(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2013 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ROBERS v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 12–9012. Argued February 25, 2014—Decided May 5, 2014 

Petitioner Robers was convicted of a federal crime for submitting 

fraudulent mortgage loan applications to two banks. On appeal, he

argued that the District Court had miscalculated his restitution obligation under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18

U. S. C. §§3663A–3664, a provision of which requires property crime

offenders to pay “an amount equal to . . . the value of the property” 

less “the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of

the property that is returned,” §3663A(b)(1)(B). The District Court 

had ordered Robers to pay the difference between the amount lent to

him and the amount the banks received in selling the houses that

had served as collateral for the loans. Robers claimed that the District Court should have instead reduced the restitution amount by

the value of the houses on the date the banks took title to them since 

that was when “part of the property” was “returned.” The Seventh 

Circuit rejected Robers’ argument. 

Held: The phrase “any part of the property . . . returned” refers to the 

property the banks lost, namely, the money they lent to Robers, and

not to the collateral the banks received, namely, the houses. Read 

naturally, the words “the property,” which appear seven times in 

§3663A(b)(1), refer to the property that was lost as a result of the 

crime, here, the money. Because “[g]enerally, ‘identical words used

in different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the 

same meaning,’ ” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 

547 U. S. 71, 86 (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34), “the

property . . . returned” must also be the property lost as a result of

the crime. Any awkwardness or redundancy that comes from substituting an amount of money for the words “the property” is the linguistic price paid for having a single statutory provision that covers 
 

 

2 ROBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

different kinds of property. Since valuing money is easier than valuing other types of property, the natural reading also facilitates the

statute’s administration. 

Robers’ contrary arguments are unconvincing. First, other provisions of the statute, see, e.g., §§3664(f)(2), (3)(A), (4), seem to give 

courts adequate authority to avoid Robers’ false dichotomy of having 

to choose between refusing to award restitution and requiring the offender to pay the full amount lent where a victim has not sold the collateral by the time of sentencing. Second, for purposes of the statute’s proximate-cause requirement, see §§3663A(a)(2), 3664(e), 

normal market fluctuations do not break the causal chain between 

the offender’s fraud and the losses incurred by the victim. Third, 

even assuming that the return of collateral compensates lenders for

their losses under state mortgage law, the issue here is whether the 

statutory provision, which does not purport to track state mortgage

law, requires that collateral received be valued at the time the victim 

received it. Finally, the rule of lenity does not apply here. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 139. Pp. 3–7. 

698 F. 3d 937, affirmed. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

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Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–9012 

BENJAMIN ROBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 5, 2014]

 JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 requires

certain offenders to restore property lost by their victims

as a result of the crime. 18 U. S. C. §3663A. A provision

in the statue says that, when return of the property lost by

the victim is “impossible, impracticable, or inadequate,” 

the offender must pay the victim “an amount equal to . . .

the value of the property” less “the value (as of the date

the property is returned) of any part of the property that is

returned.” §3663A(b)(1)(B). The question before us is 

whether “any part of the property” is “returned” when a 

victim takes title to collateral securing a loan that an 

offender fraudulently obtained from the victim.

We hold that it is not. In our view, the statutory phrase

“any part of the property” refers only to the specific property lost by a victim, which, in the case of a fraudulently 

obtained loan, is the money lent. Therefore, no “part of 

the property” is “returned” to the victim until the collateral is sold and the victim receives money from the sale. 

The import of our holding is that a sentencing court must

reduce the restitution amount by the amount of money the

victim received in selling the collateral, not the value of 
 

 

 

2 ROBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

the collateral when the victim received it. 

I 

The relevant facts, as simplified, are the following: In 

2005 petitioner Benjamin Robers, acting as a straw buyer,

submitted fraudulent loan applications to two banks. The 

banks lent Robers about $470,000 for the purchase of two

houses, upon which the banks took mortgages. When 

Robers failed to make loan payments, the banks foreclosed

on the mortgages. In 2006 they took title to the two houses.

In 2007 they sold one house for about $120,000. And 

in 2008 they sold the other house for about $160,000. The 

sales took place in a falling real estate market. 

In 2010 Robers was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. See §§371, 1343. He was 

sentenced to three years of probation. And the court 

ordered him to pay restitution of about $220,000, roughly 

the $470,000 the banks lent to Robers less the $280,000 

the banks received from the sale of the two houses (minus

certain expenses incurred in selling them). 

On appeal Robers argued that the sentencing court had

miscalculated his restitution obligation. In his view, “part

of the property” was “returned” to the banks when they

took title to the houses. And, since the statute says that

“returned” property shall be valued “as of the date the

property is returned,” the sentencing court should have

reduced the restitution amount by more than $280,000: 

$280,000 was what the banks received from the sale of the 

houses, but since the banks sold the houses in a falling 

real estate market, the houses had been worth more when 

the banks took title to them. 

The Court of Appeals rejected Robers’ argument. 698 

F. 3d 937 (CA7 2012). And, because different Circuits 

have come to different conclusions about this kind of 

matter, we granted Robers’ petition for certiorari. Compare id., at 942 (case below) (restitution obligation reduced 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

by money received from sale of collateral), with United 

States v. Yeung, 672 F. 3d 594, 604 (CA9 2012) (restitution

obligation reduced by value of collateral at time lender

took title). 

II 

In our view, the phrase “any part of the property . . . 

returned” refers to the property the banks lost, namely,

the money they lent to Robers, and not to the collateral

the banks received, namely, the two houses. For one 

thing, that is what the statute says. The phrase is part of 

a long sentence that reads as follows: 

“(b) The order of restitution shall require that [the] 

defendant— 

“(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to

or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the

offense—

 “(A) return the property to the owner of the property 

. . . ; or 

“(B) if return of the property under subparagraph

(A) is impossible, impracticable, or inadequate, pay an

amount equal to— 

“(i) the greater of—

“(I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or 

“(II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less

“(ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned 

. . . .” §3663A (emphasis added).

The words “the property” appear seven times in this sentence. If read naturally, they refer to the “property” that

was “damage[d],” “los[t],” or “destr[oyed]” as a result of the 

crime. §3663A(b)(1). “Generally, ‘identical words used in

different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to 

have the same meaning.’” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
 

4 ROBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U. S. 71, 86 (2006) (quoting IBP, 

Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005)). And, if the “property” that was “damage[d],” “los[t],” or “destr[oyed]” was 

the money, then “the property . . . returned” must also be

the money. Money being fungible, however, see, e.g., 

Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N. A., 562 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2011) (slip op., at 17); Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 

600, 606 (2004), “the property . . . returned” need not be

the very same bills or checks. 

We concede that substituting an amount of money, say,

$1,000, for the words “the property” will sometimes seem 

awkward or unnecessary as, for example: 

“[I]f return of [$1,000] . . . is impossible, . . . pay an

amount equal to . . . the greater of . . . the value of 

[$1,000] on the date of the . . . loss . . . or . . . the value 

of [$1,000] on the date of sentencing . . . .” 

§3663A(b)(1)(B). 

But any such awkwardness or redundancy is the linguistic 

price paid for having a single statutory provision that

covers property of many different kinds. The provision is

not awkward as applied to, say, a swindler who obtains 

jewelry, is unable to return all of the jewelry, and must 

then instead pay an amount equal to the value of all of the

jewelry obtained less the value (as of the date of the return) of any of the jewelry that he did return. It directs 

the court to value the returned jewelry as of the date it 

was returned and subtract that amount from the value of 

all of the jewelry the swindler obtained. As applied to

money, the provision is in part unnecessary but reading

the statute similarly does no harm. And the law does not 

require legislators to write extra language specifically 

exempting, phrase by phrase, applications in respect to 

which a portion of a phrase is not needed.

The natural reading also facilitates the statute’s administration. Many victims who lose money but subsequently 
 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

receive other property (e.g., collateral securing a loan) will

sell that other property and receive money from the sale.

And often that sale will take place fairly soon after the

victim receives the property. Valuing the money from the 

sale is easy. But valuing other property as of the time it

was received may provoke argument, requiring time, 

expense, and expert testimony to resolve.

We are not convinced by Robers’ arguments to the contrary. First, Robers says that, when a victim has not sold 

the collateral by the time of sentencing, our interpretation 

will lead to unfair results. A sentencing court will have

only two choices, both undesirable. The court will either 

have to refuse to award restitution, thereby undercompensating the victim, or have to require the offender to pay 

the full amount lent to him, thereby giving the victim a

windfall. 

In our view, however, the dilemma is a false one. Other 

provisions of the statute allow the court to avoid an undercompensation or a windfall. Where, for example, a sale of

the collateral is foreseen but has not yet taken place, the 

court may postpone determination of the restitution 

amount for two to three months after sentencing, thereby 

providing the victim with additional time to sell. See 

§3664(d)(5). Where a victim receives, say, collateral, but 

does not intend to sell it, other provisions of the statute 

may come into play. Section 3664(f)(2) provides that upon 

“determination of the amount of restitution owed to 

each victim, the court shall . . . specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid.” 

Section 3664(f)(3)(A) says that a 

“restitution order may direct the defendant to make a

single, lump-sum payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a combination

of payments at specified intervals and in-kind 
 

 

6 ROBERS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

payments.” 

And §3664(f)(4) defines “in-kind payment” as including 

“replacement of property.” These provisions would seem

to give a court adequate authority to count, as part of the 

restitution paid, the value of collateral previously received 

but not sold. Regardless, Robers has not pointed us to any 

case suggesting an unfairness problem. And the Government has conceded that the statute (whether through

these or other provisions) provides room for “credit[s]”

against an offender’s restitution obligation “to prevent 

double recovery to the victim.” Brief for United States 30 

(emphasis deleted).

Robers also points out, correctly, that the statute has a

proximate cause requirement. See §3663A(a)(2) (defining

“victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a 

result of the commission of ” the offense (emphasis added));

§3664(e) (Government bears the “burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a 

result of the offense” (emphasis added)). Cf. Paroline v. 

United States, ante, at 6–11. And Robers argues that

where, as here, a victim receives less money from a later 

sale than the collateral was worth when received, the 

market and not the offender is the proximate cause of the 

deficiency.

We are not convinced. The basic question that a proximate cause requirement presents is “whether the harm

alleged has a sufficiently close connection to the conduct”

at issue. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 

Inc., ante, at 14. Here, it does. Fluctuations in property

values are common. Their existence (though not direction 

or amount) is foreseeable. And losses in part incurred

through a decline in the value of collateral sold are directly related to an offender’s having obtained collateralized 

property through fraud. That is not to say that an offender

is responsible for everything that reduces the amount of 
 

 

Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

money a victim receives for collateral. Market fluctuations are normally unlike, say, an unexpected natural

disaster that destroys collateral or a victim’s donation of 

collateral or its sale to a friend for a nominal sum—any of

which, as the Government concedes, could break the causal 

chain. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–27, 38–39, 46, 50–51. 

Further, Robers argues that “principles” of state mortgage law “confirm that the return of mortgage collateral 

compensates a lender for its losses.” Brief for Petitioner 

30. But whether the collateral compensates a victim for

its losses is not the question before us. That question is

whether the particular statutory provision at issue here 

requires that collateral received be valued at the time the 

victim received it. That statutory provision does not purport to track the details of state mortgage law. Thus, even 

were we to assume that Robers is right about the details of 

state mortgage law, we would not find them sufficient to 

change our interpretation. 

Finally, Robers invokes the rule of lenity. To apply this

rule, we would have to assume that we could interpret the

statutory provision to help an offender like Robers, who is 

hurt when the market for collateral declines, without 

harming other offenders, who would be helped when the

market for collateral rises. We cannot find such an interpretation. Regardless, the rule of lenity applies only if, 

after using the usual tools of statutory construction, we 

are left with a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the 

statute.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125, 139 

(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having come

to the end of our analysis, we are left with no such ambiguity or uncertainty here. The statutory provision refers 

to the money lost, not to the collateral received. 

* * * 

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 

is affirmed. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

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Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 12–9012 

BENJAMIN ROBERS, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 5, 2014]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG 

joins, concurring. 

I join the opinion of the Court. I write separately, however, to clarify that I see its analysis as applying only in

cases where a victim intends to sell collateral but encounters a reasonable delay in doing so. See ante, at 5–6 (explaining that where a victim “does not intend to sell”

collateral, “other provisions of the statute may come into 

play,” enabling a court “to count, as part of the restitution

paid, the value of collateral previously received but not 

sold”). If a victim chooses to hold collateral rather than to 

reduce it to cash within a reasonable time, then the victim 

must bear the risk of any subsequent decline in the value 

of the collateral, because the defendant is not the proximate cause of that decline. 

Here, although the banks did not immediately sell the 

homes they received as collateral, Robers did not adequately argue below that their delay reflected a choice to 

hold the homes as investments.* Such an argument would 

—————— 

*Before the District Court, Robers suggested precisely the opposite:

that the banks had sold the homes too hastily, at fire-sale prices in a

falling market. See App. 35 (“The drop in value could have been due to

the housing market itself, or due to the victim’s rush to cut their losses

with the properties and take whatever price they could get at a sheriff’s

sale, regardless of whether the sale price reflected the fair market value

of the property at the time”). Before the Seventh Circuit, Robers did 
 

 

 

 

2 ROBERS v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

likely have been fruitless, because the delay appears 

consistent with a genuine desire to dispose of the collateral. Real property is not a liquid asset, which means that 

converting it to cash often takes time. See, e.g., 698 F. 3d 

937, 947 (CA7 2012) (“[R]eal property is not liquid and, 

absent a huge price discount, cannot be sold immediately”).

And indeed, the delays here appear to have resulted

from illiquidity. See App. 70 (one of the two homes was

placed on the market but did not immediately sell); id., at 

89 (the other attracted no bids at a foreclosure sale).

Because such delays are foreseeable, it is fair for Robers to 

bear their cost: the diminution in the homes’ value. See 

ante, at 6 (analysis of proximate causation). 

In other cases, however, a defendant might be able to

show that a significant delay in the sale of collateral

evinced the victim’s choice to hold it as an investment 

rather than reducing it to cash. Suppose, for example, 

that a bank received shares of a public company as collateral for a fraudulently obtained loan. “Common stock 

traded on a national exchange is . . . readily convertible

into cash,” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U. S. 56, 69 

(1990), so if the bank waited more than a reasonable time 

to sell the shares, a district court could infer that the bank 

was not really trying to sell but instead was holding the 

shares as investment assets. If the shares declined in 

value after the bank chose to hold them, it would be wrong 

for the court to make the defendant bear that loss. As the 

—————— 

suggest that the banks should have sold more quickly. See Brief for 

Appellant in No. 10–3794, p. 35 (“[T]here is no ‘loss causation’ here, . . . 

because the kind of loss that occurred (due to the market, or to the

victims holding the property longer than they should have in a declining market, or to other unknown factors) was not the kind for which the

defendant’s acts could have controlled or accounted”). But this argument does not imply that the banks’ delay reflected a choice to hold the

homes as investments, only that the banks misjudged the timing of the 

sales. 
Cite as: 572 U. S. ____ (2014) 3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

Government acknowledged at oral argument, a victim’s 

choice to hold collateral—rather than selling it in a reasonably expeditious manner—breaks the chain of proximate causation. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 38–39, 44–45. 

If the collateral loses value after the victim chooses to hold 

it, then that “part of the victim’s net los[s]” is “attributable 

to” the victim’s “independent decisions.” Id., at 39. The 

defendant cannot be regarded as the “proximate cause” of 

that part of the loss, ibid., and so cannot be made to bear 

it. 

In such cases, I would place on the defendant the burden to show—with evidence specific to the market at

issue—that a victim delayed unreasonably in selling collateral, manifesting a choice to hold the collateral. See 18 

U. S. C. §3664(e) (burden to be allocated “as justice requires”). Because Robers did not sufficiently argue below 

that the banks broke the chain of proximate causation by 

choosing to hold the homes as investments, and because 

the delay encountered by the banks appears to have been 

reasonable, it is fair for Robers to bear the cost of that 

delay. I therefore join the Court in affirming the restitution order.