2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U 

No. 2-22-0427 

Order filed August 1, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent 

except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

HOWARD J. HILL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of Lake County. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 22-LM-243 

) 

PINNACLE ON THE PARK; ) 

PINNACLE BAYSIDE DEVELOPMENT ) 

US LP; and PINNACLE INTERNATIONAL ) 

DEVELOPMENT, INC., ) Honorable 

) Michael B. Betar, 

Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Communications to verify plaintiff’s qualifications as co-signer for his son’s lease 

of an apartment in California were insufficient to exercise long-arm jurisdiction 

over lessors. 

¶ 2 Plaintiff, Howard, J. Hill, appeals pro se from a judgment dismissing his lawsuit against 

defendants, Pinnacle on the Park, Pinnacle Bayside Development US LP, and Pinnacle 

International Development, Inc., for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because defendants did not have 
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the required minimum contacts with Illinois to invoke specific personal jurisdiction over them, we 

affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In the circuit court of Lake County, plaintiff filed a two-count amended complaint against 

defendants. The complaint alleged as follows. Plaintiff resided in Antioch and worked in 

Northbrook. Plaintiff’s son, Theo Hill, applied to rent an apartment in California. Defendants 

(Pinnacle) were California businesses that owned and managed the apartment building.

¶ 5 During the rental application process, Theo was informed that he needed a guarantor on 

the lease. Theo asked plaintiff to be the guarantor, and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff asked Pinnacle 

what documents he must provide. Pinnacle informed him that he would need to complete the 

standard rental application, which Pinnacle supplied to plaintiff electronically. Plaintiff noted on 

the application that he was acting only as Theo’s guarantor. Plaintiff then returned the completed 

application via e-mail with a subject line stating, “ ‘Theo Hill Guarantor Information.’ ” Plaintiff 

included with the e-mail four recent pay stubs showing that his place of employment was in 

Northbrook. 

¶ 6 Pinnacle, in turn, asked him to submit proof that he owned his home in Antioch and that 

his property taxes were current. Plaintiff provided the information via e-mail with a subject line 

stating, “ ‘Theo Hill Guarantor.’ ” 

¶ 7 Shortly before Theo was to move in, Pinnacle e-mailed plaintiff and provided electronic 

access to additional documents he was told he must sign before Theo could move in. The access 

was provided through a “ ‘leasing account’ ” (an online portal) and Pinnacle gave plaintiff a 

username identifying him as a cosigner. Subsequently, plaintiff provided additional requested pay 

stubs in an e-mail with a subject line stating, “ ‘Theo Hill rental application cosign.’ ” Pinnacle’s 
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leasing consultant, Erica Gross, acknowledged receipt of the information via an e-mail with a 

subject line referring to a “ ‘cosign.’ ” 

¶ 8 That same day, Pinnacle e-mailed plaintiff, thanking him for his rental application and 

notifying him that it had been approved. Because the only application that plaintiff had submitted 

was the one in which he noted that he was applying as Theo’s guarantor, plaintiff understood the 

e-mail as approving him as guarantor.

¶ 9 The day before Theo was to move in, Gross provided plaintiff with a rental agreement and 

instructed him to initial and sign it so that Theo could move in. Plaintiff did so. However, because 

the only areas for initials or signature on the agreement were designated for either “ ‘Resident’ ” 

or “ ‘Landlord,’ ” plaintiff initialed or signed in the areas identified for “ ‘Resident.’ ” 

¶ 10 On July 13, 2021, Pinnacle e-mailed plaintiff, informing him that there was “ ‘a pending 

balance’ ” with Pinnacle. Plaintiff quickly responded, and asked for specific information regarding 

the pending balance. Pinnacle did not answer his request.

¶ 11 About eight months later, Pinnacle informed plaintiff by e-mail that there was a 

“ ‘past[-]due balance’ ” on the apartment. The e-mail did not specify the past-due amount. Plaintiff 

responded to the e-mail within the hour and asked Pinnacle to specify the amount past due. The 

next day, Pinnacle advised plaintiff by e-mail that Theo had not paid rent since July 2021 and that 

Pinnacle had sent out monthly balance-due statements. Plaintiff responded that he had never 

received any such statements even though Pinnacle had his e-mail, home, and work addresses.

Pinnacle replied that he should have received the past-due statements because he resided at the 

apartment. 

¶ 12 Plaintiff e-mailed Pinnacle and expressed his desire to terminate his obligation under the 

lease. He “request[ed] an agreement from Pinnacle stating what he owed, taking into consideration 
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Pinnacle’s failure to provide him due notice of Theo’s defaults.” Pinnacle responded that plaintiff 

would have to pay the full amount of Theo’s back rent. On March 10, 2022, Pinnacle e-mailed 

plaintiff, claiming that he lived in the apartment and was responsible for the full balance of the 

unpaid rent.

¶ 13 In count I of his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged a claim for fraudulent inducement to 

enter into the rental agreement for the apartment. Specifically, he alleged that Pinnacle’s false 

representations led him to initial and sign the rental agreement as part of Pinnacle’s plan to claim 

that he was a resident and not merely a guarantor and to avoid notifying him in Illinois of the pastdue rent. Count II alleged a claim for breach of contract.

¶ 14 The trial court sua sponte ordered plaintiff to submit a memorandum explaining how the 

court had personal jurisdiction over Pinnacle. Plaintiff did so, contending that the court had 

specific jurisdiction over Pinnacle.

¶ 15 Pinnacle thereafter filed a motion under section 2-301(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure 

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-301(a) (West 2020)), seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

Pinnacle asserted that it never had the required minimum contacts with Illinois to support specific

jurisdiction. In support of its motion, Pinnacle attached the affidavit of Carlos Inzunza, its property 

manager. Inzunza averred that (1) the apartment was in California, (2) the rent was payable in 

California, (3) no representative of Pinnacle ever physically went to Illinois regarding the lease, 

(4) no performances or obligations under the lease were to be rendered or accepted in Illinois, 

(5) all communications with plaintiff were electronic, and (6) plaintiff electronically signed the 

lease.

¶ 16 Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, to which he attached his affidavit. He 

averred, in pertinent part, that Pinnacle had required him to submit proof of his (1) employment in 
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Illinois, (2) Illinois income, (3) Illinois residence, (4) Illinois driver’s license, and (5) payment of 

Illinois property taxes. He further averred that Pinnacle electronically sent all rental documents to 

him in Illinois and that he completed them all in Illinois. Thus, plaintiff contended that Pinnacle 

had the minimum contacts necessary to subject it to specific personal jurisdiction in Illinois.

¶ 17 The trial court issued a written order granting Pinnacle’s motion to dismiss. The order did 

not provide the court’s rationale. Plaintiff, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, plaintiff contends that Illinois courts have personal jurisdiction over Pinnacle 

pursuant to section 2-209 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2020)). Specifically, he asserts 

that Pinnacle transacted business in Illinois (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(1) (West 2020)), committed a 

tort in Illinois (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(2) (West 2020)), made or performed a contract in Illinois (735 

ILCS 5/2-209(a)(7) (West 2020)), and was otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction under the 

catchall provision of section 2-209(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2020)).

¶ 20 It is well settled that the plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie basis to exercise 

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Russell v. SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 28. When, 

as here, a trial court decides a jurisdictional question solely on documentary evidence, without an 

evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. Id. Any conflicts in the pleadings and affidavits must 

be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, but the defendant may overcome a prima facie case for 

jurisdiction by offering uncontradicted evidence that defeats jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 21 Because of the coextensive nature of the Illinois long-arm statute (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 

2020)) and due process requirements, Illinois courts no longer need to apply the first step 

traditionally employed in personal jurisdiction analysis, which is to examine whether the defendant 

performed any of the enumerated acts under the long-arm statute. Zamora v. Lewis, 2019 IL App 
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(1st) 181642, ¶ 44. Put another way, the long-arm statute is satisfied when due process concerns 

are satisfied, regardless of whether the defendant performed any acts identified in the long-arm 

statute. Id. Likewise, personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute is improper if the due process 

requirements are not satisfied. Id. Where, as here, there is no claim that Illinois due process 

protections differ from those of federal due process, we do not consider our long-arm statute

separately from federal due process concerns. Id. 

¶ 22 In all cases involving a nonresident defendant, before a court may subject the defendant to 

in personam jurisdiction, due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts 

with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit there does not offend traditional notions of 

fair play and substantial justice. Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 34. 

¶ 23 The relevant inquiry under the minimum contacts test depends on whether the plaintiff 

seeks general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Id., ¶ 36. Because plaintiff here relies 

only on specific jurisdiction, we need to discuss only that option.

¶ 24 Specific jurisdiction requires a showing that (1) the defendant purposefully directed its 

activities at the forum state and (2) the cause of action arose out of or relates to the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum state. Id., ¶ 40. Under specific jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant may 

be subjected to the forum state’s jurisdiction based on “certain single or occasional acts in the 

state,” but only concerning matters related to those acts. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. 

¶ 25 Here, the pleadings and affidavits do not show that Pinnacle purposely directed its activities 

at Illinois. It is undisputed that Pinnacle operated rental property in California. Further, the rental 

agreement was for property located in California. Also, Pinnacle had no physical presence in 

Illinois nor sent any representative to Illinois regarding the rental transaction. More importantly, 

Pinnacle never sought out plaintiff as either a tenant or a guarantor. Indeed, it was Theo who
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requested that plaintiff act as guarantor, and plaintiff freely agreed. All that Pinnacle did in that 

regard was supply plaintiff with the required documents related to Theo’s rental application.

Plaintiff’s mere completion of those documents in Illinois did not constitute meaningful contact 

between Pinnacle and Illinois. Similarly, Pinnacle’s electronic communications with plaintiff over 

many months were nothing more than incidental contact initiated by Theo’s application. 

¶ 26 Plaintiff points out that Pinnacle required him to provide information based on his being 

an Illinois resident, such as proof of his employment, home ownership, and driver’s license. 

However, Pinnacle’s requests had nothing to do with plaintiff’s Illinois connections per se but 

were intended simply to verify his qualifications as guarantor. The information requests were 

merely a byproduct of plaintiff’s application to be a guarantor. Indeed, as discussed, it was Theo 

who proposed plaintiff as a guarantor. Thus, Theo, not Pinnacle, triggered the need for that 

information. 

¶ 27 We conclude that Pinnacle—a California business—did not purposely direct its activities 

at Illinois when it required certain information from plaintiff—an Illinois resident—after he agreed 

to serve as guarantor for his son’s rental of a California apartment owned by Pinnacle. 

Accordingly, Pinnacle did not have minimum contacts with Illinois such that subjecting it to 

litigation in Illinois would be reasonable under traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice. Thus, plaintiff did not establish a prima facie basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over 

Pinnacle in Illinois.

¶ 28 Further, we note that plaintiff’s reliance on Keller v. Henderson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 605 

(2005), is misplaced. In Keller, this court held that Illinois had specific jurisdiction over an out-ofstate defendant who sold an airplane to an Illinois resident. Id. at 608, 614. We so held because 

(1) the defendant retained an Illinois agent to broker the sale; (2) the agent, on behalf of the 
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defendant, listed and advertised the plane in Illinois; (3) the defendant agreed to send the plane to 

Illinois, where it remained until the sale was finalized; and (4) the defendant hired the plaintiff’s 

decedent, an Illinois resident, to transport the plane to Illinois. Id. at 609, 614-15. Accordingly, we 

concluded that there were minimum contacts sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the 

defendant. Id. at 614. Here, defendants were nowhere close to having the Illinois contacts present 

in Keller. Thus, Keller does not support plaintiff’s position.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 Because Pinnacle did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois, we need not 

decide whether the claims in the amended complaint arose out of or were related to Pinnacle’s 

contacts with Illinois. See Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 40. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we 

affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County. 

¶ 31 Affirmed.