IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1394

Filed September 13, 2017

DIEGO ARMANDO ALVAREZ MENDOZA,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, John J. Haney, 

Judge.

Diego Alvarez Mendoza appeals a district court order denying his writ of 

habeas corpus. AFFIRMED.

Benjamin D. Bergmann and Alexander D. Smith of Parrish Kruidenier 

Dunn Boles Gribble Gentry Brown & Bergmann L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
2

VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

A person whose judgment was deferred and who successfully discharged 

probation asks us to go a step beyond a recent Iowa Supreme Court opinion and 

hold the denial of habeas corpus as an avenue for relief is unconstitutional. 

I. Background Proceedings

Diego Alvarez Mendoza1pled guilty to possession of marijuana. His 

written plea included a waiver of his right to have the district court personally 

inform him of certain consequences of the plea, including “the [e]ffect of the plea 

on [his] status under federal immigration laws.” The district court accepted the 

guilty plea, ordered judgment to be deferred, and placed him on unsupervised 

probation for a term not exceeding one year.2 

Later the same year, a federal immigration judge ordered Alvarez

“removed from the United States to Mexico” based on his guilty plea to 

possession of marijuana and his placement on unsupervised probation. The 

decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Alvarez filed a “petition for writ of habeas corpus, or in the alternative, 

petition for writ of coram nobis.”

3 He alleged he “was misadvised by his prior 

counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea” and he was 

“ordered deported, based wholly on the quasi-conviction in question.” He further 

 

1 Appellate defense counsel refers to Diego Alvarez Mendoza as “Alvarez.” We will do 

the same.

2 Alvarez was also adjudged guilty of public intoxication and was sentenced to a term of 

two days in jail; he was credited for two days previously served. 

3

“[T]he common law writ of error coram nobis is not recognized in Iowa.” State v. 

Addison, 95 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1959) (citing Boyd v. Smyth, 205 N.W. 522, 523 

(Iowa 1925)). Alvarez does not appeal the district court’s denial of the petition for writ of 

coram nobis. 
3

alleged he could not raise the issue through a postconviction relief application 

because he received a deferred judgment and successfully discharged probation.

Following an evidentiary hearing, Alvarez filed an amended petition

alleging additional grounds for relief. The district court allowed the amendment 

and denied relief. Alvarez moved for enlarged findings and conclusions. The 

court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

A. Habeas Corpus Relief

There are three avenues for challenging a criminal conviction in Iowa: 

direct appeal, postconviction relief, and habeas corpus. State v. HernandezGalarza, 864 N.W.2d 122, 127 (Iowa 2015); see Iowa Code §§ 663.1 (2014)

(habeas corpus), 814.6(1)(a) (direct appeal), 822.2 (postconviction relief).

Alvarez asserts, “Under current law, persons who receive deferred 

judgments and successfully complete probation have no remedies under any of 

these avenues.” He is correct. See id. §§ 663.1 (allowing habeas corpus relief 

to individuals who are illegally restrained); 822.2 (allowing postconviction relief to 

certain persons who have been “convicted of . . . a public offense”); 

Daughenbaugh v. State, 805 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Iowa 2011) (“We conclude that a 

. . . guilty plea pursuant to a deferred judgment is not a conviction under Iowa’s 

postconviction relief statute.”); see also Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 135-

37 (holding (1) an individual is “no longer detained” or “restrained” in the habeas 

corpus sense where the individual is discharged from probation and the criminal 

records in relation to the underlying deferred judgment are expunged, and (2) 

collateral federal immigration consequences “are not alone sufficient to sustain a 
4

writ of habeas corpus”). But the unavailability of relief under these circumstances 

makes sense.

“Deferred judgment” means a sentencing option whereby both the 

adjudication of guilt and the imposition of a sentence are deferred 

by the court . . . . The court retains the power to pronounce 

judgment and impose sentence subject to the defendant’s 

compliance with conditions set by the court as a requirement of the 

deferred judgment.

Iowa Code § 907.1(1). Deferral of adjudication inures to the benefit of a 

defendant. As the name suggests, the defendant could have no judgment 

entered. See id. § 907.3(1)(c) (“Upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation . . . 

the defendant shall be discharged without entry of judgment.”). The defendant 

could be discharged from probation, in which case the person would “no longer 

be held to answer for the person’s offense.” Id. § 907.9(1), (4)(a). And the 

defendant’s criminal record with respect to the deferred judgment could be 

expunged. Id. § 907.9(4)(b). 

A defendant who consents to a deferred judgment balances these 

“obvious benefits in being granted a deferred judgment,” with the relinquishment 

of “certain other rights, including the right of appeal.” McKeever v. Gerard, 368 

N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 1985); see Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a) (granting right of 

appeal from final judgments); State v. Stessman, 460 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Iowa 

1990) (“An order deferring judgment is interlocutory and cannot meet the final 

judgment requirement imposed by section 814.6” and “[b]ecause a final judgment 

does not exist, [the] case is not appealable . . . as a matter of right.”). This 

choice may appear harsh, but “[s]imilar hard choices are not uncommon in the 

criminal law field” and “[a] defendant who pleads guilty relinquishes several basic 
5

constitutional rights.” McKeever, 368 N.W.2d at 119 (first alteration in original) 

(quoting State v. Anderson, 246 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Iowa 1976)).

Alvarez had nothing to challenge. His judgment was deferred, he was 

discharged from probation, his record was expunged, and his liberty was not 

restrained by the State of Iowa. Under these circumstances, a postconviction 

application would have been unavailing. Cf. Morales Diaz v. State, 896 N.W.2d 

723 (Iowa 2017) (addressing disposition of postconviction relief application filed 

by an applicant in federal custody who pled guilty to and was convicted of forgery

and concluding his attorney was ineffective in failing to advise the applicant of the 

immigration consequences of his conviction). Alvarez also had no cognizable 

habeas corpus claim. See Heranandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 127, 136 

(addressing the availability of habeas corpus relief to a defendant whose 

judgment was deferred and who had completed probation and holding the 

defendant did “not have a cognizable habeas claim” based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel”). Accordingly, he is without a vehicle to raise an 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. See id at 127, 137 (concluding habeas 

corpus relief was not a “cognizable avenue . . . to challenge [a] deferred 

judgment based on ineffective assistance of counsel”).

Faced with this inevitable conclusion, Alvarez argues “not allowing any

avenue of habeas corpus relief for those who receive deferred judgments 

materially impairs the constitutional right to habeas corpus” under article I, 

section 13 of the Iowa Constitution. He asks this court to 

rule that Iowa Code chapter 822 and Iowa Code chapter 663 are 

unconstitutional to the extent they preclude an individual with a 

deferred judgment from seeking relief from a constitutionally invalid 
6

judgment, because such a restriction would material[ly] impair an 

individual’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 

and habeas corpus. 

Article I, section 13 of the Iowa Constitution provides, “The writ of habeas 

corpus shall not be suspended, or refused when application is made as required 

by law . . . .” (emphasis added). “The term ‘required by law’ ordinarily means 

required by statutory law.” Davis v. State, 443 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa 1989). 

“Thus, the framers of the constitution expressly provided general authority for 

legislative restriction on the exercise of the right of habeas corpus.” Id. 

The legislature imposed restrictions in the form of specific pleading 

requirements, including a required statement that the person “is restrained of the 

person’s liberty.” Iowa Code § 663.1(1). Alvarez did not and could not allege he 

was restrained of his liberty by the State of Iowa. His application was not made 

“as required by law,” and his constitutional challenge is unavailing.

B. Equal Protection

Alvarez contends “the State violates equal protection when only certain 

classes of criminal defendants can seek postconviction or habeas relief.” Where, 

as here, “the parties have not argued that our analysis under the Iowa 

Constitution should differ from our analysis under the Federal Constitution, we 

decline to apply divergent analyses.” Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 757 

(Iowa 2016).

“The first step in [an] equal protection analysis . . . is to determine whether 

there is a distinction made between similarly situated individuals.” Id. at 758. 

The principle “does not deny . . . the power to treat different classes of persons in 

different ways,” it only “den[ies] . . . the power to legislate that different treatment 
7

be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of 

criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.” State v. Wade, 757

N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 

(1971)). If there is no statutory distinction between similarly situated individuals, 

“courts do not further consider whether their different treatment under a statute is 

permitted under the equal protection clause.” Nguyen, 878 N.W.2d at 758 

(quoting Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 882 (Iowa 2009)). 

The purposes of chapters 663 and 822 are well-established. The original 

purpose behind the allowance of habeas relief “was to ‘seek the release of 

persons [unlawfully] held in actual, physical custody in prison or jail.’”

Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 127 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 

Iowa Code chapter 663 codifies this objective. See Iowa Code § 663.1. The 

purpose of Iowa Code chapter 822 is to afford an avenue of relief for persons

“convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense and who” assert constitutional 

and other violations. See id. § 822.2. 

Alvarez argues the statutes treat similarly situated individuals differently 

depending on (1) whether the individual received a deferred judgment, (2) the 

individual’s probation status, (3) the advice the individual received from counsel, 

and (4) the individual’s immigration status. These distinctions do not hold water.

Individuals who receive deferred judgments and are successfully 

discharged from probation are treated similarly under Iowa Code chapters 663 

and 822. See Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 134-37 (denying relief under 

Iowa Code chapter 663 to defendants who receive deferred judgments and are 

discharged from probation because their liberty is no longer restrained); 
8

Daughenbaugh, 805 N.W.2d at 598-99 (denying postconviction relief to all 

defendants who receive deferred judgments). As for individuals who have not 

successfully completed probation versus those who have, Alvarez concedes the 

first class may be entitled to pursue an avenue of relief because they may be 

deemed in “constructive custody.” See Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 128. 

They, too, are not similarly situated. Turning to distinctions based on the advice 

of counsel and the individual’s immigration status, those distinctions, do not 

implicate state action, a predicate to an equal-protection claim. See King v.

State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 25 (Iowa 2012) (“[E]qual protection claims require ‘state 

action.’ Disparate treatment by someone other than the state (which the state, 

because of its inaction, failed to prevent) generally does not amount to an equal 

protection violation.”); accord U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make 

or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 

equal protection of the laws.”); Iowa Const. art. I, § 6 (“[T]he general assembly 

shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, 

upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens.”). Alvarez’s equal 

protection challenge fails.

C. Postconviction and Habeas Relief Waiver

Alvarez argues:

Because a waiver of statutory and constitutional rights is inherent in 

a request for a deferred judgment, a defendant must be advised by 

counsel and on the record by the court that seeking a deferred 

judgment can waive an Iowan’s right to postconviction relief 

pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 822, Iowa Code chapter 663, and 

article I, section 13 of the Iowa Constitution. 
9

Alvarez’s premise is flawed. As he concedes, it was possible for him to 

argue he was in “constructive custody” during his probationary period, which may 

have afforded him the habeas corpus avenue of relief during that period. See 

Hernandez-Galarza, 864 N.W.2d at 135 (“The district court entered its probation 

discharge order for Hernandez–Galarza on February 14, 2012. At the time he 

filed his petition on March 12, 2013, Hernandez–Galarza was no longer detained 

by or in constructive custody of the State of Iowa.”). But even if the habeas 

corpus avenue of relief was foreclosed at the time Alvarez entered his plea, he 

has cited no authority for the proposition that the district court was obligated to 

inform him of this consequence. Cf. State v. Woolsey, 240 N.W.2d 651, 653 

(Iowa 1976) (rejecting contention that district court should have informed a 

defendant of his ineligibility for a deferred judgment). 

We affirm the district court’s denial of Alvarez’s amended habeas corpus 

petition.

AFFIRMED.