COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick 

WELLS FARGO 

AND 

CONSTITUTION STATE SERVICE COMPANY MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

v. Record No. 0931-96-4 OCTOBER 1, 1996 

 

JUDY WALKER-REYNOLDS 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Lisa C. Healey; Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & 

Boccarosse, on brief), for appellants. 

 (Peter M. Sweeny, on brief), for appellee. 

 Wells Fargo and its insurer contend that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding that Judy 

Walker-Reynolds ("claimant") proved that her post-February 6, 

1995 disability is causally related to her compensable November 

1, 1994 injury by accident. Upon reviewing the record and the 

briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without 

merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's 

decision. Rule 5A:27. 

 On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. 

Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). "The 

actual determination of causation is a factual finding that will 

not be disturbed on appeal if there is credible evidence to 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

support the finding." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Musick, 7 Va. App. 

684, 688, 376 S.E.2d 814, 817 (1989). "Questions raised by 

conflicting medical opinions must be decided by the commission." 

Penley v. Island Creek Coal Co., 8 Va. App. 310, 318, 381 S.E.2d 

231, 236 (1989). 

 In finding that claimant sustained her burden of proving a 

compensable change in condition, the commission found as follows: 

 [T]he evidence predominates that the 

claimant's symptoms after February 6, 1995, 

remain related to her November, 1994, fall. 

As Dr. [Donald L.] MacNay notes, the claimant 

has continued to have persistent, severe 

symptoms since the accident which did not let 

up. Dr. [Anthony] Debs states that the fall 

aggravated the claimant's pre-existing back 

problem. We are not persuaded by Dr. [Mayo] 

Friedlis' opinion that the claimant has 

reached her pre-injury state, and his view 

that the lumbar sprain would have resolved by 

February 6, 1995, absent a pre-existing back 

problem is speculative. Moreover, Dr. MacNay 

has treated the claimant since 1990, and is 

most qualified to determine whether the 

claimant had returned to her pre-injury 

state. Aggravation of a pre-existing 

condition is compensable if it results from a 

compensable injury by accident. Southern 

Iron Works, Inc. v. Wallace, 16 Va. App. 131, 

428 S.E.2d 32 (1993). 

 As fact finder, the commission was entitled to weigh the 

medical evidence, to accept Dr. MacNay's opinion, and to reject 

Dr. Friedlis' opinion to the contrary. In cases of conflicting 

medical evidence, "[t]he general rule is that when an attending 

physician is positive in his diagnosis . . . , great weight will 

be given by the courts to his opinion." Pilot Freight Carriers, 

Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 439, 339 S.E.2d 570, 572 (1986). 
 3 

 Dr. MacNay's opinion constitutes credible evidence to support 

the commission's decision. "The fact that there is contrary 

evidence in the record is of no consequence if there is credible 

evidence to support the commission's finding." Wagner Enters., 

Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991). 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.