alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Dun-Rite Towing, Inc., et al., Appellants, v County of Westchester et al., Respondents.

[634 NYS2d 173]

—In a proceeding pursuant CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Westchester County Department of General Services dated May 26, 1993, accepting the bids of the highest bidders to provide towing services on county-owned property and facilities within the County of Westchester, the petitioners appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Carey, J.), entered June 6, 1994, which dismissed the petition.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Various towing companies submitted bids for the exclusive right to tow vehicles from county-owned property and facilities within the County of Westchester. The highest bidders were awarded the exclusive right to tow vehicles in a particular geographic zone up to the maximum rate. The petitioners challenge the award of contracts to the highest bidders, arguing that the cost thereof will ultimately be borne by members of the public whose vehicles are towed, thereby creating an illegal tax.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioners lack standing to bring this proceeding. In *Matter of Dairylea Coop, v Walkley*(38 NY2d 6, 8-11) and *Matter of Bradford Cent. School Dist. v Ambach*(56 NY2d 158, 163-164), the Court of *629Appeals established three criteria for determining standing in an administrative proceeding. They are: "(1) the interest asserted must be arguably within the zone of interest to be protected by the statutory or constitutional provisions sought to be enforced; (2) the administrative decision for which review - is sought must be shown to have a harmful effect upon the party asserting standing; and (3) there must be no clear legislative intent negating review” *(Matter of City of New York v City Civ. Serv. Commn.,*60 NY2d 436, 442-443). The petitioners failed to meet this test since they did not allege in their petition that the alleged tax created by the bidding process would be imposed upon them. Sullivan, J. P., Thompson, Hart and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
(Reap. Dec. 10465)

#### Pereline Manufacturing Company *v.*United States

Entry No. 808368.

(Decided March 12, 1963)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*John W. Douglas,*Acting Assistant Attorney General *(Morris Braverman*and *Samuel D. Spector,*trial attorneys), for the defendant.

Wilson, Judge:

The merchandise in the case at bar consists of certain household articles, exported from Germany and entered at the port of New York. Plaintiff herein, appealing for reappraisement, claims that the proper dutiable values for the items of merchandise under consideration are lower than those at which the said merchandise was appraised.

At a hearing of the case, the sole owner of the plaintiff company attempted to establish that the prices at which the merchandise was entered represented the proper value of the goods. In support of this contention, plaintiff’s witness offered as evidence a certain pricelist (plaintiff’s exhibit 1 for identification), allegedly received by the *423importer from the shipper, which list set forth prices for certain items of merchandise herein involved. The information contained on said list was, however, unsupported by any documentary or testamentary proof in support of the claimed prices. Plaintiff was thereupon given an opportunity to obtain from the shipper affidavits which might tend to establish the proper values for the involved goods.

At a subsequent hearing of the case, there was no appearance on the part of the plaintiff and the case was, accordingly, submitted on the record by the court.

The plaintiff herein, as the appealing party, not only has the burden of establishing that the appraiser’s finding of value was incorrect, but also must show by positive proof that its claimed values represent the proper dutiable values for the involved merchandise. In my opinion, there is nothing in the record to warrant a finding that the appraised values were erroneous, or that any other value represented the properly dutiable value of the merchandise, and I so find. However, in view of the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute its cause of action, the appeal herein is, accordingly, dismissed for lack of prosecution.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
Docket number: FAA - 2014 - 0754
II 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 4694 

To provide an exemption from certain Jones Act restrictions for vessels 

that arrive at or depart from the Helen Delich Bentley Port of Baltimore, 

and for other purposes. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JULY 11 (legislative day, JULY 10), 2024 

Mr. LEE introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to 

the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

A BILL 

To provide an exemption from certain Jones Act restrictions 

for vessels that arrive at or depart from the Helen Delich 

Bentley Port of Baltimore, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Baltimore Recovery 

5 Act’’. 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
2 

•S 4694 IS

1 SEC. 2. TEMPORARY EXEMPTION FROM JONES ACT RE2 STRICTIONS FOR VESSELS ARRIVING AT OR 

3 DEPARTING FROM THE PORT OF BALTIMORE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding sections 12112, 

5 12103, and 55102 of title 46, United States Code, any 

6 vessel that, after the date of enactment of this Act, arrives 

7 at or departs from the Helen Delich Bentley Port of Balti8 more shall be exempt from the requirements of such sec9 tions. 

10 (b) APPLICABILITY.—This section, and any exemp11 tion under this section, shall cease to have effect on the 

12 day that is 5 years after the date of enactment of this 

13 Act. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK7ZCZBW3PROD with $$_JOB
No. 63162.

#### Lep Transport, Inc. *v.*United States,

protest 58/17013 (New York).

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

Since the protest was filed more than 60 days after liquidation, it was dismissed as untimely, by virtue of section 514, Tariff Act of 1930.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-PETITIONER, v. HENRY EVANS WHITTLE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

*Mr. Michael R. Imbriani*and *Mr. Robert N. Golden*for the petitioner.

*Messrs. Levy, Lemlcen & Margulies*for the respondent.

March 26, 1968.

Granted.
September 28, 2016 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 New Jersey Ave, SE Washington, DC 20590 

# ComEd

Re: Docket No . FAA-2014-0855, Request for Extension of Exemption No. 11185 to February 28, 2019 with Updated Approvals Granted the most current Section 333 Holders (such as Authorization to Fly All Approved UAS under Section 333) Dear Sir or Madam : Commonwealth Edison ("ComEd") hereby requests the following : 1) Extension of FAA Exemption No. 11185, Docket No. FAA-2014-0855 from February 28, 2017 through February 28, 2019 and 2) Authorization to fly all approved UAS listed under Section 333 per Docket No. FAA-2007-3330. Pursuant to Section 333 ofthe FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (the "Reform Act") and 14 C.F.R. Part 11, ComEd, a northern Illinois-based electric utility that delivers reliable electricity for 3.8 million customers throughout more than 400 municipalities and 25 counties, seeks the aforementioned extension of Exemption No. 11185 from the Federal Aviation Regulations ("FARs" ), and updated Section 333 approvals granted since February 24, 2015 so that it may capture aerial images of utility system equipment (including threats to system safety and reliability) by using small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUASs). 

### Extension of FAA Exemption No. 11185, Docket No. FAA-2014-0855 from February 28, 2017 through February 28, 2019 Com Ed's above-referenced Exemption currently expires on February 28, 2017 and it is requested that the expiration date be extended by two years through February 28, 2019. Though Com Ed will operate some missions under the recently enacted Part 107, we w ill also operate some missions under our Exemption . The requested extension to the Exemption will, amongst other purposes, support flight m issions for which significant planning has already been conducted. Missions include aerial equipment inspections near Midway International Airport (Class 

### C) and O' Hare International Airport (Class B) - for which Certificates of Waiver or Authorization have already been issued (2016-CSA-11185-680-333E and 2016-CSA-11185-734-333E respectively) . 

### Authorization to fly all approved UAS listed under Section 333 per Docket No. FAA-2007-3330 Authorization is requested to use any aircraft identified on the List ofApproved Unmanned Aircraft Systems under Section 333 at the regulatory docket FAA-2007-3330 at www . regulations.gov, when weighing less than 55 pounds including payload. The UAS must be operated at an altitude of no more than 400 feet above ground level (AGL) . Altitude must be reported in feet AGL. This limitation is in add it ion to any altitude restrictions that may be included in the applicable certificate ofwaiver or authorization (COA).

Li ode , CSP (Certified Safety Professional) Commonwealth Edison ComEd Exemption No. 11185 E xtensi on Request 9-28-16
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v JOSEPH W. FIFE, Private First Class, U. S. Marine Corps, Appellant

20 USCMA 218, 43 CMR 58

No. 23,426

December 18, 1970

*Captain R. O. Kellam,*JAGC, USN, Accused. , was on the pleadings for Appellant,

*Commander Michael F. Fasanaro,*ings for Appellee, United States. *Jr.,*JAGC, USN, was on the plead-

Opinion of the Court

Darden, Judge:

Tried before a military judge alone, the accused was convicted of absence without leave and given a bad-conduct discharge, total forfeitures, ten months’ confinement at hard labor, and reduction in grade. He did not submit, in writing, his request to be tried by a military judge until after findings. For the reasons set forth in United States v Dean, 20 USCMA 212, 43 CMR 52 (1970), his failure so to do constitutes jurisdictional error that makes the findings a nullity. Accordingly, the decision of the United States Navy Court of Military Review is reversed. The findings of guilty and sentence are set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Another trial may be ordered.

Judge Ferguson concurs.

Quinn, Chief Judge

(dissenting) :

I would affirm the decision of the United States Navy Court of Military Review. See my dissent in United States v Dean, 20 USCMA 212, 43 CMR 52 (1970).
#### Nelson Properties, Inc., v. H. W. Denham.

179 So. 406.

En Banc.

Opinion Filed February 9, 1938.

Rehearing Denied March 10, 1938.

*139
      *Clarence W. Nelson,*for Appellant;

*Arthur S. Friedman,*for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

The appeal in this case is dismissed because it appears from the record in this case that no valid notice of appeal was filed and entered of record; the purported notice of appeal being not from any order or decree of the Court, but “to the Bill of Complaint as Amended." Nor does it appear that the purported notice of appeal was recorded as required by Section 4964 C. G. L. 1927.

Dismissed.

Ellis, C. J., and Whitfield, Terrell, Buford, and Chapman, J. J., concur.

Brown, J., not participating.
Before the First Division,

May 13, 1954

No. 58074.

protest 212228-K (New York).

#### M. Zwiebel *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of glass bead Christmas tree ornaments similar in all material respects to those the subject of *Walco Bead Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(29 Cust. Ct. 62, C. D. 1445), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. 47425.

#### Protests 982473-G, etc., of Bloomingdale Bros., Inc., et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel certain of the items were held dutiable at 60 percent under paragraph 1209, others at 45 percent under paragraph 1209 and T. D. 49753, and others at 55 percent under paragraph 1209 as claimed.
Exhibit 31.b

I, Marc N. Teal, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Boston Capital Real Estate Investment Trust, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:



1. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
2. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
3. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and



1. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



1. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
2. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.





|August 22, 2005 | /s/ Marc N. Teal       
|--------------- | -----------------------
|                | Marc N. Teal           
|                | Chief Financial Officer
|                |
# C_2007255EN.01003501.xml

| 27.10.2007 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 255/35 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

27.10.2007

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 255/35

---

View of the representatives of the EFTA States concerning a preliminary draft decision relating to Case COMP/C.38.121 — Fittings

(Meeting on 11 September 2006 of the EC Advisory Committee on restrictive practices and dominant positions)

(2007/C 255/12)

| 1. | The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's assessment of the product and the geographic area affected by the cartel in the draft decision. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's assessment of the product and the geographic area affected by the cartel in the draft decision.

| 2. | The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's assessment of the facts as an agreement and/or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

2.

The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's assessment of the facts as an agreement and/or concerted practice within the meaning of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement.

| 3. | The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's view that the infringement referred to a single and continuous infringement, especially regarding the period after the inspections in March/April 2001. |
| --- | --- |

3.

The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's view that the infringement referred to a single and continuous infringement, especially regarding the period after the inspections in March/April 2001.

| 4. | The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's draft decision as regards the addressees of the decision, specifically with reference to imputation of liability to parent companies of the groups concerned. |
| --- | --- |

4.

The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission's draft decision as regards the addressees of the decision, specifically with reference to imputation of liability to parent companies of the groups concerned.

| 5. | The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission as regards the assessment of the leniency applications and their ranking. |
| --- | --- |

5.

The representative of the EFTA States agrees with the European Commission as regards the assessment of the leniency applications and their ranking.

| 6. | The representative of the EFTA States agrees to close the proceedings against FNAS. |
| --- | --- |

6.

The representative of the EFTA States agrees to close the proceedings against FNAS.

| 7. | The representative of the EFTA States recommends the publication of its view in the Official Journal of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

7.

The representative of the EFTA States recommends the publication of its view in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Official Journal of the European Union

---
No. 50505.

#### Protests 54481-K, etc., of Burroughs Wellcome & Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel the court found that the facts herein agreed upon were such as to bring the case within the holding in *John Barr*v. *United States*(11 Cust. Ct. 88, C. D. 801), which record was incorporated herein. (See *John Barr*v. *United States,*324 U. S. 83, decided February 5, 1945.) In accordance therewith it was held that the currency of the invoices should be converted at the buying rate in the New York market at noon on the day of exportation (the “free” rate of exchange for pounds sterling), as certified by the Federal Reserve bank and set forth by the collector on each of the entries. The protests were sustained to this extent.
#### Marianne E. ENGBLOM and Charles E. Palmer, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Hugh L. CAREY, Governor of the State of New York, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 534, Docket 83-7707.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 15, 1983.

Decided Dec. 20, 1983.

Richard J. Goldman, New York City (Ricken, Goldman, Sussman & Blythe, Alan N. Sussman, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Arlene R. Silverman, New York City, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of N.Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., State of N.Y., Melvyn R. Leventhal, Deputy First Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, FRIENDLY and OAKES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Robert W. Sweet, J., granting appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellees were protected by a qualified immunity and dismissing appellants’ complaint alleging violation of their rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under the Third Amendment during a statewide strike of correction officers, when they were evicted from their facility-residences without notice or hearing and members of the National Guard were housed in their residences without their consent. In May 1981, the district court had granted summary judgment to appellees on the ground that appellants’ possessory interests in their facility-residences were insufficient to invoke the protections of the due process clause and the Third Amendment. *Engblom v. Carey,*522 F.Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y.1981). On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, but on the ground that adequate post-deprivation proceedings were accorded. However, we reversed and remanded the dismissal of the Third Amendment claim on the ground that we could not hold as a matter of law that appellants’ possessory interests were not entitled to Third Amendment protection. *Engblom v. Carey,*677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir.1982). Upon remand, the district court ruled that appellees were protected by qualified immunity, see e.g., *Harlow v. Fitzgerald,*457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), because appellants’ Third Amendment rights were not clearly established at the time of the events in question.

We affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons stated in Judge Sweet’s opinion, reported at 572 F.Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y.1983).
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

Pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,each of the undersigned principal executive officer of RefcoFund Holdings, LLC,the general partner (the “General Partner”) of S&P Managed Futures IndexFund, LP (the “Fund”), and principal financial officer of the General Partnerhereby certifies that:

 

(1)           the accompanying Quarterly Report onForm 10-Q the Fund for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004 (the “Report”)fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable,of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(2)           the information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of the Fund.

 

 
| Dated:  November 8, 2004 | /s/ Richard  C. Butt                          |   |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
|                     | Richard C.  Butt                              |   |
|                     | President                                     |   |
|                     | (principal  executive officer)                |   |
|                     | RefcoFund  Holdings, LLC                      |   |
|                     | General  Partner                              |   |
|                     |                                          |   |
|                     | /s/ Philip  Silverman                         |   |
|                     | Philip  Silverman                             |   |
|                     | Secretary                                     |   |
|                     | (principal  financial and accounting officer) |   |
|                     | RefcoFund  Holdings, LLC                      |   |
|                     | General  Partner                              |   |

 

 

Thiscertification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Fund for purposes of Section18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

----
No. 48540.

#### Protests 648974-G, etc., of J. S. Hoffman Co. et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

It was stipulated that certain cheese is similar to that the subject of *Scaramelli*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct. 270, C. D. 706, and Abstract 42146). In accordance therewith an allowance of 21⁄4 percent was made for the foreign substances covering the outside of the cheese. It was also found that an allowance by the collector should have been made in the net weight as reported by the weigher for the weight of the paper or foil, or both, with which certain cheese was wrapped, and which cheese was similar to that the subject of *Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp.*v. *United States*(T. D. 47955). This claim was also sustained.