 
20 

Ms. Tsongas, you had a couple of follow-up questions, and then 

we will go to Ms. Speier. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Not so much a question but just this hearing really 

is our opportunity to sort of revisit and visit the QDR process as 

we are poised for this next round, and as I said in my opening comments, if we got it right at the first—if we got it out of the gate, 

we would do ourselves out of a job. And I do know that we’ve revisited this QDR process over time and that now having the independent panel do its work in concert with the QDR rather than 

being a follow-on to sort of revisit and assess, I think, is an important reform, and we will see how it works. Thank you. 

Mrs. ROBY. Mrs. Speier. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Mr. Brimley, you referred to wasting assets, and you know, some 

would argue that aircraft carriers and stealth technology are examples of assets that have limited comparative advantage. Are you— 

could you point to any other wasting assets that we should be looking at? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. I think that term is generally—I should cite that, 

Jim’s boss, Andy Krepinevich, wrote a great article in Foreign Affairs that talked about wasting assets, so, in some ways, this is 

really a question for Jim. But I think, yes, you named a couple of 

capabilities that I think stealth, even aircraft carriers, if you want 

aircraft carriers to be survivable in the future, you really need to 

make investments now in increasing the range of the carrier air 

wing. I think that is a huge issue, so that is one aspect. 

I think investing in aviation capabilities that can help America 

project and sustain power over much longer ranges than we have 

in the past is really—is really what I was trying to get at when 

I used that term. You know, the massive amount of money we are 

spending procuring thousands of relatively short-range type of flyer 

aircraft does not really align, in my view, to the future of security 

environment we are going to see in places like the Middle East or 

the Asia-Pacific. 

Ms. SPEIER. Comments by Mr. Thomas. 

Mr. THOMAS. To echo Shawn a little bit, I mean, especially when 

it comes to the aircraft carrier, the Nation has made an incredible 

investment in carrier aviation over many decades, but we see today 

that the challenges we face in areas like the Western Pacific and 

even the Persian Gulf where countries with anti-ship ballistic missile technologies and anti-ship cruise missiles as well as mine and 

torpedo threats using their submarine forces, they are going to end 

up pushing our forces—our naval forces out, and they are going to 

have to operate from greater ranges. 

So, figuring out how we extend the life of the aircraft—extend 

the range of the aircraft that fly off the decks of the carriers is absolutely critical to getting every penny of value out of the aircraft 

carriers that are in the fleet today and that we are going to have 

in the future. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you all. 

Mrs. ROBY. Well, I just want to thank you, Mr. Brimley and Dr. 

Dueck, and Mr. Thomas. We really value what—the information 

that you brought us today and all of the information contained in 

your testimony, and I just want to say, as we really enter into this 
21 

process and think about the things that we talked about today and, 

you know, God willing, improve upon this process so we have an 

end product that is going to be useful in these outyears and really 

not focusing so much on the now, which we got caught up in a little 

too much in the last, but really, really taking this opportunity to 

prepare for 20 years from now. 

So thank you again for your time and your testimony, and to the 

members of the committee. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 26, 2013 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 26, 2013 

(27) 

Opening Remarks 

As Prepared For Delivery 

Rep. Martha Roby 

Chairman 

Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 

Hearing entitled "The Quadrennial Defense Review: Process, Policy, and Perspectives" 

February 26, 2013 

The Quadrennial Defense Review undertaken by the Pentagon every four years is an 

extraordinary effort. 

It is a very important mechanism for our defense leaders to consider our nation's longterm military strategy. 

It is a way to attempt to match our defenses to the likely threats of the future. 

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a clear articulation of the U.S. defense strategy 

has become more challenging. In this period, the threats to the United States have become more 

varied and unpredictable. Clearly describing our national defense posture in an unstable world is 

the difficult task of the QDR. 

The QDR process is just now beginning. Over the next year, Department of Defense 

officials will carefully consider how to approach the world and determine what resources and 

force structure are consequently needed. The Department has committed to come before us in 

coming months to learn more about how the effort is proceeding. 

Today we will hear fi'om three distinguished witnesses who are knowledgeable about past 

QDRs and defense strategy in general. They will testify about how the QDR process might be 

shaped and about broader strategic issues they believe the coming QDR should consider. 

I hope this panel can help to clarify the principles on which a national defense strategy 

should be based, and how those involved in the current effort might approach their task. 

In two months, we will mark the thirty-third anniversary of historic testimony before this 

subcommittee. In May 1980, the Chief of Staff of tile Army, General Edward "Shy" Meyer 

coined the phrase "hollow Army" in describing the conditions of Army units deployed across the 

globe to Members of this subcommittee. 

The world has changed tremendously in the intervening years. But, it remains dangerous. 

The 2014 QDR is meant to guide our planning as we anticipate the threats to the nation and the 
28 

forces we must maintain in response. We cannot retum to the days ofa "hollow Army." 

I thank the witnesses for their attendance today and look forward to bearing their 

testimony. 

I now tum to my distinguished Ranking Member for any remarks Rep. Tsongas may wish 

to make. 
29 

Statement of Representative Niki Tsongas, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Hearing on "The Quadrennial Defense Review: Process, Policy, 

and Perspectives" 

February 26, 2013 

Chairman Roby, thank you for your kind remarks. 

Good morning, Mr. Brimley, Mr. Thomas, and Dr. Dueck. Thank you for 

appearing before our Subcommittee today. I look forward to your testimony. 

This is the first hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee for the 

113th Congress and I want to congratulate Representative Roby on her selection as 

Chairman. I am glad that you and I have already been able to meet personally and I 

know the staff has been meeting regularly as well. I look forward to working with 

you and all of your colleagues on the Subcommittee. 

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome my Democratic colleagues, 

Representative Rob Andrews, Representative Jackie Speier and Representative 

Tammy Duckworth. I am excited to work together. 

I know we are going to meet together soon to discuss the issues and agenda for the 

Subcommittee. This Subcommittee has the ability to dive deeply into some of the 

more long-term issues facing the Department of Defense and its servicemen, 

servicewomen, and their families. I look forward to doing so in the bipartisan spirit 

of the Armed Services Committee. We have much to do. 

Turning to the QDR, I think it is always important to have a regular thoughtful and 

reflective review of both the long-term and short-term issues confronting the 

Department of Defense. Having a regular review ofthe review, so to speak, is also 

critical. As with all that we do, we can always do it better. This is even more so 

with the unsettled environment we are dealing with, both fiscally and with the new 

and evolving threats to our national security. We are well past the Cold War and a 

decade past 9111. We all have very difficult decisions to make regarding the best 

way to protect our Nation in the future. 

As of now we have the QDR, an independent review of the QDR, a GAO review 

of the sufficiency of the QDR, a military strategy assessment by the Joint Chiefs, 

as well at the recent National Security Strategy by the White House and the joint 
30 

DoD/Joint Staff Defense Strategic Review. We need to make sure all of these 

reviews are consistent and don't contradict each other. 

I want to make sure we get his right and I am pleased we have such an experienced 

panel here today. With sequestration set to take effect just three days from now, I 

believe that this hearing is also quite timely. Our defense strategy, after all, does 

not exist in an intellectual void; it must reflect the resources that we extend to our 

Anned Services. I am curious to hear all of your thoughts on how we can evolve 

our strategy to meet 21 st century threats in a period of fiscal austerity. 

I look forward to our discussion today with our distinguished panel. I hope you can 

help us with these difficult decisions we have ahead. 
31 

(:l~NJ$1BI!5SI~Ni\l4! 

ilES;'Jllm~NM1 

,~hoiceaI'i4.C~nstraint: Considering the 

2~~~Quadrenll.~IOefense Review 

Pj'ep."r"d StatemeQI<ef·Shawn Brimley 

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

Prepared Statement of Shawn Brimley 

Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for a New American Security 

Thank you Chairwomen Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas and members of the committee. I am honored 

to testify today on the important topic of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I had the 

privilege of serving as the lead drafter for the 2010 QDR, but I want to make clear up-front that I was not a 

senior decision-maker but rather one of many action officers participating in the year-long review, My 

comments reflect my personal views, not those of the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Center for a 

New American Security. 

My comments are organized along several1ines of approach: the strategic environment; the purpose and 

role of the QDR; key issues forlhe 2014 QDR; and the critical role of Congress during a QDR cycle. 

The Strategic Environment 

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review v{ill occur in a strategic environment quite different than the one 

the Obama administration inherited in early 2009. The global economy, though still uncertain, no longer 

teeters on the hrink of collapse. The 100,000 u.s. troops that were fighting in Iraq are home. A transition 

strategy is underway in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden is dead. Great power relations are stable. 

President Obama's first term included several challenges that have carried over and will frame U.S, 

foreign policy for at least the next four years. Today's security environment features a Middle East and 

North Africa roiled by political change. The so-called Arab Spring is, at root, a story of people rising up to 

claim their rightful agency after decades of authoritarianism~even so, the implications remain unclear. 

Korth Korea's nuclear test and Iran's continued investments in a nuclear program keep the prospect of 

nuclear-armed pariah states on the front-burner. The war in Afghanistan may be winding down, but it is 

not over so long as tens of thousands of our men and women in uniform remain in harm's way. It is in 

America's interest to remain the security partner of choice in Afghanistan as part of a sustainable 

counterterrorism strategy and to influence the development of Afghan security forces. 

The most important geopolitical story remains the rise of both India, the world's most populous 

democracy, and China, the world's most populous country, As India rises and looks increasingly east 

to"ward Asian markets, and as China rises and increasingly looks south into the South China Sea and 

southwest into the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean·-their interaction will cause powerful ripples in the 

global security environment that we must factor into U.S. statecraft. 1 

I See Robert Kaplan's, j\1onsoon: Th; ~:;;~:;' ~~:~~:~;~: ;'''~;~:~Vr~;r::~;,~~~:::';;:~~~lewYoJrk lJ.andorn Hom,e, 2010), and also "The Geography of Chinese Power," in ru"n~u ~J}Ul" 

www.cnas.org 
32 

(:l~NJ$1BI!5SI~Ni\l4! 

ilES;'Jllm~NM1 

,~hoiceaI'i4.C~nstraint: Considering the 

2~~~Qlladrenll.~IOefense Review 

Pj'ep."r"d StatemeQI<ef·Shawn Brimley 

This security environment will also be shaped by several powerful underlying trends ofw-hieh I would like 

to highlight two: 

1. An energy revolution centered in the United States. The pace of recent advances in domestic 

energy production has put the United States on a path to become the largest global oil producer 

by about 2020 and Norlh America as a net oil exporter by 2030.2 This development-due largely 

to rapid advances in hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling-will have profound geopolitical 

consequences that are only now becoming apparent. Policymakers must contemplate the future of 

U.S. defense strategy in the Middle East as the vast majority of exported oil shifts to Asia instead 

of North America; the resultant consequences for key C".S. alliances and partners around the 

world; and the diplomatic, trade, and defense investments that should begin today to prepare for 

this rapidly approaching shift. How this generation ofC",S.leaders addresses these issues will have 

a generational impact on the international system and on the practice of American statecraft. 

2. The continued prol~feration of advanced technology, The scale and breadth of the technology 

available to state and non-state actors continues to increase. What Farced Zakaria called the 

"democratization ofviolcnce" a decade ago has only accelerated,' Rapid advances in global 

navigation and surveillance technology coupled with a significant diffusion oflong-range, precise, 

automated, and increasingly unmanned technology will pose significant challenges to U,S. 

defense strategy.l Systems and operational concepts long considered bastions of comparative 

advantage may become "wasting assets"~particularly capabilities designed to project U,S, 

military power in contested air and maritime domains,s The coming years will see the continued 

spread of unmanned and autonomous systems, powerful offensive cyberspace tools, directed 

energy capabilities, widely available 3D printing platforms, human performance enhancement 

technologies, and a miniaturization of weapons spurred by advances in nanotechnology. It is not 

at all clear that the United States will lead in these areas, 

The fiscal environment is also an important component of this strategic picture. The looming prospect of 

sequestration~a particularly astrategic method of reducing the defense budgct~will reduce the readiness 

of U.S. military forces and thus their ability to properly secure U.S. interests while preparing for a range of 

'~~~ g:;~;,;~~:~:~:;\~~e~%:~~~~~~. World Energy Outlook 2012. Also see Elizabeth Rosenthal, "U,S. to be World's T The New York Times (November 12,2012), and A National Strategy for 

Some have argued 

www,cnas.org 
33 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

plausible contingencies. While I believe that the U.S. defense budget can be responsibly reduced by a 

reasonable margin given the massive increase in spending over the last decade, the failure to give the 

Secretary of Defense the ability to be precise and targeted with these cuts amounts to an unnecessary sdfinflicted strategic wound. 

The combination of a changing geopolitical environment; accelerating energy and technological 

revolutions; and a much more constrained discretionary spending picture will combine to make the 2014 

QDR perhaps the most important review since the 1993 Bottom-Up Review. 6 

Purpose and Role o/the2014 QDR 

QDRs are best understood as "snapshots" in time along the entire arc of the post-Cold War era.7 These 

snapshots should be vie"wed together~from the Base Force and the Bottom-Up Review to the previous 

QDRs. When viewed this way, recurring contours of inquiry come into sharp relief: 

How to best assess the sufficiency of the current and planned force; 

How to understand core missions and how those missions relate to one another; 

How to address lowering entry barriers and access to increasingly advanced technology; 

How to understand U ,So security commitments to key allies and partners; 

How to conceive of America's forward deployed forces and overseas bases; 

How to account for stability operations in doctrine and force sizing; and 

How to preserve America's ability to project pov-ler given the spread of anti-access and areadenial (A21 AD) capabilities. 

Beyond the above relatively constant lines of inquiry, individual QDRs are also highly dependent on other 

factors, chief among them the disposition and priorities of the Secretary of Defense. 'While QDRs are in 

the most important sense an obligation to Congress, most Secretaries of Defense also consider QDRs as an 

important tool to affect positive change in DOD. 

The principal challenge with QDRs is that they have generally attempted to satisfy multiple purposes, 

QDRs are often judged by their ability to be: 

1. A response to specific Congressional legislation; 

2. An enterprise-wide long-term strategy document; 

3. An important near-term lever for the current budget cycle; 

4. A vehicle for the Secretary of Defense to advance particularly important initiatives; and 

5. A critical public relations and strategiC communications document. 

6 The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance was a consequential document but it was not designed to be as detailed as the 

four previous QDRs nor the two reviews done at the end of the Cold War~the so-called "Base Force" in 1991 and 

the Bottom-Up Review in 1993~all of which contained implementation gUidance and specific recommendations on 

force structure. 

- Points in this section draw on comments I delivered on January 25,2013 during a conference at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies (CSTS). 

www.cnas.org 
34 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

No QDR has ever been able to funy satisfy all five of these expectations. In 2009, Secretary Robert Gates 

made a choice that the 2010 review would be "a wartime QDR" designed to help him focus the 

Department on ensuring that the tens of thousands of U.S. troops in harm's way in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 

elsewhere were given the resources and attention they needed and deserved. This is why the 2010 Q[)R 

prioritized "prevailing in today's wars," and focused on so-called "enabling capabilities" -manned and 

unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, rotary-wing assets, and 

counterinsurgency capabilities-that tended to be overlooked by a Pentagon focused on plausible but 

hypothetical future conventional wars.1I r believed then and now that when the Un,itea' St"te!' isact,'vely at 

war, the QDR process should be used to assist the men and women in l,afll11'S wa,y as mlucil ao' pClssilble. 

The tension-as existed in 2009 and 20IO-was between a Congressional requirement to focus on an ideal 

force structure 20 years into the future with no resource limitations, and a Secretary of Defense focused on 

prevailing in ongoing conflicts and managing the most complex budget in the world.') Some might argue 

the Pentagon can do both, but the same senior civilian and military leaders charged with executing a QDR 

are the same figures the Secretary relies on for advice on how to prevail in ongoing conflicts and support 

the troops in harm's way. I believe the 2010 QDR did a reasonably good job at identifying ways to help 

resource U.S, troops at war and in setting parameters to guide the evolution of the force over time,10 

This tension will be much reduced in the 2014 QDR. While U.S. troops remain in harm's way in 

Afghanistan, the transition strategy has been set and it is proper to shift more fully toward the question of 

how to sustain and enhance the best all-volunteer military in the world over the long haul. In order to 

enable this focus the 2014 QDR should deprioritize the perceived need to he a puhlic relations 

document-delineating in detail core U.S, interests; overall defense strategy; the importance of particular 

alliances and partnerships; and various other perceived requirements-and provide Congress a 20-year 

vision coupled with a detailed examination of how that vision can be best applied given constrained 

resources. The essence of good strategy, after all, is an alignment of ends, ways, and means, 

Recommended Areas of Focus for the 2014 QDR 

A core challenge for any defense review is the powerful gravitational pull toward the perceived need to 

cover everything. This QDR cannot afford to be a mile wide and an inch deep, and it need not be. This 

will be a second-term QDR that has a very detailed predecessor and, more importantly, a recently 

concluded strategic review overseen in detail by the Commander-in-Chief. The 2012 Defense Strategic 

Guidance (DSG) is an effective document that sets clear strategic priorities for a Pentagon facing 

20lU). 

'! The final report of the QDR Independent Panel contained similar tensions, lauding the QDR's focus on today's 

wars but criticizing the report's lack of a clear 20-yearview, See Stephen Hadley and William Perry (co··chairs), The 

QDR in Perspective: The Final Report of the QDR Independent Panel (U.S. Institute of Peace, July 2010). 

lfl See 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, p. 39-45. 

www.cnas.org 
35 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

constrained budgets. The 2014 QDR therefore should not retread ground plowed by previous efforts, but 

rather use the DSG as the baseline strategy and focus on how best to implement the strategy over a 20-

year period at varying plausible levels of resources and risk. I believe the 2014 QDR can best achieve this 

by focusing in part on the following strategic issues: 

Preserve Investment in Game-Changing Technologies. Absent extraordinary leadership and vision, in 

constrained budget environments the natural indination of each military service will be to preserve 

capabilities it considers "core" to its unique history, traditions, and threat assessments. 11 The current 

budget environment reflects a relatively "normal" defense drawdown by historical standards, so most 

analysts expect continued defense reductions over the next decade absent a major strategic shock. The 

biggest challenge in this environment will be to ensure that investments in "generation-after-next" 

technologies continue. Congress should ensure that programs designed to sustain the ability to project 

and sustain U.S. military power over long ranges into contested air and maritime theatres are prioritized 

and protecled. A good example of this is the ongoing attempt to develop a carrier-based unmanned 

combat aerial vehicle (UCA V) that can provide real capability in contested environments. 12 It is unclear 

whether this capability will be prioritized in the face of continued budget pressure, or whether it will 

wither on the vine in favor of developing yet another manned fighter aircraft after the F-35 Joint Strike 

Fighter. 

Protecting investments in game-changing technologies (and the experimentation required) in very 

constrained budget environments has been done hefore. The so-called "interwar years" of the 1920s and 

1930s saw America and other nations develop, refine, and field tanks, long-range bombers, radar, 

submarines, and aircraft carriers. If these innovations could be achieved in the context of the greatest 

economic downturn in history-the Great Depression~surely we can find a way to prioritize and 

preserve innovation todayY 

Reverse the Declining Value of the Defense Dollar: The 2014 QDR must deal forthrightly with the largest 

budget challenge-the ballooning cost of military personnel accounts. As several leading analysts have 

concluded, if the defense budget is held constant in real terms and personnel costs continue to rise at the 

same rate as the last decade, the entire defense budget will be consumed by personnel accounts before the 

year 2040. 14 As retired Major General Arnold Punaro has colorfully put it, "We're on the path in the 

11 See Carl Builder, Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 

The Case for a Carrier-Based 

~;~~:~~~i!:~;:;~~~~::f:~:~i?j:f:~:~:'~C~:~i:::~l~:;(~C:':c:nt~e:r ;~ Uncertainty (Center for for Strategic Strategic and and Budgetary International Assessments, Studies, 2012). 2012), The and 

www.cnas.org 
36 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

Department of Defense to turn it into a benefits company that may occasionally kill a terrorist."!5 A dose 

second to personnel costs include the massive overhead in the Pentagon, defense agencies and 

headquarters staffs. 16 The 2014 QDR cannot be confined to defense strategy and force structure alone-to 

be truly meaningful it must identify specific ways to flatten the cost curve of personnel, overhead, health 

care, and infrastructure. This will require elements of DOD not typically involved in the year~long 

minutia of a QDR to be structurally integrated into all aspects of the review,l? 

Enhance Overseas Presence: The 2010 QDR helped to accelerate what has become known as the 

"rebalancing" strategy toward Asia, The review concluded that U.S. defense posture needed to remain 

operationally resilient in Northeast Asia, but also more geographically distributed into Southeast Asia, 

This insight helped to accelerate discussions with Australia and Singapore that resulted in a growing 

contingent of U.S. Marines rotationally deployed to Darwin, Australia and U.S. Navy Littoral Combat 

Ships (LCS) being slated to operate out of Singapore on a rotational basis. 18 These initial moves reflected 

not only the strategic need for increased U.S. presence in Southeast Asia, but also an emerging realization 

that, over the long term, forward air and maritime presence can be more affordable than constantly 

deploying air and maritime forces over transoceanic distances. I believe that if the United States is to fully 

resource the "rebalancing" strategy in Asia over a 20-year timeframe and also retain credible air and 

maritime deterrence in the Persian Gulf, DOD must continue to assess in detail the nature of forward 

presence and creative ways to sustain and enhance it. 19 

Provide Detailed Risk Assessment: The 2014 QDR report should provide Congress with a detailed 

assessment of the missions required under the defense strategy and the force structure required to execute 

them under several combinations of plausible scenarios. Having met the basic requirement to provide a 

force structure unconstrained by the current budget, the 2014 QDR ought to then provide various 

alternative force structures which can be plausibly sustained given the current and expected budget 

environment. The QDR should then identify how these alternative force structures would perform under 

the scenario combinations and the different ways each alternative would pose strategic, operational, force 

management, and institutional risk to the overall defense strategy. In a way not dissimilar to the 1993 

Bottom-Up Review, the 2014 QDR should recommend to Congress a force structure that best balances 

prudent budget choices with risk to the proposed defense strategy. As I will outline below, this element of 

the Q[)R should be classified. 

J-i Quoted in Tamara Keith, "Health Care Costs New Threat to U.S. Military," National Public Radio (June 7, 2011). 

1(, See Michele Flournoy, "The Right \Vay to Cut Pentagon Spending," The 'Wall Street Journal (Februaty 4, 2013). 

17 The usual QDR players tend to be: OSD Policy, AT&L, and CA PE; the strategy and force structure directorates in 

the military services and the Joint Staff; and the various combatant commands. Other elements of DOD that focus 

on military personnel, heath care, retirement, and infrastructure tend to not be involved until the very end of the 

process, if at all. 

III This logic also applied to u.s. defense strategy in the Mediterranean, where four u.S, Navy Aegis ships will be 

forward deployed to Rota, Spain. 

l~ See Shawn Brimley and Ely Ratner, "Smart Shift," Foreign AJJairs (January/February 2013), and also Michele 

Flournoy and Janine Davidon, "Obama's New Global Posture," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2012). 

www.cnas.org 
37 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

The Important Role of Congress 

Congress plays a critical important role in any QDR cycle. The frequency, nature, and quality of its 

oversight during the review have a powerful impact on the final product. I recommend Members consider 

the following recommendations during their oversight of this QDR cycle: 

Empower a Bipartisan QDR independent Panel (QDR iP): Congress and the Secretary of Defense 

should carefully consider appointments to the panel, biasing toward former policymakers with 

experience at the highest levels of the Pentagon, and those with a bipartisan pedigree. Also important 

will be the selection of a small support staff with previous QDR experience. The staff should also be 

balanced to ensure a bipartisan ethos. The QDR IP should be provided with the material necessary to 

fully execute its charter, to include: the QDR terms of reference; the set of scenarios used for force 

sizing and shaping; the methodology used to assess strategic and operational risk associated with 

various options; and a detailed assessment of the drivers of military personnel costs and plausible 

options under consideration to reduce their rates of growth. The panelists and support staff should 

also be provided with detailed monthly classified briefings by OSD, Joint Staff, and Service 

representatives. The panel's staff should be pf{wided a secure space in the Pentagon, and reasonable 

administrative support. The panelists should also be expected to brief Congressional leaders and the 

Secretary of Defense on their findings throughout the process, not simply after the QDR is published 

in 2014. Led, staffed, and resourced properly, the QDR Independent Panel could he a valuable tool 

not only for Congress but also for the Secretary of Defense. 

Require an Integrated Classified Review: Previolls QDRs have made use of classified materials 

submitted to Congress, but the 2014 QDR ought to formally integrate one or more classified sections 

into the review itself. One of the biggest challenges in the 2010 QDR was explaining, in an unclassified 

format, the force sizing and shaping construct that informed the force structure recommendations. 

The use of integrated sets of contingency scenarios overlaid on a so~called "steady~state" global 

security posture was a powerful analytic engine that helped Pentagon officials consider various 

alternatives, but this 'was difficult to fully convey in the unclassified QDR report.20 It is worth 

conSidering whether to classify certain sections of the report in order to provide Congress with the 

best possible integrated product. I believe this would also have a positive secondary effect at the 

Pentagon by obviating the need for policymakers to reargue elements of the unclassified QDR when 

drafting follow~on classified implementation guidance such as the Guidance for the Employment of 

the Force (GEF), and the relevant program guidance for the budget cycle following the QDR's release. 

Require the QDR to be ResoU/'cc-Informed: One of the bigger issues in recent years has been the 

argument that QDRs need to be totally unconstrained hy budget pressure. It \vould be a mistake for 

QDRs to be entirely unconstrained, as that 'would surely exacerbate the gap between strategy and 

resources. This approach would ultimately result in QDRs skewing toward fantasy rather than reality. 

2(1 The best description of this can be found in Kathleen Hicks and Sam Brannen, "Force Planning in the 2010 QDR," 

Joint Force Quarterly (Issue 59, 4th quarter 2010). 

www.cnas.org 
38 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

At the same time the QDR cannot simply he a near-term budget drilL A reasonable approach would 

be for Congress to make clear that it expects the 2014 QDR to outline the size and shape of u.s. military forces required to execute the most stressing overlapping set of plausible scenarios under 

consideration. The QDR could then develop a set ofbudgeHnformed force structures that could then 

be tested in similar ways to determine which one best balances risk across the 20-year time period. 

Given the relatively advantageous position the United States is in today, it would be prudent Lo accept 

a modest degree of risk in the near~term to ensure that U.S. military forces are investing in the fight 

capabilities and structure to operate effectively in the more challenging future security environment. 

Conclusion 

In closing, let me express my admiration to the Committee for its attention to this important issue. 

Quadrennial Defense Reviews are complicated processes with many dozens of important players-all 

with particular views on how to create and sustain the hest defense strategy for the United States and 

the military forces required to succeed. I believe this particular QDR will be the most important since 

the 1993 Bottom~Up Review, as it comes at the end of a prolonged period of war, the rise of new 

powers, and the need to make tough, clear-headed choices in a constrained budget environment. I am 

confident that with the active support of Congress, the Department of Defense will rise to the 

occasion. Thank you. 

www.cnas.org 
39 

, 

EQ;l'lI~R.~lit\l!1)il'll!l\lfi 

\liSSl'l!fMCf)~1 

Shawn Brimley 

C:~oice ai'ld$icl'Istraint: Considering the 

2~'4 QuadreMi~1 Defense Review' 

Prepa~ed Statemernt",f$hawn Brimley 

Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for a New American Security 

Shawn Brimley is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security 

(CNAS) where he oversees the center's research and serves on the executive leadership team. Mr. Brimley 

rejoined CNAS after serving in the Obama Administration from February 2009 to October 2012 most 

recently as Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council staff at the White House. He 

also served as Special Advisor to the Undcr Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Pentagon from 2009 to 

2011, where he focused on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, overseas basing and posture, and longrange strategy development. In 2012, he was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding 

Public Service and in 2010 he was awarded the Office of the Secretary of Dcfcnse Medal for Exceptional 

Public Service. 

Mr. Brimley was a founding member of eN AS in 2007 and was the inaugural recipient of the ILt. Andrew 

Bacevich Jr. Memorial Fellowship. He has also worked at the Center [or Strategic and International 

Studies. 

lvIr. Brimley has heen puhlished in a variety of venues, including the New York Times, Foreign Affairs and 

Foreign Polhy, Educated at Queen's University and George \Vashington University, his research interests 

include U.S. national security strategy and defense policy, the impact of emerging technology on U.S. 

strategic choices, and the evolution of America's glohal defense posture. Mr. Brimley is a term member of 

the Council on Foreign Relations. He lives in Washington with his wife Marjorie and their two children, 

Claire and Austin. 

www.cnas.org 
40 

DISCLOSURE FORNI: FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAl, CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.s. 

Hc,usl~ ofRepl:eS!~ntati'les for the witnesses 

"Pl"'linuis O'"lU'" lelUI"'" committees to statements a curriculum 

a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(inclu.dirlg subcontracts and subgrants) received during the CUlTen! and two 

years either by the witness witness. fonn is 

intended to assist witnesses on Anned Services in 

complying with the House Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic fonn not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness "a,u,~._S_h_a_w_n __ ....;. ___ _ 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

If llPlleairiIlg in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

federal grant(s) / federal agency doUarvalue subject(s) of contract or 

contracts ~~-~--- None 

-

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

federal grant(s) / federal agency doUarvalue subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 

--------~-
41 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

Federal grant(s} I federal agency dollar value subjed(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 

----~--

Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide !he following information: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacttrring, software design, force structtue consultsnt, architecttue & engineering 

services, etc.): 

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 

None 

2 

I 

I 
42 

Federal Grant Informatiun: lfyou or the entity you represent before the Cornmittee on 

Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please 

provide the following information: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Fiscal yc<u L.V1L:'::~ ______________ ~ ___ , 

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: 

Fiscal year 2(H2:~",,-______________ ; 

Fiscal year 2011 ;No_n_e __________ • ______________ .. __ _ 

List of subjects offederal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc_): 

None 

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held: 

Con-ent fiscal 

Fiscal ye(lr ~:~:::~~=-----------------------------; Fiscal year 2011 : ________ ~ ___________________ _ 

3 
43 

Congressional testimony 

February 24, 2013 

House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

The Quadrennial Defense Review: Process, Policy, and Perspectives 

I'd like to thank the members of this subcommittee for inviting me to speak with you 

today. 

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was originally described by Congress as having 

the purpose of providing a coherent, big-picture outlook on probable international security 

trends, along with their logical implications for u.s. defense strategy, military budgets, and 

force posture. 1 It is widely observed that the QDR process has tended to stray from that 

original purpose, over the years. The overpowering consideration for some time now has been 

budget cuts to defense. Unfortunately this trend looks likely to continue. And the temptation 

has been to let budget cuts drive strategic thinking, rather than the other way around. 

I know that members of this subcommittee, along with those at the Department of 

Defense directly responsible for formulating the coming QDR, must operate under practical 

constraints which those of us who testify here can only begin to understand. To paraphrase 

one of America's greatest Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, defense strategy is not a 

graduate seminar. Having said that, most of this country's wars have resulted, at least in part, 

from some failure of strategic conception or strategic signaling to U.s. adversaries beforehand. 

So there are real-world consequences, in blood and treasure, when we fail to think strategically, 

or to pursue consistent strategies in the nation's defense. In the time allotted here, I will not 

attempt to give a detailed, technical assessment of what is after all going to be an incredibly 

complicated QDR 2014 process. But allow me to make a few broad points for your 

consideration as that process gets underway. 

The QDR is supposed to help outline national defense strategy. A strategy begins by 

identifying certain vital national interests, goals, or objectives. It then identifies threats to 

those interests, arising from particular real-world adversaries. Finally, it recommends the 

development and maintenance of specific policy instruments, including a variety of military 

capabilities, to meet those threats. It is sometimes said that we live in an age of austerity, so 

inevitably budgetary constraints will drive the strategy. But resources are always limited, and 

strategy is always about developing a coherent approach toward specific threats under 

1 H.R. 3230 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. 
44 

conditions of limited resources. So if we simply let declining budgets dictate how we identify 

threats to our national interests, we're not really engaging in strategy at all. 2 

Strategy is about prioritizing and facing tradeoffs. It's about matching up commitments 

and capabilities, policy objectives and policy instruments, so that the two are in some kind of 

reasonable balance. And the truth is that right now there is a wide and growing gap or 

imbalance between America's declared international security objectives, on the one hand, and 

its military capabilities on the other. 

To be fair, this is a pattern which has repeated itself in different ways and at different 

times, in what might be called a bipartisan fashion, over the course of more than one 

administration. Nevertheless, we are speaking here today at a time when the gap between 

America's overall military capabilities and its existing international commitments is truly 

disturbing, and is likely to only get worse. 

Here are just a couple of concrete examples. The United States has adopted a policy of 

pivoting or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. At the same time, however, we have continued 

to cut back the number of ships in the Navy. The two opposing directions do not add up. If one 

of the purposes of the pivot is to reassure our Asian allies and remind China that the United 

States is in East Asia to stay, then how can we bolster that impression, while at the same time 

cutting back on our maritime capabilities? China may not be simply an adversary, but it is 

certainly a strategic competitor. Another example: just a few weeks ago, the Pentagon 

indicated that it would not deploy the USS Harry S. Truman to the Middle East, as scheduled. 

America's naval presence in the Persian Gulf region has now been reduced from two aircraft 

carriers, to one. What possible conclusion can the Iranian government, and for that matter our 

Gulf allies, reach from this announcement, other than that the United States is now weaker in 

the region, relative to Iran? Our allies, adversaries and competitors will not simply watch what 

we say, they will watch what we do. And as our ships draw down or come home, they will 

notice. 

The overall trend, which is growing worse, is that we have broad, declared international 

commitments that are under-resourced militarily. Under such circumstances, fundamentally, 

only a few basic options exist. Either the country can boost its military capabilities, to match 

existing commitments, or it can scale back dramatically on existing commitments, to match 

reduced capabilities. 

Z For some definitions and discussions of strategy, see Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture? and 

Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006); S.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (Praeger, 1954); 

and Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard University Press, 1987). 
45 

There is of course a third option, which is to claim that we will do more with less, while 

denying that any real tradeoffs exist. I would call this strategic denial. But this is not a true 

option. We can do more with more. We can do less with less. But when it comes to national 

defense, we can't actually do more with less. 

To give credit to the administration, its 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance began to head 

in the direction of greater internal coherence, relative to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 

Review. For example, the 2012 guidance moved away from the traditional two-war standard, 

by which U.S. forces are prepared to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously.3 I 

happen to believe that being incapable of fighting two such conflicts at the same time is a 

mistake, because it more or less invites rogue states to think they might succeed with 

aggressive behavior while the U.S. is preoccupied in some other part of the world. But it must 

be conceded that given dramatic cuts in defense since 2011, there are serious doubts as to 

whether the U.S. can maintain the traditional two-war standard. In that narrow sense, the 

2012 guidance is an improvement, in terms of strategic consistency: it implies less with less, 

rather than simply trying to be all things to all people. 

Assuming we now add on additional defense cuts of some $500 billion over the next 

decade - which seems increasingly likely to happen, regardless of short-term adjustments 

around sequestration - then it has to be emphasized that even the downscaled national 

defense strategy implied in the 2012 guidance will no longer be coherent or sustainable. 

Perhaps the only good thing about this dire prospect is that it might force a genuine debate and 

assessment of some of the basic assumptions surrounding U.S. defense strategy. 

If the United States implements defense cuts anything like the ones envisioned under 

sequestration, on top of existing cuts from the 2011 Budget Control Act, then the only way to 

bring shrinking military capabilities into balance with international commitments will be to cut 

back dramatically on those commitments. The U.S. would then be headed toward a defense 

strategy resembling what political scientists call "offshore balancing.,,4 Indeed in certain ways 

we already seem to be headed in that direction. The relative emphasis today on long-range 

strike capacity, special operations, drone strikes, cyber war, area denial, and light-footed 

approaches to international security challenges, rather than on heavy ground forces, stability 

operations, counterinsurgency, or major regional war contingencies, is at least a move in the 

direction of offshore balancing. Such a strategy has always had a certain appeal in this country, 

because it appears to promise national security at minimal cost. But it carries certain risks or 

downsides as well. A strategy of offshore balancing, if that is where we are headed, risks 

3 Department of Defense, "Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," January 2012, p. 4. 

4 Christopher Layne, "The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing," The Natianallnterest, January 2012; Stephen 

Walt, "A Bandwagon for Offshore Balancing?" Foreign Policy, December 2011. 
46 

signaling to U.S. adversaries and allies alike that we are not really in the game. Naturally this 

will reduce America's leverage abroad, diplomatically, economically, and militarily. And it will 

make it much harder to achieve our stated goals of preventing aggression, succeeding in 

counterterrorism operations, maintaining open sea-lanes, and preserving a balance of power in 

Europe and Asia friendly to the United States and to its democratic values. 

For many years now, America's overarching and forward strategic presence abroad -

including its related bases, its alliance system, and clear U.S. military superiority - have played a 

crucial role in deterring authoritarian powers, reassuring democratic allies, and upholding a 

particular international order that for all its current discontents is remarkably prosperous and 

free by historical standards. If this strategic presence becomes detached or uncertain, there is 

no reason to expect that the benefits of that particular order for the United States will 

continue. If we adopt what is in effect a strategy of offshore balancing, whether or not we call 

it that, then we will have adopted a strategic approach that is at least internally coherent, and 

in line with current projected defense cuts. But we will have done so by giving up on key 

commitments and features of America's stabilizing presence overseas going back several 

decades. And if we give up on that presence, we cannot assume it will be easy or cheap to buy 

back. It never has been before. 

So if you have asked me here to make policy recommendations related to the coming 

QDR, without regard to the immediate political climate, then the first thing I would say is: we 

have to stop cutting national defense. Because if we don't, we will soon be left with no honest 

strategic options other than some form of offshore balancing and as I have indicated, there 

are multiple reasons to believe that such a choice could have negative international 

consequences on a scale we can barely foresee today. 

But the second thing I would say is, let's at least not engage in strategic denial. let's not 

pretend we can maintain existing commitments while continually cutting military capabilities. 

let's have a genuine debate over U.S. defense strategy. And this is where I believe you can play 

a vital role in relation to the coming QDR. You can help ensure that the QDR 2014 process 

reflects the original and stated intention of Congress, to produce both a long-term reflection on 

international security trends and a serious strategy from start to finish which sets clear 

priorities, identifies real-world adversaries, and faces up to the necessary tradeoffs, rather than 

denying or glossing over the growing gap between our military capabilities and our 

international commitments. 

Thank you for your time. 

Colin Dueck 

George Mason University 
47 

Colin Dueck 

Associate Professor 

Department of Public and International Affairs 

George Mason University 

Colin Dueck is an Associate Professor in George Mason University's Department of Public and 

International Affairs. He studied politics at Princeton University, and international relations at 

Oxford under a Rhodes scholarship. He has published two books on American foreign and 

national security policies, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World 

War II (Princeton, 20 I 0), and Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American 

Grand Strategy (Princeton, 20(6). lie has also published articles on these same subjects in 

journals such as International Security, Orbis, Political Science Quarterly, Review of 

International Studies, Security Studies, and World Policy Journal. His current research focus is 

on the relationship between party politics, presidential leadership, American conservatism, and 

U.S. foreign policy. flis broader research and teaching interests are in the history and practice of 

international strategy and diplomacy. He is the faculty advisor for the Alexander Hamilton 

Society at George Mason University, and a member ofthe International Institute for Strategic 

Studies. 
48 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT ANI) GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), ofthc Rules of the U,S, 

House of Representatives for the II3t11 Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a cun'iculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This fonn is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Anned Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic fonn not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee, 

Witness name:_--!C~o~l~in~l)!.!u!!e~c:.!'k,-________ _ 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

x Individual 

___ Representative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 

FISCAL YEAR2012 

federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 
49 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

Federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

None 

Federal Contract Information: [[you or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following infonnation: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : _____________________ _ 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : __________________ _ 

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: __________________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: __________________ _ 

2 
50 

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on 

Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please 

provide the following information: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: _________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: _________________ _ 

Federal agencies with which federal grants arc held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: __________________ _ 

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for examplc, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2013): _______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: ___________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : ___________________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): _______________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: __________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011. ____________________ . 

3 
51 

February 26, 2013 

STATEMENT BEFORE TilE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 

OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE 

By Jim Thomas 

Vice President and Director of Studies 

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas. and Members of the Subcommittee. thank 

you for inviting me to testify this afternoon on the subject of the Quadrennial Defense 

Reviev./. In my testimony. I will offer some lessons ti'om past QDRs and 

recommendations for the upcoming revie\v. These lessons and recommendations are 

based on my involvement in the 1997.2001. and 2006 QDRs. as \vel! as the 2010 QDR, 

during \, .. hieh I served on the Secretary of Defense's external "Red Team." I \vill first 

address the issue of the defense strategy. and then turn to how the upcoming QDR might 

weigh risks. prioritize forces and capabilities. and reformulate the force planning 

construct. 

1. Thinking About '''Defense Strategy" 

One of the QDR's major tasks is to set out a defense strategy that articulates a vision of 

\vhat the Department of Defense seeks to accomplish and how it wit! do so. The 

is supposed to be the foundation for determining the Depm1ment"s priorities, where 

should invest and what activities it should undertake. Given its importance, it is difficult 

to imagine a process less suited to developing good strateg) than the highly bureaucratic 

QDR process. That process involves thousands of well-meaning military personnel and 

civilians. ultimately resulting in a being publicly communicated to friends and 

foes alike in a glossy. unclassitied report. QDR 's development of strategy is a far cry 

from the War and Navy Departments' efforts to formulate strategy at the start of World 

War II. In the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearillarbor in 1941, the nation"s most 

senior civilian and military leaders devised a secret military strategy that focused on 

defeating Nazi Germany first while conducting a holding action with a far smaller force 

in the Pacific. That prioritization and sequencing of effo!is -- coupled \\ith the adoption of 

a peripheral, indirect campaign in North Africa, while delaying the invasion of Europe 

and avoiding altogether the invasion of the Japanese main islands proved to be a \var 

winning strategy. It is doubtful a QDR-like process could ever have produced such a 

result. 

Center for StrategiC and Budgetary Assessments 

J71inkinu S'mmTcr, \hout [)cfcJ1'>c 

1667 K Street NW, Suite 900. Washington DC 20006 

wwwCSBAonline.orq ! 202-331-7990! Fax 202·331·8019 
52 

The Pentagon's record of fashioning strategies since the end of the Cold \Var is poor. For 

[\VO decades now, those who aspire to take up George Kennan's pen have taken their best 

shot at drafting a one~size-fits-all '"defense strategy" that addresses all of the threats \\e 

face. Many have attempted to articulate a for how \\c will reconcile our national 

ends and means that can be summed up in a word like "Containment." but the 

security challenges we face today defy such Cold era approaches. Recent strategies. 

moreover, have often degenerated into "laundry lists" of objectives 'with no real plan ror 

hO\,v will be achieved, much less v"here \\e will accept greater risks against some 

lo\\cr threats to reduce the risks from current adversaries and rivals that 

pose most significant threats to our vita! interests. Having failed here. cannot 

help but fail to provide a realistic estimate or the resources required to achieve these 

objectives. Strategies that have been offered in past QDRs. such as '·Shape. Respond. 

Prepare" (1997): --Deter. Dissuade. Deter. Defeat'" (2001): "Prevail. Prevent. Prepare. 

Preserve" (2010) had titles. but lacked the conceptual "connective tissue" linking 

to capabilities plans in the form of meaningful guidance and prioritization 

to design. posture. and prepare our forces. As public documents. they also 

skirted awk\\ard, undiplomatic. albeit necessary discussions. such as what \ve should do 

if friendly states collapse. Moreover, a bureaucratic process that tries to capture 

everything the Department does and address challenge it faces within a single 

defense inevitably leads to a simplistic. common denominator result. 

Challenges as as transnational terrorism. long-term strategic competitions "vith 

othcr great powers, volatility in key regions. nuclear proliferation, and cybcr warfare each 

demand their own strategies. I would argue. therefore. that developing a coherent set of 

strategies. each tailored and differentiated for a particular challenge. would be preferable 

to attempting to craft a single defense strategy intended to address all of them. 

Strategy development also has to explicitly take into account available resources. None of 

us want a strategy that is simply "budget-driven," but neither can we responsibly craft a 

that is unconstrained by resources. The crafting of a good strategy requires a 

estimate of the resources likely to be available, which in turn should inform our 

strategic appetite. To drav,i from another historical example. Army planners in the years 

before World War II firmly believed their Servke '"vas woefully under-resourced. But 

they sav" their task as formulating a that could be executed at the current level of 

resourcing. rather than bemoaning their of funding. They crafted a modest strategy 

of hemispheric defense even as they perccived the douds of war gathering in Europe and 

Asia. The planners recommended this limited consisting of a rudimentary 

"anti-access/area dcnial perimeter" around North and the Caribbean to oppose 

the most formidable naval fleets in the world -- believing that it was the extent of what the 

nation could afford at the time. However. also assumed that if war broke out with 

Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. the \:liould rapidly increase the resources 

available I'or national defense and that the Army and Navy \\ould have to 

expand their power-projection capabilities. This \vould require a different and 

morc expansive strategy. in which the Services \vould have to a massive inflow 

of resources and conduct an unprecedented mass mobilization of manpower and 

Thus. they actually had to develop two difTerent strategies - one for the 

one they \vou!d keep in their hip pocket the event of war - and they 

transition plan to shift from onc to the other v'!hen the time came. To a large degree, 

strategy has mattered less for the United States since the end of the Cold \Var because we 

have enjoyed such a large margin of advantage economically and militarily over our 

rivals. But as those margins are reduced. strategy will matter far more. just as in the past. 
53 

Recalling the words of Lord Rutherford, "gentlemen we are out of money; novv wc must 

think." 

Historically, single individuals and small have tended to formulate the best 

strategies. Their details arc classified to signaling to adversaries ho\v we intend to 

compete, deter, counter, or defeat them. They arc also kept secret to avoid embarrassing 

our friendly foreign relations; sometimes we must hedge against states failing, 

shifting sides, or not meeting their commitments. Frequently, good are counterintuitive and orthogonal; they defy expectations, while delivering surprise. They leverage 

non-obvious asymmetries in competitions and play on the propensities or competitors to 

entice them to follow their preferences to a point of excess that accentuates their 

vulnerabilities. Good strategies tend 10 exploit {rends rather than trying to defy them. 

Finally, strategy development should not be something that occurs in four-year 

increments but rather requires constant reappraisal as our estimates of situations change. 

Good strategy should be dynamic. The implementation of successful strategies also 

requires socialization across the military and interagency bureaucracies, with the 

Congress, defense industry, and 'vvith allies to achieve '"buy-in" and sustain support for 

them over time. 

II. Weighing Risks 

The 2010 QDR accurately described the major factors in the international environment 

that eould affect national security in the coming years and outlined a set of priority 

missions that built on the core tasks defined in the 2006 QDR. It failed. however, to 

foresee or address the most significant national security threats we face a stalling 

global economy. America's own economic growth, and its fiscal 

trajectory. Consequently, less than months after the 2010 QDR repOli \'vas issued, it 

was overtaken by the Budget Control Act and the specter of sequestration. America's 

fiscal predicament and the prospect of more economic hard times ahead will undoubtedly 

dominate the upcoming QDR. Budgetary concerns have the potential to crowd out 

broader strategic considerations. Rather than making hard choices about what pOltions of 

the force should be maintained or expanded cven as the overall size of the Defense pie 

shrinks, the danger is that the Department \'"il! simply choose the politically less painful 

option ofacross~the-board, "salami-slice" cuts to the force. 

One of the tricky "risk balances" that the next QDR needs to get right is the balance 

between America's sustained economic health and maintaining a strong national defense. 

Drastically cutting defense spending in an era of austerity could lead to a 

world in which the global commons high seas. skies, space, and cyberspace - so 

critical to our economic well-being - become far more vulnerable. Similarly_ large-scale 

wars could become more probable, requiring: even greater defense spending in the future. 

On the other hand, to take measures now to reduce our national debt over time as a 

percentage of our Gross Product vvill only compound the fiscal problems our 

children \vill face and leave even fewer resources lor our future defense. While DoD 

leaders should fight for every penny they can gct to maintain a strong defense, there also 

needs to be a recognition that putting the United States on a path back to strong economic 

growth and fiscal rectitude is essential to sustain the country's long-tenn military 

predominance. 
54 

The other key risk balance is related to the first: balancing between military preparations 

for cun'ent operations and future operations. There is a danger that in fiscal hard times, 

we \'11111 attempt to preserve near-term readiness (largel) defined in terms of operations 

and maintenance spending) at the expense of longer-term readiness (defined more in 

terms of research, development. and procurement). Clearly. we must strike a balance to 

ensUl'e that we preserve sufficient forces and capabilities to deal with today's challenges 

and avoid hollowing out our forces. \vhile also reshaping our forces and capabilities to 

meet the challenges of tomorro\v. Although this debate is oftcn portrayed as the 

·'tighting-thc-Jast-war" crowd versus the "next-war-itis" reality is that the major 

challenges facing the United States today are likely to enduring character. Thus, 

I believe that the choice bet\veen preparing for current and future threats may be less 

stark. More accurately. we have to strike a balance between addressing challenges in the 

forms they take today \vhile anticipating ho\v they will evolve in the future. 

III. Prioritizing Forces and Capabilities 

Although it is impossible to predict the future, three key challenges arc likely to persist 

and evolve over the next several decades. 

First. \vhile al Qaida has been \veakened through the intelligence. military, and 

Imv enforcement efforts of the United States and its partners in recent years, 

Islamist extremism has metastasized and ne\\' nodes have spawned in an everadapting global terrorist network. 

Second, as nascent nuclear powers gro\v their arsenals and aspirants like Iran 

continue to pursue nuclear capabilities, the threat of nuclear proliferation as well 

as the potentia! for actual use of nuclear v.eapons will increase. 

Third, a number of countries are fielding antj~aecess and area~denial capabilities 

including ballistic and cruise missiles, attack submarines. advanced fighter 

aircraft, and sophisticated air defense, as well as robust eyber warfare capabilities 

that v"jI! challenge the U.S. ability to conduct pO\ver-proJection 

operations in vital theaters and be used to hold at risk our critical 

infrastructure at home. 

The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance accurately captured these challenges. but fell short 

of aligning the Department's program - defined as the forces and capabilities it \vill need 

to develop. field. and sustain - with them. The upcoming QDR offers an opportunity to 

better align the Department's program with the guidance. The challenges and top 

missions outlined in that guidance remain a good filter for establishing what the 

Department's priorities should be in an era of austerity. 

The major decisions taken by the Secretaries of Defense over the past several years 

appear to take this approach, although more \Vork remains to be done. Former Secretary 

of Defense Robert Gates appears to have used such a filter in January 20! I \vhen he 

announced cuts in defense spending and the cancellation of a number or defense 

programs, \vhiJe at the same time called for expanding or initiating a number of ne\v 

programs including long-range. nuclear-capable bombers. sea~bornc unmanned 

surveillance and strike aircraft. and electronic jammers to enhance the survivability of 
55 

U.S. forces. I Building on Gates' decisions and even in the shadO\v of the sequestration 

threat, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has called for an enhanced Virginia-class 

submarine \vith a )1e\\ payload module to greatly increase the number of ",'eapons each 

platform ean carry, advanced U.S. cyber capabilities, and improved precision weapons.2 

Outside analyses, including one conducted last year by CSBA that brought together 

diverse teams of defense analysts. Congressional staff. former government officials, and 

retired military officers in exercises to rebalance DoD's 

level cuts over the next decade. tend to confirm the 

and Panetta set out.3 

The key security challenges we face and the priority missions outlined in the 2012 

Defense Strategic Guidance a premium. in particular, on highly distributed. 

autonomous, and low-signature capable of operating independent!y. far forward in 

denied areas. Such forces and capabilities v..-ill need to be far less dependent on 

vulnerable fonvard bases but vastly more effective operating in non-permissive 

environments \vhere adversaries will contest our air forces, jam our communications, and 

blind our sensors and command and control. Accordingly. among the highest capability 

priorities for countering terrorism, eliminating WMD. or projecting pmvcr into a11tiaccess zones will be: 

Special operations forces for both direct action and indirect dTorts to enable 

foreign security partner forces: 

Submarines with greater strike capacity. larger unmanned under\valer vehicles 

(UUVs). advanced mines. and the ability to communicate at depth: 

Land and sea-hased long~rangc, air-refuelab!e, unmanned stealth aircraft for 

surveillance. kinetic strike, and non-kinetic electronic attack; 

Deeper inventories of stand-off precision munitions that can overcome modem 

air defenses and electronic countenncasures, as well as more pmverful airdelivered conventional \veapons for holding deep underground facilities at risk; 

More survivable and/or resilient. space-based precision. 

(PNT). intelligence. surveillance and reconnaissance (lSR), 

communications (SATCOM) to enable operations; and 

and timing 

secure satellite 

Non-kinetic cyber. electronic warfare, and directed energy capabilities to achieve 

both lethal and non-lethal effects. 

Combinations of such access-insensitive forces and capabilities are likely to be the 

spearhead of future campaigns terrorists, WMD powers, and adversaries 

robust anti-access As DoD aligns its with the challenges 

outlined in the Defense Strategic Guidance continues to improve the 
56 

ability of U.S. forces to operate in contested environments, these conventional and 

special operations "crmvn jewel" capabilities - coupled \vith a robust nuclear deterrent as 

long as nuclear \\'eapons exist in this \vor1d should become more central in the 

American military, especially in in an era of declining resources. 

[v. Reformulating the Force Planning Construct 

Another major component of every QDR is the development of a so-called "force 

planning construct'" which provides guidance for determining v,;hat kinds of forces \vill be 

needed in the future, and their sileo The reality is that QDR force planning constructs 

have had very little practical effect on siLing forces. To all intents and purposes. the force 

structure outlined in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review remains the force structure blueprint of 

the Department to this day. Where the force is smaller. it has largely been the result of 

budgetary pressures and the retirement of older ships and aircraft. rather than any 

conscious dIort made during QDRs. The modest exceptions to this are the substantial 

increases in Special Operations Forces, as directed by the 2006 QDR, and subscqucnt 

increases in support forces (e.g., intelligence, logistics, and rotary wing aviation) to 

enable them. as directed by the 2010 QDR. 

Across the last t""o administrations. DoD leaders have also struggled to move beyond the 

canonical "hvo regional war" construct that \vas first outlined in the 1993 Bottom Up 

Review. Each QDR has offered \vhat it claimed wa<;; a shift from the "two war" construct. 

Nevertheless, because decision makers across mUltiple administrations have seen value in 

maintaining the principle of "concurrency" - defined as the ability to deal with multiple 

threats simultaneously they have been loathe to adopt more innovative alternatives that 

might facilitate greater changes in defense. 

l support the principle of concurrency and believe it is the sine qua non for a military 

superpov.ier ,vith global commitments. Relinquishing the ability to fight multiple ,vars 

could invite collusion between potentia! adversaries as they try to stretch our resources 

thin responding to multiple crises for \vhich we are ill-prepared. At the same time. 

however. maintaining the forces and capabilities to fight multiple combined arms 

campaigns similar to Operation Desert Storm or Operation Iraqi Freedom over-optimizes 

our forces for a particular type of war while leaving Ollr forces less prepared for a wider 

range of contingencies. It would be prudent, therefore. to accelerate the shift away from 

preparing to conduct multiple, traditional land combat-centric campaigns (focused on 

invasion/counter-invasion scenarios), toward a new set of scenarios to inform the shaping 

and of U.S. forces. Specifically. any future force planning construct should ensure 

sufficient forces and capabilities to: 

Eliminate or secure a hostile power's WMD and delivery means should its 

government threaten to use those capabilities against the United States or its 

allies. or should it lose control of its WMD arsenal during the collapse of the 

state or civil \\ar. 

Wage a long-term strategic competition \\hh cost-imposing measures short of 

war against rising military pov·,:ers and prevent their domination of critical 

regions, limit their ability to coerce neighbors and. be prepared to dcny thcir 

military objectives and ability to project power. The lattcr may he accomplished 
57 

in part by encouraging U.S. allies and pa/iners to build their own anti-access/area 

denial capabilities. 

Deter or punish "second mover" aggression. The United States should anticipate 

that if it must fight a war in one region. it must maintain sufficient global strike 

including special operations forces. convcntionaL and 

deter oppOliunistic aggression or by third paliies elsewhere 

by holding out thc prospcct of swift and devastating punitive attacks andlor the 

denial of their military objectives. 

v. Conclusion 

Given both the fiscal and external security challenges the nation, the upcoming 

QDR could he thc most consequential of the last 1\\0 However. a "business as 

usual" approach in the QDR is unlikely to lead to the major in our forces and 

capabilities that are needed. The nc\v Secretary of Defense with Joint Chiefs would 

do \vell to agree up front on the major trades and decisions the QDR should make before 

drafting Tenns of Reference for the QDR. The c1assilied Terms or Reference should then 

outline concepts that explain ho\v u.s. forces should address the most pressing security 

challenges (rather than trying to define a single defense strategy). It should also identify 

highest capabilities and offer a nev,' planning construct at the start of the process, 

thereby the review to focus on the implementation and alignment details. Such 

an approach would also minimize thc risk of a protracted strategy debate, Among the 

most critical issues DoD \vi!l face. is the choice hctween pursuing a smaller version of 

today's forcc or a rebalanced force that better aligns DoD"s program \\<ith the critical 

challenges it faces and its priority missions. To preserve the country's military edge in 

austere times, I believe DoD has no choice but to rebalance its portfolio of 

capabilities. It \vill need to prioritize those that perform best in contested 

operating environments. while divesting those depend on relatively benign operating 

conditions. it is worth bearing in mind that the QDR 'vvill have far less 

margin for error previous reviews. Given1he outlook, \ve will likely be 

stuck with the forcc that results from the upcoming review for decades to come, for bettcr 

or worse. 

About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan 

policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national 

sccurity strategy and invcstmcnt options. CSBA's goa! is to enable polieymakers to make 

informed dccisions on mattcrs ofstratcg), security policy and resourcc allocation. CSBA provides 

timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makcrs in thc execlltive and legislative 

branches, as well as to thc media and the broader national security community. CSBA cncouragcs 

thoughtful participation in the development of national sccurity strategy and policy. and in the 

allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSI3A's analysis and outrcach foclls on key 

qucstions relatcd to existing and emcrging threats to US national secmity. Mecting these 

challenges \vill require transforming the national security establishment and we are devoted to 

helping achieve this end. 
58 

Jim Thomas 

Vice President and Director of Studies 

Strategy, Future Warfare, Concept Development, Defense Planning, Political-Military Relations 

Biography 

Jim Thomas is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments. He oversees CSBA's research programs and directs the Strategic and Budget 

Studies staft~ 

Prior to joining CSBA, he was Vice President of Applied Minds, Inc., a private research and 

development company specializing in rapid, interdisciplinary technology prototyping. Before 

that, Jim served for thirteen years in a variety of policy, planning and resource analysis posts in 

the Department of Defense, culminating in his dual appointment as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Resources and Plans and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Strategy. In these capacities, he was responsible for the development ofthe Defense Strategy, 

conventional force planning, resource assessment, and the oversight of war plans. Hc 

spearheaded the 2005-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and was the principal author of 

the QDR report to Congress. 

Jim began his career in l1ational security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, analyzing foreign 

technological lessons learned from the first Gulf War. After serving as research assistant to 

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Jimjoined the Department of Defense as a Presidential Management 

Intern in 1993 and undertook developmental management assignments across the Department of 

Defense over the next two years. From 1995 to 1998, he managed aNA TO counterproliferation 
59 

initiative and wrote three reports endorsed by allied foreign and defense ministers to integrate 

countering-WMD as a mission area into NATO post-Cold War lorce planning. From 1998 to 

1999, he was seconded to the lntemationallnstitute of Strategic Studies (nSS) in London, where 

he wrote Adelphi Paper 333, The Military Challenges a/Transatlantic Coalitions (Oxford: 

Ox lord University Press, 2000). From 1999 to 2001, Jim worked in the Secretary of De/ense's 

Strategy Office, playing a lead role developing the defense strategy and force planning construct 

for the 2001 QDR. From 2001 to 2003, he served as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense. He was promoted to the Senior Executive Service in 2003. 

Jim received the Department of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 1997 for his 

work at NA TO, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, the 

department's highest civilian award, in 2006 for his strategy work. 

Jim is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Intemationallnstitnte for Strategic 

Studies. He holds a B.A. with high honors from the College of William and Mary, an M.A. from 

the University of Virginia and an M.A. from Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced 

International Studies. 

A fonner Naval reserve officer, Jim attained the rank oflieutenant commander. 
60 

DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES 

CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION 

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. 

House of Representatives for the 1 13th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses 

appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum 

vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants 

(including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous 

fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is 

intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in 

complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with 

appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address 

and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one 

day after the witness's appearance before the committee. 

Witness name: James P. Thomas 

Capacity in which appearing: (check one) 

Individual 

_X_Representative 

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other 

entity being represented: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 

federal grant(s) / 

contracts 

WHS 

DLA Acquisition 

Directorate 

FISCAL YEAR 2012 

federal grant(s) / 

contracts 

federal agency 

DOD/ONA 

National Defense 

University 

federal agency 

dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

grant 

$1,200,000 Assessments/analysis, 

wargames, and briefings 

on international security 

environment, strategic 

challenges, future warfare, 

and portfolio rebalancing 

$84,000 Secretary of Defense 

Corporate Fellows Program 

Orientation 

dollar value 
61 

WHS DOD/aNA $1,800,000 Assessments/analysis, 

wargames, and briefings 

on international security 

environment, strategic 

challenges, future warfare, 

and portfolio rebalancing 

DLA Acquisition National Defense $80,000 Secretary of Defense 

Directorate University Corporate Fellows Program 

Orientation 

CTTSO SETA OASD (SO/LlC) 551,000 Future requirements and 

visioning 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 

Federal grant(s) / federal agency dollar value subject(s) of contract or 

contracts grant 

WHS DOD/aNA $2,300,000 Assessments/analysis, 

wargames, and briefings 

on international security 

environment, strategic 

challenges, future warfare, 

and portfolio rebalancing 

DARPNStrategic DARPA $95,000 Crisis simulation exercise 

Assessments in national security decision 

making environment 

DLA Acquisition National Defense $75,000 Secretary of Defense 

Directorate University Corporate Fellows Program 

Orientation 

Federal Contract Information: [fyou or the entity you represent before the Committee 

on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, 

please provide the following information: 

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______ --: _________ ' 

Fiscal year 

Fiscal year 2011 :_~ __ ~~_~ ____ 3 ___ _ 

2 
62 

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): ______ 2 _______ ~~_ 

Fiscal year 2012: _________ "2 ________ _ 

Fiscal year 20 II: _____ 3 ______________ _ 

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship constmction, aircraft parts 

manufacturing, software design, force stmcture consultant, architecture & engineering 

services, etc"): 

Current fiscal year (2013):_Research and analysis, __________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: Research and analysis, __________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011: Research and analysis, __________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held: 

3 
63 

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on 

Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please 

provide the following information: 

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: 

Current fiscal year (2013): _________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: _________________ _ 

Fiscal year 201 1'. _____________________ . 

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: 

Current fiscal year (2013): _____________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: ____________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : __________________ _ 

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, 

software design, etc.): 

Current fiscal year (2013): ________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2012: ___________________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : ___________________ _ 

Aggregate dollar value offederal grants held: 

Current fiscal 

Fiscal year 

(2013): ___________ _ 

Fiscal year 2011 : ___________________ _ 

4 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 26, 2013 

(67) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an important role 

in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external Red Team. Do you think 

an external Red Team should be part of the process for the 2014 QDR, and do you 

have any sense as to whether one will be in place? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. Given the scale of the challenges facing the Department and Congress in working through the current fiscal environment to make smart, prudent, 

and pragmatic defense choices, it is right and proper to leverage a Red Team process to help those working the QDR produce the best possible product. It will be important for any red team effort to not attempt to develop an alternative QDR or to 

get in the way of the QDR Independent Panel. I would suggest that Congress request that the Secretary of Defense establish a QDR Red Team that shall be exposed to the initial QDR conclusions in the July/August 2014 timeframe, with the 

goal of reporting to the Secretary of Defense no later than October 31 2013, in order 

to ensure that the conclusions of the team are received in time to be influential to 

the end-game of the formal QDR process. This timing also ensures that the red 

team will not get in the way of the assessment of the QDR Independent Panel, 

which will report after the QDR is released in February 2014. I do not believe a 

formal QDR Red Team has yet been established by the Secretary of Defense. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Brimley, I’m very concerned with personnel and healthcare costs 

at the Department of Defense, and was struck by your comment that the QDR must 

also look at these costs. Most of the concerns we’ve heard about the QDR is that 

it’s not sufficiently engaged in strategic thinking, why do you argue that the QDR 

is the right forum to develop a strategy for addressing these costs? 

Mr. BRIMLEY. It may well be the case that the QDR is not the right forum to develop a strategy for addressing the spiraling cost of personnel and healthcare costs, 

but I am concerned that it is possible that no other forum currently exists that is 

structurally important enough to signal real change. I believe that the essence of 

strategic planning is understanding where you are, where you are likely to go given 

current trends, and making informed choices about how to navigate into the future. 

If the QDR process does not include any references to, or assumptions about, the 

projected costs of military personnel and healthcare than any discussion about levels 

of investment with respect to military capabilities would be fundamentally ignorant 

and nearly useless for the Secretary of Defense and for Congress. So whether it is 

the QDR, the current Strategic Choices and Management Review, or some other 

high-level forum, it is critical that the underlying cost drivers for the Department 

of Defense be fully exposed to scrutiny in order to have a meaningful conversation 

about the sustainability of U.S. defense strategy. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an important role 

in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external Red Team. Do you think 

an external Red Team should be part of the process for the 2014 QDR, and do you 

have any sense as to whether one will be in place? 

Dr. DUECK. I do think a ‘‘red team’’ should be part of the process for the 2014 

QDR. Such an independent assessment from the outside helps to test the assumptions behind the QDR and in the end makes them stronger. In 2010, for example, 

there was an Independent Panel for the QDR that year, a genuinely bipartisan 

panel, that made good recommendations across a range of areas and actually anticipated certain policies such as the administration’s strategic pivot to Asia. Congress 

has mandated that a similar independent panel, the National Defense Panel, provide independent assessment of the upcoming QDR 2014, and a number of excellent 

appointments have already been made to that panel by members from both parties. 

I believe the National Defense Panel will play an indispensable role in the 2014 

QDR process. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Thomas mentioned the Red Team as playing an important role 

in the 2006 QDR, and participated in the 2010 external Red Team. Do you think 

an external Red Team should be part of the process for the 2014 QDR, and do you 

have any sense as to whether one will be in place? 

Mr. THOMAS. Yes, I believe that a Red Team should [be] part of the 2014 QDR. 

It should be composed of a group of distinguished civilians and retired senior mili-
68 

tary officers with reputations for challenging the status quo. They should be 

unencumbered from normal bureaucratic concerns. However, the aim should NOT 

be to create a bi-partisan group like the National Defense Panel that offers its own 

independent assessment of the security environment and the strategy. Rather, the 

Red Team should be to bring together a group of apolitical strategy and force planning experts (thus avoiding the typical bipartisan commission result of ‘‘splitting the 

difference,’’ that removes any sharp edges from their recommendations and is more 

likely to maintain the status quo) to advise and assist the Secretary of Defense. 

The Red Team’s mandate should be to consider how best to align the defense program with the Secretary of Defense’s strategic guidance. The Red Team should 

make its recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense, free from requirements to coordinate or staff their findings. To maximize its effectiveness, the chairman and executive director of the Red Team should be granted accesses to all Department Special Access Programs. The Red Team’s findings should be classified. 

I am not aware that the Secretary of Defense has made any decision to establish 

a Red Team for the upcoming QDR. 

Æ