· . . 


repor~ 

OAD-CR-155 

Indochina Refugee Authored 

Monograph Program 

The General Offensives of1968-69 

By 

Hoang Ngoc Lung 

Colonel, ARVN 

Prepared for: 

DeF.artment of the Army 

Office of Chief of Military History 

Forrestal Building 

12th E Independence Ave,me, S. IV. 

Washington, D.C. 20134" 

27 June 1978 

Contract No. MDA 90J-76-C-0172 

GENERAL ~ 

RESEARCH n 
CORPORATION 

WESTGATE RESEARCH PARK. MclEAN. VIRGINIA 22101 
INDOCHINA REFUGEE AUTHORED 


MONOGRAPH PROGRAM 


THE GENERAL OFFENSIVES OF 1968-69 

by 

Cotonet Hoang Ngoa Lung 

GENERAL RESEARCH CORPORATION 


WESTGATE RESEARCH PARK 


MaLEAN. VIRGINIA 22102 

Preface 

Much has been written about the enemy's 1968 Tet Offensive, a 

major event in the Vietnam War. However, most publications on this 

subject, to include books and press accounts of the Western world and 

South Vietnam's own official military history records, focused primarily on the spectacular aspect of battles fought during early 1968. 

This monograph endeavors instead to analyze and compare all four 

periods of enemy offensive activities which lasted well into 1969. 

Seeking to present the Vietnamese point of view, it assesses enemy and 

friendly strategies, the reactions and combat performance of the RVNAF 

and Free World Military Assistance Forces and the impact of the offensive on the conduct of the war with regard to the enemy, South Vietnam, 

and the United States. 

In the preparation of this monograph, I have drawn heavily on my 

personal experience and recollections. Interviews with involved principals and a review of documentation have also helped establish credi­ , 

bility of facts and depth of insight. The most valuable data, unobtainable anywhere else, are those provided by .Lieutena~~~~!i':l 

- -~--------~-"'-. 

William E. Potts, U.S.A. (~~~":~~dL~o~ h~.~,"p!:'~~!!'!!. .fi;~.!!.!.. For this 

-c-o-ur-t-e'~y:-i'-certrl~y owe him a special debt of gratitude. 

I am particularly indebted to General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the 

Joint General Staff, Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, Chief of Staff, 

JGS and Commanding General of the Central Logistics Command, RVNAF, and 

Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, J-3, JGS, for their valuable guidance, 

comments, and suggestions, especially those concerning the Tran Hung 

Dao plan and conduct of combat operations. I am also grateful to 

11 

Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General of I Corps, who 

commanded the 1st ARVN Infantry Division at the time of the offensive, 

and Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, last Commander of the 3d ARVN Infantry Division who served as I Corps Chief of Staff when the offensive 

began, for thoughtful critical remarks and valuable insight into the 

battles of Hue and elsewhere in the I Corps area. 

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan 

Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache 

serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a 

highly professional job of translating and editing that helps impart 

unity and cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ma. Bong, a former Captain 

in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of the 

Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in the 

administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form. 

McLean, Virginia Hoang Ngoc Lung 

27 June 1978 Colonel, ARVN 
• • • 

Contents 

Chapter 	 Page 

I. WAR DURING THE 1965-1967 PERIOD . . . . . . . . . . 	 1 


The Impaat of u.s. Searah-and-Destroy operations 1 


Situation as of the Seaonii HaZf of 1967 ••••• 7 


II. 	 NORTH VIETNAM'S CHANGE OF STRATEGY AND PREPARATIONS FOR 


THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE-GENERAL UPRISING •••••• 14 


Communist Strategy in South Vietnam During the . 
 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 Dry Seasons • • • • • • 14 


Vo Nguyen Giap's Strategia Viewpoint After the 


Reasons for the 1968 GeneraZ Offensive and Communist 


1966-1967 Dry Season • • • • • • • • • • • • • 17 


PFep~tions . . . . . . • 20 


III. THE RVN AND ENEMY PREPARATIONS 	 32 '. 

HOIJJ Muah Did We KnOIJJ • • • • 32 
 . The Surprise: Why? •••• 37 


IV. 	 THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE. PHASE I • 46 


A Bird's Eye View • ••••• 46 


The Attaak on Saigon ., • •• .• • 53 


Supporti11fJ Attaaks in III C01'pS Area • 63 


CZearing operations in Saigon • • • • 70 


The BattZe of Hue ••••••••• 75 


V. THE OFFENS lVE. PHASES II. III. AND IV • 	 91 


Phase II. May 1968 • • • • • • • • 91 


The Offensive. Phase III •••••• 106 


The Offensive. Phase IV. February 1969 • 112 


VI. 	 IMPACT OF THE ·1968-196.9 GENERAL OFFENSIVE • 126 


"Tal.k and Fight" . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 


COSVN ResoZutions No. 9 and 14/DKCT • • • 128 


A WindfaZZ for South Vietnam • • • • • • 134 


The Limitations of South Vietnam's Efforts 141 


iv 
• • 

• • • 

• • • 

• • • • 

• • • 

Chapter 	 Page 

VII. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 145 


GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 


Maps 

1. Realignment of Enemy Military Regions • • . . . . 36

2. The 1968 Tet Offensive, Phase I •• • • 	 48 

3. Enemy Attacks on Saigon, Tet 1968 •• •• • • • • 54 

4. Enemy Attacks on the JGS Compound • • •• • 55 

5. Targets of Enemy Attack, Downtown Saigon • • • 58

6. III Corps Area and Disposition of ARVN Forces. • • • 65 

7. Disposition of U.S. and FWMA Forces, III Corps Area ••• 66 

8. 	 Enemy Plan of Attack Against Long Binh (original captured 

sketch) ....•..• •••• •• . 68 

9. The Tran Hung Dao Plan • • • • • •• •• • • • • • 72 

10. The Old Citadel, Hue City •• ••• ••• • • 77

11. Enemy Attacks on Saigon, Phase II • • • • • 96

Illustrations 

Dead VC Sapper at U.S. Embassy Entrance, 31 January 1968 ••• 86 

VC Killed During an Attempted Breakthrough of Tan Son Nhut AFB, 

1 February 1968 ••••••••••.•••••••••• 87 

The Phu Tho Race Track as Temporary Operational Base for ARVN 

and U.S. Forces During Tet, February 1968 ••••••••• 88 

The Dong Ba Cemetery l~ere Victims of the Hue Massacre Were 

Buried, . February 1968 . • • • . . • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 89 

The Sorrow of Hue People • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 90 

ARVN'Rangers and Tank. Blo,cking the Phan Thanh Gian Bridge, 

6 Ma.y 1968 ...•••••••.•••..••.•••• 120 

Fighting at the French Cemetery Adjoining Tan Son Nhut A1rbase, 

7 Ma.y 1968 .••• . . • . • • • • • • . • • . • . •• • 121 

Combat Action Near Tan ,Son Nhut AFB, May 1968 • • • • • • • • 122 

ARVN Rangers Moving Through Western Ch~lon After Clearing 

Enemy t 10 May 1968 • • • • • • • • • • • • •• •• • • • 123 

NVA Troops Captured Near Saigon, May 1968 • • • • • • • • • • 124 

VC Rocket Attack on Saigon, August 1968 • • • • • • • • • • • 125 
CHAPTER I 

War During the 1965-1967 Period 

The Impaat of u.s. Searah-and-Destroy Operations 

The demise of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his regime--the First 


Republic--which came as a result of the military-led November 1 coup 


of 1963, began to usher South Vietnam into a period of turmoil which 


saw political stability and military security steadily on the decline. 


Successive plots and counterplots crippled central authority and 


weakened the war effort. Used as an instrument of state to counter
 . coups, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were divided among 

cliques and lost their combat effectiveness. 

This came as a windfall for the Communists who immediately seized 

the opportunity to step up their activities. The Strategic (now redesignated ~ew Life) Hamle~ system, which was the mainstay of rural 

defense. and control, came under increasing enemy attacks and faced 

the danger of ultimate destruction. In many provinces, village and 

hamlet officials fled enemy pressure and sought refuge in safer district 

towns. Lines of communication across the country became insecure because 

of land mines and interdiction. Even in big cities terrorism and 

. sabotage occurred with periodic regularity. 

The Situation deteriorated to an even greater extent by late 1964, 

especially in Binh Dinh Province, the long established. stronghold of 

Communist insurgency •. This threat came not only from enemy military 

pressure but also from the potential danger of insurrection by a local 

population which was, by inclination, extensively pro-Communist. 

The initial alarm sounded during the first week of 1965. From all 

indications, it seemed to presage still more agitation and setbacks in 

the days ahead. 

1 
It all began when an ARVN Ranger battalion was caught and nearly 

destroyed in an enemy ambush near the village of Binh Gia, in Phuoc Tuy 

Province. Contrary to their past activity pattern, the Communist forces 

did not withdraw from the scene of the fighting. They remained in the 

area, mounted another ambush and inflicted severe losses to a Vietnamese 

marine battalion being deployed there as relief. Obviously, the enemy 

had initiated a new phase of warfare, the "mobile warfare phase" of his 

strategy for conquest. 

In the meantime, our intelligence confirmed the presence of ,a North 

Vietnamese Army (NVA) regiment in the Central Highlands. Information 

collected during December 1964 indicated that this was the first NVA 

regimental size unit introduced into South Vietnam. By February 1965, 

the total NVA units infiltrated into the same area had increased to 

four regiments, all belonging to the 325th Division. In view of this 

force buildup, the Central Highlands app~rently became the target of 

primary interest to North Vietnam. , The month of February 1965 also saw two major Communist actions ..._­ directed against U.S. personnel in South Vietnam. The first was a ground -~ 

attack on Camp Holloway, a U.S. base near Pleiku, and the second involved 

the sabotage of a hotel in downtown Qui Nhon which served as billet for 

U.S. personnel. As a result, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the 

evacuation of U.S. military dependents and eventually decided to bring 

U.S. combat troops into South Vietnam. 

It was in the Central Highlands that the first contest between 

regular NVA and U.S. forces took place.' Neither had ever been in contact 

with the other until the battle of Pleime which was to become a landmark 

of the war's new phase. In launching the Pleime campaign, the NVA forces 

had planned to take Pleiku, force the evacuation of Kontum and gain 

control of Route QL-19, which would practically divide South Vietnam 

into two halves. 

The battle of Pleime lasted from mid-October to late November 1965; 

it was the first diviSion-size engagement on a South Vietnamese battlefield since 1954. Selecting the Central Highlands as battleground, the 

enemy undoubtedly placed a high stake on his legendary advantage in 

this type of terrain)which~e hoped could neutralize American superiority 

2 

Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General of I Corps, who 

commanded the 1st ARVN Infantry Division at the time of the offensive, 

and Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, last Commander of the 3d ARVN Infantry Division who served as I Corps Chief of Staff when the offensive 

began, for thoughtful critical remarks and valuable insight into the 

battles of Hue and elsewhere in the I Corps area. 

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan 

Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache 

serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a 

highly professional job of translating and editing that helps impart 

unity and cohesiveness to the manuscript. Ms. Bong, a former Captain 

in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member of the 

Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and in the 

administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form. 

McLean, Virginia Hoang Ngoc Lung 

27 June 1978 Colonel, ARVN 
in firepower and mobility. The enemy had every reason to believ,e he 

could deal U.S. forces a smashing blow in his own habitat of jungle 

and mountains where during the 1945-1954 war, he had successfully 

overru~ Kontum City and wiped out the famous French Mobile Group 

No. 100. He therefore entrus.ted the conduct of the campaign. to veterans 

of the First Indochina War such as General Chu Huy Man and Colonel Ha 

1 Vi Tung who had been crowned with laurels of victor.ies past. 

The Pleime campaign was also an opportunity for NVA forces to 

learn more about U.S. tactics and U.S. combat capabilities, especially 

in terms of firepower and mobility. The lessons to be drawn from this 

first round of engagements were particularly critical since they would 

contribute toward the formulation of an appropriate war doctrine to 

effectively confront U.S. forces in South Vietnam. 

For the U.S. and RVN forces, the battle of Pleime certainly helped 

put to test the validity of combined opevations which were to become 

the staple of warfare efforts in the years ahead. Through it, the 

U.S. was also able to evaluate its own methods and to determine whether 

the conventional approach would b~ the proper response to a war that 

many had .termed as unconventional. 

The resounding defeat inflicted on the enemy at Pleime compelled 

him to abstain from rushing into other major engagements during the' 

1965-1966 dry season. He endeavored instead to build up his force while 

constantly searching for an effective way to cope,with the expanding 

U.S. troop commitment. As more U.S. and Free World units poured into 

South Vietnam, North Vietnam also increased its infiltration of replacement and entire regular units. This infiltration rate reached a 

monthly average of 6,000·to 7,000 men during 1966. 

lColonel Ha Vi Tung was the commander of the 803d Viet Minh Regiment, 

the unit which in 1954 had destroyed the French GM-100 at An Khe Pass 

on Route 19. 

3 

The U.S., in the meantime, continued its process of force buildup, 

deploying units, building ports, airfields, combat and logistic bases, 

organizing logistic support, communications and intelligence systems 

to meet growing requirements. At the same time, it also began to find 

ways of coping with the other kind of war that the enemy was staging 

at the grassroots level in coordination with the war he was fighting 

with main force units from the North. 

In late 1966, the U.S. initiated the concept of search-and-destroy 

operations designed to clear enemy main force units from populated 

centers and drive them into areas where they could be destroyed. These 

operations were to create the favorable conditions required for pacification, which would start from populous centers. At the same time, 

U.S. air power was extensively used against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in an 

effort to interdict and inflict maximum losses to enemy infiltration of 

personnel and logistics from the north. 

Not until September of that year did U.S. forces launch Operation 

ATTLEBORO which was designed to destroy enemy main force units in an 

area west of the Michelin plantation and the very heart of enemy War 

Zone C, located in northwestern Tay Ninh Province on the Cambodian 

border. This operation ended in November and was considered a test of the 

search-and-destroy concept. Initially, it involved only the U.S. 196th 

Infantry Brigade. However, as the.9perat~~ progressed,. more U.S. forces ~/A~w"'" were commmitted, to include eventuallYJ\-element:s- 01 (fie. 2!.t:.!iJ kdis .fY . 

...:::;' Di;i~'i~n, the'173c1A1rbOrne'Brigade ;-the 3d i;igade of the 4th IahatlOY 

DiviSion, and the llth'Armored Regiment. The remarkable results achieved 

through Operation ATTLEBORO led tpe U.S. command to the conclusion that 

multi-division operations of the search-and-destroy type were the key 

to success in South Vietnam. 

After ATTLEBORO, the U.S. command initiated Operation CEDAR FALLS 

in early January 1967 which lasted 18 days. This operation was designed 

to destroy the headquarters of enemy MR-4 located in the "Iron Triangle" 

area which straddled the converging boundaries of Binh Duong, Tay Ninh, 

", '". : ''' ... " 

4 

2 and Binh Long Provinces. 

CEDAR FALLS was the first corps-size U.S. combat operation in 

South Vietnam and the first major combined U.S.-RVN operation involving 

formal planning. ARVN participation in this operation consisted of the 

1st Airborne Brigade, elements of the 7th and 8th Regiments of the 5th 

Infantry Divisions, and one ranger battalion. The combined results 

were spectacular. Not only had our forces completely destroyed the 

enemy headquarters, they also killed 720 enemy troops, took 217 prisoners 

and received 66.6 ralliers. In addition, our forces seized 3,700 tons 

or rice, 23 crew-served and 555 individual weapons, and destroyed 509 

buildings, 424 underground shelters and tunnels and 334 boats. 

During this operation Rome plows were used extensively to clear 

heavy vegetation and build pioneer roads, which effectively turned the 

heretofore impenetrable "Iron Triangle" into an uncluttered area of 

operation easily accessible to mechanized troops and fully open to

• 

aerial observation. 

Despite extensive havoc wrought by CEDAR FALLS, the enemy base 

area seemed to be alive again with renewed enemy activity only two days 

after our troops had moved out. These indications provided by aerial 

observation revealed that the enemy was resilient and resourceful enough 

to survive even the most destructive blow ever unleashed on him. This 

also indicated that a short duration foray was not enough to strangle 

an enemy base area and in order to fully exploit the results of such 

an operation and prevent the resurrec.tion of enemy activities, our 

troops would have to re~in in the·area of operation for a much longer 

period. 

~is lesson was not forgotten by the U.S. command. Operation 

JUNCTION CITY, which followed CEDAR FALLS in the widening framework of 

search-and-destroy operations, lasted nearly three months and involved 

an even larger force commitment. The target this time was another 

. :'.. ; ..... .'" 2· - . ", ...,. '.... . ...- .;.... ',' ,', 'I:' ," ....; .. " ,;.• ' .'. ". .,:- ...... ':", ....:. , ...., ."', 

The enemy MR-4 headquarters was responsible for the conduct of"· 

activities directed against Saigon, Gia Dinh and Cho Lon. 

5 

enemy stronghold, War Zone C, which represented perhaps the biggest 

prize of all. 

JUNCTION CITY was designed to destroy the supreme headquarters 

that controlled all enemy forces operating in the southern half of 

South Vietnam, the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), or one 

of Hanoi's forward command posts. COSVN was located in War Zone C, 

a large enemy base area of about 250 square miles adjoining the Cambodian 

border, long considered and boasted by the enemy as an impenetrable 

sanctuary. The terrain here was ideal for insurgent activities. Mostly 

covered by heavy underbush and multi-canopied jungle, it sheltered the 

enemy's top level military and political headquarters and was teeming 

with logistic installations: supply bases, training centers, communications and broadcasting stations, dispensaries and even rest and 

recuperation camps. JUNCTION CITY's secondary objective was to convert 

this enemy base area into a series of friendly outposts, fire bases 

and an airfield. 

Designed as an immediate follow-up of ATTLEBORO, Operation 

JU}1CTION CITY was not initiated until 22 February 1967. For this operation, 'the U.S. command committed two infantry divisions comprising a 

total of 22 battalions, and 14 artillery battalions. ARVN participation, 

which had initially been planned to involve two infantry regiments, was 

much smaller, with only four infantry battalions. 

The biggest result achieved by JUNCTION CITY ,was to inflict 

crippling losses to COSVN's main force unit, the CT-9 DiviSion. Enemy 

casualties totalled 2,128 dead, 34 detained, and 139 rallied. His 

material losses included 100 crew-served and 491 individual weapons 

and in excess of 5,000 underground shelters and tunnels destroyed. 

Total friendly casualties amounted to only 1/10th of enemy dead and 

1,500 wounded. Also, three airfields for C-130's and two Special Forces 

camps were established in the area of operation. 

COSVN, the main target', was not destroyed. However, as a result of 

the operation, the enemy was forced to gradually move his installations 

and supplies west into a sanctuary on Cambodian territorY. Since that 

'.. .,.:,. 	 ·time,' the. enemy· ne.ver .. ·again .boa,s,ted of"impe;letrab1e ,ss,tlctl¥!I;i.i!s in!!!;ide 

South Vietnam. 

6 
As for the Republic of Vietnam, the worst appeared to have passe~ 

and as security was restored in the wake of search-and-destroy operations, 

the nation seemed to revive and improve. Gradually, the nation extricated 

itself from its political impasse and confidently tread its way toward 

stability and democracy. The first foundation stone was laid on September 1966 when a constitutional assembly was created through free 

elections. Its work culminated in a new constitution from which the 

Second Republic of Vietnam was born on 1 November 1967, exactly four 

years after the demise of the First. 

As for the conduct of the war, the U.S. and RVN agreed to pursue 

a common strategy beginning in 1967. By mutual consent, the RVNAF 

took responsibility for the pacification effort, which was being stepped 

up in populous areas, while U. S. forces, assumed the defense of the 

DMZ and border areas, interdicted North Vietnam's infiltration, and 

conducted search-and-destroy operations against enemy base areas• • 

Another significant effort jointly initiated by the U.S. and RVN 

took the form of a silent war against the Viet Cong Infrastructure 

(VCI). A political arm of Communist insurgency, the VCI had always 

been active in support of the enemy's main force warfare. Its activities, 

however, seemed to have eluded the GVN's attention, chiefly because of the 

low VCI profile. As the pacification program was set in motion, it 

was realized that success could not be achieved as long as the VCI was 

free to collect taxes, assassinate our offiCials, move supplies, provide 

communications for main force units, make propaganda, and conduct 

terrorist actions. ~l of these activities were highly effective; 

they sustained the enemy's war effort and impeded ours. They took place , 

not only in rural areas but also in urban centers. Elimination of the 

VCI therefore became mandatory if pacification was to succeed. 

Situation as of the Seaond HaZf of 1967 

In general, the situation of South Vietnam ameliorated remarkably 

during the second half of 1967. As a result of pacification efforts, 

by year's end, 67% of the South Vietnamese population was living in '> "~.' <.::"" '-I " .. :,'.. '. ., .... : .. •.~:..... • ..•,'" ' .• ,;" .:•..•... ','," '.~-': .. , 

security under government control. This' was significant 'progress when 

7 
compared to the level of population control under the First Republic 

(62%). Of the 242 districts, 222 were considered secure. Up to 8,650 

hamlets had been completely pacified, and 3,500 were being contested. 

This was a remarkable achievement considering that there were a total 

of 12,600 hamlets across South Vietnam. 

The national economy also recovered and seemed to prosper through 

increased U.S.-financed imports and the income generated by the presence 

of U.S. and Free World troops. As new jobs became available, unemployment sharply declined and consumer purchasing power rose. Business 

proliferated and expanded to the great profit of shrewd entrepreneurs, 

especially those who provided goods and services for U.S. troops. 

Although the standard of living in urban areas seemed to rise, 

many thought that it was fictitious prosperity. Most disquieting, 

however, was the social ripple caused by the prese~ce of 485,000 U.S. 

troops at the year's last count, notwithstanding aoout 60,000 "thirdcountry" troops. 

Total friendly troop level by year's end stood at 1.2 million, to 

include the RVNAF. Infantry forces benefited from the support of 

3,100 u.S. helicopters in addition to tactical and strategic air. 

Beginning in April 1967, some B-52 missions were flown from Utapao 

Base in Thailand, a much shorter route compared to the 5,000 miles round 

trip from Guam. As a result, B-52 bombings increasingly terrorized 

enemy units. 

An atmosphere of optimism seemed to prevail throughout. It was 

shared by almost everybody, to include the military and political 

leaders in South Vietnam. General Westmoreland, for one, was optimistic 

about progress and prospects for the immediate,future. In a testimony 

before the U.S. Congress in November 1967, he expressed hopes that the 

U.S. would be able to initiate limited troop redeployments from South 


Vietnam by late 1968. Despite undeniable overall improvements in the 


military situation, there still existed troublesome spots, especially 


in the border areas. 


In the DMZ area, the U.S. Marine Base at Con Thien had been under 

, +e,peated"en~myattacks:,sinc~ .27 Septemb,er,,,a.nd.de!\lp,,ite. ,ver~eff~c~iye,.,. 

air support, the enemy did not break contact until 49 days later. Con 

8 

Thien, Carroll, and Rhe Sanh were major fire support bases manned , 

by U.S. Marines along the southern edge of the DMZ. As strongpoints 

of a defense system, these bases were considered an effective shield 

to protect the two northern provinces of I Corps area, Quang Tri and 

Thua Thien, from major enemy penetrations and attacks. Among these 

bases, Khe Sanh was the most important because of its geographical 

position. Located in the northwestern corner of Quang Tri Province, Khe 

Sanh effectively controlled a valley area which was the crossroads of 

enemy infiltration routes from North Vietnam and from lower Laos. 

During the last quarter of 1967, there were many indications of a massive 

enemy force concentration around the Khe Sanh area involving several 

NVA divisions. Intelligence estimates all pointed toward an inevitable 

siege of the base. If the siege ever materialized, it would amount 

to a major showdown of forces which, in view of the base's position 

and reports on enemy force concentration,. was very much reminiscent of 

Dien Bien Phu 13 years earlier. 

In the III Corps area, on 27 October an ARVN battalion successfully 

held back an attack by a NVA regiment at Song Be in Phuoc Long Province 

near the Cambodian border. Two days later, a regiment of the enemy 9th 

Division struck against the district town of Loc Ninh inBinh 'Long 

Province. The enemy penetrated the district headquarters area and 

gained control of about half of it, but was finally expulsed by the 

defenders, who were reinforced by elements of the ~8th ARVN Division and 

strongly supported by U.S. tactical air, Despite this, fighting spread 

into the,adjacent plantation areas and did noo abate until several days 

later after intervention by a brigade of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division. 

During this battle, the enemy lost in excess of 800 men. 

In mid-November, another major battle took place in Dakto, northwest of Kontum City in the II Corps area, pitting fou~ enemy regiments , brt~.a::lc> against four ARVN battalions and two U.S. infantry £at~alions. The 

engagement lasted 22 days and eventually compelled the U.S, command to 

bring in the U.S. l73d Airborne Brigade from the coastal zone as reinforcement, which increased the total friendly commitment to division 

'" 	 siz~, ,Whel;l the,enemy f~,na1ly broke cOnta(!t, ,lle,llaq ,lEJlft )~h~nd pver 

1',400 dead, inflicted to a large extent by B-S2 strikes. 

9 

V 
By the end of 1967, according to ARVN intelligence estimates, total 

enemy strength in South Vietnam had reached approximately 323,000, not 

including those units in the infiltration pipeline. Of this total, 

approximately 130,000 were combat troops; the VCI and guerrilla forces 

accounted for 160,000 and the remaining was made up of administrative 

and rear service elements. The enemy order of battle consisted.of nine 

infantry divisions distributed equallY among the RVN I, II and III Corps 

areas, and accounting for among themselves and other separate units, 

a total of 35 infantry regiments and 20 artillery and air-defenseregiments or 230 combat and 6 sapper battalions; Thesecepresented only 

confirmed units and if other reported but still unconfirmed units were 

taken into account, then total enemy force structure could be significantly 

larger. 

In terms of armament, most remarkable was the Soviet assault rifle 

AK-47 which had become standard issue for almost all enemy combat units. 

Enemy firepower was also enhanced by a substantial number of self-propelled 

rockets, mostly 122-mm and 140-mm. From all indications, enemy forces 

were apparently undergoing intensified modernization in weaponry and 

equipment. In fact, the Soviet Union had committed herself by an agreement concluded with North Vietnam in September 1967, to provide more 

airplanes, artillery, antiaircraft weapons, rockets, and ammunition for 

her embattled ally. lri October, North Vietnam itself confirmed that 

Red China and other countries of the Communist Blo,c had also substantially 

increased their level of military and economic aid. 

As statistiCS reve.aled at the end of 1967, e.nemy human losses for 

the entire year amounted to 87,534 dead and 27,178 rallied, 17,671 among 

them were combat troops. His'material losses included 31,000 assorted 

weapons and 14,000 tons of rice. Both of these losses represented an 

increase of 50% compared to our 1966 estimates. 

On the friendly Side, casualties were much lighter. Total U.S. 

losses for the seven years beginning in 1961 and ending.on 31 December 

1967 amounted to 16,106. The RVl~ also incurred losses proportionately 

much smaller than the enemy's, but in the other war, it suffered much 

. ~re S!ignificant :J,osses that .caused . some.concern tq.. both U. S • and ..netionel. . 

authorities. Those were the heavy toll in administrative cadres at the 

10 

village and hamlet level where VCl terrorist activities increased 

significantly during the second half of 1967. During that short period 

alone, 4,000 village and hamlet officials were killed, 8,000 wounded and 

another 5,400 abducted. 

The year 1968 began with a stream of intelligence reports on the 

enemy's imminent Winter-Spring campaign which bore all the signs of a 

major offensive. Despite the telltale signs, both the U.S. and RVN 

commands were still speculating on the probability of the enemy campaign, 

and neither was certain when it would take place or if it would even be 

conducted. No evidence obtained so far had ever pointed clearly toward 

the inevitability. 

As early.as 19 October 1967, the enemy had announced he would 

observe a 7-day truce on the Tet occasion. This was the longest truce 

ever proposed by the Communists. Many, especially U.S. and RVN intelligence analysts, had speculated that th~ enemy would take advantage of 

the truce period to move his units and supplies and complete the last 

stage of his preparations for the Winter-Spring campaign. Our intelligence also estimated that this campaign would be primarily directed 

against the Khe Sanh Base area where reports had indicated an enemy 

force concentration of at least three main force divisions. 

To face this mounting pressure around Khe Sanh, the U.S. command 

deployed the 1st Air Cavalry Division and one brigade of the 101st 

Airborne Division from II Corps area to I Corps area to strengthen the 

defense of the two northernmost provinces. Then, on 21 January 1968, 

two NVA divisions initiated an attack on Khe Sanh Base with the support .' 

of artillery. Concur~ntly, enemy armor made its first appearance 


during the war when five PT-76's were sighted at Lang Vei, five miles 


west of Khe Sanh. 


As the battle raged on fiercely, Khe Sanh drew most of the U.S. 

command's attention and concern. The RVN was much less concerned since 

no ARVN force had been involved prior to the siege. Not until the 

fighting had been in full progress did the RVN decide to deploy one 

ARVN Ranger battalion to the base, more for political than tactical 

reasons, evidently. For the.RVN presence was deemed symbolically 

.. ' ~igni~ica~'~' ~n ~. ba~ti~~h~~ :e~ent~liy' ~~~d' ~k; h~S~~;Y~ ',' 

11 

Despite 	Kbe Sanh and other developments in the military situation, 

I 

the RVN population and even its leadership still felt reassured. The 

presence of one half million U.S. and Free World troops and U.S. air 

and firepower had convinced everybody that the Communists could hardly 

conduct anything big, and if they attempted to do so, they would surely 

incur heavy losses and a tragic defeat. 

In any event, Tet was approaching and to most Vietnamese, everything 

else hardly mattered, including politics and the war. Even those who 

were deeply concerned about current events seemed carefree enough to 

join in the feverish pre-Tet shopping spree and preparations. 

This year, the festive mood among Vietnamese was particularly accentuated. By contrast to previous years, the level of individual income 

seemed to have risen substantially as a result of increasing business 

and job opportunities brought about by the presence of U.S. and Free 

World troops. To add to the expectation.of festivities ahead, the GVN 

removed the long ban on traditional firecrackers during Tet, which set in 

motion a booming business in manufacturing and imports. The wealthy 

Vietnamese were particularly fond of firecrackers imported from Hong 

Kong, whose machine gun-like noise tlaS rythmically accentuated by big 

booms that sounded like grenade explosions. The GVN Ministry of Information went all out in its public-relations campaign, distributing Tet 

presents for the troops and the underprivileged. Each gift parcel 

contained, in addition to the usual toilet articl~s, a horoscope predicting among other things a bright future for South Vietnam in the 

Year of the MOnkey and, naturally, disaster for the Communists. 

On Net~ Year's Day j some piecemeal information was Circulated among 

the Saigon population to the effect that the enemy was attacking a few 

cities across the country. But this information created only a small 

ripple 	of concern not strong enough to distract people from celebrating. 

Then during the night, amid the deafening noise and echo of unending 

firecrackers, there were also heard more distinct, sharper reports of 

AK-47 and RPM automatic rifle rounds interspersed by B-40 rocket thuds. 

" • '., .. ' 	Bllt'no, one seemed to recognize these, ominous, .sound!3 ut,ltil, da,"!!, when, ," 

early commuters bumped into strange faces, strange uniforms and the 

12 
distinctive "Binh Tri Thien" rubber sandals in some city quarters. 

Then it was too late; the surprise had been almost total. 

But very few of our citizens could believe their eyes. How could 

this have happened during a Tet truce and when the enemy was reported 

to be defecting everywhere? Only a few believed that the enemy was 

actually attacking Saigon, much less conducting coordinated attacks in 

28 other cities throughout South Vietnam. Why was the enemy attacking 

the cities? How had he accomplished this maneuver? Had he changed 

his strategy and his rules of war? 
CHAPTER II 


North Vietnam's Change of Strategy and 


Preparations for the General Offensive-General Uprising 


Communist Strategy in South Vietnam 


During the 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 Dry Seasons 


The Communist's foremost concern after the rapid buildup of U.S. and 

Free World troops in South Vietnam was to search for an appropriate 

strategy to confront the new war situation. 

This task was not an easy one. In the first place, Communist 

military leaders seemed to know very little about U.S. forces. In an 

article written in 1967 under the pen na~e of Truong Son, one of the 

highest ranking Communist military leaders in South Vietnam admitted 

that during the summer 1966, one year after the U.S. had begun its force 

buildup, COSVN and its key military commanders were still probing 

desperately to resolve puzzling questions concerning U.S. strategy and 

total strength, specificcapabi11ties of each major U.S. unit and 

American rules of activity. 

Nguyen Chi Thanh, commander of all Communist. forces in the COSVN 

area of South Vietnam, analyzed the balance of forces and recognized . that U.S. forces enjoyed three advantages: great numerical strength, a 

powerful air force, and sizeable artillery and armor. In his quest for . ~ .' 

an appropriate strategy, to offset the imbalance of forces which was increasingly tilting in favor of the U.S.-RVN side, Thanh strongly 

advocated the large..,scale offensive approach. He believed that his side 

should take advantage of the offensive momentum gained during the dry 

season prior to the introduction of U.S. forces and carry it on with 

major scale attacks by main force units. This strategic approach 

naturally called for a bigger commitment of NVA forces. 

Studying U.S. military strategy in South Vietnam, Nguyen Chi Thanh 

concluded that this strategy was characterized by five main efforts: , . .'. ' .. " ;,.:' '",': .' . ' , . '" "...',: ........ ~. ,.', 


14 

1. To disperse Communist main force units and force them to revert 

to guerrilla warfare. It was for this reason that U.S. forces were conducting search-and-destroy operations on a large scale. 

2. To spread Communist forces thin over the territory of South 

Vietnam and destroy them piecemeal with superior firepower. This 

effectively ~ounted to forcing the Communists to fight the war on U.S. 

terms and making them more vulnerable. 

3. To expand the RVN rear areas through pacification, consolidate 

territorial control, and use these pacified areas as platforms from 

which to launch attacks against Communist-controlled areas. 

4. To mop up and protect strategic lines of communication, 

especially vital links between bases in order to facilitate troop movement and ensure the effectiveness of offensive operations. 

5. To isolate North Vietnam from the South and seek ways to cut 

off North Vietn~ese military assistance for the South • . As a result, Thanh concluded that the most effective strategy was 

to conduct the offensive on all battlefronts continuously and with 

determination. He believed that this was the only way to gain .the 

initiative in the conduct of the war. 

Truong Son also shared this concept. Echoing Thanh's lines, he 

propounded that to make it impossible for the U.S. to take advantage of 

its superiority in air and firepower, the most effective approach would 

be to launch close-range attacks on headquarters, bases and troop cantonments on a massive scale. He was convinced that the Communist side 

would be much better off with this approach than hesitatingly searching . J . 

for any other strategy which involved no immediate and decisive action. , To waver, he argued, would bring forth disastrous consequences. 

Successive surges of Communist activities during the 1965-1966 dry 

season seemed to reflect Nguyen Chi Thanh's strategy of determined confrontation. As these activities eventually ended in failure, especially 

after the tragic defeat at Plei Me, North Vietnam's military leaders 

began to voice doubts and criticize Thanh's conduct of the war. 

Without directly incriminating Thanh, Vo Nguyen Giap made a cool 

assessment of the war situation in South Vietn~ and advocated a .. . . ", 'i:empo:rarYretrogress10n to aefensive 'i.Y~i:fai:e;-'He believed that COIIimunist . 

15 
forces were not yet ready to confront American superiority in combat 

strength and Ifirepower. A more appropriate strategy, he argued, would 

be to focus on small-scale, harassment attacks, guerrilla-style, consolidate the defense posture, and buy time for the activation, training 

and infiltration of additional NVA units. Only then would Communist 

forces in South Vietnam be prepared for the offensive phase of warfare. 

Giap's moderate stance was rejected by Nguyen Chi Thanh. To drive, 

home his displeasure with North Vietnam's minister of defense, Thanh 

acrimoniously attacke~ those he considered "conservative and captive of 

old methods and past experience." "Because these people could not see 

beyond their past," he charged, "they thought only of mechanically repeating the past and were incapable of analyzing the concrete local 

situation which required an entirely new kind of response." 

The conflict that broke out between Giap and Thanh remained unresolved. After the 1966-1967 dry season during which U.S. forces / -­ • 

successfully stepped up search-and-destroy operations, the old polemic 

resumed with rekindled impassion. Each kept reiterating his own 

arguments, and neither seemed amenable to a reconciled viewpoint. The 

enemy's quest for a most appropriate strategy to meet the U,S. challenge 

in South Vietnam thus remained an issue open to debates. 

North Vietnam's military leaders aligned behind Vo Nguyen Giap 

continued to extol guerrilla activities which they believed had been 

successful in South Vietnam. They proudly pointed to the disruption of 

South Vietnam's pacification efforts, the obstruction of U.S. logistic 

buildup activities; the interdiction of vehicle traffic by ambushes on " , 

major lines of communications such as QL-14, QL-19, QL-21, and terrorist , 

activities in major cities as irrefutable evidence of guerrilla warfare's 

effectiveness. This effectiveness, they emphasized, was producing a 

favorable, psychological impact and greatly enhanced Communist prestige 

throughout the world. 

As Hanoi viewed it, the most resounding exploit among these 

activities was the shelling of the Independence Palace by 60-mm mortar 

and 57-mm recoilless rifle on the evening of 31 October 1967 when a formal reception was taking place. This was considered particularly . ',' . .~ " ; ,,' ,'.. , '. .. ',' ,', .. . ',.. ',,, 

important because the occasion marked not only the inauguration'of South" 

16 

Vietnam's Second Republic but also the presence of Vice-President 

Hubert H. Humphrey. 

In spite of Hanoi's official stance, Nguyen Chi Thanh did not renounce his conviction. In a last analysis written in May 1967 in which 

he made an assessment of the 1966-1967 dry season campaigns, Thanh still 

maintained his view although he was more cognizant of the role and value 

of guerrilla and local forces in South Vietnam. 

This polemical impasse among Communist generals on which kind of 

strategy was best for the prosecution of the war was not resolved until 

the death of Nguyen Chi Thanh, which was announced on July 6, 1967. 1 

What followed in the wake of his death seemed to vindicate Va Nguyen 

Giap's viewpoint and took the war on a new course. Giap's viewpoint 

was thoroughly discussed in a lengthy article published in the "People's 

Army" daily on September 14 and 16, 1967 and subsequently broadcast by 

Hanoi Radio. The article was pompously entitled: "Big Victory, Gigantic 

Task." 

Vo Nguyen Giap's Strategia Viewpoint 

After the 1966-1967 Dry Season 

'''Big Victory, Gigantic Task" was actually the fourth article Giap 

wrote during 1967. In terms of content, it was considered the most significant because it accurately expounded North Vietnam's military strategy 

for the years ahead. More importantly, it seemed-to highlight Giap's 

viewpoints, which were going to provide guidance for Communist forces in 

South Vietnam. Unlike'Nguyen Chi Thanh, Tran Van Tra, his successor, , 2 adhered completely with the policies and viewpoints of Vo Nguyen Giap. 


Viewed from another angle, Giap's proposition could be primarily 


construed as a military application of major policy lines laid down by 


IGeneral Nguyen Chi Thanh reportedly died of B-52 bomb-inflicted 


injuries in his headquarters, COSVN, eomewhere in Tay Ninh Province. 


2Tran Van Tra was a Lieutenant General who served as Commander of 

,COSVN until. the.fall,ofSaigon in 1975..: Addit;l.onallyduringl973 he ..:.. .',' 

headed the NLF Delegation to the Joint Military cOmmission; 

17 
Democratic Republic Resolution No. 13 which had been adopted by North 

Vietnam's Politbureau five months earlier. Its enforcing character was 

evident. Enemy prisoners and ralliers later confirmed that Communist 

forces in South Vietnam were all required to study Giap's article. 

Appraising his main opponent, the U.S., Vo Nguyen Giap opened that 

the numerical strength and strong firepower of U.S. forces hardly helped 

them enjoy initiative in South Vietnam. 

To substantiate this point, Giap demonstrated how people's war 

activities had kept them dispersed over vast areas, pointing as examples 

to the DMZ where U.S. Marines were spread thinly over a defense perimeter 

500 to 600 kilometers long and the Central Highlands where U.S. Army 

units had to defend an area of more than 200 square kilometers. Giap 

recognized that U.S. firepower was strong and considerable, especially 

B-52's, but this firepower was not effective because in people's war, the 

obj ectives', were scattered almost everywh~re. 

Strategically, Giap was convinced that in its role as the world's 

fire brigade, the U.S. could not maintain a large military force in 

South Vietnam for any long period. He believed that the U.S would be 

worn down by the war and sooner or later would have to negotiate for its 

end on terms foreseen as advantageous to the Communist side. 

As a result, U.S. and Free World troops were the primary targets 

for attack on the Communist list of priorities followed by U.S. bases 

and the U.S. logistic system. The Communist objective was to inflict as 

many casualties on U.S. troops as possible. Attacks on the RVNAF and 

the GVN were considere4 only as third and fourth priorities. 

As regards the emp'loyment of forces for attack, Vo Nguyen Giap felt , 

that the development of main forces had to be consistent with the local 

situation in each area. Therefore, he promoted the idea that main forces 

should be concentrated on a certain "strategic zone" instead of being 

dispersed over the entire battleground of South Vietnam. 

According to Giap, the effectiveness of attacks depended on the 

judicious use of three kinds of forces: main, local, and guerrilla. 

These forces should be used in two different but very effective tactics: 

combined and independent. As Giap viewed it, the combined tactic relied , , " ", ! ,-'. ". ,',' ,,' ",' . ':' ....:. '. ..' . ,','", '... : • -", . . -. ',' 

on infantry as a primary force and the support of artillery, engineer 

18 

": . 
and sappers. The independent tactic, on the contrary, involved the use 

of small but 'highly combat-effective units in raids and shellings against 

U.S. bases and other strongpoints. 

To prove his point, Giap discussed the combined tactic successfully 

used by Communist forces in Tri-Thien and the Central Highlands. This 

tactic, he argued, had forced the U.S. Command to remove its units from 

populated areas, especially the Mekong Delta, and redeploy them to these 

battlegrounds. This redeployment in turn curtailed the RVN pacification 

efforts in the populated areas. As a result, Giap claimed, the combined 

tactic had effectively wrecked the RVN scheme to eliminate the Communist 

infrastructure in the South. 

Looking ahead and considering the future conduct of the war, Giap 

stressed that Communist forces in the South should place more emphasis 

on the coordinated use of their three forces and endeavor especially to 

expand and improve guerrilla forces as a major strategic requirement. 

He saw the potential of these guerrilla units becoming the strike forces 

of the future once they had grown strong and effective in every area. 

Predicting the future course of events, Vo Nguyen Giap estimated 

that the United States would expand the war into Cambodia, Laos, and 

possibly North Vietnam also where a major landing of U.S. forces. could 

take place. Giap's concern about a U.S. landing was genuine and 

oppressive .enough to prompt him to warn that in such an event,. Red China 

would probably intervene. In any event, he insinuated that North 

Vietnam would be well prepared to counter it. 

Up to this time, Giap had always emphasized, that the war in South , 

Vietnam was a protracted one and that it might last five, 10 or 20 years , 

or even longer. This line of thought happened to be a mimic of Ho Chi 

Minh's declaration of policy made at the outbreak of the war. It was 

also reiterated by Nguyen Chi Thanh in his last article published in 

May 1967. 

Giap's article, therefore, sounded like a confirmation of North 

Vietnam's unflinching belief in the doctrine of protracted warfare. His 

words were unfortunatelY taken at their face value and completely misled 

our analysts. '" ~,.' .,. ..... ',,'. ", '. '" ;. : . -', ',," .: ",'" ....~ •. " ',; ,," " '~'<'" .;,., :," Not knowing that Giap' s writing was intended to sd.intilate· South .. 

19 

Vietnamese insurgents on the one hand, and to confuse our side as to 

North Vietnam's true course of action on the other, our analysts hastily 

concluded, in the light of Giap's article, that North Vietnam was yet 

to show that it was prepared for a general offensive in the near future. 

In all likelihood, they estimated, North Vietnam was still pursuing a 

protracted course of warfare and far from willing to bypass its intermediary phase. 

In fact, the North Vietnamese leadership had already decided 

differently. There were several reasons for North Vietnam to make the 

strategic decision to launch a general offensive in South Vietnam during 

·the 1967-1968 dry season. 

Reasons for the 1968 General Offensive 

and Communist Preparations 

Vo Nguyen Giap revealed that he was 'primarily concerned about two 

things. First, the United States would probably expand the war beyond 

South Vietnam's territory, and second, the GVN pacification and· development program would be successful. 3 

Expansion of the war, especially into North Vietnam, was what the 

North Vietnamese leadership had sought to prevent all along because this 

would cause serious difficulties. For one thing, North Vietnam would 

have to extend its forces over a larger geographical area, which could 

include North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Since all of 

these areas of operation were strategically interdependent like links in 

a chain, a breakdown in anyone link would disrupt the entire war effort. 

A U.S. landing in the North could also bring about unfathomable 

consequences that might spell disaster for the regime. It could create 

an opportunity for suppressed popular antipathy to surface and possibly 

crystallize into insurrection, even among some high-ranking officials 

3North Vietnam had prepared to face a probable U.S. landing by organizing a para-military force and an extensive self-defense system. Its 

concern was such that the number one priority, economic production, had 

become. .secondary ·tona1:,ional 4ef.ense. . ..... " ',' ,'. ',' . 

20 

in the government. This fear was foremost in the minds of North 

Vietnam's leaders. As a testimony to it, a high-ranking enemy rallier 

later disclosed that in September 1967, Hanoi authorities arrested and 

detained in excess of 200 party members accused of being dissenters. 

Most significant among those detained were Hoang Minh Chinh, 

superintendent of the School for Political Studies; Colonel Le Trung 

Nghia, director of North Vietnam's Central Intelligence Agency; and 

several other prominent officals, all arrested for the crime of heretical 

thoughts and opposition to the conduct of the war. At about the same 

time, North Vietnam also enacted a special law which imposed harsh 

punishments on "reactionary" crimes such as sabotage, spying, opposition 

to or obstruction of national defense enterprises. 

Despite its advocacy of protracted warfare conceived as antidote 

to the U.S. strategy of quick victory, North Vietnam began to feel its 

increasingly debilitating impact. Even ~hile it argued that the ratio" 

of human losses, which stood at one American for every ten North 

Vietnamese, was more of a concern to the U.S., the Hanoi leadership 

was having second thoughts. In fact, the effect of accumulated damage 

and casualties that the North Vietnamese population was suffering had 

generated' an undercurrent of bitterness and frustration that might 

jeopardize the long-term war effort. North Vietnam's economy, which had 

gained some headway toward recovery, was plunging downhill again as a 

result of stepped up U.S. bombings against targets of strategic significance. North Vietnam was therefore becoming increasingly dependent on 

Russia and Red China for military and economic aid. More difficult still 

for the Hanoi leadership was its position vis-'l!-vis these big brothers: 

how to steer a middle c~urse between them without alienating either 

while both appeared to be heading toward aggravating animosity. 

One week before the general offensive actually took place, the RVN 

suddenly obtained an unprecedented intelligence windfall in the person 

of a high-ranking enemy prisoner. He was Nam Dong, political commissar 

of the enemy MR-6 headquarters, captured in an ambush while he was on 

his way back from a conference at COSVN. After intensive interrogation 

lasting several weeks, Nam Dong disclosed that North Vietnam was switch­ .:...•. 'i~g :i.ts·strategy 'h~m p~o'ti:a~tedwi!rfare to" general' offenSi';'e--genera'l' " ',' 

21 
uprising, a radical departure from the conduct of the 1946-1954 First 

Indochina War. ~his sudden change in strategy was a,ttributed by Nam Dong 

to four main reasons: 

1. U.S. forces were much stronger than French forces. In the First 

Indochina War, the Dien Bien Phu victory by the Viet Minh had sufficed 

to bring about the Geneva Accords. In the present war, the Communists 

entertained no hopes of achieving a similar victory given the military 

might and firepower of the United States. 

2. North Vietnam's strategy of "enveloping the cities with the 

rural areas," which had been successful during the First Indochina War, 

proved no longer effective in the face of combined U.S.-RVN efforts. 

This obsolescent strategy not only failed to bring about a decisive 

victory, it also retrogressed the war to Mao Tse Tung's first strategic 

phase of guerrilla warfare. 

3. If protracted warfare was to con;inue in its present course, 

North Vietnam would surely incur increasing losses. In the long run, 

Hanoi feared that aggravating attrition in manpower and material resources might eventually cause the Communist regime in the North to 

collapse. 

4. It.was, therefore, about time for big and decisive actions in 

the South. In Hanoi's view, a general military offensive coupled with 

popular uprising had all the chances to succeed because the Communists 

would enjoy "two strategic opportunities and one tactical advantage." 

One strategic opportunity was the U.S. presidential election in 

November 1968. Hanoi believed that in the event of a Communist victory, 

the Johnson administrad.on, which had already run into difficulties because of strong domestic opposition to the war, would no longer be able 

to bring more troops to South Vietnam. Eventually, it might even be 

compelled to reduce U.S. troop strength and seek negotiations on terms 

advantageous to the Communist side. 

The other strategic opportunity, according to NamDong, came from 

increasing opposition, both domestic and international, to U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Therefore, a big Communist victory would make this 

opposition stronger and more widespread, which in all likelihood,' would 

'. 	 "'f~ree ·the·tr.S;to term:i.nate· its'im;olvemerttinVieti:ui.ni :against ·its ovn . 

will. 

22 
As to the tactical advantage, the Communists felt certain they would 

be able to achieve surprise. Therefore, Nam Dong revealed, Hanoi had 

decided to launch the general offensive during the Tet holidays. 

When asked about Hanoi's plans in the event of a defeat, Nam Dong 

reiterated Vo Nguyen Giap's belief that this offensive would be a 

success. But even if it turned out to be a defeat, Giap did not think it 

would adversely affect the war effort because Communist activities had 

always been rooted in the rural and mountainous areas. A failure in the 

cities, therefore, would simply amount to a return to the old redoubts. 

The Communists were well aware that they would suffer great losses 

when attacking the cities. But losses were not North Vietnam's main 

concern, Nam Dong argued, because its capacities for replacement had 

been estimated at about three times those of South Vietnam. 

There were other advantages which North Vietnam thought would favor 

the Communist side. It believed that the RVNAF was no longer combateffective, both in defensive and offensive maneuvers. The South 

Vietnamese people, Hanoi believed, hated Americans and the Thieu government. They had manifested their antipathy through frequent demonstrations 

and violenc,e and by joining such popular organizations as the National 

Salvation and Buddhist movements. Hanoi was thus convinced that they 

were ripe for insurrection and ready to join the Communist side in the 

event of a general offensive. 

In all respects, Nam Dong's deposition proved to be reliable. His 

revelations corroborated several unconfirmed reports, for example, Vo 

Nguyen Giap's interest"in the 1968 U.S. presidential election. Even 

though Giap wrote in his article that such an election was merely a 

device for the U.S. party in power to reshuffle its ranks and that the 

U.S. policy of aggression would remain unchanged regardless of the 

election outcome, Hanoi in reality was well aware of the fact that in an 

election year, a U.S. president was seldom inclined to make bold policy 

decisions. 

As Giap saw it, United States policy toward Vietnam had always been 

predicated on an effort to prevent the political, economic and social 

l:!fe'6ftheAme.ricanpeop-ie 'from being' 'affected 'by the war. "And he' ",:.,-: ' 

23 
predicted this policy was going to change as a result of the growing 

political dissent both in the United States and South Vietnam. 

To his interpretation, the popular manifestations that had several 

times rocked South Vietnam's big cities were but indications of antigovernment and anti-war feelings. They were also signs of popular 

sympathy toward Communist insurgency. 

Hanoi's belief in the support of the South Vietnamese population 

was further enhanced by the RVN presidential election in the fall of 

1967 in which the winning slate of President Nguyen Van Thieu and VicePresident Nguyen Cao Ky obtained only 34% of the popular votes. Evidence 

of popular sympathy was obvious when the runner-up candidate, Truong 

Dinh Dzu, collected 17% of the ballots on the basis of his "restoring 

peace and ending the war" platform which happened to concur with the 

NLF political line. 4 

The Communists estimated therefore that a general offensive . against South Vietnam's cities would have the inevitable effect of a 

catalyst which initiated a popular insurrection. They called that insurrection a "General Uprising" whose successful antecedent they had 

found in the August Revolution of 1945, believing that a repeat of that 

historical ,event could now be 'achieved through the same device of popular 

incitement. Besides, the basic objective of people's war as formulated 

by Mao Tse Tung's tenet always dictated that victory should have 

political significance and toward that end, be made to look like a 

popular rather than a military success. For these, reasons, the military 

offensive planned for 1968 had been conceived under the conceptual 

formula of a "General Offensj,ve-General Uprising." 

To prepare for that big event, North Vietnam eVidently required 

special assistance from Russia and Red China, not only in military hardware but also, though not as urgent, in economic aid. The insistent 

quest for this assistance eventually resulted in a military aid package 

agreement between Moscow and Hanoi in early September 1967. Russia agreed 

4There were a total of ten candidates for the 1967 presidential 

,elec,ti9n,' ...... ~., ,' .., .... :~; ..... '. ';', '.; " ." . :.' ,." .". . 

24 
to provide North Vietnam with additional warplanes, rockets, antiaircraft artillery, armored vehicles, infantry weapons and ammunition. 

Then in October 1967, Hanoi announced that Communist bloc countries, 

especially Russia and Red China, had agreed to increase military and 

economic aid to North Vietnam. 

This increased military aid eventually found its way into South 

Vietnam where Communist infantry forces, with the AK-47 assault rifle 

and B-40 rocket launcher now becoming standard issues, began to enjoy a 

marked advantage over the RVNAF in terms of firepower. S 

But when did North Vietnam actually begin its preparations for the 

1968 General Offensive-General Uprising? The earliest evidence of 

preparatory activity dated back to March or April 1967 when North 

Vietnam confirmed its switch of strategy through the promulgation of 

Resolution No. 13. 

A short time later, the first instance of political preparation 

was detected in May. the same year when C05VN summoned the deputy chairman of Saigon-Gia Dinh's Committee for the Proselyting of Intellectuals 

and assigned him the mission to contact and keep close touch with those 

personalities earmarked by the Communists to take part in future coalition government. 

This intelligence report thus made it clear that one of the 

strategic objectives to be achieved was a coalition government. Destined' 

to replace the current RVN government, it was to be established after the 

General Offensive-General Uprising had succeeded in Saigon. According to 

COSVN plans, this coalition government would order the RVNAF to cease 

combat in those areas where fighting was still indeCisive. It was also 

this coalition government which would eventually initiate negotiations 

with the United States to solve pending political and military matters 

in the event of victory. 

Apparently, however, the Communists foresaw that even if their 

SAK-47's were captured in South Vietnam for the first time in 1964. 

Then in late 1966, Communist forces began to use B-40 and B-41 rocket 

launchers. Despite their early appearance, these weapons were only issued 

.piecemeal·' and did no-t become- standard- -for- all CotglllUnist -uni!.ts until the - --­ 1968 offensive. 

2S 

offensive was to succeed, militarily, they could never' actually defeat 

both the RVNAF and U.S. forces in South Vietnam. Therefore, as enemy , 

ralliers and prisoners later disclosed, the offensive was primarily 

targeted against RVNAF and GVN installations. U.S. forces did not 

interest Communist strategists because the main objective was to destroy 

the RVNAF and overthrow the RVN government through country-wide popular 

revolt. In such an event, U.S. bases and installations would become 

virtually isolated and U.S. forces would never dare to use firepower 

indiscriminately against Communist forces hidden behind the popular 

shield. In the end, as the Communists calculated, the U.S. would have 

its hands so tied that it would be compelled to negotiate for troop 

wi.thdrawal with the new (coalition) government of South Vietnam. 

To hasten the collapse of the RVNAF and win popular support, it was 

mandatory for the Communist side to influence public opinion. In fact, 

the main Communist propaganda ploy used toward this objective was to try 

and convince the South Vietnamese that the U.S. had agreed to a coalition 

government as a solution for the political future of South Vietnam. 

Therefore, since their general offensive only sought to formalize that 

solution, by pre-arrangement Communist forces would not attack U,S. 

targets. 

In September 1967, Saigon reeked with rumors that a high-ranking 

Communist cadre was apprehended by the Vietnamese police after making 

contact with the U.S. Embassy but was released shortly thereafter under 

U.S. pressure. These rumors led to another story.that General Nguyen 

Ngoc Loan, Director General of the National Police, had tendered his 

resignation in protest"of U.S. intercession and pressure. 

Although these stdries were never substantiated, they persisted as 

dOubts in the inquisitive minds of the Saigon people. So when the 

Communist offensive materialized, save for the unique sapper action 

against the U.S. Embassy, the suspicious Saigon people were very much 

interested in the fact that no other U.S. installations and particularly, 

no U.S. personnel ever came under enemy attack even though they moved 

freely in the city. And intriguingly enough, the suspicious minds drew 

their own conclusions • 

' . . :1", < .••• ", ,_ " . .... ':'., , ~ .;", , ...... ...... ... ';. . ~ "", ',.' l . .. -. 

26 
In a further attempt to convince the South Vietnamese population, 

during September, the NLF repeatedly broadcast its political program, 

guaranteeing them among other things appealing freedom of religion, 

thought, association, movement, work, etc. Such was the extent of 

Communist preparations on the.domestic political front. 

Diplomatically, the Communist effort was equally significant. On 

31 December 1967, North Vietnam's minister for foreign affairs declared 

that if the U.S. unconditionally ceased its bombings, North Vietnam 

would be prepared to talk. This sounding balloon sought to achieve a 

double purpose. First, it put a smoke screen on Hanoi's preparations 

for the general offensive and enhanced the belief espoused by U.S. and 

South Vietnamese leaders that peace talks would shortly take place. 

Second, a cessation of bombings would enable North Vietnam to speed up 

infiltration movements into the South during the dry season without 

great losses and in time for the offensi~e. 

Other Communist announcements of extended truce during Christmas, 

New Year and Tet were intended to achieve the same purposes: diversion 

and a free hand in infiltration. In fact, the Communists did take advantage of the Christmas-New Year truce both to move supplies in place and 

to reconnoiter future battle sites. According to the revelations of 

Tam Ha, a high-ranking enemy cadre who rallied after the offensive had 

faltered, the commander of the 9th Division, the unit responsible for 

attacking Saigon, and his regimental commanders made several reconnoitering trips during this period of truce. 

On the military front, as diversionary actions, Communist forces 

launched several large~scaleattacks against Khe Sanh Base in the DMZ 

area, Dakto in the Central Highlands and Phuoc Long and Loc Ninh further 

south near the Cambodian border. All of these attacks were aimed at 

drawing the concern of U.S. and RVN military leaders, forcing them to 

bring forth reinforcements which would have been otherwise committed to 

the defense of populous and urban areas, hence and at the same time, 

creating favorable conditions for sapper penetrations into cities. 

The attack on Loc Ninh, it was later known, was also intended to 

provide Communist forces with an opportunity to experiment with street 

'", . fighting 'tactie~ on the ortehand;and'to 'test' the :RVNAF reaction.s and:' 

27 

use of firepower to relieve embattled cities and populous centers on 

the other. 

To create further diversions and mislead our intelligence, 

Communist main forces remained .in their usual areas of operation while 

local units continued to harass and try to pin down our forces by ground 

attacks and shellings across the country. According to the enemy's concept of operation, infiltrated sapper units were the primary forces employed to attack important targets and headquarters in cities with the 

support of local force battalions. Once these objectives had been 

occupied, the attacking elements were to hold them at all costs for a 

period from 2 to 5 days to afford main force units the necessary time to 

move .in as reinforcements. 

To muster additional forces in a short time, enemy plans also called 

for the capture of prisoner camps and the employment of liberated 

prisoners as local combatants. It was equally expected that attacking 

forces should look for rebellious elements among the local population 

and enlist their participation in combat. For that purpose, weapons and 

ammunition were to be moved into cities beforehand and used not only to 

resupply attacking forces but also to equip liberated prisoners and 

volunteers·. 

The infiltration of weapons and ammunition into cities was subjected to meticulous planning in order to avoid detection. Toward that 

end, it was coordinated with and took advantage of normal traffic movements of goods and merchandise regularly delivered to urban markets. 

These movements were accelerated during the busy trade periods such as ~ .. Christmas, New Year, and particularly during the pre-Tet week when , traffic was heaviest and control usually more relaxed. 

Although various techniques of infiltration were used, the most 

common and reliable turned out to be the one practice so familiar to 

smugglers: double-decked trucks and boats and concealment beneath 

cargoes. Once the weapons, explosives and ammunition had been successfully smuggled in, they were to be distributed among the VCI members who 

would keep them in custody in their own houses or hide them in such unsuspected areas as cemeteries, drainage ditches and garbage dumps. An 

'. ~nemy prisone~'~hob~ioriged' ib the S3d" Rear S~rviceGrotip ;'tl1~ unit itt·· 

28 

charge of moving weapons, explosives, and ammunition· into Saigon, later 

disclosed that by using this smuggling technique, he had been able to 

deliver his war cargoes in four trips; the first time in late November, 

the second time at Christmas and the last two times three days before 

Tet. 

Another method of obtaining additional war materiels that the enemy 

had planned to use was to steal them from ARVN units. Priority was also 

given to capturing armored vehicles and artillery pieces which the 

enemy estimated to be doubly useful. Not only could they be immediately 

used to support attacks and confuse ARVN troops, their employment by VC 

troops would also look as if ARVN combat arms had joined in the attacks 

on the insurgent side. 

To speed up the collapse of the RVNAF, which the enemy had expected, 

and enlist the cooperation of some of their units, a scheme was devised 

to capture alive key RVNAF unit commanders. The enemy hoped that by 

forcing these commanders to give orders, RVNAF units under their command 

would either cease combat and capitulate or cooperate with his side. 

Among the objectives that Communist forces were ordered to attack 

and hold at all costs, radio and TV broadcast stations were considered 

most vital to the effort of instigating a country-wide popular insurrection. Several propaganda programs had therefore been pre-recorded on 

tapes, slated to be transmitted over our airwaves during the first hours 

of the offensive. The most effective among these programs, according to 

enemy propagandists, was perhaps Ho Chi Minh's Tet greetings addressed 

to the South Vietnamese population. 

On the eve of Tet: Hanoi Radio suddenlY broadcast a short poem by 

Ho Chi Minh which it said was Ho's greetings. The poem reads: 

"This Spring (Tet) is entirely different from previous ones 

Because every household is enjoying news of victory 

North and South are now forever reunited 

Forward! Total victory will be ours." 

Intended to stimulate Communist troops in the south and exhort the 

South Vietnamese population into joining them in the General OffensiveGeneral Uprising, the poem, especially the last line had also been conceived as code words for the attack, as enemy prisoners and ralliers 

.-: l,: '." ; -.. ' .'" .-, ~': .,', . ~ 

2!i 
All preparations for attack were thus thoroughly made including 

the most minute details. The enemy was so sure of success that even 

Ho's poem was composed to sound as if victory had been achieved. Its 

implied present tense made it perfectly appropriate whether broadcast 

by Hanoi or Saigon Radio, before or during Tet. 

To achieve tactical surprise, which Vo Nguyen Giap considered 

essential for success, the offensive operational plan was kept strictly 

confidential and disseminated to each subordinate level of execution 

only as requirements dictated. Executive members of COSVN knew of the 

plan some time in May 1967. Not until three months later was this plan 

disseminated to high-ranking enemy officials of the Saigon-Cholon-Gia 

Dinh Special Zone. Actual preparations for combat, however, began only 

in November. From that time on, a flurry of activities took place and 

did not abate until the attack orders were issued. 

During that time, enemy units received replacements while supplies

• 

were moved into areas of future operation. Communication-liaison, reconnaissance, and sapper teams extensive~y searched for access routes 

into cities and reconnoitered targets of attack. These routes were to 

become avenues of approach for main force units which would move in as 

soon as the main objectives had been secured. Maps were distributed to 

participating units and even though they were not militarily accurate, 

they did show GVN check points in detail. Also to minimize leaks, even 

participating units were informed that reconnaissance activities were 

being conducted with the sole purpose of selecting targets for sabotage 

or shellings. 

In addition, several sapper units were given training in street 

combat tactics. However, the extent of this training was limited so as 

to maintain secrecy. 

For those units that were slated to attack first, combat orders 

were issued only 48 to 72 hours prior to action. And contrary to usual 

operational practice, unit missions and terrain studies were simply discussed to an extent considered reasonably compatible with local combat 

requirements. As a result, no unit commander from the middle level down 

ever knew that the attack he was going to conduct was part of a countrywide general offensive. 

30 
Despite these precautions, such extensive preparations could not 

go entirely airtight and without leaving telltale traces. Most of 

these indications could be found in enemy documents that RVNAF and U.S. 

units happened to capture during operations. 

The question that should naturally arise is to what extent did 

the RVN know in advance about the 1968 General Offensive-Uprising, and 

especially, why did everybody seem to agree that our enemy had achieved 

the element of surprise? 
____ 

CHAPTER III 


The RVN and Enemy Preparations 

How Muah Did We K.no1,) 

In March 1967, ARVN units captured an enemy document during an 

operation in the III corps area. The document, which belonged to the 

enemy CT-5 Division, discussed summarily a plan of attack against Saigon. 

This plan was rudimentary and so amateuris4ly prepared that both ARVN 

and U.S. intelligence analysts disproved it as pure fantasy. 

Two months later, the National Police ,apprehended a high-ranking 

enemy cadre by the name of Ba Tra. He declared being Deputy Chairman 

of the Connnittee for the Proselyting of Intellectuals for the SaigonCho Lon area. Among documents seized from his possession, there was a 

list naming a few members of the Saigon intelligentsia. Ba Tra disclosed 

that they were the personalities whom the NLF earmarked as cabinet 

members of a future coalition government of South Vietnam. His mission 

was to contact, persuade, and prepare them for selected cabinet rank 

positions in that government. This was. the first time that information 

on a Communist-sponsored coalition government in South Vietnam was ever 

obtained. The motives behind this project and the objectives contemplated remained unclear, however. 

Then in September the same year another enemy cadre with the name 

of Sau Ha was arrested and detained, again by the National Police. 

Submitted to intensive interrogation, Sau Ha disclosed he had the mission - "'-~-----~..-.. 

to contact the U.S. EmbasSJ!:. in 5aigai...tQ..~i!!£!!!Is certain important ,------ ---_...._._..... issues of mutual interest, including an exchange of prisoners. Nothing ___~-._ _ __• ___ ·_·.·_~.,,'_'_._~____, .. _.e~.'·"''-_· 

1IIOrewas learned of what ensued except that, as rumors had it, he was 

C1a£I1It!!L1Y3.K~·]J.• S:::E;;u;~;;::~h1~h:'~;~~dlY ..mai~;~in;d·~~!1 t·:.-h·~~~s - . "~"""'~'''''''''' 

serving as a double ~~~~~.~....,,=!gll&.lJ.±~4 .SauHa,a few other enemy cadres -----."-.~.....-..- ............, ............" ..• 


32 

:~~_,~_a_dJ~~t~n de e,,:j.I!e_L~()_r_s_?me tiDl~""~E!~~aJsc:> ,_l:'~:tel1_sE!c:\.,_~~~,.p'.~~.s~~b 1 y 

upon U.S. requests. 

Rumors thereafter circulated to the effect that some kind of private 

agreement had been reached between the U.S. and the VC but nobody seemed 

to know any specifics. Brigadier General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Director 

General of the National Police, tendered his resignation to protest 

U.S. intrusion. However, his resignation was not accepted. 

When North Vietnam made public the text of Vo Nguyen Giap's article 

"Big Vic tory, Giant Task", which Hanoi Radio carried from 14 to 16 

September 1967 in its daily programs, South Vietnam immediately sensed 

that something new had been brought into enemy war policies. As usual, 

Communist rhetoric only made sense if read between the lines. A change 

in strategy seemed transparent enough, but nobody could decipher 

exactly what direction it would take. 

Not until early October was ARVN intelligence able to obtain, -- .--.---,---.-----.-------.~---- ...-.--.--~--..-- -- .-_.. 

through its agent network, the first lead of that new strategic 

diiecti;;n':Re~-c;i~tion No. 13 of North Vietnam' spoiitb~re~u. In no , .. 

nonsense terms, Resolution No. 13 called for victory in a short time 

and pre~ca.bed the strategy of large-scale offensive to achiev!! it., ,--_._. • , ...~-- - , ••• , .' •• ,.. v -"'.' .•­

A few days later, another document was seized from enemy Unit 16 

during an operation in the III Corps Area. Unit 16 was COSVN's principal armor force. The document discussed training efforts concerning 

sapper tactiCS and how to operate ARVN armored vehicles. 

On 25 October 1967, still another important enemy document fell 

into our hands in Tay Ninh Province. Dated 1 September 1967, it contained these introductory remarks "This is instructional material to 

help better understand the new situation and our new task." Apparently, 

it was intended for middle-level cadres. The document consisted of two 

parts, the first part outlining the main objective to be achieved 

by Communist forces: ending the American presence in South Vietnam. 

This was to be accomplished by the establishment of a coalition government, and the NLF would be playing a major role in arranging for the American exit. The second part of the document discussed the strategy of "three­

'33 

pronged offensive" designed to: (1) defeat the RVNAF; (2) destroy 

U.S. political and military institutions, and; (3) instigate a country­


wide insurrection of the popular masses. This projected offensive bore 


the abbreviated designation TCK-TKN which stood for Tong Cong Kich-Tong 


Khoi Nghia (General Offensive-General Uprising). 


On 3 November 1967, three days after the major battle of Dakto broke 

out fi;;';;ii-nortliwes-i-o':f'Kontum;-ARVN' forces captured a doctunent .,,-.-.-.-_______ ".' __M" •• " ........___,,_., 'h. __"'_"'"'_~__ ~"" -_ ••_--"" -- •• ,... - -~. ,,~ 

whose originator was the B-3 Front, the enemy headquarters that was 

di~';~t1ri~"the attack. The c~ntents of this document discussed four 

.',;~j~ctives to be achieved by Communist forces in the Central Highlands: 

(1) To destroy the bulk of U.S. forces in the Central Highlands, 


thereby forcing them to bring in reinforcements, and to destroy and 


disrupt a major part of ARVN forces here. 


(2) To improve combat tactics and techniques and concentrate 


efforts on destDoying enemy major units. 


(3) To weaken enemy vitality, liberate as large an area as possible I 

and consolidate the base system. Achieving this would amount to 


actually taking part in the political struggle for national liberation. 


(4) To harmoniously coordinate efforts with other fronts across 

South Vietnam in order to implement correctly and unify our policies. i

Another enemy document seized in Quang Tin Province, I Corps Area, 

in November provided substantial detail on the General Offensive-General 

Uprising that was about to unfold. A passage in the document read in 

fact: "This is the time we should proceed with our General OffensiveGeneral Uprising. Through the coordinated use of military forces 

combined with a country-wide popular uprising, we shall attack every 

provincial city, and every district town, including the capital, Saigon, 

which we shall liberate." 

At about the same time, information concerning a reorganization 

of enemy territorial control in South Vietnam began to stream in from 

our human intelligence network. Most significant among the features 

of this realignment were the changes brought into enemy territorial 

organizations in the RVN I and III Corps areas. In the I Corps area, 

the enemy Tri Thien-Hue Military Region was transformed into four 

34 
military subdivisions instead of two (Quang Tri and Thua Thien 

Provinces) • 

In the III Corps area, the enemy Military Region 4, which was in 

charge of Saigon-Cho Lon, was reorganized into 5 military subdivisions 

whose interboundaries converged on Saigon-Cho Lon. An enemy document 

classified "top secret", .. captured in January 1968 from COSVN's conununication and transportation section, confirmed this new organizational 

realignment. (Map 1) 

On 4 January 1968, during an operation in the Dakto area, the u.s. 

4th Infantry Division captured another significant document. This 

was Operation Order No. 1 concerning an attack planned against Pleiku 

City before Tet. 

In mid-January, the U.S. lOlst Airborne.p;l.v;l.sion also seized an , ,>, -",,- ," ,,,,".,-'.'. - -"'~', ··-''",·_v ..""........ _ 


enemy document from the Dong Nai Regiment in III Corps area concerning ~ . - .' 

a plan of concerted attacks against Phu Cuong, the provincial capital 

of Binh Duong, the 5th ARVN Division Headquarters an[the Headquarters, ., 

_..lst Armored Cavalry Squadron, also in Binh Duong Province. This information was subsequently confirmed by an enemy rallier belonging to 

_~he P3d Regiment~ 9th Division. 

On 20 January 1968, the 23d ARVN Infantry Division captured from 

the enemy a plan of attack against Ban Me Thuot City. However, this 

plan did not specify when the attack would take place. The same day, 

the 22d ARVN Infantry Division also seized a document mentioning Qui 

Nhon as a target for attack. 

At Qui Nhon, on 28 Jan~ry, the local Military. Security Service 

received from agent sources several reports concerning secret meetings 

held in the city by enemy cadres. During a cordon and search operation 

at two of the meeting places, MSS personnel apprehended 11 enemy cadres, 

both male and female, and seized from their possession two pre-recorded 

tapes. The tapes contained an appeal to the local population to take 

up arms and overthrow the government. They also recorded an announcement that "the Forces Struggling for Peace and Unification" already 

occupied Saigon, Hue, and Da Nang. Upon interrogation, the enemy 

cadres disclosed that Conununist forces were going to attack Qui Nhon and 

many other cities during the Tet period. 

35 
Map 1 - Reahgnmen • t of Enemy Military Regions

CAMBODIA / "...­ --- -*' 

.- / QUANGDUC 

/ 

r -­.....--)1.-.\ PHUOC LONG \ \ I \ 

~ BINH LONG I LAM DONG 

'; -{>o

~roN'"c'. \ 

TAY NINH 

MY THO 

E 1 , 

I 

I 

1, 

i 

I 

I E5 I 

1­ - " 

I 

I !..... I , I 

\ I BA·BIEN ---.... I / 

"""$:~IGON. CHO LON 

, E·4 

\ 

E2 

I \ 

I \ 

I E3 \ 

I 

SOUTH CHINA SEA 

MR-6 

36 

On the same day, 28 January, at III Corps Headquarters in Bien 

Hoa, the G-2 learned through intelligence sour.ces that the enemy had 

moved one artillery and two infantry regiments to an area north of the 

city. The next morning, 29 January, the local population of Ho Nai, 

a suburban district town near Bien Hoa, reported the presence of a Communist unit, size unknown, in an area adjacent to this town. 

On the night of 30 January, ARVN soldiers on guard duty at the 

main gate of III Corps Headquarters in Bien Hoa detected an enemy reconnaissance team nearby, opened fire, and killed one enemy armed with 

an AK-47. At Can Tho City, seat of IV Corps Headquarters, on the same 

night, enemy sappers disguised as tourists went into, a hotel and rented 

rooms for the night. They were immediately discovered and arrested. 

At 2100 hours on 30 January, a RF element tending an ambush on _-_.- --.. '~'_~e._ ~ .,. ,_ 

the Saigon defense perimeter captured an enemy s()lci:!,,~_r with an AK-47. 

Theprisoner~dIsc:i;;s~dthatColiUiiinist-t~~o'~; were going to attack 

Safgon,Tan·'s~nNhu.t'Atrb.;;e:"~th~ i<?i~t General Staff compound, and ~.". . _ .,._ ,. ,", ,­ ,-""~, 4 ' _" ~.. -, . . 

Saigon Radio sta~ion at 0300 hours on 31 January 1968. This happened 

to be just a few hours away. 

And the attack on Saigon, as it turned out. began exactly at 0300 

hours on 31 January 1968, in the small hours of the second day of Tet. 

The Su:l'prise: Why? 

One thing was certain. The enemy had really achieved the element 

of surprise. 

The surprise was so total that even though he was informed of all 

developments in the enemy 'situation which I have summarized, President 

Thieu at the last minute did not take any Significant action to 

counter the enemy's move. Apparently, he did not believe that things 

could develop as indicated by a few intelligence reports. At the time 

the fighting erupted across the country, he was at My Tho for a Tet 

reunion with his wife's family. 

Even after fighting had erupted at several places in Saigon and 

despite an announcement made by Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky over Saigon 

37 
Radio in which he appealed to our population to stay calm, many people 

still thought that it was simply a coup. Many others said they could 

not believe their eyes when in the early morning of 3l January they saw 

troops in palm-leafed hats and black rubber sandals, Binh-Tri-Thien 

style. That these Communist troops could actually establish themselves 

in some of the city blocks of Saigon was simply an incredible accomplishment. 

It was thus obvious that on our part, nobody was convinced that 

the Communists would launch a concerted offensive against cities and 

towns across the country during the Tet holidays. Even those considered 

the most knowledgeable about the enemy--our intelligence analysts--required 

better information on which to base their estimates. 

But why this surprise? Why was it possible that no one in our ~. ''''','~'.,- <"'''~' .¢' .."- '-,-." •• '~" -. ~"'.~. " ••-~,"~' ,.,,,..,..~- '~'~ ••,. ' 

intelligence establishment was adequately alarmed in the face of in­ .' ."~-, - ,-, > ,,'.-" ,,~ •• -.•, ,,-'. ,­

dications? From hindsight, it appears that our failure began with a I - .. 

wrong _____esti~te ."N.-, ..ol:t:he.. en~~i~~~9j~tell:l.gence ' " . !Dethodology ,_ , may have been

to some extent responsible for it. Our intelligence theory taught us --",,,--~,,..,--...,-... ,---."-"., -.- -_ .. '~" ..... "'-"'"""~-''''-'''' '". 

that in estimating the enemy's probable course of action we should be -,'~-"''''''~''''' ,~., .. ' - -,. 

primarily concerned with his capabilities and not his intentions • .. -~. ,-- '

Capabilities, it was maintained, differed from intentions in that they 

were real, tangible facts, the conditions that made the execution of a 

certain course of action possible whereas intentions were often something 

vague, uncertain, hence unreliable. True to these teachings, our intelligence analysts dismissed those pieces of information they considered 

as just expressing an intention such as ~he ene!DY's plan of attack 

against cities, for example. Understandably, they were primarily interested 

to know whether the enemy had the capabilities for it. 

With the information available to South Vietnam, it was true that 

­

the enemy hardly had the capabilities for such an ambitious action. 

MOst intelligence·data collected on the enemy during the period prior 

to the offensive either indicated that his units were facing difficulties 

or that the morale of his troops had declined markedly. Furthermore, 

given the prevailing balance of forces and the deployment and disposition 

of ene!DY main force units at that time, which showed that they were still 

confined to outlying bases far removed from urban centers, there was 

38 
little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive 

regardless of his intention. Our analysts further argued that even 

though the enemy was bold enough to attack and successfully occupy part 

of a city or a district town, how was he ever capable of holding it 

for any long period? Besides, it was hardly possible that the enemy 

would want to incur inevitable heavy losses for something predictably 

ephemeral. And on top of all that, we believed that the enemy did 

not even have the capability to establish, much less operate, an 

administration where he might gain temporary control. 

Some of our analysts even went as far as believing that the enemy 

was actually reverting to the first or defensive phase of his war 

strategy. They pointed convincingly to such indications as COSVN 

Headquarters being moved to Cambodia and the enemy being forced to 

carve out new bases in that sanctuary as a result of destructive U.S. 

search-and-destroy operations being cond~cted into long-established 

bases such as War Zones C and D and the Iron Triangle. To pass from Stage 

One to the General Offensive or Stage Three, they argued, the enemy had 

to go through Stage Two, which was a period of contention or holding 

out. They also emphasized that this was a certainty which conformed 

to Communist warfare rules. 

This argument seemed plausible enough if Vietnamese Communists 

strictly adhered to Red China's precepts of people's war strategy, which 

our intelligence analysts usually believed they would. Indeed, until 

shortly before the Tet Offensive, all of our intelligence estimates had 

been based on the conviction that the enemy was pursuing Lin Piao's 

strategy, which prescribed "using the rural areas to encircle and strangle 

the c;i.ties," implying insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Our analysts at 

that time had never visualized the proposition of "attacking the cities 

to liberate rural areas." 

Vo Nguyen Giap's article "Big Victory, Giant Task" also contributed 

its part to the serious error committed by our intelligence analysts. 

The idea which influenced them most was Giap's contention that the war 

was going to last many more years. With this clue, they finally concluded that the General Offensive-General Uprising to which enemy documents referred would not materialize in the immediate future. 

39 
Such an assessment eventually became a conviction, a certainty 

that overshadowed information suggesting indications of a general offensive. This certainty persisted in spite of reports on enemy training 

for street combat and behavior toward the South Vietnamese urban population which were the type of information we had never had before since 

the beginning of the war. 

Another significant omission which partly accounted for our lack 

of percePt'io~s--th~~the intelligence d~~~'collected were never as­

~~~bi~d into a cohesive mosaic or'~y~the~i;~dinto a ge~~ralestims:i:e 

that could provide us wii:fi a basis on which to construct a collection 

plan seeking to obtain a]} we needed to know about the enemy's intended 

genera~ offensive. No RVN intelligence agency, military or civilian, 

to my knowledge, bad ever attemptec( or even received any instruction 

to do this. 

But the biggest shortcoming of our ~ntelligence structure was 

perhaps the almost total lack of coordination between agencies, or the 

lack of a coordinating agency. This shQrtcoming came to our attention 

1 

, as early as in 1960-1961, was never remedied, and remained a significant 

weakness until 1968 despite the creation of the Central Intelligence 

Organization (CIO), which was directly under presidential control. 

Every intelligence agency, therefore, functioned independently and 

rarely shared its information with others. The National Police, for 

example, kept for itself those data concerning the coalition government 

plan and valuable depositions made by such important sources as Ba Tra 

and Sau Ha. Then, the vital information on the imminent offensive, 

which resulted from the arrest of Nam Dong a few days before Tet, also 

locked itself in the MSS files like some sort of private property and 

was never reported or communicated to the J-2, Joint General Staff, 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. 

The same shortcoming existed even in the military intelligence 

reporting system. ARVN units which happened to capture enemy documents 

seldom reported and dispatched them in time. Some G-2's at the division 

level and especially at corps level and many sector S-2's did not consider it a duty obligation to report what they collected to the JGS J-2 

Division. This deplorable omission was sometimes condoned or even 

40 
encouraged by certain field commanders who found it beneficial for 

their good standing to communicate the more important pieces of information directly to the Independence Palace. Influenced by his commander's reckless attitude, naturally the G-2 or S-2 was reluctant to 

contact the JGS and often felt he could dispense altogether with reporting. In two substantiated cases, a corps G-2 was expressly told 

by hia commander not to bother with reporting to higher headquarters. 

Then, despite the abundance of communications facilities made 

available for ARVN use by u.s. forces, the military intelligence system 

was never authorized any sole-purpose channels for intelligence reporting by our JGS. This lack of dedicated communications continued 

to hinder our intelligence reporting even after the complete transfer 

of u.s. communications assets. 

Intelligence coordination between the JGS and MACV during this 

period was also not firmly established a~ far as estimates were concerned. Although normal exchange of current information occurred as 

a matter of standing operating procedure at all combined intelligence 

agencies, there was definitely a lack of sharing when it came to important information of immediate consequence or those pertaining to 

the personal estimate of each intelligence chief. The fact that U.S. 

intelligence advisers at ARVN field units usually received and dispatched 

information to MACV J-2 much more rapidly than their counterparts did 

to J-2, JGS also accounted in part for the usual lack of coordination 

at this level. 

As fory,~,!IIi],:!-J;aF.:c.intel!.igence •..J;b~:r.:'!.1OTa,s_n() doubt that it was 

highly successful on collecting information through technical facilities. 

Ktehi-'tiiiieof" .the-1968 TetoffensiVI!,hOWever, the' ii~it~d-"St~t~s' did" ..~-'- ... - ",~..-.~,,,,,,.'.--,,,-.,,--..

n6tappear to be as capable in the prod~'~tii;~·"OTintenfgerice as during 

the-siib-seq~e-;;ts-t;g-;;--~t'th'~ war•.. Add1~i~~al~y ;t'~pp~~~ed-~hat U. S. 

-'-' "'-.' '-.,;',. ".-,. - -"­

intelligence suffered from the same subjectivity that plagued its ARVN .~. _,._,,, .,....'. ~_~~~·· ..,,,.,.._._'._ ... n __ ' .,. 

counterpart. ObviouslY;<O. S. military intellige~c.e.}l,lso failed to come 

,·to' any solid conclusion as far as the scope" size, and timing of the

,-, 

""enemy offensive were concerned. 

-As a result of all this, information became piecemeal, incomplete, 

untimely, and consequently did not always interest our intelligence 

41 
experts. Interpretations of this kind of information, therefor~, were 

vague and often erroneous. The attack against Loc Ninh, for example, 

was viewed as an enemy political ploy to overshadow the inauguration 

of South Vietnam's Second Republic. In the same vein, the realignment 

of enemy territorial organization in the RVN I and III Corps areas was 

interpreted as an effort by our enemy to control his infrastructure 

activities more effectively. Then the 7-day truce which had been 

declared for Christmas and New Year by the Communists was construed 

by our analysts as a pos.sible time frame for enemy attack. But the 

attack did not materialize until after the enemy had taken advantage 

of that period of truce to move supplies, redeploy troops, reconnoiter 

targets and finalize his preparations. 

In the light of available information, our RVN intelligence 

estimated, therefore, that the Communists would launch a major offensive 

campaign whose principal objectives wer~ Khe Sanh Base, the strongpoints 

south of the DMZ and other friendly bases along the western borders of 

II and III Corps areas. 

This estimate coincided with the personal views of our field 

commanders and national leaders. In this regard, there seemed to be a 

certain mutual effect which regulated their thinking~o such an extent 

that they could hardly deviate from each other. Our national leaders, 

who were impressed and influenced by rousing public and press speculaticns on the possibility of a second Dien Bien Phu battle, evidently 

accepted this possibility, especially when no intelligence agency produced anything to disprove it. Influenced in their turn by the near 

conviction of the national leaders, our South Vietnamese intelligence 

agencies came up with estimates that went along similar lines, avoiding 

those they thought would contradict their superiors. In the screening 

process, they even abstained from selecting those intelligence data 

which related to the possibility that the enemy would strike in the 

heart of our cities during the Tet holidays. 

The end of it all led to the decision to deploy two airborne 

battalions, our last reserves, to the I Corps area; the JGS had approved 

this displacement based on a MACV recommendation that the DMZ situation 

42 

required additional ARVN troops. That these battalions happened to be 

in Saigon the day the offensive took place was simply due to the unavailability of air transportation. 

Just a few days before Tet, President Thieu decided to reduce the 

RVN truce to 36 hours. He had been spurred into making that decision 

by the U.S. Embassy and particularly General Westmoreland, who informed 

him that the situation bore several indications of an imminent enemy 

offensive. But even then nobody seemed to believe that Saigon and other 

cities would be the major objectives of this offensive and that the Tet 

truce would be violated. President Thieu left for My Tho in the afternoon of 29 January to celebrate Tet. His last decision before departing 

Saigon was to concur with MACV on cancelling the truce for the two 

northernmost provinces of the I Corps area. 

Orders were thus given to all RVNAF units to confine 50% of their 

troop strength to barracks. But special,Tet leaves, which had been allowed to 5% of each unit's strength, were not cancelled. In some areas, 

defensive measures were taken based on division commanders' and province 

chiefs' own estimates of the local situation. 

At Ban Me Thuot, the 23d ARVN Division commander cancelled all Tet 

leaves and consolidated the defense of the city in the light of captured 

enemy documents. At Binh Duong, the 5th Division commander and the 

province chief took similar measures after they had come upon indications 

of an imminent attack. The division called back one of its battalions 

at Song Be, Phuoc Long Province, to reinforce the defense of Binh Duong. 

The 18th ARVN Division at Xuan Loc also called back to headquarters two 

of its battalions from outlying areas to be used as reserves and a 

reaction force. 

On the afternoon of 29 January, contents of the two pre-recorded •• ,. -,' .'~__<'~ .,·... • ____L __• __"~.,, _~,.'".~_, ..' ......., __••_~._" 

tapes seized from the enemy at Qui Nhon by the MSS were transmitted back 

fo II Corps HeadquarEers andth~J~i~~ ()pe;~~i~~scenter, JGS,via hot 

Hnes. GeneralCaoVan Vien, chiei'o:fthe JGS;immediately ordered "....-~.. -"'.,. ,_ .. "' ,,-, 

iils''')'':3 to call all corps commanders, warn them of the immiment enemy 

-'attack arid insi:r;'cj: . .J:!!!!.~~!!.~e_.§,pRo:.QRriate defensive measures. Whether 

Ii""l-l-c-o-;;;~-;;:'~nders took this warning seriouslY--:'h';;t'h;;y~'iIllP1emented ~7 _ ..... ............____.-...._"'......,",~._~_ ... ,'J.-..' -·"''''........ ---..'''·~.........,--4·io f"'~""",..-jA"'L<.l_n,:",,,,;._;;,,_v. 

the J-3 instructions were not clear at the time. In any evein:'· ..."III'any ARVN ,'":--_~""""'-~~,~." •....,,,~. "_,._,.r ~ "".__ ~~"""",.,~'r'."""""""''--·_-......s~"""""::..",,,... ,_ 

43 
commanders later claimed that this'!iarI1:ing failed to communicate any .."-.---.----~.--.-~.. . .,-. - -'~~-,'-.-..,-..•.~-...-, 

true sense of emergency • .". -..-.,"., .­

These orders were subsequently relayed throughout .the hierarchy, 

but apparently they did not reach down to every level because of communications difficulties. Unit commanders hastily tried to call back 

the men on leave, but by that time those who· had long journeys to make 

had already left. 

At that tardy moment, even those who did not have to take up immediate guard or alert duties, had managed to slip away to their families 

in town. Tet was but a few hours away. Despite the warning, the 

prevailing feeling among ARVN troops was one of suspended belief. Very 

few in fact took it seriously 

At midnight on 30 January, as tradition would have it, every 

household began celebrating Tet. Two hours later, the first attack of 

the enemy general offensive broke out at,Nha Trang. During the night, 

all five provincial capitals of II Corps area came under enemy fire. 

News of these attacks did not impart any sense of aler·t among the 

people of Saigon, who like those of other cities not yet under attack, were 

carried away by the festive mood. Saigon RadiO, however, interrupted 

its regular program at 0945 hours to announce the cancellation of the 

Tet truce in view of the enemy's blatant violations. At the Capital 

Military District, orders were issued to confine all troops to barracks. 

In the afternoon, all major accesses to Saigon were subjected to tight 

control. To reinforce its defenses the CMD headquarters requested and 

obtained the use of one airborne battalion as reserves. It immediately 

deployed one company to the Chi Roa Prison, and another to the Saigon 

National Radio Station. Tp avoid arousing curiosity among the Saigon 

people, this airborne company took up alert duties at the MSS compoun~ 

which was adjacent to the radio station. Two other companies of this 

battalion were held as reserve at CMD headquarters. 

At Tan Son Nhut air.base, no change occurred in its defenses. The 

base continued to be defended by the 2d Service Battalion and air force 

security forces, as usual; but the airborne companies that were waiting 

for air transport to take them to Da Nang the next morning, 31 January, 

were present on the base that TET New Year Day in full battle dress. 

44 

In downtown Saigon, field police forces took up defense positions 

at vital street intersections. Their presence was hardly noticed by 

the few people who ventured outside on that day. The uninterrupted 

noise of firecrackers continued to echo throughout the city at all 

hours, even during the night. And when the first enemy rounds were 

fired at 0200 on 1 February, they blended into this noisy background. 

A few hours earlier, at around midnight, many Saigon people saw groups 

of armed men moving silently in the dark in some street blocks. Most 

thought that perhaps a coup was unfolding. 

And so the attack of Saigon, which rolled up the curtain for the 

country-~de 1968 enemy offensive, took place at a time and against ~. -~-,- .,­

objectives our people least expected. -..­
CHAPTER IV 


The General Offensive, Phase I 

A Bird's-Eye View 

The country-wide attacks that made up the 1968 TET Offensive did 

not all occur at the same time. Twenty-four hours before the actual 

offensive began, five provincial capitals of II Corps area, Nha Trang, __ 

Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon, and Da Nang City in I Corps 

area were already under attack. 

It was difficult to determine why ~his apparent lack of coordination existed. Some attributed it to an error in orders received by the 

B-3 Front and Headquarters, MR-S. However, this theorY could not hold 

because the enemy ~lR-S area included not only Da Nang and Qui Nhon but also 

Quang.Nsai, Quang Tin and Phu Yen, which were not attacked untdl a day later. 

Oth~rs maintained that this was a deliberate enemy scheme designed 

to deceive our side as to the real objectives of the offensive. However, since tactical surprise had been the enemy's foremost consideration, it was difficult to accept this theory as valid. Had the enemy 

launched· all attacks at the same time, the surprise to our side would 

have been greater; then Saigon and Hue would have been even more 

vulnerable because precautionary measures would have been virtually 

non-existent. In fact, it-was precisely these early attacks that 

enabled the RVN to take some appropriate though tardy defensive 

measures. 

No one seemed therefore able to provide .a logical explanation for 

these early attacks. By general consensus, it was agreed that the 

date of the offensive was 31 January 1968, the day the enemy attacked 

Saigon, Cholon and Gia Dinh. 

Other cities and provincial capitals that came under attack on 

the same day as Saigon were: Quang Tri, Hue, Quang Tin, Quang Ngai in 

46 

I Corps area, Phan Thiet in II Corps area, and Can Tho and Vinh 

Long in IV Corps area. 

The next day, 1 February, the enemy initiated attacks on Bien Hoa, 

Long Khanh, Binh Duong in III Corps area, and Kien Hoa, Dinh Tuong, 

Go Cong, Kien Giang, Vinh Binh, and Kien Tuong in IV Corps area. 

The latest attack in date which took place on 10 February, was on 

Bac Lieu in IV Corps area. In total, 28 out of South Vietnam's 48 

cities and provincial capitals had become objectives of the general 

offensive. The ones that had been spared were regarded by the enemy 

as insignificant and subjected only to minor harassments. (Map 2) 

Regardless of the size and importance of the objective, the enemy 

followed exactly the same pattel,"n of attack. His primary targets 

remained without exception the highest local RVNAF headquarters and 

the radio broadcasting station. The forces that conducted the initial 

attack were all local units, sappers an~ VCI elements. Their mission was 

to capture and hold designated targets until reinforcements could move 

in from outside the city. Accompanying the attacking elements were 

political cadres who had the responsibility to coax the local population into rebellion. 

At Da Nang, the seat of I COl."pS Headquarters and one of the first 

two objectives to come under attack in this col."ps area, Colonel 

Nguyen Duy Hinh, acting Chief of Staff, I Corps, received a phone call 

from the JGS in Saigon at about 2000 on 29 Janual."Y. The JGS 

informed'him that the enemy would probably initiate an increased surge 

of activities and admonished caution and defensive measures. After 

reporting to Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, I COl."pS Commander, and 

acting on his instructions, Colonel Hinh informed all subordinate. units 

and asked them to cal."rY out the JGS orders. 

At about 0300 on 30 Janual."Y, the en~y began to attack Hoi 

An, the provincial capital of Quang Nam, some 30 km south of Da Nang. 

Half an hour later, Colonel Hinh heard many shots being fired at the 

I Corps Headquarters. From his house only 500 meters al~ay, he saw brilliant 

tracers ricocheting upward from the stream of cross fire. "Enemy attack," 

he thought to himself as he picked up the telephone to inform the I 

COl."pS commander. As Colonel Hinh vividly recalled, General Lam's first 

47 

Map 2 - The 1968 Tet Offensive, Phase I 

1. ATTACK ON TET EVE 

2. ATTACK ON TET NIGHT 

I 

3. ATTACK ON 2d TET NIGHT It-KONTUM 

4. ATTACK ON 12th NIGHT AFTER TET ~EIKU 

~ANKH~ I 

~BANME THUOT 

2 

3 

SOC TRANG_·,-~-./ 

(KHANH HUNGI. 


BAC LIEU 


QUAN LONG (CA MAUl,/"

dY *PROVINCE CAPITALS AND OTHER CITIES ATTACKED 

~ILITARY INSTALLATIONS ATTACKED 

48 

reaction was an expression of incredulity; "baloney, baloney," he said, 

interrupting Colonel Hinh's verbal report. Checking with I Corps 

Headquarters, Colonel Hinh learned that an enemy sapper squad had 

penetrated the headquarters compound, and ARVN soldiers on guard and 

alert duties were reacting forcefully, killing at least one. Despite 

its 'successful penetration, the enemy squad did not seem very active. 

Trying to hold ground, it fought a delaying action, apparently waiting 

for a reinforcement that never came. At that time, this reinforcement 

was being tied up in an attack on the Hoa Vang district town just 

south of Da Nang. Faced with a fierce resistance by defending forces, 

that enemy unit was being pinned down, unable to make headway or fall 

back. When morning came, an ARVN Ranger battalion, which had just 

returned from an operational mission and was resting at its base near 

Da Nang, was deployed to Hoa Vang as a relief force together with an 

ARVN armor element. From the Hoa Cam T~aining Center nearby, another 

relief element moved in. At the same time tactical air bombed and 

strafed enemy positions at Hoa Vang despite their proximit~ to 

friendly troops. The enemy attack on Da Nang ended rapidly. 

In II Corps area, Nha Trang was the first city to be attacked 

during the 1968 general offensive. The enemy attack took place at 

0030 on 31 January, just after the Tet midnight rite had been 

performed. The enemy at first attacked the Naval Training Center, and 

as the fighting went on, he began to inject troops into the city for 

other attacks. His combat force consisted of elements of five sapper 

companies totalling approximately l60·men, supported by a mortar and 

recoilless rifle company and about 100 VCI members implanted in the 

city. As·was the case in other areas, the attacking elements had. 

been promised reinforcement by main force units. But in Nha Trang, the 

enemy never suspected that the reaction by defending forces would be 

so fierce. Even with just 20 men the Nha Trang radiO station fought 

on, and not one enemy sapper was able to penetrate inside. Hith the 

immediate relief provided by an ARVN Ranger battalion and three Special 

Forces detachments, lfua Trang was free of enemy just 12 hours after the 

attack was initiated. An added reason for the rapid failure of the 

attack was that several VCI elements in the ci~y were apprehended 

49 

before they had time to participate. This was made possible through 

the revelations of enemy prisoners under interrogation. 

At Kontum, P1eiku, and Ban Me Thuot, the three Central Highlands 

provincial cities which all came under attack on the day before the 

offensive began, the enemy pattern of attack was almost identical. 

At each place, sapper elements would penetrate the city first, to be 

immediately followed by a main force regiment. TWo battalions of the 

24th NVA Regiment made Some headway into Kontum City but were subsequently driven out. The third battalion of this regiment was held in 

check outside the city. 

At P1eiku, the enemy H-15 Local Force Battalion had received 

orders to coordinate the attack with the NVA 95B Regiment, but this 

regiment failed to show up at the rendezvous. Orders were subsequently 

changed for the H-15 Battalion to proceed with the attack alone. It 

was then 0930 in the morning. Having t9 move across a large open 

field to get into P1eiku, the H-15 Battalion became an easy target for 

an ARVN armor unit implanted on the outskirts of the city. During the 

battle, the enemy battalion commander was taken prisoner. 

At Ban Me Thuot, Colonel Truong Quang An, 23d ARVN Division 

commander, had expected the enemy attack on the city in the light of 

available intelligence reports. He had therefore cancelled all Tet 

leaves and prepared subordinate units for the defense. On the night 

the enemy launched his attack, the 23d Division even had patrols on the 

move at a distance of up to 10 km from the city. When an enemy unit 

succeeded nevertheless in penetrating 'the city, the friendly reaction with 

armor and reconnaissance elements was immediate and forceful. Despite 

this, the battle for Ban Me Th~ot lasted nine days. During that time, 

the NVA 33d Regiment penetrated into the city four times but was 

driven back each time. 

At Qui Nhon, the defending forces were unable to prevent enemy 

penetration into the city, despite the fact that they had discovered the 

enemy scheme of attack through the capture of 11 VCI members and a 

pre-recorded tape destined to be broadcast on Qui Nhon Radio. Enemy 

sappers attacked the city exactly as planned. In addition, they 

occupied the local MSS building, released the 11 detainees and even 

50 

captured the MSS chief, an ARVN captain who had directed the successful 

raid and arrested these VCI members. After being released, these enemy 

cadres joined in the attack, but several were killed in the process. 

The Qui Nhon radio station, being one of the enemy's primary targets, 

had been overrun during the first hours of the attack. The enemy 

controlled this station but was never able to broadcast the prerecorded announcement for the simple reason that he could not recover 

the tape. 

Enemy forces conducting the attack on Qui Nhon were ma~e up of 

one local force battalion and one sapper battalion. The defending 

forces meanwhile consisted of a single RF company immediately available 

when the attack began but later reinforced by a reconnaissance company, 

an engineer company and a special forces company. They were eventually 

supported by two companies of the ROK Tiger Division. 

When attacking Qui Nhon, the enemy,had hoped to receive a helping 

hand from the local population who, from years of living under Viet 

Minh control prior to 1954, had been presumed to be largely proCommunist. However, this helping hand was never extended despite 

enemy coaxing.- The enemy attack on Qui Nhon, therefore, ended in 

dismal failure. 

In the III Corps area, the enemy concentrated his primary effort 

on Saigon, Cho Long and Gia Dinh, which made up the Saigon metropolitan 

area. His effort here was closely coordinated with other attacks 

throughout the corps area, which, according to plans, proceeded at a 

frenetic pace in Bien Hoa, Binh Duong,. Long Khanh, Long An, and Hau 

Nghia. 

In the IV Corps area, enemy attacks were conducted against 13 out 

of 16 provincial cities. The offensive was therefore most extensive 

despite the absence of NVA units. The enemy plan of attack in this 

corps area included a scheme to capture alive the commanders of the 

7th and 9th ARVN Divisions. As it was later revealed, enemy sappers 

had planned to attack the residence of the 9th Division commander and 

expected to capture him and his family there. They planned next to 

have him summon his deputy and chief of staff and force all three to 

order the divisional units into submission. The enemy scheme eventually 

51 

failed because the 9th Division commander remained at his headquarters 

on the night of the attack and personally directed ARVN efforts to 

clear the town of enemy sappers. 

Enemy forces in the Mekong Delta included approximately 20 local 

force battalions. All of them participated in the offensive. The 

fighting was especially heavy at Vinh Long, Vinh Binh, My Tho and Can 

Tho. 

Can Tho was the seat of IV Corps Headquarters. Despite the capture of several enemy sappers disguised as tourists in a downtown 

hotel on the eve of the attack, no alert orders were issued. Elements 

of two enemy local force battalions succeeded therefore to penetrate 

the outskirts of the city two days in advance without being detected. 

At Can Tho, the targets of attack remained the same as elsewhere: 

Corps headquarters, the radio station and a few other places of 

particular significance to enemy propaganda efforts such as the local 

university and shopping center. However, friendly forces reacted with 

determination and drove the enemy out of the city within just one day. 

At Vinh Binh, friendly forces also took just one day to clear the 

attackers. At Vinh Long, fighting was heavier and lasted for several 

days because three enemy battalions had penetrated the city. But the 

enemy seemed to concentrate his efforts on My Tho, where he committed 

three battalions and a sapper company and held one battalion in 

reserve. The 7th Division succeeded nevertheless in clearing this 

substantial enemy force from My Tho with the support provided by a 

U.S. mobile riverine unit and inflicted heavy losses to the enemy. 

Despite heavy fighting at some places, in general the enemy's 

offensive seemed to run out of steam by the end of the first week. 

In most provincial cities, friendly control was thoroughly regained in 

less than one week. Two exceptions to this were Saigon and Hue, the 

current and ancient capitals of the nation, respectively. The 

political significance of these cities was evident enough. It was 

where the enemy concentrated most of his determined efforts. 

52 

The Attaak on Saigon 

As the enemy offensive unfolded in Saigon during the night of 

Tet's first day (31 January 1968) six major objectives became apparent: 

theRVNAF Joint General Staff, the Independence Palace, the U.S. 

Embassy, Tan Son Nhut airbase, the National Broadcasting Station and 

the Vietnam~se Navy Headquarters. Attacks in other areas near Saigon 

could be considered supporting efforts. GMap 3) 

Except for Tan Son Nhut, the primary enemy fo~ce that conducted 

attacks against these objectives was the C-10 City Sapper Battalion. 

With a strength of 250, the C-10 Battalion consisted entirely of men 

who were living under a perfect cover within Saigon; they were, therefore, thoroughly familiar with city life and the streets of Saigon. 

Some of them were cyclopousseor taxicab drivers. 

The C-10 Battalion's mission was to attack and gain control of 

these six objectives and hold them for 48 hours. During that period, 

other local force battalions would be maneuvering into Saigon to 

relieve the sappers. All the men in C-10 had been promised instant 

promotion after the objectives were occupied. This stimulation had 

been deemed necessary, given the suicidal nature of their mission. 

The platoon leader who directed the attack on gate No. 5 of the JGS 

compound, for example, later revealed that in case of success, he 

would be promoted to battalion commander. His specific mission was to 

penetrate. gate No.5, occupy the general officers' quarters, and 

capture alive those generals found at home or detain their family 

members as hostages. 

The attack on gate No. 5 of the JGS compound took place at 0200· 

(Map 4) Part of the C-10 sapper platoon which was to conduct 

the attack arrived on a bus, but several of its members had already 

taken position in the Long Hoa Pagoda just across the street. When 

the bus stopped in front of the gate, the sapper contingent jumped 

out, attempting to run through the gate, usually kept closed, which 

was just opened to let a general officer in. Precisely at that moment, 

a U.S. MP patrol jeep happened to pass by. As enemy sappers momentarily turned their attention to the jeep and opened fire on it, the 

53 

Map 3 - Enemy Attacks on Saigon, Tet 1968 

HOCMON 

2/271/CT9 

~56 

'I.'\.\lU~'N TRE , ..... 101 'IL:""~~' 

8th PRECINCT 

~5NHABE 

TAN QUI 

DONG 

Scale 1: 25,000 

54 

Map 4 - Enemy Attacks on the JGS Compound 

'--::"'-7Jj,.,.;.;:", Area occupied. 

~by enemy 

Scale 1: 12,500 

55 

ARVN guard closed the gate and fired back from a side bunker. The 

u.s. jeep under attack was immedi~tely reinforced by u.s. MP personnel 

from BOQ NO. 3 and other U.S. installations nearby. The enemy 

attack on gate No. 5 ended in complete failure. 

According to plans, the attacks on gates Nos. 5 and 4 of the JGS 

compound were to be initiated simultaneously. Fortunately, the enemy 

unit assigned to attack gate No.4, the 2d Battalion (Go Mon) did not 

arrive in time. At the time of the attack on gate No.5, this battalion 

was still on the move along the railroad track that led toward this 

objective from north of Saigon. The 2d Battalion (Go Mon) was part of 

a three battalion force which was to penetrate Saigon, from Gia Dinh 

Province in two elements. The first element, composed of two battalions 

had penetrated the Hanh Thong Tay military complex at Go Vap where it 

was mounting attacks on such ARVN compounds as No Than and Co Loa, which 

housed the Artillery Command and one artillery battalion, and Phu Dong, 

the rear base of an armor unit. The second element of the Go Mon 

Battalion was to move deeper south along the railroad track toward 

gate No. 4 of the JGS where it did not arrive until 0700. The 

gate was quickly knocked down by B-40 rockets and enemy troops swarmed 

through it. Once inside, they immediately fanned out and overran two 

building areas nearby: the Armed Forces Language School and the JGS 

Headquarters Company. ARVN defenses for the entire JGS complex 

consisted merely of the Honor Guard Battalion and one armor troop. 

Initial reaction was therefore weak aqd lacked coordination. 

After occupying the Armed Forces Language School and the JGS 

Headquarters Company areas, the Go Mon Battalion dug in for defense 

instead of expanding its control to adjacent areas. Had it done just 

that, it would have probably succeeded in occupying the most vital 

areas of all in the JGS complex: the J-2 Division, the Central 

Logistics Command, the JOC, and more significantly, the main building 

which housed the office of the chief of the JGS and his chief of staff. 

Not until after the JGS compound was cleared did we learn why the 

enemy had failed to seize his biggest prize when it seemingly laY,within reach. As prisoners of the Go Mon Battalion revealed, the mission 

of this battalion was to attack and hold at all costs the RVNAF General 

56 

Headquarters. Carrying out its orders to the letter, the battalion 

did break through gate No. 4 and occupied the building area with large 

display signs all marked: General Headquarters or General Headquarters 

Company. Believing that the RVNAF General Headquarters was in his 

hands, the enemy organized defense positions to hold it and did not 

venture into adjacent areas until reinforcements arrived. 

Two hours after the attack on gate No. 4 began, two ARVN airborne 

companies were deployed to the JGS compound on emergency orders. With 

the support of the JGS armor troop, the paratroopers attacked 

ferociously to drive the enemy out, but it was no easy task because the 

enemy had been solidly entrenched in the occupied area. However, with 

the commitment of ARVN paratroopers, the enemy knew he had no chance 

to occupy the JGS main area even with reinforcements. 

At noon, a U.S. helicopter landed in the JGS compound and out 

stepped President Thieu. He immediately convened a meeting with 

several members of his cabinet who since the enemy attack began had 

found their way individually into the ~GS compound. The JGS thus 

temporarily turned into an alternate Independence Palace where measures 

were being taken to counter the enemy offensive despite the uneasy 

fact that fighting was no more than 1 km away. 

In the afternoon, a marine battalion arrived at the JGS compound 

to reinforce its defenses but did not counterattack until the following 

morning, 1 February. Joining forces with the paratroopers, the marines 

finally drove the enemy out at 1030 after a few hours of fighting. 

Defeated and dispersed, elements of tpe Go Mon Battalion took refuge 

in the city blocks nearby. 

The attack on the Independence Palace was also conducted by a 34­

man platoon of the C-lO Sapper Battalion. (Map 5) At 0130 on 

31 January, this platoon placed B-40 fire on the staff entrance gate 

of the Palace on Nguyen Du Street and attempted to crash through. 

The Palace security forces, which were made up of the Presidential gUArd, 

police, MP's and two tanks, reacted forcefully and immediately stonped 

the sappers' assault. Driven back, the enemy took refuge in an unfinished high-rise building across the street. During the next two 

days, except for two of its men captured alive, the entire sapper 

57 

Map 5 - Targets of Enemy Attack, Downtown Saigon 

~1 .213 :

" .• 

.. .. ~ 

..... _ ~ll 

Scale 1: 12,500 

58 

platoon was killed. As it turned out, the suicidal attack on the 

Independenr.e Palace was more of an attempt to create a psychological 

shock than a military victorv because it was doomed to failure from 

the start. 

Three blocks away, a similar suicidal attack was attempted 

against the U.S. Embassy on Thong Nhat Boulevard. This enemy force 

consisted of 19 saopers, all from the C-lO Battalion, equipped with 

B-40 rocket launchers and explosives. A few succeeded in penetrating 

the front yard but coUld not get into the locked building. By the 

next morning. all 19 sappers had been killed. 

In the attack a2ainst the National Broadcasting Station. enemy 

sappers disguised themselves as field police troopers. This C-lO 

sapper element rapidly overwhelmed the field police sauad defendin2 

the station for broadcasting bp.canse it WAS just "n audio and 

recordin2 studio. The chief of the transmitter station. which was 

located at Ouan Tre several miles away, was resourceful enou2h to 

switch off the remote audio lines from the main studio as soon as it 

was occuoied. He then used a stAndby studio eauioped with tape 

recorders. Saigon Radio, therefore, continued to broadcast without 

interruption, using primarily pre-recorded programs. Nobody ever 

detected anythin2 abnormal on the airwaves. 

At 0500, the airborne company, which was assuming alert duties 

at the MS compound nearbv, deployed its troops to the radio station. 

After less than two hours of fighting, the paratroopers destroyed the 

entire sapper element and captured the station. By 0700, the main 

studio was functioning a2ain and started its regular program of the day 

with Vice President N2uyen Cao Kyle announcement and appeal to the 

population. 

At the Vietnamese Navy Headausrters compound on Bach Dang Quay, 

the enemy attack was short-lived; it ended just as soon as it began 

at 0300. The ill-fated enemy squad of 12 sapoers rode in two 

civilian oaseen2er cars. As the cars approached the checkpoint on 

59 

Lam Son Square, which was usually blocked, they were stopped by naval 

guards. The fighting that ensued was brief because the naval alert 

detachment at headquarters had been in combat positions behind bunkers. 

Ten sappers were immediately killed, the remaining two were captured 

before they could even set foot inside the checkpoint line. The 

prisoners disclosed that according to plans, they were to occupy the 

Navy Headquarters, and, with reinforcements, take possession of all 

ships docked along Bach Dang Quay. These ships were to be subsequently used to transport people from other areas to Saigon as 

participants in the uprising. 

Another significant action by the C-10 Battalion was an attempt 

against the Embassy of the Philippines where the ambassador also 

resided, but the ambassador managed to escape with a light injury. 

An attempt to kidnap Prime Minister Nguyen Van Loc at his residence 

also failed. 

At Tan Son Nhut, a major attack was driven against the airport 

by three enemy battalions, two of them local force and one from the 

9th Division. This enemy force simultaneously attacked gates No. 10, 

No. 51 and. No. 2 at 0300. 

Approaching the airport from the Vinatexco textile plant located 

to the west, where the enemy had established a field command post and 

positioned antiaircraft weapons on the roof of the building, the enemy 

force broke through gate No. 51 and advanced about 200 meters inside the 

fence, moving toward the main runway. But here the enemy met with fierce 

resistance from airport security forc~s, which consisted of VicePresident Ky's security guard, the National Police, and paratroopers 

who defend~d their rear base nearby. Friendly forces were also joined 

by two USARV platoons. 

Almost immediately, two companies of the 8th Airborne Battalion, 

which were waiting for air transportation in the military terminal, 

arrived as reinforcem~nt. As a result, the enemy suffered substantial 

losses and was unable to make any progress. At the same time, the 3d 

Armored Squadron of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi began its 

movement toward Tan Son Nhut after an emergency request for relief by 

U.S. forces at the airport. On its way to Tan Son Nhut, the U.S. 

60 
armor column was guided by air-dropped flares and took cross-country 

short cuts, bypassing the embattled area of Hoc Mon and probably ambush sites. At daybreak, the column entered Tan Son Nhut and inflicted 

serious losses to the enemy force, which was compelled to fall back to 

the Vinatexco area. 

At 0900, VNAF and USAF tactical air attacked the Vinatexco 

compound, inflicting further losses to the enemy. Around gate No. 51, 

site of the most furious fighting, over 300 enemy troops lay dead. 

At gate No.2, meanwhile, the fierce resistance put up by the ARVN 2d 

Service Battalion effectively kept the enemy at bay. 

Despite the rapid restoration of friendly control at these major 

objectives, by daybreak enemy local forces had penetrated several 

areas in western and southern Saigon. 

At Cho Lon, one enemy local force battalion had penetrated and 

occupied the Phu Tho race track. As the enemy saw it, the Phu Tho 

race track was a critical strongpoint for his efforts because its 

occupation would deny our forces a large field which they co~ld use 

to bring in reinforcements by helicopters. This race track also lay 

adjacent to a critical junction of major roads between Saigon and 

Cho Lon, and provided an excellent staging area for assembling and 

dispatching troops. From this area, enemy 82-mm mortars could also 

effectively support any combat action or shell any target in Saigon 

or Cho Lon, to include the Tan Son Nhut Airbase. 

The next mission to be accomplished by the enemy local force 

battalion occupying the Phu Tho race t'rack was to attack the Chi Hoa 

prison complex and free Communist detainees. However, this battalion 

lost contact with its two local guides and did not know the way to 

reach Chi Hoa, barely 2 km away. Since most of the local population 

in the area had fled and those who remained tactfully refused to serve 

as guides, the enemy battalion found itself confined to the race track. 

The Chi Hoa prison complex remained untouched even during the 

subsequent phases of the offensive. 

In Gia Dinh Province, the enemy penetrated the Hang Xanh area, a 

major road junction just outside Saigon where the Highway to Bien Hoa 

began. Thu Due, a district town located some 18 km away on this 

61 

highway also came under attack. It was apparent that the enemy was 

trying to severe land communications between Saigon and Bien Hoa, 

seat of III Corps Headquarters, and interdict the access road to Vung 

Tau. The enemy effort in this northern suburb of Saigon was strong 

and persistent. Heavily populated and easy to infiltrate and exfiltrate, this area provided the enemy with a perfect position from 

which it could initiate attacks against key military installations 

nearby. 

At 0900 on 31 January, two enemy local force battalions 

attacked the Co Loa artillery base in Go Vap. The enemy eventually 

overran the base and captured 12 105-mm howitzers located there. 

However, he was unable to use them because before withdrawing from the 

base, ~VN artillerymen had dismantled all the firing blocs. During 

the day, a marine battalion deployed to the area retook the base and 

recovered all twelve artillery pieces. 

A short distance away, the enemy also attacked Camp Phu Dong which 

was the headquarters of the ARVN Armor Command. Since the purpose of 

the attack was to capture ARVN armored vehicles, the enemy force 

included an element .of COSVN's 16th Section, which . specialized in armor 

employment and tactics. Even though the enemy had made careful 

preparations, his reconnaissance had failed to reveal that all ARVN 

armored vehicles on the base had been moved elsewhere two months 

earlier. Camp Phu Dong was retaken at the same time as the 

artillery base. 

Both Camps Phu Dong and Co Loa turned out to be two of the most 

important targets which the enemy had planned to occupy at all costs. 

Our enemy had expected to use the captured artillery pieces and 

armored vehicles to support his attacks in Saigon. He was so certain 

of success that all participating units in the Saigon area had been 

informed that they would receive artillery and armor support. 

By the end of the first 48 hours, it was obvious that the enemy's 

chance of success had greatly diminished. Not a single major objective in Saigon was in his hands, and the promised reinforcements were 

nowhere in sight. Hopes of a popular uprising also began to falter. 

There were no demonstrations and no significant cooperation from the 

62 

population save for some isolated supply activities performed under 

coercion by the VCI. 

During this time, the Saigon VCI proved to be extremely active. 

Many of its members served as guides for the attacking units. A 

few of them were actually holding jobs in U.S. and GVN agencies. 

Among those killed during the offensive, one even had a CMD-issued 

pass a1lthorizing him to circulate during curfew hours. Several others 

had passes allowing them access to some U.S. civilian installations. 

When the attack on Saigon began, believing that the offensive and uprising were going to be a success, most of the city's VCI members surfaced and participated in subversive activities. They performed 

many useful tasks in support of the attacking forces, serving as 

guides and informants in the areas under Communist control, where 

they helped search and arrest GVN officials, policemen, and military 

officers. They acted as propagandists, encouraging the people and 

inciting them to revolt and demonstrate in support of the "liberation" 

forces. As a result of these supporting activities, the enemy local 

forces that attacked Saigon and Cho Lon were able to move around in a 

metropolitan area that was obviously too large, too populous, too 

strange, and whose modern facilities and civilization remained beyond 

their r.ealm of knowledge. 

By this time, ·as many as 15 enemy battalions had been introduced 

into the general area that comprised Saigon, Cho Lon and part of Gia 

Dinh Province. They had occupied a northern suburb of Saigon, the 7th 

and 8th precincts in Cho Lon, the Phy tpo race track and part of a few 

city blocks in Saigon itself. They broke down into small elements, 

taking shelter ill people's homes, orgenizing defense pOSitions in 

high-rise buildings, and awaiting the reinforcement of main force 

units which were to move in from the outside as planned. 

Supporting Attaaks in III Copps Area 

At the time of the enemy offensive, ARVN forces in the III Corps 

area consisted of three infantry divisions, one ranger group and three 

armor squadrons. The 25th ARVN Division was located at Hau Hghia, 

63 

the 18th ARVN Division at Long Khanh and the 5th ARVN Division at Binh 

Duong. The 5th Ranger Group was stationed in Saigon. (Map 6) 

There were' also the two airborne battalions of the JGS general reserve 

..preparing for deployment to the I corps area. In total, there were 

46 ARVN maneuver battalions in the III Corps area. For the Tet 

period, each battalion had about 50% of its strength ready for 

combat. 

u.s. forces in III Corps area consisted of the Headquarters of 

II Field Force and the u.s. 199th Infantry Brigade at Long Binh 

(Bien Hoa), the 25th Infantry Division at Cu Chi (Hau Nghia), the 9th 

Infantry Division at Long Thanh (Phuoc Tuy), and the 1st Infantry 

Division at Lai Khe (Binh Duong). In addition, there were three 

Australian battalions at Ba Ria and one Royal Thai battalion at Long 

Thanh. The total of U.S. and Free World forces in the III Corps area 

therefore consisted of 53 infantry battalions and 13 armor battalions. 

(Map 7) 

When the offensive began, enemy forces located in the III Corps 

area consisted of three infantry divisions (the 5th, 7th, and 9th), 

three separate infantry regiments' (lOlst, 88th and Dong Nai), one 

artillery regiment, and 29 local force battalions. 

The enemy offensive plan assigned the 9th Division the mission of 

attacking the Quang Trung Training Center and the Headquarters, U.S. 

25th Infantry Division, with the objective of blocking the movement of 

reinforcements from these units toward Saigon on Route QL-l. One 

regiment of the 9th Division was to attack Thu Duc and block the Bien 

Hoa highway, interdicting the movement 'of reinforcements from III Corps 

in Bien Hoa, the U.S. II Field Force in Long Binh and the RVNAF 

marines in Di An. 

The 7th Division had two regiments. One regiment was assigned 

the mission to attack the Headquarters, U.S. 1st Infantry Division, at 

Lai Khe and, in coordination with the Dong Nai Regiment, the provincial 

capital of Binh Duong and the Headquarters, 5th ARVN Infantry Division. 

These attacks would effectively interdict all reinforcement movements 

from the north and northwest toward Saigon along Routes QL-13 and QL-l. 

The 101st Regiment (Separate) was placed under operational control of 

64 

Map 6 - III Corps Area and Disposition of ARVN Forces 

CAMBODIA 

IV CORPS 

25 50 miles 

" CORPS AREA 

SOUTH CHINA 

SEA 

o 

! , " i i 


o 25 SO Kilometers 

65 

Map 7 - Disposition of U.S. and FWMA Forces, III Corps Area 

Tong Le Chon 

Prek Klok. 

1 

Quan Loi 1 

An Loc. eBunard 

BINHTUY 

Tanh 

•

Linh 

66 

Map 7 - Disposition of U.S. and FWMA Forces, III Corps Area 

eSunard 

BINHTUY 

Tanh 

•

Linh 

66 

the 7th Division with the mission to attack and occupy the Go Vap 

District north of Saigon. The 88th Regiment (Separate) was to interdict Route QL-13 south of An Loc and Binh Duong. 

The 5th Division with two regiments had the mission to attack 

the Headquarters, US II Field Force, at Long Binh with one regiment; (Map 8) 

the other regiment was to attack the Bien Hoa AFB, the Headquarters, 

III Corps, and Bien Hoa City. 

The five new subdivisions of former enemy MR-4 which surrounded 

and converged on Saigon also received specific combat missions in 

support of the attack on the capital city. One local force battalion 

of the 1st Subdivision was to attack the district town of Cu Chi. 

The 2d Subdivision's local force battalion was to attack the Headquarters, 

ARVN 25th Infantry Division, at Duc Hoa. The local force battalion of 

the 3d Subdivision received the primary mission to protect the enemy. 

forward CP of General Tran Do, responsible for the attack on Saigon, 

and to harass ARVN units in its area of responsibility. The 4th 

Subdivision was to conduct harassment activities against ARVN forces 

while the 5th Subdivision's local forces would attack Phu Loi, Phu 

Cuong and Tan Uyen in coordination with the Dong Nai Regiment. 

In the enemy Ba-Bien Province (Ba Ria-Bien Hoa), one local force 

battalion was to attack the Headquarters, ARVN 18th Division, at Xuan 

Loc, and another was to attack the provincial city of Ba Ria and 

Australian forces located in the vicinity. 

Most ·of these pre-planned attacks took place throughout the III 

Corps area either simultaneously with the attack on Saigon or one or 

t~~o days later. However, Tay Ninh City was not attacked until 6 February 

and Long An City on 8 February. MOst of these attacks were either Iy v 

immediately defeated or ephemera~successful. None of the objectives 

was held by the enemy more than one day. 

The attack on the Quang Trung Training Center on 31 January was 

highlighted by the fact that enemy troops disguised themselves as ARVN 

infantrymen and marines. But the attack failed and ended in late afternoon after the defenders were reinforced by a marine battalion. However, the enemy succeeded in controlling a large part of the Hoc Mon 

district town nearby, causing temporary difficulties for supply 

67 
--- -

Map 8 - Enemy Plan of Attack Against Long Blnh 

(original captured sketch) 

00'" 

- - - - ­ - - -­

BOO 

I 

I 

I

,

,

, 

I

,

, 

I 

/

, 

-- --- - --­-­--- -­ --- -, 
movements from Tay Ninh and Cu Chi to Saigon. 

At Bien Hoa, the enemy 5th Division attacked simultaneously the 

U.S. Army base at Long Binh, the Bien Hoa airfield and III Corps 

Headquarters but missed the Communist prisoner camp near the city 

because of confusion. The two companies of the 275th Regiment 

that received the mission to attack this camp in coordination 

with another element had been instructed to move to a rendezvous point 

which was formerly a rubber plantation nearby. Unfortunately for the 

enemy, this rubber plantation had been cleared a month earlier by Rome 

plows. So when they arrived at the rendezvous point and found that no 

rubber plantation was in sight, the two companies moved to another area, 

missing the attack. 

At the Bien Hoa air force base, the attack driven by the enemy 

274th Regiment was completely stalled by fierce resistance put up by 

the defending RF battalion after the eastern end of the runway had been 

penetrated. At III Corps Headquarters, meanwhile, even though the 

attacking enemy local force battalion had been reinforced by one battalion of the 5th Division, it was unable to breakthrough the defense 

perimeter. Shortly thereafter, the intervention by the U.S. 11th 

Armored Cavalry Regiment finally shattered all enemy efforts at both 

places. 

At Long Binh, despite detailed planning, the enemy was able only 

to blow up a few ammunition dumps on the base. At Ba Ria near Vung Tau, 

however, the enemy successfully overran a small airfield adjacent to 

the Van Kiep Training Center, main objective of his attack. Sector 

headquarters immediately employed the 11th Airborne Battalion, which was 

undergoing training at the center. In coordination with another RF 

battalion, the ARVN paratroopers eventually broke the enemy attack and 

retook the airfield during the day. 

In Binh Duong Province, the enemy attacked Phu Cuong, the provincial 

capital where he occupied the ARVN Engineer School but not the sector 

headquarters. Nearby, he also took the district town of Ben Cat, 

seizing a l55-mm artillery position installed by the ARVN 5th Division. 

However, enemy troops did not know how to use the artillery pieces. 

69 

Along with Phu Cuong, Ben Cat was retaken late in the afternoon the day 

of the attack. 

In general, enemy attacks in the provinces surrounding Saigon were 

all short-lived, lasting no longer than one day on the average. The 

enemy not only lacked the capability to hold, he also met with swift 

and forceful reactions by the local defending forces. As it turned 

out, most RF battalions performed unexpectedly well, fighting courageously in defense and counterattacking with enthusiastic vigor, aided 

in their efforts by u.S. infantry units, armor, artillery, and gunships. 

As a result, targets temporarily overrun by the enemy at the beginning 

of the attack were all retaken within a short time. 

The most sustained enemy effort in III Corps area, remained locked 

in Saigon, his primary objective, where fighting was still raging. 

After the initial shock of surprise, however, ARVN and u.S. forces began 

to counterattack and seize the initiative. 

CZearing Operations in Saigon 

At the time the enemy attacked Saigon, ARVN forces available for 

the defense of the city consisted of eight infantry battalions. These 

did not include the three RF battalions, two MP battalions and two 

service battalions which were detached piecemeal for guard and security 

duties at military and governmental ins,ta11ations, check points and 

bridges. 

The first action taken by the Joint General Staff after the attack 

on Saigon was to call general reserve units back for the immediate 

relief of the city. Within 48 hours, therefore, an additional seven 

infantry battalions had been brought back, because of fast transportation facilities available. By the end of the third day of the attack, 

RVNAF forces in the Saigon area had increased to a total of five airborne battalions, five marine battalions, five ranger battalions, one 

artillery battalion, which had all been lnthdralm from their previous 

commitment in II, III and IV Corps areas. The recall of these forces 

had not been easy. With heavy combat burdens 'on their own shoulders, 

the II and IV Corps commanders were particularly reluctant to release them. 

70 
With additional forces available, the JGS decided to launch a 

major relief operation to clear enemy troops from the nation's capital. 

Lt. General Nguyen Duc Thang, then Minister of Rural Development and 

former J3 of the JGS, came up with a plan which was quickly approved 

and code-named after the JGS compound's designation, Tran Hung Dao. 

Because of the significance of the relief operation, General Cao Van 

Vien, Chief of the JGS, took personal command. 

The concept of operation was based on the idea of organizing 

Saigon and its. suburbs into several areas of operation and assigning 

each area or zone to a specific service or combat arm. Initially, 

there were five areas of operation or zones, designated A, B, C, D, and 

E. (Map 9) Zone A was assigned to the Airborne Division because it 

was where its headquarters was based. Zone B was assigned to the 

Marine Division for the same reason. Zone C, which was essentially 

downtown Saigon and relatively more secure, was made the responsibility 

of the National Police. At that time total NP strength in Saigon, to 

include field police forces, numbered in excess of 20,000. Zone D, 

which included the Chinatown in Cho Lon, was assigned to the RVNAF 

Ranger Command. Zone E, which included Tran Hung Dao camp and the 

MACV compound, was made the responsibility of the JGS Headquarters 

Commandant. For the defense of this zone, the JGS honor guard 

battalion.was reinforced by four makeshift battalions which had been 

assembled with personnel of the JGS staff divisions and other service 

agencies located within the JGS compound and totalled 1,928 men, 

mostly officers and NCO's. The JGS staff divisions retained only 

about one-third of their personnel, those who were deemed utterly necessary 

for critical staff work•. Zone F was added to the original plan only 

on 9 February. Since this area comprised mostly outlying suburbs, and 

the ARVN did not have enough forces to commit there, it was assigned to 

U. S. forces. 

By this time, an agreement of principle had been reached between 

III Corps, whose responsibility encompassed the CMD, and the U.S. II 

Field Force, whereby ARVN forces would be in charge of clearing 

operations within the city and U.S. forces would conduct screening 

operations in the suburbs, destroy enemy forces retreating from the 

71 

Map 9 - The Tran Hung Dao Plan 

~2CO LOA ANPHU DONG

ZONE IIA" 

TAN SON NHAT 

ZONE "B" 

/

~6 

BA QUEO 

~RBORN ~, GOA "'NN 

Airborne Division r--XX 

U.S. Troops 

PHU THO HOA 

ZONE "F" 

U.S.3 ~7 

Tf 2 

ZONE "e" 

r----, 

RIOT 

POLICE 

1st Precinct 

/ 

2nd Precinct 

/Sthprecin~ Riot Police 

F/ Xx anger --___. 

Range' 41~~~~~~~~~~~:;~~;;;;;=====;;;;;;;:;::::::r ZONE "p" 

Range, 30 I 181 ~ 

~ 

Ranger 38 

Ranger 35 

7th 

Preci 

U.S. Mechanized Troops 

8th Precinct 

ZONE ifF" 

Scale 1: 25,000 

72 

city, and block those attempting to penetrate it. 

Operation Tran Hung Dao terminated its first phase on 17 February 

by which time the situation in Saigon had greatly improved in spite of 

continued fighting in some areas in Cho Lon. It was then decided to 

turn over command of the operation to III Corps. Most enemy units, 

especially the local force battalions, had been driven out into the 

suburbs. There remained only a few pockets of resistance in Cho Lon 

manned by piecemeal enemy elements. 

Clearing activities were most vigorous during the week from 5 to 

12 February, especially in Zone D where it was difficult to uproot 

enemy elements nested in people's houses in a particularly dense area. 

In several cases, our forces had to ask the people to leave the combat 

area before moving in. In addition to hit-and-run tactics, the enemy 

also positioned antiaircraft weapons on high-rise buildings, which 

seriously impeded support missions flown by gunships. Destroying these 

antiaircraft weapons was therefore a priority task for our forces. 

In some areas in Cho Lon, the enemy occupied several Buddhist 

temples and hospitals, using them as shelters or operational bases. 

The An Quang Pagoda, a celebrated Buddhist temple associated with ·the 

Buddhist militants of 1966, was used as a high-level headquarters. In 

their determination to destroy this enemy command post, our forces retook the pagoda with air support even at the price of causing extensive 

damage to .it. A short distance away, the Children's Hospital was also 

used as troop cantonment and defense strongpoint. 

At Binh Dong, also in Cho Lon, the enemy occupied a governmental 

rice depot then set fire to it. Be also set fire to a paper mill at 

Phu Lam. At both places, the fires sent billowing black smoke high 

into the sky, obstructing aerial observation and support. Causing 

these fires was a deliberate enemy scheme intended not only to impede 

our air intervention but also to create an aura of blight and fear which 

added to the confusion among the population. 

The last major battle fought in Saigon took place in the Phu DinhPhu Lam area on 11 February. With the support of a U.S. unit, ARVN 

Ranger forces completely wiped out a high-level enemy command post 

73 

located in the Phu Lam communal temple. Among the 30 enemy bodies 

found inside, there were 6 armed with pistols, an evident indication 

of high ranks. From the documents seized on them we learned 

that the place had sheltered a protection element of COSVN's forward 

command post. Speculations therefore arose and spread about to the 

effect that Tran Do, the Communist general who directed the attack on 

Saigon, had been killed. However, a subsequent fingerprint check on 

the bodies found that Tran Do was not among them. Since the results 

of this fingerprint check were not made public, rumor~ of Tran Do's 

death persisted and accounted for a jubilant mood among the Saigon 

population and troops. 

The fighting in Saigon abated immediately following this battle. 

On 17 February, however, it resumed with fresh intensity with the onset 

of a new series of attacks. These attacks began with fierce rocket fire 

striking at Tan Son Nhut and the MACV headquarters nearby, causing considerable damage to the air passenger terminal. Then enemy infantry 

troops moved in and pushed hard primarily against tan Son Nhut AFB, the 

area from Hoc Mon to Xom Moi in Go Vap, and the Phu Lam area, south of 

Cho Lon. 

The renewed attacks lasted until early March, highlighted by 

several firefights inside Saigon and Cholon. Its intensity, however, 

was much less than that of phase 1. The enemy had brought in some 

fresh local force battalions to relieve the one's being engaged and 

fresh troops to replace losses. But these fresh troops proved to be 

dismally combat-ineffective. Many among them were just retrieved 

from rest and recuperation, and others had received only a two-week 

crash training course. Apparently to compensate for this weakness, 

the enemy committed the entire 9th Division to attacks in the north 

and northwest of Saigon and in Hoc Mon-Go Vap. In the meantime he kept 

up rocket shellings against Saigon and sapper sabotage activities in 

and around the city. In addition to the Binh Loi Bridge on the Saigon 

Eiver, which had one span seriously damaged, the enemy also blew up 

two other lesser bridges and a power transformer station in Cho Lon. 

By this time, however, the RVNAF and U.S. forces had expanded their 

74 

mopping-up activities well beyond the suburbs. These activities 

converged on outlying areas suspected of harboring enemy troops such as 

Thu Duc, Lai Thieu, Di An and Vinh Loc. The objective now was to push 

the fighting as far away from Saigon as possible. 

A period of relative calm began to reign in Saigon immediately 

following a heavy engagement on 7 March between ARVN paratroopers and 

enemy main force units in the Ba Diem and Tan Thoi Trung areas in 

Zone D. This lull lasted until 5 May when it was broken again by the 

second phase of the general offensive. 

Countrywide, meanwhile, the military situation improved remarkably. 

Mopping-up activities effectively cleared most cities and provincial 

capitals from the encroachment of enemy troops with· the exception of 

Hue where fighting was still raging ferociously since the beginning 

of the offensive. Here the loss in human lives in~urred by the 

civilian population had reached the proportions ofa natural disaster, 

which was made even more horrible by the mass maSsacre of approximately 

4,000 people, all victims of Communist atrocities committed during the 

25 days the city remained under their control. 

The BattZe of Hue 

Hue, the ancient capital of Vietnam, had a population of approximately 140,000 at the time the enemy offensive began. It was the 

cradle of militant Buddhism. whose confrontation with President 

Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963 led to his death~nd the demise of his regime. 

During the years that followed, the militant Buddhist movement in Hue 

picked up momentum and flared up again in 1966 when, with the support 

of some disaffected ARVN commanders, it openly defied central authority 

in Saigon. Twenty thousand Buddhists at some time joined in antigovernment demonstrations in Hue, backed up by most ARVN units located 

in the city, including the 1st Infantry Division. 

These demonstrations eventually culminated in a showdown in which 

Buddhist households in the city displayed their altars on the streets, 

paralyzing business activities and blocking vehicular traffic, even 

the cQnvoys of the U. S. Marines. The showdown erupted in violence when 

75 

a Buddhist nun burned herself and mobs on a wild rampage set fire to 

the U.S. Consulate building after thoroughly ransacking· it. Most 

fanatic among the demonstrators were some professors of the Hue 

University and its extremist students. 

All of these confrontations with the government tinted Hue with a 

certain hue of political radicalism which the Communists identified with 

their own interests. As a result, they considered Hue the second most 

important objective to be conquered after Saigon during their 1968 Tet 

Offensive. For Hue, with its political and historical Significance, 

would be the perfect place for the inauguration of a coalition government of their making. 

At the time the attack on Hue began, ARVN forces available in the 

city consisted solely of the headquarters of the 1st Infantry Division, 

which was located in Mang Ca, a small and isolated camp in the northern 

corner of the Old Citadel. (Map 10) 

The square-shaped Old Citadel occupied an area whose outer perimeter consisted of a solid earth-and-stone rampart, 20 feet thick and 

from 25 to 30 feet high, surrounded by a zig zag moat. Inside this 

rampart, and at a distance varying from 20 to 80 yards from it, there 

was a brick wall. Both the rampart and wall were built in 1802 under 

the reign .of Emperor Gia Long, the forefather of the Nguyen dynasty. 

Within the Old Citadel, there were two areas of particular interest: 

the Imperial Palace with its stately Midday gate topped by a majestic 

flagpole, all constructed in ancient architectural style, and the Tay 

Loc airfield, a product of modern times. South of the Old Citadel ran 

the River of Perfume over which two bridges provided access to the more 

contemporary southern part of the city, Trang Tien and Bach Ho. On 

this southern bank of the river were located governmental and military 

installations such as the Thua Thien Sector headquarters and the MACV 

compound. 

No U.S. combat unit was based in Hue City. The nearest U.S. base 

was at Phu Bai, eight km to the southeast where the U.S. 3d Marine 

Division had established its headquarters. 

As for ARVN forces, besides the 1st Infantry Division headquarters 

located inside the Old Citadel, the nearest combat units were the 7th 

76 

Map 10 - The Old Citadel, Hue City 

Bao Vinh 

• 

Western G.....>(".... 

Hanoi-Saigon Railroad 

Vi 

o. 

Scale 1: 4,000 

77 

Armored Cavalry Squadron at An Cuu, 2 km to the southeast, and the 2d 

Airborne Battalion which established a temporary base near Route QL-l 

17 km northwest of Hue in the vicinity of the "Street l~ithout Joy." 

During the days that preceded Tet, the situation in I Corps area 

became tense with intelligence reports indicating large enemy troop 

concentrations near Khe Sanh Base and in the DMZ area north of Quang 

Tri. Other reports revealed a major enemy troop movement from the DMZ 

into Thua Thien Province and a logistic buildup and other troop movements 

in the piedmont area west of Hue. In the face of this mounting tension, "<-.---..-,.......-"-....,.....,..~."..-.. ....-'.""""""~.-.... - .,.,-. ' 
- the U.S. 1st Air Cavalry Division was relocated from Military Region 2 "' ___.•_.... ". " ",." ," ,_, ,-c.."~....,,..~,,~,,~ ......_ ..~,., ...".~' __ "'~',r.., ".....~ ._'_.... "'...._....,.•,._~~.. ~~"'.~,._' ~," ...__ ~ y' ..",.~.'" '.,..•v_".~_....''''_''.._ . __ " 

to Camp Evans, 16 km northwest of Hue, ready for any eventuality. No 

-,."."''''".-.''' .. -,''~~",,'',.•- "~"'''''' e,,,,,,,,,,,.~, . 

intelligence estimate, however, predicted iih"e"iiemy attack'b'il'1iiie"Cfii?lng • .." .. ~ __ ",' •. ,,-,_._..... ". - '0",,- ~'_'" 

the Tet holidays. ,,"-~ _.,_.,. 

-" ....·.-On the morning of Tet's first day, reports on enemy attacks against 

some provincial capitals in II Corps area streamed in the 1st Division 

headquarters. The night before, during a patrol mission four km 

southwest of Hue, an element of the Recqnnaissance Company, 1st Division, 

had clashed with an enemy force estimated at about two battalions, reportedly moving toward the city. The division commander, Brigadier 

General Ngo Quang Truong, immediately convened a staff meeting during 

which he took certain measures to prepare for defense. Alert orders 

were issued to confine all troops to their barracks and prepare for 

combat. At Mang Ca Camp, the seat of the division headquarters, however, 

there were only the Headquarters Company, the Reconnaissance Company and 

a few divisional support elements. 

Lunar New Year's Day in Hue passed without event amid traditional 

celebrations. Then past midnight, at 0340, the enemy struck l~ith 

a fierce preparatory fire of l22-mm rockets and 82-mm mortars. The 

enemy forces which conducted the initial attack on Hue consisted of two 

infantry regiments, two sapper battalions, and one artillery (rocket) 

battalion, assisted by sappers already in place inside the city. According to plans, the 6th Regiment was to attack the old citadel and 

push its primary effort against the 1st Infantry Division headquarters, 

while the 4th Regiment was to attack the :~CV compound and the Thua Thien 

Sector headquarters, both located on the southern bank of the river. 

78 

The 4th Regiment's attack began with the 802d Battalion pushing 

against the Mang Ca compound and the 800th Battalion against the Tay Loc 

airfield. Both encountered heavy resistance by the Reconnaissance 

$lack Panther} Company, 1st Division, almost the sole defender of these 

areas. Failing in their initial attempts, both enemy battalions broke 

contact and moved toward other targets nearby after having incurred some 

losses. The Black Panther Company, meanwhile, was called back to division 

headquarters where it was to reinforce other divisional elements in 

resisting the attack by the 8l2th Battalion. During this time, the 6th 

Regiment's CP and one infantry battalion under its control penetrated 

and held the outer north-western area of the old citadel, which commanded 

access to Route QL-l. Their mission was to safeguard a line of communication and supply route from outside of the city toward the old Citadel. 

South of the river in the meantime and despite forceful attacks, 

the enemy 4th Regiment failed to take any of the three targets it had 

been assigned: the MACV compound, the sector headquarters and the 

city's police headquarters. 

By the morning of the next day, however, Hue city had practically 

fallen under enemy control with the exception of key military and governmental headquarters. In the old Citadel, the NLF flag was hoisted on 

the Midday gate flagpole at 0800. 

Judging the situation critical, the 1st Division commander ordered 

the 2d Airborne Battalion, the 7t~ Armored Cavalry Squadron, and his 

own 3d Regiment back to Hue to reinforce the defense of division headquarters and clear the city. All three-units were intercepted and attacked on their way, the 2d ABN Battalion at An Hoa, northwest of Hue, 

.the 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron in the southern suburbs and two battalions of the 3d Regiment southwest of the city. 

Shortly thereafter, the 2d ABN Battalion was instructed to bypass 

enemy blocks and move east to approach the Mang Ca compound, which it 

entered and was immediately tasked to retake the Tay Loc airfield. 

The 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron, meanwhile, paid some price in trying 

to reach the sector headquarters, .which it did but only after the squadron 

commander, Lt. Colonel Phan Huu Chi, had been sacrificed and tt~elve of its 

79 
armored vehicles knocked out by enemy B-40 rockets. Finally, the two 

battalions of the 3d Regiment made it to the Bao Vinh pier off the River 

of Perfume after a long journey by small landing craft. Both reached 

the 1st Division Headquarters in the afternoon of 1 February. 

On the U.S. Side, two marine companies supported by four tanks were 

deployed from their base at Phu Bai on the morning of 31 January in an 

effort to relieve the embattled MACV compound. The U.S. relief task 

force was intercepted at the An Cuu Bridge just south of the city but 

finally.made it to the MACV compound in the afternoon. With this reinforcement, the MACV compound held its ground firmly against a heavy 

attack by the enemy 4th Regiment during the night. 

By now, it was obvious that to clear the enemy's foothold in the 

city, the 1st Division would require more forces. The division commander 

therefore ordered the 9th Airborne Battalion back from Quang Tri. With 

U.S. helilift support, the battalion landed in Mang Ca during 2 February. 

It was followed shortly thereafter by the 4th Battalion, 2d Regiment, 

1st Division, also helilifted in from Dong Ha. With these additional 

forces, the 1st Division finally retook the Tay Loc airfield inside· 

the old citadel after two days of heavy fighting during which the enemy 

lost in excess of 200 killed. 

In the meantime, U.S. Marine reinforcements deployed for the 

defense of the MACV compound during 2 and 3 February had brought total 

U.S. forces there to one battalion, the 15th USMC Battalion, which was 

subsequently augmented with armor elements and ONTOS vehicles equipped 

with 106-mm recoilless rifles. 

During that time, enemy forces attacked and overran the municipal 

prison of Hue where apprOximately 2,000 prisoners were detained. After 

being freed, a large majority of these prisoners was used as local 

labor while others were given· weapons and joined enemy combat units 

as replacements. The enemy also began to consolidate his control over 

the city with the effective help of local VCI members. The local VCI 

had compiled a black list containing the names and addresses of all 

those who served in the military, in the government, or in U.S. agencies. 

This list served a double purpose. It enabled enemy forces to search 

for and arrest those they considered "enemies of the revolution" for 

80 

immediate elimination. It also helped the enemy in screening and 

classifying the civilian population of Hue. 

According to accounts of survivors, the first thing Communists did 

after occupying Hue loBS to divide the city into areas and put each area 

under the control of a "Revolutionary Committee." All inhabitants were 

required to report to and register with the Revolutionary Committee of 

their area. They were also to turn in all weapons, ammunition, and radio 

receivers in their possession. After registration, everybody was let 

free to go home. During the days that followed registration, many 

people were asked to report again and never returned. They were those 

whose names had been placed on the VCI black list. When inquiring about 

their condition or location, their families were informed that they had 

to attend a reeducation course. 

Information which leaked back gradually revealed the true nature 

of this reeducation process. According to a few who managed to escape 

and survive, all those detained for the purpose of "reeducation" were 

given picks and shovels and ordered to dig shelters. They did not 

suspect that these shelters were to become their own graves. 

Later, after Hue had been liberated, most of these mass graves 

were found after a diligent and systematic search. We thus discovered 

many such graves on the campuses of the Gia Long and Gia Hoi High Schools 

and in the vicinity of the Tang Quang Tu Pagoda, all within city limits. 

But there were several others which would have never been discovered had 

they not been pinpointed by enemy returnees; they were all located 

outside the city in such outlying areas ~s those forests surrounding 

the Tu Duc and }linh Mang tombs. 

This mass murder eventually went down in history as the most 

abominable and inhuman atrocity ever committed by the Communists during 

the war. Although they condemned it, many South Vietnam were at a loss 

when trying to determine why this was necessary. After all, they 

reasoned, Hue had always been considered more anti-government than anywhere else in South Vietnam. The militant Buddhists notwithstanding, Hue 

was the breeding ground for a Communist-sponsored political movement, 

the so-called "National Alliance for Democracy and Peace." This movement 

81 

had attracted some professors and students at the University of Hue. 

Another opinion ventured that this mass murder was a pre-planned 

Communist action aimed at eliminating GVN organizations and personnel 

against whom the VCI of Hue had always harbored a certain blood feud. 

To General Truong, our 1st Division Commander, however, the mass murder 

was part of a security plan designed to protect VCI members whose covers 

had been blown when they surfaced to join in the attack, especially after 

the RVNAF announced they were determined to take Hue back at any cost. 

ln any event, the mass murder had a backlash which proved to be 

extremely adverse to the Communists as far as their standing with the 

South Vietnamese people was concerned. 

When they attacked Hue, the Communists had already made preparations 

for the installation of a local government of their own. The man they 

selected as mayor of Hue, who was later tracked down and arrested by 

our forces, turned out to be the former chief of the city's national 

police. Involved in the Buddhist showdown of 1966, the man fled and 

joined enemy ranks after its failure. 

Militarily, in the meantime, several new developments had taken 

place. For the first time after a long period of bad weather, VNAF 

tactical aircraft had taken advantage of clear skies to attack two enemy 

battalions entrenched inside the old citadel. Twenty-four 500-lb bombs 

were dropped over enemy positions especially in the southwestern corner 

of the citadel. 

During the same day of the VNAF attack, using floating mines, 

the enemy was able to destroy two of the twelve spans of the Truong 

Tien Bridge which connected the Old Citadel and business section of the 

city with the modern southern city blocks. An additional two enemy 

battalions had also been brought into the citadel. These forces subsequently launched a forceful attack on 10 February against one battalion 

of the 1st Division, causing severe losses to this ARVN unit. 

On 12 February, three Vietnamese marine battalions were deployed 

to Hue. Two among them had participated in battles at My Tho in the 

Mekong Delta and at Go Vap in Gia Dinh Province. All three battalions 

were transported by naval craft to the Bao Vinh landing from where they 

moved to the 1st Division Headquarters compound. And just as soon as 

82 

they arrived, the marines launched counterattacks to retake the citadel, 

but progress was slow in the absence of direct air and artillery support. 

The next day, U.S. ~~rine forces began to join in the effort to 

clear ,the citadel. Even solidly entrenched behind indestructible walls 

of the old rampart enemy forces suffered heavy losses caused by the 

accurate fire of l06-mm recoilless rifles mounted on ONTOS vehicles. 

The weather also began to improved markedly, which made the support 

provided U.S. ~rines by U.S. tactical aircraft more effective and 

quickened the pace of clearing operations. The enemy was apparently 

digging in for a long stay. He had strewn substantial obstacles on 

roadways inside the citadel, barricading himself behind trucks and 

other vehicles and heaps of household furniture taken from the population. He also positioned sharpshooters at key points to deter the 

advance of our troops. 

On 16 February, the technical detachment of the 1st Division intercepted a radio message from the enemy headquarters inside the citadel. 

Its content revealed that the enemy commander there had been killed 

during an attack-by-fire, that enemy losses were heavy, and that the 

new commander recommended a withdrawal from the citadel. From a reply 

message by the enemy higher headquarters, also intercepted, we learned 

that this recommendation was disapproved and Communist forces in the 

citadel were ordered to continue the fighting. 

On 19 February, the enemy suddenly counterattacked in force in 

the citadel, driving his effort toward ~he Tay Loc airfield. Not until 

much later did we learn that this surge of effort was designed to cov.er 

the escape of some high-ranking enemy commanders stranded in the citadel. 

All that remained there now were just combat troops and lower level 

commanders. 

The enemy's stubborn resistance !P~~ the citadel became-sesperate ~-.~-----..,---.'-' -.--..~------.... ~~~--...,-"--- ,.... ...----.--~---~--- _... --.

on 21 February when three U.S. Air Ca.Y{l,~F.y,".ll~!;.!;~U9n.,.",I;l.r,QlI'e".a ,.concerted --------~~"..---....."'..-....--."«.."'''...''~.-'.~~ ..~''''' 

attack against the La Chu area, five km northwest of HlJ,e"and",J.o.c.ation ---~~.~~,-..""--..,---........'-~~"-."~" ....",.,,"~"" .... ~, .,.,.."".~,' \ ""~.""""""""" ,,-."'~'''''''-''.. '' " 


of the headquarters of the 29th Regiment, 325C Division.., .. U.S. forces 
 _ ..".___""__ ... - ____.....~._,_.'_.. '.~,.,.~"~,.•.. ~ ~'-~.,#"'...'J.>_" ......."'""~,,,.--.'-,. ",", u" 


occupied this area and thus severed all enemy communications and re­ .._~,. ,,' ",""" ," ,w.,_>_......................~_"'·'....·""'....,~··""'.... ,..,·' ..\~"'·"·"'···."....,···-".,..·;"-! ........,..... ,..-"'""':-".,.,,.,,~"; ~ "'_ t. ,...-.".'.~:~.___ ,,,_..:,,, _ -""..... ,',•., ",-'_:-",", '.,'i'lt""... 


supply activities between the citadel and the outside. 

83 
On 22 February, two ARVN Ranger battalions arrived in Hue to reinforce the efforts of clearing the Gia Hoi area of Hue City. 

Then at 0500 on 24 February, the 2d Battalion of the 3d 

Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, finally retook the Imperial Court inside 

the citadel where its troops immediately brought down the NLF flag, 

ripped it into tatters and hoisted the RVN national colors. For the 

first time in twenty-five days, our yellow and triple red-striped flag 

fluttered triumphantly in the early morning air. This also marked the 

total reoccupation of Hue City for by that time, only one isolated enemy 

element still remained in Gia Hoi. The next day, this element was 

wiped out. 

The battle for Hue lasted only twenty-five days but it was by far the 

fiercest, the bloodiest, and the most destructive. During the battle, 

the enemy had committed a total of 16 battalions or nearly the equivalent 

of two infantry divisions; according to our statistics, he had lost in 

excess of 2,000 killed. An enemy document captured later revealed that 

in the battle of Hue, he had suffered 1,042 killed and several times 

that amount wounded. It also provided an inventory of troop commanders 

killed which amounted to 1 regimental, 8 battalion and 24 company commanders, and 72 platoon leaders. 

Another captured document gave a post-mortem analysis of the causes 

our enemy attributed to his defeat in Hue. These were: 

1. Lack of accurate intelligence reports. (Enemy forces, for 

example, attacked An Hoa expecting the 2d ABN Battalion to be there, but 

this unit had redeployed to the Mang Ca compound). 

2. Lack of coordination among units that attacked the headquarters 

of the 1st Division. 

3. Lack of proper coordination among all units. 

On the ARVN side, our success in driving the enemy out of Hue City, 

had to be first and foremost attributed to the fact that the 1st ARVN 

Division was able to hold on to its headquarters in the ~~ng Ca compound, 

and from there, continue to direct coordinated operations by the employment of its organic and attached units. The Mang Ca compound, therefore, 

had become not only a vital base to receive reinforcements from the 

outside but also an excellent staging area for the conduct of counterattacks. 

84 
Another element which contributed to our success was the laudably 

high morale of our troops. After being forced into a defensive posture, 

ARVN units had fought gallantly and continued to fight well despite 

persuasive enemy appeals to surrender. A case in point was the gallant 

fight put up by the 81st Ordnance Company which, with only 80 men, 

sustained combat for 15 days to safeguard its stock of 1,400 M-16 rifles. 

This company was also resourceful enough to move all of its stocks away 

befure its compound was overrun by enemy troops. In several other areas 

and military installations, our RF and PF troops also resisted valiantly 

until they ran out of ammunition and only then withdrew. 

On the U.S. Side, marine units had effectively contributed to the 

clearing of the citadel, inflicting severe losses to the enemy and 

speeding up the pace of relief operations. In the process, they had 

suffered casualties amounting to 53 killed and 380 wounded. 

RVNAF casualties meanwhile amounted to 213 killed and 879 wounded. 

On the part of the civilian population, however, losses both material 

and human, were extremely heavy. Approximately 80% of all houses within 

the citadel area had been completely destroyed. During the short period 

of enemy occupation, the people of Hue also lived in agony among horrors 

and hardships that they had never encountered before. In addition to 

war hazards, they had suffered from shortages of food, water and lighting. 

They also had to move among decaying corpses that could not be buried 

and whose, stink could drive everyone to hysteria. 

This brief co-existence with the Communists during the period of 

their occupation eventually caused the'people of Hue to change their 

minds completely. From an attitude of confrontation, they had learned 

to accommodate with the national government and above all, to reject 

with determination every political inclination smacking of sympathy 

toward Communism. 
Dud vc s..ppe~.t ~.s. 1IIIb."J Entt."". , Jl J.n","!')' 1968 


.. 

• • • 

The Ph" n.o Race Track u T_' 4., !)penH"",,) a.u 


for ARVN .Dd U,S, Force. Duriol Tet. Peb~ry 1968 

CHAPTER V 


The Offensive, Phases II, III, and IV 

Phase II. May 1968 

Prior to taking part in the General Offensive-General Uprising 

of Tet 1968, all Communist political and military cadres had received 

guidance instructions to the effect that this was going to be the 

biggest, and also the last offensive. The effort, therefore, demanded 

a highest level of determination on the part of every participant. 

However, just a few days after the offensive had been set in 

motion, an "absolutely secret" memorandum bearing the signature of 

Bay Hong, code name for Pham Hung, the COSVN leader, began to circulate 

among the Communist hierarchy. This memorandum, captured in Military 

Region 3, made an overall assessment of the situation and contained 

several self-critical remarks. Despite substantial gains, the memorandum admitted, Communist forces still fell short of their objectives. 

They had not yet occupied as many targets as had been planned, they 

had not yet w~ped out South Vietnam's mobile and defense forces, and 

they had not yet succeeded in inciting a popular uprising against the 

government. All of'these shortfalls were attributed to the failure 

to expand proselyting activities, untimeliness and lack of continuity 

in propaganda actions, and the delay and interruption of communications. 

The memorandum then emphasized: 

"The primordial thing we have to understand is that our General 

Offensive-General Uprising has been conceived to defeat a stubborn and 

reactionary enemy who has more than 1.2 million troops, all modernly 

equipped. Ours is a strategic offensive of long duration, which consists of several military campaigns and popular uprisings intended to 

91 

shatter every enemy counterattacking effort. As such, it has to be an 

extremely arduous fight." 

"We must continuously attack the enemy and deny him the chance to 

rest and to reorganize. lve must attack the enemy repeatedly, 3 or 4 

times if need be, in those areas under contest, and we must not withdraw 

just because we fail in our first effort." 

Thus it became clear from the enemy's viewpoint that the offensive 

was not a one-time effort but a multi-phased campaign, and from what 

this memorandum implied, each phase was apt to include several surges 

of activity. 

The first phase of the offensive clearly began to abate some time 

during the first week of March 1968. By this time, it was apparent that 

in view of severe losses, the enemy needed some respite to reorganize 

and refit his battered units. To prepare for the next phase of the offensive, he also required some time to conduct a post-mortem analysis 

of his failures during the first phase, move in supplies, and reconnoiter the sites of future battles. 

In the eyes of the enemy, Phase II of the offensive was particularly significant because of certain political developments that would probably affect the American war effort. First of all, there was the decision, made by President Johnson on 31 March, to cease all bombings north 

of the 20th parallel, which in effect would spare up to 80% of North 

Vietnamese territory. The decision he also made and announced at the 

same time not to run for re-election in November was surely an indication 

of severe difficulties in American internal politics. Negotiations, 

meanwhile, had reached the stage where an appropriate location for peace 

talks would soon be agreed by all parties concerned. All of these significant events were looked upon as favorable to the Communist side. Therefore, to further enhance his political.posture, the enemy considered it 

mandatory to follow up his first offensive with a second one. 

During this time, the RVN and U.S. were preoccupied with the effort .. ........ ~ ... ".~. ,~,,-."_ ..~ ,~,.. ,,' ··..,'-.... ,:... ""'~... ~.·..~'M~"'''-'', .. '''e'''' - "" ,'<", -~-~'''~' "~""""(,"",-__.~.",,,,--.",,,,,, '''on ~""""~ ....'\o,'._~,." 

to destroy enemy forces that were still in the provinces adjacent to .......".........._.___ •.••..•,__ ,_,' ......__ "_""_""''';;'''''''''''.''' ".~,.-1,,~, '.. ,.....,""_"'__ ,..,,_....,r" ";:.t,,,,,,,~,;,-;,;::.:5.t~":'",,,,,,",~:' ,',;.:,~i:';,~:·.''-'''''::V "', ",,.."'- ",- -.-.. 


Saigon. Toward that end, a major combined operation was launched .in mid­ _ ......",-"", ""'''-'-'''''-'"'''.. -;~.;••;'.,...~,,,-, .....-, -"',.".;. -' >"'''~-"'"." •. "~,,.. J.'", ,:,'\. '"', ,'0', •. '•••.,,;.',.', ...•-.-.. ,-.... '....~-"".".,;,....-~"' 

March with the participation of elements of the ARVN 7th and 25th Divisions, 

92 

--~--. 

"~,...­..........,....,.-,,.,-. 

one airborne brigade, the 5th Ranger group, and national police forces, ••" •• ' • A .~ ',.' • " ..,,', '''F.·,,':,'r'h,., .:, ."" , "......,' ......~);\"~i;;...~"""';.,..lo~,.,-":, ••" .•

and on the U.S. side,e1e!DeI).ts of ,the 1st,!l,th ,and"2~,.lA1~lltky,,.P"'vi

sions, and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Code-named TOAN TRANG 

(Total 

_~~"""" ,,~>" 

Victory), 

",-~.,. ,.-'-"' 

this 

,·.-'7"''',-"<''l;

operation 

..:,·,'''''·_";"."....",·,,~··,_''''..,.,,

eventually 

..''''.'''"''"'''''....." .... n< 

destroyed 

., 0\ .,.,......-n"'_""''''~,,"!,.~_~'.

an additional 

__...:_.. ~.~ )

I 

,

I In I Corps area, another major combined operation, PEGASUS/LAM SON,

-_.__."""""'.--Ji.__.....,.~~.............,-..,.,,'~"""~~...... 
 which was initiated in early April with the commitment of U.S. infantry, 


marine units and the 1st Air Cavalry Division and elements of the ARVN 


1st Division, and one airborne brigade, successfully reopened Route 


No.9, which connected the lowlands of Quang Tri Province with Khe Sanh ! 

J

Base. This operation also broke the siege laid on this base by two 

NVA divisions during the past 77 days. 

Information on the enemy's second phase of his offensive was obtained during the first week of April. It was disclosed by a highranking enemy ra11ier, Colonel Tran Van Dac, alias Tam Ha, who was ,", 

deputy political commissar of the enemy MR-4. Colonel Tam Ha did not 

believe in the success of the general offensive and was not convinced 

that the urban population would rise up and join in the offensive even 

before the launching of Phase I. After he received orders to prepare 

for Phase II, he decided to rally to the GVN and disclosed valuable 

information concerning enemY plans. According to Colonel Tam Ha, phase 

II had been planned to take place on 22 April, but owing to delays in 

preparations, it would be most likely postponed for about 2 weeks. He 

also disclosed that the main objective of attack for Phase II was Saigon 

and that the enemy was going to commit a force equivalent to two infantry 

divisions in this attack. According to plans, the enemy 9th Division 

would conduct the primary effort against Tan Son Nhut while two supporting efforts would be directed against the southern and western parts 

of Saigon. 

Colonel Tam Ha's disclosure corroborated with other intelligence 

data being obtained on enemy preparations for Phase II. On 26 April, 

an enemy surgeon belonging to a field medical unit was apprehended in 

Bien Hoa while he was reconnoitering a site for his surgical station. 

,JA notebook found in his possession recorded the date and time of Phase 

II attacks as beginning at 0120 on 28 April. 

93 
i 

To preempt this second enemy offensive attempt, in early May a , coordinated operational plan was implemented. The 3d Brigade, U.S. ( 9th Infantry Division, conducted ,a screening op;;~~i;;'i;"i:oni'An where 

its mis"sion w~;-t;;iiiterdic"t'·eneiny·penetrationsfrom·the south into .-..--~.-~ ~--->, 

.' Saigon. Elements of the U.S. 25th~lnlantrY-Uivfs16n"·wi·th"·l:he-·lIUpport 

-ol·U;S-:ai~·-cavarry·u.n:l.ts"operatedin the Vam Co East River area west 

of Saigon while an element of the U.S: 5th Special Forces Group conducted patrols in the Vuon Thom area, 17 km west of Saigon, which was 

a permanent staging area for enemy forces. North of Saigon, an element 

of the U.S. 199th Infantry Brigade conducted activities south of the 

Dong Nai River and north of Bien Hoa in an effort to prevent an enemy 

attack from the direction of War Zone D. The U.S. 1st Infantry Division received the mission to interdict enemy penetrations from the 

north of Saigon while the 1st Australian Task Force at Long Thanh would 

devote its efforts to block enemy penetrations from the east toward 

Long Binh, Bien Hoa and Saigon. Within the Capital Military District, 

meanwhile, ARVN units were to coordinate screening operations with 

national police forces and block the enemy's piecemeal infiltrations 

into Saigon. 

On 3 May, just when American and North Vietnamese negotiators announced that they were progressing toward actual peace talks, which were 


soon to begin in Paris, III Corps received reliable information from 


one of its penetration agents that the enemy would launch his second 


phase of attacks during the night of 4 May. 


One day before Phase II actually bega~a big explosion occurred in 


the SaigoIl Television and Rsdio compouIl.d. Enemy sappers had loaded a 


taxi cab parked in close proximity of this compound with 100 lbs of TNT 


and detonated it. The explosion caused some physical damage and inter­


rupted TV transmission for a short time. 


A captured enemy sapper later disclosed that this sabotage was in­


tended to impress the Saigon population as to enemy capabilities and as 


a signal·for phase II attacks. Enemy units had been instructed that the 


day following the announcement of this explosion on Saigon Radio was the 


day Phase II of the general offensive would begin. 


As scheduled and indicated by our intelligence reports, Phase II 

94 
of this offensive was launched during the night of 4 May and began with 

extensive shellings against 119 targets across the country, to include 

provincial cities, district towns, villages and military installations. 

Apart from Saigon, the main objective, ground attacks were driven only 

against Bu Dop, an outlying district town in III Corps area, three miles 

east of the Cambodian border. However, this attack was driven off during 

the same night. Enemy ,ground attacks against Saigon took place at 0400 

on 5 May through two primary efforts, west and north, and a secondary 


. effort, east of the city. (Map 11) By breaking down into small ele­


ments, enemy units had succeeded in penetrating the outlying suburbs 


of Saigon before the attack. Some of these elements utilized boats and 

even trucks to infiltrate into the city. At a checkpoint outside Saigon, 

our forces apprehended some enemy troops hidden in a double-decked truck 

loaded with bricks; having difficulty breathing, the troopsacrawled out ~~ 

from the lower deck. In some other areas, enemy troops di~sed them- ~ 

selves as ARVN troops. 

Immediately after an intensive shelling, two enemy local force 

battalions attacked the Saigon-Bien Hoa Highway Bridge just east of the 

city. The Binh Loi Bridge, three km to the northwest, also came under 

heavy attack by two battalions of the enemy Dong Nai Regiment. Both 

bridges were major accesses connecting Bien Hoa with Saigon across the 

Saigon River. But both attacks were driven back by Vietnamese marine 

units during the day of 5 May. 

The next day. 6, May, "the enemy launched·8IlOther,,~ffo,rt, from the 

west of Saii!>c:m. In this effort, enemy attacks which took place in two 

villages west and ';~;;thw~;t-~'f'-Tan s~'tI-Nhtit-'rl';b~iiewere-deIeated by 

element-sof the u.s; 25th'InfantryDivisfou'and aircavairyunits. The ,..-__'_-"""',c_ ... _,, •. ""'__ """'··"~_"""-",i''''''':''''_''''-''''''''M'''''''''''''';'''''' "-;"""~:"",_." ••", . 

enemy _suffered severe losses. ..._..,-_ ....... ","'H';'''-.·'''-'-· ." .~.'''. 

Intelligence agent reports, in the meantime, indicated that enemy 


troops that had penetrated Saigon from the west were trying to assemble 


at the French cemetery adjacent to Tan Son Nhut airbase and attack the 


headquarters of CMD. An ARVN airborne battalion was immediately deployed 


to this area to search for the enemy but made only scattered contacts 


with a small enemy element. As it later turned out, the enemy battalion 


95 

Map 11 - Enemy Attacks on Saigon, Phase II 

FIRST SURGE OF ATTACKS 

5 MAY 1968 

SECOND SURGE OF ATTACKS 

25 MAY 1968 

~267 

TAN QUI 

DONG 

Scale 1 : 25,000 

96 

that was supposed to assemble there could not contact its local guide 

and therefore arrived in the area the next day. With the support of 

VNAF skyraiders, our paratroopers attacked this enemy battalion and 

almost destroyed it completely. The battalion belonged to the 272d 

Regiment, 9th Division. On our side, we suffered the loss of VNAF 

Colonel Luu Kim Cuong, commander of the Tan Son Nhut AFB, who was killed 

by an enemy B-40 rocket while directing his troops during a counterattack. 

Enemy prisoners captured in this battle disclosed that their plan 

was to assemble a multi-battalion force and launch a surprise attack 

against both Tan Son Nhut AFB and the headquarters of the ARVN Airborne 

Division nearby at Bay Hien. But except for the first battalion that 

had already arrived and was annihilated by ARVN paratroopers, the other 

two battalions of the 272d Regiment failed to arrive at the scheduled 

time. Both battalions were therefore redirected toward the south of 

Saigon where in coordination with forces of the enemy 3d Subdivision, 

they would launch attacks on 7 May against the Phu Tho Hoa area in the 

6th Precinct and the 7th and 8th Precincts in Cho Lon. 

The battles that subsequently took place in Cho Lon were so intense 

that a 24-hour curfew was declared over this entire area. 

At Phu Lam, the enemy 267th Local Force Battalion moved in after 

an attack and occupied the Minh Phung area, a vital area which controlled 

two main roads providing access from Saigon-Cho Lon to Route·QL-4. Here, 

enemy troop~ were equipped with 75-mm recoilless rifles and antiaircraft 

weapons; they were apparently determined.to take on our armor and deter 

close air support. They also dug in and prepared for extended fighting. 

People fleeing the area reported that enemy troops knocked holes in 

walls between adjacent· townhouses in the area to facilitate movement 

and combat actions within each city block. This street combat technique 

was a duplication of the 1946 experience in Hanoi where the city's 

self-defense youths organized themselves for a showdown with French 

forces during the tense days that preceded the outbreak of the resistance 

war. 

Enemy troops were so well entrenched in this area that it took the 

97 
38th Ranger Battalion two long days and the support of armor, artillery, 

and tactical air to eliminate them completely and reoccupy the area. 

Meanwhile, another enemy attack erupted in the Binh Tien and Binh 

Tay areas nearby; here enemy troops attacked the Binh Tien Bridge and 

the Binh Tay Distillation Plant and penetrated into the vicinity of Hau 

Giang Avenue, which was adjacent to the Minh Phung area. The enemy even 

hoisted the NLF flag over a schoolhouse in this area. But he was finally driven off by the 35th Ranger Battalion, which fought for two days 

with the support of tactical air. 

--....•.. ". 

In the 8th Precinct, a buffer zone be.tween downtown Saigon and the ,. ,'.,-' .......,",',:', ,"'.-. 


Nha Be. area, the Y Bridge also came under attack by two enemy local I 

force battalions. But the enemy's attempt was thwarted by the 35th -' " • ",.... " <.' " -'" "" " :,-,' ,,' .'.,::"" ,,< ,~ .. , - -." • .;, . 

Ranger Battalion which, with the support of a U.S. rifle company from 

the 9th··InfantrY·Division~~U.S. armor ei~~nts, fought off the enemy advance toward the bridge from a solid defense line. A counterattack by U.S. forces ensued, led by an infantry battalion of the 3d 

Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, with the support of armor and tactical 

air, which finally wiped out all enemy troops taking refuge in city 

blocks adjacent to the Y Bridge. 

By 12 May, Phase II of the General Offensive against Saigon-Cho 

Lon had been defeated with an enemy death toll of about 3,000. During 

this phase, the enemy had. committed elements of eight regiments and 

three separate battalions. Actually, however, only 13 enemy battalions 

had successfully penetrated Saigon and conducted attacks within the city. 

The situation remained calm afterwards, and not until 25 May did . the enemy come back again with another surge of attacks which, by contrast with the first one,' caught us rather unaware. Enemy forces this 

time had filtered through the Saigon security belt without being 

detected. The Dong Nai Regiment, for example, had already been in 

place at An Phu Dong, a guerrilla base just three km north of Saigon, 

·two days before the attack, but its presence was not known. Obviously, 

the vigilance of CMD troops had diminished and their patrol activities 

had slackened because of the long days of combat during the last few 

weeks. Not until enemy forces had begun to move into the suburbs did 

98 

they sound the alert. 

The first contacts occurred north of Saigon. They were followed 

shortly thereafter by other attacks to the south and southwest. 

In northern Saigon, enemy forces consisted of two regiments, the 

Dong Nai and the Quyet Thang Regiments. The area where they penetrated 

was a densely populated suburb limited to the west by the Hanh Thong Tay 

military complex with its depots, installations and the Cong Hoa General Hospital, to the east by the Saigon-Bien Hoa Highway and to the 

south by the Gia Dinh Province Office Building and Sector Headquarters. 

With the areas of operation divided along Route QL-l and limited by 

the Bang Ky Bridge, the Dong Nai Regiment attacked toward the northeast 

while the Quyet Thang Regiment pushed in the northwest direction. 

During the battles that ensued in this area, the enemy deliberately positioned his combat elements in pagodas where he hoped his troops 

would be immune from air attacks. Many such pagodas were occupied by 

enemy troops: Tam Thanh, Quan Tam, Duoc Su, True Lam, Linh Son, Giac 

Hoa, etc. Apparently, the enemy had staked their chance on the Vietnamese traditional respect of pagodas and the pro-Buddhist sentiment prevailing among ARVN troops. He thought that if we attacked or employed 

tactical air against pagodas, we would surely incur the wrath of Buddhists and give him a good opportunity to drive home his anti-GVN propaganda. 

Despite the political risks involved, our forces were determined 

to dislodge the enemy from these pagodas. l~ithout hesitation, our 

marines, paratroopers, and airborne rangers moved in and attacked in 

force. 

The enemy attack against the Bang Ky Bridge took place during the 

night of 30 May. It was a fierce battle pitting our marines against 

two battalions of the Dong Nai Regiment. During the attack, an enemy 

sapper element succeeded in blowing up a fuel pipeline in this area 

which caused several smoke-laden incendiaries. The smoke ~creened 

enemy troop movements and imparted confusion among the population. It 

took our marines until 3 June to clear enemy troops completely from 

this area. During this battle, the commander of the Dong Nai Regiment 

was killed. 

99 
In other areas of Gia Dinh Province, fighting continued fiercely 

in the heavily populated areas. To uproot the enemy quickly, our forces 

had to employ airborne Ranger Delta teams which were thoroughly experienced in independent fighting and street combat. The relief process 

was slow and painful but effective. 

By this time, however, the use of tactical air and artillery to 

support relief operations in Saigon had begun to incur some adverse 

opinion among the urban population about their destructive effect. 

To soothe popular sentiment, the newly designated prime minister, 

Mr. Tran Van Huong, issued instructions to the effect that our forces 

had to curtail the use of firepower in the densely populated suburbs. 

In the area occupied by the Quyet Thang Regiment, our airborne 

units, abiding by the new orders, requested-the use of riot control 

agents to dislodge enemy troops from their shelters. But the use of 

riot control agents in this area proved ineffective because as soon as 

it was released by our aircraft, prevailing winds immediately blew it 

away and sometimes back toward our lines. Our paratroopers, therefore, 

had to resort to night raids against enemy positions, a tactic which 

proved effective. Decimated by heavy losses after a few days of 

fighting the Quyet Thang Regiment asked for reinforcements from the 

Dong Nai Regiment. The reinforcements arrived but were intercepted 

and destroyed by an ARVN airborne battalion. Faced with the risk of 

complete annihilation, the Quyet Thang regimental commander left 

behind a battalion to fight a delaying action while he and the rest of 

the regiment tried to slip away. When this regiment reached t~e Bang 

Ky B~idge, it was intercepted by our marines and was forced to fall ~ 

back~disorder~4ftto the Cay Thi Area and lost all chances of breaking 

through the tightening ARVN ring of troops. On 17 June, the deputy 

commander of the Quyet Thang Regiment, Senior Captain Pham Van Xuong, 

surrendered. He lnformed us that his regiment's strength was down to 

230 but 110 among them were wounded. 

Xuong's surrender was immediately exploited by our Psywar units. 

His appeal for surrender addressed to enemy troops was recorded on tape 

100 

and broadcast from circling aircraft. One by one, elements of what 

remained of the shattered Quyet Thang Regiment surfaced and surrendered. 

By 18 June, a total of 152 enemy troops had laid down their weapons and 

capitulated. This was by far the largest surrender the enemy had made 

to date. The remnants of this regiment were subsequently either 

tracked down and killed or captured. The Quyet Thang Regiment no 

longer existed in the enemy's order of battle. And with it, the enemy's 

offensive effort in northern Saigon also came to an end. 

South of Saigon, in the Cho Lon area, the enemy's second surge of 

attacks broke out on 27 May, two days later than in Gia Dinh Province. 

Here the attacks were short-lived and ended on 7 June. They were 

conducted by two local force battalions of the enemy 3d Subdivision. 

The enemy's main effort in this area, like the first. time, was against 

Phu Lam, a vital road junction connecting the Saigon-Cho Lon metropolitan area with the Mekong Delta via Route QL-4. As a result, traffic 

to and from the delta was temporarily suspended. 

In this area, the enemy's tactic was to break down into small 

elements and occupy high-rise buildings and other civilian.habitations. 

His main weapon was the B-40 rocket launcher.. Each enemy soldier, 

therefore, had to carry one or two B-40 rounds in addition to his 

individual weapon and ammunition issue. The enemy committed only two 

battalions, but each battalion had been replenished to a full strength 

of 350. Before moving in for the attack, all enemy troops had been 

ordered to fight until the last man and not to withdraw regardless of 

the circumstances. 

On the GVN side, defending forces at Phu Lam consisted of one 

Ranger battalion, two marine companies and national police forces. 

Spread as they were over this large area, they could not prevent the 

penetration of enemy forces, which succeeded with relative ease in occupying a new housing complex, Phu Lam A. A Ranger company counterattacked 

and successfully drove enemy troops off but was compelled to withdraw 

into adjacent city blocks because its strength was not sufficient to 

ensure effective defense of the complex. The enemy, therefore, came 

back and reoccupied the complex. By the time the entire Ranger batta101 

lion had been assembled and deployed to retake Phu Lam A, the complex 

had been evacuated. Taking advantage of the dark, the enemy had penetrated deeper into Cho Lon. 

A major tactical blunder committed by our forces here was their 

failure to cordon off the area occupied by enemy troops with a continuous security belt. Instead, they just posted a few security guard 

details around it. This allowed the enemy to move with ease, especially 

at night. As a result, an entire city block in downtown Cho Lon, to 

include its main thoroughfare, Boulevard Tong Doc Phuong, came under 

enemy control. Enemy troops immediately occupied high-rise buildings 

in the area and dug in for defense. 

The battle for the relief of Cho Lon became painful and drawnout. Our forces had to rely on tactical air and gunships to destroy 

enemy resistance nests lodged on the top floors of several buildings. 

In addition, they also used ~79 grenade launchers and 57-mm recoilless 

rifles to take on enemy weapon positions one by one and eventually inflicted quite serious losses on the enemy. 

On 2 June, amidst the raging battle, a fatal accident occurred ~ , . ,,-, - .., ...... ~-... ",,'-' ',<- ." .'-' •.-.,' '.' - ~-. 

on our side which caused death to some key Vietnamese commanders making 

~up"th'e command"~f'<"~h;";~ilef~peration in Ch~ L~n. Their headquarters was .....",.",,.... ,,,. ""~"".~'_"'_'''''-'''''''_'h''''''''''''''.''"_",, 

M'-1:he'''Thtii:ftlg-'Pltti6c"'1UgIr''Schoo'1 ~ A salvo of rockets....fire4 by aU.S • 

""lfiiiShip·stiu~~~:~~i.~~:ii~?i,:.2t~.f.ficer~..,while.~!!r, .wer~ observing the ~~ .."'~--" .. '," . ~,., .. '-" '~..'.,,"->•• 

progress of the battle. Five among them died immediately to include 

~:!~.ti!~,:~~~ij..a,ii,1J,1J1,p~ ..Safg09,·P()1i.G&::CMef.~i;one:l~o"-Ba:·:;p\tuoc, 

commander of the 5th Ranger Group, and the 5th Precinct Police Chief. \:~~r_. . _, " '""_'<"';,_',\~_";"'. '".. ,,,,,, ."' """"'''''''''''''''''''_''''''''''''''''''''',• .:.__ .~,._ •." .... " ......,._ .....'.,••_" ,.,.' 

The mayor of Salgon, Colonel Va:n Van Cua•. ".aIl~._!:~e military governor of 

",.,-;""-..<",-,~,,.,,-,-..,,,-<,,-,~,,--,.,,~ ',' ., --~.."'-.... ,.-,'-,'~;~, .••• ~,. , '-­

Sai:gon,'Coldnel 'Nguyen Van Giam,a,!§(),...presenLamang.. th~"8roup, were ,,0>'." '., ""_' '",.:, '" -'".- ,."'.c.,, __ . "'-.' _' ".. ~"',, -".~."..",.- ".. 

injured. 

An investigation conducted by U.S. authorities later revealed that 

the firing accident was caused by technical mishaps. The rockets obViously misfired, and the fire angle was apparently too narrow to afford 

·a good security margin. (The distance between the real target and where ./ 

the group of officers stood was merely 200 m). The crooked minds of some 

Saigon politicians, however, refused to believe that it was just an 

102 


i 
i- .......~-~. 

accident. They speculated that it was a deliberate American error 

designed to provide President Thieu with an opportunity to appoint those 

/ loyal to him to the key positions held by the deceased and injured ! 

officers, all appointees and confidants of Vice-President Ky. 

In any event, the accident caused a two-day delay in the progress 

of relief operations. By the time a new commander was appointed and 

resumed control of operations, the enemy had been solidly entrenched 

in a Chinese restaurant, the famous Soai Kinh Lam, and our forces were 

unable to dislodge him. To quicken the relief, the new commander decided to call for armor support and the use of riot control agents. I 

I 

Equipped with gas masks, ARVN troops assaulted the enemy-occupied buil- J 

ding after tear gas canisters had been thrown in•.They rapidly over- \ 

I 

whelmed enemy troops, who had nothing to protect themselves but wet \ 

towels. The Soai Kinh Lam Restaurant was retaken eaSily. 

On 6 June, our communications intelligence units intercepted a 

message in which the enemy 3d Subdivision headqusrters disapproved a 

request from local force units in .Cho Lon to withdraw and promised them 

immediate reinforcements. Two ARVN Ranger companies were deployed to 

intercept enemy reinforcements at a point on their approach route. 

During the night of 7 June, enemy troops disguised as marines 

and field police troopers and estimated at about a company's strength 

penetrated into the Kim Bien market area in Cho Lon. Almost immediately, they were surrounded by our forces. The enemy's effort to relieve 

his battered troops in Cho Lon ended in failure. Caught inside the 

ARVN noose, a few enemy elements chos~ to surrender. They were immediately employed to appeal to their comrades to cease fighting. First 

a group of 17 enemy troops surrendered followed by another group of 

32, then by still other groups. Finally, both enemy battalions which 

penetrated Cho Lon and launched attacks for the last ten days were 

either captured, killed or surrendered. 

A tally of enemy-related activities made after the end of 

Phase II clearly showed. a sharp decline as compared to Phase I. 

During the first four days of Phase II, for example, there were only 

52 enemy initiated infantry attacks, or just one half of the total recorded during the same period in Phase I (104). Of these attacks, only 

103 

6 were conducted at battalion level or above, as compared to 29 in Phase 

I. 

In contrast, perhaps to compensate for this waning Strength of 

infantry attacks, the enemy had substantially increased his attacks-byfire during Phase II. There were 433 shellings reported across the 

country compared to just 268 for Phase I. The quantity of mortar shells 

and rockets expended during Phase II in these attacks-by-fire also 

increased more than twofold (10,369 as compared to 4,185).1 

Of all infantry attacks the enemy initiated during Phase II, only 

those driven against Gia Dinh (north of Saigon) and Cho Lon were significant. In both places enemy actions differed with those conducted in 

Phase I in several aspects. 

First, apparently to avoid great losses, enemy forces broke down 

into small elements and penetrated densely populated areas from which 

they initiated attacks. This was a marked departure from Phase I during 

which the enemy launched direct attacks against definite objectives and 

incurred heavy losses in the process. The lessons of Phase I were apparently well learned. By adhering to populated areas and moving from 

one place to another in case they could not hold on to any particular 

place, enemy forces had hoped to reduce the effectiveness of our tanks, 

artillery and tactical air. The effect of this tactic brought about 

extensive physical damage and casualties to the population, which induced their grievances and helped enemy propaganda. 

Second, during Phase II, the enemy had considerably stepped up 

his propaganda activities in those areas he penetrated. Armed propaganda 

teams used loudspeakers to broadcast appeals to the population to rise up 

and participate in what they called a movement sponsored by the "National 

lAl,:I,..•§J;at;J.sticaJ....Usuus..have...be.R ebtri1led-..£i!om-..the..iile,s.2f Lt. 

General Willi.am".E.~4fi";-former"'!\'!Isi1ttan1:'''eh1:-e£·..f.~Staff for Intelligence, J-2, MACV (1969-1973) and Assistant Chief of Chief of Staff for tntelligence;"-C=~;'''11:S';"'Army Pacific (1967-1968). _. . ,"H"" •

104 

Alliance for Peace and Democracy." Ten different kinds c;>f leaflets 

were distributed by these teams, making the same kind of appeal. In 

the Cho Lon and Phu Dinh areas, VCI members searched houses and looked 

for GVN officials and military and police officers, whom they arrested 

and took away. 

Third, no U.S. installations came under enemy attack during Phase 

II. This was perhaps a calculated move intended to achieve two things. 

By sparing U.S. installations, the enemy conveyed the idea that he was 

showing an attitude of goodwill toward peace negotiations and through 

this, hoped to gain some American sympathy. This move was also aimed 

at sowing more suspicion among the South Vietnamese population about 

a pre-arranged solution to the war, which the U.S. might conclude with 

the enemy behind their backs. Speculations on this subject had already 

poisoned public opinion since the beginning of the offensive and 

affected even some GVN officials and military officers. 

The 'first surge of attacks in Phase II ended with about 4,000 

homes destroyed by fire. Our forces suffered 210 killed, to include 

67 Americans, and 979 wounded, 'to include 333 Americans. 

All enemy infantry attacks ended by 12 May, but they were followed 

by the fiercest rocket attacks the enemy had ever unleashed against 

Saigon. The rocket attacks began on 19 May, apparently to commemorate 

Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The heaviest attacks took place in June when 

Saigon received incoming rockets for 12 consecutive days. During this 

period, to impart still more terror on the Saigon population, enemy 

propaganda announced that t,he shelling campaign would last 100 days 

with an intensity of at least 100 rockets per day. But this turned out 

to be just propaganda. Enemy rocket attacks on Saigon were not selective; 

because populated areas became frequent targets for such attacks. 

During the 12 consecutive days of rocket attacks in June, over 100 

civilians were killed and in excess of 400 wounded. 

The trauma of the Saigon population and the grievances occasioned 

by these rocket attacks were such that the GVN had to take certain 

105 

emergency measures aimed at protecting Saigon more effectively. The 

CMD command, which was responsible for this protection, was separated 

from III Corps control and placed under a newly-appointed military 

governor, Major General Nguyen Van Minh, who was regarded as thoroughly 

experienced in antishelling measures during the period he commanded the 

21st Infantry Division in the Mekong Delta. General Minh immediately 

appointed a special committee in charge of protecting Saigon against 

enemy shellings. To increase patrol and surveillance activities 

along the Saigon rocket belt, CMD was authorized an additional six RF 

companies and the employment of the 8lst Airborne Ranger Group. Particularly effective in night combat, the airborne Rangers were used in 

night patrol activities and to launch night attacks against enemy minibases near the rocket belt. Security measures within the CMD were also 

strengthened, and the new CMD commander was authorized to use all ARVN 

units located in the CMD for security purposes up to 50% of their 

strengths. All of these new measures greatly contributed to the improvement of security in Saigon and event~lly curtailed enemy rocket attacks to a large extent. 

Offensive. Rnase III 

After the two phases of the offensive which took place during the 

first half of 1968, the Communists had incurred total losses amounting 

"to 170,000 casualties and 39,800 weapons of all types. 

This'heavy toll seriously affecteq the morale of Communist troops 

and cadres in almost all Units. A substantial number of enemy unit 

commanders had been killed or wounded; many others chose to rally to 

the GVN. High-ranking enemy cadres captured during the battles of 

Phase II, included Colonel Le Van Ngot, alias Ba Sinh, commander of the 

5th Subdivision and also deputy commander, All-Subdivision Front, and 

Major Huynh Thanh Dong, Chief of Staff of the forward headquarters, 

1st Subdivision. Those who rallied to the GVN included Colonel Phan 

Viet Dung, commander of the l65th Regiment, 7th Division, in addition 

to Colonel Tran Van Dac, who had defected during Phase I. 

106 

The enemy's propoganda apparatus, which had heretofore been considered effective, fell victim to an unexpected backlash. The outcome 

of the offensive thus far and the realities witness.ed by.enemy troops 

in South Vietnamese cities contrasted so much with Communist propoganda 

lines that the latter became outright lies. Southern enemy troops, for 

example, had been informed that they would receive an enthusiastic 

support from the urban population, which never materialized. NVA troops 

who were sent to the South to participate in the offensive had been led 

to believe that South Vietnam had been "liberated" and what remained for 

them to do was just go in and take over. The situation of South Vietnam 

had been represented to them,as one of near-collapse in which the 

exploited population was chafing under repressions and deprivations, 

longing for the day of liberation. But what Communist troops really 

saw for themselves during the short period they came into contact with 

South Vietnamese urban civilization had struck them as beyond imagination. 

NVA troops in particular could not believe their eyes when confronted 

with the sophisticated amenities of westernized modern life. Their 

impression was one of awe and bewilderment. 

Gradually, they came to suspect and disbelieve their own propaganda 

apparatus. Just as they were suffering from one defeat after another, 

for example, this apparatus continued to sing news of victory along with 

statistical results on "enemy" losses that had been so excessively 

falsified that even the most gullible Communist troops had to question 

their veracity. If it was true that all cities of South Vietnam had 

been liberated and if RVN and U.S. forces had been inflicted so many 

losses, enemy troops wondered why were they still required to participate 

in unending combat operations. The truth finally dawned on them that 

what they had been told was simply hollow propaganda. And for the 

devout Communist, this affected his morale most seriously. 

The deterioration in troop morale and confusion among Communist 

ranks had reached such alarming proportions that COSVN had to issue a 

series of resolutions intended to educate and restore the shattered 

faith of the Communist rank-and-file. Resolution No. 6 was adopted and 

disseminated in March 1968; however, even three months later, it was 

107 

followed by Resolution No.7. This came as a most unusual practice 

because resolutions were all important policy formulations usually 

effective for one to two years or more. 

In view of their pressing nature, Resolutions Nos. 6 and 7 contained instructions which were usually issued for less important matters. 

Resolution No. 7 was issued for the purpose of reiterating the 

enemy's view of the General Offensive~General Uprising campaign. This 

campaign, it was argued, was not a one-time offensive but consisted of 

several offensive phases, each phase overlapping with the next one and 

all conducted with growing intensity. Resolution No. 7 then emphasized 

the need for a third phase which was to be initiated in August. The 

date selected for the initiation of this phase was 19 August, the day 

the Viet Minh August Revolution took place 23 years earlier. 

Despite COSVN's determination to proceed with Phase III, obviously 

our enemy had lost the capabilities to carry it out. By this time, all 

major enemy units had been driven out of the CMD. The enemy's 9th 

Division, the single major unit participating in Phase II attacks in 

Saigon, Hoc Man and Ben Luc, had moved to the west of Tay Ninh Province 

toward border sanctuaries where it would have to lick its wounds and 

protect infiltration routes at the same time. 

The enemy 7th Division, after several engagements with the 1st 

Australian Task Force in Binh My and after withdrawing one of its elements 

from battles north of Saigon during Phase II, had retreated into Hat 

Dich base, which straddled the cOUDllOn boundaries of Bien Hoa, Long Khanh 

and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Its sister unit. the 5th Division, had also 

withdrawn into the Boi Loi area and War Zone D. 

To muster more main force strength for his next effort, the enemy 

deployed the NVA 1st Division from the Central Highlands to III Corps 

area, where its first regiment was reported in late July. At the same 

time, local enemy forces belonging to the five subdivisions around 

Saigon were completely reorganized and upgraded into regiments through 

a combination of local and main force elements. Each subdivision was 

required to have one such regiment. 

As to RVN and U.S. forces, their primary efforts during this period 

108 
against enemy rocket attacks had resulted in a combined effort taken \ 

up by the CMD and III Corps in cooperation and coordination with the 

U.S. II Field Force. The RVNAF also took advantage of this opportunity 


to implement a program of force structure expansion and modernization, 


which saw the activation of new units and the delivery of new weapons. 


Tactically, the protection of Saigon became more and more effective 


as enemy shelling was sharply reduced. To ensure this protection, our 


forces conducted round-the-clock ground and air patrols, installed 


counter-battery radars in conjunction with a system of observation 


towers which covered the entire perimeter of Saigon and its immediate 


vicinity, and extensively used military dogs for the detection of enemy 


infiltrations. As a result of these actiVities, large numbers of l22-mm 


rockets were seized and the enemy was no longer able to pDeposition 


rockets around Saigon. Rocket attacks, therefore, sharply declined 


beginning in late June. 


During this same period, ,MVN and U. S. forces also expanded , • ':~"-'."'d_"_'· . 

search-and-destroy operations around the cities and major bases, esp~:-", 

""cially in III Corps ~~ea. The U.S. 1st Infantry Division operated 

!

/ along Route QL~13 north of Saigon and in the areas of Song Be, Quan Loi 


and Phuoc Vinh. The U.S. 9th Infantry Division conducted activities 


along Route QL-4 toward the south and southwest of Saigon while the 


U.S. 25th Infantry Division mopped up the areas west and northwest I

of the city. The U.S. 199th Infantry Brigade, meanwhile, conducted J 


security operations in the areas surrounding Bien Hoa City and Long Binh ! 


I 

Base, and the 1st Australian Task Force operated north of Bien Hoa, 

interdicting enemy infiltrations from War Zone D toward Saigon. All of f 

these activities were greatly successful. During the month of June 


alone, our forces killed 1,600 enemy troops and captured over 


700 weapons of all types and 78 l22-mm rockets. Most engagements ,

i 


with the enemy took place in outlying areas such as Duc Hoa in Hau 


Nghia Province, Rach Kien in Long An PrOVince, and Loc Ninh in Binh \
, 

Long Province. ~./ff_...;_",~".'-'

, 


During the month of July, comoined RVN-U.S. operations focused 


on enemy bases located in northern and western III Corps area. The 


109 
threat of enemy infantry attacks against Saigon, therefore, greatly 

diminished,: although it still remained a concern. 

Phase III of the enemy general offensive began on 17 August 1968, 

two days earlier than planned. It was a concerted effort that took 

place simultaneously in I, II, and III Corps areas, primarily through 

attacks-by-fire. Saigon, however, came under a rocket attack only on 

22 August. A total of 19 122-mm rockets were fired on that day, 10 in 

Saigon, six in Cho Lon and three in the harbor area. This delayed 

attack on Saigon was part of the enemy's plan for Phase III. According 

to this plan, elements of the enemy 1st and 7th Divisions conducted 

attacks against Tay Ninh, An Loc and Loc Ninh on 17 and 19 August with 

the purpose of drawing our forces away from the CMD, which would leave 

the ground open for local forces of the five enemy subdivisions to penetrate and launch attacks. But this plan did not work because ARVN and 

U.S. forces steadfastly remained around Saigon for its defense. 

In addition to Saigon, the enemy also attacked another significant 

target: the Bu Prang Special Forces Camp in Quang Duc Province, five 

km from the Cambodian border. The battles here lasted several days, 

ending with enemy losses of 776 killed and friendly losses of 116, including 2 Americans. This attack, however, marked the last enemy offensive effort during 1968. 

Of the three offensive phases conducted so far, Phase III was 

definitely the weakest in all respects. The enemy was able to launch 

15 infantry attacks across the country, compared to 52 attacks in Phase 

. II. Among these 15 attacks only 2 were. of battalion size or above. 

Attacks-by-fire were a1ao sharply reduced: a total of 95 were reported, 

contrasted with 433 in Phase II. 

In some other aspects, Phase III attacks also differed from those 

of the previous two phases. For one thing, these attacks were no longer 

accompanied by propaganda activities. The enemy's plan for Phase III 

did not even call for these activities. Obviously, he had realized that 

inciting the South Vietnamese into rebellion and joining Communist ranks 

was just an utopian proposition. 

Secondly, no main force units joined in the attack against Saigon; 

only local forces participated even though they had suffered sevete losses 

110 

during Phase I. In order to bring his local force battalions up to 

combat strength for the attack, the enemy had to deactivate some others. 

Most significantly, enemy units attacking Saigon in August were no longer 

required to fight to the last man. In fact, an enemy document captured 

during Phase III contained an express order for all attacking units to 

withdraw after accomplishing their mission and not to become involved in 

sustained combat. The order also emphasized the need to draw "enemy" 

forces away from Saigon and destroy them in strategic areas (outside of 

Saigon). Apparently, the enemy realized he had paid too high a price 

for trying to hold out in Saigon during Phase II • It was also possible 

that this new order had been dictated by the need to improve troop 

morale for those units still capable of attack, because this morale was 

evidently at a low ebb. A diary captured from an enemy cadre in Phase 

III recorded these confessions: 

"Everybody is tired and confused. Many don't want the unit to break 

down into small elements because it would be easily destroyed by enemy 

attacks. Many others are afraid they will get lost in the city, still 

others will surely run into difficulties because they can't swim. On 

the other hand, the enemy is more active, more numerous, and enjoys the 

initiative. " 

Another captured enemy document revealed the fact that about 1/3 

of enemy troops were in bad health. 

To Communist leaders, especially COSVN, however, the general offensive contInuedto brriii't'fiem'vic£'ot':te~:'-""ThE!'Y''P61t1ted to the fact that 

-th;"it:'s:-";;~d'RVNhadb;;;;;dg~d"i~t;;'"',i'?;'t;rr(;ritiuS' clefenslve" posture 

1n'whIch'duayhad to recl.eploy cOlDbatunits for the defense ofc:Ll;;I.es. 

The evacus.tion of Kham Ducand the5atih base by U.S. troops was an evi-:­

dence of thi~""detet:io;;ti~gp~;ture. Other events that took place in 

th;'U'.S., such, as the reSignation of S-ecretary MCN:amar~ ~nd the replacement:' of Gene~a1W~~t~;;i~nd, .a~so·PJ~vl!d tpat"the ti;s • "'wa.s 'meeting Wi:th .• ". _.~.'"" ~ ,.,,,.:..,, .....J;.Y" .. ..........,'":."..;;:F,'.,'R.,-.;"'''u.~, .., ,'.,~ •.,,~'~-- '''-'. -. "., .. , ­

increasing difficulties. 

~ " - •• ' "<-, • :,.," ..... , 

As a result, the enemy felt a pressing need to keep the offensive 

spirit alive, if only for the purpose of taking advantage of political 

events which he was conVinced were working to his advantage. But the 

problem for our enemy was how to proceed, knowing the true status of 

111 

his units. In a letter addressed to his troops on 10 August, the 

political commissar of the 9th Division was heard making this appeal: 

"Before we launch this offensive phase in the fall, I want to 

remind all of you, comrades, that you should try to live up to your 

own fame. Let.us endeavor to accomplish the mission with which you 

have been entrusted." 

The pathetic tone of this appeal failed, however, to fill in the 

big void created by severe losses that called for immediate replacements, 

but the only source of replacement manpower was North Vietnam, and this 

process certainly took time. 

The enemy situation after Phase III, therefore, was one of longing 

for replacements and reduced activities which primarily consisted of 

shellings, sabotage and terrorists actions. 

Taking advantage of the enemy's plight, the RVN vigorously pushed 

its pacification program ahead with the purpose of restoring control 

over rural areas that had been lost as a result of the enemy offensive. 

At the same time, with a renewed source of fresh manpower, it endeavored 

to make up for the losses incurred since Tet. Both the enemy and our 

side were well aware that the 1968 general offensive was yet to run its 

final course. 

The Offensive, Phase IV, Feb~~ 1969 

Phase III of the general offensive exposed all the weaknesses which 

caused the enemy to fall far short of his objectives despite his continued and determined efforts. The dictates of politics and a strong 

bargaining position for peace negotiations, however, continued to keep 

him under pressure. 

COSVN was therefore so hard pressed that as soon as Phase III had 

ended in failure, it immediately issued Resolution No. 8 in September 

to provide guidance for the next effort. By this decision, the enemy 

committed himself to preparing for what he called the "Winter-Spring" 

offensive campaign. 

In terms of objectives to be achieved, Resolution No. 8 did not 

differ much from the previous two resolutions. Our enemy was still 

112 

i striving for a complete military victory. The approach to achieving 

this objective was different, however. Resolution No. 8 in effect pre­ __.._ ....~"""............_ ..___-...__.~"'"'""....w..,.,.._"<.'_''''~"'''''''_~;~~u:.r......,,".'.~,''''~....'"~l"'''''~'"'<'''···'.''··'···'· ," 


scribed---a step-by-step effort toward that end instead of pressing for an ._~........,,_'~n_'N __-.......,..,...._ ...,-.,.....,..._ ....~i'~J"~'>!~"""'';'"'·;'''''<"·'''''._,.,.-' ,_,"~',~".,;", 

mediate victory. Realizing perhaps that victory could not be achieved . ',- .~ ;,',.,.'.-,,'; ",...., ..... ,..,.~~.<".'.. ,. ",.... "'., ..-.-'.,,"'..,'..,,-'.~," '.,' ,.,,"._, .,','- -', .. ,,'" ", ,.. ,',-- -..' , . 

as longasU;S." forces were still in South Vietnam, COSVN observed that ) 

efforts should be devoted to attacking and destroying major U.S. force 

components to ,such an extent that the U.S. would have to concede defeat 

in South Vietnam and cease all bombings against the north. By the time 

he issued Resolution No.8, our enemy had all the reasons to expect a 

cessation of bombings. He rightly claimed that this would be a big 

victory for his side. 

President Johnson's decision to cease all U.S. _bombings beginning on 

1 NovembeF1968-came' as the "eneniyhadp~~di~'~~d:"The' cessation of bombings 

took effect--at--a-time when the onset of the dry-season made it possible for _'••',.,,",' " ••••. ' -,,_ ~" •• ,.","_""'_"_' - "" _.'c ..••• ~.~. ,_ '. ".,,, .~,••• 

our 'enemY'To "-se!i: -his infiltration machine in motion. As if he had fully 

prepared for it, the enemy did not seem to lose any time in taking advantage of this momentous decision. Only one day after this decision had 

gone into effect, a large North Vietnamese labor force was assembled 

under emergency orders to repair and rehabilitate major roads and bridges 

destroyed by U.S. bombings. At the same time, a fuel pipeline was 

hastily installed from Dong Hoi to a point just north of the DMZ, a sure 

indication'of stepped up truck traffic in this area. As aerial photos 

gradually made it all too evident, stockpiles of supplies and war 

materiels were being assembled in the north and available to be picked 

up and delivered to southern battlefields. 1 

South of the DMZ, enemy logistic movements also increased consider- I

J 

I ably. Evidence of an enemy buildup became visible enough through the I 

several operations conducted by U.S. units in this area. During opera- \ 

tion Dewey Canyon in late February 1969, for example, U.S. forces \ 

captured an enemy l22-mm field gun, which was the first ever seen deployed \ 

in South Vietnam. \ 

U.S. operational efforts in the DMZ area during this time were all "" , .... , .' .. ,., •... ',.'..,,"..._~Iwt~nI>i"-''''''~,'' ~_....._.""~. ,.,\;:,..-"_,......._._.:. ....,;,; 


,,,designed to cl;f.srupt, .•ruL.:Lnterd:l.e-t.~._m-y-"4nfllti'jtr'on~'iinalogfstic move- \ r" I 

ments from North Vietnam. During the first 40 days of 1969 alone, our 

""'.-. 

forces seized in excess of 17,000 assorted mortar rounds and over 500 

113 

( --"" 
rockets ranging in calibers from l07-mm to l44-mm. The significance of 

this amount of ammunition thus captured was less a credit to our success 

than an indication of the magnitude of enemy supplies and our enemy's 

capability to move them into the south. 

By early 1969, indications of an enemy offensive during Spring had 

become evident through several intelligence sources. Most indicative 

among them was perhaps Directive No. 71 issued by COSVN on 31 January. 

This directive reasserted the enemy's intent to renew his general 

offensive-general uprising campaign of 1968 by an offensive effort in 

the spring of 1969. Drawing lessons from the three offensive phases in 

1968, the enemy now placed first priority on destroying U.S. military 

forces and war-making capabilities in South Vietnam; to be followed in 

second priority by the destruction of RVN forces and the dismantling of 

GVN control. To achieve these basic objectives, Directive No. 71 prescribed a program of activities aimed at interdicting major lines of 

communication, isolating U.S. and RVNAF military bases, wrecking the GVN 

pacification program, and keeping both the military offensive momentum 

and the urb~n insurrection movement going. 

In the face of these enemy plans, both the RVN and U.S. forces 

stepped up ,their preparations for counteraction. Also drawing lessons 

from past enemy activity patterns, our forces expanded patrol and operational activities into outlying areas with the purpose of detecting 

enemy troop movements and preempting enemy attacks. 

As a result, when Phase IV of the offensive came about as predicted 

during the night of 22 February, the e~y could not obtain surprise. 

However, with the benefit of additional supplies and fresh manpower infiltrated during the dry season, the enemy was able to conduct infantry 

attacks and attacks-by-fire against over 100 targets across' the country, 

to include provincial capitals, military installations and outposts. 

These attacks were kept at a significant level ,only for the first 

five days. During that time, enemy activities were primarily shellings; 

the most significant ones were rocket attacks on Saigon, Hue and Da Nang. 

In the Central Highlands, enemy activities focused on major lines of 

communication such as QL-l, QL-14 and QL-19, to include sabotage of the. 

railway between Qui Nhon and Nha Trang. In the Mekong Delta, infantry 

114 

attacks were mounted against several areas in Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, Chau 

Doc, and Vinh Binh Provinces. 

In Saigon, extreme precaution had been taken by the CMD command concerning the protection and defense of the city following intelligence 

reports. ARVN forces particularly stepped up patrol and ambush activities 

in areas surrounding the suburbs. During the night the enemy initiated 

his Phase IV offensive, over 500 patrols and ambushes were taking place 

in these areas. Thus, despite the seven 122-mm rockets fired against 

Saigon during that night, our security forces succeeded in destroying 

two enemy rocket teams while they were preparing to fire on the city. 

Of all enemy activities in III Corps area, there were two most 

significant infantry attacks, one conducted by a regiment of the 9th 

Division against the Long Binh base area, and the other by a regiment 

of the 5th Division against suburbs of Bien Hoa City. The attack against 

Long Binh lasted four days during which the enemy suffered 200 killed 

while U.S. forces incurred only light casualties. 

The target of enemy attack in Bien Hoa was the village of Thai Hiep 

just northwest of the city. The village was penetrated by the 275th 

Regiment of the enemy 5th Division at about 0300 hours on 23 February. 

On the same morning, III Corps deployed a task force composed of a 

marine battalion, an infantry battalion, and an armored cavalry squadron 

to tne area, and the village was sealed off. But the attack by our forces 

against the village was not launched until 1100 hours after a Ranger 

battalion and additional RF troops had arrived. From the village, the 

enemy put up a fierce resistance, solidly entrenched behind parapets made 

of sand bags, which the villagers had used to build anti-shelling shelters. 

By 1500, after the use of air power against the target had been decided, 

ARVN psywar teams made broadcasts to the villagers asking those who 

were still stranded inside to seek their way out. Taking advantage 

of this authorized evacuation, some wounded enemy troops managed to slip 

out. After the target had been softened by VNAF and U.S. tactical aircraft, the search for enemy troops inside the vii1age became an easy task. 

When the search ended, 87 enemy troops had either been captured or capitulated, 264 enemy bodies lay strewn about, and in excess of 100 assorted 

weapons were seized. Enemy prisoners declared the mission of their 

115 
regiment was to attack Bien Hoa City and the airbase. 

A significant feature of Phase IV of the enemy offensive was the 

conspicuous absence of local forces and the exclusive use of main force 

units in all attacks. Obviously, after the severe losses incurred during 

1968, no local force unit was capable enough to participate in the 1969 

Spring offensive. 

To stimulate the deteriorating morale of their troops, Communist 

forces 'of the B3 Front employed armored vehicles in their attack against 

the Ben Het Special Forces Camp, located in the Tri-border area, northwest 

2 of Kontum City. During this attack, which began on 6 March, 1969, the 

enemy committed ten PT-76's and six cargo trucks to carry infantry 

troops. Despite the enemy's initial numerical advantage, the defending forces, which consisted only of one CIDG C~y, a u.S. Special 

Forces team and an artillery element. resisted forcefully with the 

support of u.S. tactical air and destroyed two PT-76's and all six enemy 

trucks. The fighting lasted for 56 days, and not until 1 July did the 

enemy break contact and withdraw after f~iling to take the camp even 

with the strong support of ar,tillery, mortar and rockets. During the 

period of the attack, in excess of 6,000 assorted rounds were fired 

against the camp. 

During this last phase of attacks, however, enemy activities were 

conspicuously non-existent in I Corps area. This was perhaps due to the 

success of.U.S. conducted operations in t\:lis area, particularly the 

combined operation Nevada Eagle, which spanned a period of several 

months and did not terminate until the ~nd of February. During this 

operation, the U.S. 101stAirborne Division and its ~~~'Ilterpart, 

~'the 1st Infantry Division, inflicted well over 3,000 casualties on the -~.... .,. ,. ,...... e V en=~y. Othe,r operations, during the s8lIle peri,od such as FayettACanyon, 

conducted by the U. S. Americal Division northwest of Tam Ky, and Hardin 

Fa11s also brought about ~xc~llent results. 

2

The enemy employed armored vehicles for the first time in the war 

against the Lang Vei, near Kbe Sanh, on 7 February 1968. 

116 
By the end of May 1969, the combined operation conducted by the 

U.S. 101st Division and the ARVN 1st Division had been successfully 

terminated when our forces occupied the Dong Ap Bia peak after 10 days 

of heavy fighting. Dong Ap Bia was a strategic hill from which our forces 

could control the A Shau Valley, where enemy supplies were usually stockpiled and which was the staging area for most enemy attacks in northern 

I Corps area. The control of this hill by our forces was a definite 

setback for the enemy in this area. 

Compared to Phase III, Phase IV of the enemy offensive was markedly 

stronger in terms of both level and intensity. Its significance might 

even equal that of Phase II as far as the enemy was concerned, and a 

parallel could be appropriately drawn between the two. The number of 

attacks-by-fire during Phase IV even surpassed those of Phase II (433) 

whereas only 95 such attacks were accounted for during Phase III. There 

were 125 infantry attacks during Phase IV as compared to 52 during Phase 

II and 15 during Phase III. Attacks of battalion size or larger numbered 

16, compared to six in Phase II and two in Phase III.3 

However, the most conspicuous decline in enemy capabilities during 

the last phase was perhaps our enemy's inability to launch any infantry 

attack against Saigon as he did during Phase II. Politically and 

psychologically therefore, it seemed that the effect of the general 

offensive had reached its climax during the first half of 1968. Whatever 

efforts our enemy attempted after that, to include Phases III and IV, n 

were just inconsequential ripples that did not even affect our military 

posture. 

This· inconsequential effect was even felt by those enemy troops 

who no longer believed in party leadership or a military victory and 

_. , 

3 . All statistical figures have been obtainiad Jrol)l ..tbef;!.les of 

Lt. Gerteran;,fU11am""'E:- Pofts;-former··Xs·s·rsta;;t~Ghi~L.Q~__Staff .for 

IntellIgence:" J:,zMAcv'(1969-f9i3)' l1oi:lAssistant Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence;-C2 ,U;·S ;Armi·'paciHc·'\H~1;;;i968r.~·--·"'··· 

117 

chose to defect as an expression of their disaffection. Usually, before 

any military campaign was initiated, all participating troops had to 

attend indoctrination sessions during which they learned to appreciate 

the political and military requirements for such an effort. This indoctrination was usually effective and normally, very few enemy troops 

ever defected before a military campaign began. But it seemed that all 

this had changed because by the time Phase IV was launched, unprecedented 

numbers of enemy combat troops had chosen not to fight and to defect. 

During the first week alone, ra11iers of all types had reached over the 

thousand mark and this rate had remained constant during the fo11~wing 

weeks, a record high since March 1967. For the first half of 1969, a 

total of 20,000 enemy personnel had become ra11iers, a threefold increase 

over the entire year of 1968. 

This high rate of enemy desertion reflected the declining morale 

in most all units during that period. The pressure kept on enemy troops 

had been overwhelming at a time when irreplaceable losses were increasing 

and the constant demand for more sacrifices for the sake of bargaining 

power in future peace talks was being emphasized. 

Fully aware of this deteriorating military posture, enemy leaders 

opted for a new strategic approach to fight the war. Their new strategy 

no longer called for all-out effort or big scale offensive. Instead, 

it became an economy-of-force warfare emphasizing small scale attacks by 

small level units, evidently to keep losses at a minimum. The goal to 

be achieved, however, ramained the same: however small the attacks, 

they had to draw public attention, domestically and internationally. 

For the first time since Giap's article, COSVN admitted the need to 

preserve forces when it issued Directive No. 55 in April 1969. The 

directive stressed in effect: "Never again, and under no circumstances 

are we going to risk our entire military force for just an offensive. 

On the contrary, we should endeavor to preserve our military potential 

for future campaigns." 

However sound and realistic this new approach might be, it represented a radical departure from established policies and until directed 

to do so, COSVN would have to keep it in the conceptual stage. Not until 

after the North Vietnamese Po1itbureau had voted its approval did COSVN 

118 

make it an official subject for study and indoctrination when it issued 

Resolution No. 9 in July 1969. 

Essentially an embodiment of Hanoi's decision to switch strategy, 

COSVN's Resolution No.9 went into effect immediately. Enemy initiated 

activities during the rest of 1969 faithfully followed the policies laid 

out in the resolution. During August, sapper activities made a strong 

comeback as if taking over from big-unit actions. Most of these activities 

were aimed at sabotage, harassment, and terror; they were reminiscent of . . guerrilla actions during the early stage of the war. On 7 August, for 

example, enemy sappers penetrated the U.S. rest and recuperation area of 

Cam Ranh Base, killing two Americans and wounding 198 others. The 

next day, saboteurs detonated 60 pounds of plastic at the VNAF English 

School in the 5th Precinct of Cho Lon, causing serious damage to the 

school building, 12 Vietnamese personnel killed and 67 others wounded, to 

include 28 Americans. Late in August, a grenade was thrown into a crowd 

of civilians during a meeting held by RD cadres at Phu Cat in Binh Dinh 

Province; 24 were killed and over 100 wounded by this enemy action. The . same day, a foreign freighter sailing on the Saigon River detonated a 

floating mine at Nha Be and incurred some damage. 

All of these activities were conducted to implement Resolution 

No. 9 whose policies clearly indicated the impact that the 1968-69 general 

offensive-general uprising was having on our enemy. 
AltVN RoRRer. and Tank 1I1ocklJ>8 , .... I'ban tI\.nh Clan 

lIr1dll~ . 6 1101 1968 
Fishting et the 1rench C...tery Adjoln1na T.n Son ~ut 

Alrba••, 1 Her 1968 

ta.ba t tlgn Near tan Snn ~ut AfI. ~1 1968 
Al\VII Ran.... _I,. TIIrough \I....rn Chololl 


Aft,or CI ..rln. to>-r. 10 l'1li, 19&11 

NVA Troop. Captured Naar Saigon, ~y 1968 

CHAPTER VI 


Impact of the 1968-1969 General Offensive 

"TaZk and Fight" 

Like a catalyst, the enemy's unsuccessful attacks during Tet 1968 

had brought about peace talks in Paris barely three months after Hue 

City was wrested back from among smoldering ruins. It was quite indicative of the enemy's warring policy that peace talks should begin in 

the midst of his second phase of attacks. For "Talk and Fight" had 

become the strategy that dictated our enemy's actions in the years ahead. 

As a rule of Communist people's warfare since the days of the Long 

March, "Talk and Fight" was not something new. In the context of the 

Vietnam war, however, opinions during 196B differed as to how far our 

enemy would want to go by it and what kind of balance he wished to 

strike between war and peace. Not even six months into peace talks, 

our enemy already strongly hinted at how he viewed peace-making efforts 

when a document captured from him squarely affirmed in early 1969, 

"The Paris peace talks cannot bring about any results until we achiev:e 

a big military victory." 

Peace talks, therefore, did not delude our enemy into forsaking or 

even diminishing his war efforts. On the contrary, military victory 

still remained the sine qua non for,peace and the ultimate goal to 

be achieved regardless of talks. A pattern of coordinated enemy 

activity soon developed which saw military actions support political 

moves and political moves give rise to military actions, especially when 

new "peace initiatives" were at stake. 

In spite of his weakening military posture in the aftermath of Tet 

1968, our enemy still drew heavily on his exhausted capabilities to 

achieve some spectacular each time he felt the need to give weight to 

some political move. On 8 May 1969, for example, the NLF came up with 

126 

a new 10-point peace proposal, the essentials of which dwelled on a 

total solution to the war. Among other things, our enemy demanded the 

unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. troops, the creation of a coalition 

government for South Vietnam, and no interference from foreign powers. 

Translated into military terms, this solution to the war sounded like 

a total victory on the battlefield which was precisely lying beyond the 

reach of our enemy at that time. 

Phase IV of the offensive had ended in failure. Still, to prove 

that he was utterly serious in his demands and evidently to incite 

further pressure from the U.S. antiwar movement, which he hoped could 

cause the U.S. to give in to those demands, the enemy followed up his 

peace proposal with a military initiative on 11 and 12 May. Essentially 

a "high point" of cyclical sununer activities, this initiative consisted 

of 212 shellings conducted on a country-wide basis, of which 105 were 

relatively significant and still included Saigon as a primary target. 

In several areas, shellings were followed up by infantry attacks, but 

none of these attacks exceeded battalion size. Conducted primarily at , 

company level, most ended by the end of the second day. 

Then on 10 June 1969, the enemy announced the inauguration of the 

Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam, which 

virtually upgraded the rebellious NLF into a political entity of international stature. This was also a calculated move preparing and 

paving the way for tpe NLF's participation in the peace talks, which 

practically placed it on a political par with the Republic of Vietnam 

should the latter decide to play the "t~lk-fight" game. 

By now, the political dictates of the "talk-fight" game were pressing 

on Communist military leaders for a military strategy which had not 

only to be tailored to battleground realities and their own capabilities 

but also to satisfy the military requirements in support of peace 

nego tiationa • 

In general terms, this new enemy strategy was embodied in COSVN's 

Resolution No. 9 and details of its implementation explained in a subsequent directive, appropriately called "Resolution No. 14 on guerrilla 

warfare (DKCT)". 

127 
COSVN ResoZutions No. 9 and Z4/DKCT 

Disseminated among the high levels of the party hierarchy five 

months after Phase IV of the general offensive, COSVN Resolution No. 9 

was a watershed policy directive that set the Communist conduct of the 

war in South Vietnam on an entirely new course. Most significantly, 

it provided a cool analysis of the impact of the 1968 General OffensiveGeneral Uprising on our enemy's war posture and thoroughly justified 

his actions for the past year and a half. 

Besides what he termed as successes, which in view of all the 

evidence gathered by our side, could be attributed to his usual bias, 

our enemy proved to be more candid and unusually objective when he 

assessed his own shortcomings. And although called a COSVN resolution, 

its scope evidently transcended the authority and decision-making power 

normally assigned to this southern office of the North Vietnamese 

Politbureau. The preamble of the document, therefore, made it clear 

that the contents resulted from a "total agreement" with North Vietnam's 

resolution. 

Assessing the general situation, our enemy believed that his 

general offensive had resulted in a significant human and materiel 

losses to U.S. forces. The incremental withdrawal of U.S. troops from 

South Vietnam and the de-Americanization of the war were appropriately 

considered a major turning point in the war which effectively changed 

the balance of forces to our enemy's favor. This new balance of forces 

provided a new opportunity which, if ef~ectively seized at the proper 

time, could lead to still bigger-victories. 

However, our enemy felt he was still incapable of making that big 

leap forward to seize this opportunity because of several shortcomings. 

First, he candidly admitted his own failure to promote an indispensable "political tidal wave" among the South Vietnamese population-, not 

only during the general offensive but also and even under the currently 

favorable political circumstances. 

Second, he admitted to the ineffectiveness of his proselyting 

activities, which failed to disintegrate our armed forces and our 

128 
government as he had expected they would. 

Third, he recognized that his guerrilla warfare had developed too 

slowly and sporadically, attributing its weaknesses mainly to errors of 

approach and tactics. 

Finally, the failure of the offensive, as he saw it, was also one 

of logistics, and he attributed it to the immaturity of people's organizations at the infrastructure level which could not ensure the flow of 

supplies to frontline units. 

Analyzing the causes for these shortcomings, the COSVN leadership 

believed that its cadres had not fully understood the basic requirements 

of the General Offensive-General Uprising Campaign as far as party leadership's guidance was concerned. Worse still, it felt that in many instances 

the implementation of party leadership's guidance had been incorrect and 

devoid of supervision and control. 

The COSVN leadership then castigated its cadres for being "nearsighted" in appraising the balance of forces between the two sides, 

exaulting the enemy while debasing their own capabilities, distrusting 

the Politbureau's strategy, and consequently, fighting without enthusiasm 

or conviction. The single most important principle that ensured victory 

for the General Offensive-General Uprising, therefore, had not been 

adhered to and was lost. 

COSVN criticism was especially harsh against those cadres whom it 

accused of having mistaken the General Offensive for just a one-time 

action of transient nature. This was the most serious mistake that 

caused them to lose their sense of audacity and duty required in times 

of·~rgency, and as a result, they had become rightist-minded and 

fearful of action. 

For all that candor, our enemy's self-criticism still fell far 

short of his true condition by the latter half of 1969. In fact, each 

of the shortcomings that he had confessed implied much more than he dared 

admit for obvious reasons. There were also certain other difficulties 

that he felt not politically appropriate to discuss. Most serious among 

them was the severe dent made into his infrastructure ranks as a result 

of the 1968 General Offensive. The truth was that about half of this 

infrastructure had been completely and irretrievably destroyed in the 

process. 

129 
The depletion among Communist infrastructure ranks had reached 

such proportions that beginning in May 1969, our enemy had to use 

North Vietnamese replacements to fill the VOid, especially in the Mekong 

Delta. Naturally, this was an expedient that never met the requirements 

in terms of local politics and regional affinity. It never helped our 

enemy resurrect that deceased part of his infrastructure body for the 

simple reason that a northern transplant could not become a local insurgent overnight. 

The increaSing substitution of local infrastructure members and 

combat troops with replacements from the north in the aftermath of the 

offensive gradually fostered a feeling of animosity between southern 

and northern Communists which smacked of regionalism and discrimination 

in spite of party ideology and discipline. Although repressed, this 

conflict seemed to deepen with time as the southern-born Communists 

realized that the insurgent ~ar was no longer theirs but increasingly 

a North Vietnamese enterprise. 

The severe losses incurred by southern-born insurgents, whether 

infrastructure or local force elements, during the offensive was a 

fact that could not be hidden from these families of the deceased. This 

was also true of northern-born cadres and troops whose families in the 

north suddenly ceased to hear from them after the offensive. Even 

though the COSVN leadership never admitted to it, the fact was amply 

demonstrated by the many diaries and letters captured and the testimony 

of prisoners and ralliers. 

As Communist main force units withdrew from populous centers and 

urban areas after the offensive failure, the dwindling guerrilla and 

infrastructure ranks suddenly found themselves cut off from the kind 

of military support on which they had come to depend. The interdependence and mutual support between these components, which for years 

had contributed so much to effective insurgent activities, were now 

lost. This explained why .the GVN pacification effort succeeded so 

easily and so rapidly as of late 1968. 

As a result, along with diminishing military effectiveness, other 

enemy activities also suffered a marked decline. Our enemy found it 

increaSingly difficult to sell his propaganda, recruit new manpower, 

130 

collect taxes, or run his financial operations, all the activities 

that had helped sustain his insurgency warfare for so many years. 

To overcome these difficulties and remedy his own shortcomings, 

the enemy sought ways to keep his military activities alive while trying 

to keep the commitment of forces and his losses down. He found it effective and economical to fight a kind of "souped up" guerrilla warfare: 

sapper actions. Essentially a sabotage and hit-and-run tactic, sapper 

actions were not a military novelty. Their chief advantage, however, 

was to create headlines,. which suited well our enemy's purpose at this 

juncture, and to inflict as much damage to our military potential as 

possible at minimum cost. More significantly, from this time on, sapper 

actions were to become the mainstay of enemy activities. 

In a military sense, the impact of the 1968-69 general offensivegeneral uprising saw a turnabout in enemy strategy which curtailed main 

force warfare and emphasized small-scale actions by small local force 

units. It was in this strategic direction that COSVN Resolution No. 9 

explicitly promoted guerrilla warfare and implicitly maintained that 

small-scale warfare was but a transition phase in the continuous process 

of general offensive and general uprising. 

To further explain this new warfare direction to his rank and file, 

the enemy passed and issued Resolution No. 14 on guerrilla warfare, 

which was immediately used as indoctrination material in all units. 

Resolution No. 14 went at great length to explain the reasons why 

it was necessary to break up main and local force units into companies 

while keeping parent unit designations ~ntact. It also encouraged 

efforts to turn all main force elements thus broken up into sapper 

units. 

This new organizational trend, the COSVN leadership maintained, 

had several advantages. First, by scattering combat forces, the threat 

of destruction by firepower, especially B-S2 bombings that big force 

concentrations usually faced, and losses would be greatly reduced. 

Second, the dispersion of units went along with a dispersion of supplies, 

which would make it easier to supply and support small units than big 

concentrated units. Third, the breaking down of major units also allowed 

the selection of combat-experienced troops to form new sapper units. 

131 

The success of guerrilla warfare, the resolution emphasized, depended 

on these sapper units, whose effectiveness in combat had been fully 

demonstrated in the past. 

In spite of their doctrinal logic, these arguments failed to 

convince a great number of enemy military cadres who only found weaknesses in the new strategic approach. 

These cadres believed that the dissection of units would surely 

dilute or even dissolve unit integrity and morale entirely. Command 

and control would become difficult and unit commanders would be overburdened by additional responsibilities with regard to planning, 

coordination and supervision. It was hard under those circumstances 

to maintain the offenaive spirit required of all units. 

They also anticipated logistic problems caused by direct support 

for company-level operations. Communist cadres were all familiar with 

the existing supply system in which major units were responsible for 

their subordinate components. They felt that direct support for small 

units would complicate logistic tasks and lengthen and multiply supply 

lines because the system had to reach down to every place across the 

country. 

As to the activation of new sapper units with experienced personnel 

taken from the present force structure, almost all believed that it 

would seriously affect unit combat capabilities since by this time no 

unit had its full complement of combat-experienced troops. 

In general, Resolution No. 14 wrought upon itself criticism and 

scorn from all quarters, to include veteran political commissars. Some 

were pessimistic about future war prospects, believing that militarily, 

their side had been soundly defeated. Why else, they reasoned, would 

they have to retrogress to guerrilla warfare if not because of the 

offenaive's failure? Many cadres and troops, therefore, yearned for 

the day the Paris peace talks would be concluded, losing their heart 

in continued fighting. As the testimony of rall:l!ers revealed, many 

middle-level cadres, those who enjoyed the privilege of owning private 

radio receivers secretly tuned in to broadcasts of western stations such 

as the BBC and VOA to monitor with anticipation and hopes the progress 

of peace talks and what they all longed for most: a cease-fire. And 

132 

amidst commonly shared secrets, the forlorn and the homesick already 

daydreamed about the time all could be reunited with their families. 

Undoubtedly aware of these human feelings, the Communist .leadership 

stepped up indoctrination efforts to drive home its new concept of integrated people's warfare. The war in South Vietnam, it maintained, was 

no longer a three-phase progression like the 1946-1954 Resistance War, 

but a single-phase effort with a flexible strategy. This strategy was 

essentially a continuous offensive by military forces whose level and 

extent had to be consistent with the local situation and local capabilities. 

As if to prove this point, and again to support his bargaining 

position at the conference table, the enemy successively launched his 

fall campaign on 11 and 12 August 1969 with 137 limited infantry attacks 

and shellings and his winter campaign in early November with a primary 

effort·driven against Quang Duc Province near the Cambodian border. 

But these activities failed to help our enemy redress his weakening 

military posture and compensate for what had been irretrievably lost• . The fact was that all COSVN-controlled main force units had been driven 

into Cambodian territory and other major units dissected into scattered 

elements. His infrastructure had been severely and perhaps fatally damaged, and no replacements could ever bring it to full life again. The 

morale of his troops was at its lowest ebb, and his ranks were continually 

and increasingly depleted by defection. 

In addition to this lamentable condition, COSVN was also deeply 

concerned about the possibility that the.U.S. and RVN might strike into 

Cambodia and Laos where his lifeline and sanctuaries now lay at their 

mercy. Politically, the trend was never so bad for the Communist cause. 

The South Vietnamese people seemed more staunchly anti-Communist than 

ever, and this spirit was particularly strong among the urban population. 

Despite these domestic setbacks, which came as an adverse consequence 

of the 1968 general offenSive, our enemy still felt he had the upper 

hand in long-term prospects. He saw an indisputable advantage in. the 

withdrawal of U.S. troops and the complete cessation of bombings against 

North Vietnam which in time might give him the ultimate chance of a 

final conquest. 

133 
A WindlaU 101' South Vietnam 

Like a cold breeze, the Communist 1968 Tet Offensive seemed to 

awaken the South Vietnamese people from a lethargic slumber. Everybody 

became sober and alert, fully aware of what was at stake. 

But the damage was done and the moment of truth had arrived. The 

initial bewilderment and terror gradually disappeared and gave way to 

consciousness and self-assurance. Even though war had stepped into 

their heretofore secure habitat and after meeting face to face with an 

enemy whom they had so far only heard about through all sorts of myths, 

the urban people still kept their faith intact and never even thought 

of the RVN being defeated in this showdown of force. 

It was difficult to trace back the roots of this overconfidence. 

People rushed about to stay away from crossfire, but never did they panic. 

Perhaps in their brief contacts with Communist troops, they had not been 

impressed. They had seen in those young and plain peasant faces nothing 

but innocence and immaturity, and they suddenly felt a strong surge of 

compassion and pity. They had seen that these troops were fighting 

without the support of artillery or tanks. 'And, unconsciously, they made 

a compariaon and came to the conclusion that it was most unlikely that 

the paratroopers, the marines, the Rangers could ever be subdued by those 

peaaants. No, they were convinced that the RVN could not lose this war, 

especially when the mighty U.S. forces were still there at their side. 

As their homes turned into battle positions behind which the intruders entrenched themselves, the urban'population suddenly became 

conscious of ,their duties to defend not only themselves but their nation. 

But how could one do this without taking up a weapon and joining in the 

fighting? Thus, the idea of self-defense gradually took shape and became 

stronger as the enemy procrastinated. It was a neglected feeling that 

had not surfaced in the people's consciousness for a long time. 

In this very moment of distress, every dissent of opinion seemed 

to disappear as if by magic. Politicians, congressman, and all those who 

professed to be political opponents of the regime suddenly found all 

polemics hollow, almost ridiculous. Unconsciously, they also felt the 

134 

need to join in the struggle by contributing constructive ideas to 

s.teer the nation away from possible demise. 

However, the immediate efforts to save the nation always rested 

with the military. The first action taken by the Joint General Staff 

was to conduct an emergency operation to clear the enemy from Saigon, 

the symbol of the GVN authority. As an expedient to assemble enough 

forces for the effort and to set the example for the entire RVNAF, it 

was decided to turn all staff and service personnel of the JGS into 

combat troops with the exception of a few key staff elements, and the 

Chief of JGS himself took personal command of the relief forces. Several 

battalions were thus activated overnight, and it was truly an unprecedented event which saw colonels and majors acting as platoon leaders and 

company grade officers carrying rifles as simple privates. But they 

created quite a sensation and greatly impressed the local population 

around the JGS compound when they were deployed to take up combat 

positions just like any other ARVN troopers. 

In Saigon as well as in other cities throughout South Vietnam, big 

crowds of servicemen on Tet leave reported to city garrison headquarters, 

anxious to get back to their units. Because of the lack of transportation 

facilities, the JGS authorized all sector headquarters to employ these 

servicemen for immediate combat duties in their hometowns until security 

was restored; then they could join their units when transportation was 

available. 

In addition to expedient measures, the JGS, pending the general 

mobilization bill which was being drafted by the National Assembly, 

recalled to immediate active duty 65,000 retired servicemen who had 

less than 12 years of service. This bill was passed on 15 June and 

signed into law on 17 June. By this law, the draft age range was extended 

from 18 to 38 instead of the current 19 to 39 eligibility. Those who 

belonged to the 17 and 39 to 43 age classes were required to join the 

People's Self-Defense system. A stumbling block in manpower procurement, 

which had been obstinately maintained by the legislative branch, was thus 

removed. 

With this new mobilization law, the JGS estimated that the RVNAF 

would receive an additional 268,000 men by December. What it did not 

135 

expect was that three months ahead of schedule nearly 90% of that 

quota would have been met. The popular response to mobilization was 

unprecendented, and it overwhelmed the RVNAF processing and training 

capabilities. By September, 240,000 draftees had beaten, the deadline 

by volunteering or reporting to draft centers ahead of time; among bhem, 

161,000 were volunteers who enlisted in combat 'arms or service branches 

of their choice. Most remarkable was the fact that about half of that 

manpower consisted of urban youths, again an unprecedented record. The 

surge of volunteers and draftees was such that basic training had to 

be reduced from 12 to 8 weeks. 

If this enthusiastic response to mobilization was an indication 

of anything, it could only be a measure of how the people felt toward 

Communist insurgency. It had to be msde clear, however, that this 

enthusiasm did not result from propaganda or psywar actions, although 

the Ministry of Information and the RVNAF Political Warfare Department 

did step up public relations activities. It Simply stemmed from a 

sincere desire to serve, to contribute something at a time when the 

nation's survival was at stake. And in their decision to join the 

military services, these youths had unquestionably expressed an unflinching faith in the future of South Vietnam, which they felt they 

had a duty to defend and believed that it was defensible. As a result 

of the mobilization law, 6% of the South Vietnamese population had 

Virtually become combatants in one way or another. Transposed to 

another scale, it was as if 12 million Americans had joined the services 

at the call of duty. 

In all cities across South Vietnam, especially in Siagon, the 

urban people beyond the draft age also displayed a similar enthusiasm 

in organizing themselves for defense. Given their endemic indifference 

to the war effort, this sudden demonstration of patriotic fervor struck 

everyone as strange and incredible. Without being told or asked, they 

set up self-defense committees, organized fund drives to purchase 

barrier msteriel, fenced off their own blocks with barbed wire, and 

took up guard duties at the only entrance gate to each block. At night, 

they became particularly vigilant and security-minded, screening people 

coming in and out, letting in only those people who lived in the block, 

136 

and reporting to police all s~rangers or suspects who lOitered around. 

In Saigon, especially in some suburban Catholic communities, people 

were not satisfied when taking up guard duties with bare hands. They 

began to petition the government for weapons and ammunition. At first, 

the distribution of weapons for self-defense purposes was restricted to 

Catholic communities. Soon, by popular demand, the GVN overcame its 

cautiousness and made weapons available for all self-defense organizations. This was how the People's Self-Defense movement came into being, 

a concept which had been espoused since the days of the First Republic 

but never was implemented on such a scale owing to the lukewarm response 

by the people. Taking the cue from the growing popular demand, the 

GVN stepped in and launched a country-wide campaign to institute selfdefense forces not only in cities but also in rural areas. By April, 

just three months after Tet, the People's Self-Defense Forces had become 

a reality throughout South Vietnam. Their organization was eventually 

formalized by the Mobilization Law in June 1968. 

Riding on the crest of the self-defense movement, the college students of Saigon, mad~ idle by the closing down of universities to make them 

available as refugee centers, gathered themselves into a para-military 

organization pompously designated "Capital Defense Student Division". 

Armed with individual weapons, the students were employed to assist 

the police and ARVN units in maintaining security for the city. When 

communist forces attacked Saigon during Phase II of the offensive, 2,000 

college students of the division participated in the defense of the 

city. They were mostly deployed to man checkpoints and guard accesses 

to Saigon, particularly in the river-bound southern suburbs. The Student 

Division did not exist for long, however, for as Saigon came back to normal, 

the students also returned to their books. 

During the. attacks on Saigon, Communist forces were all equipped 

with AK-47's and rocket launchers, B-40 or B-4l. The superiority of 

these weapons, espeCially the A~47, was immediately recognized by the 

urban people, even by the teen-agers. For one thing, after days of 

listening to battle sounds, the Saigon people were able to differentiate 

between the sharper, rounder and more uniform AK-47 bursts and the 

dull crackles of our ~arand and carbine reports. Therefore, they could 

137 

orient themselves and know exactly where the enemy was. To pass idle 

time while the fighting was still raging, some even amused themselves 

with this guessing game by listening to the sounds of gunfire and telling 

whether they were the enemy's or ours. All agreed that the AK-47 sounds 

were more impressive. 

The inferiority of ARVN troops in individual armament eventually 

became a major concern, which pressed the JGS into asking for improvement. 

A modernization plan was initiated and placed under a combined JGS-MACV 

committee for implementation. By May 1968, the first stage of the plan 

was completed, and the RVNAF began to receive modern infantry equipment 

such as the M-16 rifle, the M-60 machinegun, the M-79 grenade launcher, 

and the AN/PRC-25 field radio set. 

By the same programming effort, the U.S. also made available more 

heavy equipment for the RVNAF to keep up with their modernization 

and force structure expansion trends. By the end of 1969, ARVN armor 

assets had been brought up to 1,500 vehicles compared to 600 at the time 

the offensive began. Artillery pieces also increased substan~ially, to 

include the ~102 for the Airborne Division, adding two more artillery 

battalions to each infantry division. The Airborne Division thus found 

itself with three artillery battalions, one for each brigade for better 

direct support instead of just one for the entire division as in early 

1968. The VNAF also saw its helicopter armada increased fourfold to 

400 ships, in addition to 60 more jet fighter-bombers. 

An indirect consequence of the offensive was that the rural areas 

became virtually open to enemy penetratio~ and control. The threat 

exerted on Cities compelled GVN and military authorities' to place a 

high priority on their relief at the expense of other activities, including pacification and development. As the fighting continued, ARVN 

infantry battalions were gradually extracted from pac~fication support 

and redeployed to cities to ensure their defense. Meanwhile, RD cadre 

teams which remained behind in villages found themselves unable to 

operate without military support. Many such teams were called back to 

cities to participate in more pressing tasks such as organizing and 

supervising the operation of refugee centers. 

138 

The deterioration of security in rural areas was such that as soon 

as the urban situation improved, pacification became the number one 

priority again. Rapidly, security and control were restored as fighting 

in cities subsided, just as they had quickly deteriorated when the enemy 

offensive was in full swing. By 30 September, therefore, the GVN had 

regained its normal pre-Tet control over rural areas, based on RES 

statistics. 

Encouraged by this quick recovery, the GVN immediately embarked on 

a three-month accelerated pacification program beginning on 1 November. 

The purpose was to take back everything that had been lost to the enemy 

in the rural areas during the offensive. 

The subsequent pacification effort for 1969 continued and expanded 

the scope of the successful accelerated program. More oriented toward 

development, the 1969 program focused on the village rather than the 

hamlet, a concept which effectively turned the village, the traditional 

basic administrative unit of rural South Vietnam, into a bulwark of local 

development and progress. The village chief, an elected official, was 

given full authority in local government affairs; he was especially 

empowered to.resolve property and land ownership matters, a move which 

paved the way for a monumental land reform program the next year. 

Militarily, the village chief also assumed unified command over the PF, 

the RD cadres, and especially the police, which for the first time in 

South Vietnam's history were made available at the village level. Within 

this new rural administrative structure, the village was destined to 

play the key role in national defense and development, a role that 

enabled South Vietnam to contest effectiVely with the· enemy at the 

very grassroots level. 

The immediate goal of the 1969 pacification program, however, was 

to drive the enemy away and prevent him from returning to the rural 

areas. Priority was given to those areas that met the criteria of high 

population denSity, proximity to major lines of communication and 

political and economic viability. In June 1969, half way through the 

program, the GVN pushed it even farther by launching a speCial four-month 

pacification effort which concentrated on improving security, order, 

and law enforcement in villages. When the program was completed, 

139 

up to 92% of the South Vietnamese population by HES statistics were 

living in relative security in class A, B, and C hamlets. 

In spite of inherent errors in any data collection and reporting 

system, the fact shouid be admitted that by the end of 1969, South 

Vietnam truly fared much better in terms of rural security and control. 

Credit of course should be given not only to the GVN efforts but also 

to the material and technical support provided by MACCORDS. This 

pacification progress was real and especially unsettling for our enemy. 

He was so completely flabbergasted by our achievements that a good part 

of COSVN Resolution No. 9 was devoted to assessing the impact of the 

GVN pacification program and devising a comprehensive plan to counter it. 

As if to testify to the success of pacification in 1969, the political 

commissar of the enemy MR-4 (Saigon-Cho Lon) admitted, in a document 

captured from him, that the expansion of GVN control was such that he 

had to spend nearly four months on long detours to reach the Ba Thu 

area in Cambodia for a high-level COSVN meeting. It had normally taken 

him only two weeks to travel to the same area. 

Improved security made it possible for the RVNAF to take over the 

responsibility of defending the CMD from the U.S. II Field Force on 

1 October 1969. But since the beginning of the year, the RVNAF had 

already taken on additional combat responsibilities to destroy enemy 

main and local force units, relegating pacification support responsibilities to the RF and PF. 

SOCially, the enemy 1968 offensive had brought about additional 

problems for the GVN which suddenly found in excess of 3 million refugees 

on its hands. This created unusual burdens for a national budget 

already deeply in deficit. The process of finding shelters, providing 

food and health services, and resettling this mass of dispossessed 

people was not only finanCially and socially burdensome but time and 

energy consuming as well. In addition, there were also problems of 

screening and surveillance to weed out enemy agents who found the 

refugee masses particulary tempting for propaganda and subversive 

activities. 

Then there was the problem of rehabilitating civilian housing 

and industrial plants destroyed or damage~ as a result of street fighting, 

140 

especially in Saigon, Cho Lon, and Hue. All of these relief and financial 

support expenses struck a big dent in the national budget. On top of 

these problems, the GVN also had to ensure the regular supply of cities, 

especially Saigon, in basic commodities to avert shortages in rice and 

fuel and patticulady to combat black market and price manipulation by 

greedy businessmen. 

To make a final tally, the enemy 1968 offensive affected South 

Vietnam in several aspects and placed many burdens .on the GVN. Eventually, all obstructions were removed, and South Vietnam found everything 

much better than before the offensive. But progress and achievements 

would have been much more substantial had the South Vietnamese leadership 

known how to exploit its advantages of the moment. It was agreed that 

never before had South Vietnam been in such a privileged pOSition, a 

position which combined all three basic ingredients of success, namely, 

"opportunity, advantage, and popular consent," as the famous strategist 

Sun Tzu saw it centuries ago. 

The Limitations of South Vietnam's Efforts 

Unquestionably, the enemy 1968 offensive came as a windfall for 

South Vietnam in terms of prospects for long-range success. Among the 

basic ingredients of success, popular consent was the most important 

because up to that time it had been missing. For years, the battle of 

the hearts and minds had been waged but never won. But this time, and 

tI! 

most unexpectedly, this battle was won without much effort. Th!l:s- stimulating fact was that during and after the offensive, every South Vietnamese seemed to have made up his mind as to what side he wanted to live 

with. This almost universal rejection of Communism came about not as a 

result of propaganda or coercion but as a profound conviction, a faith 

suddenly .rediscovered in the face of disaster. As a result, the popular 

consent to align with nationalism was sincere, almost instinctive. 

Without a formal referendum, the great majority of the South Vietnamese 

population had overwhelDdngly voted for the nationalist regime, by their 

attitude, by their actions. If this popular mandate was maintained 

141 

and strengthened, then force of will and solidarity could never be 

subdued by its Communist archenemy. 

It was most unfortunate that as soon as the perils were gone,· this 

national unity and sense of dedication to the national cause also ebbed 

away, and everything seemed to downgrade to its former condition, edging 

the nation back to its old problems of divisiveness, factional rivalry, 

social malaise, and lethargy. 

A cunning politician, President Thieu took advantage of the nation's 

survival effort to consolidate his power, wresting it back from his 

political rival, Vice President Ky. He fired Ky's appointees, to include 

the prime minister, reshuffled the cabinet, reappointed key military 

commanders and replaced them with his own men. All of these changes 

did not help improve leadership or advance the national cause. They 

were made in the same old pattern of power intrigue, based not on 

talent, experience or merits but on personal loyalty and clannish 

relations. The administrative machinery, therefore, continued to 

function with the same lethargic pace, plagued by inefficiency, waste, 

and corruption. Deluded by perpetuating political intrigues, a divisive 

national leadership, and the aggravation of social ills, the South 

Vietnamese people who were expecting progress and innovation, gradually 

found their newly rediscovered patriotic ardor and dedication sapped 

and gone. 

Militarily,. the conduct of war efforts was affected by the replacement of three out of four corps commanders. This change was 

publicized as an effort to remove incompetence but the real motive 

behind it was entirely different. In fact. since Thieu was elected 

president, he had always felt his constitutional power greatly 

constrained by the Council of Generals, a kind of military politburo 

which had propped him and Ky up into power, of which he was simply 

a member. By removing the three key members of this council, President 

Thieu effectively used his elective authority to deal it a fatal blow 

and asserted himself as the unrivaled strongman of the regime. 

The second element of success South Vietnam enjoyed in the after~ 

math of the 1968 enemy offensive was opportunity. This opportunity came 

and went because South Vietnamese leadership failed to take full 

142 
advantage of it. It was the most opportune moment for the Republic of 


Vietnam to regain national initiative, enhance its cause, initiate 


social reforms, create a foundation for national development and self­


sufficiency, and reorganize its defense structure and armed forces in 


such a way that the conduct of the war conformed to both conventional 


and unconventional requirements and to the economic realities of the 


nation. 


Vietnamization provided just that: a precious opportunity to 

develop indigenous resources for long-term survival. The gradual 

American disengagement implied that South Vietnam had to rely upon 

itself to survive, and with continued American aid, it had all the 

chances of making it provided that the American protective shield 

would not be removed as long as North Vietnam still maintained its 

divisions in the south. 

For all its implications, Vietnamization did not concern the South 

Vietnamese leadership who saw in it just a chance to get more war 

materiels and economic aid from the U.S.. It failed to see for itself 

that to survive without the presence of American troops, a comprehensive 

. national plan mobilizing all resources available and obtainable would 

be required to enable South Vietnam to take over war responsibilities 

effectively. Aside from criticizing Vietnamization as an inappropriate 

term to save pride and face, the Independence Palace did not provide 

any guidance on how it should be implemented, what other requirements 

it occasioned in addition to force structure expansion and equipment 

modernization, and how the war should be, fought without the American 

presence. The South Vietnamese leadership even failed to alert its 

people on the immediate consequences of the U.S. troop withdrawal and 

condition popular psychology to self-sufficiency and self-defense. As 

a result, Vietnamization amounted to just that: a ~rmal process of 

force expansion and modernization, nothing else. 

The complacency and nearsightedness with which the South Vietnamese 

leadership viewed the process of American disengagement derived perhaps 

from ignorance and blind trust. It was possible that President Thieu 

did not sense any cause for alarm because he had been promised continued 

143 

American support. But as a national leader, he surely took a chance 

when he did not even question the future of that support. 

Last but not least was South Vietnam's enhanced posture as 

a strong and viable nation, which was brought about not only by the 

enemy's failure but also by the U.S. disengagement. Both events 

concurred to make South Vietnam the indisputable master of its own 

destiny and the invincible adversary of North Vietnam, not the southern 

insurgents whom it had crushed during the offensive. This was a 

military and political advantage that in the long run should have 

contributed to South Vietnam's success in war or in peace. 
CHAPTER VII 

Observations and Conclusions 

The Communist General Offensive of 1968-69 marked an important 

turning point in the Vietnam war. Despite its short-lived intensity, 

which lasted for some time during Phase I, then diminished during Phase 

II, and finally became insignificant during Phases III and IV, the 

repercussions and effect caused by it bore heavily on the final outcome of the war. 

Both sides, the Communists as well as the RVN and u.s., claimed 

victory. Victory, however, depends on the sense that each side 

imparted to it. In the commonly accepted sense, victory usually means 

military success, and the extent of victory can be measured by che 

objectives achieved, the losses incurred. Within this frame of 

reference, the Communists could hardly say they were the victors of 

this offensive. 

Of all the military objectives that the Communists had set about 

to attain~-the major cities, provincial capitals, and district towns 

of South Vietnam--none was under their control when the offensive 

ended. For this failure, they had to pay a prohibitively high price 

in human losses even if we were to scale down our own reporting 

statistics. 

Our enemy also publicized what he 'claimed to be "severe losses" 

inflicted on our side. Knowing communist propaganda for what it was, 

there could hardly be any grain of truth in those figures, which had 

in fact been so exaggerated that even Communist troops and proCommunist public opinion refused to believe them as a matter of simple 

logic. If the alleged losses had been as true as reported, they 

reasoned, the RVNAF would have been entirely wiped out. But the truth 

dawned on them that not only were the RVNAF very much alive and well, 

they also became stronger and stronger. What else could explain the 

fact that eventually Communist forces had to withdraw to their bases, 

and even main force units were constrained to break down into small 

145 

elements in order to survive? 

Victory, however, did not simply mean military success in 

Communist eyes. Our enemy recognized the importance of military 

success, but he believed that the essential ingredient of victory was 

political success. In the drawn-out process of conquering South Vietnam, the Communists always nurtured the dream of a political victory. 

Their strategy of offensive, therefore, combined all three efforts: 

political, military and proselyting, in which the military effort was 

but a lever to drive political success forward. 

Such a political success was what the Communists had very much 

expected during their 1968 General Offensive-General Uprising. They 

hoped to achieve this through the catalyzing effect of the military 

offensive: a country-wide revolt among the population living under 

the RVN control. 

Popular uprising and tactical surprise were the two key factors 

that led to genuine victory, as the Communists viewed it. Both had 

been the objectives set forth in the offensive plan whose success was 

predicated on their being achieved. 

As the offensive unfolded, everyone could see that the Communists 

were able to achieve only one of these objectives: the much-expected 

"general uprising" never materialized. If our side was the victim 

of military surprise, then the total indifference shown by the South 

Vietnamese people toward Communist instigations came about perhaps 

as an even bigger surprise for our enemy because it was political. 

Just as we kept asking ourselves why we were surprised, our enemy 

must have asked himself the same thing. This surprise of his, like 

ours, had its own causes. For one thing, he had misread the feelings 

of the South Vietnam population. It was true that urban unrest had 

crippled South Vietnam to some extent ever since the Buddhist showdown in 1963. This and the subsequent political turmoil coupled with 

anti-government, anti-U.S. protests and demonstrations, which climaxed 

in disruptive acts of violence, were obviously the manifestations of a 

frustrated urban populace undergoing a phase of political growth crisis. 

They never meant, as our enemy had erroneously construed it, an 

expression of sympathy toward insurgency or Communism. 

146 
True to their self-serving interpretation, Communist leaders 

identified this urban unrest with the process of political struggle for 

the Communist cause. They believed that Communism was the only 

alternative and that those who openly defied the government naturally 

opted for Communist insurgency. 

In this black-and-white world of Communism where party discipline 

and doctrinal orthodoxy were the absolute rules, understandably no 

political cadre of the lower echelons would ever dare contradict the 

party's leadership by reporting the contrary. No party member would 

want to run the risk of being criticized as rightist-minded and lacking 

faith in the party's policies and leadership •. For this aberrance, he 

might even be castigated for failure or neglect in proselyting the 

masses or the crime of heresy. As a result, the Communists committed the 

same error that sometimes marred our effort, namely, failure to report 

the truth. 

One of the ploys that our enemy had planned to use in instigating 

the South Vietnamese population into insurrection was to make them 

suspicious of the U.S. His purpose was to impart on them and on the RVN 

government and armed forces the impression that his offensive action 

had been subject to pre-agreement by the U.S. .. The suspicion was further enhanced by the fact that the RVN was 

"''''''.';.,' 

caught.~Jf-:gllar~Lk.y"~£h,e~..Q.fJenElive.Apparently very few Vietnamese, --..--" ' . 

especiallY;'l}p§!a...lo!ho lIa4 aeme...knQi!l,edge about U. S. capabU1ties, could 

briilg-th;~elves to believe that t~~"~:'S::-;;~;uniible todetect. 

CouiDM\i;t- preparat~-s-f':"o-r-t"'"h-e-gene·rar·offensive.""They ·suspect.ed 

th~t th~'-ii';'s:-al'lllttiOw-6ut withh~ld ;h~ -:i.~i;;,uUonbecause it had 

struck an agreement with the Communists to end the war and disengage 

from South Vietnam. This was how the surprise came about, they concluded. To some senior Vietnamese Commanders, it also appeared that 

I

/

, the U.S. intelligence system, in spite of its technological prowess, 

had simply failed to fully predict the objectives, scope, and timing 

of the enemy offensive. 

To obtain the element of surprise, the Communists had to strike 

on New Year's day that, by tradition, every Vietnamese held in sacred 

147 

veneration. The price they had to pay for that surprise, 

therefore was unexpectedly high because it was the popular backlash 

that doomed their plans to utter failure. There was no doubt that in 

those areas under attack the urban people were irrated by what they 

considered a most treacherous act by the Communists. And this wrath 

partly accounted for the enthusiasm with which people subsequently 

responded to the GVN appeals for solidarity in self-defense against 

.aggression. 

Granted the Communists did achieve the element of surprise, I do 

not believe it would have been possible under normal conditions. Our 

enemy had spent at least six months to prepare for his offensive. 

Given the scale and the extent of preparations, there was simply no 

way he could keep it secret, regardless of how precautious he might 

have been. Indeed, to some extent, our enemy did give away his secret 

and our intelligence was also able to detect several indications. In 

the light of these indications alone, the enemy scheme would have 

appeared more transparent to us had we not been preoccupied with 

overconfidence and subjectivity. The lesson here was quite classic, 

but this was how we learned not to underestimate the enemy's capabilities. 

Since our enemy had predicated his success on the element of 

surprise, a question that could have been asked in the aftermath of 

the offensive was this. Had we been able to detect the enemy's 

scheme, or, in other words, if our enemy had known that his plan was 

no longer a secret, would he still have proceeded with the offensive? 

It is difficult to prove something that would have resulted 

from what did not really happen, but from hindsight and based on 

events which subsequently unfolded, one may say that the offensive 

would have taken place even if it had been discovered. 

As evidence to this, we may point, for example, to the fact that 

the enemy still launched the second phase of his offensive even though 

he no longer enjoyed the element of surprise. The fact was enemy 

infantry forces kept returning and even succeeded in penetrating 

Saigon and Cholon for a second time even though we knew in advance the 

148 

entire enemy plan, including such essential details as his objectives, 

his forces, his direction of attack and even the timing of his attack. 

It was self-evident, therefore, that any planner had to take into 

consideration the possibility that however minute his planning, 

the element of aurprise might or might not work. That it might not 

work would not necessarily doom the entire plan, and in view of the 

political objectives he had decided upon, it would be senseless for 

our enemy to hold back his offensive simply for the reason that we 

had known about it. 

Undoubtedly, our enemy had weighed the pros and cons and estimated 

the chances of victory or defeat in his planning. This was precisely 

the reason why Vo Nguyen Giap later concluded that even in the event 

of defeat, his side had nothing to lose in the offensive. This made 

sense militarily because the worst that could happen to our enemy 

amounted simply to a retreat toward his former bases where he could 

always wait and prepare for another chance. 

Not only did our enemy have nothing to lose, he had everything 

to gain because the general offensive was perhaps the only strategic 

alternative to help him recover some measure of initiative that had 

been lost after the dismal dry seasons of 1965-1966 and 1966-1967. 

The general offensive was intended precisely to wrest back the 

initiative, not only a military sense but also in terms of politics 

and international prestige. 

The chain of events that successively took place in the aftermath 

of the offensive, such as President Johnson's non-candidacy, the 

reshuffle of U.s. military leaders seen through the resignation of 

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and the reassignment of 

General William C. Westmoreland, the complete cessation of bombings 

against North Vietnam, the mounting anti-war movement in the U.S., 

and the eventual U.S. troop redeployment from South Vietnam: all were 

considered as political victories by the Communists. Centainly, as 

they viewed it, these were far more important than just military gains. 

To put it differently, our enemy believed that he had broken the 

will and determination of the U.S. through his general offensive. To 

149 

his reasoning, the u.s. intervention in Vietnam had reached its peak; 

from this time on, it had no other way to go but downhill. 

As far as the RVN and U.S. side was concerned, the military gains 

were more obvious. Such mi,litary accomplishments as measured through 

statistics on enemy troops killed, detained or rallied, on enemy 

weapons captured, represented solid facts that nobody could dispute 

because they were witnessed by the South Vietnamese people themselves. No single city or district town had been completely seized 

by the Communist during the offensive. More importantly, the enemy 

was completely driven away from urban areas. These facts also constituted undeniable evidence of our military victory. 

In addition to military victory, the RVN also achieved other 

gains which, though less visible, were perhaps far more important 

for its long-term survival. 

First and foremost, the RVNAF had gained self-assurance; they 

were confident they could defeat the North Vietnamese Army. Then, 

the extensive firefights that pitched our RF and PF against NVA units 

completely shattered the myth that the RVN territorial forces were no 

match for the enemy's main forces. The RVNAF felt confident because 

they had fully demonstrated, to their own people and in the inquisitive 

eyes of the foreign press, the value of their combat capabilities, a 

value that had been misconstrued because they had had no previous 

chance to prove it. 

In terms of internal politics, the RVN also gained a resounding 

victory. The South Vietnamese people, at the most critical moment of 

the situation when the enemy was at their very doorsteps, had madce 

a clear-cut decision as to their political inclination. They had 

unwaveringly opted for the regime of South Vietnam and declined the 

invitation to join the Communists, although this invitation was wrapped 

under such appealing concepts as Neutrality, Democracy and Peace. 

This unflinching attitude of the South Vietnamese people toward 

Communism was termed appropriately "voting by feet." Indeed, by their 

feet, they always chose to flee the Communist-controlled areas toward 

where the nationalist government was established. 

150 
But the South Vietnamese people did not only vote by their feet; 

they also voted by their hands which picked up weapons and by their 

will which told them to uae these weapons for defense. They did not 

simply flee the Communists; they actually joined the ranks of nationalists and fought against those from whom they fled, directly or indirectly, even with weapo.ns, something which was least expected and 

seldom occurred before. Without being told, they voluntarily cooperated with the government in organizing themselves for defense, 

protecting their households, their communities against the VCl whose 

membera they tracked down and eliminated. The surprising fact about 

it all was that never before had the rapport between the people and 

the armed forces and between the people and the government been so 

close. Without much effort, the GVN had thus definitely won the battle 

of the hearts and the minds. 

Such was the situation of South Vietnam in the aftermath of the 

1968 Tet Offensive. Its positive aspects were self-evident. Unfortunately they were little known by the world at large, especially 

the American publiC, which was exposed only to the negative aspects that 

carried all the undertones of peSSimism, despair, and defeatism. 

Reports on the enemy's offensive came to the American public only 

from one side, the South Vietnamese side. Among the words and pictures 

depicting war, 'destruction, and death, there was none that suggested 

and effectively conveyed the fact that those involved on our side, to 

include the people, never lost their confidence in ~he survival of 

South Vietnam. The end. result of it all seemed rather weird. While 

those directly involved in the fight were still confident and hopeful, 

the spectators detached from it had already felt disheartened and gave up. 

In this atmosphere charged with prejudices, everything seemed to 

take on a meaning quite different from normal. General Westmoreland, 

for example, requested an additional 200,000 U.S. troops, which 

made sense militarily since this reinforcement was needed not only to 

deter future offensive attempts by the Communists but also to 

exploit the gains achieved after they had been defeated. 

151 
But tqis request unfortunately brought about a totally different -- effect, an effect which was both undesirable and unexpected. It fed 

more fuel to the anti-war movement whose most vocal elements vehemently 

demanded the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam and an 

immediate end to the war. Although it never had any significant 

effect on our conduct of,fh~";~;-'~ther than~~llifYi.{lg' the~ill of some 

ARVN junior officers, this clamor struck at the hearts of some segments of the American public and U.S. Congrel3l3men as ,we,ll who had 

,,:- "'_' 

already felt bitterly disappointed with the military solution in t, _. _. . .•,_ ,.,_. " •• ~'" ". ~"j_" '._ ,_ . __ ._ .. C' _, _, > •• .- • (:•• ,•••• ,.-" •• _,.-c'," ,,;_ ,,:.; '"

Vietnam, in which they no longer took heart. For at a moment of 

'utmo'ii!:coriHdence and optiJidsm;'the'eneIllYliuddently pulled out a 

surprise attack which seemed to turn everything upside down. 

From hindsight, one may be tempted to question the wisdom of 

that request for more U.S. troops. At a time when Americans felt _,",'" "....."."'''''-'''.•''''''.''"?'~.....~"'~".........,..,..,..'~ .......,.-,...,I.Y."o"<,,,,' '~A ,.,.~ 

increasingly adverse to the war, perhaps a political move such as '_~""";:"'"'' 0,' ". ,.', _,.;....."','",'~s"'-'""""""',"'.,,,",-·J, .........,~ __ ...,,~"'.li'·"'.;...~· .....,' '.-.. . 


recommending a gradual reduction in the level of U.S. troops by that , ,-"..,,;,,,,",., . '", ­

same amountwould'i\a;;;"e-helpeii'ievel off the mounting tension•. Not 

pnly would this have been mare logical, it could even bring our 'hard 

earned military victory and other gains, into .p,roper focus. After all, , ,,_, .,:,.,~~.",,,,p:.,;~~,,:;';".';";'·~I:::U 

we should have required less, and not more troops in South Vietnam ."--_."--"",,,,-.-'~': ", 

sinceclle enemy had. ,.b,een.so so~dly defeated. 

To free nations, however, balancing the requirements of the war 

against those dictated by politics in order to achieve the desired 

overall result was perhaps not a habitual domain of war leadership. 

Yet, in the context of the Vietnam war, political dictates could 

hardly be ignored because it was they that eve~tually prevailed. \ Strangely enough, the events which unfolded in the U.S. during I. 

1968 followed a pattern similar to those that took place in France 

fourteen years earlier. It was in that remote backstage of the war 

scene, whether in washi;~t()~:'ji;~~1i~t'~;oprr{e'1t"the .e-"~.-,,. ""', ,." t~'j '" -->--.~...•. , "", "...... -. 

mest insecure and disenchanted. But there could hardly be any ""'. -"-'.' '~"'- -,_;,,~,:~:..oh --_~-f':·,o.,,,,·......<"''''';;~l>.-;''"''·;;'~''''''·'';;''''-'<!'·~W",''''i.\\·.',--<1,",,,; C_""_ ., 

parallel between 1954 and 1968 because the military situation then 

was entirely different. The aftermath of Dien Bien Phu was one of 

deterioration and despair, whereas what followed in the wake of Tet 

152 J
1968 was but improvement and high expectations. Despite this, much 

to our consternation, we could do nothing to help cleanse the polluted 

air of our political backstage. 

All this led us to the conclusion that the outcome of the enemy's 

1968 General Offensive-General Uprising had self-compensating but 

opposing effects for both sides of the war. To our side, South 

Vietnam and the U.S., it was obviously a military success but a 

political failure in the long-term. As to our enemy, he was unquestionably defeated militarily; but politically, it was hardly deniable 

that he had won. 

The enemy offensive, in the final analysis, was not unlike a 

chess game in which our opponent sacrificed his queen to move into 

checkmate position. We won his queen but in the process we also 

exposed our king to his checkmate. However, the final outcome of 

Tet 1968 would not have necessarily turned out this way had we known 

how to enhance our chance. For Tet 1968 had brought about new opportunities that would have helped us attain success in the near future. 

But we just let these opportunities slip by unknowingly. 

Our enemy, on the contrary, jumped on this occasion to formalize 

the National Liberation Front as an entity capable of struggling 

politically with our regime on equal terms. He also seized the 

opportunity to obtain the complete cessation of bombings against his 

homeland, to gain an advantageous position in the peace talks that 

followed, and finally to wrest back the,initiative in the war. 

The United States, too, had seized its own chance, the chance of 

disen;aging from th~ w~rtrlthhdhor~nd £;;""~h;h~;'e~~~at its new ",,;.r"~:f _ ,,- " ,. ',.,' . "~"'l',':' ",_ ,_;, 

strategy would work as long as South Vietnam survived. 

"""""7"ffn'ltspart; '§out'il"V:fetiiillt"w~~'i:i:ven"theopportunity to strengthen its defense posture by expanding and modernizing its armed forces. 

For some time, it was able to regain initiative on the battlefield, 

driving the enemy away from urban centers and into his jungle habitat. 

Two years after Tet 1968, it was even able to launch offensive 

operations into Cambodia. But the best opportunities that South Vietnam enjoyed in the aftermath of Tet 1968 were perhaps the support of 

153 

its people, the solidarity of its own ranks, and the ascendency of 

its cause. All these were the ingredients that should unfailingly 

lead to ultimate success had our leadership known how to nurture and 

find ways to develop. 

The sad fact was that once the threat to survival had been 

removed, all the gains that we were able to achieve gradually disappeared and finally everything seemed to retrogress to its former 

condition amidst contentment and complacency. 

It was inadmissible, however, for the South Vietnamese leadership 

to fail to see what our enemy could and would do both in the short and 

long term and take appropriate actions to counter it. Communist strategy 

in South Vietnam was as clear as daylight, especially since the event of 

COSVN Resolution No.9. Never in the war had we been able to lay our 

hands on such a comprehensive enemy policy document. All of our enemy's 

strategic approach, present and future, his vulnerabilities and shortcomings, his short and long-range objectives were there, laid out with 

unmistakable clarity. Despite this, we failed to plan for counteraction 

or even modify our plans to meet the implications of our enemy's strategy. 

Perhaps our leaders did not appreciate the importanc~ of that document 

or did not believe in it. Or perhaps they were confident that their way 

of conducting the war was appropriate enough to face any contingency. 

In any event, it looked as though they saw in COSVN Resolution No. 9 

nothing" but the evidence of a military feat. 

South Vietnam's passivity and iner~ia in t~:".~~.ce._~.~ enemy designs . -_."---.•.,,. -..-~,.,--.. ",- ......~~.~ .. ~.--~,~.........~-..'­

were evidenced by its own indecisiveness as to whether to make the 

-enemy docu;;;ent -public. ourleadershi~d~d-~~-~"-~o:-~~~~to clo' with 

-1~ a~d~as' unable--io agree-·fo-diSagree·;.ith~-u. S:'-;;~';~endation .to 

~dease it to the.pi~~~ .. -·~·itwas· finally the-U:S:- E;;;b~s~:y~ich made 

the decision .and...informed our own press of COSVN Resolution No.9. 

Finally, the Republic of Vietnam failed to exploit its own political 

and military advantages brought about by the enemy offensive. By its 

own doing, it let its principal role slip away and relegate its position 

to that of dependent nation. Its subsequent efforts to regain that 

154 

primary role in the Paris peace talks, therefore, were not too successful 

because it was too late. 

The elements of success that South Vietnam enjoyed after the 1968 

Tet offensive were all there for it to exploit. But it did not know 

how to do it and let them slip away. 

Politics, for one, reverted to intrigues and power struggles as 

if oblivious to the ever-present threat of Communist conquest and 

seemingly ignorant of the fact that u.S. policies had irreversibly 

changed from commitment to disengagement. 

Had our national leaders been more pragmatic and more properly 

concerned about future prospects, they could have seen for themselves 

that South Vietnam was in grave danger. Had they been cognizant of 

that danger and taken appropriate measures to maintain and exploit 

the gains achieved after the 1968 offensive, then perhaps this 

offensive would have yielded golden fruits, not for our enemy but for 

us who rightly deserved it. 

South Vietnam would certainly have survived the conquest of its 

archenemy. For the prospects of a militarily strong and politically 

stable South Vietnam would have caused our allies, especially the 

U.S., to adopt political and military policies other than those that 

prevailed in the end. 

Unfortunately, political clairvoyance and wisdom were not the 

forte of our leadership. As a result, what we gained from the 1968 

Tet offensive turned out to be just an ephemeral victory. But from 

it our enemy was able to shape up the favorable conditions that enabled 

him to win the final victory in 1975. 

155 

Glossary 

ARVN 

ABN 

AK-47 

B-40, B-4l 

BBC 

Binh-Tri-Thien 

CIO 

CMD 

COSVN 

CT 

DMZ 

FWMA 

GVN 

G-2 

BES 

J-2 

J-3 

JGS 

JOC 

MACCORDS 

MACV 

MP 

M-79 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Airborne 

Russian-designed assault rifle, 7.62-mm 

Chinese-made rocket launcher 

British Broadcasting Corporation 

The provinces of Quang Binh, Quang Tri and Thua Thien 

Central Intelligence Organization 

Capital Military District 

Central Office for South Vietnam 

Enemy code abbreviation for divisions (Con~ Truon~), 

parricularly those under COSVN control surh aA the 

5th, 7th, and 9th 

Demilitarized Zone 

Free World Military Assistance 

Government of the Republic of Vietnam 

Assistant Chief of S,taff for Intelligence, Corps and 

Division level 

Hamlet Evaluation System 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, JGS 

Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, JGS 

Joint General Staff 

Joint Operations Center 

Military Assistance Command Civil Operations and 

Rural Development Support 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Military Police 

Grenade launcher 

156 

S-2 

MSS 

MR 

NLF 

PRG 

PF 

PT-76 

QL 

RD 

RF 

ROK 

RPM 

RVN 

RVNAF 

Tri-Thien 

Tri-Thien-Hue 

USARV 

VCI 

VNAF 

VNN 

VOA 

Military Security Service 

Military Region 

National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) 

Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) 

Popular Forces 

Russian light tank 

Vietnamese National Route 

Rural Development 

Regional Forces 

Republic of Korea 

Chinese-made light machine gun 

Republic of Vietnam 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

Officer in charge of Military Intelligence, regiment, 

battalion, sector and subsector levels 

The provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien 

The provinces of Quang Tri, and Thua Thien and 

Hue City 

United States Army, Vietnam 

Viet Cong Infrastructure 

Vietnam Air Force 

Vietnam Navy 

Voice of America 

157