674 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 4 / Monday, January 8, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

the MLG for conformity with the key lock 

system installation description in Figure 3 of 

the REIMS AVIATION INDUSTRIES Service 

Bulletin No. F406–56, dated April 12, 2005; 

(iv) For airplanes with Cessna MLG 

P/N 9910136–8: inspect the MLG for 

conformity with the key lock system 

installation description in Figure 4 of the 

REIMS AVIATION INDUSTRIES Service 

Bulletin No. F406–56, dated April 12, 2005; 

(2) For all airplanes: prior to further flight 

after any inspection from (e)(1) of this AD 

where the key lock system does not conform 

to the appropriate installation description, 

install a key lock system that conforms to the 

appropriate installation description. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/ 

or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(f) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Staff, 

FAA, ATTN: Mike Kiesov, Aerospace 

Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 

901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 

64106; telephone: (816) 329–4144; fax: (816) 

329–4090, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has 

approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(g) Refer to MCAI Direction Ge ́ne ́rale de 

L’Aviation Civile AD No. F–2005–065, dated 

April 27, 2005, and REIMS AVIATION 

INDUSTRIES Service Bulletin No. F406–56, 

dated April 12, 2005, for related information. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 29, 2006. 

John R. Colomy, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–50 Filed 1–5–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2006–26495; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–CE–80–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Alpha 

Aviation Design Limited (Type 

Certificate No. A48EU Previously Held 

by Apex Aircraft and Avions Pierre 

Robin) Model R2160 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This proposed 

AD results from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

development of the New Zealand produced 

Alpha 160A aircraft identified an issue with 

the fuel shut-off valve, where it may not be 

possible to switch the valve ON once the 

valve has been placed in the OFF position. 

This is due to friction in the shut-off system. 

The fuel shut-off valve, which is normally 

ON, is a safety feature to allow the pilot to 

stop fuel flow to the engine in an emergency 

situation such as a forced landing without 

power. The fuel shut-off control is guarded 

and requires a deliberate action by the pilot 

to operate. Not withstanding this, a 

hazardous situation is possible if the fuel 

shut-off valve is inadvertently switched OFF 

in flight and the pilot is not able to switch 

it back ON. 

The proposed AD would require actions 

that are intended to address the unsafe 

condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by February 7, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to http:// 

dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions 

for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–

5227) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, 

Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4146; fax: (816) 

329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Streamlined Issuance of AD 

The FAA is implementing a new 

process for streamlining the issuance of 

ADs related to MCAI. The streamlined 

process will allow us to adopt MCAI 

safety requirements in a more efficient 

manner and will reduce safety risks to 

the public. This process continues to 

follow all FAA AD issuance processes to 

meet legal, economic, Administrative 

Procedure Act, and Federal Register 

requirements. We also continue to meet 

our technical decision-making 

responsibilities to identify and correct 

unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated 

products. 

This proposed AD references the 

MCAI and related service information 

that we considered in forming the 

engineering basis to correct the unsafe 

condition. The proposed AD contains 

text copied from the MCAI and for this 

reason might not follow our plain 

language principles. 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2006–26495; Directorate Identifier 

2006–CE–80–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 4 / Monday, January 8, 2007 / Proposed Rules 675 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The Civil Aviation Authority of New 

Zealand, which is the airworthiness 

authority for New Zealand, has issued 

AD DCA/R2000/39 dated August 31, 

2006, to correct an unsafe condition for 

the specified products. The MCAI states 

that: 

development of the New Zealand produced 

Alpha 160A aircraft identified an issue with 

the fuel shut-off valve, where it may not be 

possible to switch the valve ON once the 

valve has been placed in the OFF position. 

This is due to friction in the shut-off system. 

The fuel shut-off valve, which is normally 

ON, is a safety feature to allow the pilot to 

stop fuel flow to the engine in an emergency 

situation such as a forced landing without 

power. The fuel shut-off control is guarded 

and requires a deliberate action by the pilot 

to operate. Not withstanding this, a 

hazardous situation is possible if the fuel 

shut-off valve is inadvertently switched OFF 

in flight and the pilot is not able to switch 

it back ON. 

You may obtain further information by 

examining the MCAI in the AD docket. 

Relevant Service Information 

Alpha Aviation has issued Service 

Bulletin AA–SB–28–002, dated June 28, 

2006. The actions described in this 

service information are intended to 

correct the unsafe condition identified 

in the MCAI. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of the Proposed AD 

This product has been approved by 

the aviation authority of another 

country, and is approved for operation 

in the United States. Pursuant to our 

bilateral agreement with this State of 

Design Authority, they have notified us 

of the unsafe condition described in the 

MCAI and service information 

referenced above. We are proposing this 

AD because we evaluated all 

information and determined the unsafe 

condition exists and is likely to exist or 

develop on other products of the same 

type design. 

Differences Between This Proposed AD 

and the MCAI or Service Information 

We have reviewed the MCAI and 

related service information and, in 

general, agree with their substance. But 

we might have found it necessary to use 

different words from those in the MCAI 

to ensure the AD is clear for U.S. 

operators and is enforceable. In making 

these changes, we do not intend to differ 

substantively from the information 

provided in the MCAI and related 

service information. 

We might also have proposed 

different actions in this AD from those 

in the MCAI in order to follow FAA 

policies. Any such differences are 

described in a separate paragraph of the 

proposed AD. These requirements, if 

ultimately adopted, will take 

precedence over the actions copied from 

the MCAI. 

Costs of Compliance 

Based on the service information, we 

estimate that this proposed AD would 

affect about 10 products of U.S. registry. 

We also estimate that it would take 

about 3 work-hours per product to 

comply with the proposed AD. The 

average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. 

Required parts would cost about $300 

per product. Where the service 

information lists required parts costs 

that are covered under warranty, we 

have assumed that there will be no 

charge for these costs. As we do not 

control warranty coverage for affected 

parties, some parties may incur costs 

higher than estimated here. Based on 

these figures, we estimate the cost of the 

proposed AD on U.S. operators to be 

$5,400, or $540 per product. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

We determined that this proposed AD 

would not have federalism implications 

under Executive Order 13132. This 

proposed AD would not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

Government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify this proposed regulation: 

1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

3. Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this proposed AD and placed it in the 

AD docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Safety. 

The Proposed Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 

39 as follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

Alpha Aviation Design Limited (Type 

Certificate No. A–48EU Previously Held 

by Apex Aircraft and Avions Pierre 

Robin): Docket No. FAA–2006–26495; 

Directorate Identifier 2006–CE–80–AD. 

Comments Due Date 

(a) We must receive comments by February 

7, 2007. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Model R2160 

airplanes, serial numbers 001 through 191, 

certificated in any category. 

Reason 

(d) The mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) states that: 

development of the New Zealand produced 

Alpha 160A aircraft identified an issue with 

the fuel shut-off valve, where it may not be 

possible to switch the valve ON once the 

valve has been placed in the OFF position. 

This is due to friction in the shut-off system. 

The fuel shut-off valve, which is normally 

ON, is a safety feature to allow the pilot to 

stop fuel flow to the engine in an emergency 

situation such as a forced landing without 

power. The fuel shut-off control is guarded 

and requires a deliberate action by the pilot 

to operate. Not withstanding this, a 

hazardous situation is possible if the fuel 

shut-off valve is inadvertently switched OFF 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
676 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 4 / Monday, January 8, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

in flight and the pilot is not able to switch 

it back ON. 

Actions and Compliance 

(e) Unless already done, do the following 

actions: 

(1) To prevent the shut-off valve from 

remaining partially closed when the selector 

is turned to the ON position, due to the 

possibility of excess friction in the fuel shutoff valve causing deflection of the push pull 

cable, accomplish the inspection and rework 

instructions in Alpha Aviation Service 

Bulletin (SB) No. AA–SB–28–2002, dated 

June 28, 2006, within 25 hours time-inservice (TIS) after the effective date of this 

AD. 

(2) If the fuel shut-off valve cable is bent, 

replace the cable per SB No. AA–SB–28–

2002, before further flight. 

(3) If the force required to operate the fuel 

shut-off valve exceeds the limits specified in 

SB No. AA–SB–28–002, dated June 28, 2006, 

rework or replace the valve as required, per 

SB No. AA–SB–28–002, dated June 28, 2006, 

before further flight. 

FAA AD Differences 

Note: This AD differs from the MCAI and/ 

or service information as follows: No 

differences. 

Other FAA AD Provisions 

(f) The following provisions also apply to 

this AD: 

(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Staff, 

FAA, ATTN: Karl Schletzbaum, Aerospace 

Engineer, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 

901 Locust, Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 

64106; telephone: (816) 329–4146; fax: (816) 

329–4090, has the authority to approve 

AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the 

procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement 

in this AD to obtain corrective actions from 

a manufacturer or other source, use these 

actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective 

actions are considered FAA-approved if they 

are approved by the State of Design Authority 

(or their delegated agent). You are required 

to assure the product is airworthy before it 

is returned to service. 

(3) Reporting Requirements: For any 

reporting requirement in this AD, under the 

provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act 

(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) has 

approved the information collection 

requirements and has assigned OMB Control 

Number 2120–0056. 

Related Information 

(g) Refer to MCAI Airworthiness Authority 

of New Zealand AD DCA/R2000/39, dated 

August 31, 2006, and Alpha Aviation Service 

Bulletin AA–SB–28–002, dated June 28, 2006 

for related information. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

December 28, 2006. 

John R. Colomy, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–48 Filed 1–5–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2006–26491; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–CE–76–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Alpha 

Aviation Design Limited (Type 

Certificate No. A48EU Previously Held 

by Apex Aircraft and Avions Pierre 

Robin) Model R2160 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This proposed 

AD results from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as: 

To prevent fuel system leaks inspect the 

bronze/brass hollow threaded fuel line 

fittings for type and leaks, per Avions Pierre 

Robin Service Bulletin (SB) No. 86. Replace 

leaking Type 1 fuel line fittings with Type 2 

fittings, per SB No. 86, before further flight. 

The proposed AD would require actions 

that are intended to address the unsafe 

condition described in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by February 7, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to http:// 

dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions 

for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–

5227) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl 

Schletzbaum, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Small Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, 

Room 301, Kansas City, Missouri 64106; 

telephone: (816) 329–4146; fax: (816) 

329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Streamlined Issuance of AD 

The FAA is implementing a new 

process for streamlining the issuance of 

ADs related to MCAI. The streamlined 

process will allow us to adopt MCAI 

safety requirements in a more efficient 

manner and will reduce safety risks to 

the public. This process continues to 

follow all FAA AD issuance processes to 

meet legal, economic, Administrative 

Procedure Act, and Federal Register 

requirements. We also continue to meet 

our technical decision-making 

responsibilities to identify and correct 

unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated 

products. 

This proposed AD references the 

MCAI and related service information 

that we considered in forming the 

engineering basis to correct the unsafe 

condition. The proposed AD contains 

text copied from the MCAI and for this 

reason might not follow our plain 

language principles. 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2006–26491; Directorate Identifier 

2006–CE–76–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The Civil Aviation Authority of New 

Zealand, which is the airworthiness 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS